we developed a preliminary set of risk indicators to analyze elements of risk along our border and evaluate the progress we were making amin relation to our goals. before 2012 if you asked a border patrol agent if we were winning, he would say absolutely, and he would point to the number of arrests and seizures to show you that. regardless of whether they went up or down, we were winning. we had no other way to explain it. this isn't to suggest we weren't seceding in our mission, we just had no way to tell if we were succeeding along our border. so the border patrol had to build a foundation of consistent and reliable data on cross-border occurrences. not only on data of what we were catching, we also had to record data on what we were not catching and the unknown. today the border patrol does not describe the border as controlled or uncontrolled. instead it uses a variety of indicators, intelligence estimates, capability assessments, commander judgment to assign areas with risk category of high medium or low. the border patrol also continues to evaluate and validate these missions to make sure we're consistent on current risks. in closing, i'll leave you with a few thoughts on border security that became very evident as we wrote these articles and i spoke with dozens of agents representing over a thousand years of border patrol experience. border security is not an end state to be achieved and revisited every five or ten years. rather, it's a constant battle we fight every day and one in which we must be vigorously engaged. there is also no panacea for border security. no silver bullet is out there. course riddle, in his definition of a wicked problem, explains it best. there is no solution, there is only better or worse. there is only the system, and that's what border security is, a continued struggle. resources will need to secure the border however, using risk strategy will ensure that border patrol maintains security and continues to work with interagency partners to combat the border risk security and safety. ultimately the articles answer those big three questions, why we changed, how we changed and if we're winning or not rkts, making progress towards it. with that i'll turn it back over to stephanie. thank you. >> thank you both. i'm going to exercise the moderator's prerogative and ask each of our guests one question first before opening it up to the floor. the first question i have is for chief fisher and that is regarding your hopes for this trilogy of articles. as i said, i've been very impressed with a vision and having strategy for the border patrol. the question i have is -- i can understand from an audience perspective. i am not in the border patrol. i can take these articles using my own experience. but your hope for what folks in the field will take away from these articles what was your intent from a border patrol-specific perspective? >> thank you stephanie. well, for the border patrol agents, my intent was for every border patrol agent regardless of how long they've been in the organization and where they currently are stationed and regardless of what rank they may or may not hold is to read it, first and foremost, which was mandatory, by the way for all the chiefs. and have a better understanding of what we as an organization are asking them to do, first and foremost. secondly, i would hope that they could envision that which they are doing plays a much larger role in border and national security. because many times and oftentimes when i talk with border patrol agents in the field, we talk about network operations and we talk about the threat of terrorism but to a border patrol agent who has been out on the line, for instance, for five years will raise his hand and say, chief, i've never sign terrorist here. what are you talking about? making them understand what we're asking them to do day in and day out plays into a much larger, very complex security system that we're not going to solve on our own. so for the internal audience hopefully they can understand, one, where we are, where we're going and their contribution to that overarching mission. >> i appreciate that. i have a question regarding the risk-based strategy you outlined in the second of your three articles. you mentioned, in your remarks just now, that it's not a resource strategy, because throwing resources at this set of challenges won't necessarily lead to the outcome we're trying to pursue. and so can you talk a little bit about the risk-based strategy its limitations? you mentioned also there is no panacea or silver bullet short-term fix, that this is really a long game. this is the longer term strategy. there are gaps, there will be vulnerabilities. so how does one think about a risk-based strategy? how does one wrap one's head around the idea that there will be gaps and, you know, eventually we'll try to address those gaps, but first things first. what's the strategy? >> situational awareness. a-number 1. the resource-based strategy we talked about through resources of the board is based completely on activity lefrlzvels. in the articles we talked a little about the deployment of the international space station. the space station was designed in some areas, thicker in some areas, thinner in some areas, to specifically combat risk of impacts. and in the same way on the border. the articles are probably the first step reading those articles, understanding those articles, understanding the risk-based concept in that we address the threats. we use those three tools. the intelligence, the analytical process and the planning process, it's not an end state. it's an endureing state. it's a continuing struggle and it changes for us. we don't smuggle alcohol anymore, we don't have that. it's drugs and alcohol and other aspects on the border, but things change over time, and the word border patrol had to do something over time to articulate how it's actually changing. the articles kind of hint towards that. >> the follow-up question, then would be measuring that. as you try to quantify risk and you try to quantify you know -- and i know from a hill perspective, the demand is always what metrics are you using, so how can we figure out whether we're getting to where we need to be? so what is your reply to folks on the hill or elsewhere who say, you know, the metrics of the past, you know were not useful because the numbers were high, you were winning, if the numbers were low you were winning. it didn't really tell you anything. what's different about the system going forward that you can actually measure success? >> measuring success for us is different in that we take the border environment holistically. we compare everything, not just the apprehensions. we go back to the articles and talk about the inventory of assets and the reactivity of what we were doing. sure, we were apprehending we were doing everything we could, but there were things we knew were getting past us. there were capability gaps but we never considered that in our planning. typically the border patrol before this we would look at traffic, we would look at activity in a given area and we would create an operation specifically for that traffic just in a reactive posture. but looking at the border patrol holistically, we needed to understand apprehensions alone meant nothing to us. if you're apprehending a thousand and 10,000 are getting away, what did you really accomplish? so we needed a way to understand the entirety of the border environment and the ttoa and our analysis will do that for us. >> i would now like to open it up to the floor for questions. just a couple of reminders. if you would wait -- i will call on you. if you will wait for a microphone to come to you, state your name and affiliation if you have one. and please do ask a question. i encourage you to make sure it's statements, but at the end of the day ask our guests a question they can answer. first up anybody willing to -- if we could go to that gentleman in the back. >> thank you, brett mitchell, renaissance institute. just as an outsider's question. when the thing happened last year with the children with brownsville, did the border patrol back off on methodology in order not to turn away thousands of kids, or how did these kids get over at that brownsville crossing? >> well, when we started seeing the trend increase in the spring, and it peaked right around june of last year -- and really, it's happened before. we haven't seen it at least in south texas, in that greater numbers as it related to individuals in other countries in mexico, for instance. our methodology didn't change. we were still making the apprehensions once the detections were met. if you haven't been to brownsville, texas and get up on the levee and look, there is a river there. so a lot of what people think about the border is different than that area. so preventing people from ever crossing the rio grande valley, at least in that area, is just not practical. what we want to be able to do is ensure that we're able to, once we detect them is make the apprehension and do that in a higher proportion than we've done in the past. what the department really learned from that, and i give the secretary a lot of credit for this. when the numbers started going down in july, we didn't just say, whoo i'm glad that's over, right? we said, let's look at this and find out what we need to do. the secretary even in the spring was talking about the unity of effort. some of you may have heard that. if some of you were here a couple months ago, the secretary laid out a very good case in the approach of the campaign plan and introduced a couple weeks ago the task forces that are going to stand up that effort. all of that was part of this learning process. so it wasn't just, hey, the kids are coming across, what are you going to do? what robert talked about, that was our typical reaction. what's really important is when the numbers go down, the question should be, now what are you going to do? we tend to go from crisis to crisis. that's not a pejorative in some organizations, and especially in the environment in which we operate now in terms of information, the instantaneous, everybody understands what's happening in the field whether you're a municipality or you're at the border. people get very reactive and that somehow feeds and is very contagious at times. that's just my own personal experience here in washington, but that's not an organizational position, that's just the reality in which we have to operate. but we have to, you know stop going just from crisis to crisis and really think these through and the secretary and his team have done a really good job of pre prepositioning the department in the future. whether the unaccompanied children come back or not, this is just another incremental evolutionary step to do integrated connor network operations better than we have before. but thank you for that question. >> i call on this gentleman up here. >> thank you very much. excuse me. tedd alden with the council of foreign relations. what is this about networks? you mentioned there is an internal and external face to that. there's what you want to measure within your organization in order to get the results you want, and then there's the story you want to present to the public. is it critical that the metrics that you're using be the same for internal and external purposes? i mean is it okay to have kind of one set of internal metrics that you don't share and another set of external metrics? putting aside things like national security confidential information, but putting that aside, is it important to have a single set of metrics for both internal and external facing purposes? >> that was a question i was going to ask you in about a week or two so i would like to get your answer to this, by the way. we're having that discussion now, right? i've heard both sides of the argument. i'm kind of going to hold off my vote until i get a little better informed. i come from the school of give everybody everything, which freaks a lot of people out. just give it to them whether they can understand it or not. if they misinterpret it or use it to bash the organization, that's certainly their prerogative, but it shouldn't limit those who are really interested right? i think if we do more and more engagements like this or have a session where you sit around and say, tell me again why you think the average apprehensionre recid recidivi recidivist, how is that important, and tell me mathicallymath mathematically how you calculate that. i do not have math skills. we certainly shouldn't just give it to people because they don't understand it. i also heard if, in fact, you give everybody everything, the security notwithstanding in terms of we don't want to divulge everything, tactics and procedures, but when it comes to the actual numbers a lot of it if it's too confusing nobody really understands. so part of that external message is, geez, i don't care about the numbers. i don't care how you calculate the z score and why it's used. if you say standard deviation one more time chief, i'm going to slap you. i just want to know, is the border secure and how do you assess that? there is some ways you can just maybe do a home page. for those that are interested and want to delve a little deeper into that, there are certain forms for that. we have to stop doing this all or nothing, right? and we start looking at the specific@3ñqñ audiences and try to tailor what that message should be, but we're still having discussions, and any insight into that would help with the cause, i'm sure. thank you. >> the gentleman across the aisle from him, please. >> ed ball with cross match technologies. i'm wondering, you say you don't want to pin the metrics on one particular metric you want to spread that out. great skpchlt you're great. and you're going on a risk-based strategy, but that sort of begs the question, what's an acceptable level of risk? >> that is an excellent question. you know, let's take a look at the different types of threats, right? if you say what is acceptable in allowing a terrorist into the united states along the southern border, that level of risk is very small in my mind, right? we have to do everything and anything. which, by the way, the reason why, when we look at how do we assess that risk, right, first we take a look -- if anybody asked me chief, is the border secure or not, we transition that to, what is the state of the border? let's take a geographic section. if you're talking about the arizona corridor let's have that discussion about arizona. because what i'm about to explain in arizona may or may not apply in a place like south texas. so the first thing we do, and this is a continuous process, by the way. we'll take a look at what the intelligence estimates are, we'll take a look at the current intel. what is intel telling us in terms of the intent and capability of any particular adversary regardless of who they are in that spectrum? and define the threat for us. that's not -- the border patrol doesn't do that. we don't own that, we are the consumers of that. then we assess vulnerability and consequence on our side, and we try to identify what the risk is. that's one whole section, right? the second section is understanding those risk indicators that we were just discussing, about 12 or so of those. what do they mean in the geographic area in comparison to other corridors? and third, as robert mentioned, was our situational awareness? how well do we know what's happening in the environment? then we can assess the level of risk. the level of risk for allowing a terrorist in this country is a lot different than allowing 6,000 unaccompanied children come through south texas. we have to really think about threat differently because they're not all equal. yet throughout history, again it's just because as we're evolveing this, we used to just look at the border because not only was it resource-based, we took the approach we're going to grab and hold terrain. it was just get him on the line, and once we've got a piece of that dirt we're going to hold onto it. lo and behold there is a lot of dirt to hold onto. so what now do you do? so that was part of it. not all risk is equal and again, we're not espousing that we're the experts in understanding risk and mitigating risk. there is a whole host of those, and perhaps some of you in the audience that can help us in the out years helping us understand how we actually implement and manage this. we're really at the infancy in understanding this new shift in our strategy and how you assess risk. and by the way, the border patrol is not going to be the only one dictating what is acceptable. there is a whole bunch of voters, i'm sure will have a voice in this. >> actually, if i could follow up on that and ask robert a question regarding you know, not all risks are created equal and when you have a risk-based strategy, you have to take several factors into consideration. one of your articles talked about a traditional approach and traditional capabilities and technology. and so could you talk a little bit about capabilities in approaching the risks as identified in the strategy and the sort of integration of traditional and technology as methods to approach this kind of risk? >> sure. so when we talk about traditional and technological assets or capabilities, traditional, we talk about assigned cutting. the border sanis an art. it's the tv you see, it's the young border patrol agents out there in green uniforms actually tracking them down and putting hands on individuals. that's the way typically it's been done for the majority of our history. the chief talked about the border environment and our capabilities are changing. that comes along with underground sensors, fixed towers radar trucks, all types of technology. specifically we talk a little about uas and the capabilities they bring especially in the change of texture area. he flies over the border takes a picture flies back, takes a picture, and we compare the two. that kind of situational awareness is something we've never had, the ability to do that. so that in and of itself has given us a better situation of awareness, which led us to the metrics we have today that allows us to understand what's happening on the border in a more consistent manner. >> you mentioned unmanned aerial systems. u of uas's, and i understand some things have been brought to the border patrol, so it's not always military technology. one thing i was wondering if you could talk a little bit about is sort of interagency partners you mentioned the border patrol is one piece of it and as you use technology and you talk about inner operability, whether it's officer of marine or other pieces of activity national guard comes to mind in some instances in the recent past. could you talk a little bit about, you mentioned inter inter-agency partnerships, but expand on that and how it impacts the thoughts behind your articles. >> interagency folks when we talk about integration, the second article talks a little about the black swan theory. it's one of the more common questions i get and what was that for us? it was literally unrestrained integration. it is the ability that we have through the interagency process when we want to, when we focus on individual targets to stop crime, to stop illicit border activity. that no doubt came from brett rose's murder in 2009, but also the south texas campaign. when the south texas campaign was developed it had to bring everyone in the same room. it had to go beyond co-location or cooperation. it had to be true integration. it had to have everyone in the same room, all the intelligence on the table we had to pick specific targets, we had to vote on those targets and we had to not only tell each other what we're going to do against them, but we had to focus in on individual targets responsible for that. and then of course, we've had d.o.d. on the border for some time. so that lesson that came from the unrestrained immigration in robert rose's murder and how we brought those individuals to justice led that revolution on how we raised the environmental awareness. >> thank you. this gentleman up here, please. >> first, chief, the recent visit that you hosted on the border, i would say we've seen clear evidence that the thought process of the agents is changing, and everybody is talking about risk base and developing their own metrics and stuff, so i want to compliment you. it's definitely been deployed down to the troops on the border. my question specifically is when you look more strategically at risks in the future, what do you see is the primary risks for a secure border environment from a strategic perspective? and regarding the metrics, what kind of lead metrics are you looking at in order to help predict and foresee what's going to happen in the next two, three, five years ahead that you need to really get ready for? >> that's a great question. thanks. so for the first part of the question, i think everybody was so focused on unaccompanied children -- i'll kind of go back to that example -- and there was a lot of discussion about what are you going to do with the kids? is the border patrol feeding them? there was just hordes of people, thousands a day as you can imagine, right? we were wondering who was mix nd that group. when you start looking at groups of 50 just coming across -- and by the way a lot of them weren't running away from border patrol agents. it was a smuggler's paradise. smugglers were paying their fees and taking them across the river and saying, when you get there, sit down. a border patrol will be there within 30 minutes. they were making a lot of money no risk, and all these people started coming across. there is no impediment there to stop people from crossing. whether you couch it as a mass migration or not, when you have a lot of people infiltrating a specific area, you don't know who these people are at least we don't until and when you do the biometrics and you sit and talk with them. when you have that many people coming across a specific area, now you have to be able to move some of those agents who were on patrol or in response to the detection, and now you have to transfer those agents to transportation, get them away from the border. so you're starting to thin your force to a potential threat that's going to exploit. not that the kids are a threat necessarily when it comes to national security interest, but people exploiting the circumstances to come in either behind that or with them. so that's one. leading indicators for us and i won't bore you with all the metric, is what we call first-time entrance. and it is exactly what you think. we want to be able to track people coming into the united states or in our systems biometrically for the very first time. it's not about the individuals, right? if you look at the third article a lot or if you take a look at the 12 it's not about people and it's not about marijuana. it's about the business model of these transnational organized criminals, it is the counternetwork, interdependencies. so when you look at, like, a first-time entrance -- in fact, that was the only way we were able to point and tell the commissioner when he asked us, hey, in 2011, we're going to invest our last dime in arizona, and we're going to be successful in arizona. and chief, i need you to tell us where arizona is going to be. no one has been able to predict this before, so we had some smart folks who said, how about we look at the data differently? how about we take a look at where proportionately along the southern border people are showing up for the very first time? again, it's not about the people. it's about the business shift and the smugglers who decided, we're going to start moving elsewhere because it's too difficult to go in this particular area. and lo and behold, for a three-year period, the vast majority of individuals crossing the southern border for the very first time were showing up in south texas. two years before south texas was a blip on anybody's radar. but that was one leading indicator. and we're looking at others to be able to make those judgments to talk about you know, in the future what our resource requirements may be. and how about hey, how about we start shifting border patrol agents and beefing up a particular area in advance of a potential surge instead of reacting to it? so we're starting to look at the data a lot different than we have in the past. great question. thank you. >> the lady over in the corner, please. >> good morning. my name is laura stump. i'm an arizona native. i have a question about the relationship of border control to border communities. as we know people who live on the border have a wide spectrum of opinions from everything to wanting more policing wanting more patrol, and those unfortunately who have a lot of grievances against the border patrol in their communities. i was wondering from your perspective, how do you see that the opinion and dialogue has been carried out -- the opinions of border communities have been taken into account in strategy and how do you plan to include them in the future? >> again another excellent question. i think the communities in which we serve are paramount to helping us think through. it's one thing about looking at the border from a strategic context and going out to a rotary club and say, hey we're with the border patrol we're the experts deal with it, right? we don't do that. at least we shouldn't. what we want to be able to do is understand, because the constituency out there aren't inconvenienced by the checkpoint. they're not -- just because the border patrol agents are tracking a group through their yard and the dog is barking, we don't want them to be the nuisance. we want them to help us understand that border environment. add to that situational awareness. we rely on those communities, and the leadership in the field meets with them frequently because they're a really good source of information. i'm not talking about as a confidential informant. about, hey, i noticed the dog started barking the last couple weeks and that hasn't happened in the last three months. we want to be able to involve them, first and foremost have them understand what we are doing in terms of our deployments. i'm not saying they all have to agree with the way we're doing it, but at least give them the opportunity to understand. this is what we're doing and this is why we're doing it and get their reaction to that. understand what their concerns are so we can adjust as needed and recognizing that we don't want to be on their property any longer than we need to right? but it is a critical component. when robert is talking about integration and looking at our federal, state and travel partners, that's critical, but it's not to the communities we serve. they're going to look at it as we encroach upon their rights or we encroach upon their property, and we really want to be good stewards in that regard as well. >> the question in the back. >> thank you. my name is eric alsmodal, consultant questioning. i believe they did something a year ago about manned versus unmanned capabilities, and i wondered if you could talk about the cost differences, et cetera between those two capabilities? i believe you used manned aerial assets more recently, and maybe how that progressed since you started that. >> i'll be honest i'm not very familiar with the gao study, but my broad reaction would be the cdp air marine office within u.s. customs and border protection has a variety of platforms. they do specific missions. so if you say hey, is an a-star valuable? i would say yes, if it's giving air to ground support. it's for deployment and it's only being flown once we have a tip and q and we have someone to go after it. when you say, we want to go up and down the border and detect people coming across. my answer is it's probably not the best utilization of that asset. the same could be true of a uh 60 helicopter or a uh system. we're not familiar if it's cost effective, we just want to make sure we're using its capability for its intended use and not just, let's get up in the air and start looking for people. which by the way, ten years ago, we needed them because we didn't have a lot of detection capability. and by the way and robert can probably appreciate this also, as a border patrol agent working by myself in the middle of nowhere and not able to get communication out, when i started hearing helicopter blades coming from the north and all of a sudden i would hear this pilot get on and say, 631 this is fox, you got any traffic? i'm here to support you. that person was my best friend. so yeah, border patrol agents always want air because a lot of times that's the only comm's relay out, or they know if something happens, that pilot is going to land and help them. >> i would like to ask a little bit about the changes that have happened in the border patrol in the last ten years. the growing use of unmanned systems, whether they're piloted or, you know unmanned systems drones per se or aerostats for example, mobile aerial surveillance, things that you can use a truck to go ahead and shift spaces. the fact that the border patrol has grown so much since 2004, robert mentioned over 21,000 agents, that's something that i think a lot of people would be surprised. if you go back to 2004, i think that's double or more than double what you all had in 2004. if you could talk a little bit about what's happened in the last 10 years and where you see that trajectory going in terms of the capability of the border patrol unmanned systems. some have questioned do we need as many agents if we have this technology? how do you address those kinds of questions? >> that's a great point, and my quick answer is it's an art not a science. there is not a set of instructions that comes with an aerostat when we get a handover from dnd and they say, this is how you can deploy it and reduce your level of staff by 30% because that's what happened to us when we deployed it. i want to thank reverend swann and the work he did with jf north, because over the past ten years, as the military was being deployed in theater a lot of times they would take emergency technology and come out to the border. one is because the environment in some of our border locations were very comparable to what they were going to be facing and they wanted to test and evaluate some of the equipment. on the other hand, we had between 90 and 180 days at times to gain some additional detection and monitoring capabilities. so it helped us out. and the military in those instances really taught us on how to absorb different technology, because if you give a border patrol agent any piece of equipment, he or she is going to use it to the equivalent of what they're used to right? quick example. one of the first unmanned aerial systems we got border patrol was like great this is like another helicopter. get it up there, and when the border patrol agent calls, they're going to slew the u.s., right, and tell the border patrol agent if he's close to the group or not. only because that's all we knew. so early on as we were getting more and more equipment and learning this process, we had to teach the organization how -- and we're still learning ourselves on what is the best fusion of all these different types of capability? ten years ago, if i was in arizona, there was no command center. i wouldn't have the responsibility that some of those agents do now. there is going to be a smifthift tonight that starts at 4:00 we're going to run that shift for ten hours. there is one watch commander who has to determine, where are the 15 surveillance systems going to be located? which one of the ground sensors are not working and how are we going to cover that gap? i have two fixed wing running eor, i have two helicoptersd kopicoptershelicopters, one to be on stand-by. as a border patrol agent, i have to figure out in that shift how i'm going to deploy that because there are about 500 border patrol agents are counting on me. that didn't happen when i was in that position, thank god. we have border patrol agents who aren't intimidated by that but they need to learn. and there are folks who can help us continue because ten years ago, as robert mentioned, we are learning at a very fast pace. some of it is trial and error which is okay, but a lot of it we have to be able to close those gaps, and the united states has been a great partner and continues to be a great partner in flattening that learning curve out? >> hello my name is dan. i'm from tucson. i work with an organization called nor more deaths. i'm glad you've heard of us. we are concerned specifically about the migrant deaths that happened in our sector last year. we had 128 deaths. so i'm curious in your plan it doesn't seem to mention anything about goals to reduce migrant deaths and also one of the things the organization is very concerned about is abuse of mig pomerantz migrants within custody. we have physical abuse of migrants in custody. i'm just wondering what the plan is to reduce those aspects to remedy the problems we've been bringing to your organization for the past ten years. >> thank you for the question. don't discount the fact that even though you don't find it in the pages we are not as concerned as you are with deaths along the border. that's another indicator that we do track over time. i'm happy to report those are down for the second year in a row. rescues are up. and i think the overarching deployment -- remember when you're looking at something specific like border patrol that really comes out when you look at the operational plans to support the strategy. so the strategic document -- as a matter of fact, the article that robert wrote talks about what those shifts were. it doesn't talk about the tactics, techniques and procedures. it doesn't even mention, by the way, if you look through those pages, what the strategic objectives are within any of the four corridors. the intent of the article wasn't to do that. if you're interested and want to take a look at what the campaign plan for arizona is there is publications that are available that i would be happy to walk you through, but i will tell you, reducing all deaths in any way, whether they're drownings, whether they're exposures in the elements, that's certainly something we want to continue to the extent that we can control that. oftentimes we cannot. right? because of these organizations oftentimes will exploit people. they will tell them, for instance, hey, we're going to cross the west desert. you're from tucson, so you're probably very familiar with the reservation, right? and they'll tell you we'll be walking for an hour, so don't worry about carrying any water. that's not true. these people coming from central and south america don't know that. so help us if you could, as we continue our messaging campaign and let people know how dangerous it is. it is not worth the risk of your life and your loved one's life. and don't pay a smuggler in the united states to have them smuggle somebody in the united states. it's too dangerous. and the people who are profiting from this have no regard for that which you and i hold dear, which is the safety and security of everybody in and around the border environment. but thank you for the question. [ inaudible question ] >> yeah. well as it relates to in custody, whether there are allegations the misconductor death -- misconduct or deaths, the border security takes all those very seriously. the commissioner just recently received the authorization for 1800 positions which are criminal investigators within cdp, so we will be doing those investigations as soon as we -- as those allegations come forward. there is a whole host of folks that do those investigations now currently. you have the office of the inspector general ice does some of those investigations, so any allegations of misconduct are thoroughly investigated, and we will continue to do so. >> with all due respect, sir, you've asked two questions now, so if you wouldn't mind we will turn to someone else. thank you very much, though. [ inaudible question ] >> with all due respect, sir thank you very much. can we get a microphone up to him, please? thanks, tom. >> first of all, thanks for a very informative discussion. i'm andre and i'm the director for vietnam southeast asia and washington, d.c. for the interstate travel company in detroit. we're business people, not really concerned professionally with border security. my question is this. the allegation has been made by at least one congressional representative and maybe more, but one i read about in the "washington post" today, that islamic extremists are training some of their people to quote imitate hispanics, unquote, to cross the southern border. my question is, is there any credible intelligence that that's happening to your knowledge? >> no. >> if we can turn to this gentleman over here. >> don fagan ibm. thanks again for putting together the paper. it's really tremendous. i'm glad you guys are doing it. i'm wondering if other components within bhs have talked to you about doing something similar object maybe putting together a collaborative paper on how you all work together on the borders. >> yes and no. >> this could be a very short q and a session. robert, please elaborate. >> yes, they have. i believe -- the importance with the article is like a first step, right? even just speaking of the border patrol in general or dhs employees in general, we are very, very good at telling stories. i mean, you could sit with a border patrol agent for 20 years and hear stories, some of the best law enforcement stories in the world. we haven't been so well at writing these things down so i will carry the suggestion back and i will encourage them with all due haste to do that. thank you. >> if we can come up to one of our csi senior affiliates here, jack crispman. >> good morning, chiefs, and thanks for being here. quick question. i think a lot of folks myself included have been sort of disappointed about the level and quality of the dialogue around border security. i think there are some notable exceptions. csis and council for foreign relations, for example have done some very thoughtful work. but generally, the level of dialogue has been less than i think the seriousness of the issues would warrant. so, first of all, just as a remark, i want to congratulate you guys because i think the work that chief shachroeder you've done has the potential to elevate the work done. you said you see this as opening the door to further conversation. how do you envision that dialogue moving forward? and if someone is on the outside, either a think tank or public or private sector, whatever, and wants to contribute, how do you recommend they contribute to the discussion and dialogue and move forward? >> thanks, josh. i'll let robert talk a little bit about it. i'm as disappointed as you are. let it be clear. we're going to continue. whether it's forms like this, i think getting the publication out, getting it on the website should at least generate more interest about, hey i don't know what you're talking about on page 18 could you talk about it? it always seems that when we want to be able to do this, and there is some momentum building within the organization, that the timing just isn't -- i mean i was really surprised -- touche to stephanie. i said you scheduled this for the sixth of january the first day congress is back and everybody is talking about a potential border security bill, right? all of a sudden, the antennas are up about what's going to happen. that's just the nature of it. it has been over the years and you know that. we can take two positions, and this is just my personal opinion. one, we can say we've asked a thousand times. i'm tired of asking and let's just go back and do our job and forget about it. i think that's the easy way out. one, the organization internally, we oe it to them to talk about how proud we are of work that they're doing, and we oe it to owe it to the citizens who aren't in uniform. i'm not dissuaded, i'm not chagrinned. i'm going to continue to try. whether it's opportunities like this, whether it's opportunities in the media, i say yes to every opportunity. although rare and infrequent as they are i want to talk about the mission and men and women in the organization and will continue to do so. and anything that you think that we should be doing that we're not, let us know right? a lot of times people just say, when are you going to come out and talk and do this? give us the opportunities. because everyone that comes in with a request, i advocate within the department about this is a really good opportunity, it's our opportunity to talk about the campaign at the secretary's level, how that meshes with what we're doing in between the ports of entry. we want to be able to make those discussions and dialogue a lot morro buste robust in the future. we want to continue to do that so help us out. >> if i can just follow up on that question, which is robert you're in a unique position having been on the hill a little bit now, and i'm not going to put you in an awkward position to try to say what politicians will do in the upcoming congress. but in terms of what you want congress to focus on in terms of a border security issue, a risk-based strategy issue what would you like to see happen? what kind of key topics would you like to see discussed early on in this congress? >> this question kind of ties in with what the gentleman asked and also the individual from arizona here. when they asked me hey, what should you focus on i was asking them recently, what do we get wrong about the border all the time? after thinking a couple thoughts, it's that there are only two states in the border controlling and uncontrolling. that has been the dialogue completely. i'm hoping the articles change that dialogue. i'm hoping this is one that the border patrol will take at issue and put out. one of the most important things in the article as it all comes out of what we need to focus on is that border security isn't going to be completed by resources alone. it takes an interagency operation and intelligence investigative efforts, and it takes the focused efforts on those individuals responsible for the majority of the crimes. so resources alone won't solve the problem, and you continually hear that debate. every day, all hours of the day, it's resources resources resources, and it's extremely important. but if it's not coupled with the interagency knowledge, skills and abilities that we have with the intelligence community the investigative community and they're not focusing on single individuals, we're going to continue to struggle. so i would say that's most important. >> general? >> guy swann from the association. i've worked with you guys a lot, and i have to say that under chip's leadership this agency has really blossomed and started looking ate lot a lot of things, and robert's thinking is a big part of the advancement of this operation. could you talk about your international engagement? you talked about the interagency extensively, but what about internationally the border security, and how does it factor into what you've written? >> thank you general for the question and your kind remarks. it's very critical. as a matter of fact, when you look at -- i'll go back to the southern border and approach. it's the approaches right? we're not just talking about the line so to speak, and things only start when they come into the united states. as a matter of fact, beyond just intelligence and working with with our partners, it's to identify the threat well in advance, so we kind of take -- cbp has done in the air passenger environment. how do you minimize risk in the air passenger environment? you identify threats and don't let them get on the plane. we don't have to do turnarndsounds like we used to back in ban goregorebangor, maine. within the approach, and a lot of times -- you know this, general, you've been down there -- we have even within the corridors to our south within the hemisphere, trains are going to predict routes of travel in most cases. how do we then leverage that with the government of mexico, for instance, and the work you have done with your team and helped us bridge the mill you have established and taking that a step further and doing that work with the federal police is continuing to do joint threat assessments, for example, so we at least have the same sense of awareness. we start with the easy stuff. and if we can agree to either understand what that threat environment looks like or even if we disagree at the end of what we should do about it that's okay, too. i think over time our ability is in working with mexico -- and they do recognize that some may look at it as this is just migration through the country and nobody should do anything. but those in those leadership positions, from the military and certainly the security side of it, recognize that the threat, even though it may be heading to the u.s., is going to come through their area and we're making incremental steps and trying to do that joint planning, doing the joint patrols as we continue to do. we're looking for continued support in that regard both in terms of frequency of deployments and number of deployments, and we're really looking for a sustainment of that commitment over time, which i think is really the critical piece as you saw when we were down there. >> sir if i could follow up on that just briefly in terms of -- you've you've talked about the southern border and the southern approaches. could you talk briefly about the northern border? obviously, not as many, one would argue, scenarios which are of concern along the northern border, but, i have to confess i was the candidate for awhile in the pentagon so i'm curious as to what the border patrol might be doing along our northern border. >> right now they're trying to identify what their risk indicators are going to be on the north. if you look at any of the 12 risk indicators the metrics are specific on a threat which i would generally characterize as flow. right? people and things coming across the southern border. so obviously, if we're trying to measure the extent to which we're reducing that flow, those metrics make sense. it does not make sense to adopt those metrics in a place like haver montana and hold the chief in haver montana, accountable to reduce the average apprehension for recidivists when they're catching maybe one person in the spring. right? it's a different environment. i'm not suggesting there's no threat there. i don't know what the threat is right now. i know what the intelligence is. so what the border patrol leadership is doing is understanding this framework and managing risk. they're still held to account to manage risk. what they have to do is identify what the intent and capability that defines the threat is in their area of operation. understand their vulnerabilities and what the consequences to identify what that risk is. and he the process in this iteration along the northern border to really carve that out. >> my name is paula. i have a -- i'm glad to hear about the increase in dialogue with communities and the public around border patrol commission and strategies and i think this handout will actually be very useful in helping with that dialogue. and i hope along with that, my question goes to sharing the information as you gather these measurements, and impacts, and i specifically would ask about getting numbers about checkpoints. what happens at checkpoints? apprehensions and seizures. a lot of communities that i'm familiar with in arizona have asked for this information about their local checkpoints. so they know what is happening at those checkpoints, and have not been given that information. as well as the transparency around when it does happen, such as antonio rodriguez's death. but transparency around the facts, and the information relating to that. when a border patrol agent is involved so that the public does know and the border patrol can be held up either accountable or the facts are out there so they are judged by everyone equally. >> i would agree. so i'm going to point in that far corner. you'll see assistant chief ryan landrum. if you're so inclined at the end of this walk over introduce yourself, and he will give you a business card and a point of contact if there's a specific inquiry whether it's tell me about the i-19 checkpoint over the last year. i want to know how many apry hengss were made at that checkpoint. to the extent we can do that without whatever the question is, if we're able to release that data we'll get it to you. fair enough? thank you. >> do we have anyone else? >> oh, i'm sorry. ma'am? >> my name is janet horton i'm from the australian embassy here in washington, d.c. i just had a question, more technical question about your risk space metrics and how you use them in calculating the sort of border flows. particularly how do you measure what you don't know? so for those where you haven't apprehended someone, they're not a turnaround that you're aware of, how do you factor those in to your risk mate ricks? >> that's a great point. that's the question even when i first came up in 2010 and i've heard it throughout my career and i just kept getting it repeatedly. so, if a tree falls in the forest and there's nobody around, does it make a sound, right? and so how do you know what you don't know. you're given us -- and i still remember this, one of the first hearings that i did with gao, that's great, chief, border patrol. this was back in 2010 one of my first hearings that's great you're giving us all your apprehensions. you're just giving us your enumerator. i didn't know what enumerator was. i just sat there on the panel, i was like math was horrible for me. i was like -- then he said well it's just like, you know, chief you're just giving me your batting average but it's not your batting average. you're just telling me how many hits you got. you're not telling me how many at-bats. that i understood. i said okay maybe we could do something with that. thanks for the tip. that started some of the dialogue and the discussion. again this is not an exact science. right? there is one of those 12 indicators, which is called the interdiction effectiveness rate. my staff, by the way gets paid more each syllable that they come up with a risk name. this one obviously someone got a big payoff. interdiction effectiveness rate. it goes to the heart of a question i got, it was a probably i don't know, six years ago or so. and this was a community that really wasn't on or near the border. we're talking about what we do, and our deployments, and then finally this -- this gracious woman raises her hand and says chief, i don't understand anything that you're saying. could you just tell me last night, how many people came across the border, and how many people did you apprehend? she said is that too difficult? and there's two sides of me. and my left side was saying, oh, my gosh. that is really difficult. i have no idea. but it is so simplistic. why can't we at least do that? and that's what set us off to be able to identify to the extent that we're able to this interdiction effectiveness ratio. so we do have in fact a denominator. and i tell people and i'm very open about this, this is not science. right. what you're trying to do is you're trying to organize, train, equip, an organization along 2000 miles of border with mexico, to be able to count how many people are coming across that border. now just think about that. 2000 miles. with some very rough and disparate terrain that you will find in most places. how do you do that? so for a number of years, i still remember it, nobody wanted to even try. because as a proud organization, right, if you couldn't do it with perfection you just didn't do it. which is the reason why we held up apprehension numbers, you know, and we would defend it to the death, because we could go in to a e-3 system, and be able to tell you exactly what the fingerprint identification number was who the person's name, bigraphic we had that. we didn't have the ability to be able to count how many people came across the border. and so what we decided to do is take a risk. and say okay, let's not make perfect the enemy of good here. let's add to this as a situational awareness piece. and see if we can't get better. and lo and behold the organization is getting better. and we're utilizing different technology to be able to do that. we're using existing technology for this purpose that we weren't using it before. and border patrol agents, you know, god bless them. i'm very proud of the work that they do. they, unlike the leadership, are not risk adverse. you tell them hey, i'd like to be able for you to count on your shift this afternoon how many people came across. they're like, okay. without any thought. right? they want to be able to do this. and they're going to come back to me and say i could have done a lot better chief if you gave me "a," "b" and "c." through each successive year as we talk about that and look at the manner in which we're collecting the data, how we're standardizing the methodology across, how we're capturing it and how we're assessing what that means is each year it gets more and more exciting for me to do that. but i will always stop short of saying this is the number and it's right. this is a number and we believe we have some processes in place that inform us better than last year. but if somebody says i need you to guarantee that denominator, i can't do that. unless there's some piece of technology, some dust that's out there, that's going to be able to tag and track people and be able to, you know, geospatially plot them somewhere that the department can then make an accounting of that. short of that, we're going to continue to do our best to be able to identify that. not as the metric, right? we're not trying to hijack you know, do away with apprehensions and the effectiveness rate now becomes the new golden nugget. this is one of 12 that helps inform us about how we're doing and what we're doing along that border. it's a great point, though. >> we have time for one final question and this is the gentleman who's going to ask it. >> it's just a follow-up on the last one. what is the range in a percentage, of those 12 metrics, the specific numbers that you think you apprehend? what percent of the people come across the border do you think you apprehend? >> on average, it's. 78%, 79% at this point. that's 95% confidence with a margin of error of about 2%. >> you use all of those math terms. i would like to thank everyone for coming out today. it has stopped snowing it looks like. that doesn't mean the danger is gone but it does mean that it's going to be a little bit less flurry-like. i do want to thank our guests here on the dais with me, both chief fisher and assistant chief schroeder. thank you so much for joining us. and for sharing your insights and you're welcome back any time. please everyone join me in thanking our guests. and live now to the ray burn house office building on capitol hill where today the house foreign affairs committee is holding a threat assessment hearing on north korea. state, treasury and homeland security department officials are expected to testify. the committee chair is ed royce, republican of california. and democrat eliot engel of new york is ranking member. this should get under way in just a couple of moments. live coverage here on c-span3.ñi again we're live here on c-span3 this morning, with the house foreign affairs committee holding a threat assessment hearing on north korea. we'll hear from state and treasury and homeland security department officials this morning. the committee chair is ed royce of california. that is one reason the hearing is a little bit delayed in getting under way. he is not in the room as of yet. but the ranking member, eliot engel of new york is there. so we expect this to start shortly. live here on c-span3. also, coming up later today, on the c-span networks we'll go to the brookings institution for comments from consumer financial protection bureau head richard cordray set to start at noon eastern. and then at 1:00, 1:00 eastern, we're planning to take you live to the heritage foundation conservative policy summit with discussions on digital trade, foreign policy, marriage and religious freedom. and the pro-life agenda. it will all end with remarks from kentucky senator rand paul. at 1:00 p.m. eastern here on c-span3. this briefing will come to order. and the members here know we're not going to be able to formally organize until next week, but i very much appreciate the ranking member mr. engel his cooperation in beginning this process of holding today a briefing, so that we can get started on the many pressing issues that we face. and i look forward to meeting next week to formally organize the committee, and discuss how all of us can work together in a bipartisan way in order to advance u.s. interests around the world, and one of the things i've enjoyed about working with this committee is the way mr. engel and myself and the members here on the committee have been able to advance the idea that we work on a consensus, and then move that forward with one voice. overseas. and i think that amplifies the message from the united states. but the issue that we're discussing today north korea, is one where for years the united states and our allies have been rightly concerned about the threat from north korea's nuclear and missile programs. mr. sherman and myself remember very vividly the situation of proliferation by north korea with respect to the -- the transfer of that capability. into syria and on the banks of the euphrates a weapons program being developed there as a consequence of north korea. and and for years we've watched that program grow and now this brutal regime has added a new weapon to its arsenal, which is cyber attacks. and the state sanked cyber attack on sony pictures underscored three unchanging facts about north korea. first this rogue regime has no interest in being a responsible state. second while kim jong-un continues to carry out human rights abuses around the world, and by carrying out attacks for those of you who remember some of the exercises the north koreans have taken offshore, as well and most importantly of what they've done to their own people, the way in which a country treats itd own people will sometimes tell us how they'll treat others. the current president of south korea, her mother, was assassinated by north korean agents. so we looked at that u.n. report that was recently filed after the evidence and interviews with many of the survivors defectors out of north korea. this was the conclusion of the report. the united nations has found no parallel in the contemporary world for the treatment of people in north korea. that's quite a statement. in the mean time, of course, instead of assisting that population the resources that north korea gets its hands on continues to go in to its nuclear and missile systems, and of course, cyber weapon capability, as well. and third the third point north korea's weapons are not nearly for show. we and our allies in northeast asia are facing a brutal and dangerous regime, one that not only is trying to miniaturize nuclear weapons to put them on icbms. but also one, as i said earlier, that has been involved in the past in central asia and in the middle east, in proliferating these weapons -- different types of weapons missiles and other types of offensive capability as well as nuclear weapons capability. so north korea's growing cyber capability emerged most starkly in 2013. our allies, south korea suffered a series of cyber attacks that temporarily brought down some of the commercial and media networks. it disrupted banking systems. the hackers called this dark soul but in particular what they were able to do was to shut down the banking systems in parts of the country, shut down the atm systems, and so forth. despite limited internet capability in north korea, the fact is that there is an elite cyberwar fare unit the defectors have told us about, bureau 121 which was traced back as the source of these attacks on south korea. and some of the expertise was obtained overseas but sending them to other countries for training but certainly that capability was deployed against south korea. and last year's cyber attack is estimated to have cost sony hundreds of millions of dollars in damage. it was a state sanctioned attack that has many americans asking if that is what north korea can do to a movie company, how vulnerable is our critical infrastructure? how vulnerable is our electric grid? you know, what if electricity was cut off? i mean that obviously could be a dark chapter. earlier this month the administration announced long overdue sanctions targeting officials and front companies of the north korean government. and i'm glad the administration has described this as just the first aspect of its response because many of those north koreans blacklisted many of those individuals who were blacklisted had already been targeted by u.s. sanctions. but the significance of this new executive order may come from the broad power it gives the president to target anyone who is a part of the north korean government, or is assisting them in any way. that is if the administration chooses to use it to its full advantage. we need to step up and target those financial institutions in asia and beyond that are supporting the brutal and dangerous north korean regime. such sanctions have crippled north korea in the past. for those of us that remember the consequences on banco delta asia being sanctioned and left the regime unable to buy the loyalties of its generals at that time, and could not be paid. this committee has been focused on the north korea threat for years, bringing attention to the regime's human rights abuses. its illicit criminal activities. its growing nuclear and missile programs and helpful scrutiny of north korean nuclear negotiations. indeed, last congress the house passed legislation that ranking member eliot engel and i offered to ramp up the financial pressure on north korea, pressing for north korea to be designated a primary money laundering concern as has been done with iran curtailing its sale of weapons and stepping up inspections of north korean ships, among other steps. unfortunately the senate failed to act on this critical legislation before it adjourned. but will soon try again, and give the senate a chance to join us in tackling this growing threat. and i'll now turn to the ranking member for his opening comments. >> thank you very much, chairman royce. thank you for calling this briefing on the threat that north korea's nuclear missile and cyber capabilities pose to our national security, and that of our friends and allies in the asia-pacific region. i want to, on a personal note say that i commend your strong leadership on this issue. and it means a great deal that this briefing is the very first item on our committee's agenda in the 114th congress. i look forward to working with you and the rest of our colleagues to address this challenge and to continue working in a bipartisan and productive way in the year ahead. and i want to second what you said. it is very important for us, whenever possible to have one voice in international affairs. it strengthens us. it strengthens us around the world. and that's what we tried to do in this committee. so you and i, mr. chairman have introduced joint legislation. we've written joint pieces, joint op-ed pieces. we've done joint letters to officials, and i believe that we've gotten the biggest bang for the buck because we've shown a unity on this committee. one of the things that i've noticed is when i go overseas, and we take a bipartisan delegation along our differences really really narrow because we're all americans and we all love this country and i think it's very important i think this committee leads the way in terms of the way congress ought to govern in a bipartisan fashion. so, i want to thank you, mr. chairman for all you do to ensure that that continues. i also want to thank our witnesses for their service, and for their testimony today. the recalcitrance cruelty and unpredictability of the kim regime makes north korea one of the toughest challenges we face on the global stage. the last three administrations, democratic and republican alike have attempted to address the problem of north korea's nuclear program. unfortunately, very little progress has been made. despite a long list of sanctions, north korea is no closer to denuclearization today than it was several decades ago. rather north korea has continued to develop its nuclear conventional and cyber capabilities at an alarming rate. already north korea has a cigars nal of short-range missiles that could reach south korea and japan. most troubling to me is the continued development of north korea's medium and long-range missile capabilities. they may be unreliable today but some of these missiles could eventually pose a threat to guam, alaska or even the west coast of the continental united states. and some believe that north korea has aspirations to build submarines that could carry these missiles even closer to american shores. north korea appears to be working toward a miniaturized nuclear warhead that could be mounted on intermediate and long range missiles. i was concerned by comments made in october by the commander of u.s. forces in korea that at this moment north korea may process the ability to miniaturize a nuclear warhead. based on recent events it's clear north korea's aspirations do not stop with conventional or even nuclear weapons. the regime is wielding 21st century weapons and has developed cyber capability. like many others i was deeply disturbed by the cyber attack on sony that took place in november, an attack that was not disruptive but destructive. agents working for the north korea regime vandalized threatened and coerced a company operating in the united states. this attack and the pursuing threats of violence were a perverse and inexcusable act by the north korean government. as i said then no one especially an entity operating in the united states should feel that they must cede their rights to operate within the law because of veiled threats from rogue actors. i look forward to the witnesses and hearing how each of your departments is dealing with this threat. are you engaging with the private sector are you ramping up information sharing in collaboration across agencies are you putting safeguards in place to assure that these kinds of attacks will not be successful in the future i look forward to hearing about your progress in these areas. there is no international agreement or clear definition of what constitutes cyberwar, or cyber terror. yet it is clear that cyber attacks can cause destruction of property, stroke fear, intimidate the public, or even bring about the loss of life it could be as serious as conventional acts of war or terrorism. we must assure that north korea's cyber capabilities and the cyber capabilities of other state sponsored and rogue actors do not threaten our citizens our businesses or our national security i'd like to hear the witnesses' asisments of these risks and the ability of our allies and partners to effective defend against them. let's remember the greatest threat the regime in pyongyang poses is to its own people. i have visited north korea twice myself. mr. wilson was with me on one of the trips. i remember the incredible uneasyness i felt being a place where absolute power is consolidated among a very few and where the rest of society is systematically and brutally repressed. for years we've heard reports about the abuses endured by the people of north korea. torture, starvation forced labor, and execution. a recent united nations commission of inquiry report confirmed these reports, calling the north korean regime responsible for systematic widespread, and gross human rights violations, including what they said was crimes against humanity. the chairman and i share a deep commitment to addressing the injustices endured by the north korean people. so we face a delicate balance, holding the korean leaders who perpetuate this violence accountable or recognizing the need for basic support for the north korean people. maintaining that balance makes our work on north korea all the more critical and all the more difficult. so i look forward to hearing your perspectives on this issue, and i thank you for joining us today. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you engel. this morning we're joined by representatives from the department of state from treasury, and from homeland security. ambassador sung kim is the special representative for the north korea policy and the deputy assistant secretary for korea and japan. previously he served as u.s. ambassador to the republic of korea. and he was the special envoy for the six-party talks. honorable daniel glaser, prior to his confirmation as assistant secretary for terrorist finance in the office of terrorism and financial intelligence at department of treasury he served as the first director of the treasury's executive office of terrorist financing. and financial crimes. brigadier general gregory touhill is deputy assistant secretary for cybersecurity operations and programs at the department of homeland security previously he served in the united states air force as the chief information officer and director of command, control communications, and cyber systems. at u.s. transportation command. and so without objection, the briefers' full prepared statement will be made part of the record here. members will have five calendar days to submit any statements to you, or questions or put any extraneous material into the record. and ambassador kim, if you would like to begin, and if you could summarize your remarks and then we'll go to questions. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. ranking member engel, and members of the committee. thank you very much for inviting me today. along with my colleagues from treasury and homeland security to testify about north korea. as we respond to north korea's destabilizing, provocative and repressive policies and actions we appreciate the interest and attention you and the committee have given to this important issue. in recent weeks, mr. chairman, the american people and the international community have been deeply troubled by the destructive cyber attack on sony pictures entertainment. an extensive fbi investigation has concluded that the attack was conducted by the government of north korea. the administration is totally committed to defending the u.s. citizens, u.s. businesses, and our nation's constitutionally protected right of free speech. that is why the president made clear that the united states would respond proportionally to the attack in a time and a manner of our choosing. our response to the attack on sony is consistent with our policy on the dprk across the board. one which seeks to work with our allies and partners to increase the cost to north korea of its irresponsible behavior, to sharpen the regime's choices, and to persuade the dprk peacefully to abandon its nuclear weapons program, respect the human rights of its people, and abide by international norms and obligations. mr. chairman as you stated eloquently in a recent interview we need to change the equilibrium in north korea and move the regime away from hostility. together with the international community, we're using the full range of tools at our disposal to make clear to the dprk that abandoning its nuclear weapons provocative actions and human rights abuses is the only way to end the political and economic isolation. in our messages to the dprk, and to our partners we made clear that we will respond to the dprk's misbehavior. the executive order signed by the president on january 2nd is an important new tool. it responds to the attack on sony pictures, but also provides a framework for addressing the full range of dprk illicit behavior. in applying this pressure, just as in our efforts at engagement our work with allies is vital. the united states is very limited economic and other ties with the dprk so our financial sanctions are much more effective when supported by our partners. we also work with our allies to deter dprk aggression. having left seoul as ambassador just a few months ago i can tell you that our alliance with south korea is stronger than ever and our growing trilateral security cooperation with south korea and japan also sends a powerful message of deterrence to pyongyang. if i may, mr. chairman, i would like to take this opportunity to thank you and the committee for the committee's strong support for our robust alliances with both japan and south korea. mr. chairman as we apply unilateral and multilateral pressure and strengthen our deterrence we will continue our principle diplomacy. we have made clear to the dprk that the door is open to meaningful engagement. close coordination with our partners in the six-party process is essential. thanks to our continued robust engagement with south korea japan, china and russia our unity has never been stronger. wherever pyongyang turns, it hears a strong unwavering message from all five parties that it will not be accepted as a nuclear power. our alliances with japan and the republic of korea are a bedrock of our six-party diplomacy. both allies are resolute in their commitment to the goal of the denuclearization of the korean peninsula and an end to north korea's illicit behavior. both governments have condemned the attack on sony pictures and expressed solidarity with the united states in our response. to intensify our coordination our travel to tokyo for trilateral talks with my japanese and south korean counterparts later this month. on that trip i will also visit beijing to strengthen our cooperation with china. china has done a great deal on north korea. we believe it can do more. in the wake of the cyber attack against sony pictures china did condemn malicious behavior in cyberspace. although russia has recently pursued investment in north korea and invited kim jong-un to visit moscow later this year our alignment on the clear goal of denuclearization remains strong as ever. we also work actively with partners in the broader international community, especially on human rights. building on the important work of the u.n. commission of inquiry, this past year the u.n. human rights commission and general assembly adopted by overwhelming margins resolutions calling for accountability for north korea's human rights abuses. just last month the u.n. security council took up the dprk's great human rights injustices on the standing agenda for the very first time. mr. chairman standing up to north korea requires a sustained and concerted effort by all of the countries in the six-party process and indeed, by the entire international community. together we will to borrow your words again, change the equilibrium in north korea and persuade pyongyang that north korea will not achieve security or economic prosperity while pursuing nuclear weapons, tramping on international norms and abusing its own people. thank you again for the opportunity to appear before this committee. >> thank you, ambassador kim. dan? >> thank you chairman royce ranking member engel and distinguished members of this committee. thank you for inviting me to speak today about the u.s. government's efforts to counter the threatñi poseai by the malicious cyber attacks of the dprk. the dprk is a brazen and isolated deng i'm that has repeatedly shown flagrant disregard for international standards. this is evident in the dprk's development and proliferation of its nuclear and ballistic missile programs, its repeated violations of u.n. security council resolutions, its repression of its people through serious human rights abuses, and most recently, its cyber attack on a u.s. company and attempts to stifle freedom of exbregs in our country. in response to the dprk's cyber attack on sony pictures the president signed an executive order, executive order 13687 on january 6th, 2015, granting the treasury department the authority to impose sanctions against agencies, instrumentalities, officials, and entities, controlled by the government of north korea, and the workers party of korea. executive order 13687 represents a significant broadening of treasury's authority to increase financial pressure on the dprk and to further isolate it from the international financial system. for the first time treasury has the authority to designate individuals and entities based solely on their status and officials, agencies or controlled entities of the government of the dprk. treasury also now has the authority to designate those providing material support to the government of the dprk. simultaneous to the issue of this executive order, treasury designated three entities and ten individuals from secretary jack lew described as quote critical north korean operatives. these include the reconnaissance general bureau known as rgb which is the dprk's primarily intelligence organization which is responsible for many of its cyber operations. the korea mining development trading corporation known as comitt which is the primary arms dealer and ten officials of the dprk government including eight comit officials placed throughout the world. secretary left chlt w made clear we'll continue to use this tool to expose north korean government owes fishes and entities. treasury has also used existing tools to raise the cost of the dprk of its provocative actions. since 2005, treasury has designated over 60 north korean related entities and individuals under executive order 13386, 13382, which targets wmd proliferation related activities and executive order 13551 which targets north korean arm sales the procurement of luxury goods and illicit economic activities. under these authorities, treasury has exposed and cut off access to the u.s. financial system entities and individuals such as the foreign trade bank and daedong credit bank two of north korea's most important banks and have provided crucial financial support for a number of dprk illicit activities. we've also designated general kim young chal the head of the rgb who james clapper recently named as the official who likely ordered the cyber attack on sony. today, the dprk's financially isolated thanks in no small part to the actions i have described. over the years treasury has ensured that the dprk has limited access to the u.s. financial system and worked with our allies to restrict pyongyang's access to the international financial system. as a result of sanctions, and other measures targeting the dprk's illicit conduct, financial institutions around the world began severing their ties with the dprk in order to avoid entanglement with north korea's illicit activities. these actions contributed to the dprk's estimate isolation and spurs positive change in the behavior of banks across the globe. while this increased isolation has made targeting the dprk more complex, treasury continues to deploy the tools that its disposal to raise the cost of the dprk's defined behavior and induce the government to abide by its international obligations. the u.s. government's response to the malashs sony cyber attack is a demonstration of our determination to hold the dprk responsible for its actions. but protecting the u.s. from cyber attacks isn't just about imelementing sanctions. it's also about working with the private sector to safeguard our economy and the infrastructure more broadly. beyond our response to the sony cyber attack safeguarding the u.s. financial system and its critical infrastructure from the threat posed by state sponsored malicious cyber activity is also part of treasury's mission. treasury partners to share specific threat information and improve baseline security and enhance industry response and recovery and i go into much of this in my written testimony and in greater detail. as the united states confronts the destabilizing and destructive actions of the dprk treasury is employing its authorities to isolate north korea from the international financial system. treasury will continue to use its arsenal of financial measures to combat the cyber threat by the dprk. thank you mr. chairman for your invitation to testify before the committee today. and i look forward to answering any questions. >> thank you secretary glaser. general? >> thank you very much mr. chairman. ranking member engel and distinguished members of the committee thank you very much for having me today. i appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today alongside my colleagues from the departments of state and treasury. the department of homeland security leads the national effort to secure federal civilian networks and coordinates the overall national effort to protect critical infrastructure and enhanced cybersecurity. the dhs cybersecurity mission includes analysis warning, information sharing vulnerability reduction, mitigation, and aid to national recovery efforts for critical infrastructure information systems. dhs ensures maximum coordination and partnership with federal and private sector stakeholders while working to safeguard the public's privacy, confidentiality, civil rights, and civil liberties. within dhs the office of cybersecurity and communications focuses on managing risk to the communications and information technology infrastructures, and the sectors that depend upon them. as well as enabling timely response and recovery to incidents affecting critical infrastructure and government systems. our service executes its mission by supporting 24x7 information sharing, analysis, and incident response for private and public sector partners. we provide tools and capabilities to strengthen the security of federal civilian executive branch networks and engage in strategic level coordination with private sector organizations, on cybersecurity and communications issues. dhs offers capabilities and services to assist federal agencies and stakeholders based upon their cybersecurity status and requirements. the department engages its stakeholders through a variety of mechanisms, including information sharing forums as well as through the national cybersecurity and communications integration center which we call the ncic. the ncic a 24x7 cyber situational awareness incident response and management center is a national nexus of cyber and communications integrations for the federal government the intelligence community, and law enforcement. our activities include first incident response. and during or following a cybersecurity incident, dhs may provide response capabilities that can aid in mitigation and recovery. through our integration center dhs further disseminates information on potential or active cybersecurity threats to public and private sector partners. and when requested by an affected stakeholder, dhs provides incident response through the united states computer emergency readiness team, commonly referred to as the u.s. cert or the industrial control system cyber emergency response team commonly referred to as the ics cert. our second activity is assessing security posture and recommending improvements. and upon request, dhs conducts risk and vulnerability assessments to identify potential risks to specific operational networks, systems and applications. and then we provide recommendations for mitigation. our third activity is providing technical assistance. dhs may provide direct technical assistance upon request. for instance following attacks on the financial services sector in 2013 and 2014 our united states computer emergency readiness team went on site with major financial institutions and other critical infrastructures to provide direct technical assistance. u.s. cert's technical assistance and technical data include identifying 600,000 distributed denial of service related ip addresses, and contextual information about the source of the attacks, the identity of the attacker, and associated details behind the attack. we have had a long-term consistent threat engagement discussion with the department of treasury the fbi, and private sector partners in the financial services sector. regarding the sony pictures entertain entertainment incident, in november of 2014, the ncic was made aware of a specific significant breach in the private sector impacting sony pictures entertainment. cyber threat actors targeting sony used a sophisticated worm to conduct cyber exploitation activities. since that time dhs has initiated a series of pro-active steps designed to protect not only the dot-gov space from spill overbut our private sector partners. we have worked extensively with our partners including the fbi and other agencies and international partners to share information and collaborate on incident analysis. dhs has published multiple products related to this incident incident, shared with other federal agencies our international partners the private sector, and the general public. as a trusted information sharing partner to the private sector, the ncic does not have a regulatory role. our mission includes securing critical infrastructure and protecting the federal.gov space. as we conclude, evolving and sophisticated cyber threats present a challenge to the cybersecurity of the nation's critical infrastructure and its civilian government systems. dhs remains committed to reducing risks of federal agencies and critical infrastructure. we will continue to leverage our outside of government, to enhance the security and resilience of our networks, while incorporating privacy and civil liberty safeguards into all aspects of our work. thank you again for the opportunity to provide this information, and i look forward to your questions. >> thank you very much, general. i was going to start with a question of the assistant secretary glaser, and ambassador kim made the point that increasingly russia has stepped in where china has curtailed with respect to support for north korea. he's speaking about the issue of of -- of forgiving debt, and certainly the investments from russia into the rail network. i've traveled in north korea and the functioning rail network just ends at the border. and once you're in north korea, it's not operational. or at least none that i could see. and so the investment would seem to be critical coming from russia. the question i have is, does -- is that investment would then be sanctionable, right? under the interpretation that i just read? and on top of that if we look at the section 311 sanctions which you were at the center of in 2005, i remember working with you on that at the time, with respect to banco delta asia, there's a lot more that we could be doing here if we were to label north korea a primary money laundering concern as we've done with iran. that would be possible. after all, we count -- caught them, you know with $100 u.s. currency. we saw that in macau. we had $100 bills there that were counterfeited out of north korea. so the question i have, then is let's go to that issue of financial sanctions on north korea, as kurt campbell former top state department official for asia, noted recently. we could really move effectively with that and make life much more difficult for those who are making life difficult in south korea and here. >> thank you for the question. chairman royce. the -- i certainly agree with you. it is our goal and it has been our strategy. it's been our strategy at the treasury department for many years now to implement sanctions and other financial measures in a way that isolates north korea from the international financial system. and that would be from the international financial system everywhere. whether it's china, or russia, or the united states or europe, or other places in asia. the goal is to squeeze them financially as much as possible. with respect to the new executive order that you make reference to and that i discussed in my testimony, that's an important new tool that we have at our disposal, precisely because it gives us a tremendous amount of flexibility in how we approach targeting. so we could go -- we could target any north korean government agency. we could target any north korean government official, and then once targeted we could apply sanctions with respect to any individual or entity who's providing them in turn material support or any individual entity that they, in turn, control. so that gives us a large -- >> and i think that's where we need to have the focus, because the foreign trade bank that was a designation a long time coming. but just designating north korean institutions is not going to tur tail the kind of hard currency that the regime uses in order to continue to expand their icbm program for example. >> right. and that's why we're trying to do, identify what their nodes are to the international financial system. you mentioned banco delta asia designation under 311 that we did ten years ago. why that was -- why that was so successful was not with respect to the specific action on banco delta asia, but that tied up about $25 million of money that north korea said was north korean money. but, the real impact of banco delta asia and that designation and that action was that it created a chilling effect throughout the financial system. banks around the world stopped doing business with north korea. we still live in that world today. that action and a lot of other actions we've taken have made it a lot harder. >> and that's why, mr. engel and i have our legislation that we have over in the senate. because, my observation at the time was that, as you said, it wasn't just banco delta asia, it was a dozen banks all that were willingly doing business in laundering, basically, or doing business with north korea and once those accounts were frozen not only could he not pay his generals but i later talked to defectors who'd worked on the missile program. he said that program came to a halt because we did not have the hard currency. we couldn't even buy the clandestine gyroscopes that we would buy on the black market for those missiles. we couldn't pay for anything. and that's the kind of pressure i think, could cause a regime to recalibrate its thinking. there has to be consequences directly, and it has to impact, you know, the family itself. that run that country. and the best way i can think of doing that is to not give them the hard currency so that those generals are not paid, the army is not paid, and at some point people turn and say there has to be a better way forward than the kind of repression that's going on. and that's why we're trying to jump-start this beyond just sanctions within north korea to the financial sanctions that would truly truly create additional pressure. do you think our legislation, which we had passed in to the senate last year if we get that out of the senate this year, do you think that would be a useful tool? >> we -- you know, you say, chairman, that it was dozens of banks. it was more than dozens of banks. it was hundreds of banks making the decision at the time to not do business with north korea. so we've -- we had that impact. and that's an impact that we're still -- that's a world that we're still living in. so again, you say the goal is to identify financial institutions outside of the -- of north korea that provide these points of access. and that's exactly what we're trying to do. you mention chairman foreign trade bank. i thought that was an extremely significant action. that was north korea's primary source of access to the international financial system. >> true enough. but i would just point out there's a number of small banks that we've been following that are doing business with north korea that frankly, if we really wanted to squeeze, we could cut that off. and if we do cut that off, it becomes very problematic for them to get the resources even to send these hackers, you know to moscow. or in the past they sent them to beijing to get the kind of training. if you cut off the hard currency, these regimes like north korea, cannot carry out the kinds of offensive attacks that they're given to. >> right. and that's exactly what we're trying to do. foreign trade bank daedong bank, these are banks that we have targeted with sanctions. we used section 311 on banco delta asia. the actions that we've taken have caused a chilling effect even within the chinese financial system. even banks major commercial banks within china have cut off their relationship with entities such as foreign trade banks. so i think chairman, that that's exactly the right approach that we should be taking. >> we're on the right road. we just want to accelerate it. dan thanks for being here to testify today. we go now to mr. engel. >> thank you, mr. chairman. testify today. >> thank you. >> we go to mr. engle. >> the charm said that it needs to have a direct impact on the family. when we went to pyongyang, i was there twice, and granted you are limited to what we could we're told essentially where the elites live, so the elites are treated relatively well, while the rest of the country is starving, and that's really the problem. what can be done that would impose meaningful costs to the north korean elites? what other levers would we have to influence them to make sure that it's not a situation where you have elites in the capital doing relatively well, and then we impose sanctions the sanctions hurt all the people that are starving around the country, but the elites basically are untouched. what might we do to make sure they're not caught up in it. >> thank you for the question congressman, i don't think that the misery that's been inflicted on the north korean people can be attributed to sanctions. i think the north korean government bears sole responsibility for the north korean people, but i do take your point that the goal is to try to put pressure on the elites. i think it's precisely but the banks system, because that's where they acquire the hard currency, the luxury goods, the other things that make their lives meened that make the system run as far as the system actually runs. so that's what we are trying to do. we're trying to identify their sources of currency. one of the important sources for example, is conventional arms sales. that's why we targeted eight officials in our recent round the sanctions a couple weeks ago. these are individuals who operate in places like africa who are raising hard currency for the regime, and we're trying to cut off that as a source. as the chairman said, we tried to identify the points of action so they can't repatriate the funds or use the funds they do have. this goes an effort that's been ongoing for ten years. it's a hard target their needs are relatively small, it make it effective when we put or finger on a node we can have impact. so it's an ongoing effort. we're -- i think that gives you the flex ability to really step that up. >> thank you. i'm wondering if any of you can talk about the -- obviously north korea is gaining additional conventional and nuclear capabilities. obviously it seems to us they have emboldened themselves with respect to belligerent activity such as cyberspace. i'm interested in hearing your perspective on that. they pose a great threat not to the region but to the united states directly. what we need to do is continue to strengthen our efforts on sanctions, pressure, but also continue to work on strengthening our current capability on all fronts. i can assure you they have continued to improve their capabilities. we have fully capable of defending against any threat posed by the north koreans and i point to one upcoming example which is our military exercise with south koreans that will be coming up shortly. it's a very important exercise. defense oriented, but very effective exercise that we maintain the strongest possible combined capability, so we are prepared to deal with any threat posed by north korea. >> and don't the north korean usually react hostilely to joint maneuvers between south korea and the united states? we're saying this joint drill we are doing together is routine, and it's not related to a report that north korea is trying to increase its submarine capabilities. whether it is or isn't aren't we likely to see some acting out by north korea as a result of these joint maneuvers? >> sir i don't want to speculate on what the north koreans are planning to do. you're quite correct they don't like our exercises because i think they understand that our exercises strengthen our combined deterrent capability, but they are routine sfm exercises that we have carried out for 40 years. we've been quite open about it, so north korea really has no right to complain about these exercises. >> you mention it had, ambassador, the six-party talks. when we were in the north koreans seemed to be more interested in having two-party talks with the united states rather than the six-party talks. is that still what we find coming from them? >> unfortunately at the movement they don't seemed tore interested in any constructive dialogue with anybody, including the united states. we believe the six-party talks framework still provides a viable forum for discussing this issue. one of the main reasons is the six-party process the north koreans made the most clear commitment to denuclearization and the six-party process also includes the key countries in the region that have a stake in this issue. this is an issue for the whole region, and we have the chinese who actually chair the process the jaapees south korean and russians in the process. i think we need to try to work within the process to make some lasting progress. we find that the elites in north korea find creative ways around the existing sanctions s. obviously. they work through chinese banks, and those banks are not exposed or integrated to the international market. what are we doing to go after these types of institutions? the chinese financial system is integrated into the international financial system. i think one good example of our ability to impact behavior in china was as i had the exchange with chairman royce was our designation of foreign trade bank which is north korea's main commercial bank, the bank through this they do most of their conduct. they acted as you would expect any bank to ask and announced they should cutting foreign trade off from their banks. so we can have an impact on commercial banks in china. that said i think you're exactly right, china does provide north korea the lion's share of access in the financial system. it's a subject i've had discussions with, the chinese many times on and it's something that we need to continue to talk to the chinese about to try to get chinese assistance in making sure their financial system does not provide north korea the opportunity to exchange a proliferation or knit other listed economic at this time. sung and i were talking about it just before this hearing, and i know that sung plans on having this conversation with the chinese as well. so it is a significant issue. one we are focused on. >> we're going to mr. steve chabot. >> this committee has long recognized the growing capabilities of north korea. last year i held two hearings specifically on north korea. it's one of the understandings mo vexing security challenges so just a couple questions. ambassador kim, in june of last year the cybill committee heard testimony from your predecessor, ambassador glen davies, and in his testimony he said china is north korea's quote last remaining patron unquote, however, as chairman royce already mentioned pyongyang has a growing relationship with russia and illicit note works with cunning in the middle east, especially iran. we know that north korea maintains a fairly

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