Transcripts For CSPAN3 Politics Public Policy Today 20140905

And the colonial marines is a e unit that resembles on a much m smaller scale the union color regiments of the civil war in that the officers are white men, but the enlisted men and the ncos are africanamericans. And they are being attracted into the service because theyr not being compelled to it, and indeed, as far as we can tell, f most of the runaways, indeed, tl including most of the men, dont choose to be colonial marines. H some may end up as sailors or ms others work more informally as guides. Many women worked as laundresses and nurses. Hem some of them are serving as paid servants for british officers rh and others go to work for the ts dockyard in bermuda. So theres a whole range of roles, and it is a subset of the men who are serving in the colonial marines and theyre not compelled to do this, though aro there is a great deal of t persuasion applied to encourage them to serve. By the and they are attracted by the fact they will be paid, they re will receive decent clothing fon the first time in their lives. Re they will receive a daily meat r ration for the first time in lis their lives. They will receive a daily in alcohol ration for the first time in their lives. Have they will receive some respect h and they will have the opportunity to plunder and in some cases kill their former masters. Ei now, possessing racial prejudice, because these british and naval officers, again, s. Theyre growing into this role. Dont get the idea that these are William Lloyd garrison fromt the decks of these naval warships. You know, theyve got other g priorities. So theyre not naturalborn abolitionists but they are working up a real good hatred for the United States as this conflict goes along, and theyre trying to think, how can we really stick it to them . Ed for it occurs to them, by liberatind their slaves and using them hem against them. Thats whats going on here. And coburn thought, well, its useful because it draws these people away from their masters. It weakens the economy. Ws the hes not so sure that these young men are going to be effective fighters. Nomy. He said, quote, blackie ar hearabout, thats what he says in 1814 as the drilling has started. Quote, a month later, however, coburn changed his mind upon noticing how well the new recruits responded to their training. T he reported they were, quote, getting on astonishingly and ar. Really fine fellows. They induced me to alter the bad opinion i had of the whole of t their race and i now i believe w these who we are training will end quote. And with glee he noted that this is the news of the colonial marines was alarming the local masters. Quote, they expect blackie will have no mercy on them and they know that he understands bush rt fighting and the locality of thn woods as well as themselves anda can perhaps play hideandseek t in them even better, end quote. And during may and june, he y starts to employ the colonial y marines as part of the rating forces and they are ing systematically targeting militia batteries, particularly along the Eastern Shore and along the Northern Neck of virginia and ig the valley of Southern Maryland. And they perform very admirablye and win the universal praise of British Naval officers. Ill just quote one of them andn again, its coburn but you coulo multiply these quotes. Em quote, how uncommonly and unexpectedly well the blacks have behaved in the several engagements and though one of them was shot and died instantls in the front of the others, it e did not daunt or check the and others in the least but on the r contrary animated them to seek revenge. Now, on the one hand, by recruiting blacks in significan numbers, the british are able tt escalate their shore raids. Latee they are able to go deeper inland than they ever could in 1813. They also need to do so because the british cannot sustain their crews without food drawn from the shores of the chesapeake. And there are more and more people on these warships and on Tangier Island as they are welcoming more refugees. In the first year of this year operation when they were reluctant to take on the refugees, 600 had come to them. I believe that 2,800 went during 1814 which shows the payoff of s the british now welcoming them and aggressively going out and seeking them. T but now they have to feed them on top of their own crews. And so that means they have to accelerate and escalate their rating into the interior to get food, to get livestock, in , particular, but to get hams, to get chickens. Particul they are seeking out food. And they are going to the places where their colonial marines know best, their former neighborhoods. And thats an opportunity, thend for some revenge and its also, more importantly, an opportunitn to get out relatives who have been left behind. Atives w so everybodys purposes are being served by these raids, the purposes of these runaways who e have become colonial marines and the purposes of the british who want to punish the americans and need to get food for their own f crews and this expanding refugee population. Anding they benefit from the nocturnaly knowledge of enslaved peoples who have had to become intimate experts in the landscape. Because they have had to know sn how to navigate it at night ando dodge slave patrols in order for them to meet their friends, to s meet their wives, to meet their children because black families have been split up in this period of time and tend to live on different farms and plantations. Ity is so the black community is maintained by nocturnal travel. They are the experts in this landscape. They know it better than their masters who allegedly own ity. Ma ape and it is that knowledge that w passes to the british. And we can find both in british. Sources very eloquent statements about how better informed and h more secure they are now that id they have blacks as their guides and as their light infantry in e the form of these colonial bu marines, but we also find it from american officers. One of them, Brigadier General john p. Hungerford of virginia i said, quote, our negroes are flocking to the enemy from all quarters which they convert into troops, vindictive. With the most minute knowledge of every bypass. Ost they leave us as spies upon our post and return upon us as guides and soldiers in incendiaries. Rn it was by the aid of these guides that ambushes were formed everywhere in the woods. From this cause alone, the enem have a great advantage over us in a country where the passes h and biways, through our innumerable necks and swamps arr so little known to but very fewa of our officers and men in through which the enemy can penetrate and be conducted withf so much ease by these refugee blacks, end quote. And this is the same modern artist imagination of the colonial marines engaged in onei of these raids at benedict maryland, and it shows them nedt destroying some kegs of alcoholh in the foreground. In the middle ground, you see a British Naval officer directingd a black family to safety and freedom in british boats that are just out of the scene here t and in the distant background you see an american sailing shit being burned. Ckgrou so the whole range of activitieg that colonial marines would havo been involved with, several of o their activities are combined il this one imagined reconstruction of their activities. Now, the point i want to make is that this raiding would not havk been as effective without the colonial marines that transformed british operations. Here is a map done and i am grateful to ralph for sharing this with me. This shows the variety of targets the british had in 1813, the first year. Year. And youll see that its fairly randomly scattered along the bay, east and west, north and south, by the maritime targets are the prince targets and thats indicated by these west, symbols for sailing ships. If we go to 1814, well see a very different nature of british attacks. Many more shore raids and they are concentrated particularly along the Northern Neck of nt nr virginia and in Southern Maryland, either along the r shores of potomac on the rticulr maryland side but especially along the patuxent river. Eck o the british are targeting them for a reason. P one, there are a lot of black people there eager to get out and help the british. These are also the pathways or should say the waterways that lead to washington, d. C. , and coburn has been looking for the opportunity to get to washington. He did not have that opportunity in 1813. Now he has it in 1814. What he must first do is soften up and eliminate militia resistance along one of these two corridors. The virginians are much more republican than the marylanders of Southern Maryland and they fight a lot harder, so coburn decides that the resistance is eliminated much more quickly and earlier because most of the People Living in Southern Maryland dont really want to be part of this war at all. O be and they certainly dont want to deal with superior british ant forces that are now wellguided by the local experts in the landscape. And it is because of this that the british are able to land t without any opposition at benedict in midaugust of 1814 a and they are able to advance to the upper reaches of the river and to approach the very mida outskirts of washington, d. C. , t again, without any opposition te because that opposition has already been eliminated by the raids of the summer. And they were able to brush aside militia resistance which e it belatedly appears at bladensburg and push into washington, d. C. , where they le famously burn the public edly buildings. Here is a very famous image of that. And you will notice, theres not a single black face represented in this, which is all too common among representations of battles of the war of 1812. They are presented as lily White Affairs in almost all cases. The colonial marines were very much present in the occupation of washington, d. C. , and in the burning of the white house and h the capitol. Now, so my argument today has been that the colonial marines and black refugees in general transform the british operationc in the chesapeake and make it far more effective and nes destructive to the americans it than had been their operation in 1813 when they did not have the same level of support and erican assistance from black americans. Now, this is an image that is produced. Im going to get this magic l arrow out of the way, which is. Not part of the original image. You may recognize this structure. Its the u. S. Capitol building. This was produced in 1817 by a critic of american slavery, an american critic of american slavery named jesse torrey and jesse torrey wants you to thinks about the destruction of the Capitol Building and wants you to draw certain conclusions from it and those conclusions that he wants you to reach are indicated by the other figures hes put in this particular engraving. You can see down here in this ia right foreground, a group of enslaved africanamericans, a slave coffle. In washington, d. C. , was a major center for the interstate slave trade of the United States which is accelerating in this very period of time. And, indeed, although i certainly find it impressive that 3,400 africanamericans cel will escape to freedom during the war of 1812 from the icana chesapeake, it is probably that something on the order of 60,000 enslaved chesapeake slaves weree moved deeper south into the slad harsher slavery of the deep south during the same period of time. And jesse torrey is commenting on that. Ave we have a slave trader who is there with a group of enslaved n people, men, women and childreno and then just so you will willer get the message, we have a couple of other figures floating in the sky. Two lady liberties who are s when you put together the threea components of this, the message is that the u. S. Capitol burnedt for the sins of the United States in sustaining slavery ino the land devoted to freedom. Now, the last thing i want to show you is the only photographu that we know of of one of the runaways from the war of 1812. This is gabriel hall. He came from calvert county, maryland. He was born probably in 1801. Gl he was 13 years old when he escaped, so about the same age n that willis had been. 13 and this is a photograph taken much later in life, in 1891, wi when he was 90 years old. Llis and he was a prospering farmer in nova scotia, which is where approximately 2,800 of the refugees from the war of 1812 end up after the war as free people. Ng that had survived and maybe those additional images will po8 up by right now this is our onlo chance to look at the face of someone who from the Africanamerican Community experienced the events that iv discussed today. T ive thank you very much. [ applause ] so im happy to take any questions you may have. Yes, please . [ inaudible question ] yes. Okay. So ill repeat the question. Where do the british take the refugees at the end of the war . During the war, they are being i taken to Tangier Island, to bermuda, a major British Naval base and is the central headquarters for the operation , on the chesapeake. O other main British Naval base ip north america is at halifax, nova scotia. So probably about 1,200 during the war years are moved on to nova scotia and then another 1,600 are moved on to nova scotia from bermuda or from the sea islands of georgia where the british also operated at the very end of the war. So were getting about 2,800 who go to nova scotia. We weve got another approximatelyt 360 who go to new brunswick, another of the maritime provinces. And probably about 1,000, including most of the colonial marines who go to the west Indian Island of trinidad. Professor allgor talked about and in trinidad they have their most successful experience a. Distinct identity. Professor and in trinidad they have their most successful experience. And they manage to maintain distinct communities in a distinct identity. Professor allgor talked about identity formation in her presentation. This particular community in trinidad has maintained its cohesion, and they call themselves to this day the merikans to distinguish themselves from the many other peoples of color in trinidad. So they dropped the a. They turned the c into a k. And theyre merikins and a fair number of them have subsequently become immigrants in england or in the United States. But they are still very proud about being merikins. Yes . [ inaudible ] the british was integrated. So why didnt the royal navy apply the lessons in louisiana that it arguably should have learned from the chesapeake . Well, the british do. So the British Forces in the chesapeake include two regiments of from the west indies. The black west indian regiments. So the british are really in the forefront of deploying people of color in their military. They do so in india and they also do so in the west indies. So 2 3 were actually black people when the war of 1812 begins. The United States is extremely reluctant to employ even free blacks in its military. It does so in the navy and the privateers, so free black americans make a major contribution to the u. S. War effort in the navy and the privateers but are not allowed in the u. S. Army until the very end of the war when policy suddenly changes because the United States is basically on the ropes militarily and is desperate for men. The only place where a significant number of black men are employed in the United States army is at new orleans by Andrew Jackson. There are two battalions of free blacks were employed and probably another battalion of enslaved people promised their freedom but Andrew Jackson. This employment outraged the local whites of louisiana. So Andrew Jackson is going out on a limb and hes a slaveholder himself in tennessee but this shows you how desperate he was for men to fend off this british attack which included back soldiers. Unfortunate, or fortunate, whatever side you want to put, unfortunate or fortunate on in this war, jackson wins bigtime and then he reneges on his promise to the black soldiers. He promised them freedom and then said, sorry, youre not going to be freed because i really dont have that power. Yes . Thank you for a superb presentation. Thank you. Clifford from warrenton, virginia. I question the effectiveness of a 1,000 broadside circulation to a population that cannot read by reality, the effectiveness of their inability to read. And i also question the notion that white virginians, marylanders, would discuss the circulation of this broadside to their enslaved people. Can you address that . Yes, i can. Two very good questions. One is, there is much greater literacy among the slaves in this period of time than i think weve recognized. This is probably the peak period for literacy among enslaved people. A couple of reasons. One is, its not illegal yet to teach slaves to read and write in virginia. That will become illegal in 1832. In the wake of nat turners revolt. Until then, theres an actual fair amount of teaching slaves to read and write, particularly artisans and house slaves. The other thing is, this is also a period in which the vast majority of enslaved people in chesapeake have become christians and theyre usually methodist or baptist and their class leaders or teachers would like many of them to be able to read the bible. So theres much more literacy than we have bargained on and you dont need everybody to be able to read it. He can read it to everybody else. The other thing is that people in america are lousy at keeping secrets. They are the worlds worst people at keeping secrets and this comes back to bite them all time in the war of 1812. You get officers in the front line writing letters about how terrible their troops are and theyre not prepared and theyre sick and they get published in the newspapers of that time. People talk about stuff. They cant stop themselves from talking. So we live in a society now where weve been conditioned for the last three generations to try to keep secrets militarily and our government has become better and better at trying to keep these secrets. So it can be hard for us to understand this time where people were just blabbing away about everything. And we get this notion that black people and white people live in separate worlds. At that time, they didnt. And youll get these virginians were who frankly say, we have an internal enemy and they are waiting on our tables, they are working in the fields next to us and they are hanging on everything we say and anything we say is being reported to the enemy. Thank you very much. Youre welcome. Thank you for the questions. Yes, ralph . Why didnt the british [ inaudible ] why didnt that keep going . Okay. Well, this goes to the points that andrew makes. The british dont want to be in this war. You know, sometimes these naval officers work up these real good fantasies about how great it would be to break up the United States and really stick it to the americans. But thats never the official policy of their government at home. Their policy at home is, lets get out of this war as soon as we can so they want to inflict pain on the United States but not with a goal really at the official government level of breaking up the United States, but of just getting them to give in and make a peace treaty as quickly as possible. So if we compare you know, at the peak, the colonial marines is a unit in the chesapeake of 360 men. Youre not going to topple slavery with 360 men. In the union force that would end up toppling slavery had 360,000 black troops. Its a whole other scale of things. And thats because the unions goal was not to try to negotiate a solution. It was to crush the south. And they realized the only way that they could crush the confederacy was to enlist thousands of africanamericans to help them do it. And the british never get to that point because the war goals are so much more limited for the british and at the end of the day, what do the british want . They want the United States to go back to being their number one trading partner in the world. They want to be able to resume business and thats not going to be so good if youve totally destroyed the slave system in the United States. So the goal of the policy is to inflict pain on the United States, get them to give in and then go back to a more peaceful and trading relationship that is profitable to british manufacturers again. Yes . Im doing research on the slaves get on board the potomac squadron that came up the Potomac River after the burn in washington. And the ship logs the british ship logs show they picked up slaves on several occasions and even trained some of the slaves on board the decks in small arms in preparation for fighting the americans. And ive looked at the depositions that youve looked at so well described in your book. In these same depositions by the landowners that are filed after the war and give these wonderful stories about how the slaves got to the british, they seem to be you can tell the landowners or the neighbors are making a big point on whether or not they went on their own accord or were forcibly taken. So i would like for you to speak about that. Yeah. So slave masters dont like to see these escapes as a referendum on their conduct as masters because they like to believe that theyve actually treated their enslaved people, in their view, well. And so they preferred to believe that the british have come in and forced people away or but sometimes you find out what this force means, and it means they come in and theyve told the slaves that theyll have a better life if theyll go away with them. And from the perspective of masters in the chesapeake, these are just lies. That theyre not going to have a better life with the british. So the overwhelming majority of people in virginia and maryland do not believe that the british are at all sincere in what theyre doing and that these slaves are going to end up ruining the day they ran away from their masters. Now, theres abundant evidence that this is not true. And there are a handful of slaves who do choose to go back to their masters at the end of the war. You can number them on the fingers of a hand. Whereas youve got over 3,000 that prefer to stay with the british. And its also untrue, its a canard that just lives on and that the british sold at least some of them into renewed slavery in the war of 1812, and there is zero evidence that this happened. Yes . Peter. Does a slave revolt have any effect on the military operations of the americans . Yes, very much so. Particularly on the ability to muster militia. So the United States has a major manpower problem of its own, which is it doesnt have enough men to invade canada properly. And theyre sending almost all of their regular troops to invade canada which leaves the defense of the coast overwhelmingly to state militias who are not trained and equipped or motivated for this job in any prolonged way, but theyre out there month after month obliged to serve in harsh conditions with inadequate equipment and food and a lot of them are being pulled in from the piedmont to the tidewater and they dont like it, and one of the things that they keep coming up with why they shouldnt have to go down to norfolk and die of malaria, which is the number one killer of american troops in the chesapeake is malaria at norfolk which is a graveyard for these militiamen. The reason they come up with is, the slaves are probably going to rise up and revolt if the militias pulled out of piedmont and went to the coast. The irony is, by all measures of violence, such as arson, poisoning, murdering of masters, even running away in the piedmont goes way down during the war. Because there are so many militiamen marching back and forth on these roads that actually the slaveholders in piedmont are in more secure control than they were in peacetime. The reverse is true in tidewater where enslaved people can see the british warships, they can hear the british warships because coburn very thoughtfully has his band playing as they go up and down. Coburn liked to call attention to himself. He also liked to call attention because he knew that if that enslaved people would come the night after they heard this warship loudly moving up and down lets say the rappahannock. Were the slaves who escaped house servants and artisans or were they which is what i would expect. Theres a broad occupational range that slaves have in the chesapeake, and every occupation they have including field hand is very well represented. What i did find was that the number who were artisans or house slaves, they are disproportionately represented among the runaways. What that means is, i am not saying they were a majority. Because a majority are probably field hands as was a majority of the enslaved population. But the proportion of those who run away who are artisans and house slaves is larger than the proportion of the enslaved population. And we find the same pattern in the civil war. That the people who are who feel most aggrieved by slavery are those who have a little more education, a little higher skill, and are much clearer that their ambitions are being stifled. And the british are presenting an opportunity for freedom, what freedom means to a lot of former slaves is the opportunity to finally get the worth of their skill and to be able to hold their families together. And this is appealing across the board but the people who kind of work up the courage to make the attempt are disproportionately artisans and this shocks the hell out of their shockers thinking, these are the people weve been best to, and they should be most loyal to us, and theyre not. We get the same kind of rhetoric come out of slaveholders in the civil war when they are shocked their own house slaves would betray them. Okay. Thank you very much. [ applause ] here are some highlights for this coming weekend. Today live at 10 00 a. M. On cspan, the Nebraska Supreme Court will hear oral argument on the keystone xl pipeline. Saturday, former fcc commissioners, with campaign 2014 gearing up, watch the latest debates on cspan. Tonight at 8 00 eastern on American History tv, authors and historians talk about the burning of washington in the war of 1812. Find our Television Schedule at cspan. Org. Our coverage of the White House Historical session symposium on the war of 1812 and the burning of washington, d. C. , continues with university of virginia historian john stagg. This is a little more than an hour. With that, let me introduce with great pleasure dr. John stagg, professor of history at the university of virginia, and the editor of the James Madison papers where hes edited so far 20 of these critical volumes of madisons personal correspondence. And wed like another 20, john, if you think you could fit that in in the next few years. [ inaudible ] because of the work of john and his team, we have much more complete understanding of madison and the context of his life and really we cannot have done our work of James Madisons montpelier without this incredible research. Today hes going to illuminate the intricacies of madison, as well as the perpetually fluctuating cabinet and madisons later Life Reflections on his thought about the war. So please, join me now in welcoming our colleague and and our mentor, dr. John stagg. [ applause ] thank you, cathy for the warm welcome. I would like to add my thanks to the previous speakers and to the organizers of the conference today. As the bicentennial of the war approached, i found myself saying what was the federal government and washington going to do about the bicentennial war of 1812 . It was entirely predictable that the great state of maryland would have a party, particularly in 2014 because the great state of maryland thinks it has a franchise on the star spangledbanner and the nations flag. Im glad to say that we are doing something here today. And, as i say, im grateful to the conference organizers for that. Let me start with some very general remarks about the nature of James Madisons historical reputation. For the first half of the 20th century, i think, madisons standing was not high. The main reason for that was the war of 1812, which i dont think i need to belabor here at the moment. One of the most frustrating and unpopular wars ever waged by the United States. But there was also the impression that madison was really just a pale clone of thomas jefferson. He didnt have a clear sense of madison as a distinctive personality. He stood too much in the shadow of jefferson. Theres also another factor, that was that madison, at a certain point in his life, contributed not insignificantly to theories of nullification that drove the nation towards civil war in 1861. Remember the virginia and kentucky resolutions of 1798. That was held against madison by National Historians a long time ago. So if you looked at these rankings of prisons, youd find that madison was always in the bottom half. Admittedly, he wasnt right down there, but he was not thought of very highly. Well, some strange things happened since then. If you look at current president ial rankings, youll see now that madison is ahead of 44 president s to date. Madison is now in the top 20. Hes not way down there like he was before. Recently, i saw a poll that said madison was number six. Now, im not quite sure how to explain this. Im just going to ask you to take my word for it at the moment. In fact, such a poll does exist. I want to Say Something about how we might explain this. I say this without selfreverance or flattery. I think it does something to th. I think it does something to the appearance of modern Founding Fathers editions in the second half of the 19th century. We now have a much clearer idea than previous generations of what madison contributed and how he might be compared to his contemporaries. On that process, i think madison has generally come to fair pretty well. Hes emerged as an extensive figure. It might also owe something to the phenomenon sometimes referred to as founding sheik. Madison has generally had his figure burnished. I might tend to suspected that as we become more satisfied since the 1960s; there was more competitions in places at the bottom rankings. [ laughter ] ive had the effect of pushing up the standing of president s from a very distinct past. However, it does remain a problem with the war of 1812. Even in the era of the bicentennial, americans are confused about this war. Theyre confused why it occurred. The campaign to this war was by no means clear that the United States was a victim. The best, many historians say, the nation managed unmuddled. So i think its something of a paradox. The historical reputation of the present rising, in the war of 1812, has not. Someone said more about that paradox. If you take almost any book on the war of 1812, and there are a great many books on the war of 1812 from the past two centuries of the event, its easy to pull out half a dozen factors or problems which contribute to its unsatisfactory progress and rather ambiguous outcomes. Some historians relate this directly to madison. They say its his fault. Others can describe it as a problem which madison, as president , had to contend with, but he didnt do a very good job of overcoming. So what can we say about madison himself . My serious charge is that he did not want this war. And how thats any of the other factors that determine the government of the war. So our first question is whos war was it . Was it madisons or was it the war hawks . Most historians favor the war hawks. The critical developments that face the final path on the way to the war occurred between march and july of 1811. In march of 1811, madison learned of the war and lapsed into his final bout of insanity. It was assumed they might then modify the fractions. Now, ma day soften read these reportings. And he sensed there was a chance for american relations. And to take advantage of that possibility, he brought into his cabinet james monroe. There were a number of reasons he did this. But one reason was that monroe had previously served as the american minister in london and had formed some personal relations with some british politicians who were expected to become british ministers. Now,this was a window of opportunity. The region never changed. And for that reason, british policy towards the United States remained unchanged. Now, admittedly the region did make a conciliatory gesture to the United States by sending a new minister to washington in the summer of 1811. Madison knew that george iiis old ministers were not likely to ease up. Now this prediction should come to pass, madison concluded he should have a much stronger policy of resistance towards Great Britain than he has done in the past. Now, how do we know this . We know this because of an editorial in the administration newspaper. Oh, sorry. Okay. All right. I wasnt looking behind me. Yes. Onwards and upwards. Yes, how do we know this . Because an editorial in the administration newspaper, the national intelligence, the newspaper that coburn trashed when he burned washington in 1814, it said as much. And we know from a surviving fragment of the diary of the paper, joseph gales, that madison had dictated the contents of that editorial to the editor. So what that means is that as early as the spring of 1811, madison was considering very seriously the need to go to war with Great Britain. And this is seven months before the 12th congress and the war hawks even meet in washington. They would continue with these policies for as long as it took r took for them to end this vk  abomination of the affairs of europe. Now, this was 1811. In 1811, nobody was predicting that Napoleon Bonaparte would be gone. You might have made that prediction after 1812 and 1813, but in 1811, nobody was counting on napoleon going away any time soon. So in response to that situation, madison at the end of july 2811 called the 12th congress into an early session. His reason for doing so was that he had decided he now had no other option but to prepare for a war against Great Britain. Again, he took this decision weeks and weeks before the 12th congress met in washington before congressmen knew what policies they might have to pass judgment. So how can we say that war hawks forced madison into a war he did not want . Quite simply, we cannot say that and should not say that. Its one of these myths thats very hard to kill off, but its simply not true. The role of the war hawks, in fact, was very different. They were not the macons of american policy towards Great Britain. Maybe its spokesmen worked its way through committees and votes in the house of representatives as congress prepared for war in the 36 months after november 1811, but the prong mover of american policy here is not congress. It is president madison himself. And shake policy throughout the war of 1812. How well did this work for him as commander in chief . The answer is a rather mixed one. In most cases, the policies the odd M Administration passed the house of representatives, not the senate. The reason is the not is not controlled by a majority of republican votes. Now, rather the Senate Administration supports in the senate could often be out maneuvered of federalists and republicans who didnt like James Madison very much. The result was that the administration did not get what it wanted or it didnt get it in a sufficiently, timely manner. The differences between what the administration wanted and what they got had an adverse effect on the policy throughout the war of 1812. This could be demonstrated in a number of ways. Ill give an example. One is the decision to expand the size of the American Army in the First Six Months of 1812. The other example is all the debates over how you financed the war in the second half of 1814. When the war is going extremely badly with the United States. To put it simply, the expanded army was a bureaucratic nightmare. That the War Department never got full control over. By the end of 1814, the United States is facing severe financial difficulties. Congress cannot pass legislation in ways that solve the problems. The situation got so bad, i think somebody mentioned, by the end of 1814, the United States has, in fact, defaulted on the national debt. I should adhere, nobody in this room should Tell Congress this is happening. We do not want to encourage bad behavior on the part of the National Legislators any time in the near future. But thats what did happen towards the end of the war. Now what would madison have done about this or could he have done . He had no hold over congressmen. He did not bargain for votes. He did not use patronage and government contracts to get votes and he did not, we might imagine Lyndon Johnson doing, go up to a congressman, seize him and said son, i need your vote. I imagine that scenario is too, impossible at this point in American History. The problem is, not that madison did not try to influence congress. He did try to influence what they did within the means available to him at that time. The president did not have power to get control over the outcomes he sought. All right. Lets move to another question. How did madison manage his cabinet and the administration during the war . I think the answer is a mixed one. To summarize, from 1809 and 1817, which is madisons tenure at the white house, madison had two secretaries of state, three attorneys general, four three secretaries of the navy, four secretaries of the treasury and four secretaries of the war. You can see why a number of historians said he couldnt hold his cabinet together to save himself. Im not going to review his entire history of madison relations with his cabinet. Ill just hit on the higher points. Obviously, there are Serious Problems in the War Department. Madisons first secretary of war, a man, had very few ideas about strategy or tactics. He was largely a bureaucrat. The way it was organized at this point, compelled him to act as glorified Quarter Master general. He was forced out at the year of 1812 and was replaced with james monroe who could have handled the details of the War Department and of course, it was monroe who comes back to the War Department after the british burned the public buildings in washington in august of 1814, but much of what monroe did was designed to position himself to become president in 1817. Enacting in that way, he fuelled a bitter feud with the secretary of war who actually held the war for most of 1813 and 1814. The problem was armstrong wanted to be president in 1817. As a consequence, neither armstrong or monroe lost the opportunity to undercut each other throughout the war. This was sort of a pattern of misconduct, this behavior, if you like, that culminated when the british attacked washington. On that occasion, some of you will note that armstrong declined to participate 100 in the arrangement of the capital while monroe has been accused of medaling with the organization of the troops at the battle of blatsburg that probably facilitated the British Advance on washington. And i feel most americans feel madison should have stopped this. Firearm strong armstrong or monroe. And he seemed to be too willing to tolerate colleagues who were clearly self serving. The question is why . The problemious i think lies in his personality. He was not confrontational in style. He liked to avoid pleasantness, if he possibly could. But the real problem was madison had most difficulty getting anyone to serve in the cabinet at all. He went through candidates throughout the war. Just trying to get someone to serve the job. He got far more refusals than acceptances. The reality, too few politicians thought that a cabinet position was worth the sacrifices entailed. Madison usually had to settle for what he could get. Now, lets say the affairs are reactive rather than the proactive quality to much of madisons decisionmaking. And he of the appeared to deal with problems only when they had gotten out of hand and it was impossible to ignore any further. Now, in the matters of wartime policy, he spent too much time pursuing the wrong strategies after 1812. Now, what this means specifically is when the americans invaded canada, the United States attacked in canada. The british power in north america rested on that control of montreal, quebec and maritime promises. But the americans, instead of going after them, fretted away their resources around lake erie. All this is true enough. It cannot be denied. I think that situation did not arise from the understanding of the strategic requirements of the victory. Almost every year of the war, it was clearly understood that montreal was the first and most important target for the americans to get control of. After that, they could move on. The campaigns in the regions with montreal were made either in response to the need to devote more resources to local defense, particularly against hostile indians on the northwest frontier of the United States or taken to places with much greater strategic significance. The problem was that many of these agreements failed and in their failures, they created new authorities that required attention and resources. The result was that the United States became bogged down in a series of conflicts that did not doppler according to any coherent strategy of how the larger war might be won. If thats the case t problem of the american war effort was not so much of an effective strategy as the inability to develop sufficient military power to surmount the other obstacles success. So, moving on, what were these obstacles to success . And how far could madison be held responsible for. Most of them center around three factors. One is the defects in the u. S. Army. Second and related to that is an overreliance on untrained militia and the war and the third one was the inability of the United States to cope with the lodgistic problems of invading canada to the north. Now, itss already been mentioned today that the annex was too small to take canada. Most estimates of its size by the end of the war was only a little more of 30,000 men strong. However, a Statistical Analysis of the registers in the surviving military equals to the period, suggest that they were probably somewhere near about 48,000 in the u. S. Army by the end of the war. Thats a fairly significant difference. Its about 15,000 men. On top of that, you have to consider in terms of manpower, the United States had an advantage over canada of about 151 in terms of the population. You put all of that together and you would think the United States would be able to defeat canada. But it was not. One reason is that after the failures of the First Six Months of the war, political pressures on the administration required a great regular troops around the coasts was after the failures of the war. There is the possibility that they would have to deal with more mo bible British Forces they they do in 1813 and 1814. That left few troops available against canada. Even at the height of the war, in the summer of 1814, the United States could take no more than 4,000 regular troops into canada and the invasion. The army fought incredibly in 1814, there simply werent enough men to dispose the british positions on the peninsula or the northern shores of lake ontario, which will then have them advance further eastward. Now, we turn to the matter, what we say about the quality of these troops. How well were they trained . They were scarcely trained. I want to be careful what im saying here. Im not saying the army received no training, it did receive training of various sorts. The real problem was that the army had no uniform system of training. In fact, the United States employed three compatible methods to train throughout the war of 1812. This created enormous difficulties for generals and higher offices who had to try to meld men in trained and different ways into a unified force that was trained in a unified and single way. And under the military operations at the time, training troops would always beat untrained troops. It is, in fact, not until january 1815, that britain convened to address the problem on how to train the army and what is the uniform method. But january of 1815, the war has one month to run. So is the president responsible for this . Should madison have solved this problem . We said we need to train the army. You might say that he did, but you might say that this is a sort of problem that the secretary of war can sort out. But theres no evidence that anyone in the War Department had the slightest idea that this was a problem. They were to take offices like Winfield Scott who learned the hard way by the harsh experience of what it took. n to train men under arms. And above all, to teach them not to run from the enemy as they do. Now, because of that, it was always necessary to supplement with militia. And and if the regular army was not very well trained, the situation was far worse. The federal government had the authority to call the militias into National Service under specified conditions. But it had no authority for specialized training. Those matters were left to the states. And, basically, the states did nothing about it. Despite the fact that president s and secretaries of war said we have a problem here. Congress refused. As a result, the worst fiascos that occurred in the war of 1812 always associated defects of the militia. One is the battle of queenstown heights in october of 1812 when the new york state militia refused to cross over to reinforce american regular troops who had managed to gain a toe hold on the shore of the river. The new york militia refused on the ground, but the constitution did not oblige them. 1814, a motley crue of militia and others before a british army who was twothirds of his size. The third problem i mentioned was logistic problems. That has always been seen as a very serious problem in the american war. Now, besides by deciding to attack canada, the United States had committed itself to an offensive war that was to be waged over a frontier that was over 1,000 miles in length and required to supply from towns and cities. Demographic and geographic realities are more than frontier. Basically t population was far too sparse to have more. You just couldnt throw an army up there and say feed yourself and march on the british. It was much more complicated than that. The problem was the United States had a very rudimentary supply agencies near the 19th century. As a result, many had to be created from scratch. So its not terribly surprising. There were enormous inefficiencies and problems in getting these supply agencies up and running and to do their job. Now all these factors, you will find, have been discussed at great length in books on the war of 1812. I think we need to place them in some sort of broader perspective in order fo to understand why the war of 1812 was so unsatisfactory. How did madison think about these problems and did he ever say it in his correspondence . For the war years, it was disappointing because madison did not write down much. Beyond saying, of course, he was disa pointed that the war was not going to plan. There are some leaders rk at kat mentioned from madison in which he does reflect on the problems that he encountered during the war of 1812. I wanted to Say Something about those leaders now. They date from the mort of february, 1827. Madison was responding to questions of two people. Now the first point to make is that nowhere does madison take the blame of anything that went wrong. From that respect he was entirely uninformed about the decision he made in the war. He said why do we have to go to war . Well, it was the british. The british would only be more reasonable, even by the matter of only a few weeks. In response to the charge, it was put to him that his administration failed to press the administration for adequately. He said it was congress fault. If they had given me the laws i wanted and the shape and time i wanted them, i think we would have seen, he said, a very different picture. On top of that, madison said and perhaps he shouldnt have said this, by the way, invading canada, theres a very difficult what he was referring to here was the experiences the british had and which the americans themselves had encountered in the opening years of the revolutionary war when two american armies failed to take and hold quebec in months of the American Revolution. Madison summed it up in the following way. I quote, the difficulties by the forest be penetrated, savages to be uncounted and the likes to be parched in order to reach distant theater at home, in the midst of the resources. Madison also listed two other factors he considered to be paramount. One has already been alluded to in previous talks. That was the failure of napoleons invasion of russia in 1812. This is a subject that caused enormous controversy and continued to cause controversy since. But 1927 madison expected napoleon to defeat the russians and take them out of the war. He said had he been successful in the war in 1812, it would be, this is his words, a fair calculation, close quote, Great Britain would have been so fully employed to deal with the consequences of a french victory that Great Britain is not able to defend canada under those circumstances. Madison said the british would have had no choice and i quote, again, but to listen to our reasonable terms of reconciliation, close quote. The other factor that matters at great length is the poor quality of american generals during the war. If you read any history of war of 1812, its one of the longest catalogs you can read about sad people who dont know what their job is and complain about it and found countless excuses. Now, we might say ill becomes madison to complain about the generals, after all, he signed the commission for most of them and had a role in selecting them. But, when we look at this later, at the war closely, we see that madison is not so much intent on blaming all the generals as he was in faulting one general in particular. That general was william hull, who was supposed to have commenced the war in the summer of 1812 by invading canada from the american town of detroit. Then he withdrew about two weeks later. For this, he was court marshalled and sentenced to death. Madison actually reprieved the death sentence, though not the verdict of the court. He had good reasons for his decision. Basically, he did not trust his army to do the job. He assumed they would fail in advance. If he said he hadnt tried to invade canada and failed, the result would be a massacre of all the women and children in the town of detroit. Now, madison was not very sympathetic towards holland when he fought back about this. It was 1827. Nor have most historians since 1812 been very sympathetic. Madison said his experience and knowledge should have led him to take greater risks. He did, then he wrote, and i quote, what a contrast would be the success so easily at the outset of the war. A triumphant army and hastened at the points below. Thoo thats going toward the ocean. The important command of lake erie had fallen to us. The indians could be neutral or submissive to our will. Enthusiasm and accelerated volunteers would have stepped forward and doubled confidence and the intrigues would have been smothered in their embryo state. Close quote. In short, what madison was claiming here, that the United States never recovered from the opening defeat of the war. The impact of this setback was so serious, it hampered all other aspects of the prosecution, the war. This is at least an arguable case. The historians continued to argue about it. That was how madison saw it at the time. Now, drawing this all together, what am i trying to say here . That is that all the argument that is historians usually put forward to explain what went wrong in the war of 1812, can be offset by others. The circumstances of other factors that needed to be weighed in the balance before measured judgment can be made. Madisons role as commander in chief. In other words, we can have carried the process on endlessly, add qualification after qualification to the judgment with the excess qualifications. Now, two verdicts might be reached in this point. One is to throw out their hands in despair and say with the problems of waging a successful war after 1812 were so difficult. The real error madeson made was to have gone to war at all. The nation was in no condition to be waging war. Now you might say this is true enough. Seem to back up with judgment. How it is simply put, that would have left mad son with no solution to the problems the nation was facing as he understood them in the year 1811. Thats the year he was making critical decisions. The other point we might make is we lack appropriate yardsticks to measure madisons performance at this point in the nations history. Today, all models for success in a presidency draw heavily on the presidencys of Abraham Lincoln and franklin roosevelt. But americans near the 19th century lacked relevant precincts. George washingtons role as a revolutionary war general isnt really appropriate. And that was first used here. Early 19th century americans, madison held deeply engrained fears about the potential abuse of executive power in the time of war. The way they saw it, that was a short road to monarchy and tyranny. To the extent that madison did think about the power, they did not believe it was the role of the president to rally the troops or the public at large. Other words, it wasnt the president s job to go out and campaign personally for the war he was trying to wage. Madison had seen john adams try to do something similar at the end of the 90s. He thought madison was absolutely out of his mind. He far exceeded the priorities of legitimate executive power. These concerns led madison to act with great restraint during the war, rather than listen to the dangers of going to excess. Now, that might seem fitting, but the picture need not be so bleak. There were all these failures his tor yans talk about. There were successes and achievements. If the United States did not decisively win the military contest, it did not lose the war, either. And the british cannot and should not claim that because the americans did not achieve their state of war aims, that the british or canadians won the war. By the summer of 1814, the british, again, had staked out some fairly large claims that they might advance against the United States. Weve heard talk of the indian butter state and there was talk about altering the boundaries of the United States to make sure Great Britain has control of the great lakes and river and things like that. The point about all this is in 1814, the british armies failed to deliver the goods. And the british army failed despite the fact they managed to get washington in the course of the failure. When the terms of the treaty came out, it was the british who felt they had lost something and the americans felt they had won something. The british were somewhat embarrassed that they had not been able to dispose of such a power of the United States more inclusively than they seem to have done. This is why many historians have decided the war of 1812 was merely a draw. I dont find that entirely satisfactory. A draw, to me, implies that two evenly matched forces failed to achieve success in a contest. Fwu United States and Great Britain were not evenly matched after 1812. There are notable asymmetries on both sides which, in fact, made it difficult. The war then ended not so much as a draw, but a stalemate that was born of inability of a conference to find ways to continue conflict. Having come to that point, both eventually did settle for a piece that restored the status quo. And that peace was in 1814. We might quantify that a little further. Nobody won, we might say, but that does not mean there were no losers in the war. All historians agree the real losers in the war in 1812 were the indian peoples. A good many of who fought on the side of the british. But a significant number also fought on the side of the United States. Americans tend to forget some indians fought for the americans during the war of 1812. Regardless of their choices, all indian partisans lost heavily. They suffered disproportionately the casualties. In 1814 and 1815, they were forced to see large areas of land to the United States. And these land sessions, particularly above the gulf coast and the regions to the south and the great lakes, ensured that the United States was going to dominate the hartland of the American Continent in the future. I say that because this is an outcome that could not have been taken for granted in 1811. But those outcomes, for the war of 1812, set the stage for future americans until the time we get to 1848, there is no doubt that the United States is the supreme power and that the survival of the Great Britains canadian colonies is going to be a large matter of american goodwill or toleration for the british. Now madison presided over these developments that made a crucial role in shaping the development of the american nation state in the 19th century. And the influence fell well into the late 19th century. He did this part at the same time trying to preserve his oc[n vision of what sort of nation the United States should be. And he did not use the emergence of war to bring about changes of its government. The war of 1812, as historians would like to remind us, was one of the few wars in the nations history that was fought without any restrictions on the Civil Liberties of its critics or other people of the nation. And that was a decision that madison was determined to uphold. He did not, as ive already mentioned, want to seek the policies of the alien sedition acts that president john adams had resorted to between 1698 and 1900 during the quasi war in france. So this is a rather tangled picture, admittedly. But in the complicated nature of developments, there were some successes. And i think madison probably should be given credit to some of them. Thank you very much. [ applause ] the floor is open. Yes. Do i recognize you . Or am i speaking out of turn . If you want to, you can, yes, sir. Given the fact the congress did declare a war, given the fact madison did not like to grab lapels or campaign, why is it the american historians make madison the only president who is given sole ownership of a war . Well, im not quite sure i would agree with the premise. People said pretty uncharitable things about mr. Bolts war in the 1840s. I think its inconceivable there would have been a war with mexico at that time if polk had not insisted on it for his own reasons. But i think, to come back to the premise of your question, the answer probably is that madison seems to be a convenient scapegoat. We have Unrealistic Expectations of what a president might have accomplished at that point in the nations history. We look at lincoln, roosevelt, what it takes to be a successful commander in chief in a time of war. I think no president could have operated that way in the 19th century. Institutional and other developments had not taken place in American Political Development at that time. To have made that possible, for a president to do that. So, the war of 1812 is a mess, how do we explain the mess . Well, blame it on madison. Thats what a lot of historians have done. Its what critics at the time did when they wished to criticize the war and all that seems to be going along with it. We recycle stories through history like that. Yes, thank you. If my memory oh, sorry. Thank you. If my memory serves me right, there is a provision in the treaty, i think the last provision that talks about a promise to deal with the indian issue and native American Issue and slavery. Why was that put in there . Whatever happened . In both cases, effectively nothing, to give the short answer first. The provision relating to the slave trade is that the british inserted that in the treaty. They were trying to make the United States the United States undertook to take an active steps in the atlantic trade slave. At this point, the only nation in the world interested in doing it. He also did the trade. The americans agreed to sign the treaty. But the americans were very bad enforcing that. They did not really cooperate with the british and the trade. One of the worst offenders was John Quincy Adams, who signed the treaty of gent and was the principle negotiator. Do you think John Quincy Adams would enforce the suppression of the atlantic trade when he was president a few years later . No. Why did he not do this . It would have allowed them to stop merchant men and slaves and say let me see your cargo. Let me see your manifests. This was too much of the policy that the british engaged in the years before 1812. John quincy adams would be one of the last american presence. He was an anglophobe and he was white. The other clause is an agreement that the United States and the british would undertake to restore the indians to the status they have enjoyed in the year 1811, the year before the war broke out. The british insisted on this. We know, as you know, they are in the process of throwing indian allies to the wind just as they had done at the conclusion of the American Revolution at war in 1782 and 1783. The british was largely a face saving device. The beginning of negotiations the british insisted on the establishment of the indian buffer state that they refer to easily. That wont nowhere. The british ministers told them, the negotiators to drop that. We are not prepared to rupture the talks over that. The british came up with this as a facesaving formula. The americans accepted it. Probably neither side in gent in 1914 was really familiar with the extent to how bad the indians had been defeated and how badly they would suffer in terms of land sessions. Andrew jackson, as he ended the creek war in the middle of 1814 took 23 million acres of land from the indians. Now, under the terms of the treaty, that, you might think is supposed to go back. The americans accepted it because, one, they didnt think there was any realistic chance of enforcing it. And there wasnt. And the americans were not prepared to see the negotiation break up over a point like that, at that stage. They wanted out of this war by that time, too. The result was it was a prepared letter. Nobody took notice of it from jackson. Thank you. Yes. Why the war of 1812 is always thought to have been a disaster or a loss is because the new englanders wrote most of the history books. Yes, theres a certain amount of truth to that. Sorry. The theory is that one reason why we regard the war of 1812 as a failure is new englanders came to write most of the histories. Thats that is true and of course the classic case and point is henry adams, who, of course, was the son of the president s grandson, great grandson of president s who wrote the classic history of the United States in this period. And he waxed eloquent about this. Not that evans was sympathetic for the others. You are right, thats all they have into the history. The war of new england is. Yes, theres a certain point, yes. Yes. Madison faced this areas attempt in congress to remove the seat of federal government from the potomac. I find little in madisons papers about the subject. I wonder if you could comment about that. First, you are right, theres little in the paper about it. The council of the city of philadelphia, after the burning of washington did make it known to the administration that the federal government wanted to move. They are welcome to move back to philadelphia. The weather had been before 1800. This was debated for three weeks or a month in congress. Madison appears to have been largely inactive behind the scenes. What happens to a big in coop that every time it went through, they read something. I did find some documentary. Its not in madisons papers. He let it be known, if the bill passed, he would be billed. The source was not madison himself, but it can be documented from the period. Yes. What would you say were the most serious casualties of the war of 1812 . Well oh, what were the most serious casualties in the war of 1812 . Well, i suppose we should say, off the bat, the most serious casualty is the loss of life. So how Many Americans were killed in the war of 1812 . This is rather difficult to calculate. Nobody kept precise figures on this sort of thing. The usual estimate is given that about 2,500 americans were killed. They suffered as a direct result of combat in the war. I did some calculations and found that, in fact, about 10 more of them died of disease, sickness and other causes. They are not directly related to the battle. There were simply the product of the military camps, the inability of Army Commanders to provide decent sanitation. If they got into an army camp, they could go through and take a heavy toll on life. Substantially more men on the american side died as a result of disease, sickness than they ever do from the british. Then, of course, theres Collateral Damage that occurs when militia die as a result of british raids. We might estimate, 15,000 or 16,000 americans died one way or another as a result of the war of 1812. The indians suffered, i think, portion natalie rather High Percentage of losses. We dont know precisely. We dont have good figures for indian population. They are best known of course the numbers that the indians are operating from a far smaller demographic base, so the impact of heavy losses is going to be much greater on indians. So, the indians lost a great area, warriors, particularly. Also women and children as a result of the war. That made it easier for americans after 1815 to remove some of these people. Ship them further west after they ultimately end up in reservations and indian territory in oklahoma. This did facilitate american expansion. Then, on top of that, i suppose you can throw in Property Damage that result in british aid, merchant men and things like that. Its impossible to get a precise figure, i imagine. The british captured a few american merchants. I think its impossible to put a figure on that. But, if we say the human damage is necessary, the greatest damage that any war inflicts, thats what it looks like on the american side. I dont think we can do much better than that, given qfb ou current state of knowledge. Yes. Question, sort of a factual speculation. If the british prevail, does the treaty of gent get rewritten . The answer to that is no. This is a myth that is perpetuated by books. Particularly books about Andrew Jackson. They want to say jackson saved the nation. The answer why it is no, it is quite straight forward. The treaty of gent was signed on the 24th of december, 1814. It was ratified. Now, according to the war of nations, a treaty cannot come into effect until both governs have ratified it. The British Government rad fied the treaty of gent on the 28th of december before they sent it across the atlantic to see what sort of reception they would get in washington. The battle of new orleans was fought on the 8th of january, 1815. The new years battle, dont get to washington until early february, 1815. The british, by ratifying the treaty have said to the americans, we want this war to be over. So, under international law, for the war continued after the british ratification. The americans that would have had to have been an american decision. Nobody in washington said we should throw out this treaty to carry on the war. That is a great myth. This is not to say jacksons victory did not have consequences for american politics. Would jackson have become president without that battle . No, the british signaled the war is over, the americans were confronted with the choice. We agree with them, dont agree with them. They chose to agree. In more recent years, the war is referred to as the second war for independence, could you comment on that . This is the word critics use. Its not a word i greatly like. It emerges about the time of the war itself. It emerges on the war of 1812. They start appearing as early as 1816. If you read those books, particularly from 1816 through the civil war, they all take this. America the classic place is this is 1,000 page book. 1,000 pages written by a new york journalist. Its probably one of the most widely known 19th century sources. This is exactly the line that lawson takes. In 1783, we have became free from Great Britain. We did not become independent. The british did not respect our ind pen dense. They said this sa plot to reduce americans. So, when he gets the treaty he sayings the british have given up. America finally becomes not only free, but independent. Now, thats the assumption behind the notion that the war of 1812 was necessary to complete the independence that was supposedly won between 1776 and 1783. Its going to take another war to vindicate and consolidate that independence. Thats the dominant myth that runs through american histories of the war for much of the 19th centu century. Its still there in 20th century history and accounts added additional correlation and complication as historians delve into the records. [ applause ] join us tonight for cspans tour. Well explore the lewis and Clark Expedition to the pacific. The first transcontinental trail. Those who migrated to Rural California during the dust bowl. That starts at 9 00 p. M. Eastern on her companion network, cspan. Here are some highlights for this coming weekend. Today, live at 10 00 a. M. Eastern on cspan, the Nebraska Supreme Court will hear oral argument on the keystone pipeline. Saturday at 6 30, former fcc commissioners put campaign 2014 gearing up, watch the latest debates on cspan. Sunday at noon, kay hagan and tom tillis. Tonight at 8 00 on cspan 2, author john yoo shares his opinion on law and the effect it has on nations. Saturday on book tv afterwards, how he thinks republicans can make gains for the his tannic vote at 10 00 p. M. Eastern. Sunday at noon, threehour conversation and your phone calls with the former chair on civil rights. Tonight at 8 00 eastern on American History tv, authors and historians talk about the burning of washington. Saturday, on real america, the building of the hoover dam and sunday at 8 00, the anniversary of gerald fords pardon of nixon. Find the schedule and let us know about the programs you have been watching. Kaulg us at 2026263400 or c123. You can email us at comments cspan. Org. Follow us on twitter. Next, day one of the symposium marking the 200th anniversary of the burning of washington d. C. During the war of 1812. First, Andrew Lambert on the coming up, day one of the symposium on the british burning of washington and the war of aspects of the war. Dolley madison and the creation of the american nation. That is followed by alan tay lar. Remarks by john stagg editor of the James Madison papers at the university of virginia. Coming up, day one of the symposium on the british burning of washington and the war of 1812. Hosted by the White House Historical association, the u. S. Capitol historical society, and James Madisons montpelier. Next, Andrew Lambert, author of challenge, britain against america in the naval war of 1812. This is 45 minutes. My name is stewart mclaurin, and im the president of the White House Historical association. Where we are privileged to convene today for this significant event. Were honored to have with us today two members of the board of directors of the White House Historical association, the honorable ann stock and mr. Knight kiplonger. Were also honored to have with us mr. William almond, the curator of the white house. This symposium commemorates the bicentennial of one of americas most critical yet overlooked conflicts. With the gathering of these extraordinary scholars and experts in the history field, the next two days are sure to educate, inspire, and enhance our understanding of the war of 1812. The White House Historical associations mission echoes the symposium goal of echoing the public on the history of the white house. And we are so pleased to host this day and a half of symposium here at the associations david m. Rubenstein center for the study of white house history. This event could not be possible without the partnering and the support of our cosponsors, the United States Capitol Historical Society and James Madisons montpelier. We thank these two wonderful partners for being with us today and for the contributions they have made to make this a successful event. We would also like to extend a special word of thanks to the kenmart company who generously underwrote a significant portion of tonights of todays symposium and if youre with us tonight for dinner, you will receive a specially commissioned gift from kenmart made for this symposium. The association is grateful for the support and partnership we have had with kenmart for 34 years in the production of our White House Christmas ornament. This began in 1981 and is a very significant part of what we do, given that the proceeds from the sale of this ornament go to support our work with the white house. Please be sure to take a moment to visit our shop, which is right across the courtyard behind you here today. As well as online at www. Whitehousehistory. Org to obtain the 2014 Christmas Ornament which honored president warren g. Harding and finally to our audience here at the White House Historical association in washington and those watching on cspan from across america, we are welcoming you to hear these 14 prestigious presenters share their work and guide us through one of the most significant periods in our nations history. To begin our very full afternoon program, it is my pleasure to welcome kat imhoff, president and ceo of James Madisons montpelier to introduce them. Good afternoon. Its so wonderful to be here. Also wanted to say that our good afternoon. It is so wonderful to be here and the board chair, greg may joins us as well as Mount Pellier Board Members and i hope you get a chance to have the leadership and we could not be more pleased to help sponsor these next two days and i just love the title, america under fire. Mr. Madisons war and the burning of washington city. Declaring war, congress and the president exercised powers granted to them by the u. S. Constitution and for our young country, only three decades removed from the the first war of independence, the war of 1812 tested many of the ideas in the constitution and it called upon madison to abide by the limitations of powers that hed worked so hard to institute. So as we commemorate the sobering events of 1814, this panel will be shedding light on the new scholarship and ideas about the origins and outcomes of the war. Fittingly, the british context of the war and dr. Andrew lambert and the professor of naval history of Kings College london and in addition to writing about british strategy and technology and the 2012 volume on the war titled the challenge, britain against america in the naval war of 1812 and it was honored by the anderson award and help me welcome dr. Lambert to the podium. [ applause ] thank you very much for that extremely kind introduction. The award of a medal for writing a book about the war of 1812 is somewhat ironic at home because in all honesty we dont know what happened. Its a great honor for me to be here today and my thanks goes to the White House Historical association to put this event together. Its important, i think, when viewing the great events of Natural History to take a look outside and to see what everybody else is doing at the same time where this particular set of events in this country fit into the Bigger Picture and really my job this afternoon is to situate the war of 1812 in World History and to put that relationship between america and the wider world. The war of 1812 posed both sides on both sides of the atlantic, president madisons decision for war split the country and it opposed the country that would damage the economic interests and while the republicans welcomed it it as an opportunity for territorial expansion and the address of other significant internal issues. News of the war reached the British Government which had recently been reconstructed. The Prime Minister had just been shot in the house of commons and his replacement from liverpool was not thought to be destined for a long term in office. In fact, he would last 15 years, Prime Minister and no one knew that at the time and he was not thought to be a great leader and he was not a man in command of parliament or on indeed a good public persona. He turned out to be a very good manager of a cabinet at a time when the british needed management because the last king of this country george iii was sliding into a permanent madness and his regent, his son george iv made a poor showing on the national let alone the international stage. We needed a leader who was solid, reliable and made good, effective use of the resources at hand and lord liverpool turned out to be that man. The british were in the tenth year of the conflict with Napoleon Bonaparte. The warbroken out in 1803 and the british had been waging war against the greatest warrior of modern history for a decade. They had managed not to lose. Partly because they live on an island. British ministers had little reason of optimism in early 1812 that the war would end well. The last Great British victory had been the battle of trafalgar in 1805 and since then the british had hung around the margins of europe a nowing the french and hoping that the rest of europe that being ruled by france is a bad idea. Some europeans had seen this, but not all of them. The british were not especially worried by the american declaration of war. After all, the United States was then quite a small country. It had relatively limited resources and it had no great reputation for having a large and powerful army or indeed a particularly large navy either. What the british were worried about was the additional strain on their already seriously overstretched resources. I show you this slide just to remind people that the Louisiana Purchase is transformational for the United States. It turns a country which really looks to the atlantic into one that starts to look to the rest of the continent and not just west, but north and south, as well. The war between britain and america was a consequence of the anglofrench war and it was extreme legal measures that brought on the clash with the United States after the destruction of his navy napoleon had instituted a total economic war again britain. His strategy was to exclude British Trade from europe and to try to bankrupt the british. Napoleon understood that the basis of british power was not men, armies or even fleets. It was trade and money. If napoleon could break the british economy, britain would surrender. His continental system would harness the european continent in a war against britain. They would exclude all British Trade from europe on penalty of seizure and destruction. The british counter blockade, the famous orders in council did exactly the reverse. It it cut europe off from the rest of the world so the european his to fight a 12year long war without any coffee. And there were few other things they missed, as well. The europe counter blockade cut europe off from africa, asia and the americas and fundamentally it threatened americas economic development. From 1803 through to 1812 american shippers, merchants and traders had made a lot of money being the last neutral carrier. The last country that could carry goods from the French West Indies to europe through the british blockade. They were also trading with the british and neither the british nor the french treated the americans particularly kindly. The british would arrest their ships and send them before a court and napoleon simply burnt them. The American Government thought napoleon was less dangerous than the the british or less dangerous to their interests. The european content was beginning to destroy the economieses of other european states. Napoleon protected france from the economic war by asset stripping all of the conquered territories. The first country to rebel would be russia. Napoleons only on serious ally and a Major Trading nation with a big export trade geared towards supplying the british market. Inside the continental system from 1807 to 1811 russia saw her economy collapse. Being part of napoleons team was very bad for your business. In 1811, hey realized his country would be bankrupt and he would follow his father to an early grave. The czar was murdered and they changed the government. Basically most of the land owners in russia relied on selling goods to the british to pay their bills. So the czar decided that bankruptcy in death was slightly less bad than being invaded by napoleon, but only slightly. Even as the war of of 1812 was about to start the cracks in napoleons system are becoming quite fundamental, but the british havent yet seen the future. In 1811 the longrunning interchange of arguments at sea reached a high point with the incident between the uss president and hms little belt. The little belt is the small one with the union flag. A case of mistaken identity according to Commodore John rogers. A case of deliberate aggression according to Arthur Bingham who command the little belt, but the british made little of it it. They were far too busy doing other things. In 1811, 1812, napoleon is beginning to gear up for the invasion of russia and this would be the Great Campaign that will decide the outcome of the conflict in europe. Mr. Madisons war depends on the french winning. If russia collapses back into the continental system, napoleon is utterly dominant in europe and what possible hope have the british got and they will have to make terms and it will be possible then to negotiate with them on a range of issues. But the british wouldnt surrender to napoleon and let alone to James Madison and the main british army was successfully in spain under the duke of wellington and the british simply have no spare ships, men or money to fight a war with anybody else. Indeed, during the war of 1812, the British Military effort on land and see was rarely more than 7 in their land and sea forces. They simply didnt have any more to spare. It wasnt a case of choice. That was all there was. So in 1812 in 1813, british strategy defensive and has largely reactive and the americans had the initiative and