Senator johnson . Thank you, mr. Chairman. Lets quickly go back to the kurds. Ive been made aware of the facts that the baghdad government is basically in arrears on the kurds budget by 6 billion. Is that pretty accurate . There are a lot of ways to do the accounting and the math. Baghdad claims the kurds owe them money. The kurds claim that baghdad owes them money. And in that in that space is where a deal lies. And i think thats going to be part of the conversation informing a new government. If it is true that baghdad owes them as much as 6 billion, would the u. S. Support the kurds ability to export oil and obtain that revenue so they can keep themselves going . We want to get as much oil on to International Markets as possible from all parts of iraq. And thats something that we very strongly support. We worked very hard over the last six months to get a deal on the table by which the kurds would have exported as much oil as they possibly could through some of the existing arrangements with the revenuesharing allocations that exist. And that deal almost succeeded, but it ran up again the election time frame. Once in the election, it was very difficult to close a deal. I think well be able to get that back on the table. We want as much oil from iraq, north to south, on to International Markets as soon as possible. Okay. Now i appreciate the fact that were going through assessments, and were studying the problem. But i want to you have to recognize reality before you develop a strategy. But i really do want to just compare where we are now versus where we were prior to the 2007 surge. And mr. Mcgirk, youve been involved with this for some time. What was the level of the iraqi forces back in 2007 . I really want some relatively quick answers here because i want to get some data points. How do you measure the level . It was i mean, how many people were in the Iraqi Security forces back in 2007 . I dont have the i dont have the figure, but it was not a highly effective force in early 2007. But in america we had about 132,000 at the start of the surge and surged about 167,000. Correct. What were we in terms of enemy fighters in 2007 . We assessed the main enemy then was al qaeda and iraq, isil how many people were we up against . These figures are difficult. We had assessments of 6,000 to 8,000, but probably more. I understand. What do we think current isil forces are . Current, theyre difficult to measure, 15,000 or so, in iraq far less. So basically double where that we had in terms of 2007 . Isil today, according to our assessments, is far more capable in manpower, resources, fighting effectiveness, yes. Thats my point. The u. S. Troop levels in iraq are how many . Total now about yeah, weve inserted 775ish and about 100 that were associated with our office of security operation, so less than 1,000 less than 1,000. Less than 1,000 now. Back in 2007, prayer to a pretty difficult battle in terms of surge, we had 168,000 at the height of that. And isil now is double the size it was in 2007. And they have some of our weapons, their capabilities are much higher. Thats right. Where what was the size of the Iraqi Military force in june of 2014 prior to isils moving to iraq . What was our estimate there . I dont have that figure, but i can get it for you. Are we talking hundreds of thousands . I mean hundreds of thousands, but we try to look at capable and effective forces. One of the purposes of the assessment was to determine which units are effective, which are ineffective. There are some unit, frankly, that are totally ineffective, and there are some unit that are totally capable and effective. Ms. Slotkin, do you have that information . I think its just shy of 200,000. 200,000 prior to the intrusion or the i believe soy invasion . How many now . You said they lost four divisions. How many melted into the background . Again, i dont have the exact number. Its probably closer to 160ish. Do you have any sense just percentagewise of what percentage of that force would have any effective not in terms of fighting effectiveness in terms of fighting . In terms of dissolved units, but 30,000. The iraqis have since recalled about 10,000. According it our isci assessments, theres about 10,000 who have come back and going through a threeweek Training Course now. The effectiveness of the Iraqi Security forces versus u. S. Forces . Not comparable, right . Cant compare them, no. We got a real problem on our hands. Can you we talked a little bit about the threat to our homeland, that isil in syria and iraq represent. Can you describe what the threat to the homeland is because of the situation . I mean, can you make the American People aware of why this matters . What really concerns particularly our counterterrorism experts and also concerns us is that this rise in very dedicated global jihadist fighters come from all over the world. In baghdad there week there was a suicide bomber, there was a german, there was an ahn. Isil an australian. Isil was able to funnel 30 to 50 suicide bombers into iraq. We assess almost all foreign fighters. It would be very easy for isil to decide to funnel that cadre of dedicated suicide bomber, global jihadis around the region, or europe, or worse, here. That is a very significant, significant concern. They have training bases in syria, and they are recruiting on social media and the internet. Its something that we have never seen before. A year ago the president declared the war on terror was over. Do you believe the war on terror was over . I think we have a very significant fight on our hands with isil which we have to manage. I have no further questions. Senator cardin . Thank you, mr. Chairman. Let me thank both of you for your appearance here today and for your service to our country. I certainly agree that the United States has vital interest in containing isis growth and threat to our homeland and to our allies. I also agree that we have direct interest in dealing with a government in iraq that represents all the ethnic communities fairly with an effective government that gives confidence to moderates that their voices can be heard within the Iraqi Government. But it was interesting i was listening to senator johnson go through some of the comparisons on the strength of the terrorist networks, whether its isil, isis, or al qaeda, or whether its whatever, and he was drawing a comparison over the last seven years. If you go back to before the u. S. Troop invasion in 2001, at least my assessment my understanding was there was virtually no al qaeda, no terrorist network that was a direct threat to our homeland in iraq. So it does raise a lot of the questions that senator boxer raised initially that our use of military force back in 2001 was ill advised. We dont want to repeat mistakes that weve made in the past. Thats the reason i bring it up. But i started with the fact that we have vital interests in dealing with the current circumstances that are on the ground in iraq. I i know this hearing is focused on iraq, but i want to move a little bit to syria and what impact the isis is having on the opposition effective not and syria and whether were finding any of the support for the opposition strengthening isis capacity within iraq. And the network between the moderate gulf Arab Muslim States in supporting the opposition in syria, are we confident that that is not finding its way to the terrorist networks now operating in iraq . Obviously the connection between isil between the threat and n iraq and syria is pretty significant. I dont i dont personally know of any reports for opposition support being funneled to isil. I think they are in a pretty bitter fight against both the regime and the terrorists who have taken over territory particularly in eastern and northern syria. So i dont have any reports of that equipment and that support thats been provided getting in to their hands. But its always a risk. What precautions have we taken with moderate arab states and with our own support for the opposition in syria to make sure that we are not finding american support or moderate arab states support ending up encouraging terrorist activities now moving in to iraq . This is something obviously we talked to our Gulf Partners about quite a bit. Certainly over a period of the last couple of years. And we just urge them to make sure similar to the way we do end use monitoring that they have some way of telling who they are providing things to, in what capacity, et cetera, et cetera. We urge them to follow up the way we would want them to follow up. Mr. Mcgurk, what impact is the impasse in syria in the failure to have a workable plan in syria impacting stability in iraq . Thats a very good question, senator. The iraqis, since the beginning of the syria crisis and this is really all iraqis, have had a different conception of the syria crisis than we have had. Theyve been very concerned that based upon their own experience that were you to see the fall of the assad regime that it would unleash chaos on their borders. And they take whats happening within that frame. Theres a kurdish dimension in the syria crisis, tribal dimension to the syria crisis. Its accelerated the centrifugal forces that is tearing at the fabric of iraq. So its its very hard to even state the impact that the syria crisis has had on iraq. In particular the rise of the suicide bombings and car bombings, all of which we assess are isil. They come month after month and they are targeted and this is ideology, you can go back to the writings of 2004, to attack shias in marketplaces, playgrounds, mosques, repeatedly. To attack sunni tribal leaders who disagree with them. And thats why in february almost 8 of the suicide 86 of the suicide bombings isil brought into iraq were focused on the euphrates valley and anbar province, attacking sunnis who disgraced with their ideology. Then disagreed with their ideology. Then to the kurds with the disputed boundary territories in the north. That is what isil is trying to do. We got the suicide number down to five to ten a month in 2011 and 2012, and it went up this month. It has a devastating effect on the psyche of the country. Do we have any iraqis displaced within iraq or outside in other countries since june . Immediately in mosul, there is about 500,000 idps, and since this crisis really started earlier this year, the idp number is over a million. And are they in iraq, iran, other countries . No, most are in iraq, and most have fled to the kurdish region in the north. Weve worked very closely with our regional partners and with our u. N. Partners in iraq to manage this crisis. Secretary kerry, after he was in baghdad, went to paris to meet the Foreign Ministers of uae, saw, jordan, and went to riyadh to see King Abdullah in riyadh. The saudis after that meeting generously contributed 500,000 to the u. N. Agencies working in iraq, which was a muchneeded contribution. Weve contributed since the crisis began in mosul about 18 million. And were working closely, particularly with our kurdish partners, to manage the crisis. I take it that very few of these people have returned because its not safe at this moment . Yes, thats right. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Thank you, mr. Cardin. Senator flake . Thank you, mr. Chairman. How long have we known that isil was a threat to the extent that they are now . How long has the state department assessed it as a threat . Weve known this Organization Since 2003. Its al zarqawi, iraq i know weve known it, but at what point did we think that there was a threat, that they would be able to take over mosul or well, in mosul, theyve had this mode us vivendi in which they run racketeering schemes, and they selfgenerate funding for about 12 million a month in mosul. Weve known thats been going on. Their open assault into mosul, we didnt have indications of that until a few days beforehand. Just a few days before that. When did we give warning to the Iraqi Government that this was a threat, or did they have they has their Intelligence Network been sufficient to know this before it was a problem . Its a very good question, senator. In fact, weve been giving warnings, expressing concern to the Iraqi Government about the security environment, not just in mosul but in northern ninawa, going back about the last year. It was a part of the conversation that i know our Vice President had with Prime Minister maliki when maliki of here in november. Weve been very concerned about it and trying to work with the kurds and with the Iraqi Security forces in those areas to have some coordination because isil comes through that Border Crossing south of a town called ribia, and they have filled that space gradually over the last year. Without our military there conducting ground operations, our effort have been in the diplomatic field. One, to try to convince the iraqis to be more inclusive and not give rise to this kind of activity or space for that kind of activity to happen. But two, to warn them and remember them combat this and help them combat this. Seems that weve been spectacularly unsuccessful in the diplomatic arena in that regard. And do you have any response to that, or how hard are we working there . What intelligence do we have, are we passing it on, are they is the Iraqi Government simply unresponsive . Whats been the hydrohere . In terms of intelligence sharing with iraqi forces and cooperation with iraqi forces, right now as we speak, it is at a level we havent seen since our troops left in 2011. So there is some tlunts for opportunities there for us. Since weve focused on the al qaeda isil threat in iraq, going back to last summer, you see statements the state department made about baghdadi. Hes in syria and isil is an increasing threat to iraq. Weve developed platforms with the iraqis to try to develop a better intelligence picture. But a lot of it was slow going. On the political side, we are very focused when the crisis began in anbar to make clur, very clearly that any tribal fighters rising up against this group will get full benefits and resources of the state. The iraqis also agreed to train about 1,000 natives of falluj, gave them three months of training, and there was an operation in northern fallujah. And frankly, those fighters lost. They lost because the isil networks, particularly in fallujah, with snipers, with ieds, with military sophisticati sophistication, is able to overmatch any tribal force that comes to confront it. Thats the situation right now. It was also the situation in northern ninawa because we have tribal contacts up there with the main tribe up there. And over time, given the infiltration was syria, given the amount of force that isil can bring to bear, it was very difficult for locals to stand up to them. You say cooperation with the Iraqi Government was slow in coming. Where where does the fault lie with that . Was it slow were we slow to recognize the threat of isis, or was the Iraqi Government simply slow to heed the warnings that we were given, or the the cooperation that we offered . I think we started moving fairly aggressively in the summer. The iraqis wanted to do things on their own. They didnt want our they didnt really formally request direct u. S. Military assistance until may. Although there was a conversation about the possibility of such assistance earlier than may. But the formal request came in may. You know, iraqis are very proud of their sovereignty. We have a strategic Framework Agreement that allows us to do an awful lot. The notion of flying Surveillance Drones over iraqi skies, frankly, was controversial at first. So we had to develop the mechanisms and the procedures for doing these things, and we have those now well in place. Our role in congress, one of our main roles obviously is to provide funding for these conflict, for intelligence, for diplomatic efforts, aside from thousands of lives lost. Weve spent about 800 billion at last count in iraq, just in iraq. What can we tell our constituents that weve gotten out of that . Where are we now that we wouldnt be had we not spent 800 billion . I think i mean, as senators boxer said, we gave them an opportunity, and we hope that this isnt the end of the story in iraq. We believe that there is still an opportunity for the iraqis to form a government and do something about this problem. And were urging them to get on with it and, you know, i think that thats we still believe in a way forward in iraq. They just have to take the opportunity. Is it possible at all in the state departments view to move ahead with maliki in charge . Will there be sufficient trust, any trust from the sunni population that hell be inclusive enough, his government, or does our strategy rely on somebody else coming in . I think its going to be very difficult for him to form a government. So theyre facing that question now, now that the president s been elected to face the question of the Prime Minister. Any Prime Minister, in order to form a government is going to have to pull the country together. So whoever the leader is is someone thats going to have to demonstrate that just to get the votes he needs to remain or to be sworn in to office. So thats something thats going to unfold rapidly over the coming days. Whoever the nominee is has to form a cabinet and present it to the cabinet to form a government. The speaker of the parliament again was was elected overwhelmingly with support from all major groups, as of the president , and we would anticipate the Prime Minister as the president said, it has to be somebody with an inclusive agenda and bring the groups together, otherwise he wont be able to govern. Thank you, mr. Chairman. Thank you. Senator . I want to thank senator menendez for chairing this hearing. Senator kaine and corker, as well. And thank the witnesses for your testimony. I will follow on senator flakes questioning in a moment. I share the administrations ultimate goal, as youve just been testifying to, of encouraging the creation of an inclusive Iraqi Government supported by all of iraqs different sectarian groups that has some