those teams have some great capabilities. it gives you a great starting point. and i think that our first thought in 2010 was let's set up with the initial structure, set it up in terms of offense and defense and teams that could do offensive actions to defend the country. >> anyone have anything to add to that? >> yes, sir? dr. singer? >> just two things. the first is the idea of assuming that our response would have to be limited just to cyber means. if someone carries out an act of war against us using cyber means we are not and should not be limited in our response to use other means, and that's why we're seeing that kind of deterrence hold. the second though is as general alexander said we've built up great capabilities. there are many things mr. snowden did but one of the other things he did was reveal we have very potent cyber offense capability capability. i would add to those who believe building up more will deliver deterrence. the question, why has not not delivered deterrence yet? there's no question we have great capabilities and yet the attacks have continued to come. we need to build up deterrence or denial making ourselves more resilient so we can shrug off those attacks which, therefore, makes the attacks less productive. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, mr. chairman. dr. singer, i must complement you. to found a technology firm is an act of genius. i also enjoyed your churchill quotes. one of my favorite is how he thought history would treat his role in world war ii. his response was very well, because i intend to write it. on this issue of deterrence and i think senator rounds really hit the point and i think we should follow up on this is the question of what is an act of wore and when will we respond because if an act of war isn't defined, your opponent has to know you will consider it an act of war and there will be a response. mr. singer i think your point is well taken. it doesn't necessarily have to be a cyber response. i do think there needs to be some response. deterrence by denial ultimately you have to have some offensive capability. you have to be able to punch back or you're simply always on the defense. if you're nodding your head, i assume you agree with that concept. >> i very much agree. i'll compliment you in return. i'll have an article next week on this question of deterrence and the three approaches are what the committees wrestled with, very clear norms, so both sides, all the sides understand what is and isn't an act of war so that there's no miscalculation. the second is to understand that you can respond but you can respond in other means other areas, and it's not just through military, it may be through trade or espionage. there's a far more complex war where you hit me with a nuke, i threaten to hit you back. and the third is deterrence by denial, something that wasn't possible in the cold war, the idea of civilian. it would be an incredible useful concept and importantly resilience works not just against state level attacks but it is also effective against all the other attacks out there whether it is nonstate actors like terrorists or just criminal groups. >> on that point, general good to see you again and i think a point you made i hadn't really thought about was the idea of a join private sector cyber security effort perhaps facilitated by the government but not government environment so we don't have the privacy issues. it seems inefficient to have bank of america spend millions and anthem and target and walmart when in reality they're all chasing the same problem and it may be that a consortium similar -- there was a semiconductor consortium years ago to deal with this in a joint way might save the private sector a lot of money. the government could act as a facilitator. dr. clark an important point made today and it was made in one of the hearings, instead of building weapons systems that have absolutely everything that will last 40 years and be by definition obsolete, we ought to build modular systems, if you will, that can be modernized on the fly rather than starting all over again. is that essentially what your testimony was? >> definitely. it gives you the ability to take advantage of the refresh cycle that exists for those smaller systems. we talked about moore's law and how that results in a doubling of computer programming power every 12 to 18 months. and computers are at the heart of every one of our payloads whether it's a sensor or a missile or even a smart bomb. today an unmanned vehicle. we should take advantage of the fact that refresh cycle will be so fast and develop those payloads on a much faster time line. >> in trying to develop a weapons system that has everything for everybody at one time that will be fixed in time is just the wrong way to go. >> which gets back to the requirements problem. if i define my requirements in isolation from what the technology might be able to give me in a near term time frame i end up aspiring to something i'll never be able -- >> and the requirements proliferate because it's the problem of a camel is a horse designed by a committee. >> instead of defining the requirements in conjunction with what the technology has delivered. >> mr. singer if your article hasn't gone to press, i would urge a quote from robert frost, good fences make good neighbors. when people know where the rules are, that's when you can avoid conflict. final question just for the record, mr. alexander -- general alexander, very chilling in your early testimony that we won't have time for human decision making in responding to some of these kinds of attacks. in other words, the 30 minutes or an hour for the missiles is now in a matter of seconds. the question is how do we war game and prepare a response that can be done instantaneously without the intervention of human discretion? i think that's an issue -- my time has expired but i think that's an issue that deserves some serious thought and discussion. thank you, gentlemen very much. this has been very illuminating. >> dr. singer, i would suggest it's always darkest before it's totally black. senator ernst? >> thank you mr. chairman. gentlemen, thank you for your support to our nation in so many varying ways. the discussion today has been very beneficial i think for all of us and our constituencies. general alexander, i'd like to start with you, sir. we've spent a lot of time talking about the cyber threats that exist out there and the devastating effects to our networks should they be attacked or when they are attacked. and really the ability to recruit and retain some talent to deal with the cutting edge threats that exist out there. what i'd like to know is a little bit more how can we utilize our resevrve and our national guard forces to bring in some of the best and the brightest? we have a lot of folks that certainly serve in very similar capacities and there is civilian employment. can we use them to leverage our forces? >> actually, senator, that's a great question. we were doing that when i was on. i know that continues. each of the national guard units are setting up cyber teams that would also help. as you note some of these have some of the best technical experts in the civilian industry that partner with us. you go out to washington, microsoft employees, all around the world. all around the u.s. there are some great there and it also gives you an opportunity to bring those on to active duty when you need them and then take them off. finally if we work it right it helps provide security for the state and local government. >> i think that's wonderful. i know in my transportation company we had some computer wizzes working in the civilian industrial. there were truck drivers when we were mobilized, but a lot of talent that exists out there. and mr. scharre, paul, i know we have spent some time talking about future personnel generations in our department of defense. and i would like to visit a little bit with you about again, the national guard and the reserves and where you see their role in the future. whether it's army, navy, air force, marines. and how they can support future conflicts. >> thank you, senator. i think this issue of civilian expertise is a unique capability that the national guard and reserves brings to the table and this example of computer experts driving trucks right, and i saw many things in iraq. we had people misaligned. not as aligned as they could be with some of the skills that are resident in the force and a process to actually identify those skills and tracked inside the department so if the nation needs to be able to draw upon that we would know who are these experts would be extremely valuable and a way to increase even further the skills and capabilities that the national guard and reserve brings to the table. >> i think that's a great idea. we do identify our civilian skill sets through the guard and the reserves. i don't know that the dod truly pays attention to that and i think we have a lot of, as i said, talent and abilities that could be better utilized with the force. do you think the dod will continue to rely heavily as we move into future conflicts in outlying years as heavily as they have maybe in the past 14 years? >> i think there's no question they'll continue to play a valuable role. we have given a lot in the last 14 years. they'll continue to be a valuable contributor in the few door. future. >> i'll move on to mr. clark. i did lead my colleagues in a letter with concern for russia's activities near some of our under water cables. and it is very concerning because these are fiber-optic cables and they carry senseitive information, communications, many of these things vital to our economic stability and i know that it is a very sensitive topic. but i think it's vital that we talk about our interests. so are you concerned at all about the security that we have that exists or does not exist out there? and if you could expound on that, please. >> i'm very concerned about it. those cables carry trillions of dollars in financial transactions every year, about 90% of the world's economy runs undersea cables as a result of that. the russians for a long time have had an undersea reconnaissance program and they've taken we can tell by the areas where they're operating that they are looking for something down there. out in the open ocean these cables are fairly hard to find. you have to search a large area. where they have their landings on the shore over in europe or the middle east, they're relatively easy to locate and trace back into the water. those cables could be easily broken. they're broken fairly regularly today in terms of trawlers. responding or replacing those cables lies with industry. you're talking time frames of weeks to months to repair a cable that's been damaged as a result of hostile or accidental action. we need to improve being able to rapidly respond to these attacks to restore the activity on the cables and need better monitoring capabilities where it's a target rich environment for an undersea vehicle or a ship that will deploy a remotely operated vehicle to attack them. there are technologies that could provide the ability to monitor these areas well. being able to find something small like dr. singer or mr. scharre talked about will be really hard. we need to detect the vehicles that could be used. it's a huge potential vulnerability that could be exploited in peacetime or war. >> i agree. i appreciate it. i think that's something we need to turn our direction to, also. thank you, mr. chair. >> to all of you who are testifying, thank you. the department of defense has used technology basically quality over quantity to stay ahead of the other countries. we are falling behind in our ability to rely on our technical superiority. do you share that view? what are some very fundamental steps we should be taking in order to increase our capacity? any of you can answer. >> okay, i'll start. i think one of the main factors is time. talked about payloads over platforms. i would encourage software over payloads, being able to upgrade very rapidly. there are more fundamental shifts. thinking of taking a major platform and breaking it apart entirely into a larger number of just the payloads that are all interacting together and that's something worth experimenting with and exploring. >> are you saying that we should spend mormone money on r&d or is it the way we're structuring how the money is spent? >> the way we spend money is critical. the r&d is very decentralized and fragmented. a more centralized focus on the key areas and efforts under way with the long range defense acronym. i think are beneficial in that regard. >> senator, i would add i think it's both the way but we don't spend enough on r&d. and we've seen the percentages on the government as was mentioned in the defense industry. the issue is not just in terms of weapons but if you run out fof missile in a fight you may have to exit. you've deferred to the enemy in that time. >> one more thing. we have a pretty good inventment in r&d. in addition to that industry used to do a lot of research and development with their own money to explore capabilities that might be beneficial in the future. they've reduced that with the reduction over the last several years and the amount of procurement. that is in the past has given us things like stealth, like new radar technology. how do we encourage industry to be looking at problems they address with their new technologies. >> to have the potential of technology transfer and whatever research that they're doing and developing. for mr. scharre and mr. clark what impacts do you anticipate relying on fossil fuels will have on planning and effectiveness of our future warfighters? and what is your assessment of the department's progress in terms of reducing reliance on fossil fuel sources? >> one is strategic risk and vulnerability. another one is cost. but an important one is alternatives can increase the endurance for many various long endurance capabilities, particularly robotics that we could put on the battlefield. better batteries can allow us to have persistent surveillance to protect the enemy for virulent months or years at a time. >> it's about not so much fossil fuels as reducing our energy independence. we have to project forces over a long distance because our friends and allies are an ocean away from us. so we're generally transferring them over a long distance and even when they get there they're having to operate at the very edge of our logistics change. so the energy they need in general would be important. in taking advantage of technologies that don't require fuel at all would be important. the idea of going to new battery technologies that last for a very long period of time and then recharged by the sun or returning to a docking station would be a very good way to reduce the tether that we have to maintain. right now we have to have refueling aircraft and ships out at the edge with the ships that they're refueling and then refuel a ship, for example every few days while it's operating and then aircraft have to operate for a much shorter period of time before they need to be refueled. moving to energy technologies that don't require fuel to be delivered to the platform on a regular basis would be very important. >> thank you. >> thank you mr. chair. sorry, senator hirono and i had to step out. we were celebrating the 240th birthday of the united states marine corps. welcome the chair and the ranking member as members of the navy and the army -- >> a dark day. >> gentlemen, thanks very much for your testimony. general alexander, i was actually struck by your testimony in one area that -- well, in a couple areas i thought was very insightful. this idea of cyber, this notion we're constantly being attacked and you mention it in some of the dollars and sta tististics is eye popping. there's been this notion of us being on defense, defense, defense. one thing that i liked about your testimony is you talked about a little bit in terms of offense where we invented the technology and we're the leader. there are opportunities for offense. could you provide examples? the chairman's statement of turning technologies into offensive advantages was illuminating from a historical perspective. what are some opportunities in terms of offense that we have with regard to cyber? >> there are a number of offensive capabilities. first and foremost you have to see what the adversary is doing, hence the need for the commercial sector to be part of the solution. so what's hitting them can be seen by everyone. if you think about how two computers actually talk, i want to talk to you that takes time. and if you think about a computer trying to get in while that's happening, if the government can see it, the government can stop it or do things with it. you have opportunities to change what's happening in cyberspace with offensive tools that would de defend the country. the issue comes down to so what would you authorize cyber command to do in order to defend it? you might say i'm going to let you do everything to block everything from where it's originating from but i don't want you destroying systems yet. we're going to go a step further. but technically speaking, and you've seen this you could destroy a computer in cyberspace by getting on it and doing certain things to it. it's public record. now all you need is access. you take the capabilities of an nsa and the fbi at times and put those together. so you have tremendous opportunities. when we look back at our capability we're the most integrated network society in the world and we look back, look at all these opportunities and you look at ours on the defense you say, man, we're broke. if we throw rocks, we have all threes glass windows. the first step, fix those. >> just a related question. i know there's been a lot of discussion in this testimony on occurrence and it seems to me i would welcome any of your opinions that if you're from an authoritarian regime like russia or iran or china that they in some ways have an advantage because they deny and lie -- oh, we had nothing to do with that -- even though they did or they do. you mentioned one example the iranians were attacking our financial system. would it make sense to say if you do that again we will crash your entire financial sector. if you're an authoritarian regime you can lie about who is doing it that the costs of all these attacks is almost minimal because we don't react. should we maybe look at being more public and upping the ante saying, if you do this, north korea, iran china, we'll responsibility. and some of these countries, i'm sure we could crash their whole economy. what would be the problem with that deterrence that makes it more transparent but raises the cost? if we announce that we'd have to act. i'm curious what would you think of something more transparent from our perspective, and do we have a disadvantage when we're dealing with regimes that routinely lie about the ishsue? >> i'd say one thing we have to think about is the deterrent action might need to be proportionate with the action it's intended to deter because it won't have credibility otherwise. if we say the iranians are attacking our banking sector that we would crash their financial system that might be disproportionate and they don't find that a credible threat. if we did it, it may deter further action but may be seen by the international community as being highly disproportionate. we might need something that they would say, they will actually do that. that's where the response needs to be. electronic warfare, jamming, small attacks on oil infrastructure, a small amount of collateral effects while also demonstrating the resolve of the united states that would be credible and we could repeat but does not cause a huge, damaging reaction. >> the challenge is there's not the mutual in terms of the old destruction so we are far more vulnerable to cyber attack than north korea, but that's actually a good thing because we're integrated, we have freedom. we wouldn't want to be in that position that they're in so recognizing the lack of maybe looking at other deterrence angles. i would add one more important thing talking about steering cyber command to taking on these roles in the civilian lead is moving it and us away from its role in clear warfare itself and the determinant of success or failure in future wars with cyber will not be thinking about it individually but how it's integrated with other warfighters. using it to take down an air defense so it's cohesive with your warplanes going over. israel was able to pull off an operation. be careful of steering cyber command more and more to civilian roles. may lead us to success in nonwar but set us up for a fall in real war. >> i want to add some clarity. >> that's the war game and the effort but cyber command in our defense department can't work without the energy sector. we need to defend in this area. we can defend themselves and push that out beyond the boundary. i think our defense department has to think more comprehensively of this whole thing. i agree going after all the targets is part of it but my concern is the easy thing, if i were a bad guy, i'd go after our infrastructure. i'd take it out before you could respond. make sure we have it correct. >> i want to thank you for being here, appreciate it. i want to follow up on something that you had in your prepared statement is just the start of a potential series of actions that reshape the international environment. your experience of what comes next with moscow and what should we be doing to respond? >> i think everything that's going on is for putin to get more closure on eastern ukraine where the weapons platform that he really cares about are created. i think he wants control of that. i think he will continue to go for that. there is nothing that i would seen he will stop. he will lie, he will do everything he can and then help make that happen. syria is a great way to push -- think of it as a feint. he can accomplish some real objectives. and is doing that by helping to shape what he thinks are the best proxies for russia, syria and iran in the region. people are still dying there. and focuses everybody on syria. i would not be surprised if over the next six months we see more action with syria i'm concerned about the tension that creates, we get to the point we have to fire back against russia or iran. if we do that we'll see their response in cyber. i really do. i think it will come -- because there's no way iran can come. they've been fairly good at stopping those but they can hit us with cyber. disruptive attacks against the financial sector. >> so i guess i would -- anyone who wants to comment on this but as i hear you discuss this i think if we let him continue to do this without any response as far as i can see doesn't this become a fait accompli which we could see ourselves headed in this direction which will put us in a more dangerous situation. if you were advising the president, what would you tell him to do to respond to putin? >> i would say refocus on ukraine. it is a situation where we have a friend of the united states, not an ally but a partner that's under threat and better to defend themselves in the electromagnetic spectrum as well as in cyber. it would be really important to giving them the capability to defend themselves and the russian attempts to gain more territory and that would force putin to refocus his effort back onto that and make a determination whether he's going to resolve. he's able to create influence without any counter. >> i think our vital interests in eastern europe and the middle east are at risk. i think we've already had some outcomes of the iranian deal. we lost some of our allies in doing this. and losing those allies is something we cannot afford to have happen. we have to step back and say what is our strategy? we have to deal with both at the same time. we need our allies to know we're going to stand beside them. it's the same thing in eastern ukraine because everybody's looking at it, you made all these decorations about nato. are you goinging to be there? and at times unintentionally our actions may look like we're not. and what i'm concerned about when you talk to saudis, the israelis and others they think are you here with us or are you with iran? what's your objective? i think we have to clarify that. our nation needs to let our allies know we're there for them. that's the first and most important thing we should do and we should discuss with them how we're going to stop issues in ukraine with nato and what we're going to do in the middle east to shore up our allies there. >> does anyone want to add to that? >> the last several decades of u.s. defense strategy has been focused on the challenge of networks of individuals, criminals, insurgents terrorists and the problems of failed states. and moving forward we're going to have to recognize it's russia or china. we have to return to great state xe competition and what that means is that when we look at certain areas, we need to look at it of not through the failed state but proxy warfare as well. we're going to need to learn lessons of what does and doesn't work in proxy warfare and reframe our approaches along those lines. and on top of this is focusing on how do you keep a lid -- how do you win a competition but also keep a lid on it from escalating. >> thank you, all. appreciate it. >> general, just to follow up on your comment to senator ayotte, you say we'd have to take some actions to reassure our allies, other nations in the region, in the middle east. what actions would those be? >> i think we need to reach out to saudi arabia the united arab emirates, kuwait jordan and egypt and walk to sit down with them and say we're here. some of the things we ought to talk about -- >> we say that all the time, by the way. >> and then put in place -- you know, when you look at it and you look at egypt, perhaps some of the best comments on a strategy for egypt, how do you get them stability? how do you get them security? you have to have energy to get jobs. 24% unemployment is really bad for us. it's bad for the world. how do we help get the middle east in place? they have enough money to do it. we have the expertise to help them get there. we have to look at the security, the stability, the energy sector and the jobs the economic development for the middle east to get them to a place where they can be looking forward to their future versus fighting all these issues we're seeing with radical islam. so i think a comprehensive program like that led by our country and others in the middle east is a step forward and let them know that we're going to be there not just for a couple hours but the next several decades. >> right now the egyptian regime is becoming more and more repressive. 45,000 people in prison, no sem plans of any really progress on a number of areas which are in contradiction to our fundamental principle principles. >> this is a tough area. i've been to egypt several times. how do we help them get out of this? in my dealings with our counterparts, they understand and want to do it. how do you get there? and there is so much tension in that region. they're going to have continued failed states and with those failed states now we have just another one. it seems to me at some point we have to come up with a new strategy that counters that. i personally believe that is some way of developing their economies. >> dr. singer, i have your book on my desk admittedly in a pile of books on my desk. i will move it to the top of the pile and the next time i encounter you, i will be able to given you a vigorous critique of your thesis that you espouse in that book. congratulations on its success. mr. scharre, thank you for your articulate answers to the questions to mr. clark and general alexander, a special thanks to you for your past service but also it will be the intention and they do work on a bipartisan basis, this committee, they start to look at the follow-on to the cyber legislation that we just passed through the senate and we'll be calling on all of you as we move forward with that effort. i think you would agree additional legislation is necessary, would you agree with that, general? >> i do, mr. chairman. >> thank you. jack? >> mr. chairman, this was an extraordinarilyinsightful panel. you chose wisely, a west point commander who shaped his life, you have a submarine officer, an army ranger and a graduate of harvard university good job, mr. chairman. a signature feature of book tv is our all-day coverage of book fairs and festivals from across the country with top nonfiction authors. here is our schedule beginning this weekend. we'll be in massachusetts for the boston book festival. middle of the month it's the louisiana book festival in baton rouge. and at the end of november, we're live for the 18th year in a row from florida for the miami book fair international. and the national book awards from new york city. some of the fairs and festivals on c-span 2's book tv. >> up next military and local law enforcement talk about interagency cooperation information sharing, and training efforts to prepare for and counter threats of violent extremism against military personnel and facilities. the association of the u.s. army is the host of this event. good morning everybody. i'm don loren and itch the have the honor of moderating. i would like to thank you for inviting me to do so this year. but, more importantly, for including these homeland sessions in this year's program. countering the violent extremist threat to the nation and to dod personnel and installations are increasingly important elements of today's military environment. it's fitting we have a meaningful discussion on this topic. i had the honor of moderating last year's panel on homeland security issues here at ausa and i'm pleased to see this year ausa has expanded the discussion to several extremely relevant panels. i believe there are four pamnels this year. we saw secretary johnson kick off yesterday morning. i wanted to tell you that our services share many many customs and traditions while we in the navy do not do as good a job pronouncing hoola as you all do. the unit challenge point must entertain those who can at the bar. so to my good friend guy swann, dave perkins who is running around perry wiggins my new friends jeff snow and mike smith, here is my 31st anniversary army ten-miler finisher coin. my 15th. and i invite to you produce your coin or meet me at the bar later today to discuss it. i can remember in the mid-1990s while a fellow at harvard university having general sullivan visit us and engage the military fellows in stimulating discussion. the united states army exists to fight and win the nation's wars. and while i will remain silent on the responsibility of my own service which celebrated its 240th birthday yesterday, i will say that there is no truer statement nor one more relevant than that which general sullivan professed then. fight and win the nation's wars. i've heard general sullivan say that for 20 years now. we heard the chief of staff say that yesterday and add to that statement in defense of the nation. and make no mistake about it there's no other army, no other military, no other entity on the planet as capeable and competent as doing that as our united states army. but the nature of our nation's wars has changed considerably over the 20 years that have passed since general sullivan first said that to me. it's not as simple as ten soviet divisions coming across anymore. no strategy document no longer addresses how we will fight and win two major theater wars simultaneously while conducting counter insurgency, peacekeeping or military operations other than war elsewhere. the nature of military operations has become more encompassing. in fact, the very substance of these panel discussions attempts to get our hands around what it means to defend the country. the threats we face as a nation have become more complex. these threats can come from rogue nation states, failed states terrorist organizations or lone wolves. not only do we have to defend the nation defend our deployed forces, defend our interests abroad, but we now have to defend our installations and our personnel here at home. connectivity and communications make actions once only the purview of nations possible by small groups of individuals. the separation between homeland defense and homeland security has become gray and less defined. as the u.s. military organizes, trains and equips to play a role in this threat environment, it must do so in an environment defined by rule of law. an environment under the national jurisdiction of the department of justice that spans the 50 united states, the territories, the tribal nations that make up america. and as the chief told us yesterday it must employ all of its components active guard and reserve. it must learn to interface with 72 fusion centers. it must operate with 8,000 law enforcement agencies and nearly 18,000 first responder entities. when combatting the wmd threat and i personally would add cyber to this threat list as all our weapons of mass effect, we must train for those that are every bit as important. they must have resources to these important missions but cannot sacrifice the core competencies that make us the premiere fighting force in the world and must not seek a whole government approach to this task but participate in a whole of nation mission as presidential decision eight mandates. whole of nation federal state municipal government, and private sector. and citizenry. we must defend infrastructure of which 85% resides in the private sector. we must defend military personnel in shopping center recruiting stations. we must defend military installations that are integral parts of their communities. we must defend these installations against classic connecticut attack and against cprne and against cyber intrusion and against inspired and directed terrorist attack. the 2014 qdr and the 2015 national security strategy clearly direct the u.s. military to defend the u.s. and support civil authorities at home. the national security addresses the top strategic risk ss to our nation which include catastrophic attack on the u.s. homeland or critical sfrat. the threat of attacks against citizens abroad and our allies. the proliferation and the use of weapons of mass destruction. and the effect of severe global infectious disease. the dod strategy for mission assurance tells us the critical criticality says we are capable and perform our core competencies as well. the recently released june 2015 national military strategy of the united states requires an integrated approach to the tasks of providing for the military defense of the homeland, combatting terrorism, countering weapons of mass destruction and providing support to civil authorities. and my dear friend dave perkins the u.s. u.s. army operating concept, win in a complex world the same title as this conference title poses that the u.s. army is faced with multiple dilemmas. it's faced with multiple options. must operate in multiple environments and mpartners. these are our marching orders. this is the strategic guidance that defines the world we must operate in. this is the complex environment in which we must defend america and keep the homeland safe. this is the battlefield in which we must fight and win the nation's wars to defend america. as the strategic guidance directs, we must understand the threats to the force, including those posed by homegrown violent extremists. we must understand the issues surrounding force protection in the domestic environment and the cooperation required across agencies to better protect our standalone forces. we must undertake initiatives across state, local municipal and tribal domestic agencies and the army that enhance our force protection. and we must eliminate barriers that impede our abilities and take actions that increase our awareness, preparedness, and exchange of threat information in a law enforcement centric homeland environment. today's panel will continue with perry wiggins discussion from yesterday, a discussion which included active guard reserve, osd and unified commander responsibility in defending america and keeping our homeland secure. our panel today is eminently qualified to continue that discussion and from the multidimensional perspective suggested by the threat. perspective that is whole of nation state, local, municipal and private sector. a perspective that is predicated on relationships, on planning, on training on exercising. a perspective that truly embodies the concept of one team, one fight. leading off the discussion we're fortunate to have major general mike smith, the director hqda g-34 protection. we then have major jeff snow commanding general of the u.s. army recruiting command. we have mr. chris klein deputy director federal protective service nation protection and programs directorate dhs. we have assistant chief lamar green assistant chief for homeland security bureau metropolitan police department of the district of columbia. and we have my good friend sheriff al cannon, charleston county sheriff, and mr. michael trapp deputy provost marshal of u.s. army north. we've got a lot to talk about but this all centers around your questions after everybody is done making their statements. so, thank you very much. and let me turn it over to mike. >> thank you very much for that introduction and those opening remarks. lieutenant general wiggins major general hen chch, i am michael smith major general and i'm the deputy chief of army reserve. i want to thank lieutenant general tally for being gracious enough for me to continue on this important work and follow through. it's portimportant that we have knowledgeable people here and show the importance of working across the interagency community working with local law enforcement. the army g-34 army force protection, was established in response to the investigation following the first ft. hood shooting in 2009. the army decided to reduce gaps and seams across protection programs by operationalizing the family of protection programs under the auspices of the newly established g-34. the g-34 is tasked with integrating, coordinating and synchronizeing all components of army protection to ensure unity of effort among headquarters department of the army staff, army commands and other army organizations in order to develop, prioritize resource manage, execute and assess the full spectrum of army protection-related programs. the g-34 also leads army's efforts to coordinate with the air force, the navy, the marines, the office of the secretary of defense and the joint staff and other government agencies including the department of homeland security and the fbi. after the ft. hood 2009 shooting, the army recognized that the threat from homegrown violent extremists is real and we must take actions to protect the force. in the past few years we have hardened our installations those being large bases with their own assigned provost marshals, that is law enforcement, and now we are placing additional emphasis on the security of our off-installation facilities, you would know them as recruiting stations army reserve centers and national guard armories where they don't have dedicated assigned force protection or specifically law enforcement officials. in the -- you may remember the september 2013 washington navy yard shooting where there were mass casualties, not long after that there was a second ft. hood shooting in april of 2014. our response to that incident showed that we had made significant progress and we were better prepared to respond. it also highlighted the complexities of trying to prevent these types of incidents. in the 2014 ft. hood shooting the shooter was not motivated by radical anti-american agenda, but rather a series of problems that spiraled out of control which eventually led him to lash out at those who he perceived wronged him. most recently the chattanooga incident highlighted attacks targeting military personnel can occur away from our large military installations. they can occur in the communities large and small where members of the army reserve and national guard live and work. attacks involving military personnel and facilities are often used as propaganda regardless of the original motivation of the shooters our enemies will attempt to exploit the event, radical publications will proclaim the shooters to be jihadists and martyrs even though that was not the shooter's original intention. through numerous outlets our enemies encourage individuals in the united states to use their residence within the united states to enable attacks and further their radical objectives. in just the past year hundreds of names have been containing personally identifiable information has been released in a hope to inspire people to take action. targeting can occur in many ways ranging from simple harassment to identifying people more specifically. we must ensure that the entire army team is aware of the threat and are properly trained to identify and report suspicious activities and respond when needed. one of the toughest challenges for the army is how do we address a threat that starts in the shadows like the shooter in chattanooga and only becomes visible at the onset of violence. to be successful we must address this at a few levels. at the federal, state and local level we need to continue to expand and -- our cooperation with local law enforcement partners by sharing information with agencies to our mutual benefit. we need to continue to respond in coordination with these local partners through execution of the national incident management system and ensure that our policies enhance interoperability and synchronize responses across judicial jurisdictional boundaries. within the army we assure commanders that they have the authorities and the responsibility to respond whenever and wherever warranted. we rapidly inform uniformed service members and former service members when they are identified and potentially at risk. we coordinate emergency action exercises. our personnel know how to react when presented with a dangerous situation particularly when law enforcement arrives. we continually assess and improve mass warning notification procedures and capabilities. at the individual level service members and family members are trained and understand that they could be targeted just because of the affiliation with the military and department of defense. we encourage them to be aware of their digital footprint ensuring that privacy settings are properly set for all social media accounts. with that i look forward to your questions and hearing from the rest panel. >> thank you, mike. jeff? >> thanks. first of all, thanks don, for the introduction. and let me just tell you, general wiggins, i appreciate the opportunity to panelrticipate on the panel on a topic near and dear to my heart. i've got the good fortune of commanding u.s. army recruiting command, and i assumed command in late june, 23rd to be exact. and i can tell you the first trip i took was down to little rock, arkansas, to actually pin a purple heart on -- or to hand a purple heart to the parents of a young man who was killed in 2009 standing outside of a recruiting center. and pinned another one on another young man who had been severely wounded but fortunately had recovered. and then two weeks later we had chattanooga. so i share that to tell you the threat is real. and i've been in command long enough to circulate amongst those recruiting centers. in the army as in the army, all components of the army, we've got more recruitment centers than all the other services together all across the united states. and my assessment was that there were things that we could do to enhance our force protection obviously in the wake of chattanooga it caused all of us to take a step back and look at what are those things we can do to enhance our force protection. and the big part of it as general smith has just articulated, enhance those relationships. i'll tell you, i think we've got a good relationship, but for our recruiting centers and stations, we are very much reliant upon those relationships and sharing of intel and information and certainly are reliant on local law enforcement to respond when a particular threat is identified to our stations and center. so, there's a number of things i could share with you, but i got to tell you i'm one that is very much interested in your questions as opposed to me telling you the number of things that we've done. i will just tell you i'm happy to do so. there are a number of things that we can and should do to enhance the force protection, some of our soft facilities recruiting centers being one of those, and we have taken steps to do so. and there's a lot more that we plan to do to do so. but a big part of it will be to continue enhance those relationships. as was highlighted yesterday in the panel the importance of those relationships cannot be understated. it is -- it is one of those things you got to work at day in and day out. it's not something you do one week and then three four five, six weeks later you reach out. these are routine. i think we do a very good job of sharing information, but we've got to continue to do that. but it's also one of those things you can never rest on your laurels. you got to continue to work at. like general smith, i look forward to your questions. thank you. >> thank you. chris? >> all right thanks. i promise, i had a blue jacket in the car that i was coming over here in and doris lynn who works with me said you probably need to take that and wear it because everyone is going to be dressed up. no it's a pretty simple panel, no problem. so i'm the only one up here without a jacket on which makes me look bad. the federal protective service is a small component within the department of homeland security. our responsibility is the protection and the law enforcement of all gsa, general services administration owned and leased facilities about 9,500 across the united states. dod offices and agencies occupy space in 995 of those buildings including 46 military processing stations and 127 armed forces recruiting centers. last september as most of you are aware an online chat room associated with the foreign terrorist organization directed their followers in the united states to act on their own and to target government officials, military and law enforcement. so, within those 9,500 gsa facilities a number of those three agencies are in there. immediately following this announcement the federal protective service enhanced the protection of our highest-risk facilities by implementing 12 new protective measures at those facilities. and then not long after on october 22nd was an incident in ottawa canada, at the war memorial in parliament. two of the three took place in ottawa on the 22nd of october. on the 27th of october secretary johnson who was with you all yesterday directed the federal protective service to enhance the protection of high-risk facilities in five cities. that lasted for 37 days. other incidents occurred across the world, charlie hebdo and a number of incidents happened and we continued to respond to other cities. it started with 20 cities. 5 cities, 20 cities, 101 cities and this operation which we call blue surge continues today. we interact with dod primarily at the jttf, the national jttf out in mcclain where you have your military operations support team. daily interaction with those guys, the dod agencies housed within gsa facilities. that's where the interaction takes place and then that's where we get information to deploy our folks out to those recruiting centers and stations that are within our area of responsibility. may 7th this past year dod went to force protection condition bravo in conus. we sent our guys out to go to all those facilities that housed dod assets in our inventory to make sure that everything was in place to ensure it was properly protected and then once again after the incident in chattanooga we sent our folks back out to those facilities to talk to the tenants to make sure they were adequately protected. i don't want to take up too much time talking about things that we've done. look forward to your questions. >> thank you very much. lamar? >> thank you. thank you for inviting the metropolitan police department to be a part of this board. i think one of the things that we continue to hear from the first panelists that spoke is partnership. partnership's important and establishing partnership after an incident is just simply too late. we need to know each other work with each other, be familiar with each other's tactics and procedures well before we have an incident. in terms of force protection, the lone wolf active shooter, the hve, represents a major threat to force protection efforts in a domestic environment. there have been recent attacks throughout the country and they have been so frequent in nature that it's becoming something that just seems regular throughout the united states. and in my idea that's just not acceptable. recent mass shootings to give you an example cupertino california, people killed in a rock quarry carson city nevada, gunman comes in and fires -- opens fire on several national guard members who are simply just having breakfast. here in our own nation's capital, the washington navy yard, subject enters that location and commits mass murder. there are various challenges as were mentioned earlier. active shooters, lone wolves are very hard to detect. they're very hard to counter. so, our intelligence collection, our intelligence dissemination our partnership has to be operating at an opentimum level. the lone shooters have the advantage of knowing a location working at a location being familiar with their environment before they conduct these outrageous attacks. one of the most glaring qualities about these type of events it's usually low tech and high yield in nature. the person usually doesn't have a lot of training. there's not a lot of ways to track subjects that come in and commit these types of atrocities. some of the lessons learned from the navy yard and i'll touch on a few really quick. communications. one of the things that we learned through our experiences at the navy yard in both incidents, we had the actual shooting that occurred in 2013 and this year we had a call that turned out to be thank god, a false alarm, but it was an excellent opportunity to see if some of the strategies procedures things that we put in place actually were effective. and in many cases they were. it may be prudent for military installations especially those located near largely populated areas to review their emergency call taking procedures and policies and ensure that their guidelines for actions and events of a large scale incident. your emergency call takers inside of your bases should really have that partnership and communication with your city's 911 call center. one of the things we realized during the navy yard is that inside of the military facility existed actually like a small subdivision of washington, d.c. it was a separate city. the 911 calls and all of that intelligence that was related to those 911 calls weren't related -- weren't passed on to the citywide 911 call center so that was a gap that we had to expose. the first responders that were responding were not getting the information that your call takers were receiving through the base communications. so, that's something that we worked on. and i think that's something that we should take from here and if you command a base, it's something you should look at in your procedures. emergency call takers should train together. your police forces that are on your bases should train together. we currently train with ndw, with ft. mcnair on an annual basis so that we're familiar with each other's tactics procedures and how we respond. additionally when we responded to the navy yard, since that was a separate environment the navy yard went on lockdown. that's one procedure that we sat down with the base commander. we sat down with joint forces and we talked about whether it's prudent to go into a lockdown situation if you have an emergency on your base which in essence locks out your first responders. okay? so procedures were put in place to mitigate that type of issue. and we're still kind of working on that right now. again, training together is key. doing tabletop exercises so that you're familiar with each other before an incident occurs doing full-scale conspiracyexercises so we get to actually act out our procedures in response to a major incident. i'll touch on intelligence. here in washington, d.c., we have excellent communication with our military partners. our jttfs fbi, the fusion center plays a major role in sharing intelligence back and forth with our military partners. i am going to end right there and open up for questions. thank you. >> thank you. al? >> as i was reflecting back my first assignment as a police officer specialized assignment was as a police community relations officer in charleston carolina. actually north charleston. and it did not take me long to figure that a critical part of what i needed to do given that we had the charleston naval base and charleston air force base, was to convince everybody that military community was a part of the community and not a part from the community. that was 40 years ago. i don't know that it has been any truer than it is today. now, we've come a long way since 9/11 in terms of sharing information. and i would submit to you that charleston for a number of reasons represents the best of that kind of communication based on the efforts that we made to stand up a port security program. but i will tell you that lamar in a sense in that they do interact on a daily basis out of necessity here in the washington district. the fact of the matter is that the further away you get out in the hinterlands not so much. and where that mantra a part of the community and not apart from the community, it becomes incumbent both on the base and local law enforcement to come together in ways that they've not come together before. and my air force buddy here i don't want to -- i will give you an example post-9/11. interoperability was a major buzzword. much was directed towards that and amc allocated a lot of money to put -- to build that capability of interoperability in their security force vehicle. well, what that resulted in was that security force's vehicle in charleston air force base could communicate with security force's vehicle at scott eyre force base. now, the likelihood of those vehicles being close enough to do that is very unlikely. we've since, i'm happy to say, got the joint base to come on our local radio system and where in the past it had a walkie-talkie at the law enforcement desk there, we now have complete communications as circumstances dictate. and unfortunately in the past there has been need for having that kind of communications. with charleston as small as it is, and it's a real challenge that we're confronted, has elements of the navy still there, nuclear school and consolidated brigg. i'm not saying that very loud, because i don't want too many people to know that. they've already unfortunately know that cat's out of the bag and they've been looking at that as a possible alternative to guantanamo. consolidated brigg there. 40% of the materiel shipped to the middle east left out of the port of charleston. up until dover got 17s c-17s out of charleston were carrying the bulk of the airlift. we have remnants of like i say, the navy nuclear school is still there, spaywars is there that put the electronic suites in the mraps. one of the originators of the mrap v-hull design force protection was from charleston. so, we've got a lot going on for a relatively small place. and quite frankly because of that port initiative -- port security initiative we built a unified command approach and today anybody that has assets that can bring to the table has a seat at the table. and they participate. we do actually have some pretty important army folks there. the corps of engineers we're hoping to deepen the channels and help out there. but when you look at the nature of the threat and as recently as yesterday secretary johnson talking about resurrecting the national threat assessment system, with the focus being more on the domestic threats. we all see them. we share them. law enforcement is as much a target perhaps for different reasons than the military, but we're targets as well. so it's incumbent on us to communicate better and to coordinate efforts when those lists are posted by isis in debeke, those personnel have off-base addresses that are provided as well. and you need to be -- you know you don't want a situation where you go off and you leave your family and then have nobody that's really focused on them in terms of law enforcement. so, that's an element in and of itself that should prompt greater communication and coordination. but the most recent issue of "inspire" magazine aqap which has the team of that issue was assassinations, had a picture of dylann roof who was thor. tate the perpetrator of the church shooting in charleston. we've been through a number of incidents in charleston and just as soon not have any more. to the extent that we can work together as a part of the community, it's very challenging. it's very challenging to the military as they look out and try to figure out who the players are in terms of law enforcement, the jurisdiction. whether it's a concurrent jurisdiction whether it's an exclusive military reservation, those issues are very challenging. and i'll be honest with you, it's not going to be the fbi that -- if you're on exclusive military reservation that you call first or who are most likely to respond first. it's going to be your local police officers and you need to get to know them better and coordinate. and i would recommend to you that one of your biggest handicaps is the fact that you turn over periodically. and one other responsibilities particularly of your provost marshal or your law enforcement cid is to write a collection requirement ought to be assigned to write up something about the local military personnel -- police personalities so that the incoming commander has some insight in to who does what who's responsible for what. and i'm not sure those messages get passed on to the extent that they should be. those are crucial, crucial parts of that relationship. and as we found in defining port security, what we were doing was defining that port further away from the waterline. and i would submit to you that the military needs to be looking at that -- from that perspective as well. that air base that naval base is not defined by the chain-link fence. you've got to have a broader perspective than that. and that includes your local law enforcement. you need to know what kind of capabilities you've got, that provost marshal, cid need to be doing that kind of assessment. who do you turn to. what s.w.a.t. team do you turn to. do you have that capability on base. if not you need to find who you going to call when you have somebody that is holed up in a building or something. maybe with a -- with a domestic situation. but there are a whole host of reasons to go to the effort to one, identify who your players are and locally law enforcementwise, identify ways of developing memoranda of understanding or those sorts of things to clarify and clear up the jurisdictional issues. i think -- being an attorney, i'm always mindful of the legal ramifications, but i will tell you something, good faith and good intentions have a significant role in determining legal outcomes. so if you set out to do the right thing and enter into memoranda and your lawyer's obviously going to be involved, but you do it and don't just say can i do this, but make sure you say if i take this way, how can i do it to accomplish 90% of what i want to accomplish. those are probably the two most important things. learning your police people and what they're capable of, who the personalities are, and then overcoming whatever shortcomings you have that relate to the jurisdictional issues. thank you. >> thank you, al. mike? >> thank you. well, the joy of being the cleanup batter is to look down and realize that pretty much everything you intended to say has been covered probably by people substantially more entell intelligent than yourself. i want to welcome you and thank you for taking part in this panel and thank you all of our panelists for being a great variety of points of view and things we need to talk about to the table. if you heard anything yesterday and today repeated more i doubt it's than relationships. every panel member here has talked about relationships. and the other side of the bang is not a time for relationships. we tried that in the past nationally, we know it doesn't work. so, what army north brings is that centerpiece. we are responsible for force protection and anti-terrorism for the 300,000-plus soldiers and their families and civilians that are in north america. we work closely with the united states northern command on a daily basis. we work closely with the provost marshal general's office on a daily basis and, of course the g-34 protection. we are that commander with the responsibility for force protection in north america and it's our job to make sure that we're all talking to one another so that every individual soldier knows what's going on. knows what the threat is knows where their safe place to be is knows who their law enforcement presence is and who to call and what to expect when that call is made. our responsibility is to communicate daily with the 20 acoms and asccs and drus to let them know what the threat picture is to let them know what's going on out there. i'm very proud of our 24-hour, 7, 365 threat fusion cell. we sit right next to the army north g-2. and every day we are talking with sheriff's offices the department of homeland security, the department of state the federal bureau of investigation so that we know what's going on out there. we know the threats that are developing. one of our boss's primary themes is this site picture. what's going on. how can he reach out if there's an event in north carolina, an event in california, an event in north dakota against a stand-alone facility. do they have something to do with each other. is this a trend. is this something that every soldier in north america needs to be made aware of. one of the greatest things that our boss is driving and we're working very hard on is a common operating picture. first we want to be able to see what's going on out there understand what it could mean, analyze it and very quickly get that information not only to those 20 commands but to be able to reach out to every individual soldier so we have a number of things we're working with, trade-off with g-34 with northcom to make that a reality. as you figured out the army's a big place. and the more we dig the more we're surprised. and all of our efforts to figure out post-chattanooga exactly how many stand-alone facilities the united states army has in north america, we began with a rough number of about 5,600. at last count we're up to 8,900. because besides the ones you're aware of recruiting centers, reserve centers, national guard offices, there are -- you know, we army north have folks embedded with every fema region in the country and our friends in the force -- the federal protective service provide protection for most of them, although not all of them. some of them are in storefronts. but we've got to find a way not only to process and share information, but to make sure every single soldier knows what actions he or she needs to take to protect themselves and their families. one of my favorite sayings of the many famous things that people say when george washington said when we assumed the soldier we did not set aside the citizen. our soldiers live, operate, take care of their families and commit to their communities. they need to understand where their protection comes from. we could certainly as secretary johnson said yesterday, we can build a secure internet. we can actually build secure borders. we can make air travel completely safe. but that's not who we are and that's not what we do. we are not going to all run to the garrison and hide. we're part of the american community. we're a part of the fabric of this society. so, what general wiggins leads us to do is remain a part of the community. be prepared to execute our mission. but know how to manage risk, take care of our soldiers and their families, and to close with the relationships. and we can only do that with relationships across the army relationships across the services, and relationships with the state, federal, tribal, county, every level of law enforcement. and we have to be talking every day. again, we cannot learn who we need to be talking about on the wrong side of the bang. i'll turn it back over to admiral lauren and thank you all for joining us. >> those are some pretty broad-ranging comments on a very broad-ranging subject. and i want to thank everybody for their comments. i'd like to open it up to questions, and i'll take the prerogative of the chair to ask the first question, of course, which is we talk about relationships. and yesterday the chief talked about readiness and an integral part of all of that is planning and very importantly training. and training can be at various levels as we all know and the reality is, it has to go from the actual lowest tactical level all the way up to the senior level. my experiences here in washington are that unless periodically the president, the cabinet secretaries are sitting at a tabletop exercise you only get 90% of the effectiveness of that training unless it goes all the way to the top. so, i'd ask our panelists here what are some of the initiatives that perhaps they have been involved in their respective relationships within their communities and the broader reaching relationship with the total army that they may have pursued and are engaged in. so, who would like to start? mike? >> i can begin addressing that. from a department of the army standpoint, you know, we establish policy at the headquarters. but it's executed down at the unit level. when we talk about off-installation facilities such as army reserve and national -- army reserve centers and national guard armories they reach out to their local community to conduct these exercises that you mentioned. with local law enforcement establishing relationship many members of the army reserve and national guard are also local law enforcement members, so it's a natural fit and a natural tie to bring that together. so those exercises are conducted periodically. and we try to combine them if there's multiple units in a building rather than having local law enforcement reaching out three, four five times to the same location. that's the important part of that. but in addition it's the continual sharing of information. as was mentioned it was once a year where i take command of a local unit and meet the local police and two years later i roll out and somebody else comes in. it's important to have that dialogue and get to know each other. share information about what's going on in the community and it works both ways both between military members and with law enforcement as well. a key point was made i think about al that when military we're transient. we're there for a short period of time and then we move on. it's important that a part of that battle handover that those relationships are handed over as well. so that law enforcement knows that mike isn't there anymore that mark is, and they know how to get ahold of mark and continue that relationship that's there. it's about team work and it's about the partnership and exercising it at the local level and reporting it up through higher headquarters. what resources are needed to improve the response if it's interoperability or connectivity how can we help from higher ed quart headquarters? >> anyone else? >> in the interest of time when you say training i say for us the priority has been rehearsing our battle drills within some of the recruiting centers. what actions do the individuals take. who do they call. but really our efforts beyond that emphasis, so that which we can control, has really been the relationships. so, it's interesting, i reached out to some battalion commanders in advance of the panel and said, hey, listen, i'm going to have this opportunity. just give me some feedback in terms of the things you are doing, and i got to tell you, i got eight different battalions here and they all talked about direct relationship, local police department sharing of information. they listed all the organizations that came up in a briefing. regular force protection interaction with the jttf directly. i got names of individuals. some of the points we've talked about about the importance of this relationship and that you got to work at it, that really has been our emphasis. >> yeah, just from a local police perspective we've done tabletops, full-scale exercises with several of our military partners. the tabletops were more an executive level, higher management going over incident command, making sure that all of our components from the military, the proper people from the military would command to incident command. that was one of the things we realized in our navy yard interactions was that we didn't have the proper people in the initial incident command. we actually there was confusion as to who was in charge of the base at that time. so we've had several briefings where we've sat down with their executive level and just really gotten more of a training on who's in charge who we need in that incident command, and from their perspective who they need to send out to the incident command. we've done the tactical-level training through full-scale exercises where we've actually done drills on the navy yard facilities. we've done drills at ft. mcnair as well. that communication, that learning each other's procedures and who needs to be face to face has been excellent. >> thank you. >> i'll add one other thing, if i may. >> sure. >> which is always pressing that push to test button. monthly we do an exercise where we reach out from the headquarters to the 20 commands within north america. and we purposely change it where the response must be by e-mail or next month it must be by telephone or next month it must be by message. because as you know, it never fails that something isn't going to work. each month we find a hole. each month someone has moved and we didn't know about it. so you just, you know, sheriff cannon talked about, you know, making sure that the first thing you pass on is who you need to talk to, who you need to go to who you need to have a relationship with. even if it's internal, you got to push the press to test button on a very regular basis, because people change, things happen, communication systems go down. so, i'll just add that. whatever great plan you have, you really have to check it to make sure it will survive first contact with the enemy. >> thank you. okay. your questions please. matt's got a microphone here, so please speak into the microphone. identify yourself and do your best to make it a question. >> thanks. patrick tucker with defense one. in 2009 after the ft. hood shootings the president established an insider threat task force. one of the mandates was an integration center for analysis of big data as applied to insider threats. so to the question can you speak to samome of the nascent efforts to apply big data analytics to the job of detecting early warning signs of an attack both within the broader population and in the service populations because they're very different populations and data sets. thank you. >> you want to try that? >> yeah. i'll start with the response on that. you made a reference to the insider threat task force, the g-34 leads the army's effort as part of the national insider threat task force. that has many aspects to it. active shooters which is really what we're talking about here is just one element of it. the larger element and where that was geared to in addition to 2009 it goes to the unauthorized disclosure of classified information which is really beyond the scope of this. but there is user activity monitoring to ensure that things are done properly. more to your point we're working with big data analytics now to identify exactly what it can provide to us to help support that. other initiatives that we have are installation access controls which will verify the identity of people coming onto our bases to determine whether they have any active wants or warrants on them. that's something that you'd want to know before people come onto bases and things like that. background checks. again, occurring on a periodic basis in accordance with the federal rules and regulations. does that answer your question? >> a quick follow-up. can you point to any particular incident where some of these techniques were used to actually thwart or stop an attack before it happened? we hear about all the bad news in the headlines. some of the success stories get missed. was it effective in any way to prevent a particular attack? >> it is always hard to prove a negative as you say. but the identity verification measures at the access control points on bases have identified people with active wants and warrants. -- at the gate. that's not to say that they were on their way to conduct something. but they had that in their background, and as a result of that i would offer that the procedures achieved their intent, to, you know, provide better security for the bases and better identity as to who is coming on the bases. and as the word gets out that we are checking, that, in fact, is a deterrent for people who would otherwise try to get onto a base with ill intentions. >> interesting. mike, did you have anything to add? >> i just will add a success story only because it's already in the public domain. we had significant hve threat streams prior to the anniversary of 9/11. and what they've made public, the fbi specifically rolled up ten threat actors that had expressed particular threat information against the department of defense. obviously until the prosecution is over, they release very little information, so the most i can say is that we have seen active law enforcement active data analysis active communication across agencies that has resulted in preventing planned events. >> thank you. another question? yes, ma'am. up. >> good morning my name is charlotte peete, as all of you are evaluating and looking back to the tragedy in chattanooga, tennessee, what specific mitigation strategies could have or should have been in place? and are you acting on any of those now? >> interesting point. >> and i'll take a stab at it. i mean, listen in the wake of that tragic incident it caused all of us to kind of reassess our force protection facility so, you know, part of this is you know, we reviewed our policies our programs, and procedures to address, you know the potential of this threat. i'm in the camp of it's not a question of if this is going to happen again, it's going to be a question of when. so, there have been a number of things done. in part there was a department of defense task force that actually did an awful lot of work across this across all services. within the army there are things that we don't have to wait for the department of defense guidance to come out. there are things that i thought we should do to enhance the force protection. one of those things that we are doing, i'll give you a specific example, is we've already ordered ballistic benches to go into our recruiting centers. for those who are underinformed it looks like a normal bench but it can withstand a 762 round. that's something concrete we've taken steps to do that i think could have mitigated -- i don't know that it would have, you know prevented but could have mitigate mitigated. the other thing is in our recruiting centers, and some of those you can see into those recruiting centers. so, we've -- we've gone out. we call them clings. but you can put something on the front of that recruiting center so the recruiters inside the recruiting center can see out. but individuals looking in in the daytime cannot see in. that is yet another thing. we're also are pursuing controlled access so that, you know, right now it's uneven. there are some places, some recruiting centers, that do have controlled access. that's primarily been a result of crime in areas as opposed to threat. but i think we need to move to a consistent standard. i think the department of defense is going to help us with that. and i can tell you there are more, you know. my other comments we're not going to rest on our laurels. one thing you picked up, this is an evolving threat so as such our response needs to be a evolving response based on that threat. >> chris, did you want to comment? >> so, within the federal protective service, governmentwide is the interagency security committee the ise, it sets standards and guidelines for security at federally owned facilities. those standards are developed by security levels so as a security facility level five is the pentagon. facility security level one is a storefront martin luther king avenue southeast, 13 employees not a high risk, not a high volume of work that goes on there. so, those facility security levels determine minimum security standards. so at a security level four like the reagan building if you've been into the reagan building before as a visitor you go through screening. you go through an x-ray machine with your packages and you walk through a metal detector as you go in. and there's guards there that do that screening and you've got metal on you, you know, whatever it may be, they'll turn you away. so, it's been very beneficial for us. we don't have a lot of crime in our federal facilities primarily because we do this level of screening there. but the insider threat is what's unknown. normally employees that work in those buildings don't go through screening because they work there. they've got an hsd pd-12 compliant i.d. card and they have a background investigation and they're known but that doesn't mean that they're not having some type of issue that may cause them to do harm to co-workers. so, we think our facilities are pretty secure based on the security level a a recruiting station may be a level one. i was a recruiter back in my time in the army and i'm glad you are doing the work you are doing in those stations. you have to balance it out. i wanted the guys and girls to come into the office and join the army. they're not going to want to do that if they have to go through a bunker to get into the office. what's going on here? i don't want to join this place. it's a balance. how do you balance it out? i know it's a big issue that dod is working with. for us if we can put -- this happened with gabby giffords several years ago at the safeway when she was shot. we met with the capitol police in the senate and the house senate arms, it would be nice if you could move the district offices into the gsa facilities that we protect. anyone coming in there will go through screening and we know that anyone who is going to go into the auditorium for that speech does not have a weapon because they've been cleared. but then the members of congress, i need to be with my people. i need to be able to meet them and see them where they are. i don't want them to have to come through this gauntlet to try to come and see me. it's a heck of a balance that has to be done out there and it's something that all of us are working towards to make sure our people are safe. >> lamar, do you have anything to add? >> just from a local perspective, any types of intelligence that comes through that dictates there's a threat or anything directed toward a military recruiting facility or base, we would pick up either through our joint terrorism task force or it comes through our fusion center the rtac, who monitors various different systems, guardian, e-guardian and your arctic mile system is built into that system as well so when suspicious activity threats come through, we have different contingency plans where we'll send officers to recruiting locations. some for just visibilities. sometimes they'll have to check in. it just depends on the level of the threat so we're tied into that actively as well. >> thank you. this last question i'd like to take this woman here who had a hand up earlier. >> thank you. i'm kathleen kirkoy from "army times" my question is for general smith regarding training reservists for contingencies and i'm wondering if you feel that reservists need more training opportunities and training exercises to prepare. and if so, do you have enough resources under current budget constraints to conduct those training opportunities? >> that's a great question. and one of the challenges for this when we look to arm service members in the united states is we have to be mindful of the laws and the authorities that we have. the office of the provost marshal general in the third row, his team is putting together training programs for the reservist who we would choose to arm so that they understand what the procedures are, what their authorities are, and how best to manage. we would call it rules on the use of force. so, we're -- from an army reserve standpoint, we've already reached out and have begun some of that training. we're in a position to be prepared to respond if the commander chooses to do that. you recall earlier i mentioned that commanders had the authority to do that. and everyone has been tasked to develop a plan for their particular off-installation facility. so whether it's a small detachment with a company on it or a larger installation that has 10 or 12 units. so, it's really the commander's responsibility. they look at people with the proper background checks and so forth. defer to people who have a law enforcement background. they could be military police soldiers, enlisted or officer serving in the unit, or members of law enforcement that already have an authority to carry a weapon and they know what the local jurisdiction responsibilities are and the local laws. as far as funding, funding is extremely tight. but safety is very important too, so this is a priority for our service members for our commanders. and it further stresses the importance of the linkage, the partnership and the team work with local law enforcement. >> that's what i was going to add. that is yet another area that really dictates that you train with and have understandings with your local law enforcement so that the -- everybody knows the roles and responsibilities when something happens. crucial. >> and i'll just add with that i mean if you think about what we've talked about before until this point local law enforcement is the first responders. as we arm soldiers or prepare to, they could be coming upon a scene where there's somebody else armed in addition to the bad guy. so, we don't want our good guy soldiers that are responding to be misconstrued as adversaries by local law ens are forcement so that's why it's extremely important not only to have the training but to do exercises with local enforcement so they can understand interoperability of communication is essential there. but that's why our first default is always to partner with local law enforcement before we go to any decision like that. >> well before we thank our panel for their participation i want to thank you for joining us. we had a good turnout here despite the competing presentation. and we went ten minutes over. my apologies there. i also want to thank i counted eight working level one and two stars, nine if you count the three star. in the audience today. and so i just want to thank you for your level of interest on what is an important topic. and we look forward to continuing the conversation during the remainder of the conference. so please join me in thanking our panelists for a very interesting panel. a signature feature of "book tv" is our all-day coverage of book fairs and festivals from across the country with top nonfiction authors. here's our schedule beginning this weekend. we'll be in massachusetts for the boston book festival. in the middle of the month it's the louisiana book festival in baton rouge. and at the end of november we're live for the 18th year in a row from florida for the miami book fair international. and the national book awards from new york city. just some of the fairs and festivals this fall on c-span 2's "book tv." and we have more now from this association of the united states army conference. it's a panel on u.s./mexico security cooperation and the army's role in homeland security. all right, well good afternoon. i'm not guy swann. he got tied up handing out some awards. my name is george cohen. i work on the national staff. it's an honor and privilege for me to be here with you. i want to thank you very much for your time. we have a great, great panel for you today. thank you for joining us for our third and final iow/dhs breakout session. this session is entitled "the portion of mexico to homeland security." of course, one of the goals of our association in the institute of land warfare is to foster an understanding of the emerging security environment. and as your professional organization association, aosa is proud to provide events like this one that broaden the knowledge base of army professionals and those who partner with our army in our nation's defense. these presentations are our way of amplifying the army and help to further the association's mission to be the voice for the army and support for the soldier. of course, we can't do this alone. ausa relies on its members to help tell the story, tell the army's story and to support our soldiers and their families. a strong membership base is vitally important for advocacy efforts in congress with the pentagon and the defense industrial base. as well as the public and communities across the country through ausa's 120 local chapters. so for those of you army and homeland security professionals and your comrades in arms who are not yet members of the association of the u.s. army, we encourage you to join with a special introductory offer. you'll find the invitation on your chair. card looks something like this. just bring it to the ausa membership booth, booth 407 in exhibit hall "a." if you are already a member, thank you for staying with us. you're very important to us. so please give your invitation to a fellow professional so he, too, can enjoy what you enjoy with your membership. you'll be doing a service to the association, to the united states army and to the nation. so, i'll finish banging on about that. and now turn the floor over to dr. richard downie, executive vice president for global strategies omnitru technologies. >> thank you, richard. i'll get my stuff out of the way here. well, thank you very much, george. good afternoon. you know, it's great to be an audience where there's actually interaction, but, you know, it's -- this is an army -- this is the ausa. this is normally, you know, the kind of spirit we expect. we have our partners from mexico are here down below. so if you would help me one more time, good afternoon. >> good afternoon. >> oh, thank you so much. that's much better. much better. well, as george mentioned, i'm richard downie. and it's really a pleasure for me to be here today as your moderator for this panel on the importance of mexico for u.s. homeland security. and it is an honor to be with this very distinguished panel, and also with this distinguished audience. so thank you very much for all joining us today. you know, when we talk about threats to the united states typically we tend to immediately think far away -- iran, north korea, al qaeda, although they certainly are here. but, you know, when you look at a map and we don't have maps to project today. there is no projection. but you've all seen those maps of the arrows coming up from the south of the roots of trafficking from south america through central america through the caribbean through the eastern pacific and they all come up these arrows show how these -- the traffickers take drugs, pirated material, people, up, and usually the arrows stop at the u.s. border. but we all know the arrows don't really stop at the u.s. border. they continue on. other maps will show you they continue on to los angeles and seattle, dallas, chicago, atlanta, washington, d.c. and they continue on up to canada, too. and the point is that if these -- if these traffickers can take illegal drugs and pirated merchandise and people successfully into these areas, what else can they bring? and the problem is we see as a result how closely intertwined our security is with that of mexico, because all those roots coming from the caribbean, eastern pacific, central america, they all converge in mexico going through. and it is so important for us to work with our mexican partners in this. and we have a terrific panel today to address this issue. of what are those things that can pass through our security, that we need to work so closely with our mexican counterparts with. what we'll do today, we'll have -- we're going to have -- this panel will speak, each of them will speak seven or eight minutes or so. we want to leave a lot of time for questions because i think that will be the richest part of this dialogue. we want to make it a dialogue. i ask you, please, as you listen to each of the speakers, to be thinking about what you want to ask them. and don't be shy. because they're happy and we want to engage with you on this. so, first up, on the speakers today, will be general -- brigadier general j.t. taylor who is the deputy director for plans, policy and strategy at the u.s. northern command and norad which is the unified command that focuses -- one of their many responsibilities is focusing on mexico. and he's going to give a strategic overview to start things off. he'll be followed by michael houston who is the principle director for the americas in the policy directorate of the department of homeland security. and he will address -- he actually has spent a lot of time focusing in homeland security on mexico, so he'll be giving us the framework that department of homeland security uses to address this. he'll be followed by dr. duncan wood the director of the mexico institute at the woodrow wilson center here in washington, d.c., who has spent tremendous time in mexico as a professor here and has a great overview of all issues related to mexico and particularly our relationship with mexico, and our cleanup batter will be lieutenant general perry wiggins who is the commander of u.s. army north. and amongst his many responsibility, army north is the army component that focuses on the relationship with mexico. and during his time he's actually spent six years at army north in a variety of positions, so he's seen not only during this administration under enrique neat -- nieto but also on the previous administration of felipe calderon. he has a tremendous appreciation for how this relationship has gone. and he'll be addressing some of the strategies -- one of his very close relationships is with general salvador fuegos who is the defense minister of mexico so we look forward to all of our panelists giving an overand then your questions. again, be thinking about what you'd like to ask our panelists and let me turn it over to general taylor, please, thank you. >> thank you very much. ladies and gentlemen, i appreciate the opportunity to share a few insights to you of the absolute necessity of mexico to the security of north america from the perspective of u.s. north command, and i'd like to start with a little strategic context from a north american continental perspective writ large. because i think it's essential to understand the role that mexico plays in our security by comparing it a little bit to the role that canada plays in our security. now, history has shown that if you want to threaten the united states, there's a number of approaches that you can take to get to north america. you can take an equatorial approach where you come from the east or west coast from the sea. that's a hard approach because there's great distances involved or you can take a polar approach where you go over the north pole. there is less distance involved with that in the aerial domain. that's absolutely inhospitable in the land domain. but our aerial domain threat over the pole is an existential threat, so over five decades we have cultivated a very close relationship with canada to address the existential threat that exists coming over the poles that has served north america very well. in fact, our chairman recently articulated four nation-state threats to north america and of those four three of them can reach us in the aerial domain over that polar approach. and so we learned of the absolute necessity of a close relationship with canada. we learned that that was in our national interests. and that relationship that we have with canada has enabled us to truly be able to provide aerospace control and maritime warning. that relationship is critical to the security of the united states and canada. both our countries benefit from that against existential threats. that relationship we have with canada is a model that is worthy of emulating. but an aerial threat over the poles is not the only threat that north america faces. the security landscape is evolving and north america faces a threat from the south. now, our threat from the south is not presently an existential threat, but it is a security threat nonetheless. and this threat that is transnational in nature exploits seams between countries. it's an organized threat. it is a networked threat. it is agile. it's adaptive. and it can reach the point to where it actually destabilizes regions and it can also challenge sovereignty. and so we broadly describe that threat as transnational organized crime. now, this threat enters the united states through the land domain transiting through mexico and through the maritime domain coming up through the caribbean. and like i said while that threat is not as of yet existential it is a national security matter. and mexico is postured to play every bit an important role against that kind of threat that canada plays against the aerial domain threat that we face from the poles. and so these kinds of threats include such things as special interest aliens, the potential smuggling of weapons of mass destruction, the trafficking of drugs and persons moving north or weapons and money moving out of the united states and south.

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