henhen hence downward prices on gasoline. when our country produces more, that helps bring down the overall price. so the gasoline prices at the pump aren't linked to west texas intermediate crud. they're linked to brent crude. when we empower our industry to grow and expand and produce more supply, that helps bring down prices, prices for oil globally, prices for gas at the pump. that benefits consumers. that benefits small businesses across this great country. so, again, the studies done by the entities and others show that on a long-term secular basis, gasoline prices are lower by lifting the oil export ban because we're part of the global supply. the united states produces more supply globally. so it benefits consumers. second, let's talk about our economy. that's pretty obvious, isn't it? if we have a growing, expanding, thriving energy industry, producing more oil and gas in this country, that leads to more jobs. good paying jobs of all kinds, everything from the roughneck out there at the well head to the petroleum engineer to the markers and across the board, right? so more good paying jobs, more economic growth for our country. and we've seen that in recent years as oil production in this country has expanded largely due to the shale plays, states like my state of north dakota and in texas but, also, natural gas across places like pennsylvania and ohio and other parts of our country. so that's obvious. it's good for our economy, and it's good for job creation and just think about it, okay, let's put this in common sense terms as far as lifting the oil export ban, let's say you've got store "a" and it produces a product and let's say you have store "b" and it produces exactly the same product. but store "b" always gets $5 to $8 to $10 more for the very same product versus store "a." store "b" always gets $8 to $10 more for the very same product. which store is going to grow and prosper? which store will stay in business and which store is going to go out of business? simple stuff, right? but fundamental economics. if we get $5 to $8 to $10 less for the very same product, our industry is going to atrophy and that same industry in other countries will grow and prosper. their economies will grow and prosper. they will have more jobs. and, remember, energy is a foundational industry. all other industry sectors need energy, right? so when we have a thriving, growing, strong energy industry in this country, that helps the rest of our economy as well. and, of course, that leads into national security. let's talk about those competitors. who are those global competitors to produce oil and gas throughout the world? well, gee, let's see, there's opec and there's russia. oh, and there's venezuela, right? so where do you want to get your energy? where do you want to get your energy? do you want to get it from the united states of america and our closest friend and ally canada? or do you want to remain dependent on opec? that's a pretty easy answer. the american people resoundingly say we want to produce the energy at home. it's not just an economic issue, it's a national security issue. we are more secure when we are energy secure. when we produce more energy here at home than we consume. when we work with canada to produce more energy, we not only make ourselves stronger, we make our allies stronger. and we reduce the strength, the geopolitical strength and the economic vitality of our adversaries around the globe. and that's why we need to lift the ban on oil exports. and so we'll talk about a lot of things this morning, and we'll talk about, well, gee, is it time to do it? it is certainly time to do it. it looks like iran's production will come back on the market. i've been a very strong proponent of sanctions against iran and think we should continue those sanctions. both sanctions have had a biting effect. before we impose those sanctions iran imported about 2 million barrels a day of barrel. now they're down to 1.1 million a day they export and sell. but that oil looks like may be coming back on the market. that makes the timing more imperative for us to act now in terms of lifting that oil export ban. and the one final point i'll make before i wrap is so often we hear that has to be paired with something, some other type of energy measure. why? if it's a clear benefit to our nation, if it's a benefit to consumers, if it's a benefit to our economy, to job creation, if it's important for our national security, why don't we just do it and do it now? i believe we should. i believe the time has come and we need to act. thanks so much. great to be with you this morning. [ applause ] good morning, senator. thank you for your comments. well, let me start with the last thing you mentioned. i've been asking the different guests here today about the prospects for some type of political deal. you said if it's a good policy, why should we pair it with anything? well, what if you need to do that to get the votes. so what are some things even if you don't want to pair it with anything do you think that's going to be a political necessity in order to get this over the finish line? >> it may be. there may be things that we compare it with, but just two thoughts. the first thought is one i just finished with. if it's a clear net win, let's do it. the other point i make, remember, the process in congress is not always a direct addition process. if you pair it with something or add something else, you may p potentially lose more votes than you gain. for example, right now i think basically you'd get every -- in the senate you'd get every single vote on our side of the aisle, i believe. that's 54 votes. that means we have to pick up about seven democrat votes roughly because give or take you have to have a little extra there. and so keep in mind if you start adding things that drop off more votes than are added, you haven't gained ground, so you have to be careful when you talk about that transactional aspect. >> how many votes do you think you have right now? you mentioned you think you've got your entire caucus together. how many democrats shy of 60 do you think you are on a straight ahead bill? >> the realities of it depends on the vehicle. in other words i don't know that it would come to the senate floor as a stand alone measure. it's more likely it would be attached to something else as an amendment. in some cases the subsets overlap. in other words, the people that are for the underlying measure are favorably predisposed to voting for this amendment so you don't shed votes. on the flip side there are some vehicles that votes you would otherwise get for the amendment absolutely will say, look, i'm for the amendment but i'm not going to vote for it on that bill. i don't think it works or i'm not willing to support it. so it really comes down to the underlying measure you're talking about, and i think there are some that line up pretty well and so that's the key. but i have to answer your question. i think there are more than seven democrats that will join us if we get the right vehicle and that's why i put it in those terms. >> thank you. what could some of those vehicles be? >> well, a good example is really a reauthorization, if you will, or updating of the law that determines how we handle chemicals and particularly hazardous chemicals in this country to make sure that they're handled safely and well with good transparency. so it's something that's very timely. it's something that needs to happen. i think it's well structured. comes out of epw and is a good fit. i have been and continue to push both to deal with that underlying ledge lags and to demand that this is an amendment that goes with it. >> have you had any active discussions in your caucus or democrats on marrying it specifically to tosca? >> i have and i will continue to. again i'm pushing it hard because i think it's timely and something we get done this year. i think it's a good fit. >> i've been wondering about the timing. certainly we've had several senators on your side of the aisle, cruz, cornyn and some others. and for one reason or another have decided not to bring bills forward. is that a sign that advocates feel they're still shy of the votes? >> it's a sign that we want to pass it versus just bring it up. we get votes to pass it and the thought was that if we don't bring it up in the right way with the right vehicle we could have people vote no that would have voted yes. it's part of a strategic effort. i've been very involved with my colleagues to keep it in that framework to get a result, so we pass the legislation. >> what has been the effect of the crude prices? what has been the impact of that on this debate substantively, the ability to steer this through congress? >> why do you think the price is down? i mean, i think you go to that -- people have to understand what's going on because i think it drives the policy argument. opec is concerned about losing its market share. they are the buffer absorbing the impact of more oil coming on the market by reducing how much they produce and sell in the international market. this time they're not doing it. they're concerned about continuing to maintain their position in terms of world oil supply. so with all of this coming on with the geopolitical events going on, vis-a-vis iran, opec has been pushing particularly saudi has been pushing a tremendous amount of oil onto the market bringing prices down, isn't it? what happens when they reassert their market control? prices come right back up, don't they? does that sound familiar? does it sound like history is repeating itself? does that sound like a prescription to remain dependent on opec? that's what we're talking about. let's look around. do we want to be energy secure in this country or repeat the same old past where prices are down, sure. stack our rigs, reduce our industry, reduce our production in this country and go right back to depending on opec, vens way will. enough of that. the american people have said enough of that. let's make the right policy changes so we grow our country. >> despite the price collapse is it's seen as an effort to batter the u.s. shale industry. are you saying it would somehow provide a muscle booster to the u.s. shale industry at a time it's under this assault? >> exactly. it's about making sure that we sustain and grow our industry and, remember, at the end of the day all we're talking about is making sure our industry gets a level playing field, a fair shot. job creation, economic growth, national security, of course. that's what we should be doing. now look, there's a lot of factors that go into oil prices and you know the swings in any commodity price over time, but look at some of these underlying realities. let's make sure we're not repeating patterns of the past. >> the energy secretary has spoken to this topic several times it's not really in his wheelhouse. >> the white house won't answer questions. i asked the other senators this, too, we've had some steps on swaps with mexico. to you is that a sign they're open to wider legislation or conversely a sign that they're willing to take small steps but would say no to a more wholesale removal of the restrictions? >> the signals i've seen leads me to believe, by the way, it takes a bipartisan majority to do it. at least from what i've seen the president will sign on and not veto it. that's just my reading of the signs to this point. >> you said why wouldn't we want this industry to grow and prosper in the united states. it has grown and prospered in the yunited states. i guess i would ask what is the problem in need of solving here? this is an industry that despite the more recent head winds has been doing very well. we've seen historic, of course, production increases. how needed is this policy step to prevent the industry from having a much rougher time? >> it's very needed, ben, and that's a great question. i appreciate you asking it. that's why i gave you the analogy of two stores, pick any two businesses or types of businesses or any industry sectors you want and just think for a minute if one business gets $10 more to sell, then the first business is going to succeed and thrive and prosper. it's as simple as saying that you want to make sure that russia, opec, vens way will and those types of countries have a competitive advantage versus the united states so they will continue to produce oil and gas and we will not. and that's the economic reality we face and why is it happening now? well, because those other competitors see what's happening. the united states is rising up and taking over the energy markets, right? so they're going to make sure that doesn't happen. why would we help them? yes, mr. putin, we would like you to have a $10 advantage for energy in your country versus the companies that are owned by americans, the shareholders of this country? why would we say that? yes, opec, we want to depend on you rather than getting energy from north dakota and texas and from canada. why would we do that? why would increase in u.s. production only makes what's a difficult safety situation. worse. >> we've also got to have the right energy infrastructure. if they want to ignore forces they're making a mistake because those forces are set by pricing and the consumer will determine what they want to buy, what type of energy, and at what price. we have to be mindful of that always. wove to create a xcompetitive argument for our industries to grow and move it from where it's produced in this country to where it's consumed as safely as possible and that means you need the right mix of pipelines, rail, and road. and in the case of electricity, we need transmission. you have to build the energy infrastructure along with growing the energy industry. so that's what we have to do, and that's part of an energy plan that truly maex okes our country energy secure. >> we've had other u.s. agencies ta taking steps on regulatory steps on crude by rail safety. do you think those steps are sufficient to handle increased production we would see that most anticipate under a lifting of the ban? >> the regulatory structure is always under the industry. it regulates and moves ahead. they are trying to catch up and adjust. the other point we've got to have both the clear structure and regulators understand that you have to empower investment. it helps us build the infrastructure and i'm talking about private investment that creates revenue, tax revenue for our country and actually helps address the debt and deficit rather than higher taxes. i'm talking private investment that drives that infrastructure, growth, but also that's the same investment that goes into new technologies that produce more energy and do it with better environmental stewardship. >> i would be ex communicated if i didn't ask you about the k keystone pipeline. what are the signals you're getting from the administration? what are you hearing on timing, on outcome, and would we see another -- would we see another capital hill legislative effort? >> october 19, i think the president would have turned it down already, perhaps on his trip to alaska, but it kind of got embroiled in the prime minister election in canada which i believe is october 19. and i think the administration didn't want to get caught up in the canadian prime minister race and has held off on a decision. although as we are in year seven now of delay, the strategy of defeat through delay may continue. we'll see. we've passed it with 62 votes. in the long term we'll get it. it's more of a question of when. >> i wanted to move on to some of the questions we're getting from social media and also for folks out there. you can submit a question on twitter with the #asknj. let's see what we've got here. oh, here's one. with the possible shutdown could the gop -- basically could the gop make the decision to move away from the emphasis on defunding planned parenthood and somehow instead try and attach export legislation? >> look, i think we should defund planned parenthood. i think we should not only pass or approve keystone but build the necessary energy infrastructure to make this country energy secure. we need to lift the ban on oil export. why does it always have to be this or that? let's do the things that help our country move ahead and prosper and at the same time let's get consistent in terms of making sure the government is funded, create a better business climate and, you know, meet the challenges that the american people want us to meet. i don't look at these as either/or propositions. let's make the best case we can. let's have the debate. put the measures on the floor and vote. no more filibusters. let's go. >> the looming fiscal deadlines are something weighing heavily on a lot of minds. how where are the discussions on gop on planned parenthood while avoiding a shutdown? how are you -- how are you going to thread that needle or how will the democrats thread that needle? >> look, i'm a member of the appropriations committee. we've passed all 12 appropriations bills through our appropriations committee with big bipartisan majorities. let's get those bills on the floor. let's vote on those bills. let's not have filibusters. people can offer their amendments. you put the measure on the floor, you have the debate, and you vote. >> i thought your mention of tosca was interesting. that's kind of bedrock environmental statute that hasn't been reauthorized in quite a long time. that's a difficult thing to get through the full congress. what are some others? >> realistically it will have to have it. i don't know how you have an energy bill without adding it and also obviously we talked about tosca but related bills, infrastructure, and other commerce measures. i think momentum is really building. you see what's going on in the house. they're good to go. we have the votes now in the senate and it's time to vote. >> that's going to be the last word. thank you for being here. >> good to be with you. [ applause ] >> thank you, senator. thank you, ben. i appreciate you moderating today and all of our speakers, i also appreciate you in the audience for being with us this morning. thank you to jack for underwriting the event today. we would ask you all if you'd take a moment to let us know your thoughts on this event. we really do value your feedback. thank you so much. have a great morning. the pope's visit to the u.s. c-span has live coverage from washington, d.c., the first stop on the pope's tour today beginning at 3:49 on c-span. we're live with the president and mrs. obama to greet the pontiff on his arrival at joint base andrews on c-span, c-span radio and c-span.org. as the obamas officially welcome him to the white house. live coverage begins at 8:45 eastern. and later that afternoon starting at 4:00, the mass and cannonization at the basilica of the national shrine of the immaculate conception. live coverage begins from capitol hill as pope francis makes history becoming the first pontiff to address a joint meeting of congress. and friday morning at 10:00, live coverage from new york as the pope speaks to the united nations general assembly on c-span 3, c-span radio and c-span.org. and later at is 1:30, the pontiff will hold a religious service at the 9/11 world trade center museum live on tv or online at c-span.org. now today i'm a reporter for nbc 4. is this marion barry's place? that's his seat there. i went back to the office and i called him up. mr. mayor, i've been to club 55. i mean, don't you realize people are watching what you do, where you go? they say you sit there all the time and watch naked dancing girls. there was a pause on the phone. he says, it's nice, isn't it? >> this sunday night on q&a, nbc 4 washington reporter tom sherwood on the political corruption in d.c., maryland, and virginia. >> i think 44 attorneys general from around the country signed a letter saying they agreed with governor mcdonnell that what he did was politics not bribery and the gifts he should have reported the gifts. $15,000 for a child's wedding. $70,000 loan. the problem was bob mcdonnell had been considered potentially a vice presidential candidate. was in over his head. this is another case where you're a public figure and you let your messy private life combine together. >> sunday night at 8:00 eastern and pacific on c-span's q&a. all persons having business before the supreme court of the states are admonished to draw near and give their attention. >> number 759, earnest miranda, petitioner versus arizona. >> argument number 18, roe against wade. >> barbara madison is probably the most famous case this court ever decided. >> they enlisted as slave people here on land where slavery wasn't recognized. >> it will take presidential orders and the presence of federal troops and marshalls. and the courage of children. >> we wanted to pick cases that changed the court in society and that changed society. >> so she told them they would have to have a search and demanded to see the paper and to read it, see what it was. which they refused to do so she grabbed it out of his hand it to look at it. and thereafter the police officer handcuffed her. >> i can't imagine a better way to bring the constitution to life than by telling the human stories behind great supreme court cases. >> fred boldly opposed forced n internment of japanese-americans during world war ii. after being convicted for failing to report for relocation, mr. kormatsu took his case to the supreme court. >> most of our famous decisions are ones the court took that were quite unpopular. >> if you had to pick one freedom that was the most essential to the functioning of a democracy, it has to be freedom of speech. >> let's go through a few cases that illustrate very dramatically and visually what it means to live in a society of 310 million different people who helped stick together because they believe in a rule of law. >> landmark cases -- an exploration of 12 historic supreme court decisions and the human stories behind them. a new series on c-span produced in cooperation with the national constitution center debuting monday, october 5 at 9:00 p.m. and as a companion to our new series landmark cases the book. it features the 12 cases we've selected for this series with a brief introduction into the background, highlights and impact of each case written by veteran supreme court journalist tony morrow, published in conjunction with quarterly press. landmark cases is available for $8.95 plus shipping and handling get your copy at c-span.org/landmarkcases. and we're live this morning here at the senate armed services committee for a hearing on middle east policy getting testimony from former cia director and retired general petraeus expected to answer questions on policy in the middle east and plans for combatting isis. the chair of the committee waiting on him, john mccain, of arizona. this is live coverage here on c-span 3. again, a full hearing of the senate armed services committee looking at middle east policy and testimony from former cia director and retired general david petraeus, retired jensen tensed earlier this year to two years of probation and $100,000 fine for sharing classified information. he'll be talking about u.s. policy in the middle east and plans for combatting isis. the committee will come to order. since a quorum is now present i ask you consider a list of 3,725 pending military nominations. all of these nominations have been before the committee. the required length of time. is there a motion? is there a second? >> second. >> the motion carries. senate armed services committee meets this morning to receive testimony on u.s. strategy in the middle east. eight years ago, eight years ago our nation was losing a war in iraq. despite the assurances of the bush administration, the generals and leaders there, despite the favorable comments of at that time secretary of defense who said, quote, stuff happens and other equally ridiculous comments, we were losing the conflict. in fact, we were at a point where it was almost sufficient votes in the united states senate to force a complete withdrawal from iraq. and then a seminal event took place before this committee, a day that i will never forget. on september 11, 2007, general david petraeus appeared before this committee with ambassador ryan crocker. their compelling testimony was critical in securing support for the surge, an integrated civil military campaign plan that defeated al qaeda in iraq, brought security to the iraqi people, and created the possibility for meaningful political reconciliation. now we meet again. now we meet again. at a time of grave security challenges around the world, more than ever our nation must be able to draw upon the wisdom and experience of its most distinguished leaders. that's why i'm so pleased to welcome back before this committee who has had many appearances before this committee one of our most distinguished leaders, welcoming back general david petraeus for his first appearance before congress since leaving federal government. general, it's good to see you. i want to thank you for your willingness to testify today and offer insights from your decades of distinguished service especially your leadership in iraq, afghanistan, and as director of the central intelligence agency. across the middle east today the old order is collapsing, both the regional balance within states. no new vision has emerged to take its place and across the region. chaos fills the vast ungoverned spaces left behind. filling this vacuum have been terrorist groups such as isil and al qaeda. on the one hand. and hostile states such as iran and russia on the other. this disintegration has only been made worse by a failure of u.s. strategy and leadership to shape events in this vital part of the world for the better. too often we confused our friends, encouraged our enemies, mistaken in he cexcess of cauti for prudence and replaced with the perils of inaction. in iraq and syria one year after the president commenced air strikes and committed u.s. troops, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff and commander of central command characterized the fight against isil as a stalemate. isil has consolidated control of its core territories and expanded in syria. efforts to retake iraqi cities like mosul, fallujah and ramadi have floundered. isil is expanding to places like afghanistan, lebanon, yemen, libya, and egypt. this appearance of success only enhances isil's ability to radicalize, recruit, and grow. the obama administration now tells us their strategy is working. ultimately isil is not 10 feet tall. it can and must be defeated. however, the current policy does not appear sufficient to achieve our goal of degrading and destroying isil. to put it mildly, this committee's hearing last week on counter isil strategy did little to alleviate these concerns. in the absence of an effective strategy, violent extremist groups like isil, al qaeda and their adherence are expanding across the middle east, africa and south asia including afghanistan. after 14 years of fighting in afghanistan, decisions made in the months ahead will determine whether our sacrifices were worth it. after pulling out of iraq against the advice of our military leaders, the preside president's plan to withdraw from afghanistan would risk a replay of that failure. we look forward to your views on this policy. in addition to the so-called islamic state, the islamic republic of iran has been another main beneficiary of the middle east descent into chaos. for years many of us have urged the administration to develop a strategy in the middle east. unfortunately, that has not happened. instead, the administration is too often treated iran as merely an arms control challenge rather than the wider geopolitical challenge that it is. left unchecked iran has stepped up its activities in eiraq, syria, lebanon, bahrain, gaza and elsewhere. whatever one thinks of the nuclear agreement it will not resolve this larger iran challenge and will likely make it worse as iran gains new legitimacy, the lifting of sanctions and billions of dollars in sanctions relief. into the wreckage of our middle east policy has now stepped vladimir putin. as in ukraine and elsewhere, he perceives the administration's inaction and caution as a weakness, and he is taking advantage. putin's ongoing military buildup in syria is the greatest expansion of russian power in the middle east in four decades, and it will allow putin to prop up assad, play kingmaker in any transition, undermine u.s. policy and operations and prolong this horrific conflict. the main beneficiary will be isil. in classic fashion, the administration first condemned putin's move but has now capitulated agrowing to military to military talks. the first step toward a solution is recognizing there's a problem. unfortunately, that has appeared beyond the capacity of the administration. instead they continue to resort to a litany of truism ts, strong man arguments, partisan attacks and talking points that, to borrow a phrase, require, quote, a willing suspension of disbelief. in a display of self-delusion that could rival the iraq policy at its worst, the obama administration now tells us their strategy is working, that we're making progress, that time is on our side, that strategic patience is all we need, and that we should just stay the course. when our earlier strategy in iraq in the broader middle east was failing not so long ago, we thankfully had leaders like our distinguished witness who were willing to face that situation with realism and a president who, to his ever lasting credit, took responsibility for that failure and changed course. other american presidents including jimmy carter and bill clinton have demonstrated a similar capacity for change. there's no reason president obama could not do the same. no one believes that there are good options. there never are. no one believes that these kinds of problems lend themselves to purely military solutions. they never have and never will. no one expects us to succeed overnight and no one believes that america could solve every problem by itself. that does not dissolve us of our responsibility to make the situation better where we can. yes, these problems are hard, but as our witness once said, they're not hopeless. now, more than ever, we need some reasons to be hopeful again. i thank you for appearing before the committee today and look forward to your testimony. senator reid? >> well, thank you very much, mr. chairman and general petraeus. welcome to the armed services committee. this morning's hearing continues -- the committee's review of the policy issues confronting the united states in the middle east, and your long experience in a number of leadership positions both in the united states military and as director of the central intelligence agency makes you superbly prepared and qualified to provide your perspective on the current swagts ituation in middle east. thank you for being here. the situation in the middle east presents a deeply complex problem and it's a near certainty the problems that were challenging our nation's security today and for many years to come. while our nation's military plays a critical role addressing the threats emanating from the middle east and lasting solutions will require dogged diplomacy and those of our allies and partners. as the committee heard at last week's hearing, the immediate threat confronting the united states, our partners and allies in the middle east is isil, isil's control over portions of syria and iraq provides this violent extremist organization a base from which to terrorize civilians and spread its poisonous ideology regionally and globally. the brutality of isil with the assad regime and other armed elements in iraq and syria has caused a collapse of stability in many areas and forced millions to flee the violence. the emerging refugee crisis in europe highlights the urgent needs in the international community to focus on the region. the international coalition enabled by the leadership of john allen has brought together 60 plus countries to respond to the isil threat including a multinational air campaign to degrade isil's capabilities and programs to train and equip local forces in iraq and syria. general petraeus, we are interested in your views on the value of a multilateral approach to confronting isil. i would also be interested in hearing whether you support the efforts to build and work through local forces on the ground to liberate and then restore stability to areas previously under isil control. in iraq u.s. are once again training and equipping training forces and helping to recruit to the counter isil evident. general petraeus, given your experience on the ground in iraq which is extensive and detailed both as an operational and strategic level commander, i look forward to hearing your assessment of the broader military campaign but also on whether the iraqi security forces can summon the will to fight successfully against isil and other opponents within iraq. further, the administration has rightly, i believe, conditioned our support to the iraqi government on their continuing efforts to be more inclusive and responsive to the concerns of the sunnis, kurds, moderate shias and minorities. again, your assessment of these political efforts would be deeply appreciated. in syria, according to public reports, the dod run, train, equip program has suffered setbacks. observers have criticized the program and, again, i would be interested in your assessment of the viability of this program. at the same time the already difficult task to restore security in syria has only been further complicated by president putin's act of providing equipment including fighter aircraft to assad regime controlled areas under the guise of joining the counter isil effort. what president putin hopes to gain from this brazen military intervention in this volatile situation is unclear. and i would again like your perspective on that issue. last week the joint comprehensive plan of action or j jcpoa entered the implementation phase. in the coming months the iranians have much work to do and the world will be watching to see whether iran will discharge its obligations holding iran accountable during this phase of the agreement is, i would suggest, one of the most significant efforts that we can take along with our allies. aside from the jcpoa, general petraeus, the malign and destabilize activities are of critical concern. this includes continued support and financing of the assad regime, hezbollah and lebanon, the yemens, shia he wielements shia militias in iraq. countering the influence in an area the administration has made a significant commitment to our pa partners in the gulf cooperation council, an increase in training and exercise programs to ensure these partners have the necessary capabilities to counter iranian threats. again, your assessment of these efforts would be appreciated. while much attention is focused on the middle east, the united states continues to have nearly 10,000 u.s. forces deployed in afghanistan as part of the resolute support mission. a critical decision will have to be made in the next few months rega regarding the size of u.s. forces to be retained in afghanistan during 2016 and beyond. again, your advice in this respect would also be appreciated. and, lastly, we cannot forget that al qaeda, especially its affiliates in yemen and adherence in syria remain a transregional threat to the united states and other interests around the world. your insights with respect to what would be done to keep the pressure on al qaeda, both the senior leadership and organizational structure would be deeply appreciated. once again, thank you for your service, your accomplished service, and thank you for joining us today. >> general petraeus, welcome back. >> thank you, mr. chairman. it's good to be back. >> mr. chairman, senator reid, members of the committee, thank you for this opportunity to discuss the situation in the middle east. as you noted, mr. chairman, this is the first time i have testified in open session before congress since resigning as director of the cia nearly three years ago. as such, i think it is appropriate to begin my remarks this morning with an apology, one that i have offered before but nonetheless one that i want to repeat to you and to the american public. four years ago i made a serious mistake, one that brought discredit on me and pain to those closest to me. it was a violation of the trust placed in me and a breach of the values to which i'd been comm committed throughout my life. there's nothing i can do to undo what i did. i can only say, again, how sorry i am to let -- to those i let down and then strive to go forward with a greater sense of humility and purpose and with gratitude to those who stood with me during a very difficult chapter in my life. in light of all that, it means a great deal that you have asked me to share my views on the challenges in the middle east where as you noted, i spent most of my decade in government. i thank you for that mr. chairman. and i thank you for the support and friendship that you have long extended to me. the middle east today is experiencing revolutionary upheaval that is unparalleled in its modern history. at the root of this upheaval is the weakening or disintegration of multiauthorities and governments. has led to a struggle against a vast swath of territory. a competition both between different groups within states, and one between different states in the region and some outside it. almost every middle eastern country is now a battleground for a combatant in one or more wars. the principal winners thus far have been the most ruthless revolutionary and anti-american elements in the region. this includes sunni extremists like the so-called islamic state, which is attempting to carve a totalitarian caliphate out of the wreckage of the old order. and the islamic republic of iran, which hopes to establish a kind of regional hegemony. those exploiting the mild east while also exacerbating it. while hostile to each other, the growth of each is feeding the sectarian radicalization that is fuelling the other. but none of them reflects the hopes of the overwhelming majority of middle easterners. the crisis of the middle east pose a threat not just to regional stability, but also to global stability. and to vital national interests of the united states. for the repercussions of developments in the middle east extend well beyond it. indeed, the middle east is not a part of the world that plays by las vegas rules. what happens in the middle east is not going to stay in the middle east. we see this in the global reach of the islamic states from the sanctuaries it has seized in the region. and the tsunami of refugees fleeing the conflicts of the middle east. and the danger of nuclear cascades sparked by iranian actions and in the escalating tensions between the u.s. and russia over syria. and it is in the middle east today where the rules-based international order, the foundation of american security and prosperity since the end of world war ii is most in danger of coming apart at the seams. international peace and security do not require the united states to solve every crisis or to intervene in every conflict. but if america is ineffective or absent in the face of the most egregious violations of the most basic principles of the international order that we have championed, our commitment to that order is inevitably questioned, and further challenges to it are invited. i will focus here this morning on three countries at the eye of the present geopolitical storm. iraq, syria and iran. it has been more than a year since the united states commenced military action against the islamic state in iraq and syria. and while there have been significant accomplishment ofs, the progress achieved thus far has been inadequate. an impressive coalition has been established, key isis leaders have been killed or captured. and support for local forces in iraq and syria has helped roll back isis in certain areas. some elements of strategy are in place, but several are underresourced, while others are missing. we are not where we should be at this point. in iraq we have halted and reversed isis' momentum in certain areas but we have seen gains by isis in others, such as ramadi. in my judgment, increased support for iraqi force, sunni tribal forces and percent ameri peshmerga is needed. i also believe we should select controllers for coalition air strikes for those units. and we should examine whether our rules of engagement for precision strikes are too restrictive. that said, we should exercise restraint to ensure our forces do not take over iraqi units. i would, not, for example, embed u.s. personnel at the iraqi battalion level. nor, would i support clearance operations before a viable hold force is available. as critical as the front line fight against isis, however, the center of gravity for the sustainable defeat of isis in iraq lies in baghdad. in this respect, we should recall that the cause of iraq's unraveling over the past several years was the corrupt, sextarian and authoritarian behavior of former prime minister nuri al maliki and his government. this is what alienated the sunni population we work society hard to get back the iraqi fabric during the surge. mali mali maliki, after which is gained strength in the syrian civil war and then threat back into iraq. the key now is for the united states to help strengthen those in baghdad who are prepared to pursue inclusive politics and better governance. goals that unite the majority of iraq's shiite, sunni and kurds. it is vital that sunni and kurds in particular, are again given a stake in the success of the new iraq, rather than a stake in its failure. there is that present in iraqi unprecedented support for hide dar al abadi. with the backing in the streets, iraq shia cleric and one shia party what has embarked on of course serious forms that are being resisted by the leaders of the iranian-supported militias and former prime minister maliki. the relate then is that the challenges in iraq are neither purely political nor purely military. they are both. what is require said civil military plan in which diplomatic plans are created. that is what ambassador crocker and i pursued during the surge and all of the elements of that effort are once again required. though it's the iraqis that must achieve ground forces and achieve reconciliation if the results are to be sustainable. unfortunately, we do not yet have the proper military architecture in place to support this, though we do appear to be moving closer to it. notably, the operational headquarters for the campaign against isis in iraq is based in kuwait. this means that the u.s. ambassador in baghdad does not always have a day-to-day military counterpart. i would strongerly recommend facilitating this by moving key headquarters to baghdad, and ensuring that a comprehensive civil military plan is pursued. i note here that i'm very encouraged that the general selected to lead the campaign in iraq is the officer who as a brigade commander in ramadi in the fall of 2006 launched the reconciliation initiative on which we subsequently built during the surge, leading eventually to what became the anbar awakening. i should also note that in my view, the commander in baghdad should focus primarily on iraq, while another commander perhapsed positioned in turkey, perhaps under the three star iraq could be designated to focus on operations in syria, which clearly need greater unity of effort. let me now turn to the situation in syria. syria today, mr. chairman is a geopolitical chernobyl. spewing instability and extremism over the region and the rest of the world. like a nuclear disaster, the fallout from the meltdown of syria threatens to be with us for decades. and the longer it is permitted to continue, the more severe the damage will be. it is frequently said is that there is no military conclusion to syria or the other conflicts royaling the middle east. this may be true, but it is also misleading. for in every case, if there is to be any coach a political settlement, a certain military and security context is required. and that context will not materialize on its own. we and our partners need to facilitate it. and over the past four years, we have not done so. it has been clear from early on in syria that the desired context requires the development of capable, moderate sunni arab ground forces. such sunni elements are critical for any objective one might have in syria. defeating extremists like isis, changing the momentum on the battlefield for an enabled associated settlement and upholding that agreement while keeping isis down. unfortunately, we are no closer today to having that sunnis for than we were a year ago, or when support for such forces were first considered several years ago. the central problem in syria is that sunni arabs will not be willing partners against the islamic state, unless we commit to protect them and the broader syrian population against all enemies, not just isis. that means protecting them from the unrestricted warfare being waged against hem by bashar al assad, especially by air force and use of barrel bombs. this, not isis, has been the primarily source of civilian casualties. it's also been a principal driver of the radicalization fuelling isis and the refugee crisis. the problems in syria cannot be quickly resolved. but there are actions the u.s. and only the u.s. can take that would make a difference. we could, for example, tell assad that the use of barrel bombs must end. and that if they continue, we will stop the syrian air force from flying. we have that capability. this would not end the humanitarian crisis in syria. or end the broader war. or bring about the collapse of the assad regime. but it would remove a particularly vicious weapon from assad's arsenal. it would demonstrate that the united states is willing to stand against assad. and it would show the syrian people that we can do what the islamic state cannot, provide them with a measure of protection. i would also support the stability of enslaclaves in syr protected by air power, where a moderate sunni force could be supported, and where additional forces could be trained. internally displaced persons could find refuge, and the syrian opposition could organize. now, no one is more conscious of the cost of military intervention or the limits of our military power than i am. as commander in iraq and then afghanistan during the height of combat in those country, i wrote more letters of condolence to parents of america's sons and daughters than any of my contemporaries. i do not make recommendations for any kind of military action lightly. but inaction can also carry profound risks and costs for our national security. we see that clearly today in syria. and russia's recent military escalation in syria is a further reminder that when the u.s. does not take the initiative, others will fill the vacuum. often in ways that are harmful to our interests. russia's actions to bolster assad increase the imperative support for the modern opposition in syrian civilians. we should not allow russia to push us into coalition with assad which appears to be president putin's intention. while we should not rush to oust assad without an understanding of what will follow him, assad cannot be part of the solution in syria. he is after all, the individual seen by sunnis across the region, as responsible for the deaths of some 250,000 syrian, the displacement of well over a third of syria's population. and the destruction of many of syria's once thriving communities. finally, let me turn to iran. the nuclear agreement negotiated by the obama administration contains many positive elements. it also contains problematic elements. over the next 10 to 15 year, the agreement will impose meaningful constraints on iran's nuclear activities. it will also, however, increase considerably the resources available for the iranian regime to pursue maligned activities. and in the longer term, as constraints imposed by the agreement expire, the risk of iranian proliferation will increase. the key question going forward is what will be the relationship of the united states to iranian power. will we seek to counter it, or to accommodate it? as the obama administration sought to promote the nuclear agreement, its senior members pledged the former, to counter a maligned iranian activity. but many in the region worry that the white house would pursue the latter. this would be a mistake. to be sure, reconciliation with iran should not be dismissed. but it is one thing if reconciliation means that iran abandons its qods-force driven democracy and pursuit of hegemony over its neighbors. it's a very different matter if reconciliation entails accommodating those actions. as we have seen in iraq, syria and yemen, iran's activities are not only hostile to us and our partners, they also exacerbate sunni feelings of alienation and disenfranchisement which grow groups like isis. it's marking the end of a hostile relationship with iran that would enable our disengagement in the middle east, we should see its as inaugurating a new phase of that competition that would require intensified u.s. involvement in the region. this should include several important actions. first, the united states should make absolutely clear that we will never allow iran to possess highly enriched uranium, and that any move in that direction, will be met with military force. this guarantee must be ironclad to reassure our partners in the region, and have the desired effect with iran. such a declaration would carry maximal credibility if issued by the president and congress together. second, we must intensify our work with our arab and israeli partners to counter iran's maligned regional activities. this can take several forms, including continued using of existing sanctions authorities against iranian entity, tied to terrorism, ballistic missile development, and human rights abuses. it should also include expedited approval of weapons systems sought by our partner it's in region and greater integration of their capabilities. and should encompass additional actions to demonstrate that the theater remains set with respect to our capabilities to carry out military operations against iran's nuclear program if necessary. beyond these actions, we should understand that the most immediate test for the credibility of our policy will be what we do in iraq and syria. the outcome in those countries will be the basis for the judgments of friend and foe alike that are steadfastness and competence in thwarting isis and iran's request for hegemony. mr. chairman, the situation confronts the u.s. and middle east today is very hard. but as i observed, and as you recalled when i took command in iraq in early february 2007 amidst terrible sectarian violence, hard is not hopeless. as complex and challenging as crises in the region are, i'm convinced that the united states is capable of rising to the challenge if we choose to do so. i ended my statements before the senate armed services in the past by thanking its members for heir steadfast support of our men and women in uniform. i will end my statement this morning the same way, repeating the gratitude that so many of us felt during the height of our engagement in iraq and afghanistan, for the committee's extraordinary support for so many critical initiatives. on and off the battlefield. even when a number of members questioned the policies we were executing. this committee has also long played a critical oversight role, poising tough questions about u.s. policy and strategy. i highlight the leadership of chairman mccain in this regard for questioning the strategy in iraq in 2007, and calling for many of the key elements that ultimately made possible the stabilization of that country. the questions that members of this committee ask about our approach in syria and the broader fight against isis continue in this tradition. again, this committee's unwavering support of those serving our nation in uniform has meant a tremendous amount to those on the battlefield and to those supporting them. and it is with those great americans in mind that i have offered my thoughts here this morning. thank you very much. >> thank you very much, general. and thank you for probably the most comprehensive overview that this committee has received on the situation. i'm very grateful. and i would mention, perhaps one of the most admirable and important part of my experience was watching your leadership, not only in the architect of the surge, but your motivation of the young men and women who are serving in the military as officers and enlisted. your inspirational leadership to them was something which i will always remember with great admiration. you called for, in your statement what some of us have asked for years. and that is barrel bombs have got to end. it's not isis dropping the barrel bombs. when i colleagues say isis is the problem. they're not the ones who killed 230,000 of their countrymen, it's bashar al assad, and we should own up to that. and some kind of accommodation with bashar al assad of course would fly in the face of everything that the united states of america has ever stood for. so you are calling for in your statement that we have bashar al assad stop the barrel bombs and establish an enclave where people could take refuge, could get protection from the incredible insane cruelties of bashar al assad. there's going to be blowback from that. that doesn't mean american boots on the ground. doesn't that mean, we're back in the quagmire? doesn't that mean -- i can see the reaction from some of my friends on the surge with iran. what's your response that, general. petraeus, with boots on the ground and the quagmire that characterized it prior to the surge? >> a couple point, mr. chairman. i think very important to underscore the fact that bashar al assad can't be part of the long-run solution in syria. he is, as i noted, as you noted, the individual held responsible for well over 230,000, perhaps 250,000 syrians dead. he's the magnetic attraction that is bringing jihadis to syria to fight him. and indeed, if we are to support the forcing, it won't work for us, it won't be supportable, if we don't support it against bashar al assad's actions against it, the most horrific of which are the dropping of barrel bombs. and that can be stopped. we have the capability to do that. we don't have to put 165,000 troops on the ground to do that. we don't have to put any boots on the ground to do that. although i think at some point in an enclave, we should not be supposed to the possibility of some advisers or support elements being in something like that, in the same way that we have them on the ground in iraq. so, i don't see this as entering a quagmire. i see this as taking out the most horrific casualty producing item. i think general allen has said that well over 50% of the casualties overall in syria, have been caused by these indiscriminate barrel bombs that at a moment's notice can drop from the sky. we have the capability to stop that, and we should. >> speaking of russia, i noted that the russians now have aircraft that are primarily as interceptors, not close air support. isis doesn't have an air force. that's very interesting. and what is your assessment of what vladimir putin is trying to accomplish with this incredible buildup in syria? and what should the united states do in response? >> well, first of all, i think you have to look at this at large. i think vladimir putin would like to do is resurrect the russian empire. you see this in a variety of different activities, or at least the soviet union. he has a number of activities, diplomatic and economic, of course, military, in a variety of countries around russia. and now, he is, of course in syria as well. and trying to revive russian relationships with countries in the middle east. i think the immediate objective that he has in syria is to solidify the corridor on the mediterranean coast between lada kia where he has the air force and the only naval base left in the mediterranean. clearly, he would like to shore up his ally, bsh bashar al assa. at the very least, he wants to make sure bashar is not thrown under the bus by other regimes until he has a sense forward. his objective is to keep that naval base and indeed keep the air base that is useful for solidifying it in that corridor. i think beyond that, he wants to help bashar solidify his grip which has been challenged increasingly in recent months, and by oppositions that runs along the coast from homs to damascus so he can at least keep a rump syrian state. as i said, assad cannot be part of the long run solution. but as i also said, we should not be quick to oust assad until we have some sense what would follow him. >> so the united states, in short term, should do what, in regards to his significant military buildup? >> well, the first is, we should not go in league with this. we should not think that we can partner with russia and iran and bashar al assad against isis. again, if russia wanted to fight isis, they could have joined the 60-plus coalition that general allen has so capably put together and help drop bombs on isis. they have capabilities that would be useful to that fight. so this is clearly not what they're up to. we have to be clear in our resolve to make sure we deter action by russia that would involve any forcings we're supporting. and certainly, anything we're doing in that region and show firmly, not provocatively that we will not accept that. i might add that this as extends, of course, to what's going on in ukraine. i was there a week or so ago. the good news is that the violence is down somewhat in the east, probably because putin is going to the u.n. general assembly, and then has another negotiating round. and would like to get out from underneath the sanctions that are so crippling. i might note that i think putin is not playing the strongest hand in the world, although he's playing his hand tactically, quite effectively. but at the end of the day, vladimir putin is going to run out of foreign reserves. he's probably got 200 billion or so left. he will burn through those in the course of the next two years. and if the sanctions are still imposed at that time, he will and the companies that have debt coming due, he running a very large fiscal deficit, are not going to be able to go to the world markets and get money to finance their government operations. so, i think he has actually a limited window of a couple of years to continue provocative actions. in ukraine, belarus, moldova, syria, georgia and so forth. and we have to be very careful during this time, when he could actually lash out and be even more dangerous than he has been. >> senator reed. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. and thank you for the very important hearing. and general, thank you for your very insightful and irra indict treatment of these issues. it's been very helpful. i want to go back to the point you made. long term, assad not to be the future of syria. >> correct. >> but short term, you acknowledge that there has to be some recognition of what the following would be? >> absolutely. sure. i mean, syria could actually get worse. >> right. >> it's hard to believe that, but it could get worse. >> does that, in some way, imply that for at least the temporary expedient measure, we would have to work with assad. with the russians, et cetera, to create a transition? you know, you seem to pose this he can't go on until he knows what's following him. but he can't stay forever. but we don't know where to move. >> right. sure. i think actually being seen to work with assad would unravel our relationships with our sunni partners in the region. and i thinks, therefore, not something we can do. having said that, what we can do is ensure that we don't launch an offensive or support an offensive by opposition forces that could precipitate his departure. again, there is some sense of what will follow. as i mentioned, again, this sunni arab force that we need to support is essential not to fight isis. it's essential to create the context within which he might actually get a political agreement, and that context is not there right now. >> so essentially what your advice would be is that, this sunni opposition force composed of a whole range of elements with different political velocities, if it puts additional pressure on assad, that coulds for him to leave? that the the solution? >> well, i don't know about forcing him to leave. again, they could force a negotiated settlement out of which will come something that will not include assad. i don't see how he's part of the long run -- >> let me ask you that again. because of your insights, you have continually revealed the complexity of this issue. and if we could pursue it, who's going to do negotiations, if year looking for a negotiated agreement? >> well, there say u.n. special representative of the secretary-general. he happens to be the same individual, stefan b. mistoria, ironically, i persuaded him to the do the same position in afghanistan, where he was highly capable. so there is an extent process. i'm actually seeing him on sunday in new york, just purely coincidentally. >> so, in a practical sense, we should begin to energize this human process? effect a means to at least create a forum for negotiations? >> correct. i mean, this does exist. it's been -- it's been halting to put -- to put a happy face on it. but it does exist. and it is something on which we could build, again, as there is a sense of the context developing, where those in damascus are going to realize that perhaps it's tile to cut a deal. and those who are supporting damascus in tehran and now in moscow. >> you early on were advocating a training-equipped program for syria, to get effective count on isil forces on the ground. what can we do to revitalize that effort? is it possible to revitalize it? >> i think it is. frankly, again, it has to. if we can't do this, we are not going to defeat the islamic state. we've done a great deal with the syrian kurds. but you can't push kurds there or in iraq, farther than the others that they can hold with legitimacy. so you can't push them all the way, i don't think, to take out the capital of the islamic state, for example, and expect them to hold that. it's not their traditional territory. and the same is true in iraq. those who say, we'll just keep pushing the peshmerga farther. the peshmerga shouldn't go farther. b barsani knows that. and in iraq, there also has to be the development of this force and that is moving along. actually, the pieces are in place, if we will resource them. and actually make a critical policy decision. and i think that's the critical element for a sunni force in syria. they are not going to be willing to be supported by us if we're not going to support them when they're under attack by bashar, as well as when they're under attack by isis, oh, for that matter, the khorasan group or others. >> so it can be done putting in indigenous forces in the field, et cetera, in protecting against any foe? >> indeed. and take down the barrel bombs. if the barrel bombs continue, then the air force goes down. beyond that, i think we'll have so support some forces that will not gone all the way through the train and equip program. again, i think pushing everybody through that is not necessarily the solution for ramping up. >> one of the approaches to taking down the -- is eliminates the air fields, although some of these can be dropped by helicopters so that makes it very difficult. the other is to destroy the aircraft, et cetera. is there any sort of -- that runs the risk, obviously, of some response, if not by the syrians, some response by even the russians, at least protesting. >> well, there was a -- there's publicly reported that had we taken out the chemical systems in the red line issue, that a lot of that would have been done, if not all of it, by sea and air launch cruise missiles and a variety of others. you don't even have to fly in the airspace, et cetera. the fact is, we're already in syrian airspace. we're flying over it all the time. we've already put boots on the ground in syria. special mission boots. so we have the capability to do a great deal. i think we know how to do it capably and without undue risk. >> thank you. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i agree with senator mccain. he said that it's refreshing to get a very succinct presentation, and breaking it out, iran, iraq, syria. and you have certainly done that. and i appreciate it very much. >> thank you. >> one thing, we haven't talked about very much is the refugee situation. and it's been our feeling, or at least my feeling for a long time, that until such time as we develop a strategy in the middle east, that it's going to be very difficult to address this. it's also, as you put it out, become more severe if we don't. in january, general madis testified before this group, he said, quote we have many potential allies around the world in the middle east who have rallied to us. but we have not been clear about where we stand in defining or dealing with the growing violent jihadist terrorist threat. he's saying the same thing, we don't have a specific strategy there. dr. kissinger stated before this committee, the role of the united states is indispensable. it's time for a global upheaval. and the consequences of an american disengagement magnifies and requires larger intervention later. first of all, i ask do you agree with these assessments? >> i do, yes. >> you know, i'm embarrassinged to say, if we have a strategy in the middle east, and dealing with specifically these countries and others, i don't know what it is, because we've been waiting nofor that strateg. and it seems to me that you're not going to resolve the refugee problem that's a very real one. and here we are expanding the numbers that we would be willing to accept. and this is just a drop in the bucket when you look at 4 million out there, plus another 8 million that have been displaced, still in syria. so, until that time, i don't think it's going to resolve the problem. would you have a specific explanation of the strategy of the administration in the middle east affecting the whole middle east, along with the syria, iraq and iran? >> i'll defer to the administration for that. >> i've been defer to get administration for that also, and we still don't have it. you mentioned ukraine. i know this is supposed to be the middle east subject. but i happen to be there right after the ukrainian elections with poroshenko and with the prime minister, how committed they were to us, and that they for the first time in 96 years don't have one communist in their parliament. and then immediately, of course, putin started invading, sending troops and sending equipment in, very similar to what's happening in syria. now, you did respond to what they're trying to, i guess, do with their military buildup in syria. is there anything you would like to add to that, in terms of what their end game is, what they're trying to accomplish with that? >> going back to ukraine if i could, actually. because i think what putin wants in ukraine is to ensure that ukraine does not succeed. his worst nightmare would be a thriving, vibrant, prosperous democracy with free market economy on his western border. he can look at poland and see what happened in the 20 years since poland and ukraine had roughly the same per capita gdp. poland is twice as much now. ukraine is still mired where they were. he's going to do everything he can, not only where the conflict seem to be freezing to keep it bubbling. but what he really wants to do, again, ensure that there is failure in ukraine. and then in that regard, the future of ukraine is going to be achieved not kiev. and there are concerns about political infighting and so forth. and the ukrainian leaders have got to pull together and get the politics right, just the way, by the way, iraqi leaders have got to pull together. because the center of gravity as i mentioned of the fight in iraq is actually not on the front lines. as important as fighting on the front lines is pushing back isis out of ramadi and out of mosul and so forth, the future of iraq is going to be determined by politics in baghdad. and as i mentioned, we have an unique opportunity right now to support the prime minister of baghdad who is a year into the job pursuing very aggressive reforms. he's done away with the vice presidencies, the deputy prime ministers, eight ministries, and is now asking for examination of activities of chief justice. somebody who was actually a solid, reasonable chief justice during the surge and in the years after that. but increasingly became used, i think is an accurate description, by prime minister maliki to go after the sunni politicians and alienate and undo what we did in the surge. >> my time has expired. but i'd like to have you answer for the record. i go back to oklahoma and i talk to people, and they contend and i do, that we're overcomplicat overcomplicating this deal with iran. and you that don't really need to go back to the fact that verify, verification is important, i don't think variousfication is theirs. i'd like to have you analyze just that part of that proposed deal. if we have something that can go as long as 54 days before going in and figuring out whether or not iran is develop something of the things we think they are, i'd like to know how verification plays into that for us. >> sure. >> general, thank you for your service. characterize, if you would, on the solution that follows assad in order to get there, how could we interact with russia in the u.n. context, in order to bring about a political solution? >> well first of all, i think it just important to acknowledge that there are various potential options for syria. one could be, you could put the whole country back together again and have a multiethnic, multisectarian, pluralist democracy, i find that remote in terms of possibilities. or the way of acknowledging that we can't put humpty dumpty back together again and there will be a number of states carved out of the old syria, perhaps a sunni stand, a shia alawite stand and kurdish stand. perhaps more than one. but none of this is going to. happen. you're not going to have negotiations, certainly, unless the individual most responsible for this civil war, bashar al assad and his regime, feel that they are threatened and that their survival is in question. i think if you can get to that point, then you might have the leverage to conduct negotiations, in which case, we would expect that russia would be on the side of keeping a favorable regime to them. because, again, they're overriding national interests in this case, beyond president putin striding the world stage, again, as he did, to provide a way out of the chemical weapons conundrum is to maintain the seaport that he has at cartuz and the air base. >> in your opinion, are we not getting close to that point where assad feels completely threatened? >> i think probably the russian intervention gives him a degree of new hope. i think he has been losing recently, gradually, steadily, over the recent years, in a sense that he might not be able to continue the fight. of course, progressively, what has happened over the years has been first qods force advisers entered to help bank roll equipment and some of that. russia has provided some of that. and then lebanese hezbollah entered the fray on the side as well. there are reports from militias from neighboring countries fighting on his behalf. certainly, the support from russia, especially if it include ace considerable amount of military hardware will bolster him farther. >> turning to iran and the agreement. i read your op-ed with ambassador ross. and i find it very compelling. there are a lot of conclusions that the two of you drew, that i had drawn as well. and in determining how i was going to vote. and that was that, in the short term, it certainly is in my judgment and apparently, what you articulated in the interest of the united states with the agreement. but in the long term, and you speak in terms of 10, 15 years down the road, do you want to expand then on your idea, and i'll quote from your op-ed "in other words, deterrence is the key to ensuring not just the iranians live up to the agreement, but also preventing them from developing nuclear weapons." >> absolutely. not only that, deterring, if you will or dissuading or persuading countries in the region that they don't need to go to that similar point that iran is, or will be at the 15-year mark and perhaps beyond. because then we're going to have a real threat to the proliferation regime that is in place. or nonproliferation regime. so, again, the key element here is an ironclad, u.s. position, again, ideally from both congress and the white house that states unequivocally, that if iran ever moves towards enriching to weapons grade, that we will stop that militarily. >> and your other sentence that leapt out at me "but verification means only that we catch the iranians if they cheat, what matters more is that the iranians recognize that they will pay a meaningful price when we catch them." >> correct, absolutely. again, they've got to know in advance. and there are provisions in this. the snapback provision, actually, i think is fairly artful. again, there are many positive features in this. the elimination of the entire 20% stockpile. the elimination, 97%, 98% of low enriched 3.5%. ends the plutonium path to a bomb with wrinkles to be sure and some challenges that have been noted but, again, a number of positive but some problematic ones. because along with that will come the release of at least $50 billion, according to the under-secretary of the treasury that has been frozen around the world. and this is for a country. that's 10% of the gdp just given to it. most of that undoubtedly will go to worthy programs for iranian citizens there will be a portion that will end up in the pockets of qods force that will enable them, lebanese hezbollah, hamas, houthis in lebanon who couldn't get their way at the political table got their way with force of arms and so forth and shia militia in iraq. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, general petraeus. thank you for your service to your country. it's been so valuable to us. those who have watched your career have been with you in iraq, seeing you serve the country, i'm not aware of anyone who has done a more superior job than you. and my respect for you and your integrity is unmatched. and senator mccain, i believe, his opening statement is very important for all of us. i think the questions senator reed asked raised the kind of practical questions we've got to deal with. i believe at this point in time, we as a congress, needs to assert itself. i think the first thing congress should say to this administration is, should us a strategy that will lead us out of this morass that we're in. and we don't have that today. i believe, and i'll ask you, you've seen the political role and the disagreements and agreements that occur. don't you thing it's possible for republicans and democrats on this panel and this congress to agree on a long-term, overall strategy for the middle east that could guide us for decades to come? and isn't that important? >> well, what's interesting is that this is one of those moments in time where there seems to be bipartisan -- bipartisan sense of a need to do more, frankly. and that includes to define all of the elements of the strategy. as i mentioned some of those elements are there. some are underresourced. and some are missing. >> well, if we had an overall goal, i think it would be important to have our allies also join in that. you think that's possible? our european allies to join us with on a plan that we could -- it's got to extend beyond the next presidential election. ke weren't change our strategy, every time our president changes. >> look, you know, it's always good to recall winston churchill on allies. he said the only thing worse than allies is not having any. and i spent a good bit of my time in afghanistan, in particular, but also in iraq, doing what might be termed coalition maintenance. and i firmly believe that we should never go it alone, if we can avoid doing that. although we should also recognize that there will be different contributions from different countries. and at the end of the day, the reverse, with no countries in afghanistan that did not have some caveat of some type. and the art of that, of coalition command, is figuring out what each country can uniquely do well. where each country needs to be augmented, frankly by u.s. assets to contribute the most that it can, given the limitations that it has. >> i think this is a historic hearing. i remember senator mccain's reference to your testimony and ambassador crocker. i've asked you at that time, and you've already answered it about the middle east, i think, today. which you said, and we worry, could we be successful? and i ask you, do you believe if you go to iraq with a surge, that we could achieve a successful result? you said, yes. i asked you if you got to the point where that wasn't possible, would you tell us so? and you said, yes. and you succeeded as you suggested, that we could succeed. now, i just can't tell you how much i value your opening statements. and i think we all should appreciate the efforts of senator mccain at that time in 2007. when his presidential election, he placed everything he believed about the forces of men and women in combat above any personal political goals. and i think that's a good example for all of us. >> i seem to recall him saying he would rather lose an election than lose a war. >> i did both. >> well, if i could just make one quick comment, senator. it's really important to remember the surge that mattered most was not the surge of forces. it was the surge of ideas. it was the change in strategy. big ideas are everything. and shifting from consolidating on big bases and getting out of the neighborhoods, to recognizing that the only way to secure the people is by living with them is big idea number one. it was very difficult to execute. it was costly, but it was necessary and it actually did help bring security and ultimately brought violence down by some 90%. coupled with the other big idea, which was you can't kill or capture your way out of the an industrial-strength insurgency. you have to promote reconciliation. and that's why i singled out building on that case of reconciliation that had been established in late 2006, outside of ramadi by lieutenant -- now lieutenant general mcfarland who is actually back in that region and spending the bulk of his time in baghdad. >> thank you for your service. thank you for your wise words. and i think it's a challenge to us to see if we can't, at this point in history, develop an overall view of the middle east. there have been studies that the show violence that have been around where extremists -- extreme islam, things that cause conflicts. and i think we need to seat whole region. and within it we'll have allies, we'll have our problems, we'll have things we have to accept, even if we don't like. some things we're going to have to try to provide leadership on. and in the long term agreement of that kind, among both parties of all of our people, including our allies around the world, i believe we get positive development. my hand is open to try to reach that kind of agreement. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and general, thank you, again for your service but also for being here today and presenting to us i think is most valuable. you know, we look at trying to find something that would try to resonate over in that part of the world, especially with syria being so unstable right now and our relationships in that area. you can only look back from past performance and learn from that. when kadafi was taken out of libya, we have nothing to replace kadafi with, we see what's happened to libya. we're gone out of there. in iraq, there had to be somebody making decisions this is the person we're going to put in, knowing he had to be a hardline shiite. knowing he would divide up the shunnie forces there and causing basically the instability that we have. was that not considered, or is it just impossible to find a moderate that can work with the different sectors involved? >> first of all, there's been a lot of discussion of this, and a lot looking back. ambassador jeffrey at the time has written about this -- >> that's the caution we have with assad right now. we want to say who do you replace him with? what do you do, since we've had failures in both of those? >> again, you play the card -- you can influence that sometimes, there may have been a moment to do that. i actually ended up being in afghanistan during the penultimate months of that. but i was there for the initial piece. we should remember that, you know, i've been tough on prime minister maliki here. but prime minister maliki, during the surge and indeed in the years after the surge, he's the one who went after the shia militia in basel. in the charge of nights, we called it march madness in march of 2008. and it was a very close-run affair until we could get all the forces martialed to support his elements tha s that were on ground. it was an effort there in qatar city. and set the conditions for the reasonable harmony that lasted for several years after that. tragically, he undid much of what was done during the surge. no longer honored the agreements made with the sunni populations called the sons of iraq and so forth. again there have been a lot of academic and pundit discussion, think-thank discussion on why we hung with him. especially because former prime minister allawi got one more goat. so there was a lot of wrangling back and forth. without question, this is something in everyone's mind and within everyone's memory. and again, certainly the experience with kadafi. although i think the point at which we committed to support the well spring of citizens going afriter kadafi that that arguably was the right move, what we needed to do is carry out a ddr program, a disarmament demobilization reintegration program for all the forces to help to try to reform the security forces as quickly as possible. i think we had to answer in that regard so that when you've got a conclusive government that is supported whole haheartedly andu move forward. >> may i just, with that being said, i'd lean strongly supporting because i wanted to work with our allies. i always said if i couldn't go home and explain i couldn't vote for it. i couldn't explain to west virginians what happens. because we put them in a position to be stronger if they had not changed their ways. since we didn't hold them accountable, basically, for their action of terrorists, how do you expect them to change their ways later on. so that was the one thing to stop me from supporting it. what i would ask you, how damaging to our allies would the u.s. have been if had had been defeated? if those who voted for it had not voted for it? would it have damaged our relationship if the allies would have said we're going to go without you? >> oh, absolutely, sure. i think there are big questions what would happen to the sanctions regime, could you get it back china on board through this whole process. does it all become unraveled. look, i think the real question -- this is a reality. focusing forward, taking the rear-view mirrors off the bus. the biggest question is what happens after 15 years. that's when virtually -- there's a few that linger. virtually all the restrictions of the agreement end. and iran can move out quite smartly in ava is right of different areas and building its enrichment capacity and other elements of the program. that is why it is so vitally important that the u.s. be very clear, crystal clear, iron clad, why the white house and congress together should be clear about what would happen if iran ever made a move towards weapons grade enrichment. that will also not only hopeful live deter iran but ensure our our gulf allies. that's another important consideration. >> thank you. >> thank you, sir. >> general petraeus, thank you for your testimony. i think we could have gotten status of forces agreement in iraq if we had really, really tried. do you agree with a that? >> actually, let me put it to you another way. if it goes through parliament, the problem was it was probably not going to be approved by the parliament. an interesting fact, we have 3,500 troops on the ground without a status of forces agreement. so we seem comfortable doing this now, though we really have to. candidly, that was something we might have considered trying given that the prime minister was going to give us personal assurance and test it out. there's no guarantee having 10,000 troops on the ground would have given us the influence or prevented prime minister maliki from taking the highly sectarian actions that he did. but i wouldn't have liked to have tested the proposition. >> thank you for that. i'm encouraged that you're so positive about prime minister abhadi and his reforms and he has the backing of iraqi citizens in the streets. i assume by that you mean kurdish iraqi citizens in the streets. >> no, i mean shia iraqis. the sunnis desperately need it because without this they have no source of revenue so those who say late iraq break up. it is is one thing for kurdistan who is largely autonomous and has oil revenues coming in. although not enough. they are running a deficit. they still need to get their 17% out oil revenues from iraq proper, which means really the two southern provinces it produced the most. there is no oil or gas going to be provided for the sunni areas. there's no production in those areas. one of the real serious problems is how would they survive? the second is, who drives the boundaries? where are the borders? if you have a state of politics that is so fractious, how are you going to have an amicable divorce? this will be a fractious divorce. the body wants to pursue inclusive politics. i don't think people picked up there are huge demonstrations going on in the cities of iraq in the southern part of the country because of citizens who are outraged by in sufficient services, particularly electricity for a month and then corruption. and they are flat outraged. the grand ayatollah is seeing this through his clerics, issued statements, that encouraged the reforms that prime minister abbadi has now pursued. they are moving each week. he has pursued more reforms. indeed, he knows that the only way to get to combat isil sustainable is to get the people in the area where isis is located to turn against them in the same way that we did with reconciliation with the sons of iraq program. but of course citizens can't turn against a particularly barbaric force unless they have a sense they're going to be secured. this will have to proceed. you have to have sunni arab iraqis who will not only clear but be able to hold with a considerable assistance from us in intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance. >> this sort of divorce you talked about is something really to be avoided in iraq. and you have a different view about sorry where you seem to suggest or your testimony is it wouldn't be the end of the world if syria, as we know it, does split up. >> because they had this horrific situation. syria has gone through considerable -- we call it sec tearal cleansing. this would not have been the solution for syria four years ago. but we are where we are with syria. and you see enormous displacement of different sets. >> but we can avoid that in iraq and we should make every effort -- >> no guarantee we can at all. this will be a very close-run affair. but we should try to a avoid it, i think. there will be greater devolution of power. there will have to be a political bargain between baghdad and the sunni arab projects. the muss allowies don't agree with tikitis who don't agree with the anbaris. by the way, all of what do you mean come through here or see you out somewhere in the region. so that's going to be difficult as well. there's nothing easy about this situation right now. but i don't think we should just say, okay, well, we'll just let it go further. because there are still mixed areas in baghdad. there are still mixed areas in the baghdad belts. deaala province is mixed. there has been sectarian displacement. but the only way to prevent that kind of horrific civil war breaking out, which is what the result will be if there is a determination to break it into sunni, shia, and kurdistan, you've got to get inclusive politics. once again, you have to give the sunnis a sense they have a stake in the future of the success of iraq rather than the failure. they felt that in 2006 in the surge and the last couple of years as well. >> well, your answers are very thorough and we are way out of time. let me ask for something on the report. senator mccain mentioned it in his opening statement. i hope on the record you can give us insight as to what lessons we might play in afghanistan that we have learned from our experience in iraq. >> chairman, can i make two quick points on afghanistan possibly? first of all, there have been reports recently that there is a policy or an acceptance of what clearly is absolutely reprehensible, unreceivable behavior by certain afghans with using male essentially sex slaves and so forth. i was very pleased to see general campbell issue a statement today, the current commander in afghanistan, who was a two star in afghanistan when i was the commander of international security systems. of course he was also there as a brigade commander. he stated very clearly it has never been a policy. it is not a policy now. and it certainly was not something that was acceptable or even discussed frankly when i was a commander of the international security assistance force. the very first line of the counter insurgency is we have to be seen to be helping secure and serve the people and we have to help the afghan forces do the same. there's no way that that kind of behavior would be seen as helping to serve the afghan people. and it is absolutely unacceptable. second, look, i do think that we have to take a very hard look at our future plans for the footprint that we have in afghanistan, recognizing that now there is an islamic state presence being established there, recognizing there is still work to be done to continue the disruption, the further disruption of al qaeda senior leadership in the federally administered tribal areas of pakistan. that campaign has had considerable, considerable progress success indeed not only on osama bin laden but three number twos in about an 18-month period. and that is a very, very much diminished incapability central headquarters for al qaeda. but it has to continue to be disrupted because we don't own the ground nor does pakistan fully. beyond that, we're in a situation where a relatively modest number of u.s. forces providing assistance to our afghan partners, we are able to continue to accomplish the mission that we went to a afghanistan to achieve. we cannot forget why we went there and why we stayed. it was because afghanistan is where al qaeda planned the 9/11 attacks and conducted the initial training for those attacks. our mission was to ensure that

Related Keywords

Qatar , Fallujah , Al Anbar , Iraq , Marshall Islands , Alaska , United States , Belarus , Moldova , Turkey , China , Syria , Russia , Allawi , Al Basrah , Washington , District Of Columbia , Bahrain , Ukraine , West Virginia , Mexico , Arizona , Anbar , Kayseri , Egypt , Tehran , Iran , Libya , Poland , Khorasan , Kordestan , New York , Moscow , Moskva , Canada , Japan , Damascus , Dimashq , Texas , Afghanistan , Kiev , Ukraine General , Virginia , Georgia , Ramadi , Lebanon , As Iran , Az Arbayjan E Sharqi , Pakistan , Oklahoma , Abbadi , Hormozgan , Baghdad , Israel , Gaza , Israel General , Saudi Arabia , Pennsylvania , Ohio , Yemen , Capitol Hill , North Dakota , Kuwait , Venezuela , Americans , America , Marshalls , Saudi , Iranians , Iranian , Afghan , Iraqi , Lebanese , Israeli , Russians , Japanese , American , Canadian , West Virginians , Russian , Iraqis , Syrians , Afghans , Ukrainian , Soviet , Syrian , Winston Churchill , Dar Al Abadi , Hamas Houthis , Shia Alawite , Tom Sherwood , Bob Mcdonnell , Vladimir Putin , Barbara Madison , Maliki , David Petraeus , Jimmy Carter , Al Qaeda , Las Vegas , John Allen , Nuri Al Maliki , Ryan Crocker , Lada Kia , John Mccain , Bashar Al Assad ,