Legislative advisor and lobbyist for kissinger really by default because there was no such thing on the National Security council at the time. And when dick, and i was assistant to dick, when he took over the overall, that was all full of congressional relations because the subcommittee, the Foreign Affairs committee was holding a series of hearings, a major series of hearings on foreign commitments and overseas commitments of which the bases were a central part. So i became by default when dick left, the base study was my portfolio. I spent half of my time on the hell on what became a hill on what became a major onslaught on the vietnam policy. This was theforum for the end the war group at the time. And gradually, since i was the only one doing that, anything that ended up coming ended up having to do with congress ended up on my desk. Dick kaegel big portfolio when he left and everybody else was so busy in the National Security council with their own portfolios that suddenly when he departed i was the only guy there with the inbox. I ended up working on all of the issues, the war powers amendment and the european troop level reductions initiatives. It became a very busy time. It was a great experience for me. It was a great opportunity because by default i was the congressional relations person. I stayed as henrys hill advisor until he left the white house. You are enables reserve officer and went to the white house. John lehman i did my summer active duty in vietnam every year i was on the National Security staff. It was invaluable to me. I could both get to where i want to to go, where the action was and the yet i could not get the snow jobs and the party line had i been a vip or senior officer. It was very valuable to me. Alex wouldve pointed me in the direction that he wanted to check things out. A i would get assigned usually to enable unit. Once or twice to army units. It gave me an opportunity to really get a feel from the troops point of view, rather than the vip visiting fireman point of view. Certainly those experiences impressed me very much. My first trip over there was the summer of 1969. By then it was in full sling. It was not as if there hadnt been with the Nixon Administration had adopted was the point of view of many young thinkers in the army and more senior ones like John Paul Van who had been advocating this. It was in full swing by the time i first got there. It gave me a chance each year to see the progress or lack of progress that was going on. By 1972i was over there during the eastern offensive. There was no doubt in my mind the limitation had worked. A i saw firsthand the Vietnamese Army the 21st division throwback, what was purely a conventional attack. They had really shot their best bolt. After the tet offensive it became much more of a conventional war. It was a conventional invasion by Armored Forces across the dmz. It had been such a surprise. All of the u. S. Forces were outcome except for the air support being given from the carriers and from the type the u. S. Air force bases. The vietnamese regroup. The north had pushed the south all the way down and Central Highlands had taken by august they were pushing the north vietnamese out of vietnam. They were beating them in battle after battle. They were pushing them back. I was there during the battle of they took that early on. It was a very bloody handtohand combat. They defeated the north Vietnamese Army with north american airpower support. It was very clear to everybody there in the u. S. Advisory group that it had succeeded. There were continuing problems with corruption and political generals. For the most part they were there because they were proven fighters. They did a remarkable job. Then i was back the following summer and 73. And then and 74, when the rug had been pulled out by congress it was the most searing and troubling experience i have ever had in the government. I felt as everybody involved from kissinger on down, it was hard for me to spend three weeks of a there with the visa mise air force and the Vietnamese Army, who had the rug pulled out from under them. Having won militarily on the ground, to have congress cut off not just American Military support, because that had already been withdrawn. But to cut off the funds to prohibit to prohibit ammunition and any support whatsoever, cutting off spare parts to the Vietnamese Air force that we had just outfitted. It was a searing experience. I was up in the Central Highlands at a Fire Support Base and over the valley i could see through the binoculars the north vietnamese building the highway so their tanks could go down south through the valley. I said why arent you guys firing at these guys. They said because we are down to our last 100 rounds and that has to last us three months. It was just tragic because after all the blood and treasure that had been spilled to reach that point, to have the usb tray its allies in such a way was heartbreaking. It tested ones patriotism to be an american during that period to see what the effects of that congressional cut off was. That is what you witnessed in the summer of 74 . John lehman yes. Two points from the earlier period. There was a story of how Henry Kissinger introduced you to rockefeller. John lehman [laughter] yes. I had met rockefeller before. He was his Vice President so i attended meetings with him and so forth. It was about 8 00 and i went over to the my office was in the Old Executive Office building across the street. I went over to the west ring west wing to bring something henry asked for, a piece of paper. Nelson rockefeller locked in. He and henry were very close friends. They got talking and rockefeller said, i have to hire a new policy person, ive had such a hard time hitting good staff. I read how you are running the hold government the whole government. The nsc staff is making all of the policy in town. Where do you find all these good people . Kissinger looked at me and said nelson, you have this all wrong. Look at lehman here, an irishman with a jewish name. If i had at the other way around i would really have something. Henry still has a wonderful sense of humor. It was a great experience working for him. He had a terrible temper, but it was a great safety valves. He would blow his stack and street and scream at you. Five minutes later it was all over and he would go back to talking about the policy that you just recommended and have been screened at four. I loved working for him. It was never a goal moment. He was a tough taskmaster. If you had a good idea he listened and it went forward. That was a really satisfying. Dick allen was a terrific guy to work forward to work for. He had a similar sense of humor. I think henry had a little more cynicism born of more experience and so forth. Dig wanted to get things done dig wanted to get things done dick wanted to geth things don he really cut to the chase done. He cut to the chase on fiscal policy issues. I guess the biggest compliment that you could pay to him is the fact that henry felt that he was such an intellectual threat that he needed to be sent on to other things. Who initiated the list of leaks . John lehman there had been a series of newspaper articles, one of which involved me. Being in congressional relations i could see so much during the period. Anything that was embarrassing that came in as a classified cable from the embassy in saigon, or whatever, that would cast the south vietnamese in a bad light or some investigation of two, or Something Like that would immediately come out and appear in the Washington Post. We knew because reporters like guys like john osborne in the new republic and the guys covering the hill in the Washington Post were the guys printing the stories. You knew where they came from. Those guys, being crows, played both sides of the street you while they would not reveal their source they would reveal where the source was. We knew where the leaks were coming from and a private party where a bunch of staff, hill staffers, where. They were decrying this ability to maintain securities. I said fulbright and his staff were leaking things, anything that came to their hands that was embarrassing to the vietnamese or the Nixon Administrations effort. Unfortunately that appeared in the Washington Post the next day. Bill rogers, the secretary of state, whom i had great admiration for, he was trying to build, as one must, with the chairman of the Foreign Affairs committee that a relationship with fulbright. So he met with president nixon in the oval office and said you have to get rid of this guy. He is shooting his mouth off and this is so disruptive. There is no way i can go back to fulbright without saying weve done something. Weve got to build this relationship. Nixon for road his brow for road furroughed his borw. His brow. Before henry could reply, nixon said, let me tell you what i think. I think you should promote lehman tomorrow. I heard the story because i thought i was a goner. I thought bill rogers wanted to hand fulbright my scout. Afterwards al hague told me the story. There was a growing paranoia about these leaks. As i recall, the president asked kissinger and kissinger asked dicvk. I know i got asked by dick allen to compile ok you are getting headlines for saying they are leaking. Wheres the leak here . Give us the citations. I compiled a list of dozens of newspaper articles based on classified information. It was a very thick compendium. It then went into the president and that led to i dont know the exact sequence of who spoke to whom. After that the plumbers were set up. I guess it is kind of a historic document in that it is just a list of newspaper citations. Wasnt this a problem for kissinger won he came up for confirmation . Wasnt there some concern about what questions may be asked about wiretapping . John lehman i was still working for henry at the time. It was tom cora locus and i who managed his confirmation hearings. I dont know whether the wiretapping issue had broken then. I dont recall it as having been a big issue in that confirmation hearing. A lot of that didnt come out until later in the whole watergate sequence. 73. Some of that was already out. John lehman it wasnt henry who had ordered this. The later wiretaps, i dont think they are related to where the taps were put on by the fbi that led that was the big issue. I dont recall that being a particular issue with henry and the confirmation. There are lots of other issues. Right outside the caucus room outside the mens room i was talking to kissinger during one of the breaks. He had to go in and use the head. Im talking to him, standing over by the sink. One of the stalls bursts. They start screaming at him, you are a murderer, you are responsible for millions of deaths and you killed i forget exactly what it was. Iran over to grab the guy and full away. Henry was just as cool as a cucumber. He just kept right on just as if he was what he was, a knot. He never flinched or stopped. Henry finished doing what he was doing and went over and washed his hands. He was not easily flustered. I figured the rest of the hearings would be a piece of cake. I want to talk about cambodia in 1970, cooper church. You have a tremendously interesting description of that era. What was the debate about letting congress in before hand . John lehman as i recall there was an much of a debate because at that time everybody in the white house was so convinced that anything given to congress would leak that the basis for going into the sanctuaries in cambodia was really the strong recommendation of the chiefs who had been chafing under these sanctuaries where they could just a dock over the border then regroup and store their supplies and have all their logistics and so forth. Certainly with kissingers view and the president s view that the vietnamese had to be given a chance, this was to be the last use of American Forces left before they all left shortly thereafter. Since it was military and not political they believe they should keep it very tight and not Tell Congress in effect. They were sure it would leak and the north vietnamese would get the benefit as they had in previous military operations that had been leaked. This would certainly exacerbate relations. Kissinger felt this was a military and not a political operation. Operational security had to take precedence, i think it was as simple as that. Nobody i recall ever thought it would precipitate the kind of reaction not only in congress but in the public at large. As a result i think that the president s advisers, domestic advisers from the stories i had heard, they had really panicked. Particularly after can state. And they convinced the president that he had to end the incursion to where the objectives were basically. That was kissingers view. There was great frustration that having taken the heat they pull back before the real benefits were achieved. There is no question the firestorm that was arrested, i will never forget that the white house at the time had to surround it with buses. Bumper to bumper buses that protect the white house from all of the demonstrators. All of us had to dress like we were part of the demonstrators to get in. Otherwise you couldnt get through. If you dressed like you werent working at the white house you would never be able to get near the place. We would find a place that nobody was paying much attention. You literally had to call had to crawl under the bus to get through. On the other side, show your white house off before you get bludgeoned. You had to walk. They had National Guard troops in the basement. You had to carefully walk through the leptin through the weapons and legs to get through the elevator. That was for 10 days or something of they talk to some of the demonstrators. Nobody expected that. Nobody foresaw the tremendous reaction. When can state happened it was understandable. Before then the reaction was so strong that it surprised everybody. Can you tell us about william rehnquists role in fashioning the executive privilege . John lehman yes, bill rehnquist was i forget the name of the exact title. He was the general counsel in effect for the justice department. He and i really were the main task force to put together the congressional strategy and marshall the arguments on executive privilege. Bill really wrote the briefs on that. His view in executive privilege has withstood the test of time. The Current Administration would not like his views. I think he really understood there were clear limits on executive privilege and executive power. There was no clear delineation between the executive powers and the legislative powers in these regards. They understood that this was that this would cause contention. They left it for politics to decide where the line was. There was no clear delineation. It is left for them to decide. It is executive authority in National Security. But not to take it beyond what was clearly constitutionally envisioned. He was very impressed with his grasp i was very impressed with his grasp of the issue and his willingness to speak john lehman in the current and previous administrations, the attorney general did not have the benefit to have good advice from bill rehnquist. He never made the farreaching claims to executive authority that have been made by some subsequent residence. Did you play any role in getting the votes . John lehman very much so. I was involved in the safeguarding and all of the legislative battles we had. The Trident Submarine that was as big a fight as the abm. Every issue was a big fight. Again, we worked out of the headquarters was the Vice President s office and jacksons office. John tower and the republicans their room was in the Vice President s office. The jackson wing worked out of jacksons office. It was the committee on present danger aligned with the Nixon Administration, not on everything. The troop levels in europe, the mansfield amendment. In a way, it was a healthier battle because it was not drawn along partisan lines as it is today. [indiscernible] i first met Richard Perle outside of congress and the administration, at a conference. I was very impressed. We spent a couple of days debating these issues and we found ourselves on the same size of the issues, reinforcing one another. We got to know each other socially and, when i worked on the hill, i worked with him and dorothy bostic. He was really working for dorothy. She was the main National Security person scoops staff. Scoop was so close to next and on policy issues that we never did anything without clearing it with scoop. [indiscernible] john lehman paul was brought into the original orbit including george will and Bill Schneider. Paul had not yet come into the scene. He was recruited later by freddie clay, when fred was appointed head of acta, around 1972 1973. Paul, at the time, was it nail was at yale. Our group Bill Schneider worked for senator buckley and george will worked for senator alan in colorado. And i worked for kissinger. We used to play poker regularly we were good social friends. We worked together because these were all players on the hill. Fighting to end war amendments, getting trident through and so it was an initial an interesting time with interesting people. Everybody is still involved one way or another. [indiscernible] john lehman all of us were concerned about the agreement that provided it had codified a disparate balance they gave the soviets and numerical advantage, they could be transmitted into political leverage. Kissinger knew of my views on it , and that is why he asked me to negotiate with jackson ideal to get jackson support. That gave him plausible deniability. But everything i did with regard to offer an counteroffer, i cleared with henry because they wanted to get scoop to support it and, at the very least, not to block it. [indiscernible] john lehman the deal involved the trident, the Cruise Missile the commitment to go forward with tomahawk, it involved there were a few other things. The development of the b1 bomber. Kissingers argument for accepting this was, we dont have anything on the books. We inherited a bankrupt strategic system with no new initiatives, it will take us time to do this. So this will give us that time to redress the boundaries. Jacksons view was, ok, if thats what you say, show me the money. Show me the commitment. Show me the decisions that are going to make this real. Thats really what the deal was. That he would actually commit to do these things. Its what lead to something other breach with jackson later on, because jackson signed on to salt 1 but in salt 2, jackson felt that henry had given away the tomahawks and the backfire issue that he had pledged in salt one to support to his dying day. That was part of the rift. You didnt agree with kissingers approach . John lehman i certainly agreed you know kissinger has always wanted or been tempted to have favor of both sides in these debates. He liked to have plausible deniability that he was really for tomahawk and pushing tomahawk and trident. I was, in some ways, the expendable person. He made this deal with jackson, but i can assure you, i did no such deal without henrys blessing. I thought it was a good deal. In order to get a Firm Commitment for the trident and a tomahawk which i thought would be a tremendous benefit i thought it was a good deal. Salt i, limiting us to two abm sites, excepting a threeto disadvantage, kissinger was right in that we had no programs underway to address that. Taking him on his word, it was the right thing to do. It was a good deal. In july 1970, you were having discussions about executive privilege. The president basically says i am keeping troops there because of my need to protect troops. Which is a narrative description of his ability. Was kissinger upset that the president made that claim . John lehman no. To my knowledge, this came as the domestic side of the white house. This was something that used to drive henry and al crazy. Very often, things would appear that did not come through kissinger. And obviously came from one of the domestic sides of the house or came from the state department, or somehow got into the president without going through kissingers filter. This was clearly one of them. We felt that this was going to lead politically, a really weak almost laughable argument. Even though you could construct a legal basis around it, it just wouldnt sell from a Public Relations point of view. This is one of the times when kissinger used to just shake his head. We chafed the nsc staff for keeping us totally separate from the rest of the white house staff. He felt that very strongly. Keeping us out of the white house mess and that sort of thing. But he was right. He said that the people are going to bring the president down. He said that in my presence couple of times. He did not have much admiration for the domestic guys on the white house staff. Can you talk about the complicated nature john lehman i was not one of his drinking buddies, he didnt let his hair down quite that way. He would say things that were sometimes not complementary and overall, everything he ever said in my presence about nixon showed a very genuine respect. As a kind of partner, he did not , he used to say things about everybody that could be taken at a total taken out of context. There is no doubt in my mind that he had a deep respect for nixons grasp of policy and his intellect. How did the chilean action complicate relations for the administration . In those days, you didnt have oversight committees. You would tell leadership about covert action, or maybe not. John lehman the Senior Leaders of congress were kept in the loop. I negotiated the ground rules for formulations. For Foreign Relations. Like when the secret negotiations were going on in some of the intelligence matters. There were always some people, usually the speaker of the house , the senior republican, the chairman of Armed Services and formulations, they were briefed. They knew about the things. There were no records kept, there were no notetakers allowed. I went to most of those meetings. In fact, we had several particularly on vietnam, where we briefed the whole committee. No notes were taken, no staff was allowed except me and one Foreign Relations committee guy. They were kept in the loop, but it was the leadership that said they were the ones who strongly advised not to generally briefed the committeess of Armed Services are Foreign Relations. And take it wider than the top leadership. That was the traditional way was always done. With a briefed on chile . John lehman im sure they were. You mentioned that one of your strategies john lehman we felt that the Armed Services committees was where the Administration Supporters were. That Foreign Relations had become, during the fulbright era, an era for public debate in congress and televised hearings and so forth, and that we needed to build up Armed Services to an equal stature because they were basically where our supporters were. That was where those who understood or specialized in and had more depth of knowledge of military and Naval Affairs work. Thats what we did. We never briefed one without briefing the other. Can you talk about 1974 and the consequences of the suspension of aid to vietnam. Did you do anything wrong you go would you do anything different . John lehman the key juncture with regard to cambodia, there was a proposal on the house floor and jerry ford was the republican leader, and kissinger i arranged a call from kissinger to give with jerry ford to give ford the ammunition to block it. The delicate thing we were doing was kissinger had really made a deal with joann lie that there will be a negotiated settlement for cambodia, the chinese. That the enemies from supporting the rouge. Or especially for the vietnamese to get control of cambodia. This deal had been negotiated by kissinger. Kissinger explained to ford over the phone a secure phone, i believe that this deal had been arranged for i forget the dates the debate was going on in may, he said, the agreement we have i cant tell you more than this but this problem will be solved by september or august. But he said, we cannot have youve got to stop this amendment, which was cut off all funds by july 30 or june 30, Something Like that. Board totally misunderstood and went out on the floor and said, i have just talked to the white house and they say they can live with the cut off that is after the date that henry had given him. It just totally blew it, because we had the votes. To block the amendment. And jerry ford given away. [indiscernible] john lehman yeah. Was it 1973 or 1974 . This was the cambodia amendment. This was to cut off support for cambodia, im fuzzy on the dates. It would have been 1973, yeah. That was a key juncture. The larger picture was that watergate, we couldnt deliver the votes that needed to hold on to prevent these cutoffs. Whether tactically we did some wrong things, i do not know. The bottom line was that the president had lost all power by then. And his ability to block things, his ability to use the carrots and sticks the president s have to deal with the congress was gone. And of course, the deal that henry had cut for peace settlement, it was also dependent on a strong president because it was dependent on a threat to resume bombing if they violated the truce. And they did the south grid of course i 1974 and invade the south. Of course, i 1974, it was handed to them on a silver platter. How would you compare and contrast the two white houses you worked in . John lehman they are to very do for people. Nixon was very much involved in the details of National Security , defense, foreign policy, and reagan was not. Reagan was a delegator. There was never any question which way the compass was pointing. For instance, the issue of the navy when there were efforts within the administration to reduce the size of the navy, cut the number of carriers, there was never any hesitation on reagans part. He would listen to me, and he hired me to do the navy rebuilding, and the other people on other president staff, he wasnt interested. He listened to the secretary of defense, but he always backs me up and every battle i was ever in. I think nixon was much more disposed to get into the details of every one of the battles, and he was very good, because he had the depth and experience. One of the things that led to his downfall was that it was obvious, he was fascinated by National Security and foreign policy. He was totally bored by domestic policy and he really delegated domestic policy to his subordinate cabinet. You might say he was not minding the store to the extent he should have. I think that it was a lot easier , there was more openness in the reagan National Security area mainly because there was never anybody in charge for a long. Of time. And the reagan years, it was constantly changing a set of players. The power did not reside in the National Security the way did during the next and ears. Everybody knew that kissinger was in charge for the next and years. You went around him or through them at your own peril. It is a real problem with the reagan approach to the National Security council and the National Security advisor was at there were so many changes and such a turnover in National Security advisers. First it was dick allen, then clark, john poindexter, mcfarland. All of them good people. But none of them had time to build and hold the staff of the quality that could give the kind of coherence that kissinger and his staff did. As a consequence, there wasnt nearly because the turnover not because of any inadequacy but because of the constant turnover, it allowed a lot of people like oliver north. Luckily, you had strong cabinet officers. And strong cia directors, strong secretaries of state strong secretaries of defense, Strong Service secretaries. You could say you need the kind of firm control that kissinger asserted to the National Security council. Why did that Jackson Group turn against kissinger . By the reagan era, they are decrying kissinger. John lehman part of it was because they felt that in the salt ii, the effort to get salt ii deals that were done under the next and administration were not honored. Specifically, the Cruise Missile, the tomahawk deal, the building the rebuilding of the navy. Things like that. A lot of it was, i think, politics. When carter won, many of fords people blamed it on jacksons blocking of salt ii which they had high hopes would turn the tide in the election. I dont think that is the case at all. Many of the ford people blamed the effort to block salt ii as the reason that ford lost. You were not in the ministration . John lehman i was. During the salt ii agreement, i was the director of the arms control and disarmament agency. I was at the nsc meetings where they were blocked. The blockers were basically jim holloway, who was the acting chairman of the joint chiefs, and donald rumsfeld. And i argued against it. They were disappointed, and president ford particularly chastised me at the meeting for not being an advocate of arms control. Whited russell why did rumsfeld block . John lehman the chiefs convinced him that giving up the backfire and giving up Cruise Missiles the tomahawks was a bad trade. And you agreed . John lehman i agreed, yet. Thank you. John lehman my pleasure. [captions Copyright National cable satellite corp. 2015] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. Visit ncicap. Org] tracy chernault, park director at Petersburg National battlefield. He discusses the importance of supply lines to both armies and the disparity between the union and confederacy armies access to ammunition. Our first speaker is tracy chernault. We have programs out there, you can pick up the