Transcripts For CSPAN3 Naval Warfare In The American Revolut

CSPAN3 Naval Warfare In The American Revolution October 20, 2014

For the American Revolution institute and i am pleased to welcome you to anderson house. The American Revolution institute promotes the knowledge and appreciation of the achievement of american independence, for filling the aim of the Continental Army officers who founded the society in 1783. The institution supports advanced scholarships, conduct Public Programs, and makes Resources Available to teachers and students to enrich the understanding of the war of independence and to the principles of the men and women who secured the liberty of the american people. If you are not out our Public Program mailing list and would like to be, you can fill out the form you found on your chair. We also have our fall Public Program out front if you dont have a copy and would like one. Tonight i am pleased to introduce dr. Dennis conrad, who will speak about the changes to Naval Warfare during the spring of 1778. Dr. Conrad as a historian at the naval history and heritage command. As a editor of the naval documents of the American Revolution series, and is one of the authors of sea raiders of the American Revolution. He is currently the lead historian for electronic document to him as the spanishamerican war. Dr. Conrad received his doctorate from the university. [applause] my purpose here tonight is to highlight the publication of volume 12 of naval documents of the American Revolution. It is a little difficult, hawking a book that even your publisher is less than enthusiastic about. To quote a blurb, this book is a key scholarly resource for a narrow group, naval and military historians and researchers of Early American History and the revolutionary war, who require primary source materials. Potentially interested may exist with some military and revolutionary war enthusiast, students studying this war may be interested in the naval perspective through this comprehensive source. But the president of the United States is very enthusiastic about volume 12 so it balances out. Unlike the Government Printing office, i think volume 12 is an important book that should enjoy a wide audience. I am hoping we will put it up online at the naval history and heritage command website in the not too distant future. You wont have to pay the 99 in costs to buy the letterpress edition. Although a period covered by volume 12, april and may of 1778, is a small number of time, a number of changes occurred, changes that would significantly affect how the war was fought and contribute greatly to its outcome. The most important of these developments was the internationalization of the war. With the dispatch of a french fleet on 13 april bound for american waters. The signing of a treaty was obviously a major event. It was not, however, i guarantee that the french would commit to naval resources to support american independence or to operate in american waters. In fact, the first request made by the american commissioners in france, asking that the french navy convoy attacked american merchants was denied. While the french leadership was unwilling to commit resources to protect american commerce, they were willing to commit their navy to assist the americans. In able to move that was credited to the triumvirate of sartine, his assistant, and the chevalier, the french decided to dispatch the squadron to american waters. Since the british had few ships in the mediterranean, they were free to go on the offensive. At the same time, the presence of a larger french squadron, the threat of a cross channel invasion, and concerns supported by intelligence that was incorrect but on good authority, that the spanish were preparing to enter the war as allies of the french, disquieted the british and forced them to keep significance naval forces in the English Channel and to delay sending a reinforcement under admiral john byron to north america. Byron first received orders to sail with reinforcements to america on 3 may, but avoidable delays and a decision by the lords of the admiralty, postponed to the departure of this relieving fleet until the british fleet commander got good intelligence of the fleet and is satisfied it is down to america or the west indies. It did not sail until 7 june. The indecision grew when foul weather jack, his fleet, encountered horrific weather that to battered and scattered it, according them to arrive well before british reinforcements. The riskiness of the decision to send it to american waters should not be minimized. Had the british dispatched quickly, they might have been trapped and lost. French planners understood that the possible benefits outweigh the possible dangers and acted decisively. Had to the execution of the strategy than as bold as the planning, the french navy could well have ended the war in the spring of 1778. Vice admiral howtzs fleet was badly scattered and was inferior. Moreover the british army abandoned philadelphia on 18 june to move to new york city. While that army marched overland, it shipped the bulk of its stores on merchant men which moved slowly and in a disorganized fashion down the Delaware River to delaware bay and then north to new york. Haddad arrived earlier, he could have captured this enormous prize, crippled the fleet, and could have blockaded the city. The large british garrison there depended almost entirely on supplies shipped in from elsewhere. Without that resupply it probably could have forced a surrender. However, this did not happen, because the fleet was slow getting to american waters. Although it sailed on 13 april, it took more than a month for the spanish fleet to pass the straits of gibraltar. Documents published in volume 12 demonstrate that our adverse weather, poor sailing, faulty equipment, the need to go as fast as the slowest chip, and the use of the voyage as a training exercise, caused the squadron to proceed across the atlantic that can only be described as leisurely. One of the most informative documents in the volume is the station bill for the flagship. Here it is in the original and our french and english translation. It demonstrates clearly how they used the voyage to america to train officers. The station bill not only gives the station of every officer during combat that also detailed the instructions regarding their duties, such as on the poop deck, [indiscernible] as near as possible, will command to the maneuvers and musketry and watch over the rapidity of fire. Another place in the station where they say, every commander of a gun division will have control over the men attached to each gun. He will do his best to become personally acquainted with all his men and notes those who show the most seal and intelligence and those who distinction themselves in combat. While the french fleet may have been better prepared as a result of this training, its slow progress across the atlantic meant that it did not arrive at the delaware capes until 8 july. By that time the chance to defeat the fleet before could collect and retreated to a strong defensive position in new york or to capture the british army had passed. Despite this opportunity, the nature of the naval war had changed dramatically. Internationalization of the war meant that no longer could the british assumed they had unchallenged control of american waters or even the English Channel. Another effect can be gleaned from how wills reports to the admiral. Service in american waters was hard and british ships and crews suffered accordingly. British commanders in north america were thus put between a rock and a hard place, as there was no facility to the british had plans to establish one. To rotate ships to england for refit and repair left of the American Fleet week but to keep those vessels on station, as howe and his successors were often forced to do, reduced their effectiveness. One of the congenital factors in the french naval victory at the battle of the virginia capes in 1781 was the Poor Condition of the british fleet. The spring of 1778 also saw a dramatic change in British Naval strategy. The british deemphasized the war in heartland america. As mentioned, they abandoned philadelphia and consolidated forces in new york and rhode island. They eventually abandoned the latter, as well. Under the new strategy, mobile detachments sent by water from new york to destroy American Forces in detail, to rate american seaports to keep down american privateering activity, and to support a british attempt to hold up a selfsupporting loyalist base. Thus the focus of british efforts would be the west indies and the periphery of the United States. In a letter to lord howe, the lords of the admiralty spelled out the new strategy. To reinforce east and west it was a viable strategy. However, fear of invasion caused british leadership to limit reinforcements to its army and navy in america. Because of this the british were overextended and outnumbered in the United States and west indies. New york was a difficult position to hold, which limited the troops available for detaching, and as a result of written forfeited naval initiative in the western hemisphere and became increasingly reactionary. The concentration of royal forces in american waters did open up opportunities for british and loyalist privateers, a trend that would continue until wars end. Because howe feared such privateering would result in desertion from Royal Navy Ships and would provide a smaller pool from which to draw sailors, he eventually had to give way. As a result, the royal governor began issuing letters of mark and reprisal in august, 1778. This excessive privateers operating out of bermuda, sent augustine, and especially new york became more and more evident, and they garnered greater official support and had a greater impact on american shipping. The Continental Navy saw changes during this period, too. In the period of march to may, 1778, the Continental Navy had six ships captured and destroyed the alfred, the randolph, the columbus, the virginia, the washington, and the effingham. William mallory wrote to a friend, our little fleet is much thinned. Only one has been captured on the ocean. These losses called into question the competence and character of the Continental Navys leadership, particularly its ship commanders, and also forced a changed in the role the Continental Navy played. Unable to contest british dominance in the bays and sees a surrounding the major cities of the United States, american seamen were pushed to the peripheries were they enjoyed some success. In north america, there were two areas, nova scotia and east florida, where american vessels dominated in the spring of 1778, and a third, the Mississippi River, where they could realistically hope to contest a british dominance. In nova scotia, privateers from new england so invested, the term used by contemporary, the residents of liverpool voted to dismantle the towns fort and to inform american privateers men that if they attempted to land under arms we should oppose them, but if they did not, they are offered to take a vessel out of the river and we shall not molest them. In georgia, gunboats, manned in large part by continental soldiers, scored a dramatic victory over the royal navy. To check an invasion of east florida by the southern Continental Army, captain Thomas Jordan led a force of three vessels to save simons inlet in georgia, destroying three galleys. Instead, the british squadron was soundly defeated in two of the vessels and it were captured. It was a germanic victory and gave the americans control of the inner coaster waters all the way from charleston to Saint Augustine, thus threatening the very existence of british east florida. Well in active they were able to coddle together a naval defensive force, thus mitigating the damage and unrelated issues halted the american advance toward Saint Augustine. It was nonetheless an important victory and established at least for a very short time american dominance in those water, and could have changed the course of the war and the american deep south. Then i wouldnt have had a career because there would have been no nathanael greene. Another success was on the periphery and early 1778, occurring along the Mississippi River. The origins of the expeditions to conquer west florida go back to the summer of 1777, when the governor of louisiana received a letter from colonel george morgan. It proposed a 1000 man American Expedition against pensacola. Galvez would provide intelligence and transport and artillery powder and provision. His response was equivocal but probably more convincing was the fact that the flotilla returned laden with arms and ammunition and provisions. After much debate, american leaders decided to dispatch a much scaleddown expedition. James welling, a captain, and 1029 man went in a boat, arriving unmolested into the heart of english territory, his party captured and ravaged a number of british settlements. They also captured several vessels, one of which was later turned into an american warship. At natches, they convinced the inhabitants to sign of oath of neutrality. He might have successfully captured west florida, however the americans began plundering those not considered friends, thus creating a pool of disaffected who were instrumental in helping the british to reestablish authority. One result of the willing expedition was that it almost sparked a war between england and spain. Wellings party was too small to be viable without the help of galvez, who helped extend american raters the the sacred right of neutrality. The english saw him as aiding and assisting and abetting his majestys rebellion, looking upon them as separate and distinct powers. Galvez also disposed of plunder accumulated by the raiders. In a letter to lords george germane, peter chester, argued that the only effectual method to truly address our injuries after all other methods have been tried would be to make reprisals and detain spanish property until ample restitution was made. Therefore it was not a paranoid rant but an appreciation of the situation that led a beleaguered yet to determine galvez to write his superior on 14 april, it seems the english are plotting an attack on the city, new orleans. Although the reception given to set americans is the same as in ports of europe and the islands of america, against which the english take no revenge, they see the town as defenseless. I already have two frigates in front of the city and according to this, an additional two or three are expected. One is at the mouth of the river. They cannot have any other object but this town and no business to attend to in natches. I have been informed that the commander of these frigates is a brutal man, willing to commit any kind of transgression without regard for consequences. It appears he intends to demand i turn over the americans, especially the commander in his party, and opened fire and destroy the city if i do not cecede. His lordship knows i cannot accept such a demand, and that i should be determined to defend said americans and their prizes and use all forces at my disposal although they are few for this purpose. It was a testament to the strength of galvez and to his friendship toward the United States that he was not cowed into submission by british divination. As Oliver Pollock reported to congress in a letter, i cannot include this important subject without giving the greatest applause to governor galvez for his noble spirit and behavior on this occasion. Though he had no batteries erected or men to defend the place against the two ships of war, with a hundred men all coming against him, and he laughed at their haughtiness and despised their attempts and in short they returned. What then ensued was an elaborate game of chicken which went on for several months and was not resolved until chester received a letter from lord george germane on 5 august, forbidding him from taking the rash step of seizing spanish property. By then the material willing had exhausted the patience of both galvez and pollock so that both were dedicated to getting him out as quickly as possible. Galvez went so far as to allow pollock to put out an armored vessel. Even so, it was november before welling departed against a privately owned sloop. The sloop was captured at sea dwelling was taken prisoner. Welling languished in british custody for almost two years before his captors permitted his exchange in late 1781. While the welling expedition boosted galvezs reputation, it was a failure for the americans. Contrary to expectations, it did not permanently open the Mississippi River to american commerce. In fact, the river was less available for American Youth after the raid. It also hardened sentiment in british west florida in joining the american cause. Clarks assessment of the exhibition is spot on plunder is the prevailing passion and the country can expect little service. Therefore, and west florida as in georgia and nova scotia, the americans were unable to transform temporary advantage into longterm success. In afghanistan and i had a thousand 50 eight, the british had reinforced with the nova scotias and had undertaken an offensive against georgia. However, the idea that the Continental Navy cannot stand to protect the heartland prevailed. Americans who attacked the British English scientist is not expected in european waters in 1778. An example of the latter was an activity of

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