comments by dr. glenn williams. our first paper is by tom long, who is an assistant professor and coordinator of history in the department of george washington university. he joined the u.s. navy. he graduated from harvard law school in 1970 in practice corporate banking law until he retired. afterwards, he went back and got a phd in history from george washington university. he teaches courses in early american history, constitutional history, military and naval history, and today he is going to offer you a paper. "water, water everywhere -- logistics of the 1975 -- 1775-1776 campaign. professor long: is a pleasure to be here with you today. i'm going to do this a little awkward. before dawn in 1775, john murray, the fourth earl of dunmore was forced by rebellious virginians to abandon the capital in williamsburg and flee with his family. he fled to the protection of the british royal navy. the chesapeake bay watershed, his territory, was critical to the war effort. the american revolution interrupted in april of 1775. virginia was the most populous and profitable of all the colonies in british north america. it was arguably the most important strategically as well. the value of the average annual export of tobacco from virginia exceeded 750,000 pounds. grain exports was over 200,000 pounds. together, they combined for 37% of all the exports from the continental colonies in north america. after august 1776 despite a bridge blockade, they exported tobacco to the west indies in exchange for you nations. economic historian -- exchange for munitions. economic historians have suggested that the revolution might not have been one without that much-maligned staple, tobacco. the geography of the chesapeake a region largely dictated the strategy britain would need to control the area. the bay is the largest tributary in the united states, stretching 195 myers to its northernmost -- miles to its northernmost reach in the chesapeake's. it was the perfect place to harbor large ships. there are two great ironies about the ubiquitous water of the chesapeake region. first, although these were major thoroughfares for everyone in the region, they were almost enormous obstacles for any military force trying to move through the area that did not have naval support. although they delivered fast quantities of fresh water, british worships were constantly short of potable water. historian jeremy black has suggested that a serious maritime strategy vigorously pursued it might have led to a different conclusion in the revolution. it is arguable that seaboard strategy and concentration on efforts of any control of blockading the rest of the coast was the most sensible one for them to pursue. they would avoid two of their principal difficulties. logistics and the problem that they could not fight in the interior. he knowledge that america could not have been conquered by a maritime strategy, but it is necessary to consider the possibility that the american conflict would have ended as many of the other wars did, with a compromised piece. as early as 1774, british leaders advocated such a strategy. virginia became radicalized in 1774. lord dunmore, on the 24th of december, wrote a letter to london calling for a close blockade imposed by a strong and flexible naval force in the chesapeake area the port should be blocked up in their communication cut off by water, even with the neighboring colonies. no vessel should approach any port in virginia. the british needed small warships in order to dominate littoral waters of the colony but they did not have the infrastructure necessary to some or chesapeake. when the enemy with the french or spanish fleet, they could rely on water and repair facilities from the colonies. the colonies became the enemy. their ability to keep ships on station for long periods became highly problematic. when dunmore fled the governor's palace, the hms macklin sailed down and around yorktown, where dunmore went aboard hms boeing, anchored off yorktown. on the ninth of june, dunmore was a governor without a colony. he was forced to wage a campaign to reassert his authority. the hms otter. the line drawings are the original drawings from the national maritime museum in greenwich, or they have the ships drawings. she was commanded by matthew squire. she becomes a major player in the battle of the chesapeake dunmore not the only naval force in the chesapeake. george colyer became the commander of british forces in america on the fourth of april, 1779. he recognizes the wisdom of the dunmore and jeremy black plan. he was not the only one. the british government had concluded that war in america should be reduced to a maritime, concentrating the resources on the rebel support, resulting in a conflict which weariness might then draw both sides towards a compromise. when, or colyer -- commodore colyer immediately advocated in attack, he met with general clinton and they planned an attack. colyer and brigadier general matthew launched an attack against rebels in the massachusetts the area. colyer intended to and the rebellion by shutting up the navigation of the chesapeake. when in virginia, colyer used warships to wreak havoc in the area. he quickly became convinced that the operation should not be merely a rate as clinton and matthew wanted, but an occupation resulting in the establishment of a naval base in the area. he wrote clinton urging that his forces should remain and be reinforced, arguing that the shipyard was the most considerable in america and that it could serve as the hub of a strategic position and easily defended major naval base. adhering to their rating strategy, general matthew would not even wait for a reply from clinton to colyer's request. he sailed out after 24 days in the bay. secretary of state lord george germane endorsed the strategy. the secretary recommended, the way they do, that clinton establish a permanent facility in portsmouth and conduct an active campaign in the chesapeake. clinton was unwilling to commit expensive forces to the chesapeake area in 1780 he sent major general alexander leslie to lead innovation of the chesapeake. the fleet is supporting the army. they are not initiating strategy. they are not taking strategic operation. leslie took the fleet and went to charleston to aid cornwallis in his campaign and the carolinas. when germane learned that clinton had again failed to establish a base in the chesapeake, he wrote the general a scathing letter. he asserted the king had commanded him that you carry out the chesapeake project when the king's service require it. when hostilities had broken out in massachusetts in 1775, the british royal navy was one of the most military -- powerful military forces in history, if not the most powerful. they have 131 ships of the line. they had a massive industrial complex, infrastructure, if you will. it was composed of dockyards needed to support the bluewater war in european waters. warships in the age of sail were intended to be self-sufficient for several months. drinking water was a serious problem in areas like virginia, where it is hot in the summer. water would foul in a short amount of time. access to drinking water was important, as water from many of the rivers was stagnant and not safe for drinking. the only maybe dockyards in the area were at halifax, nova scotia, 700 miles to the or, or the english harbor of antigua 400 miles to the south. before the outbreak of hostilities -- before the outbreak of hostilities, royal navies in the chesapeake could avail themselves of plentiful local sources of food and water. norfolk had a population of six and 6000 people and was home to -- 600-6000 -- 606,000 people. more than 3000 of those people signed loyalty oath to the british government. the local citizenry would deliver to the fleet at their peril. john shaw was attacked and nearly tarred and feathered by a rebel mob. the navy would get a few provisions from the region after that. the seven small ships the ploy by dunmore -- deployed by dunmore were the ships called for by colyer and his colleagues. they ranged inside from the little schooner hms magdalen to the 44 guns. the otter, also 14 guns, was one of the most active ships. her design called for a complement of 125 men, including ships crew and her marines. her story is illustrative of the problems. the ship log provides insights into life aboard a small ship and logistical problems. she carried just 83 sailors and officers and 13 marines. even a ship as small as the otter required a steady flow of food, ammunition, and fresh water. the navy had no establishment to provide such facilities in the chesapeake. in the three weeks in which he sailed from boston to virginia, the otter took on water on five separate occasions. she arrived as dunmore was fleeing and became immediately heavily involved. she attacked rebel shipping. the captured several prizes. she participated in numerous raids on rebel outposts. in october 1775, while based in the elizabeth river, she was constantly in search of fresh water for her crew. the day she arrived at anchor, she sent for water. it reflects that water was "received on board on 21 days during the month, and that on three others her crew was sent to look for water." being able to do with loyalists may provisioning easier than that it would become later. the ship also received fresh beef six times between the 21st 10 31st from october. provisioning of water was a constant occupation, but not yet extremely difficult. on the ninth of december, dunmore's forces were defeated in the battle of break ridge. the norfolk loyalists who professed loyalty to the governor were forced to flee. 90 ships in the elizabeth river became consumers of water and provision instead of suppliers. not only did it neutralize, but it compounded the problem. in addition, getting water became extremely risky. the otter toted down the elizabeth river to their water point. they anchored. at 10:00 the next morning, rebels fired at the boats going up the river for water. the ship fired two of her six founders, which made them scatter. i imagine it did. when the rebels disregarded in order to move away from the waterfront issued by the hms liverpool, that had just arrived, they opened fire. otter participated in the attack on norfolk and the fire that resulted completely destroyed the largest city in virginia and her major port. otter remained in the norfolk area, usually using her tenders to attack the rebels. conditions deteriorated on the ship rapidly. the situation was much worse than it had been in october. on the first of february, otter's men fired on rebels from the ship and when they dispersed, captain squire sent a party on short as a forging unit. conditions were terrible. they were met with strong gales and hail, snow, and sleep. he sent them a short six days later. they were attacked. the marines were captured and taken prisoner. the ship received the water only six times in october -- only six times. 21 times in october. not much fanfare. that is not much deal. cause of death, generally not listed. it appears that the cause of death was most frequently exhaustion and disease. the ninth of or 1776, he found the ship and dangerously weakened condition. apart from manning her tenders, the otter could not muster more than 20 men for duty. the entire fleet had less than four weeks supply of meat and eight of bread. he ordered water to conduct a raid on baltimore. before he could do it, the lower entry on logbook, roebuck had to send over a lieutenant, a midshipman, 18 seamen, and 10 marines. she captured five prizes and conducted reconnaissance. they wind up evacuating up the bay. hammond tells dunmore to leave the norfolk area and evacuate up to quinn's island because they are told there is a good harbor there and there is plenty of fresh water. they arrived. the day they arrived, sailors on the island sent 270 pounds of fresh beef above hms boeing. on the seventh of june, foy sent 11 men ashore to dig a well to provide fresh water for everyone. the summer heat became too oppressive. in the matter of a month, the well went dry. they run out of water. they are forced to abandon quinn's island. this is a drawing thomas jefferson made of quinn island. they move from quinn's island to the potomac river at st. george's island. they get to st. george's. they need to conduct one more operation before they could even consider evacuating the bay, which is what they are planning to do. hammond has advised dunmore that they need to leave the bay altogether. he sales with roebuck all the way up the potomac as far as quantico, where he was able to fill caps for the entire fleet. they then sailed out of the chesapeake. the otter was the first to leave. she sailed out on the fourth of august, 1976 -- 1776. the next day, boeing sailed out bound for england. on the seventh, roebuck sailed out carrying lord dunmore. after 1776, the british tried to maintain a distant blockade. boeing came back. she could remain onshore a brief time before she too ran out of water in her salience -- and her sailors were exhausted. she had to abandon her blockading and sale on the seventh of november. lacking water provisions and repair facilities, the crews were exhausted. it is clear that without a facility that could provide support within the region, the small ships needed for a literal campaign of that sort could not function. no one could say for certain what would have happened had the british actually established secure basis. we do know that while dunmore's fleet was in the bay, little commerce was able to escape. after they left, trade flourished, enabling the colonies to finance the entire war. the siege at yorktown might have ended differently if the british fleet was based there. it is possible that a compromise solution contemplated by the british government after the french had entered the war and suggested by jeremy black might have resulted from such a stalemate in the chesapeake. in any case, it is clear that the vital importance of logistics in a remote amphibious campaign of this sort is absolutely demonstrable and demonstrated by the british campaign here as personified by the experience of hms otter. thank you. [applause] professor smith: thank you very much, tom. our second presentation is by michael crawford, who holds a doctor in american history from boston university. he has taught at texas tech university and he served a fellowship in the editing of historical documents at the adams papers at the massachusetts historical society. before joining the staff of the historical center. he is a specialist in the navy as well as in american religious history. dr. crawford has written or edited 15 books, including volumes in the award-winning series "naval documents in the american revolution." in 2008, the board of directors of thess constitution museum bestowed upon him the samuel eliot morrison award of recognition of scholarship and contribution to maritime history. since 2008, dr. crawford has been the senior historian at the naval history and heritage command. today, his presentation is going to be entitled supply of the french fleet and north america in 1778. dr. crawford: thank you, gene. french squadron of 12 ships of the line, four frigates, carrying 1000 soldiers, right on the coast of north america on the fifth of july, 1778, and it left the coast to sailed for the west indies on fourth of november. this essay is going to answer a simple question about this expedition. how did he feet his men while he was in -- how did he feed his men while he was in north america? a simple question. the answer to the simple question is they planned to repair vision the fleet with the help of continental congress. what did the fleet need? they had an aid prepare a detailed list of provisions. we don't have that list but it was summarized as meet or fish in place of salt provisions, preserved vegetables, and bricks for constructing an oven. one the fleet arrived at boston at the end of august, he had a schedule for a three month time and gave it to the continental major general. the schedule called for more than one million pounds of flour, a similar amount of beans, 40,000 kilograms of fish, mustard, and 729 cords for wood. at one pound a day per man for 10,000 men, this would suffice for 100 days. by the time the fleet made landfall on the seventh of july, it was short of fresh water and when it arrived on newport in late july, it had only 20 days of vigils . before the french took up the challenge, the british faced the same challenge. the outbreak of hostilities and the british army had no supplies and stockpiled in north america and the british planners expected the requirement of supplies from europe would be temporary. they realize that would have to continue indefinitely. in consequence, the british authority transferred responsibility for transporting from contractors to the treasury department. procuring provisions proved a challenge for all armed forces in america. nowhere more so than in new england. in the 18th century, bread was more abundant in pennsylvania than new england. by the outbreak of the revolutionary war, new england was more dependent on importation of flour, posing challenges. wheat shortages in new england were acute enough that various states competed and imposed embargos on exports. congress ladenburg against exportation of the long list of provisions. in september, congress acted to facilitate the flow of foodstuffs to were the shortages were creating hardships. the british had evacuated philadelphia three weeks earlier and continental congress resumed residence. the french admiral transported conrad alexander, the french ambassador, to philadelphia and sailed northward. he presented the list of requirements to congress. they entrusted the marine committee to provide. some would be dispatched immediately with water and flour. he appointed a french merchant to be agent for the french navy and they worked together to procure biscuit and flour. he ordered his fleet to rhode island to cooperate with american forces under john sullivan. the french fleet weighed anchor on the 23rd of july, too soon for the provision to arrive. the assistant commissary general had succeeded in sending on board the fleet 50 head of cattle but i've not been able to procure. general sullivan received notice of the possibility of cooperating with the french on the 22nd of july. two days later, confirmation the campaign would go forward. the general had only 1600 troops present and inefficiency of provisions. after leaving sandy hook, the fleet cruised at sea several days. when the fleet arrived july 29, lafayette had not arrived and militia forces were still arriving and sullivan was not yet ready to cooperate. sullivan came on board the next day to consult. sullivan was told his particular need for fresh vegetables. he wrote that he had assigned a continental agent the task of supplying the fleet. 60 oxen would arrive the next day and he would supply fresh vegetables. sullivan assured the supply. he apologized for not supplying all the fleets wants. he appealed, lamenting the long time at sea multiplied the scurvy. that evening, sullivan got a prize of fresh lemons. the cargo temporarily relieved the scurvy. sullivan again reassured he would not want for provisions despite assurances. the americans were having difficulty procuring flour. lieutenant colonel explained to the admiral the quantity of wheat necessary for provisioning the french fleet cannot be furnished at the moment without starving sullivan's own troops. lafayette arrived in rhode island on the evening of the fourth of august. sullivan determined to wait additional militia, delaying the joint operation until they agree to land troops on the island of rhode island. on the 9th, the british fleet appeared off newport and on the 10th, the french fleet set sail. although the middle when take states where fleury, the warehouses of the northern states, securing an adequate supply of provisions proved less easy than in the north. philadelphia, marine committee for national relying on commissary for provisions to gather provisions and dispatched them to the french fleet. on august 11 when the french fleet was at sea, it was reported supplies were sent sufficient to fill two orders and was ready to ship a large amount of additional biscuit, pork, and rice. cheese would not be available until fall harvest. the next day, a day during widget it were the aftermath of a violent storm, the chairman of the marine committee wrote. he requested a 20 day supply of biscuit and salt provisions in addition to what had been on the list. lee apologized for the delay, excluding the enemies control of the sea necessitated. they said the only item in short supply was salt. on the 13th, wadsworth wrote sullivan to contribute the efforts to the fleet to the fact the flour health was bad and would not be until the harvest that quality wheat would be available. word was sent to sullivan to the french would not be able to resume the campaign to capture newport but would be taking shelter in boston where the fleet would refit. on arrival, the french admiral explained how the manner of provisions played into his decision to suspend provisions. the fleets need for provisions was a cause equal to the importance of storm damage to the ship's and evidence the british naval reinforcements or joining the fleet. when the fleets arrived, major general heath reported to washington on the challenges the provisions had presented. yet been sending provisions for weeks to rhode island and not the fleet shows up in boston. the unexpected destination will not be a little embarrassing. they are short of bread. even if the fleet could be quickly repaired, it would not be able to reengage in further operations. americans had 3 regions from where they could draw to supply the fleet. procuring provisions proved difficult. the committee reported the flower from albany would not reach boston in time and order the commissary general to draw additional flour magazines in new england. shipments of flour were slow. the british had regained command of the seas between the capes of virginia and boston. the transports assigned to its convoy were still in the delaware. provisions from the mid-atlantic states had to travel by land. on september 2, washington reported a considerable quantity of provisions from philadelphia. 20 days later, he feared no provisions had arrived. october 12, heath reported provisions were arriving daily. monopolizing the supplies of the french, supplying boston from maryland proved impossible. the marine committee order the supplies they put in a warehouse near the shore. in september, realizing american officials efforts would be insufficient to delay the fleets departure, flour was purchased directly. the providers folded to them instead of the american army. on november 5, he wrote to paris a detailed report and he praised all of the french officials that helped him supply his fleet. the french did not apply lessons they learned to their future. they did not follow the british example of having a supply chain from europe. the convoy only carried two months instead of four months of supplies, expecting a second division to come and bring the rest. the second was canceled. in america, they found the continental army was having a supply crisis. the french and americans competed for the supplies. the french paying hard coin and letters of exchange on the european market monopolized the supplies. perhaps despite their dissatisfaction, the french were content to repeat the process because it did obtain what they needed. thank you. [applause] >> thank you. our third presenter today is michael. he is a senior undergraduate student georgetown university majoring in history. his focus is on the history of institutions and their role in society and has worked with john o'malley on the historiography the catholic historical field and with mike crawford at the when the fleets arrived, major general heath reported to washington on the challenges the provisions had presented. yet been sending provisions for weeks to rhode island and not the fleet shows up in boston. the unexpected destination will not be a little embarrassing. they are short of bread. even if the fleet could be quickly repaired, it would not be able to reengage in further operations. americans had 3 regions from where they could draw to supply the fleet. procuring provisions proved difficult. the committee reported the flower from albany would not reach boston in time and order the commissary general to draw additional flour magazines in new england. shipments of flour were slow. the british had regained command of the seas between the capes of virginia and boston. the transports assigned to its convoy were still in the delaware. provisions from the mid-atlantic states had to travel by land. on september 2, washington reported a considerable quantity of provisions from philadelphia. 20 days later, he feared no provisions had arrived. october 12, heath reported provisions were arriving daily. monopolizing the supplies of the french, supplying boston from maryland proved impossible. the marine committee order the supplies they put in a warehouse near the shore. in september, realizing american officials efforts would be insufficient to delay the fleets departure, flour was purchased directly. the providers folded to them instead of the american army. on november 5, he wrote to paris a detailed report and he praised all of the french officials that helped him supply his fleet. the french did not apply lessons they learned to their future. they did not follow the british example of having a supply chain from europe. the convoy only carried two months instead of four months of supplies, expecting a second division to come and bring the rest. the second was canceled. in america, they found the continental army was having a supply crisis. the french and americans competed for the supplies. the french paying hard coin and letters of exchange on the european market monopolized the supplies. perhaps despite their dissatisfaction, the french were content to repeat the process because it did obtain what they needed. thank you. [applause] >> thank you. our third presenter today is michael. he is a senior undergraduate student georgetown university majoring in history. his focus is on the history of institutions and their role in society and has worked with john o'malley on the historiography the catholic historical field and with mike crawford at the naval history and heritage command. is currently writing is these is on the relationship between georgetown university and the catholic university of america at the turn of the 20th century. he's a senior fellow for the designing of the futures of the university initiative at georgetown and a jon carroll fellow. his paper today is entitled "the french red rise of september 8, 1788." >> on 8, september 1778, a group of french bakers toiled along the waterfront in boston. on that evening, the crowd approached the bakers and demanded the baked bread. according to the commander of american forces, the crowd fell upon the bakers with clubs and beat them. two officers rushed to investigate. they attempted to restore order and the crowd assaulted them. his death turned disastrous. he was the chamberlain to the french king's brother and brother-in-law to one of the flag officers in the french fleet. this had the very real potential to end the alliance. cooler heads prevailed and the american and french officials did their best. it was quickly agreed british sailors must beers possible for the incident. any anger was directed against their enemy. the riot was all but forgotten. this is a look first to examine the official explanation to see if british sailors were to blame. if it turns out there were not, it follows the townspeople of boston must have assaulted the bakers. the question that follows is why? since no one was charged, it's impossible to say who wads responsible. the circumstances provide several clues. the first is the lack of evidence against the british sailors. today after the riot, general he stated some of the hands belonging to the privateer are suspected of being concerned in the riot. he was booked to grab to this explanation as a way to avoid further conflict, agreeing some sailors have provided suitable instruments. heath is trying to distance any americans. it seems an unspoken agreement emerged. the speed with which his agreement was reached offers a motive other than facts prompted the accusation. the most obvious benefit of this lies in its political attractiveness. if the british could be blamed for the death of a french officer, it will provide a convenient scapegoat. any shared anger have the possibility to strengthen ties between the countries by directing anger against a mutual enemy. political expediency is not a reason to discount the official explanation and it should give one pause for accepting it. this incident could not have come at a better time for american leaders in boston. dutch american leaders in boston. inconsistency with which american leaders corresponded for just a political motivation for blamg british. general he blamed the sailors and easy determine american to describe the seamen involved. he identified those involved as americans. the conversation among american leaders focused on the political ramifications of the riot and their concern americans might have been responsible is expressed in the language. this is in contrast to the public discussions of the riot, which laid the blame on british elements in the city. two different conversations were occurring -- one in public and private. it suggests a political motivation behind the public's story, the consistent message masking to doubt american leaders had about american involvement. it's difficult to believe american officials would not have pursued british sympathizers. taken together with the obvious political motivations, it seems more unlikely those responsible were residents of boston and the british were scapegoats. if british sailors were not responsible, what could have driven the townspeople of boston to turn against their allies? a number of historians offer their own explanation but none of these have proved satisfactory because their authors have focused on a single cause and failed to account for other possible factors. english to differences between the bakers and townspeople led the conflict, a bread shortage in boston sparked a food riot, and anti-french sentiment among lower classes was responsible. we tried to determine which of these have the greatest influence. the first of these is alos the least convincing. one can imagine being unable to communicate their desire for bread. it must have been clear to the crowd they are being refused. it appears the french had hired an american to act as their chief baker who would have been able to explain why he was unable to part with the bread. the language barrier most likely exacerbated tensions. linguistic tensions alone could not have caused the riot. the explanation a flour shortages sparked the riot proves to be more compelling. if people were desperate for bread, it's unlikely they would let a few men stand in their way. it would have probably made them angrier. language only played a supporting role. the riot was a popular tradition by the 18th century. if the authorities refused to run different situation, it was not uncommon for a mob to take matters into its own hands. there were over 30 food riots the former british colony, six in boston. those involved or rarely punished and those facing the french bakers probably assumed that they could seize the bread without facing judicial consequences. a flour shortage would have provided a powerful incentive to attack the bakers. on this point, historians are divided. in order to detangling situation, we look at the three major factors entered into the flour situation. the economic situation of the city, the knot of provisions required by the french fleet, and the demands of the american forces in and around boston. by the way colonial period, production had shifted south to the mid-atlantic colonies, and by the 1750's, most language towns were importing flour and rice. this movement of food relied on trade routes that were thrown into turmoil by the efforts of the british royal navy to intercept american trade and by the embargoes on exportation of state government and congress. to make matters worse, the depreciation of continental and state currencies hampered the attempts of most people to acquire what flour was available. by 1777, the paper money issued by continental congress was rapidly depreciating. new england farmers were less willing to bring whatever surpluses they did have it to cities because it'd not want to sell their crops at a loss. legislative attempts to keep prices down encouraged farmers to hold on to their surpluses. most of the artisans and other workers could only complain about being left with nothing to eat. the fleet sailed from france in early april 1788 with enough drug provisions to last about four months. at the time the fleet reached the eastern seaboard in early july, it was running out of provisions. congress and various segments of the continental supply system scrambled to assemble provisions. by the town of fleet arrived off newport in late july, it had still not in supplied its basic needs. in early august, general john sullivan reported the french had no more than 20 days provisions on hand. attempts were largely unsuccessful. when the fleet arrived in boston, it was not better supplied. upon arrival, it is estimated the fleet with the over one million pounds of flour for three months. heath expressed his doubts that such an amount could be procured. heath knew about the difficult of supply in new england. he had struggled to provide commissary in the region. the british decision in the summer of 1778 seized supplying british soldiers met another 5000 mouths to feed. the presence of the french fleet added to an already stressful system. to make matters worse, the french fleet had brought with it a large supply of hard currency and bills of credit to assist on buying provisions. these purchases had a dual effect of driving up the price of the flower that remained. an agent for the commissary reported that flower suppliers would only accept hard currency. this situation was advantageous for the french and maybe already challenging path of acquiring flour more difficult for lower classes in boston because they only had access to depreciated american currency. the situation was grim indeed in the fall of 1778. the depreciation of paper currencies meant procuring flour would become increasingly difficult. capital flour was available was most likely going to the merchants. the demands of the american military forces further strained availability of supplies. once the french begin purchasing flower, prices skyrocketed and those without access would have an even more difficult time purchasing flower. for the poor, the fall was one of acute shortage. hunger brought on by a shortage may have brought townspeople to attack the bakers. the animosity was not immediately vanish with the commencement of the alliance with the french. even those who are not served against the french were too young to remember grew up in environment were public displays of anti-catholic and anti-french attitudes were common. largest of these displays with the annual pope day parade celebrated every november, which colonnaded in a bonfire where people burned effigies of the pope and devil. pope day encouraged a strong protestant egos in the city and contributed to an anti-catholic and anti-french sentiment among the lower classes. unlike members of boston's elite who enjoyed ample opportunity to socialize with french officers and left temper. common people have blue opportunity to attract with french. to see those men stealing flour must have angered hungry bostonians. more recent events contributed to the air of tension. when the fleet was -- tensions ran high and it appears a public scandal would result. though sullivan later apologized, many americans is disappointment and anger. having held such high hopes for the new alliance, to have the front to sell to boston without any contributions to the war effort, was disappointed. james warren explained we have a foolish spirit. it is unlikely this subsided and undoubtedly played a role in motivating the riot. this suggests these incidents were the result of an underlying tension between the groups and not a one-time affair. this harmony between locals and french sailors proved to be a greater concern than conflict of personal honor among the officers. the alli preps never came closer to ending that on that fateful night. american leaders in boston did their best to remove any possibility of blowing from the townspeople. the lack of arrests made it impossible to say for certain who was responsible. given the strong political motivations as well as a lack of evidence, it seems highly likely that the townspeople of boston were responsible. this conclusion seems more likely when considering the possible reasons for the boston riots. while the alliance with france helped to ultimately secure american independence, it caused substantial hardships for the people of boston. the flour shortage and large concentration of american forces and british prisoners in the region played an important part in sparking the riots. the language barrier between the townspeople and french sailors also contributed to escalating tensions. driven by anti-french sentiment and a lack of bread, the rioters came within an inch of changing the course of the revolution. this serves as a reminder that revolutionary america was not a unified america. this also brought, and americans and frenchmen into occasional conflict. the riots and far-reaching political consequences ultimately served to remind us the forgotten power of the common people to influence the course of events. thank you. [applause] >> thank you. today, we're fortunate to have comments being offered by glenn williams, who is the senior historian at the u.s. army center for military history where he is currently the army's commemorative team leader. he is a retired army officer who entered public history as a second career. he is author of the book "year of the hangman." he is also author of the uss constellation, a short history of the last worship built by the u.s. navy. and he is the could you be due to the report on congress and historical preservation of the war of 1812. in addition, he's been the editor of the u.s. army campaigns bicentennial commemorative pamphlet series posed by the u.s. army center for military history and author of a forthcoming book entitled "dunmore war" to be released early in 2016. glenn. >> thank you. one comment on that. [indiscernible] you get this army guy going to talk navy logistics. you will get it in the proceedings but he didn't hear it and the spoken papers. mike starts out his paper talking about two famous logistics. it either napoleon or frederick the great. the second one, a tribute into omar bradley, makes a comment about amateurs talking strategy and professionals talking logistics. those are really both kind of army ways of looking at it. i was racking my brain to find a navy way of talking about logistics and stumbled across one on the spring. i was an infantry officer. and the army says we are making your additional specialty. it really hit home to me one day when i was stationed in the 82nd airborne, underneath the unit designation and flag out front was the motto "try fighting without us." [laughter] >> isn't that true? how many of you play chess? i was in the chess club in high school. i never won any games. if you can imagine playing chess and one of your pieces breaking down or the knight needing to be forged, it complicates the game. i think all of the papers come all of which i really enjoyed reading, really brought this about in different ways. i think they really complemented each other in one way or another. i would like to show this picture. i was the curator at the uss constellation. i was in the navy sea cadets. i retired and decided to be the curator. i found this picture here. can anyone guess where this was taken? about where the tripoli monument is is where the camera is set up. constellation was here for about 25 years as a naval training vessel used by the navy. she was also used for gunnery training. a neat thing to put up there. half the time, we're talking about a photograph that wasn't around at the time. the three papers -- all of them i thought really well done. the longer versions are even better. we will discuss some aspects of them. i think it's really tough -- you cannot separate operations and logistics. we saw how logistical problems contributed to the inability to accomplish certain missions and to be successful in those operations. the two are inseparable. we also saw between the three papers different ways of fighting by yourself or as part of a coalition and how that can assist or detract from your ability to supply your forces. we look at the ability to supply your long supply chain and your logistical infrastructure and relying on local procurement and some of the problems inherited in that like competition. we talked about the price of wheat in the mid-atlantic states versus new england and how operational concerns or what's happening elsewhere can affect those. logistics impact any kind of military force. i think of arnold's expedition into canada. they had no problem hunting game. they didn't have access to fresh vegetables. the strength of the men deteriorated quite quickly because of the lack of fresh vegetables. armies suffered more deaths and hospitalizations due to non-battle reasons. and the competition. mike mentioned it didn't seem like the french had learned from earlier experiences in bringing logistical support. who is the queen of the sea? great britian. the french fleet was able to do is locally in a number of cases but had to think of the threat of supply coming from the metropolitan france. that might have played into the decision to rely more on local procurement than from metropolitan france. let's see. public support. in the bread riot paper, a number of things going into this. it wasn't only national interests involved but a certain amount of ethnic conflict between people who grew up in english tradition looking at the french as an enemy. now you want to tell us they are on our side? new england was basically calvanist and the french were mainly catholic. there was a lot of french living in the boston area as well. you have not dynamic at play when you are talking about interaction with the public. i really enjoyed descriptions about infrastructure. it goes into more detail about the system of yards and how the navies were supplied and maintained in the european continent. if you get a chance to look at the long versions come i recommend them. logistical considerations tend to limit operational reach. the operation and rhode island had to be curtailed because of logistical reasons. tom mentioned he thought maybe the story of yorktown would have been different had the british established a naval base. remember why we ended up going to yorktown. washington had always wanted to attack new york. it was his worst defeat, the center of political and military government for the british. it was their biggest naval base in what became the continental u.s. the french ships and drew too much water to get over the bar at sandy hook. that might be a consideration. keep in mind washington is always trying to talk officials into attacking new york. they said let's look southward. the continental army turned their attention to the chesapeake. now, one of the tings i was told to look at were omissions. i really enjoyed all of the papers. there are things i worry about. tom, he read a couple quotes from some of the letters. i thought it might have improved the paper a bit had he explained the system of naval ranks in the royal navy. it gets pretty busy. i thought it might have stood a little explanation. a master's mate was the same rank as a midshipman. they both had a path that could lead to lieutenant. they're both considered junior officers. a midshipman was a gentleman and a master's mate had worked its way up to the ranks so he was not. they were not social equals. that is just a suggestion. if i were grading you, i would not take points. same thing goes for ships. ships in those days were considered of the line or below the line. tom's paper mentions them as cruisers, technically correct. dunmore's was pretty much a fleet. i thought it might have been a bit better if he mentioned the class of the ship. i can really get confusing. in those days, a cruiser is a ship operating from a fleet. i would have liked to seen a little more explanation of that. these are my pet peeves. nerdy pet peeves. things when i read 18th-century warfare -- when i was stationed in europe, stars and stripes had a cartoon out with the five warning signs of an army career. one of them had the soldier there with his notebook and a pen and getting ready to write something. the caption is -- that's me. i am a native from baltimore. i drive around and see people with their maryland flag upside down and i tell them it's upside down. i do it at the post office, the fire department. where was i going with this? [laughter] >> nerdy things that are pet peeves of mine. there was no royal army during the revolutionary war. it is the british army. it's not the royal marines. the marines don't get that title until the napoleonic war. we all know they were raided according to the weight of the projectile. that's how the name of the gun gets its name. it's not a 24 pound gun, it's a 24 pounder. another one is the use of terms that don't belong. the worst one i found was they would talk about the war of 1812 battle where one side was artillery fire with a barrage. you cannot fire a barrage with loading cannons. in the 18th century, when it says bombard come it means to attack with bombs. what weapon fires a bomb in the 18th century? the moyter. the only fire solid shot projectiles. that is what all fleet mostly had. if you look in the primary sources, that's how they describe it. if you look in the treaties of the 18th century, they call it the canon. that wraps up my comments and i turn it back to dean for questions and answers. >> thank you. [applause] i would like to open up with would the speakers like to make any further comments? ok. we will open up the floor to questions. >> [indiscernible] i'm interested in the topic. how do you feel about that topic? what was a reason behind it? >> i came about this topic from this gentleman. i was his intern two summers ago and before the day, he has me a packet about this incident and says see what you can find, if you can come up with an explanation. he was suspicious about the british being responsible so i found some interesting stuff and that grew into this paper. my sources are largely published collections of letters from the delegates to the continental congress and from the naval documents of the american revolution collection. i have some unpublished ones coming up in the next edition from dr. crawford. >> my plan was to steal the research. [laughter] >> and to write a paper on the bread right but he did such a good job, i just wrote about stealing his work. [laughter] >> his comment about the sources. for those of you not familiar, to enable document of the american revolution is one of the most marvelous collections of material you will ever find anywhere. if you're not familiar, get familiar. also talk them up. you have heard the admiral say today he is doing a wonderful job. they have to pay to publish the book, which is sold by the government printing office for profit. talk them up. they are really valuable. you are through september of '78, now? >> through august of 1778. >> they are 3-4 inches thick. these are really remarkable. absolutely priceless. encourage them. >> they cost about $100 each. [laughter] >> other questions. i will further add that in addition to the naval documents of the american revolution, they also produced the naval war of 1812 collection, which should be coming out with volume four hopefully soon. [laughter] >> i will also mention we have had the spanish-american war series. >> that's modern stuff. >> they do have one on the barbary wars. >> yes. >> it's all you ever wanted to know. >> no further questions. thank you so much for being here and a last round of applause. [applause] >> to me, it describes the whole effort to bring the natural world and the man-made world into harmony, to bring order, usefulness, delight. to our whole environment. and that only begins with trees and flowers and landscaping. was about unifying the nation, her signature issue. she was an natural campaigner, businesswoman, and political partner to lbj. lady bird johnson, this sunday on first ladies: influence an image. examining the lives of the women who ki t

Related Keywords

New York , United States , Canada , Texas , Philadelphia , Pennsylvania , Rhode Island , Williamsburg , Virginia , Boston , Massachusetts , Delaware , Greenwich , United Kingdom , Elizabeth River , Antigua And Barbuda , Tripoli , Tarabulus , Libya , Washington , District Of Columbia , London , City Of , Newport , Chesapeake , Quantico , Boston University , English Harbor , Saint Paul , Sandy Hook , Maryland , Norfolk , Georgetown University , Spain , Paris , Rhôalpes , France , Baltimore , Americans , America , Virginians , Antigua , Britain , French , Spanish , British , Frenchmen , American , John Murray , Alexander Leslie , John Sullivan , James Warren , Omar Bradley , December Dunmore , Thomas Jefferson , Conrad Alexander , Michael Crawford , Glenn Williams , Samuel Eliot Morrison , John Shaw , Colyer Commodore , George Colyer , Jon Carroll , Matthew Squire ,