i am with the world war ii memorial, and i want to thank you for joining us today. we are favored with an extraordinarily interesting, and i think you will agree, wonderful lecturer. craig simons is a friend of mine , and he has devoted his life to college teaching and writing. to be more specific, a professor at the u.s. naval academy or 30 years. during which time, it is a book -- he has published about 38 books. he is currently finishing a book about the history of the united states navy in world war ii. the whole thing. he has also written some wonderful books including a biography on joe johnston. what brought you onto dry land for that one, sir? [laughter] he was present at the funeral of general sherman. in any case, these kinds of facts attract all kind of historians and antiquarians. we are blessed to have dr. simons with us and, speaking figuratively, the proudest ribbon on his breast would be his service during the turner revolution. if there are people between the mightf 65 and 80, you remember. stansfield turner was president of the naval war college from 1972 to 1975, and he was sent there by his superior with the hunting license to make the place stern and rigorous. they are up there in newport, rhode island plane golf -- playing golf and having a good time. i do not know how many of you met admiral turner, but he took that advice seriously and he went out and hired five or six relatively young military officers and professors. he insisted the curriculum be totally changed. would be required reading their study by one of the most important book on military history ever written. so, one of the stars for this change was the gentleman on my right. he has survived a great teaching career at the naval academy and has been invited back several times and has received the academy's highest award for excellency in teaching. join me in welcoming dr. craig simons. [applause] simons: thank you, everyone. to be here and to honor, in part, the legacy of hayden williams that led to the establishment of the world war ii memorial on the national mall. but also, i want to commemorate the anniversary of the attack on pearl harbor. the image that we have been looking at the wall behind me is the uss arizona in its death throes. for many americans, it is a reminder of what happened that day. december 7 is a day that still echoes in the collective national memory, as roosevelt promised it would. when he prepared the speech he was going to give to congress the next morning -- roosevelt dictated it out loud to his secretary, voicing the punctuation as he did so. "yesterday, december 7, 1941, a date which will live in world history." after he finished dictating that, he sent grace off to type it up in a triple spaced manuscript. she brought it back and he had a pen and rewrote the first sentence, deciding it lacked the impact he wanted, crossing out "world history" and wrote in the word, "infamy." well, having no luck whatsoever, there go. [applause] -- [laughter] the upper right corner. so, we have thought of this ever since. infamy. a surprise attack on a sunday morning on a nation at peace. to most americans, it was a complete shock. surprise is the most common adjective applied to this. like all historical events, it had a long back story and a critical context. history," thed phrase originally written in his speech, had quite a lot to do with it. the roots of this stretch back a decade. i think we need to back up a little bit too 1937, when the japanese military leaders initiated a military conflict that they labeled rather incident."he chinese but it soon became a full-scale war of invasion and conquest. it may seem more than a bit absurd that a small island nation should seek to conquer a continent sized nation. part of it was hubris. in 1937, the japanese were infected by a national confidence and a national pride that was rooted in the assumption of a racial and cultural superiority. not only over the chinese, but over everyone else on the planet. they believed that they were exceptional. they believed they were not bound by normal rules that applied to other nations. inaddition, japan's military 1937 was a relatively recent creation. it was modern, well-equipped, and most of all well organized. the chinese military with none of those. at first, the japanese found the war in china to be easy-going. they swept aside the opposition and occupied swaths of territory. soon enough, the progress slowed. the japanese found themselves in a seemingly bottomless quagmire. they won great victories. a -- inmost cases come most cases, the chinese armies they fought dissolved from the battlefield and, in many ways, it was their vietnam. frustrated by chinese tactics and convinced by their own propaganda that the ungrateful chinese were refusing to accept the nine liberation at the hand of their superiors. the japanese responded with then fury with their chinese civilians and chinese cities, conducting wars against civilians and the elusive chinese army. this was a form of warfare that was unusual then. notoriously, it included what the western newspapers labeled "the rape of nan king." the numbers are roughly estimated, but as many as 300,000 chinese died in that assault. most of them were civilian and many of them were women and children. photographs, like this one, became infamous throughout the world and appeared in many newspapers and newsreels. americanstered the ever further against the japanese. in that same month, japanese planes attacked and sank a navy gunboat. first, the very fact that united states navy and boats were sperating on the inland river of china does not speak highly of the chinese government at that time. the japanese suspected the americans were there to gather information. they insisted the attack was an accident and apologized, offering to pay indemnities, but it further poisoned japanese and american relations. further self evident to americans that the japanese were the aggressors. self evident it remains today. the chinese were victims. as we are, we thought that somebody ought to do something about it. there was no enthusiasm for intervention by jack -- united states troops in asia. but, the united states looked to modify japanese behavior by applying economic sanctions. again, there is nothing new under the sun. they applied economic sanctions , because america was then the world's leading producer and exporter of crude oil. and by a large margin. fieldscovery of the oil in texas had made the united states the world's oil king. in 1941, the united states was oilonly the world's largest producer, but it generated six times the amount of oil as the number two producer, venezuela. so, throughout the 1930's, we pumped oil out of the ground as fast as we could and sold it for pennies on the barrel. japan, by contrast, had no oil at all. that is still true. what that means is that the united states had its hands on the control valve that supplies oil to the japanese industrial economy. if japan did not behave, the united states could close the valve anytime they wanted. despite that implied threat, the japanese behavior only seemed to get worse. when the european war began in september 1939, the success of german forces there created opportunities for the japanese in asia. this would defeat of france and holland and the circumstances of britain meant that the asian colonies of those european states have become virtual orphans. borneo, java, and sumatra were all rich and proven oil roven oil reserves. french indochina was a source of rubber and tin. japan had none of these, and there was a temptation to get them was irresistible. for army officers, the move into south asia was economically appealing, and it offered a way out of the chinese quagmire. it is a curious and kind of contradictory vision. to complete the conquest of china, they needed access to the european colonies of south asia. to achieve those resources, they would almost certainly have to britain,ar with both holland, and quite possibly the united states as well. the japanese army leaders saw cost if itacceptable enabled resolution of the war in china. in for a penny. in for a pound. roosevelt certainly knew that america is your monopoly on oil was a potential key to influencing japanese behavior. but he was reluctant to play that card. ,o use a modern euphemism cutting oil to japan was the "nuclear option." it would force japan into a corner that would force it leaders to knuckle under american demands or find oil elsewhere. the elsewhere being the dutch east indies. given the deep-seated national pride of the japanese government and its citizens, there was hardly any question between which of those options they would choose. in calculating response of other nations to whatever leverage you want to apply, culture as well as cost is a critical factor. tougher is not always better. calibrate theto pressure he applied onto japan rather carefully. he wanted to apply a pressure to encourage the japanese to change their behavior, but not so much that it attacked their national pride, forced them into a corner, and trigger a war. since then, there have been a few conspiracy theorists to suggest that roosevelt wanted a war with japan. the argument goes like this -- roosevelt was committed to ensuring the survival of england in its war with germany. that is true. on lend lease ending the arsenal of democracy. as england staggered under the blitz, he began to fear that supplying the tools of war might not be enough. the active american participation might be necessary. since he knew that the american public did not want any part of getting into another foreign war, the only way he could make that happen was to provoke a confrontation. in pursuit of that, so the theory goes, he directed the u.s. navy to become aggressively -- increasingly aggressive against german u-boats in the north atlantic. first"suing a "shoot directive. risking, and according to some, even inviting a german declaration of war. if that was his goal, it did not work, because hillard did not take the bait. didas determined -- hitler not take the bait. he was determined on subduing the soviet union before he went after the united states. perhaps then the japanese would suffice? by provoking a war with japan, it would provide the united states with a so-called "backdoor" to the war. the most extreme version of this theory holds that roosevelt knew that the japanese were about to attack, and he withheld that information from the commanders so that the attack would come as a bolt from the blue which would ensure a furious response from the american public and congress. there is no substance to this theory. becauserecisely roosevelt was determined to focus on the defeat of germany that he wanted to keep japan at arms length. he wanted to slow its expansion southward, if he could, but he was determined to avoid an open confrontation. after germany was beaten. wanted to avoid confrontation with the united states until after stalin was beaten. it is significant that when roosevelt went before congress ," deliver his "infamy speech he did not ask for a declaration of war against germany. only japan. who declared war on the united states two days later. and japanese --lords,the in for a penny and japanese warlords, in for a penny. in for a pound. approved an embargo on high-octane aviation fuel could be categorized as military in nature. he insisted that the sale of crude oil should continue at the same level as in past years. as one historian put it nicely, "roosevelt wanted to bring japan to its senses and not to its knees." other members of the cabinet date. they got their opportunity to months before pearl harbor. roosevelt sneak out of town for a clandestine appointment. a kind of cloak and dagger staging that he loved. he stole away from washington on a supposed fishing trip, and then he secretly boarded the augusta which carried him to the south bay of newfoundland. on august 5, he met with winston churchill for a four day meeting. this was during a church service aboard the hms prince of wales. what hasng produced become known as the atlantic charter. fdr made no firm commitment to churchill or anyone else about american involvement. churchill was greatly disappointed in that. the fact that the two men had met at all was significant. while fdr was a way at this meeting, the assistant secretary akerson, one of the hawks i mentioned earlier, refused japan's application for the credit to buy the oil. in fact, cutting off oil exports. since 80% of the pants oil came from the united states, that decision provoked an immediate crisis in the japanese government. when roosevelt returned from his meeting with churchill and learned what had happened, he felt he could not reverse the decision without looking it esolute. -- irr and so, the embargo stood. the embargo force the japanese to choose quickly between backing down to the americans or backing -- for forging ahead of thee conquest salvation of asia. for tojo, it was inconceivable that they would count how -- they would bow down to the americans as far as the sale for oil. the only other option for the japanese was to obtain the oil from those orphaned colonies of rich malaysia and the dutch east indies. japanesender of the imperial navy was this fellow, admiral yamamoto. i see this cut off the top of his head here. i apologize, admiral. he had a supposed war with united states at the start. he had served two terms coming -- two terms,e and he had seen the oil fields in texas. he knew his country had no chance against such a industrial behemoth. once the decision to go to war had been made, he insisted that the only way japan could survive was to cripple the american battle fleet at pro harbor in the first few days -- at pearl harbor in the first few days of the war. he argued that would buy japan a six-month breathing space, and perhaps it could hold out long enough for the americans to weary of the war and agree to it negotiated settlement. -- to a negotiated settlement. almost no one in japan in january -- in japan almost no one in japan genuinely expected to win the war with the united states as in defeating its military and dictating peace. they did however expect that by holding out long enough, they would wear down the americans and erode their resolve to continue a war of 5, 10, or 15 years. the japanese ambassador to the united states, nomura, seen here on the left with the secretary of state, knew none of this. he remained in washington to seek a settlement, unaware the decision for war had already been made in tokyo. hull however did know, or at least she suspected. for some time, the united states government had been able to break the japanese diplomatic code, information from which was called magic in washington. in this november, hull obtained a copy of a dispatch to nomura telling him that if he did not reach agreement by november 29, it would be too late. according to that, things would automatically happen. the cable was not enough to convince american military leaders to send out an alert. emerald harold stark on november 27 minced no words. this dispatch is to be considered a war warning. the target of japan's imminent aggressive moves, start wrote, might be the philippines, thailand, malaya, borneo, or maybe all of us. the army chief of staff also sent a warning to army commanders in the pacific. a shooting war, marshall wrote, could start at any moment. by the time those messages arrived in oahu, the japanese carrier strike force was already at sea. it was commanded by this man. this is admiral kyuchi nogumo. a warrior by instinct, nogumo fretted constantly over the smallest detail. occasionally he would call junior officers into his presence and solicit their reassurance things are going ok, right? you could even sense is insecurity i think in this photograph. in spite of that, it was nogumo who was tasked with the job of taking a 30 ship task force across the pacific ocean to strike the american battle fleet in pearl harbor. american commanders from the white house, pentagon on down doubted the feasibility of any such strike, not only the likelihood that even the possibility of such a strike. it was not even unlikely that tiny japan would choose to go to war with the mighty united states. it was in their view logistically impossible for a major strike force to cross 3000 miles of open ocean, refueling en route, and going. no one could do that. yamamoto's view, it was too risky not to do that. to him, it was the only way japan had a chance of surviving. nogumo's fleet got underway on the 26th of november, the day before the war warning reached oahu. and president roosevelt signed a declaration in washington declaring the last thursday in november to be called thanksgiving. the americans were very much aware that war with japan could break out as marshall put it at any moment. as evidence of that, let me share with you the front page of the kilo hawaii tribune on november 30. let me show you, nearly everyone knew the war was in fact imminent, but it is also clear that no one, certainly no one in hawaii, washington or anywhere else, thought that the target of that strike would be hawaii. if the japanese have decided to attack, and apparently they had, the one area under american control that might be in jeopardy was the philippines. at pearl harbor, the navy commander was admiral husband kimmel. both he and the army commander general walter short had received the war warnings a week before, and each had to decide what were appropriate defensive deployments. in kimmel's view, what that meant was getting the fleet ready for offense of operations should the japanese strike in the philippines. the fleet must be ready to put to sea immediately to attack the marshall islands. it meant protecting his military assets from the 19,000 residents of oahu of japanese descent. marshall had told him to provide detection against sabotage. that is what he did. in his view, the best way to do that was to group's planes together in rows where they could be closely guarded. neither man considered for a moment the possibility that the japanese might open the war with an attack on hawaii. meanwhile the american intelligence community lost track of the whereabouts of japan's carriers. you would think that itself would be in the red flag. the americans had broken the japanese diplomatic code, magic, which was how hull knew something was going to happen after november 29. they had not penetrated the operational code. it would not have mattered a great deal because nogumo absolute radio silence. and the japanese effectively pulled the curtain across the activities of their strikeforce. when kimmel asked where the carriers were, layton did not know. kimmel reacted with mock astonishment. what? he cried. you don't know? that was followed by a sentence that has been much quoted by historians ever since and meant i suppose in an ironic way. do you mean to say they could be rounding diamondhead any moment, and you wouldn't know it? kimmel's comment was more banter than rebuke, because he knew layton did the best he could with the scraps of data. and the knowledge that they were on the major verge came from british messages in the south china sea who spotted two large invasion fleets, more than 100 ships, heading south from japanese home waters through the taiwan strait. it was the largest naval deployment in world history, and roosevelt was furious at this unmistakable evidence of japanese doubledealing even though nomura was talking peace in washington, the war invasion was already steaming southward. stark suggested that this alone might be grounds for military action. roosevelt's closest advisor harry hopkins also suggested that since war was apparently unavoidable and imminent, the u.s. should strike first. that is the top guy on the right. according to his diary, he mused aloud to the president, it was too bad we could not strike the first blow. roosevelt nodded thoughtfully and was quiet for a moment. and he said, no. we can't do that. we are a democracy and a peaceful people. he was determined that the united states would not fire the first shot. well of course the japanese were perfectly willing to fire the first shot, and at 6:00 a.m. on the morning of december 7, 20 -- 220 miles from oahu, the six carriers turned into the wind, increased speed to 25 knots, to launch planes. the zero fighters left earth, circling above the task force == the zero fighters left first, circling above the task force while the heavily burdened torpedo planes and bombers roared off six carrier decks simultaneously, in a carefully choreographed sequence, launching 183 aircraft in only 16 minutes. that is a remarkable display of efficiency. and by 6:45, the entire formation was heading south for oahu. at that very moment, a lookout on the destroyer ss board looking at the entrance saw what was clearly the feather of a submarine periscope. the skipper was william outerbridge who was on his second day in command. but that did not deter him from ordering his ship to immediately opened fire. the second shot punched through the sub's fragile hull, then he dropped a depth charge to make sure. as it slipped into the wake, satisfied he had sunk it, he sent in a contact report at 6:53. had sunk a midget submarine, very much like this one. one of five the japanese committed to the pearl harbor attack. they had been carried to get back on top of fleet submarines all the way from japan. the 78 foot long to man submarine had been uncoupled from their host vessels the night before and then sent into pearl harbor late on the night of december 6. in the end, their only contribution was to provide what ought to have been an early warning of the coming air attack. alas, outerbridge's report did not trigger the alert it should have. as it worked up the chain of command that sunday morning, it was met with skepticism, uncertainty, and caution at every step until it was too late to make a difference. another lost opportunity to sound the alarm occurred only minutes later at 7:02 from a radio station on the north shore, detected a large number of inbound planes coming from the north. the radar installation was new. radar itself was entirely new in 1941. and it was being manned by inexperienced trainees, which is why they were on duty on a sunday. moreover the flight of b-17s was expected in from california along pretty much that same trajectory. the duty officer told him, forget it. other than that destroyer is patrolling off the entrance and the catalina's patrolling the great american naval base slumbered. japanese intelligence indicated there were nine american battleships in the harbor that day. they were mostly correct. one of the nine was the utah, a former battleship now used as a target vessel. the pennsylvania was in dry dock for repairs. the other seven are all moored on the southern rim of fork island. this is going to be the nevada at the tail end, the arizona inboard of the festival, the two by two with the california at the head of the line. the japanese pilots swooping in from the north, it was a thrilling and glorious sight. to announce the attack and in fact achieve complete surprise which rather stunned the japanese themselves, the commander of the flight fujita broke radio silence for the first time since leaving japanese waters to broadcast a predetermined code signal, tora, tora, tora. tiger, tiger, tiger. last-second confusion led them to attack simultaneously. it really didn't matter. the level bombers flew in at 2000 feet while others approached from the south at 500 feet. almost every american who saw them, and there were hundreds of them who saw those planes by day, and every one of them assumed they were friendly aircraft engaged in maneuvers. a few who were upset that they were hot dogging it on a sunday morning tried to copy the numbers on their tails so they could report them to the squadron commanders. then the first bombs exploded. you see one in fact exploding right here. the nevada, a voice announced, this is a real japanese air attack and no shit. within minutes, the maryland and the tennessee were each hit by a pair of bombs. three more exploded close alongside the arizona, and a fourth was a direct hit. at 8:10 a.m., they punched through the arizona's five inch armor deck, penetrated to her magazine, and exploded. the resulting fireball ripped the heart out of the ship. this is a slide we started with. the arizona sank almost immediately, taking 1177 men down with her. they are there still. meanwhile the torpedo plane that had circled around to the south came in low over the anchorage, untroubled by american fighters, to drop their specially modified torpedoes. they did not know of those would work in the shallow waters of pearl harbor. they did. three of them struck the west virginia, three more hit the oklahoma, and two hit the california. initial raid lasted about half an hour. then after a brief hiatus, 170 more planes arrived. they are focused on finishing off the capital ships still afloat or partially damaged. the americans were alert by now and shot down 24 of the planes. by 10:00, four american battleships had been sunk, three more severely damaged. altogether the japanese crippled 18 ships and destroyed 188 airplanes, damaging 159 others. not to be overlooked of course was the death of 2403 u.s. servicemen, nearly half of them on board the ill-fated arizona. roosevelt got the news while sitting at his desk in the oval study one floor down from the now famous oval office. he had just finished a lunch of soup and sandwiches when the phone rang. harry hopkins was with him. it was fdr who reached across his desk to answer the phone. it was navy secretary frank knox who told him the japanese had just attacked pearl harbor. roosevelt slammed his left hand down on the desktop with a loud bang and shouted no. roosevelt knew that hull was supposed to meet with nomura to receive the japanese peace initiative. he called hull and told him to receive the japanese without comment and then bow them out. hull couldn't do it. he received nomura and the other delegates cooly. the japanese decision-makers in tokyo have planned for nomura to deliver this response and hour before the attack, but there was upset on timing. hull already knew of the attacks. nomura did not. after silently reading through the japanese reply, hull looked up and said, i have never seen a document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions. infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge, i never imagined until today that any government on this planet was capable of uttering them. in the immediate aftermath of the attack, the japanese celebrated what seemed at the time to be a spectacular victory. it was in fact a more complete triumph and with fewer losses than even the most optimistic planners in tokyo could imagine. pretty soon they had the loss of two carriers. instead they lost no ships and only 29 planes. and the five midget submarines. the only real disappointment was the american carriers had not been in port. the war warning on november 27 had prompted kimmel to send them off of a deck load of fire planes to reinforce two outlying american outposts, wake island and midway. they were not in harbor when the japanese arrived december 7. taking the long view that history allows, it is evident that the japanese attack on pearl harbor was one of the most self-destructive acts in world history, ranking alongside hitler's invasion of the soviet union six months before. it unified what had been a divided america nation, swept away the protests of the isolationists, and awakened a sofar latent american industrial capacity that would produce the largest naval force on earth, one that was not only far larger than the imperial japanese navy, but larger than all the navies of all the nations on both sides throughout the world. combined. perhaps no other act could have so thoroughly awakened the sleeping giant of the united states. then too none of the japanese pilots who celebrated their victory aboard their carriers that day could possibly have known that 24 hours before they took off, 7000 miles away on the other side of the world, 500,000 russian soldiers sortie out of moscow against the german army. and before the winter was over, the russians would push the germans back to hundred miles. japan entered the war the precise moment that the german juggernaut was exposed as vulnerable after all. thank you so much for your attention. i look forward to your questions. [applause] >> yes, sir. you don't need to get up. here comes a microphone. now we will have you on tape. >> great talk. a masterful presentation. i have always been shocked as an infantry officer by the term surprise attack. what other kinds of attacks are there? [laughter] >> and a further question is, admiral jim lyons i think, who was the paccom commander, he had had a review -- i have not read the book -- but he believes that kimmel and short should be exonerated. what is your view? craig symonds: let me start with the first question first. i spent 30 years as a civil war historian before i turned turncoat and became a world war ii historian. in the 19th century there were a lot of attacks that were not surprise attacks. imagine the 15,000 men lining up on seminary ridge for the charge, lining up around noon and then making that charge about 3:00? the union forces on seminary ridge watched them assemble. there were such a things as non-surprise attacks. we had the word surprise to this particular attack because it seems to carry with it a suggestion of under handedness, that somehow the japanese want to have said they were coming, then come. that would have been the ticket thing to have done. i think it is micro-aggression as the kids say these days. but as to the second question, the innocence of the commanders, there is a tradition in the navy, and a lot of my navy friends here in the audience know this as well. if you are the captain of a ship down asleep and the ship runs aground, who bears the final is responsibility for that? it is still you. for that, kimmel and short had to be relieved. that is a different question from guilt. the implication is that they overlooked some obvious preparation that they did not, they were not conscientious and preparing commands. they were not serious about their job. i think that is not true. they had to give up those positions because circumstances suggested that the american public would have tolerated nothing less. in terms of saying they were guilty of either oversight acts of commission i think is going much too far. it is interesting to me that kimmel's family in particular has tried very hard over the years since then, 75 years now, to exonerate their father, grandfather, from the guilt that has been laid upon him by generations that followed. and i'm sympathetic with that move. he did revert from four stars to two stars. i find that reasonable. two stars is a statutory rank. he got four stars as virtue of his command of the pacific fleet, but he is no longer the commander of the reverts to two stars. i think that was probably necessary as well. it is interesting that if you visit the cemetery at the naval academy overlooking college creek where his tombstone is located, there are four stars whatever that may mean. i hope that is responsive to your question. yes, sir. we have got a microphone coming. wait just a second. >> 50 years ago tomorrow, i was a naval officer at denver's point, oahu, and i went over to the 25th celebration of this battle that you have just so eloquently talked about. and i was impressed by two things. i went over about 10:00 in the morning. there seemed to be more japanese there that americans. and second, they, their mood although i did not find it offensive, their mood seemed to be one of pride, that this attack was really something in their eyes. i was wondering what your experience with japanese and their attitudes toward pearl harbor? mr. symonds: what it implies is the american view of peripheral -- pearl harbor, this was a dirty, sneaky, underhanded, mean, vicious almost stabbed in the dark and back alley kind of act. in the japanese point of view, this is a remarkable just tickle accomplishment. something you would not have tried yourself, we brought six full-size carriers across the entire width of the pacific ocean and launched planes only 220 miles away from your greatest naval base, and you didn't know a thing about it. that is pretty amazing. so i think you are right, perspective is almost everything. i don't know if that pride continued in subsequent generations. i'm not sure it survived the war. the japanese government was embarrassed by the fact they learned later that nomura's document was late, that it had come in after the attack. they really meant to announce a break in diplomatic relations and then to strike. but they mishandled that particular kind of logistics. but there was a great deal of pride in the japanese navy at what they had been able to do. i don't think that survived the war. i don't think it survives today. i don't think you will find very many japanese beating their breasts and saying, yes, we really showed you at pearl harbor, any more than americans would go to hiroshima and say ha. there was a woman in front of you that had a question. >> thank you. you mentioned a great deal about japan's desperate need for oil. and i remember, we were shipping scrap iron and steel to them in the late 1930's. that apparently got shut off. how did they come to the decision to stop that? craig symonds: the idea of embargoing certain critical elements was to make it difficult. when you employ economic sanctions to get a nation to behave the way you want to, which is hubris, you start with a little bit of pain as if to say, we can make this harder on you. then you embargo more. we will do scrap iron, now something else, now high-octane aviation fuel and then, my guess is terrible now, the nuclear option of embargoing oil itself without which the japanese could not survive. it is like do what we tell you where we -- you will not be able to survive as an economic entity. there was a ratcheting up of pressure on the japanese to force them to behave. i think one of the reasons why there was expectation in certain quarters, there is a point where you can make it so painful they have to do what you want. but if you don't also take into consideration the culture and the pride and the natural history of the people you are inling with, that can very mucd 1941. yes. >> you mentioned about the success of the american surface fleet. would you comment on the japanese failure to go after the appeal tanks, the shipyard, the submarines, and whether that was something they considered or the point was get the american fleet? >> that was something afterwards that it was easy to point to. has no oil either. they import all of their oil. farmey take out the tank in a long, the ships that are there cannot operate. the japanese did not hit that. in hindsight, we know that would have been a prime target. liberalrs, and he was a minded individual, his orders were to cripple the fleet. if you take out half of their fleet, that his success. he thought we had four carriers and eight battleships, and if you get two of the carriers and four of the battleships, you have done your job. he did sink four of the battleships. the carriers were not there. when the pilots came back after that second rate, the squadron commanders told him, we wiped out all of their airplanes. we can fly with impunity now. give us a third rate, and we will annihilate that base. he said no. we have stretched as far as we can go, i have met the details of my orders. i am leaving. off he went. the short answer is they did not think of hitting the fuel tanks. i laid that on no google, not that we want to reach for him particularly. he was notginning sure this would work. he thought this was a long shot. he thought he was condemned to have to command this. first he thought he would be identified halfway across. when i get there, they might not even be in port. they might be somewhere else. he thought, i have been so lucky so far, i am gone. yes, sir. [inaudible] advising him that there could very well be danger lurking ahead. or was everyone stultified by the thought it could not happen? >> i think he had a lot of advisers telling him the japanese would attack. here is the japanese conundrum i did not have a chance to address. the japanese it to get the dutch east indies, that is where the resources work. why attack us at all? all of those resources have to get from those places to japan. they have to go right through the philippine islands. as long as the philippines were in american hands, we still have our hand on the spigot that controlled japanese access to oil. we have to take the sea lines of communication between the homeland. the united states might not fight for british malaya. but they will fight if we attacked the philippines. they know that means war with the united states. since it does, let's take out the fleet first. he had a lot of advisers telling him war with japan was coming. we know they were going to strike. we know they will hit the british, the dutch, and the french and probably the philippines. hopkins saidarry to him we know they are going to do this. why don't we hit them on their way there? roosevelt said we cannot fire the first shot. he expected that shop to happen in the philippines. what no one expected, and literally i mean no one thought they could attack hawaii. not that they wouldn't, but that they couldn't. it was too far. it was too hard. it was logistically overwhelming. that is why it happened. where do i go now? we will go with this gentleman here closest to the microphone. >> is there any truth to the story that pearl harbor was really only going to be phase one of a two phase attack on the united states? phase two being attacking washington, d.c. in new york ofy with some kind of scheme sending small aircraft on submarines to the east coast and having them assemble with one bomb on them. i heard this story at the air and space museum from a dozen. i don't know if it is true or not. have you heard anything about that? >> no. [laughter] >> that was an easy one. not at all. right here, sir. here comes. we want to get you on tape so we can hold you to it. >> i believe the attack in the philippines comes after hawaii. the attack on hawaii surprise. i was puzzled why the attack on the philippines was a surprise and why macarthur was caught apparently so flat-footed. >> you will make me say something bad about general macarthur here at the national defense university. [laughter] it is true. the long story here is the idea that macarthur was going to launch an air raid, that was recalled. by the time the japanese strike on the philippines happen, those airplanes were back on the ground. these brand-new b-17s had just arrived to bolster the defense. instead of following the plan that have been laid down as early as 1911, macarthur decided to try to defend on the beaches. that did not work. he retreated anyway. he lost most of his supplies. he did some wonderful things, particularly as the overseer of japanese reconstruction after 1945. war in theent of first six or seven days after december 7, left much to be desired. the question is why macarthur was given a medal of honor. the short answer frankly is that america had to have something to cheer on december 8. everything was terrible on december 8. when macarthur was recalled in response to orders that he left, he did not run away. in response to orders, he said he was ordered to come back. i came through, and i will return. that created something for the american public to hang onto. the consummate politician roosevelt was recognized the value in that. with theed macarthur medal of honor in command in the southwest pacific. mostrms of who was theepared for an attack on ofen and a, -- eight december 19 .1, macarthur does not come off very well. [applause] >> thank you. this weekend, american history tv on c-span3 brings you three days of programming, including tonight at 8:00 a.m. eastern, andrew jackson presidency with arizona state university professor. >> probably the most colorful president in the united states history, i think we can say almost objectively the most colorful president in u.s. history. giant of a figure. >> saturday at 10:00 p.m. eastern on reel america, the 1951 educational film subject narcotics. describing the dangers of heroin addiction. >> this is a room where addicts come to inject their narcotics. >> on sunday beginning at 2:00 p.m. eastern, we will bring you archival presidential inauguration's starting with fdr in 1933. >> first of all, let me assert my firm belief that the only thing we have to fear is fear itself. in 1953. d. eisenhower john f. kennedy 1961. >> man holds in his mortal hands the power to abolish all forms of human poverty and all forms of human life. >> ronald reagan 1981. >> let us take inventory. we are a nation that has a government, not the other way around. this makes us special among the nations of beer. america,day on reel the 1977 film the time has come narrated by james earl jones and created for overseas audiences. the film restored by the national archives documents the progress of african-americans by profiling several newly elected black officials. >> the partition -- participation of lax in the political process is bringing a new sense of hope and optimism. it also brings about a sense of economic priority. >> american history tv all weekend, every weekend on c-span3. for the complete schedule go to c-span.org. >> up next on the presidency, constitutional law professor passagetalks about the of the 22nd amendment to the u.s. constitution, limiting the number of terms of president can serve. he explained some of the unintended consequences of ratification. the national archives at kansas city, missouri, hosted this hour-long event. >>