Izibility of security. And in every document that nato puts out, we talk about this again and again about indivisibleity of security. Saying all that, the Alliance Still goes at Great Lengths to endorse and support and embrace arms control. And the reciprocity aspect of that. Even the most die hard official within any government in the alliance that believes that we should eliminate all Nuclear Weapon weapons they do it only in the official context of reciprocity and quid pro quo that we would not eliminate our Nuclear Weapons, would not reduce our Nuclear Posture except in a process of discussion and negotiation with russia. In the last summit the alliance again stated that they looked forward to developing various transparency and confidencebuilding ideas with russia and the federation in the context of a nato council with the goal of developing detailed proposals and increasing mutual understanding. They continue to believe that this partnership between nato and russia, based on the respect of international law, is of Strategic Value and continues to aspire to a cooperative, constructive relationship, but one thats reciprocal. The flip side of that is, as theyve said, in the wales summit, is that Current Conditions do not exist to allow that to continue. And then the alliance decided in essence to suspend all discussions with respect to the Nato Russia Council. When i was there i chaired something called the Nuclear Group. That Nuclear Group developed a series of confidence Building Measures that were shortterm, midterm and longterm. Among those were discussions on nato and Russia Nuclear doctrine. Those discussions that were candid and were very open. It was a very constructive dialogue. Nato on its side was pushing to have russia provide information on their tactical or nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons, which they refused to do, but they were still willing to talk about doctrine and do it in a classified environment. We had three of those meetings. We also dealt with safety and security of Nuclear Weapons, and that process each Nuclear Weapons state, which, therefore, the united kingdom, United States, france and russia, conducted very specific safety and security exercises at each at a location in each one of those countries. They were very successful and they were really eye openers for the Nato Alliance as to how these countries would conduct a response to situations where a Nuclear Weapon might have been stolen. There might have been an accident. There might have been a detonation of some sort. The followon exercise was to be a Nuclear Weapon or Nuclear Device in a country that wasnt a Nuclear Weapons state. And russia decided they or asked that it be in one of the states that were that had the dual aircraft mission. None of the states came forward to have this exercise. Another country did and the russians refused to participate. This was all happening in 2010 and 2011, and at that point there was no longer any discussion on transparency and confidence building. So im back i guess ill just close up because i think its good to have some discussions, but again as far as nato is concerned, theyre very interested and keen on having a continued dialogue on these confidence and security Building Measures. Thats not happening. And given the continued animosity and difficulties and challenges of the various accusations and allegations, i really dont see that happening in the very near future. How are we doing . I guess i can finish up by telling the story that i think aptly captures our challenges. And that is the story about two hunters that go hunting for bear up in alaska. They get up there, and theyre dropped off by the pilot in this little airplane, and the pilot says, well, just let you know, i can only take back you two guys and one bear. Three days later, the pilot flies back and theres the two hunters with two bears. And they start arguing. And he said, look, i cant do it. One of the hunters says, look, ill give you an extra thousand dollars if you take us and the with the bears. Okay. They load the two bears in the plane, the two hunters get in the plane, the plane takes off. He gets about five miles and crashes. And miracle, miracle, both hunters survive. One staggers up, looks around and says, where are we . The other one says, i think were about two miles further than we were last year. So we continue to go down that path. And with that, ill close and take your questions. Thank you. Thank you, guy. Well, we do certainly have a lot of was it the same pilot both years . Different pilot. I dont think so. We certainly have enough time for questions, and while you are all gathering your thoughts, let me just pick up on a few things. I know the agenda says that listed me as an additional speaker. Im not going to talk. Ive said enough. What im going to do is moderate a discussion and take your questions. On the Nato Russia Council, guy, even if nato were inclined to resume some of those activities, do you think the russians would bite . I dont thing so. And part of the reason is, surprisingly for an alliance actually it was a year from last year. There are some very, very Strong Language that made it quite clear that theres no longer going to be business as usual with the alliance. For example, quote, russia has breached its commitments as well as violated international law. And thats a very big thing for europeans. Thus breaking the trust at the core of our cooperation. And they lamented the fact that for two decades nato has gone to extraordinary lengths to embrace this relationship. But as i said, talking seriously about them becoming a member of nato. And as a result of crimea, as a result of the activities in Eastern Ukraine but also the things theyve done and threatened to do in georgia and moldova and just a whole litany in fact, if you go on the nato website, theyve actually listed the 25 years of mythical crimes that nato has committed against the Russian Federation and responded to that. And its a long, long list. Everything from nato promised that we would never deploy forces in Eastern Europe to we violated the Nuclear Nonproliferation treaty by training pilots to fly the Nuclear Mission. And just goes on and on and on. So its really going to be hard, sharon, i think, to go back to a relationship. Again, as i said at the very beginning im very disappointed at that in some respects. I think we should have been a little bit more forceful, the alliance should have been a little bit more forceful in trying to reengage saying, look, where can we as steve has pointed out, where are the areas where we can Start Talking again and Start Building the trust and confidence. And thats why i said at the end of the day, this track two that were engaged in will pay huge dividends and is really, really important. I think, sharon, i think that guy is largely right. But let me try just to add a little ray of optimism. I went through the early 1990s when i worked at the stit department on arms controls issue. You have the soviet walk out from both the negotiations on the arranged Nuclear Forces and on strategic arms reduction in the end of 1993 you had a deep freeze in u. S. soviet relations throughout 1984, then in early 1985, the soviets said we want to resume the negotiations and within 2 1 2 years you had the inf treaty and major progress on s. T. A. R. T. Its very hard to be optimistic about the current state of u. S. , russia and west russian relations right now. But we shouldnt ignore the possibility there may be an opportunity to try to turn things around. So again, i think probably being pessimistic is the more realistic course now, but, you know, things can change fairly quickly. Thats been demonstrated by relations between washington and moscow in the last 30 years. One other thing, steve, that you brought up, this question in talking about doctrine. And the russians are quite interested in talking about new technologies, right, whether its precisionguided munitions or other things. And i quite clearly remember a question from one of the participants to the russians where it was asked, okay, well, how would you feel about a cyber attack . You know, does a cyber attack constitute an attack on your state . Does it create an existential threat . And the answer was, well, okay from one russian, right . That depends on how successful it is. Right . So that seems to be a very risky situation for us to be in. And i fully understand that these talks with russia and with everybody else on Cyber Security and on any kind of limits are difficult, but once you introduce the notion of, well, a Nuclear Response to a cyber attack, it seems to me we need some kind of forum for at least discussing these issues. And nato may not be the right place. I mean, i just welcome your thoughts on that. No, i think one of the things that came out of the discussion was that on the nato side, my guess is that the alliance is going to have to be prepared to talk about questions other than nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons if it wants to have a dialogue with russia on nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons. That would include questions like Missile Defense, traditional strike and might include issues like conventional forces because i do believe that at least now while the russians are in the process of modernizing the conventional forces there is a perception and i think it still reflects the reality if you look at nato forces and Russian Forces at the conventional level nato still has some significant, quantitative and in particular qualitative advantages. You have to have that broader discussion. Where cyber fits into that, i dont know. And part of it may well be is im not sure yet that either the United States and russia separately have a fixed enough doctrine on cyber to have that conversation. Now, you could argue maybe its better to start the conversation before sides get fixed. But for all of the attention thats just talked about here in the cyber world, you know, im not sure i understand what american doctrine on cyber is. And ill give you an example. Because i do think that when the u. S. Government thinks about cyber, how do you deter Cyber Attacks . And about, oh, four or five years ago i was out Strategic Command did this annual deterrence seminar in august where they talk about questions and at one time they had a very interesting panel on cyber deterrence. The question i posed and im not sure i received a good answer was when i look at deterrence in the Strategic Nuclear area, i understand what were talking about because i can read Hans Christians right and say how many Strategic Bombers does the United States have and how many intercontinental Ballistic Missiles. Its very clear to the world what backs up american Strategic Deterrence in terms of doctrine. If you look at the cyber side, its still a pretty opaque world. We dont know how much does the u. S. Military put into cyber, how many people are working this, what sorts of capabilities. So i dont know how deterrence works in that world when youre not communicating either side. If you conduct a cyber attack, heres what might happen. And we may have to be getting our own thinking a bit in order before we can have a useful conversation with the russians on that. Let me just add, at nato we have a cyber center of excellence in talent and the genesis of that was a massive cyber attack from unknown sources, and as a result nato headquarters theyve created a cyber division, very small, but one that is, again, not wholly endorsed by all the members of the alliance but is again recognizing the many challenges an difficulties, what is an attack and trying to come to grips with it by creating an infrastructure to deal with it and have a forum for discussion on that. And there was talk about having a working group like that in the context of the Nato Russia Council just like we have i chaired for example a theater Missile Defense sub group in addition to the Nuclear Group in which we had very good cooperation with the russians up until 2008. Again, theyve structured themselves to try to deal with it, but again theres a long way to go. Thanks. Sharon. Steve put his finger, i think on the sort of essential question. You kind of rephrased it, i think. Does russia want to reduce the writ . And when we look at mh17 and the response to mh17 that certainly doesnt give one great optimism and certainly is a massive trust destroyer. But let me offer a ray of optimism. And it has to do, i think, with, you know, for us to participate in a track two, it really is track two. We dont really need to think about or i certainly dont, many of the participants dont need to think about whether the u. S. Government endorses this or not. The russian system doesnt work that way. So just the very fact that we are able to hold these discussion discussions and have the level of representation we had from the Russian Federation says something that at least some areas in the russian government are supportive of continuing these types of discussions. Maybe not in the context of a nato russian discussion right now as guy suggested, but in this context. And it just only emphasize the point that guy was making that what we are doing is all that much more important. Thank you. Its time to take questions from you. So we have some roving microphones. And i just ask that you introduce yourself and your affiliation and ill try and go in order. Austin, can you come up . Thanks. Thanks. Hi, my names an dre cito, im a reporter with tass, the russian news agency. Actually, my question is a direct followup to what youve just been discussing. First, i think its an important discussion. Thank you for having it. Second, for me as a journalist, its hard to even cover this event because i do not understand its practical significance. So i have a group of eminent experts who seem to be agreed that the dialogue is needed. From all of you, you are official dialogue on confidence building, on trust building all of that. Like andrew just said on the russian side, its probably sanctioned in some way even on track two, but what about the american side . So you are all for it. So what does it mean . You also seem to be all agreed that the west and the u. S. Are not willing at this point to restart the dialogue. Thats my question. What does it mean . What does this panel mean . What does your opinion matter for washington . Let me try briefly. And then ill let the diplomats take over. Yes, this is track two, but remember also our sponsor for this dialogue was the u. S. Government. And so and there was definitely interest in the u. S. Government. We had some government speakers at our that did not participate formally in the dialogue, but did attend, gave luncheon and dinner notes. I know anecdotally, not on an official level, that there is great interest in what was said. I dont know that the u. S. Government has plans to follow up on this. Thats beyond my ken, but yeah, its not quite i dont know if i would say it was totally track two, totally track 1 1 2. Steve put it quite well. Both sides have a big interest in reducing some of the risks that are currently not entirely nuclear, right, but the risks in these inadvertent escalation, and so to the extent that this may contribute to helping mitigate some misunderstandings, i think theres great interest in it. The panelists . A great question, andrei. But just on the value of the event today, okay, this event is being streamed live on the internet, and i believe that cspan is also broadcasting the event. So i think there is a value simply in the role of Public Education that we are talking about this. Reasonably serious people, knowledgeable people, and we think that there is a problem and that maybe maybe this can possibly have some influence outside of the building in a multitude of ways. I just add two points briefly. Any time ive had a conversation with somebody in the u. S. Government about a track two after ive been involved in, the u. S. Government supports these type of things. They think that these contacts are useful. They keep a dialogue going. Sometimes they produce ideas which can then work their ways into official channels. The second point id make, at least this would be my view, is that in the aftermath of russias military seizure of crimea and Russian Military action in Eastern Ukraine, it was appropriate for nato and russia for the nato to ratchet down the nato russia relationship. There have to be political consequences to egregious bad behavior. But the feeling of most of the american participants in the workshop it might make sense for nato to relax that and open up the way for a nato russia militarytomilitary dialogue particularly on the issue of