stymied. and then the third part is the whole kurdistan region and the pkk. and as we all know or some of us may know, these two trends have been at each other in certain forms between cooperation, tacit agreement, leaving the pkk in the mountains in northern iraq, and also in direct competition with each other. and that competition still exists today. that is to say, the two main nationalist trends within the kurdish movement are those led by the pkk and barzani. and the extent to which this competition for leadership of the kurds and to direct the nature of the kurdish nationals and should be taken into account, because that did not change after june 10, 2014. and it continues today. so when you're looking at the changing relationships, look at this as well as when it's these interm power struggles between the kurds, they are existing today. because the kurdistan regional government does need to be broken down into barzani's kurdistanic democratic party and the talibani patriotic afghanistan. and they are divided and trying to play off each other between turkey, iran, and the pkk. so what has happened? what candidate onslaught of the islamic state do for the kurds? it created a shared existential threat to this idea of kur ish nationalism. so that they're calling all the kurds to fight isis. and when the islamic state came into mosul, and the iraqi, kurdish peshmerga under barzani fled, who saved the day? it was the pyd and pkk. even symbolically, this has played very well into the pk k's hands, particularly among the yazidis who are blaming the pyd for running away, and it's the pkk considered the savior who is now in mt. sinjar who effectively continued to fight. so this whole illage of the pk kflt coming into northern iraq and the kurdistan region remains in the minds of many kurds today. and that is something that has changed. secondly, even if you look at some of the discourse of what's going on between these parties, they're actually competing for each other, competing against each other, regarding who's making claims to saving more people. this is not a strategic alliance. it's a tactical one. each one continues to vie for the support of kurdish populations for gaining influence. that has not changed. but, again, the pk k's capitalized on this moment. what else has not changed? the kurdistan region, the barzani turkish alliance. some of them are disappointed with turkey for not having come to the iraqi kurds' defense militarily. it remains essential, not only commercially but politically. so some of the same limitations that existed before the mosul intervention continues today. and i don't think that barzani is going to sacrifice his relationship with president erd waup for the pkk. that goes in terms of energy interests. that goes in the survivability of the kurds quasi-state. there's also a limitation, again, between even if some of the kurds and pkk are coordinating and fighting with the iraqi kurds, there's still an influence again over this power struggle.ñx-áñ barzani still wants to influence the syrian kurds. and any alliance that barzani maintains with turkey is going to hurt him. technically when there was the release of the turkish hostages, how are the kurds interpreting this? erdogan cut a deal with isis and that's why they took barzani. so again, in the minds of kurds on the ground, as long as this kurdish problem in turkey is not resolved, it's, and as long as barza barzani's in the heart of the turkish alliance, there really are important limitations between these two groups, and i see that that's going to stay. and finally, there are deep internal power struggles going onion side the kurdistan region right now. they existed before. but since the isil, you had the puk working and the iranians have provided necessary weapons to the kurds. both have agreed, barzani thanked the iranians, but nonetheless, you have that division, and i don't want to make it so clean cut, but it was the barzani, turkey, pkk, puk division. so it is giving the groups certainly the opportunity to come together but it's reinforcing some of the divisions that are in my view going to keep these groups apart strategically. but on a tactical level, particularly as the americans engage and the coalition engages to assist iraqi kurds in providing weapons and military assistance. i think i'm going to close there. so, again, think of this alliance, don't be worried. i don't think, people are worrying there's going to be an independent kurdistan last month, and that wasn't going to happen. this is not a strategic alliance, it cannot be sustained, as lock as iraqi kurds need regional support and as lock as regional states reenforce their commitments to the territorial boundaries of iraq, which i don't see changing in the near term. thank you. thank you for this. next we have the research director at the foundation at washington, d.c. the doctor serves as an academic. he holds a ph.d. in south asian studies. he has sought courses in history, politics and culture and art in the islamic world at columbia university and george mason university. the floor is yours. >> good afternoon. thank you to institute of turkish studies and middle east institute. thank you very much for inviting me here. i was asked to talk about isis, how, well, sur kturkey's isis challenge, how turkey approaches this challenge. in some ways, the answer is very simple. turkey considers isis a terrorist organization, and that is that. but when you look at the broader context and how we got here, both in terms of the challenges, the civil war in syria and the iraqi situation over the last several years, the iraqi political situation, things get much fuzzier. how to resolve that problem, that question becomes a much more difficult one. just off the bat i can say that the current campaign is not clear about this either. there's no actual political goal, political strategy defined, at least what we can see publicly, by the u.s. that that will resolve the issues on the ground and lead to a stable situation in syria or iraq. how we got here. how we come here is very quickly the so-called arab spring, arab revolutions. and then contra-revolution and civil war. and actually, aspects of all these three are right now at play, in both syria and iraq. the u.s. and allies, including turkey have failed to find a common strategy, common front to support the syrian opposition and create a credible alternative to the assad regime. and the chaos and vacuum created by the civil war over the past several years have created breeding ground for terrorist organizations. assad regime is culpable in all this as well. they used divide and rule tactics against the opposition. they have kind of allowed kurds in the north to have their own space, you don't touch me, i don't touch you kind of arrangement. and kurds focused on protecting their own territory. and the regime is culpable in also allowing isis to have space for itself. i'm not going to dwell on this too much. but the dynamics on the ground maybe two years ago, a year and a half ago, you could still talk about the regime versus opposition dynamic. but today, that's not there. and because the international community hasn't been able to take care of this, not that the u.s. and allies could possibly put everything back to normal, that's not possible. that wasn't probably going to be possible. but we've missed many opportunities to prevent the events that have unfolded over the past year, year and a half. the vacuum created in the syrian civil war is yeclipsed by anothr vacuum next door in iraq. the alienation and disenchantment of the sunni populations and the maliki government's exclusionary positions has created ample opportunity for isis to capitalize on that. a lot of disenchantment is very strong now and has been strong for a while now in iraq. so that has basically created a situation where in the north you have the kurds, they're, as dr. natali mentioned, a couple months ago they were talking about they might declare independence, but then baghdad government who's kind of supporting assad's regime and sort of conducting sectarian policies against the sunnis and aligning with iran and trying to play off iran against u.s. and then russia, et cetera, so you have, in both countries, we have almost unannounced failed states in many ways. so how are we going to put all this back together? i don't think it, we're going to put it all back together by striking isis. that's a counter terrorism measure, and it's going to help roll back isil, perhaps, militarily. it might create some semblance of security. i'm even scared to suggest that. because the situation is so, so complicated. but those kind of gains would have to be translated into political stability, which won't happen unless you can address the syrian civil war and the iraqi/sunni disenchantment, among any other political challenges, but we do need a political road map. the current attacks, actually, might lead to sort of emerge nc of splinter groups. it might lead to cohesion of isil and their broad appeal abroad. so there are lots of unforeseen circumstances that can come up. unfortunately, the current president obama's strategy, announced strategy, does not seem to address, from my point of view, the political aspects of this issue. in syria, there has to be a broader political plan for a transitional government. and i mean, after all, assad's regime's refusal to lead the country into unity, into somewhat stable situation is at the heart of it, the root cause of isil's strength in syria. and similarly, there has to be a plan to address the sunni d discontent in iraq. iraq has pledged to be inclusive in the near term. that could be an opportunity now maliki is out, but there's going to be a long way to go because sunnis, they've done this before. they've done the awakening. and i'm not sure how much they're going to trust the baghdad government after all this. what is turkey's approach? turkey has been affected by both situations in significant ways. you can talk about perhaps marginal gains, like they've, they were able to deepen the ties with krg. but broadly, i think both syria's and iraq's stability and those countries remaining united is in the best interest of turkey in the medium term and long term. turkey has been affected in terms of security, security fallout from the syrian crisis. it has been affected. it is hosting now a million and a half refugees.8fqç there are more coming. and among many other, turkey has supported opposition in syria. and it has called for the end of the syrian regime as it is now. it has asked the u.s. to create no-fly zone. it has asked, you know, it was ready to work with obama when assad crossed the red line, et cetera. so turkey has been asking the international community or the u.s. and allies to actually contain this civil war and help build a coalition to lead towards a transitional government, political transition if syria, and that hasn't happened, and it probably won't happen anytime soon, but that's the harder task that we have to accomplish. that's harder than, you know, bombing and then thinking about it later. in a couple months there is this -- i don't want to create another, you know, name for this, but maybe bomb and walk away syndrome, something like that. if we see that happening, we won't see any semblance of stability in the middle east anytime soon. al qaeda activities yep siinsid syria, inside turkey and across the border is a significant problem for turkey as well. it has struggled to keep the border secure. it's very hard when you're also supporting the opposition groups. and the, while trying to secure the border, you're trying to take care of the refugee problem, but you're also involved in trying to find a way to, you know, convince groups like kurds and others to unite as around a common front against the assad regime, which turkey sees at the core of, at the heart of the current instability. i don't want to run out of my time. the very recently, turkey talked again about the no-fly zone idea. and that would have to be endorsed by the u.n. security council. i don't see it happening anytime soon. and the u.s. won't be willing to do it on its own, obviously, and turkey doesn't quite have the capacity to support an effort like that, but it can't do it on its own. so turkey's legislation allows it to -- they passed legislation a month ago to do cross border operations in syria and iraq. and just the other day they broadened the purview of that legislation. so we might see sort of turkey taking part in a larger capacity in the current, after the release of the hostages we can see maybe turkey taking a strong, larger role, even military or otherwise, but i think turkey will maintain a defensive posture for the time being. and unless they see a plan, as i talked about, a broader, longer term plan in syria, i don't think they'll be part of a military operation. thank you. [ applause ] thank you, doctor. i think we'll get a chance to ask a lot more questions at the end of the panel. for the present time, the last speaker we have is a washington-based analyst and kurdish affairs analyst focusing on syrian affairs and turkey. his publications appear in various media outlets including the bbc, cnn and al jazeera. he is frequently interviewed by tv channels in turkey and kurdistan as well as other channels in turkey and syria as well. the floor is yours. >> thank you for you too. hello, welcome, all of you. before i just entered here, i got a call from within syria, i would like to start with that. the u.s. air strikes in syria, kurds welcome positively. but unfortunately, so far, there hasn't been any positive impact on kobani. it has been under fierce isis attacks for over a week now. isis, they seized from mosul, they have been attacking to seize the city. and there are serious fears that local officials are very, very concerned that they're planning to do a massacre in a larger scale than what happened in sinjar. so the people i spoke today are telling me what military people are telling me that isis predicted these attacks are coming. so they moved most of their manpower out of raqqah. so what is being targeted right now, concrete buildings, really not damaging a lot, underground wise, practical wise. so the negative impact is that all those fighters are left, raqqah, moving toward kabani. so this increases the possibility of city falling into isis or massacres take place even more. so this is one of the thing that i need to share with you. the demand for the local officials is that to degrade and destroy isis, they should focus on targets around kabani too. it is being focused on from three directions. north, east, and south. so the city is under attack. despite the fact that kurds have been fighting, resisting, with very, very modest weapons which are not matched to isis' weapons. but the situation is getting worse. isis has been using humvees, sophisticated tanks, whereas the kurds have kalashnikovs. they have been resorting to using their bodies to stop the tanks, to explode the tanks, because they don't have weapons. this is what happened on the ground, unless isis targets around kobani is targeted, it's likely that a very serious massacre might take place tonight, tomorrow, in two days. this is what i've been told. so i hope that the president obama those planning the operation take this into consideration and address this issue. i interviewed the democratic party leader yesterday to get his reaction about the attacks. he says it's very positive, but ku kurds, as the main power for fighting isis for almost two years, they are the most experienced power that know isis techniques. isis veteran experience, so he says they want to be a partner within this operation, really, the purpose is destroying isis. so the expectations among the kurds is in the immediate term isis targets around kobani will be attacked. and on the upcoming days, aspects of the operation, fighting will include kurds. hike nobody everybody agrees that is the most effective force fighting isis. this is the moment i can't tell you. in regards to what kurds of turkey, how turkey's role for kurdish perspective, there's a growing disappointment towards turkey within the syrian population and the population in turkey as well. this is being raised in the highest levels of kurdish representatives, politicians or military people that so far the general perception is that turkey is turning a blind eye to isis. so indirectly to support, treat jihadists in syrian hospitals. but if there is attacks, the perception change that now. many people think turkey took this support one step further, no longer turning blind eye and really helping isis. this is the perception among the syrian kurds. it's been raised by many people. among the kurds of turkey too. hdtp have been raising this two weeks ago. one of the leading pkk members also mentioned that we were stabbed from the back, referring to the government that government chose to support isis instead of the kurds who are, who have invested their hopes in the peace process. so right now, the future of peace process is in very, there are concerns that the peace process may not really continue. in kurdish point of view now, many people are looking to see what to say about this. but i talked to hdp's leader in washington right now. i had the pleasure to talk with him today. i think the situation of kobani is taking an important place in his agenda with u.s. officials and the other organizations. so although turkish media report something, i, he has not said one week, supposedly he had given one week the government to clarify, but he's going to do some statement tomorrow. but he is also shared that they are not happy. they're certainly very disappointed the way government handles the issue of isis versus syrian kurds. so this is, this is growing, this contact toward turkey. as far as the, what is on the ground concerned like recently, ypg and the free syrian army had some kind of agreement underground, and they are right now, some groups of fsa are fighting alongside ypg against eye ses around the euphrates river. so in regards to free for the hostages, among the kurds is that there was a deal that has been done within the government, turkish government and that isis, the deal is that there are some ideas or allegations that turkish officials provided a train load of weaponry before this attack happened. so i talked to a muslim who is a head of the local kobani council, what they call it, the local government. he was saying that there are videos, and i think this video is now also published on cnn's site if i'm not mistaken. there are videos that the turkish train stops somewhere. and officials both on the turkish and syrian side of the border, they are very concerned that this is a situation. i can tell you that there is a big fear, a big concern. and what personally creates a concern for me is that the peace process, the status of, this can come to an end. this can be jeopardize. this can be an unusual, grave concern for me. so hopefully this crisis situation will be addressed effectively. listen to the kurds, what they have to say. the kurds, not only in syria, but those in iraq. the kurds have been the main power fighting isis. not only in syria but in iraq. from our friends, only 75 kilometers. it's all kurds are fighting with isis. they get some acknowledgement and get support from the international community with weapons. but kurds of syria who are the main power of fighting, not allowing isis to expand, they are the main power. this needs to be acknowledged and seen. if it had not been for the ypg, kurds, armenians, they are in a much more overt situation. but thanks to the ypg now those communities are living in a comparatively better situation than the rest of syria. so this has to be seen, the expectation on the ground is that the u.s. will see that and that knowledge will provide them weapons immediately and protect the people. the people of kobani, 1,000 people are under great, great danger. everyone knows isil does not hesitate to use any means. so shed tears for any kurds. but another sinjar very likely to happen. this is the video for the international community to see this. and address this council. in the q and a session if you have any questions, i'd be glad. thank you. [ applause ] okay. so we have plenty of time for questions and answers. but if i may, what i'm going to do is just start the ball rolling by asking each of the panelists one question each and if they would like to address one another's pieces that would be appropriate too. and what we have is two microphones on either side of the aisle. so if you would like to ask a question, after the panelists have answered their initial questions, if you could raise your hand, introduce yourself briefly and ask a question with a minimum amount of comments to as to allow everyone in the room as much questions as we can field. i'd like to start with dr. natali. what is assumed by the u.s. government in your interpretation of the term moderate? what do we understand by this? and related to that, i guess this is a broader question, what is expected of why the united states of turkey, in the continuity of this campaign? my question to you now that the 49 or 46, i'm confused with the number of hostages released. so it's 49. the 49 hostages that have now been freed, there is growing expectation on some, on some level that turkey should now be playing a greater role in the coalition that has been built against isis. what were the factors that constrategy con strate strain or facilitate turkey's role in the fight against isis. what is the turkish government's role now in branching out against isis. and finally, my question goes to you, it's two parts. and they're kind of unrelated. if you assume on some level that air strikes may have a limited impact against isis, is there any indication from what you've heard from your contacts and your interviews that boots on the ground in any sort of at what point if air strikes are seen to be ineffefeeffective at end. and what is the expectation of syrian kurds? and then we will have plenty of time for questions from the floor. >> i think you can answer from where you're sitting. >> so i, again, i'm speaking on my own behalf here. what does the congress mean when we talk about a moderate opposition. you know, this is one of the problems, this is not the first time we're visiting the syrian crisis. this happened a couple years ago or a year ago, should we fund and train a syrian opposition. what does it mean, al nusra moving back and fort from the fsa, free syrian army, moving back again between isis. so it's been very difficult to target what would be a moderate opposition. nonetheless, there's a term you've probably heard, vetted. there will be a vetted opposition in that arms aren't going to go willy-nilly to anybody with their hands out. that there would be those moderate groups vetted within, you know, coordinated with the syrian national coalition, which is the group that the united states recognizes as one official, as the official group or an official group of syria. so who are those names? i don't know. but this is not a perfect situation. actually, they're all only bad choices. so you have to pick what i see as the least bad choice. and there is awareness that one of the big concerns is, will these weapons being provided to a vetted, moderate opposition, fall in the hands of unsavory types? right? will they make their way to isis? just months ago you probably couldn't even tell who was with isis and who was without, not in isis. will they be used against assad. because there's a different mission in syria for isis, those members of isis than there is in iraq. which one of them is still overthrowing the assad regime. there's another anomaly. another group that has been fighting islamic state since day one which is the pyd is obviously not on a list in which the united states could fund or support. and, and here i go to whatever policy that is provided, don't forget the underlying principles of the policy, to ensure the territorial integrity of these states. turkey remains a key, essential ally. so what do we expect of turkey? certainly, there's been a lot of attention to turkey should be doing more. close the borders. we've heard the story. and there is a lot of, you know, credibility to that. but since these hostages have been released, you've already seen, i would say, efforts being made at the border to capture the smugglers of oil. there's a large, significant revenue stream being used to support the isis in iraq and syria, and i think some of these efforts are starting to be made on the turkish side. secondly, i don't imagine that every coalition partner -- and that doesn't include turkey. it also includes our partners in the gulf are not going to be participating exactly the same. that does not mean that turkey will not be engaged and will not continue to play an important role. so there has been, again, it should be more nuance. i don't see how any of this could happen without turkey. and whether we want to say that erdogan has turned a blind eye or now he's complicity in it, i think we will now see a turning and more engagement. but in the way that turkey can, my last point is we're far from the region. those of you who have lived in the region for a really lock time know that we can leave, turkey and all the other player, they have to deal with these actors on their borders for a long time. so that's where i leave my answer. thank you. >> well, that answers, that gives the part of my answer, too. that border is a long border. it's a flatland. it's very easy to move in and out. turkey has a highly centralized, strong government, and its internal security is strong. it has traditionally been strong. but it doesn't mean that it can protect the border just think of the mexican border. but that creates, that has created a lot of problems for turkey. at some point, if you look in the news reports, this was a long time, maybe a year, year and a half ago, there was vandals with their horses and their arms and everything. they were going through the border, and the turkish military had to intervene. the problem is not easily solvable in that way, in terms of securing that border. turkey has been doing a lot more, but will it be ever enough? also sorts of groups will take advantage of that. pkk has taken advantage of it for decades. but i don't see the strategic gain that turkey would get from supporting isis. they adamantly deny having ever supported isis. it's a terrorist organization since 2013. and it's listed in the terrorists in turkey, et cetera. but even if they didn't decline, what is the strategic value for turkey to support isis, whereas, on the other hand, those who fight isis are much more familiar to turkey, actually, to kurdish, i mean the pkk and pyd, these are guys turkey knows. long, has known for a long time. if you were turkey, would you rather cooperate with them, work with them or that you're at the table negotiating with them for the resolution of the kurdish issue at home? or would you go ahead and support isis for what strategic benefit exactly is not clear to me. and if you're talking about the arms, isis has u.s. arms. does that mean that u.s. gave isis arms? so it's, it lets, let's be more nuanced about that as well. they're having, there have been many reports of arms smuggling through turkey into syria, but what i know from turkey's perspective, the groups that are willing to unite and fight dwebs assad regime will be kind of, will be supported. that's the kind of line for turkey. are you going to be engaging in terrorist activity and holding ground for yourself? holding space for yourself? or are you going to go ahead and work to bring down this regime? you may like or not, turkey remains committed to the regime change idea which the u.s. technically also is committed to. and it is doing what is necessary to realize that. of course that may not be possible at this point or it may not be possible anytime soon. but from that perspective, you don't have a serious reason to support isis, unless you're thinking that turkey is going to want kurds being killed just because they're kurds. and i don't think that's turkey's perspective with regards to syria. in terms of, you mentioned it, actually, vetting process, the opposition, who to trust, et cetera. but that can all collapse if you don't support the opposition and in other areas, you know, politically, if you don't allow them to manage the humanitarian crisis, you're not going to get them, they're not going to be liked by the population, the population will have to succumb to the groups who are able to provide help to them. so if you can vet and arm the syrian opposition, that's going to be only the beginning of the story. you have to support it politically, financially, et cetera and make it a credible alternative to assad's regime. i think turkey and the u.s. are on the same page about that need, but the current strategy does not seem to include that. so i think, and it can all collapse. you can vet and arm a group. and then they can lose. so you, we need a medium and longer-term strategy. thanks. >> i would like to take up the second question. i agree with him that the border of turkey with syria is very hard to control. it's 910 kilometers. very, very hard to control, but i think turkey could have done much better in terms of controlling the jihadist pouring into syria must of them come legally, with passports and stamps. the international media covered how easily these people traveled turkey, so it's really much more could have been done to prevent these people coming all over the world from, even from china. recently there are reports that chinese isis members were killed, traveling from china, afghanistan, tunisia, all over the world, al bane yeah. there's no way these people are coming in illegal way. they're flying into turkey. so this is the first. the second thing, why would turkey choose isis over pyd. this is what, this is a question what syrian kurds have been asking for a long time. how come turkey chooses isis over us. the perception, again, whoever you speak in syria kurds, they're really convinced that turkey is against, turkey is not supporting them, turkey is supporting these groups fighting against them. so i don't know why. maybe the phobia, the kurdish phobia is still alive. maybe, i have no idea. but i also would ask the same question. i would assume turkey should support kurds, because turkey has a large kurdish population. and the syrian kurds are direct relatives of kurds from turkey. i have some relatives that end up being in syria. so i have my own relatives. so really, in kurdish perspective, although i am turkish, officially, and my relatives are syrian, one family. so the expectation from the very beginning was both the pyd and the other side, senior national council, that they had good relations with turkey, but this is not the case. unfortunately, the syrian kurdish region are under embargo. the turkish border are very, very, it's very limited passage. so only very, very emergency case that they are sending others. and it's close, people are suffering, kurds are suffering too. because there's though goods coming into syria. and the syrian kurdish region. and turkey could really allowed that. eased the embargo by allowing people to go back and forth. the tur kish companies could made lots of money. this is what they say for example. operate, there's a city. whose city now? the population doubled, tripled after the arrival of people. they say we are close to an industrial hub. we want turkish companies to come here rather than be paid 200, 300% commission. we want turkish companies to come and do business here. we want to have good relationship. we have money but we cannot spend. so we would love to see that. there are many possibilities that turkey could improve the relation but it's not happening. later on, if turkey acted like only syrian kurdish council, another kurdish group, but mr. barzani has been supporting and marginalized recently, the relation, unfrnortunately did n improve. maybe one reason many people believe turkey makes the benefit of making isis and ypg fight, getting rid of two evils with one stone. i think this is many people's thought. even if this is the case, still stay away isis. they are in the town of kobani. whoever is in route there, turkey is really in this war against them. so this needs to be seen. this is not without any ground. i think what has been done so far makes people believe that turkey is carrying out negative policy against them. in regards to impact, like isis, the targets of air strikes are not the kurdish towns, especially not kobani which has a difficult situation, it's raqqah. these kind of places. so because they are not directly fighting isis, it doesn't have any impact. if the targets around kobani are hit it might slow down the isis advance. it might give some opportunity, maybe destroy their weapons, this might be some room for better protecting themself for ypg, but this is not happening. so the yes, ma'impact is only m impact. the fighters on the ground might feel more high morale that isis is now being attacked and maybe very likely the people are going to be targeted. so this is the impact. and people, the refugees in turkey, they are starting to return, hoping that the situation is going to normalize with the attacks. but militarily, there's no positive impact. rather negative, because isis sending all the fighters, those are not there already, heading towards kobani at least to get there and make it an issue. >> very quickly, turkey has been talking to europe for more than a year now. and europeans said you shouldn't allow these foreign fighters to come in, and turkey asked them for list and when they provided the lists, turkey deported a lot of people. more than 1,000 people. but if you're a european, if you're a european passport and you have a beard or whatever, you come to the airport, they are going to assume are you going to join isis and stop you. that's a difficult thing to do. but turkey hasn't refused to deport people. it has deported a lot of people. and pyd still is technically a terrorist organization for turkey. so you're saying turkey needs to cross the border into syria, risk getting into war with assad regime, basically, right? it has the authority to do conduct, cross border operations for its own security, but you're saying that turkey should come in and help pyd, which is an arm of pkk which is technically still a terrorist organization and save the kurds from isis? this doesn't quite work that way. isis is a terrorist organization for turkey and pyd is a similar. so you are asking turkey to go into a different country and basically help the kurds. helping the kurds on the humanitarian side is a priority for turkey. turkey hasn't closed the borders. it's taken more than 130,000 refugees. more are coming. but helping turkey, helping kurds in what way exactly? it's not clear. so you're saying turkish army should come in and help pyd defeat isis? i don't want to make this too long. but also, in terms of the embargo, again, it's the same thing. it's a p yflt d-controlled area. how do you expect turkish businesses to just trade with what they, what has gone through their terrorist organization in turkey. >> i'm going to open it up to the floor. >> can i make a couple comments, try to mediate. we said, you know, there's a statement made, well, naturally, turkey should be working with the p kmt k, pyd because they know them. that's exactly right, it's because turkey knows the pyd and pkk that they have no interest in seeing this group armed. and secondly, we need to look at this as an evolving policy. i hardly think, and i have initially been critical of this what seemed to be open-door, open-border policy. but what was perceived as al nusra, the free syrian army. this all evolved over time. so i hardly think that turkey or anybody else in the syrian coalition that was starting this in istanbul two years ago said boy, let's bring they will in because we know they're going to be isis. even six months ago you didn't imagine this was going to turn out the way it has. there are sleeper cells in istanbul. this is not just about the border now. this is in the heart of turkey. i really don't think that this was something that started out -- was it a miscalculation? i would possibly say so, but so, it would be important to look at this as even the iraqi kurds, look, on june 10, when mosul was taken over by isil, what were the iraqi kurds even saying? we're not getting involved. they knew about this. and even they said, two weeks later, we had no idea that it was going to turn out to be this way. and i think that's the case with turkey too. secondly, i just don't see the pkk, pyd's agenda has always been one of whether it's challenging the territorial integrity of turkey, even though it's changed, why would turkey, whose aim was to disarm the pkk now wants to see arms possibly getting into the hands of the pkk. so this is a very difficult political situation, but i don't think it's so clear cut in saying either you choose the pyd or you choose isis. there are two different challenges right now, neither one of which, you know, lessens the significance of the other. >> first of all, the jihadists, i understand, americans, people can travel and nobody should be stopped because they have beards. i agree with you. but they are non-western people. so they are morocco, afghanistan, pakistan, china. these people are from this. and the media has covered it enough. i don't want to spend any more time on this. so turkey could have done a great deal of steps to prevent, so this is already established by the international community that turkey does not do enough. second point pyd, by their own official statement, based on what, you call it pkk. they don't hide they're inspired by the leader and pkk aligned organizations. but pyd is a kurdish organization. they don't hide. they say, pyd is a syrian organization. i talk about syrian kurds. the government establishes autono autonomy. pyd is the main power. but there are more powers. i talk about syrian kurds, some 2 million people who are suffering because of the embargo. these people have suffered from bad decisions. do they deserve some status or not. so this other question, and turkey being the, why not welcome them. why not make them feel they are valued. why treat them with negative attitudes. so nobody tells turkish army to go to syria and fight. that's not the case. but there are other ways you could help. you could ease the border. you keep saying pyd. pyd is the strongest political party. but the ypg is composed of many people who are not opponents. and there are other people they all say that, you know, turkey could have done better. we want better relations with turkey. so turkey shows being this perspective. treat them as?- ] kurds, brothd sister of may own citizens who are suffering. and if that is the case, why are the government officials talking to erdogan now. if p yflt d's relationship pkk is thin, how come there's a peace process or brotherhood process, whatever it's called. so there's a contradiction here. either it's not sincere or they should not see pyd considering erdogan.