he is also the winner of the -- that particular book won the samuel elliott morrison award. e is the author of lincoln and his admirals which won the lincoln prize in 2009. in recognition of his extraordinary contribution, the naval historicle foundation in 2014 awarded him the congressman duredudly w. knox history award for lifetime achievement. professor john mars lak is william s. giles distinguished professor emeritus of mississippi state university came out of retirement in 2008 and accepted the task of serving as executive director of the uelills sis s grant presidential library and managing editors. he is the tautsdzer of a dozen books. incheweding sherman. and sherman's other war. his honors include an excellence in writing award from the u.s. army historicle oundation. as testament to the high regard in which he is held, several of his students contributed to an editted volume titled, of times and race. ees says inspired. i was honored to have the opportunity to contribute the final essay to that volume. in addition to the great scholarship of these two men, they are known for having married well. something they shared with lincoln. their better halves rf two women that i admire deeply and that i am sure that all of you would join me in that same sentiment. their husband will discuss johnston and sherman the two surrenders. [applause] > what a perfect introduction. thank you. that's great. john and i are delighted to be back here at the lincoln forum. those of you who know us even a little bit will not be surprise today hear last night we had an opportunity to get together and consume some wine. and in the midst of that conversation, fueled by wine we were talking about how we were both terribly jealous of ron chernow whose biography of hamilton inspired a very lucrative musical on broadway. so we thought how appropriate thank you. that's great. ohn and i are delighted to be it would be to have joseph e. johnston the musical. >> or william t. sherman the musical or the one that really inspired us was henry wager halek the musical. as you see on the screen here and you'll be delighted to hear, this is not going to be a musical presentation today. instead, alas, it is a tragedy n three acts. act one. on april 17, 1865, which is a full week after lee surrendered to grant at appomattox as we just heard a few moments ago, joseph e. johnston and william t. sherman met in the front yard of a small farm owned by james and nancy bennett near durham station, north carolina. here is what that farm house looks like today. and here is the newspaper engraving of the imagined meeting between these two generals and here is a modern ainting by dan nance and how he imagined that. however it looked, let us imagine the moment. it had been four years and five days since the war began. and since then these two men had spent a lot of that time, each of them thinking about the other. wondering what plans lurked inside the active brain of his opponent. for two and a half months in the spring and summer of 1864, they had dueled one another in north georgia in what was called a red clay minuet, each striving to gain an advantage, each failing to do so, until a frustrated and impatient jefferson davis replaced johnston with john bell hood. they had fought again only two weeks before this meeting near bentonville, north carolina, in another strategically indecisive engagement. now, with lee's army already having surrendered in virginia, they met face to face for the first time ever. with an opportunity to end the war. and at least as important to establish a foundation for the peace that would follow. their conversation could well have much to do with what reconstruction would look like and how or even if the country recovered from its wounds. what is not evident in this painting is the amount of baggage that each man brought with him to the meeting. not literal baggage but etaphorical baggage. my job here in this first segment of this tag team presentation is to detail some of the personal, professional, and political baggage that johnston brought to this meeting. after jefferson davis dismissed joe johnston from his command in july of 1864 the old general went into what amounted to retirement in columbia, south carolina. where the diarist mary chestnut was living. she noted johnston and his friends were bitter about their dismissal, bitter at davis, bitter at john bell hood whose subsequent defense of atlanta was a disastrous failure and whose quixotic campaign into ennessee was even more catastrophic resulting in the virtual destruction of the army of tennessee outside nashville. of course, if johnston's supporters blamed that catastrophe on davis and on hood, those two men and many others as well blamed johnston, whose constant withdrawals in georgia had in their view taken the fighting spirit out of the army of tennessee before john bell hood ever got ahold of it. the error, as they saw it, was not that johnston was dismissed but that he had been kept too long in command. the mutual bitterness was palatable. the observeant mary chestnut wrote in her diary, we thought his was a struggle for independence. now it seems it is only a fight between joe johnston and jeff davis. of course columbia, south carolina was no safe haven. for sherman, advancing north from savannah, had it squarely in is sights. as sherman headed north, the confederate congress in richmond, the members of which were as disgusted with davis as johnston was, virtually rebelled against the administration bypassing a law that appointed robert e. lee by name as commander-in-chief of all confederate armies. never mind the fact that the confederate constitution gave that title to the president. moreover, that same act called upon the president to appoint joseph e. johnston again by name to command what was left of the army of tennessee. it was a deliberate slap in the face to jefferson davis, and while davis happily appointed lee to the top command he refused to appoint joe johnston to anything. instead writing that johnston was in his words deficient in enterprise, tardy in movement, defective in preparation, and singularly neglectful of the duty of preserving our means of supply and transportation. then he did it anyway. it was lee who convinced him that if nothing else the popular johnston who was very much loved by the soldiers, might convince some of those who had desserted to return to the colors. johnston's first instinct was to refuse the appointment. he suspected this was another of davis's tricks putting him back in command just so he would be the one to bear the historical burden of making the final surrender. but just as lee had talked davis into making the appointment he also convinced johnston to accept it. others told johnston that lee now hated davis as much as he did, which was not true, and that lee still had confidence in his old friend and west point classmate, which was rue. so in that new job, johnston fought only one battle, the one at bentonville. it was indecisive. but in johnston's view, it proved that the men of the army of tennessee could still fight. that disproved all the things that hood had been saying about how the men of the army of tennessee had forgotten how to be soldiers. nevertheless it was obvious to johnston that any further fighting now after appomattox was useless. a week after bentonville and lee's surrender at appomattox he and most of the men in his rmy believed the war was over. in the second week of april he traveled to see davis who was now heading southward from richmond having evacuated the confederate capital in a train to tell him so. they met in a railroad car near greensberg, north carolina on april 12. davis sitting at a small desk surrounded by what was left of his cabinet. i don't have an image of that. here is davis sitting at a desk. so this will have to do. johnston told the president our people are tired of the war. they feel themselves whipped, and will not fight. davis was fiddling with a piece of paper he was holding in his hand, turning it over, folding it, unfolding it. did not even look up. to look at johnston in the face. but after a brief pause he said, well, general johnston, what do you propose? that was the opening johnston needed. he asked permission to arrange an armistice that would, this is now quoted material, "permit the civil authorities to enter into the needful arrangements to terminate the existing war. davis hesitated. then he said, well, sir, you can adopt that course, though i confess i am not sanguine as to ultimate results. with that grudging assent, johnston then invited sherman to the meeting at the bennett house five days later. now let's hear what may have been on sherman's mind when he greeted johnston at the bennett house. >> i think you've all seen this picture before. it is the worst picture ever taken of sherman, and he hated it. he didn't want to have his picture taken. t is a picture of that period. sherman as you know took atlanta in september of 1864, but at that time he showed no interest in crushing the army of confederate general john bell hood, who, as craig pointed out, was joe johnson's replacement. "i do not wish to waste lives by an assault." he quickly sent word to henry w. halek who was chief of staff in washington, "atlanta is ours and fairly won." the civil war as we know was bitterly fought, but sherman's decision not to destroy hood and his army in atlanta was a clear indication of something. just what this man's attitude was toward the confederacy and its people. sherman simply did not want to go into -- go back into fighting a war of maim and blood. but he couldn't remain in atlanta. he had to do something. o he planned and this took place over a period of time to institute a new form of warfare, to institute destructive war against the confederacy. and how was he going to do that? by marching to the sea. lincoln and grant were not in favor of this, but sherman quickly wore them down, began his march from atlanta to the sea, on november 14, 1864. one of the things i want to point out if you remember nothing else about my part of it, i know you'll remember everything craig said. but my part of it, i want you to remember that this is not an example of sherman's work. he did not burn atlanta down. he didn't do it. we can talk about it afterwards if you'd like. but the lost cause would have us believe that's what happened. this was actually created by john bell hood when he set fire o atlanta. he set fire to ammunition of atlanta and explosions happened and all the rest. anyway, he didn't destroy everything despite what "gone with the wind" has to say. there you have "gone with the wind." nor, as legend would have it, sherman did not burn every home between atlanta and the ocean. it simply didn't happen. he did, however, march through georgia, and he arrived at savannah on december 21. from there, he sent a message to lincoln, "i beg to present to you as a christmas gift the city of savannah." all kinds of newspapers talked about our union santa claus. as was the case with hood in atlanta, sherman now had to deal with confederate general illiam hardee. but, again, he refused to cut off his escape. rather, he consciously, specifically, left open an exit so hardee could get away and sherman would not have to fight him in the trenches. and when sherman's army entered savannah, the soldiers, his soldiers, sherman's soldiers were on their best behavior. previously they had taken or destroyed anything they wanted. now they paid for everything they took. well, what happened? as long as they held out, he'd fight them without mercy. as soon as southerners quit the war he would as he phrased it ecome the south's best friend. hus, he is not going to try to destroy hood or hardee or atlanta or savannah. e is going to institute what comes to be known as a soft piece for the hard war he's been demonstrating in georgia. well, let's face it. the war is hardly over at this particular point when sherman ets to savannah. grant now wants sherman to come to virginia. ends him a letter. there is a letter waiting for sherman. come to virginia and help me finish off robert e. lee. well, sherman fought against that idea because he did not want to participate in such killing again. nstead, and they worked this out, he headed north into the carolinas and another example of destructive, psychological warfare. this time he particularly punished south carolina because he and his soldiers blamed south carolina for starting the war. but, interestingly, he was less harsh on north carolina, which, as you know, was very slow in seceding and had been much less enthusiastic about secession nd battle and war. so sherman and his troops are now marching through the carolinas and what joe johnston says is one of the most impressive military feats since julius caesar. in fact, what happens is, a figure from sherman's past reappears. guess who that is? that is craig's hero, joe johnston. now, craig pointed out that jefferson davis had fired johnston just before the fall of atlanta, and he also pointed out that now davis had to swallow his pride and bring johnston back. why would he do that? well, he had no choice. after george h. thomas destroyed john bell hood and his army of tennessee at nashville in december, 1864, there is no confederate general left to attle sherman except for joseph e. johnson. so johnston takes over what is left of the confederate army in the carolinas, and he gives sherman, as we heard, a momentary scare at bentonville. hen he had to fall back before the surging yankees. well, sherman felt that he had done the right thing. he believed that his destructive war was a more direct way to get to the desired end of ending this civil war, defeating the confederacy, restoring the union. he certainly did not want to get back into the meat grinder of war. but what's going to happen now? he's in carolina. joe johnston is back again. well, craig's already told us. sherman receives a letter from joe johnston requesting a meating between the two of them. nd just before he leaves for that -- getting ready to leave for that meeting, is sherman, a subordinate hands him a telegraph that is just arrived from washington. end of act one. act wo. the two men arrived at the designated meeting place. they dismounted. shook hands. and leaving their respective entourages outside, they went together into the bennett's small farm house. ow, unlike lee and grant and the maclean house, we saw several images, you have all seen images of that, there were no adrianza, no staff members. just the two of them, together, in this small, rustic cabin. once they were inside, sherman took out of his pocket the telegram that he had been handed just as he was leaving for the meeting and showed it to joe johnston. >> so far he had shown it to no one else. t stated two days before abraham lincoln had been assassinated in washington, d.c. johnston looked up at sherman with horror and declared it was the greatest possible calamity for the south. e said he hoped that sherman did not think the south had any hand in such an act. sherman replied he was confident that the rebel army had nothing to do with it, but he would not say the same about jefferson davis and his government. to which johnston made no reply. with that cloud hanging over their heads, they got down to business. sherman offered johnston the same terms that grant had offered to lee at appomattox. johnston acknowledged that the terms were, in fact, generous, but he suggested that perhaps they could go further and arrange the terms of a permanent peace. sherman replied to that by asking if johnston had the authority to make such an agreement. it was a good question. davis had told johnston that he could enter into discussions to, "permit the civil authorities to enter into the needful arrangements to terminate the existing war." in fact, davis had dictated that phrase himself. but what davis had meant, and johnston knew this, was that johnston had permission to convince the union to agree to southern independence. which was why he had expressed so little optimism about the outcome. what johnston now tried to do instead was conclude a peace hat would reunite the country. of course, as a general commanding an army in the field, johnston did not and could not represent the civil authorities. sherman pointed that out to him. but johnston noted that john c. reckenridge was scheduled to arrive that very afternoon and breckenridge was both a former vice president of the united states and currently the secretary of war in the confederate government, and he, johnston said, could represent the civil authorities. i had to put this up because of the mustache. that posed a problem for sherman, because he was prescribed from entering into a negotiation with a representative of what lincoln was always careful to describe as the so-called confederate government. he pointed this out to johnston and johnston replied, well, yes, that's true, but breckenridge is also a major general in the confederate army, as we see him here in his confederate uniform. so sherman could treat with him in that capacity. of course, if breckenridge was merely a general in the confederate army, it was not clear how he was supposed to represent the civil authorities. still, anxious for the blood letting to stop, sherman agreed to meet with both men the next day. it's hard to tell who was being more duplicitous here, johnston for implying that the confederate government was willing to end the war, when he knew that davis wanted to fight on to the bitter end, or sherman for using the figure leaf of breckenridge's commission as a major general to enter into negotiations with a member of the confederate government. but both men wanted peace. and they calculated that stretching the letter of their instructions was worth it. so the three men now met in the bennett house the next day, april 18, and it started out splendidly. sherman had brought with him a bottle of kentucky ourbon. i felt obligated to include this slide because i know that no one in this audience knows what a bottle of kentucky ourbon looks like. you'll note and apparently you have already noted this one happens to be from trader joe's. i doubt that's the brand that sherman had with him. in any case, sherman offered a glass of it to each of the confederate generals. well, breckenridge, who was a native kentuckian, and who had been exiled from his home state for years, sat up eagerly. got rid of his plug of tobacco, rinsed out his mouth with water from his canteen to prepare himself, and then tossed back his drink with evident satisfaction. after that, they got down to work. sherman had prepared for the meeting by drawing up a memorandum to use as a basis for an agreement. the three men quibbled a bit over some of the language, but there were no major disagreements. at one point, sherman, obviously deep in thought, got up from the table, absent mindedly walked across the room to his saddle bag, got out the whiskey bottle, poured himself a drink, then put the bottle back. breckenridge fell silent. and afterward complained to johnston in outrage that sherman was no gentleman. did you see him take that drink by himself? the agreement they produced was pretty straight forward. in addition to the terms grant had laid down at appomattox concerning johnston's soldiers, it called for the dissolution of all southern armies across he nation. so far so good. but there was more. the agreement also called for the restoration and recognition of existing state governments. and that was a problem. because it intruded into the political rem. nevertheless, all three men signed it, even the pouting breckenridge. and johnston left the meeting in the belief that he had ended the war. he was wrong. why was that, ohn? [laughter] >> well, this so-called treaty had been signed, as craig said both sherman and johnston were pleased because they really thought the war was now over. traditionally shall the story goes that sherman immediately sent the terms to washington, d.c. for the new andrew johnson dministration to accept. however, received an e-mail from walter starr who you may know is the author of a recent book on william henry stuart and presently is working on a book on edwin stanton. well, he insists that it's much more complicated than that. what he discovered was that sherman also took and sent some of the surrender terms to some southern newspapers. for example, "the columbia, south carolina phoenix" of april 24, 1865, and that newspaper quoted it as saying that this peace treaty would bring peace to all the united states and the confederate states. sherman believed that he was exactly doing what should have been done. so it's possible that he may have sent information or planted information in a newspaper to put pressure on the administration to accept the terms. the problem is, however, that he never said anything about it, nor did anyone else say anything about such plans until walter starr found this information. so i think you have to say it's just difficult to know for sure but we wanted you to be aware of that. we do know, however, without any fear of contradiction, that sherman thought he had done the right thing. he told his quarter master for example, "i have today made terms with johnston that will close the war and leave us only to march home." now, he had been presented this -- he then presented this information to his generals. several of his generals thought it was a big, big mistake. "they are too liberal." several believed. but, in fact, as we've already mentioned, sherman had always promised the south a hard war as long as it kept fighting, and that it would be a soft war once it quit. well, johnston and the confederates promised to surrender. promised they would quit. so sherman in his heart of hearts believed he had no choice. but he had to fulfill the promise he had been making over and over again during the war. so sherman had no doubt that his plans for ending the war were good plans. and, after all, they were simply lincoln's plans. you remember the picture we saw earlier of lincoln and grant and others and sherman sitting here and porter? so what sherman did do, he did send the plans forward to washington. well, sherman's aide that sherman sent delivered the plans to grant. grant looked at them and immediately called for an emergency meeting of andrew johnson and his cabinet. now, keep in mind as craig pointed out, that lincoln has been assassinated. the nation is in shock over this. the nation, including the administration is war weary over all of the death and destruction. so the cabinet, like the american people, was in no mood for a soft peace. the north had the upper hand after all. so why should the union side reward great knew that sherman's terms were dead on arrival, and the cabinet greed. and the list to say, this man took the lead -- and needless to say, this man took the lead in agreement sherman. he had a cabinet meeting that night at 8:00 p.m., and the cabinet voted the terms down. sherman had simply gone too far. stanton ordered grant to tell sherman to go down to north carolina to tell sherman in no uncertain terms, that he had no right, as a military man, to take on responsibilities that were clearly civilian. meanwhile, sherman did not know what was going on in washington. there is no twitter at this particular time. but sherman at the same time is writing joe johnston of his confidence, the andrew johnson m administration, would follow lincoln's lead, except to surrender terms, and that he, sherman, would be praised for establishing this agreement. he said, don't worry joe, verything is ok. we are on the right track. nstead, washington exploded. word spread to general w. alec, who is now in richmond to be the military governor of that particular area. and it spreads to other civilian and military leaders, and eventually, it spreads to the press. stanton and halleck were particularly upset, and openly attacked sherman for overstepping his authority. stanton accused sherman of elping the confederates. halleck even ordered sherman's subordinates to ignore any irect orders from sherman. not knowing anything about the shermans having a wonderful time in north carolina, he thinks he is just on the verge of becoming a national hero. then all of a sudden, ulysses s. grant shows up, his buddy, his friend. grant arrives, very calmly, and says nothing about firing sherman, and taking his place. but he calmly tells his friend that the terms are not acceptable. i think what you need to do was all joe johnston, get with im, and just renegotiate hings. well, sherman's response to this is quite positive. he reacted calmly. he wrote stanton and note expressing his willingness to change the reaty quote -- this is sherman writing to stanton -- i admit my follies and embracing in a military convention, any civil manners. am ready to work with the johnston administration, and we will all work together to come up with an appropriate end to the war. he said, i still think i am right, but i'm willing to compromise. but he said, we better do it fast because if we don't do it fast, the confederate army is going to break up into guerilla bands, and then we will really have problems. and then sherman received some northern newspapers coming he could not believe what he was reading. the papers actually charged him -- william comes to sherman, charging him with being a traitor. he worried again about the south continuing the guerilla war. if his treaty, which he knew was right, quote he said -- we should not drive a people into anarchy. well, as he had done previously in california, louisiana, kentucky, memphis, sherman worried about anarchy. he had fought this war to prevent anarchy from triumphing, and now he is trying to institute a pwaceeace that others are going to initiate a new anarchy. he struggled to understand the key point. most northerners did not see southerners as fallen away friends. they saw them as recalcitrant friends that needed punishment to prevent any future civil war. hen stanton called sherman a traitor to the future of the union, this slur found northerners ready to believe that this was true of one of the generals who adjust won the civil war for them. end of act two. act three. >> johnson also felt betrayed. a few days after he thought he had end of the war, he got a ote from sherman informing him their agreement had been rejected. that hostilities would resume in 48 hours. by then, most of johnston's army had marched away home. and johnston -- in johnston's view, -- in the same note, sherman also invited johnston to meet with him a third time, this time without any reference to civil issues. johnston checked with breckenridge for orders. perhaps still resenting being tonight that secondary -- that second drink of whiskey, breckenridge told johnston that even if he had to surrender but was left of his infantry, he should try to bring off the cavalry in order to prolong the war. johnston was appalled. he was in no mood to ask any of his men to lay down their lives solely for the purpose of keeping jefferson davis in office for another day or two. e met with his own generals, his subordinate generals, who told him there was no fight left in the army. the men were leaving in groups of 10 and 20 or more stealing the draft horses in the cavalry ounts to make their trip home. if you try to bring off the calvary, as breckenridge suggested, the men were unlikely to do it. johnston wired breckenridge, we have to save the people. and spare the blood of the army. and he met with sherman for a third time in the bennett house on april 26. this time, they limited themselves to military issues. johnston formally surrendered his army, that in no more. or the rest of his life, jefferson davis consider johnston's decision to urrender an act of treachery and cowardice. lee had been surrounded and went as far as he could go and had no choice. but johnston, davis believed and wrote, just quit. there was no victory parade or a parade of any kind for the betterment of the army of tennessee. they just went home. most of them did with the urrender terms required. mighty their own business, not bearing arms against the government. johnston remained embittered not sherman for whom he always expressed admiration, but at jefferson davis and ed davis's military advisor, and john bell hood. johnston devoted the rest of his life to writing a book and a whole handful of articles in which he tried to prove that davis had conspired against him. it was clearly the least admirable episode of his life as he grew old, picking apart old feuds and resentments. where were sherman and for the surrender? et's find out. >> the tension in the room is just -- well, we talked about this final surrender at the bennett house, and we know that after that took place, sherman marched northward. elements of the press wanted to know publicly if he planned to use his army against civilian authority because he was furious by this time. those absurd accusations just infuriated him. but sherman took no action. he wrote no letters. instead, he got his own unusual kind of revenge. the grand review of armies was held in washington on may 23 nd may 24. there you have a picture. well, and this particular case, even before they got to washington, they had to march through richmond. guess what -- guess who was in command in richmond? halleck. sherman's in a letter to halleck saying, you are not going to get any salutes from my army, so you better not show up. then when he himself was involved in this particular grand review, he led his army assed the reviewing stand, and here you have a picture of the reviewing stand. i don't of how well you can see it, but you see some of the eople there. sherman is there and stanton is there an grant is there and johnston is there. in any case, when he marched past with his army, march past the reviewing stand and he passed stanton. stanton offered his hand to sherman is there and stanton is shake hands. sherman snubbed him. that was sherman's revenge. so you see him there to the right in this photo next to montgomery meagues apparently whispering something to the guy next to him. and you know to stanton is standing behind grant and the president is about 10 feet away. by the end of the parade, sherman had cooled off, but he remained disillusioned. he wrote a public letter about his refusal to shake hands. he said quote -- i cannot recall the act, but shakespeare records how poor falls staff, the prince of cowards and wits, rising from the figured death, stabbed again, and carried the arcass aloft in triumph to prove his valor. o now, when the rebellion in our land is dead, many fall stabs appear. and you know who he is talking about. so, by the end of 1865, both sherman and johnston felt betrayed by their superiors. in the initial agreement he had made with joe johnston, sherman had demonstrated yet again, but i like to call his passion for orders, passion for piece. during the war, and certainly at its end, he wanted to let the south go in peace once it tops fighting. he saw himself as a hero of the north's victory, and believed that northerners shared his belief in soft peace as they supported him in hard war. that was not the case. the interesting fact is that he and joe johnston remained friends. later, the two of them, one of them was the commanding general of the army, and the other one, being a ember of the united states house of representatives, could be found on the floor of sherman's home with all kinds of maps on the floor, and they are on their hands and knees studying the atlantic campaign. well, you know sherman dies in 1891. and johnston traveled to new york to act as an honorary allbearer. this contemporary drawing is supposed to be drawing is supposed to be johnston walking immediately behind the casket. well, many of you know the story. it turns out that before be reached this point, sherman was laid out, whatever the proper term is, in the casket, in his home in new york city. and as the casket is closed and brought out of the home and to the street in manhattan, joe johnston, honorary pallbearer, is standing there to help, he has that his hat off, and has is hat over his heart. and it is very cold, it is february, after all. another mourner leaned forward to urge the old general to put on his hat because he said, general, you will catch a cold. johnston replied quote -- if i were in his place and he were standing here in mind, he certainly would not put on his hat. so, he did not. and as you may know, the story ends that johnson catches a cold and he ies from that cold soon after. so, in the end, it is fair to say, and craig and i agree on this, these two delman served as a metaphor -- these two men served as a metaphor of what might have been. no matter what sherman believed or try to implement, or no matter what johnston tried to do for his part, the south has preferred tourist -- the south has preferred to remember sherman as a dylan, and to remember johnston as a field general. it was considered old at that time, but in any case, our union army veteran named ethan allen hitchcock -- hitchcock may have expressed the situation best by quoting from the 25th sonnet of william shakespeare. and shakespeare was one of sherman's favorite authors. remember, i quoted that earlier, but here is the four lines that maybe expresses it all, quote -- the painful warrior, famous for the fight, after 1000 victories once boiled, is from the book of honor vanished quite, and all the rest forgotten for which he oiled. thank you. [applause] >> we are told that we have time for two quick questions, and that is all, so rush the microphones. >> and take it easy, too. >> for mr. marszalek, were there any thought that sherman had as he moved from georgia, id he know what was going on there? >> the question was determined think about andersonville? yes he did. he sent a unit of union calvary to try to free the people at andersonville, but they failed. and they were imprisoned. so nothing came of it. very good question. >> i know this isn't the question, um, that will result in an easy answer, but suppose andrew johnston had gotten along sherman? how would reconstruction have iffered? craig: the question is what would have been different if andrew johnson got along with sherman? that is too difficult for me to nswer. that is something i should let craig answer. craig: we can say anything, and who would know otherwise. there are two what if possibilities. what would lincoln have accepted in the kind of arrangement he made if he had not been assassinated? my guess is lincoln would have done a workaround, he would accept it the idea that the rmy surrendered and there is a temporary restoration of existing state government, but that is subject for further consideration, but the anger that was so possible in the north following the assassination made it impossible, i think, to accept terms other than surrender and he will tell you what will appen to you. there are two -- the tragedy implied in the title of our presentation, the tragedy in three acts is partly the what might have been? we don't know what might have been, but want the assassination took place, it is clear that it was going to be harder to bring about the kind of peace that sherman and johnston envisioned at the minute the minute the minute the -- when they met at the bennett hues. thank you very much. -- house. >> interested in american history tv? visit our website. you can view our schedule, preview upcoming programs, and watch programs. american history tv at c-span.org/history. >> monday night on the communicators we visit the state of the net conference and speak to senior advisor to house member kevin mccarthy. >> the disruption by technology is so fundamentally challenging our entire economy. and government has no choice but to reflect that reality. and it will. we've been through this. i don't think quite to this scale but we have been through our democracy was created. and it's survived and thrived. i would argue in a lot of way combs proved upon itself. we are at that same kind of inflection point today between sort of an industrial economy and maybe an information economy or however you want to phrase it. that creates an amazing opportunity to not just survive as a democracy but to create the more perfect union. >> i believe that the cyber a urity agenda in general is super important agenda that needs to be pushed. the reason is that cyber security is not a problem that it was had in technology. cyber security is a problem hat is here to stay. >> this april marks the 100th anniversary of america's entry into world war one. live from the national world war museum and memorial in kansas city to the explore the u.s. role in the fighting and the war combs pact on the homefront. we'll take you inside the museum to see art facts that tell the world war one story. that's saturday april 1 beginning at 10:30 eastern here on american history tv. nly on c-span-3. >> next on american history tv to mark the opening of the national constitution's exhibit american spirit, the rise and fall of prohibition, two historians with books about the era and the center's president and ceo discuss the history and politics of prohibition. the panel discusses the reasons for the movement against alcohol abuse beginning in the 19th century and the problems with enforcing and then repealing the 18th amendment to the constitution. this the program from the national constitution center in philadelphia is about 50 minutes. >> ladies and gentlemen, welcome. i am the president of this wonderful institution. the only institution in america chartered by congress to disseminate information about the u.s. constitution on a nonpartisan basis. beautiful. so great to hear those wonderful words of our inspiring mission statement here in the beautifully