in just a moment to the foreign relations committee will come to order and thank you to all those for being here. today's hearing will examine the crisis in libya. like to thank your witnesses for again appearing before the committee on this important issue. unfortunately six years ago after they nato intervention in libya remains on the brink of civil war. like many of its neighbors libya failed to transition into a stable representative democracy hoped for by the citizens following the arab spring. sadly it's a libyan people who have paid the price. fighting between militias has undefined internal security, we can government institutions and damaged the economy. it is also posing substantial risk to the u.s. and to our allies. infighting is created a permissive environment for terrorist groups like isis. the organizations gains in libya have led to u.s. supported boteri options -- in places like sir. conditions allowing extremists to thrive remain. i think any of us agree that the libyan political agreement needs to be altered and the current government lacks the power to actually govern the entire country. that's only the beginning. until the array of militias come under some type of simple political control no government will be able to provide potential services across the country. even then libya's will still face enormous challenges to fix weak government institutions and turn around a struggling economy pretty look forward to our discussion today and hearing from our two witnesses on the views of the crisis and one needs to be done to bring about its peaceful resolution. we will be predicted interested to hear your views on what the u.s. should do to help achieve the goals and with that and what we should expect devices or other radical groups regain ground in libya. we thank you both for being here ambassador i did want you to have to hear all of my opening statement so i went ahead and again with that i will turn it over who are distinguished ranking member senator cardin. >> thank you mr. chairman. i thought your opening statement was very important to be heard by all. i just want you to know that and i thank you very much for convening this hearing on libya. yesterday i had the opportunity to represent this committee along with senator graham who is representing the appropriations committee. we met with ambassadors and our nation security council. we headed to our discussion and a very helpful discussion. we tracked down the whole reins of issues from north korea to reform within the united nations ambassador haley is doing an incredible job representing our just and i think her leadership as the president of the security council will be important. she's focusing on issues of reform and moving to issues of north korea and other areas that the united states has national security interests. one of the issues that came up during that discussion by our friends in europe, our friends in africa and the middle east is what will be america's engagement? will america be a power for the values that we stand for in dealing with global challenges? that was raised by our friends in europe and the middle east and africa. i say that the codes i start with the fact that the united states must be engaged. it's in our national security interest to have a representative governments in countries like libya that represent all of the population because when we don't have a representative government what happens is it creates a void. that void is filled by isis as we have seen in northern africa. it is filled by russia and russia's engagement which has not been helpful and we recognize it's in america's national security interests to get engaged. as you know we have the trump administration has yet to be able to fill a critical position and we are still not clear what his policies are with regards to libya. in a meeting with prime minister of italy president trump said and i'm paraphrasing but we don't really have a role. we do have a role in libya and i think this hearing is an important indication by the congress that we do expect a role to be played. i want to just underscore the importance of representative inclusive government and there's no military solution. we have seen this all too frequently in so many countries in that region. we need an inclusive government, government that represents all of the different factions. we saw as the chairman pointed out under the leadership of the g&a we were able to make progress and that was important but we also see with moscow's involvement that the general in the eastern part of libya is causing all types of problems for civilian control of the country and participating in activities that in my mind raise concern about human rights violations and war crimes. there is a role for us to play and if it's done right we not only have a representative government with the management of oil resources to give them a growing economy and a growing standard of living. that is our goal and i think this hearing played an important part in the senate's oversight of that responsibility and i look forward to hearing from her two witnesses. >> thank you very much are those comments and we will turn to witnesses. the first witnesses dr. fred wehrey senior -- if the endowment for peace. our second witnesses the honorable deborah jones u.s. ambassador to libya from 2013 to 2015. thank you for bringing your expertise and knowledge and if you would give your opening comments in the order i just introduced you and introduced you and if you could summarize in five minutes we would appreciate it. without objection your testimony will be entered into the record. please proceed. >> thank you. chairman corcoran -- corker ranking member and committee members thank you for letting me spake and i'm honored to be with my co-panelists. today the u.n. backs president and tripoli in tripoli is failing a basic government unable to establish itself amidst feuding militias and internal paralysis. more importantly the council confronts an existential challenge from an eastern faction led by the general backed by egypt united arab emirates and increasingly russia the ally parliament and east has refused to endorse the president council counsel with this key objection being the issue of control over libya's military. meanwhile the countries economic rent a surge of migrants across libya shores remains unchecked and jihadist militants whether in the form of the islamic state i'll qaeda or some new mutation could still take root. these looming dangers mr. chairman demand immediate engagement from the united states. the most basic level the united united states faces two imperatives. first preventing the resurgence of terrorist activity and second supporting the formation of an inclusive representative stable government. on the counterterrorism from the libyan led campaign certs last summer in the islamic state of many realtor attribute their remaining islamic state militants estimated in the low hundreds are currently pulling in the west and south and may try to mount a high-visibility tab 2 show their continued viability. what struck me the most during my visit last year in the libyan areas of afflicted by jihadist presence whether cert benghazi or the west is any traction islamic state that was highly transactional bull. was the result of poor government and at this point the importance of a broad taste approach ended nine to tajada sanctuary. nonmilitary strategies are essential promoting economic development in governance education in civil society form of vital adjunct. in the effort to identify local libyan partners to defeat terrorism the united states must proceed carefully. given the absence of a truly national cohesive military american armed groups could upset the balance of power and cause greater factional conflict moving forward the nice fish on the back as forces controlled by international recognize governments and even this support should be limited in scope and geared toward specific threats but a second area where american diplomatic and gauge what is crucial is the formation of the new government. a starting point for doing this is a new libyan led dialogue backed by the united states with european partners and the goal of the talk should be the amendment of the libyan political agreement of 2015 specifically the composition of the president's counsel. the new talks should focus on new tracks out of the first agreement. first they should include the leaders of libya's armed groups who must agree on a roadmap for building a national level military structure. hear an american red line must continue to be the elected civilian control over the military. proposals for military rule or military counsel are hardly a recipe for enduring stability. for most libyans they run counter to the values for which they fought in the 2011 revolution. second the talks must set up a mechanism for the transparence of oil revenues especially the municipal authorities. one such an agreement is in place the united states and its allies must stand ready to assist whatever government emerges is not just on counterterrorism. with its formal institutions get it to years of dictatorial rule libya citizens remain its greatest resource and this is why it's so important the united states preserve its capacity to engage strictly with the libyan people. mr. chairman committee members by travels across libya during the past year underscore the desperation of the spy previously islamic state was dealt a significant blow thanks in large measure to the sacrifices of brave libyans that libya is now more polarized than ever in the growing vacuum in feature radicalism. aspen for american leadership to avert the pending collapse safeguard american interests and help the country realized the early promise of its revolution. thank you for the opportunity to speak with you here today. >> chairman corker ranking member senator cardin and this distinguished mirza committed my apologies as a retiree. never tell with the parking downtown coming in on a plane tuesday morning but it is my distinct honor to appear before you today on this important vexing matter and i'm pleased to appear with a colleague that i consider really authority them are the most honest authorities and voices on libya today. libya has confounded and frustrated and exhausted policymakers and diplomatic tactician or's with this stubborn resistance to the obvious political mass of $1.2 billion of oil a day caught up in the endorphins of revolution. many assume libya like athena from the head of zeus would turn into dubai on the mediterranean and we could all go away. in hindsight clearly libya was not -- libya has a history like any other place in that history is one of fragmentation even preceding gadhafi. or i've often said to people as gadhafi was not the creator of libya's fragmentation. he certainly exploited it using the oil wealth that he had at his disposal and i think it's important to remember that he deposed king injury is without firing a shot. he used that oil well much as a cartel would do to disparate parts of the country libya has always existed as julius caesar said like three separate entities with different historical and political backgrounds and which explain to us often the different influences that play to this day in each of those regions for international partners. when gadhafi died in affect libya was the mafia without a don and that is the challenge that we have now. gadhafi was gone but his legacy remains. understanding the backdrop is very important to comprehend the deep divide in political antagonism that all of the revolution which i concluded not long after my rev legibly in 2013 was for all intents and purposes unfinished. there is a highly touted parliamentary vote in 2012 but essentially that's it with length of buying and purchasing a -- for a fountain pen that doesn't exist. i don't want to repeat of lot of what has been said here. i've submitted a lengthy background note which i hope people agree contains a bit of a different narrative. many people have described the splits and libya is somehow sick laird nationals versus islamists and others myself included and i expect doctors wehrey would agree and view the situation status quo elements some who were pro-gadhafi versus revolutionary elements and some islamic with marginal ideological extremists on both sides. the revolution reveals together with true patriots a significant number found were educated in the united states and elsewhere in the west and some unabashed ideologues. i won't go into the whole narrative of the talks in the long talks there that i would agree with fred and his we looked over at overtime as we were there observing on the ground and working to advance their mutual interest it soon became clear to us is when we were dealing with area said that did not affect national patrimony or the appearance of giving advantage to the military side we were able to accomplish things in the other hand efforts to train special forces and to respond to prime minister in april of 2013 to appeal to g7 leaders were frustrated due to that composition and the lack of any unified command and control. interestingly throughout the gadhafi area -- eric technocrats with the national bank of the national oil company were left largely alone to do their business indicating to me that libyans in fact did not want to disturb their wealth, their national wealth. in fact we found that we worked pretty closely behind the scenes with them to ensure that that remained the case. unfortunately in the latter years following negotiations there have been efforts by some to create competing authorities. to does mail it say the average libyan whose primary concern is that he or she have enough to be back to committee get into ideally travel. against this background tripoli the government had for all intents and purposes removed itself from benghazi with the international community and this is when he first appeared at the time in february, february of 2014 at the time of the egregious resolution and went on a television on what we called an electronic tube calling on libyans to rise up and join him against the illegal unlawful gnc he did not stir much response in that affect pretty underground only reappearing in may and benghazi when he declared his day sickly vigilante war against individuals he constituted for he condemned as responsible for anarchy. together you know they story of the national elections held in 2014. i hope you read carefully my paragraph on that because my narrative and understanding when i was on the ground is a bit different in response to counter threats into libyan tripoli and the declaration by the time that the dialogue was no longer necessary. the militias acted preemptively to drive the militias out of tripoli which meant taking them out of areas that they had conquered during the revolution. this is a lot again and again about duty about revolutionaries holding on with ap the airport to tripoli tower that helped libyan investment authority the islamic call center that was important under gadhafi later on in terms of territory. this fighting over this then can occupy territory that others felt they had no right to is what led to our withdrawal and the eventual withdrawal of all diplomatic members or diplomatic institutions or omissions in libya at the time. i will offer a couple of things against this chaotic background. despite the political disarray the united states did conduct a number of missions successfully including the capture of -- while engaging with all sides in the political reconciliation talks and the support of the libyan government paid in other words this is not a matter of requiring us to pick and choose. libyans were the first to assert the presence of iceland da'ish and removing them. we can talk about isolator but i think you have covered the road map there. let me just same conclusion and we can get into questions later that libya is not engaged in a traditional civil war based on intractable ideological differences. the war of attrition in the controlling of destroying infrastructure in the absence of good trump administration. historically exhaustion and poverty meant or physical -- have proven prom -- prime motivators but as long as different factions who thus far have been fairly evenly matched in terms of turf contingent believe they can count on external support to tip the scales and avoid reaching the limits of add them proffers meant to exhaustion intermittent intermittent -- will continue contrary to human suffering refugee flows and penetration bolivia's vast territory by foreign fighters all qaeda and iceland da'ish. this is neither good for libya nor for us nor for our european partners. in the libyan solution will require at the municipal level for governing regime that ensures equitable situation of national wealth a certain degree of autonomy including unsecured matters of local and regional levels and their integration of the re-habilitation of their members. it must begin with a cease-fire monitor by the international community with libyan acquiescence in support as well as a gathering of heavy weapons throughout the country and continued cooperation in the war against isil da'ish and others wishing to exploit the libyan territory. libyans must agree to all this and i would note here that no one party party. >> no could become to conclusion here. tonight i will conclude. let me just say it is civil conflict libya is not easy but it's a worthwhile project. legitimacy cannot be imposed. must be earned. libyans have not asked us to fight their battles for them. the least we can do is support their dreams which were inspired frankly by our example. thank you. >> thank you so much. senator cardin. >> let me thank both of our witnesses. there is clearly great differences between syria and libya. syria has ethnic clashes that are very deep whereas libya does not have that burden. what we saw where russia intervened in syria and the damage it caused by being gauge meant in syria making the extremely difficult to get all sides together in a peace process which is the elves might answer in syria as that is the ultimate answer in libya. so now we see very disturbing trends about russia's engagement and libya. we see where they are actively engaged in supporting general have far who has been extremely difficult in recognizing the civilian government and according to human rights watch has committed war crimes. so my question first with the what is russia's intentions and libya? why have they've been able to get the cooperation of egypt one of our partners in the use of egypt's facilities and the military operations and what is the u.s. interest in dealing with russia's engagement in the libya? dr. marine le pen have some suggestions here. >> again i think it's one of the saving graces that the level of national interference can pass to syria. i would point to the gulf states is the most harmful after stepping back to 2011 revolution rate had to gulf states playing out their regional rivalry and libyan soil. the egyptian role came before russia in that long-standing economic and security interests. in libya they were among the first backers of general haftar and indeed when the general took power in egypt that was felt in the vso the egyptian policy toward libya shifted. again. >> in your testimony respect for civilian control is critical to the stability of that country. general haftar has not been helpful in that regard. >> correct. >> they are siding with general haftar. >> i think russia's interests in libya stems back to the gadhafi air a and the infrastructure projects. general haftar is a useful ally. it's very useful for their narrative. nato broke the country. here comes russia to clean it up they are backing him reportedly with spare parts and training in medical care. this is one of the alarming things about this parallel institution. russia was printing libyan currency to help prop it up so again their role has been unhelpful and it's been theatrical at times. the question is can they really fool syria and libya? do they want to present themselves as an indispensable broker? today want to be the ones that forge a new government that is favorable to their strategic and economic interests? the united states were to withdraw just in libya would that be good for russia? >> i think so center yes. my conversations with libya everyone is on edge waiting for the u.s. to give a signal. the absence of a signal creates a vacuum and that's an invitation further powers. >> what type of signal are we waiting for? >> well i think the high-visibility and art diplomatic engagement in our support for the government and the role of special envoys from the state department in supporting the europeans. i think a more visible and vocal and certainly not a signal that we are washing our hands of this. >> if i could be forced to turn to senator johnson and say times for interjections. i'm sorry i heard your two points and our staff yesterday was talking about then i realized it was certainly helpful in sirte with what happened with prices but i'm not understanding what that really means and their leadership there i'm truly seeking an answer could enough that italy france and other countries are very involved but tell me what it is specifically that the united states should do to move towards a political agreement here. again i think just a more visible support to the regional initiative statement containing some sort of new negotiating track with united nations with these regional partners and signaling to the libyan people and the libyan potic lacquers we are prepared to engage along a broad spectrum of initiatives to help the society and to help the libyan government. i think one example of what i'm talking about was when the libyan factions moved there fighting to the south when they started clashing in the south. the p5 issued a statement, all five of the p5 saying this was bad for libya. that consensus is where this u.s. needs to play a role. not just a background role. >> senator johnson. >> thank you chairman. i've seen political disarray. icy libyan technocrats. do they still exist and is there any hope of assembling the libyan democrats to provide governing? >> i think when it comes to the national oil company to the bank there are technocrats however the political leadership is in disarray and it needs guidance and support. we were able to do that as long as we were engaged with them. that's important to remember. we haven't had the physical presence of the diplomatic nature in libya since we withdrew in july of 2014. that sends a huge message to libya and unfortunately the political sensitivities and the rest the u.s. was nascent to -- worried about the paralysis but in fact we brought the russians and the chinese into the dialogue process. we were actively engages in that and having the u.s. on board signaling data supports the political as well as a military solution is extremely important. art appeared practical no pepfar in my time there and fred will know this controlled more than 12% of the country at any given time. you're never going to see isis or any other group there unless you have cooperation across-the-board. if you go in supporting haftar you will have a civil war and it will turn into something existential for libya and afraid >> how many significant groups are there? >> i would say there are thousands. this is one of the tragedies of libya paid the power so fragmented so it's neighborhood by neighborhood. even when the town of ma zarraga there are hundreds but within tripoli there are probably four or five. other major ones, 1200 but are there 10 major groups? >> he really is that fragmented traders talk now about this track of security dialogue of ringing and who would the -- you probably did get 12 to 15 leaders of the armed groups and that would get you there. again there's a chance for a spoiler to play a role. >> with the local fragmentation what role -- you really do have to start with military control at somebody's going to have to control the ground military. someone is going to bring these factions together. >> in certain areas in town a lot of these militias are tied to towns and they have arrangements with me to civil councils. there is a measure of control negotiated control between businessmen and municipal councils of the notion you would have unity in the country. conquest is -- but we need to look at is growing from the ground up. >> there's a countervailing horse with haftar in the recent uav in russia. who would be the most trusted foreign power to try to assert some level of stability and control? for example wasn't italy their primary trading partner? >> italy is playing a huge role in terms of recurring dialogue in tripoli and must ride. they have offered help in the east. >> does any foreign power troops there? if there is a contingency of troops in tripoli doing low-level training. >> but they are very limited numbers, correct? >> correct. >> do they need more? should we be encouraging european allies to step up to the plate? someone is going to have to insert some kind of military power to exert control. >> this is something that needs to be agreed upon but that needs to be worked out with libya. any foreign presence could play into the jihadist narrative. what needs to happen first is libya needs to re-up on a roadmap for their military. >> but with political disarray. there are thousands of forces. i'm trying to come up with what is really going to -- is going to require some kind of international coalition to try to stabilize the situation first, right? >> i don't think so. what's happening is there are talks underway to try to get these on board for leadership for demobilizing. lots of yemen want to go back to jobs and schools and they want a strategy for doing this. >> including chrystia freeland freeland -- haftar? >> the problem is that he wants to be part of the supreme commander. see that this kind of reality and not a problem is in the? >> it's a problem. the reality is the dispersal of heavy weapons and the opposition of haftar this deep and the misurata to have capability is based on july and august of 2014. they do have command and control and they do have the sense of protecting their own turf that will drive them to combat. if haftar is in the lead they have said before when there engaged with them that they were prepared to work with others in a controlled system but haftar has restated opposition to living, to be subordinate to civilian command creates a lot of discomfort with people in particular given some of his ties and the supporters outside of libya where people don't know what the point is. i think all countries as a security council we are in agreement we want a stable libya. there other factors here. we have partners including egypt and others who are adamantly opposed to the notion that any islamist group or a muslim brother group have any access to libya's wealth which they believe will lead to some kind of islamic takeover for their own principalities or their own government. therefore their objective has been to do something that keeps it away and haftar has been a bit of a tool for them in that regard. he has been unable to consolidate its gains outside of the benghazi area essentially. this has been going on for three years. i agree with doctors wehrey it be in less you have an libyan agreement on an organization that's going to ensure transparent distribution of national wealth under a more localized government >> i got it, thank you so much. senator booker. >> dr. wehrey i want to read a portion of your testament to promotion of the entrepreneur ship multilevel government education civil society is a vital adjunct counterterrorism tool border control trained and equipped in direct action. you describe an environment where isis is thriving in areas where there is no government and no civil society. i just want to put that into the context of administration policy right now in reducing the state department resources to deal with civil society. it's very shocking to me the budget that they have outlined in light of what you seem to be indicating as a prescription to ultimately bring it back to libya. could you comment on that? >> i agree senator and where i set up camp in libya were these marginalized areas that have fallen off the map of post revolutionary libya. if you look at a city like sirte it was neglected after the revolution and sirte was lacking representation. there were tribes there as well as islamic state simply for what they provided. the same thing in the west. the smugglers doing deals with the islamic state if there is no local economy. in the south there's no governance. this is where aqim flies through the same in benghazi. how do you fortify the resilience of libyan society and that's where governance comes in that is so essential. >> whatever the strategy is part of that is essential that civil society investment and the state department is critically able to do. >> i think so senator and us along with local partners, i went to southern libya to a very remote town wracked by tribal fighting and it just fallen off the map. there was nothing there but people, didn't people bear talked about usaid computer center that was set up the basically connected them to the lobe and gave them computer skills. unfortunately it was destroyed in fighting but they look at that as a visible indication of u.s. commitment. >> what disturbs me is we are operating under amuf from 2001. i'm just curious is intervention both military and i hope civil society work do they want to continue to use the amuf is a reason or justification for their intervention militarily? >> i can't say. pardon me because i'm no longer in government but i'm hearing from contacts and special forces that they are hearing signals that in fact where essentially going to go to hit-and-run policy in libya as opposed to trying to knit together the kind of enduring solution. >> if i could what you are saying is that has to be in the issa specific whack-a-mole issue. it's not going to be and enduring presence which would mean the amuf is operative. you don't hear any plans of any long-term ground saying it's unnecessary anyway? nothing to that end. >> right. i am hearing what i call tactical impatience. people want to act against what they see there really not considering the overall living context which is libyan so my experience don't have indigenous isis by and large. soft -- opportunistic as dr. dr. wehrey said it may don't want to share their wealth. they are the ones that are called ice allowed in their own country. >> i want to jump quickly to my remaining two seconds. human trafficking is a serious concern in this country. migrants are being held hostage in slave markets in libya. furthermore smuggling which is driving conflict there and i just want to know if you have any input about what we should do to address this larger humidity crisis. i imagine pulling the conflict to allow us to liberate that this was a critical objective. >> first i'm sorry to say human trafficking piracy and slavery has been part and parcel of libya's history. even when he had a strong authoritarian -- authoritarian government. it's not something that they have paid attention that the international community would like for them to pay. this is one of the areas when you have a political dialogue and yet the government that engages across the country and makes the distribution of wealth part and parcel of working against those kinds of things in replacing those activities, smuggling which has long been the bread and butter for many libyans particularly in the south but also for those on the borders who brought in sub-saharan africans and traded them. this is aside from the kind of thing that you can only address with civil society with governance. >> just to add to that symptom of libya's economic collapse and the circle of complicity in this lucrative smuggling trade has widened. it's how people make their living in the same thing in the north. promoting programs for alternative livelihoods in the south. fixing libya's economic crisis but then again being careful who we partner with. the notion of training the libyan coast guard. who are we talking about? many of the coast guards or militia run and in fact complicit with trade returning these migrants to these surrenders detention centers and i've seen several of them. it's humane -- inhumane and immoral. >> thank you chairman. ambassador doctor thank you for your testimony here today. want to highlight the importance of the united states working on multiple fronts to defeat isis in libya. he spoke to some of this but on april 20 president trump as you know held a joint press conference with the tide foreign minister nepa press conference he said he doesn't see a role for the united states and libya apart from the islamic state militants. that was a press conference with the prime minister. do you both agree that defeating isis in libya or anywhere else for that matter both require the establishment of inclusive and effective governance? >> i do agree senator absolutely 100%. as i outlined in my testimony who joins isis are the losers in the political order and the people shut out of the political process. any government that excludes people on the basis of ideology or belief, those people are going to get radel allies to them is going to increase the pool of terrorism. >> that in turn have some ramifications. usaid state department of civil society can they bring to bear on some of the challenges and the municipal administration you spoke to that are necessary to bring stability, is that correct? >> vasily senator. the fact that municipal authorities enjoy elected legitimacy when you go-round two towns there are certain cases where they have had success so one of the strategies i've seen from the united nations and others is going straight to those municipal authorities including the budget and helping them finance themselves. what's so worrisome about the haftar control under haftar's control as he is replaced control with uniformed military. >> i would say again in sirte we saw support opportunistic farm groups that were politically opposed to misurata. it was about competition for resources so until you have the government who does what governments are supposed to do which is to ensure equitable access to national resources through security regulatory framework rule of law you are going to have this problem in libya. >> ambassador my previous line of questioning was prospect. being retrospective here thinking about the lessons learned and whether there are broader applications. in your prepared remarks many thought a dubai on the mediterranean -- and you've commented such an expectation was in hindsight wishful thinking. a poll doctrine poses the questions we should consider before taking military action. number six of those was whether the consequences of our actions have been fully considered. this really applies to both of you but first ambassador in 2011 deeply there was a failure to as a question what comes next and more broadly but broader lessons for u.s. policy based on the experiences and libya might we draw? >> senator i do think and i was not part of the decision-making process of course but i do believe it was a very different situation. i think people forget it was in fact the arab league that came to us in asked us to take action to provide a no-fly zone because gadhafi i'm mike leaders in tunisia egypt and yemen where similar uprisings were taking place in the so-called arab spring uprisings the leaders were not attacking their own populations but where is gadhafi threatened to do so to kill them so when you have a situation like that particular hand the heels of events like rwanda or the things that think politically would have been difficult to stand by and do nothing and watch a dictator who we dealt with as a dictator who had been responsible for a number of terrorist actions around the world to stand by and say we prefer stabilities to supporting those who were trying to overthrow him. again remember we were speaking to people on the revolutionary side like dr. jabrill who presented an articulated vision of what we could do. .. >> i think also people were surprised to allocate resources or go in with our european partners to assist libya. it's important that libya's did not want foreign military on the ground. they did not want a lot of foreign presence, period. what they asked for was the un mission, special mission in libya, and that's what they got. he did begin by writing a white paper on organizing some sort of military structure. i think it was only later when people realized the depth of the fragmentation and that the revolution was in fact unfinished because excessive transitional government proved incapable of the arming the militias, rehabilitating, taken away their areas of control, and it was clear that they were not all that interested in having any western groups who would have been injured, killed in the process. >> i will say, retrospect, one of the things that has occurred is the leader of north korea has learned if you give up your weapons of mass destruction, then you will likely be taken out and we are having to deal with that dynamic right now. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you both for your testimony. the government of national accord, the proposed un facilitated agreements has failed to achieve, does that represent the best way forward for libya as you try to put all the factions together? is that really an avenue still? >> i think the libyan political agreement really remains the touchdown. they still see that agreement signed in december 2015 as the foundation. the question is what kind of political structure. you are talking about the presidency council, the other bodies, the state council, that's what it's being worked out. there was a five person presidency council that was tremendously unwieldy that was right with the vision, there were other structural problems and so the talks are how do you revise that. the key question, this has been a sticking point is civilian control over the military. are the new negotiations a covert way for him to come on to a new council where he would be de facto ruler of the country? >> it seems to me, if that's the fundamental question, what is it, don't we have leverage? we give egypt and an enormous amount of money. the saudi's are our ally, are we leveraging our relationship with those two countries based on the support they're giving libya. you are both smiling. i don't know what that means. >> thank you for that question senator. as you know, no relationship is purely bilateral. we have many engagements in different areas in the region, and the nature of our relationship with egypt and the arab emirates and others are deep and multilayered. i think when it comes to priorities or how much leverage you actually have in some areas it's quite limited because what is existential for others is not necessarily seen as such by us and vice versa. i think some of our friends have made a decision that they believe they live in the neighborhood, and they cannot tolerate what they believe we naïvely think is the ability to have islamists in a government that has access to a lot of money. so, there are ways around this, building and safeguards, building and transparent systems that we would say we have institutional ways around this, in these settings where institutions are not always the predominant feature, they see things differently. >> bottom line, you are saying their interests are going to trump any influence that we may have over this because we have a multilayered interest with them so therefore this is not at the top of their poll? it just seems like what we are resigned to come if we don't leave and then use leverage with countries that can leverage the situation and exacerbate the situation that they exist, what we are destined to is a continuing internal conflict, and us on occasion striking isis targets as we see it necessary. that is a long-term proposition for failure at the end of the day. >> i'm not sure failure, i think it's just the nature of international relations and diplomacy when your priorities don't always jive on these things. >> i think the egyptians are coming around, they have actually pushed for negotiations in the west. they have an interest on their border, they don't want the division of libya. i don't think they want military conquest of the country. they have certain security interests. i do think the u.s., especially the new administration has more leverage since we are sending these messages that we have your back on iran, i think that can translate, libya still affects multiple u.s. allies, perhaps more than yemen. we are not getting involved in libya. i think in the case of the uae, they are interference has been almost purely ideological driven by the muslim brotherhood and that's not a recipe for a country that will be immune to terrorism. i think we need to have stronger leverage. >> i would point out, egypt has certainly been aligned with israel so i do agree there is some leverage that we haven't had in the past that hopefully will be useful as we move ahead. >> thank you both for being here. libya is often pointed to as an example of foreign-policy mistake or what have you, and i want to revisit that for a moment. i want to talk about the benghazi defense brigade. as you know libya has become a terrorist safe haven and an alphabet soup of organizations fighting for control of the country. what are your views regarding cooperation between the benghazi defense brigade and elements like al qaeda? i know they have attempted to deny links to terrorism. is it not the fact that they are a well-known coalition. how would you characterize them and in particular whether we believe the libyan national army has the capability to defeat them? >> he will know someone in al qaeda or be affiliated. there is a 6-degree of separation. is the group and al qaeda affiliate or organization? no. is its involvement helpful yes. i don't think they have the ability to fully defeat a force that could challenge it in the oil prices. that will be a site of contention for years it has been ever since 2015. >> i would only add that there were many who argued that when they engaged in benghazi, in fact he undid the work of parsing off the extremists from the core of some of these militias. in fact, they drove them back together because their sole objective came to defeat him instead of what they had been doing before, peering off and coming back into the national grouping after the revolution and marginalizing the extremists. just about every libyan family , it's like rebels and yankees. they got someone they would rather not see at the table and then they feel sorry when that person passes away. i've watched libyans over the death of benghazi revolutionaries because they are cousins or someone else but i would say the hard-core group and they have been a refuge for people because it's filled with caves, it's isolated and easily cut off. the christian saints used to hang out there because it was so isolated. that is a problem. benghazi is a mix but i think it's hard to say that the whole group of the revolutionaries is part of the problem. they drove out isil from deanna. >> on the broader question, this is what i get from a lot of people. i am simplifying it. qaddafi was a really bad person but he kept the country stable print he was overthrown and the islamists are there and it's become a playground. my counter has been the jihadist are not the people who overthrew him. it was the libyan people. he was gone one way or another. the choice before us at the time was not whether he stayed but whether or not a vacuum would follow. it's my assessment, the reason why that is relevant is it is being extrapolated to syria. the uprising that led to it was not led by the radical elements as much as it was by the libyan people who didn't want to live under this lunatic criminal. >> i think you are absolutely right, but what happened was immediately following the revolution, he gets back to what we were saying before, the infighting over control of the nation's assets have led to these divides that are not fundamentally ideological in nature. this is the country who 98% are sunnis. that's not the issue. the issue is who controls the wealth. that's why i say i see it as status quo, who owns the goods versus distributed democracy of people who felt it was time to share the wealth and also have a democratic group. i think there are some who are indeed, but they are still democrats, small the democrats and those who are ideologues and extremists and they have always been there and they are dabbling in very troubled waters. at the end of the day, i still believe in my heart that this needs, a political reconciliation that provides for equitable distribution of national wealth in a transparent way will bring people together against those narrow groups of extremists. >> thank you, sir. let's go to this diplomatic breakthrough that the italians have made, bringing together the dna and the brook actions in some kind of preliminary negotiation, to reach a negotiation with donald trump saying i don't want to have any part of getting the united states in the middle of this, but like you're saying, at the end of the day a diplomatic resolution is the only way we are going to be able to resolve these difficulties, including splitting up the oil revenues. can you talk a little bit about these initiatives and what hopes you may have for it to be a building block to have a resolution reached that is diplomatic and not military. >> i think the italians deserve enormous credit for brokering this. what it is is the state council ahead of the ho are agreeing to talk, meeting for the first time, the question is, what's next. the devil is in the details. what new body emerges from this, but then i have to underscore this question about who controls military force. this was what led to the fighting back in 2014, the the monopoly on the use of force. the question will be what is the general's willingness to engage in this process as well. >> you think this indicates he is willing to participate in the process based on both factions will now be talking. >> i don't know. we've seen these things happen before, these initiatives and then there's always room for spoilers in libya. i just don't know what his stances. i know the algerians, the tunisians have their own initiative, i think it's encouraging that he is starting to meet with a number of high-level officials, but as i understand it in the medications with the un, he wants a seat at the table that could be the head of the table. >> i was just going to say, talk is the opposite of conflict so that's a good thing, however the political balance of these negotiations is really flow thrown off when you have external elements making promises to people or giving them added weight in the equation that could then lead to them staying out of the process. i think that's the case right now and with other groups. >> so reports are that saroj is coming to the united states to meet with president trump and reports also are out there that they are going to talk to him before he comes to washington to meet with trump. so, does i give you some reason to believe that the united states, president trump should play a hands-on role and not a hands-off role in terms of trying to resolve this dispute? >> of course, i think the president can play a helpful role in that if he underscores the importance of a political solution and authorities over the military. if anyone can make a deal, i think he probably thanks he can. >> you are saying this is an opportunity for president trump to try to make a deal. he should play a hands-on role in trying to bring these two parties together, if he is coming to see the president, i do believe the president should offer something more than saying this is an italian problem and we will help you militarily and that's it. >> it's not simply the deal, but it's what comes next. it's that guarantees and the involvement to the make the deal stick. the sort of government approach is so important. we should be ready to engage. >> do you see this as a big moment, there's a number of events that are converging, heading toward this meeting in the white house. >> again, i don't want to sound pessimistic but i'm guardedly optimistic. it is something we have seen, this is where the regional state is so important. the role of the emirates and egypt, the fact that they agree to the 2015 agreement. meanwhile they hedged, the role of regional spoilers and spoilers on the ground, can they deliver the rejection us in his camp. how much control does he have. >> thank you. thank you to both of you for being here today. i apologize if i'm asking a repetitive question. with the rising tension between house of representatives and the national court, there was a report from the guardian on march 14 that stated, russia appeared to have deployed special forces to an airbase in egypt near the border. it goes on to explain that u.s. and diplomatic officials have said any such russian involvement might be part of a support to the military commander. could you provide any input. >> i'm going to yield because i have no information on that. >> i have no information beyond what i have read. >> if they were to do the open source report, what role do you think they should be playing. >> senator, i think, we know foreign special forces have played a role in the past in his campaign in benghazi, there's been russian offers of training in russia, there's been offers of medical help, i'm not sure what value adds that gets him right now. his principal mode of combat, he hasn't shown a willingness to go after so i think the question is is this another arrow in the quiver of russia to signal their involvement. >> is it then in the national security interest of the united states, concern of our national security interests that there are special forces in libya. >> i think this is one of those where we have to be very cautious. we've had special forces. this is all a matter of common knowledge. i'm not giving anything away. i think it depends on what the intent is as the doctor said, what is their purpose, and i think a lot of it may be russia putting in our face that they are there. i think we have to be careful in how we respond to it. >> we've seen no increase or expand that flows out of libya. >> concern? >> is there concern that russian forces or activity could spur migration again into russia, into greece or italy? >> i don't think so. most of those flows are coming up through the central area of the desert and the west. i don't think i would have any consequence for the flow of migrants at all. according to the 2017 posture statement, the instability in libya and north africa may be the significant near-term threat. could you talk about that statement could you talk about your concerns. >> i think the notion of libya is really profound so we were talking about a number of interest in the region whether it's the success and stability of tunisia and we know they've plotted attacks on libyan soil. the security of the u.s. ally egypt. there is huge concern about the spillover of arms and jihadist to the south so i think libya is this epicenter that affects the surrounding region. >> can i add that i think it's important to remember that tripoli has a fairly normal day-to-day life on the scope, on the scale of things. what i am saying is a lot of the refugees are coming from other places and strolling through libya because is not governed properly. there is eternal displacement in libya but the wealthy libyans have other places to live. it's the planning and the smuggling of weapons that is problematic. they will point out to you that they were not libyans, but that is the problem that libya provides a playing field in the south. on the other side of the coin, they don't provide the kind of urban centers that eiffe isil or -- exploit to as steel oil we've already seen libyans in the city state are prepared to fight, particularly in tripoli, they are not ready to allow that. >> thank you. i may have to step out. it may not be here at the end. i want to thank you both for being here and for your testimony. it's been very helpful. we look forward to following up again with questions "after words". with that, senator merkley. >> thank you, mr. chairman i want to start by returning back to the conversation about the u.s. and the question of a no-fly zone. it seems like at some point we went beyond and in that transition, did we adequately, in terms of our analysis evaluate the consequences of that and understand the challenge that would be faced following the demise of gadhafi's regime? >> again, i wasn't part of the planning. i think the military would have to address that as well as people in the security council. however, i do believe we did not believe there was a vacuum in the sense that we were speaking to people, some of them quite articulate supporters of the revolution who assured people they were prepared to come in and take over and provide the institutional replacement that would allow them to organize the country. i don't think libyans themselves were even aware of what a mess this would become, to be honest. >> i would agree. i in i think there was this overly optimistic assessment that libya would get back on their feet. a small country, oil reserves, it wasn't destroyed. i think there was this sense that we've handed this off to the europeans and united nation. now syria is happening. the libyan role is essential in the sense that they told us we got this. they didn't want a large presence on the ground. i think there was an excessive focus on elections as a success marker that we've gotta get the election right. meanwhile there was a lot of lessons learned in terms of how we do this. i will also add the regional role. regional states have their own security plans. they had their own proxy and allies and they were doing things on the ground that were not helpful for unity later on. >> i do think it's something we should keep in mind later on. we have very articulate spokespersons in iraq who assured us there would be no challenge there in terms of the transition and those individuals will all always exists, but when there is a long-term dictator, if it's gadhafi or saddam hussein, the transition can be extraordinarily difficult "after words" and i feel like we should give that full analysis. i want to turn to the nonproliferation side. following pan am 103 negotiations with libya, libya decides to try to rectify that. how to those conversations address the nuclear program that had said gadhafi, if he followed through to dismantle his nuclear program could gain a respected place among nations and touted this example as saying i hope others will find an example in libya's action. there were ten related sites that were addressed. at the time we were considering libya to miasma them what messages sent to iran and they were extremely dismissive that there was any reverberations in terms of how they would perceive the vulnerability following an agreement to dismantle his program. i think that was tremendous to other countries we were working on. i just want to get your sense on that particular point. >> again, these are probably questions better directed to people like bill burns who were engaged in those negotiations back in the day. i would also say i think there is a sense at the time, and again i'm out of my lane, but there was a lot of discussion in the head of the first national council that led the government "after words" were they were talking and doing, looking at reforms and economic reforms and opening up in a certain way. i suspect there was an element of hope. first there was a concern that it's never a good thing for the united states to not talk to large essentially placed countries that have it dangerous impact on the rest of the region. libya was at a point where we might see the openings of some sort of transition. obviously the libyan people didn't feel the same way when it came to 2011. >> the question i'm asking is in the context of the role that we and other nations play in dismantling the regime and the message that sent to north kore korea. >> i can probably speak more to the iranians because they probably have a better sense of government than the koreans but they are adding their own survival success in that. i am not qualified to address that here. >> i would just add to that. i think it's a very different context. north korea and iran are totally different strategic context so i don't know what lessons they took from that. >> i find it a bit of a dodge at a time where we are trying to persuade other countries to dismantle their countries to not recognize that dismantling a nation i gave up their nuclear program would be seriously, others pay very serious attention to that so i don't really accept that you're not all qualified to address the question. i think you are ver being very tactful and polite. >> can i just say the u.s. dismantling the country, what was happening was there was a failing government that was unable to meet the need of the government. the reform project was dead and you had an uprising. >> i didn't -- i referred to libya dismantling their nuclear program. >> but you are talking about the 2011, the result of that, he didn't have the ability to deter the intervention and that this led to his downfall. >> i'm really talking about the message of sent to have worked with the nation to have them forgo their nuclear program and then be vulnerable to outside intervention. that is kind of the core issue that drives north korea and iran to want to secure a nuclear weapon, to say, it kinda gives them a bit of a guarantee. our actions in regard to north korea would be different if they didn't have nuclear weapons in existence. >> with all respect senator, i'm not trying to dodge, but i think a similar situation would only be if the north korean people themselves were rising up against the leader and being slaughtered. >> i have described it as a similar situation. >> i think that's changing the context. >> i think that makes it difficult to say because the united states and the international community choice, yes, maybe they're taking something from this. would gadhafi have used nuclear weapons on his own people? i'm not so sure. having participated in the final precursor for chemical weapons, i'm pretty glad we went in there and we were able to clean up a lot of that stuff because the last thing you want is to have it in the militias for the other groups. >> on that point, we do agree. thank you. >> thank you. thank you to our panelists. i'm sorry i was at a hearing on north korea. i'm sorry to be late and missed your testimony. i wonder, could either of you speak to, and again, i apologize of some of these have been answered. can you speak to the current status of the government. my understanding is that while they haven't been able to govern very well, they do seem to have support from a lot of libyans. is that the case and how long would we expect that to continue if the current chaos extends for long period of time. i think again the support from libyans is for this agreement. i was in libya last year end you sense it in the capital. there is, they are not able to meet people's basic needs. long lines in the banks, rolling electricity, blackouts, they haven't been able to get their budget under control. there is a dispute with the central bank. they don't control security. these militia flareups happen and their diving for cover. there is a sense that something needs to be new renegotiated but i think the foundational accord still sticks and i think a lot of libyans recognize that and you better not jump into the darkness msu got something to replace us. >> are you optimistic that there might be progress as a result of the discussion in rome and the potential, what appears to be maybe they're getting close to a compromise agreement? is that something that is promising that may offer hope for people? >> i would agree with doctor wary that people don't want to throw out the baby with the bathwater and the fact that the international community and the united nations endorse this agreement and supported it, after a long time, it took a long time. in the process libyans learned a lot about political dialogue. it was a politically illiterate country in so many ways and having been part of that process for all those years, i saw this firsthand. i think they want to modify and extend. they would like to see, my sense is, and what i hear from libyans, they would like to see a final integration between the house of representatives with an authority that's not overly overwhelming. they don't want a strong authority. they don't want a dictator but they would like to see a unified authority and they would like to see general hester under the civilian authority. or, even marginalized. quite frankly, a lot of people would like to see him in some honorary role on the outside, promoted up and out, but libyans want stability. they want predictability, and they want their economy to grow again. that's what they really want. >> what about the discussions in rome. are they really making progress? >> i'm not privy to a lot of the details, i think discussion is already better than the opposite, but we have seen a lot of discussions in the past. libyans are very good at talking and throwing chaff and going back and fragmenting even more so you come back with a whole new ballgame, but i think at least it's a step in the italians do know libya very, very well and libyans i have spoken to do believe the italians are taking the correct approach. i will say that. >> how concerned are you that the united states seems to be missing from the discussions? and from a leadership role right now on what's going on. >> very, and, what does that mean as you talked about the economy of libya and how people want to see the economy going again, and as the beginning to get their oil reserves producing again, and we are looking at other nations coming in, russia, i assume china to come in and provide assistance to the oil reserves, what does that mean for the united states in the future? >> i will say only that if the perception becomes and spreads that the only time the united states was interested in post revolutionary libya was when we could make a lot of deals and money and the minute we became difficult we pulled out and focused on military instead of what we believe as americans as the for freedom principles, then we have a problem. >> you would both like to see the united states take more of a leadership role? >> i think we need to be present and we need to make clear what our vision is. i think we have very successfully, libya was one of these for situations, certainly in my 30 for your career where was a bilateral assignment as ambassador but it was a multilateral process throughout where we were supporting un positions and also having to work and coordinate very closely with security cancel representatives and allies. we had to deal with regional powers and parties. libya has many parties in it. the u.s. needs to play a signature role and a very important symbolic role certainly, and it needs to be, presence matters. >> you agree with that? >> completely. that was a great characterization. it's not us leading the charge on this, but playing a cordoning function and we are sort of the glue that keeps it together with these different players. just being present at the table is so essential. echoing from my conversations on the ground, this notion that we are there for counterterrorism, or we are there for the oil, these narratives are out there so these notions that we care about the libyan people and we care about people are so important. >> i know i'm over my time, but in terms of the future of africa, north africa and middle east, don't we have to include libya with whatever strategy we decide with this region. >> yes, libya, many of the states have the potential to be a resource and really an important boundary for a lot of africa. it should be a major tourist area. it should be a major medical center. it should be a place of university. it has a history, it has a presence, it has a place and it's really close. i tell people it's closer to rome than mecca. libya is closer to some parts of italy then some of its neighbors. it is important. it cannot be dismissed. >> thank you. thank you, mr. chairman. let me just ask one or two questions if i may. the commander of the u.s. africa command general, before the armed services committee warned that libya must carefully choose where and with whom we work in order to counter isis and not shift the balance sparking greater conflict in libya. what lessons did we learn from the campaign last year. [inaudible] >> i will say it was our policy prescription back in march 2015 that the only way we could defeat a soul was to partner across the board because of the landmass of libya. we can't choose one partner. at the time, the chairman agreed that anyone who shared our views on isis could be a partner in libya to deny them any toehold. you have to partner with like-minded or people who share your view. we worked and we found them, so that has been successful in that regard. i would just add to that that those who drove out the islamic state were tied to the government of national cord, but just very loosely. some of them were opposed to it. they have now turned on the government. again, we did form a partnership, but it was a very limited and targeted where we assisted them on a geographic threat. we are not talking about training militias, writing them a blank check or giving them aid because that could upset the balance amount was mentioned in the testimony, if we side with one faction against terrorism, that could cause the other faction to go against us to return to a regional patron. there is all sorts of second and third order effects. we've seen it in the east were certain countries were giving support to the lma which was an unrecognized forest and i had a political effect on negotiations. >> if the head of the president's counsel actually comes to washington, if that were to take place, there are some rumors, i want to follow up on charming quarters follow-up to my question. what should the united states expect in deliverables from the leaders of the president counsel if they were to come to the united states as a prerequisite for a visit year in america. >> i was going to turn around and say my advice would be that he needs to come prepared to firmly articulate what he is prepared, what he needs, but also what he can do right now, what the situation is and what he's prepared to do as well in terms of compromise or political dealmaking to bring things to closure. so often we found that when the libyans come, they are kind of looking for someone else to tell them what to do and then they want to quibble with it. they can't do this with a can't do that. he needs to come with a clear, articulate vision of where he sees the process going. he should be prepared to play out what the italian dialogue is producing, and he should be prepared to put out there what their minimum standards are for any kind of compromise or for expanding and also revising the agreement. the u.s. shouldn't be put in a position of having to offer something larger, but he should be able to articulate what it is he wants to do. >> so he should come with a specific game plan. is there something more we could expect from that type of a high visible opportunity? >> unfortunately i don't think he's in the position of strength to deliver. it has to be, this visit happened within a broad consensus that includes other players. it's not just the visit alone. he may ask for a million things. but they go back and they can execute and they can't write the check. we've seen this movie before. we need to demand when he comes, who is on board and what's the consensus and what's the roadma roadmap. >> thank you. this has been very informative. we appreciate your insight and hope to have more visits to create opportunities. we thank you both for sharing your deep knowledge of the situation. we will keep record open until the close of business on thursday. i know both of you have busy lives but if you can respond to questions promptly, we appreciate it. we look forward to seeing you back here in the near future and thank you very much for your testimony. the meeting is adjourned. , on. [inaudible conversation] [inaudible conversation] televi. and is brought to you today by your cable or satellite provider. coming up a senate hearing on government waste and fraud. then a discussion on who benefits from globalization. after that, a panel examines the role of the united states in the world today. and later, a senate hearing on u.s. foreign policy concerning libya. now a senate hearing on duplication, waste, and fraud in areas of the federal government. witnesses include the comptroller general of the general accountability office and the treasury inspector general for tax administration. this is an hour and 40