Iraq is still very much an experiment. One, i think the feeling that i got throughout the country is that there is still discussion about what this state represents, what it should be. And an idea that we in washington sometimes see as a divided nation that wants and should be formally split into three entities is in fact not there in many respects. Iraq is still trying to figure out in itself what the relationship should be between the communities, how it should treat its neighbors, how to redefine its identity both in terms of its relationship with iran, the u. S. And its arab partners. One thing that i think we should be looking at very clearly is the u. S. Should be encouraging that process forward. The more we encourage iraqis to discover a new process that reaches reconciliation as ambassador was mentioning i think more iraq will be stable. Definitely what the fight around daesh and isis requires that process to move forward. Thats really my viewpoint on where iraq is today. And you just mentioned daesh which is perfect segue to aaron the bar fellow at the washington institute. If youre looking for somebody in washington who really understands isis and isnt just going on what they read other people saying about isis but reads the propaganda that comes out, understands the organization, how the organization thinks about governance, how it thinks about its goals and articulates them, aaron is your guy. Im delighted you could join us. Where does this stand in the process both of daeshs goals within iraq and the way nondaesh members of the Sunni Community in iraq see both the daesh project and the project the ambassador was describing . Yeah. For the Islamic State they dont really care whats going on in baghdad right now in terms of their discussions on whats going on. Theyre not worried about what the kurds are doing. Theyre focused primarily on their own state building project, whether its in terms of, you know, suppressing anyone going against them or whether its trying to return industries back to working again. This is one of the things that im seeing now at least in terms of what theyre trying to show to the world right now. Is that life is going on in the areas that theyre controlling. Of course its a lot more complicated than that. For example, if you look at their health administration, theyre trying to put out this message that theyre able to provide services for people in medical facilities and hospitals. But then if you look at the administrative documents which have been leaked online and their official propaganda, theyre actually looking for doctors to be able to work there and telling doctors that are leaving as idps or refugees that if they leave theyre going to seize their homes and things like that. So theres a different picture depending on whether you look at the official propaganda theyre putting out versus what the administrative documents locally theyre giving to the local population. And while they definitely have control, its purely through terror and authoritarian methods and not necessarily in terms of the local peoples will to want them to stay there. Your sense then that the sunni population is significantly winnable if the kind of inclusive government the ambassador was talking about begins to show itself . I definitely think theres a segment of the population within the Sunni Community that would be willing to go on board with it, but at the same time i think they also need to feel assuaged that they actually have buyin in baghdad. If you look at sort of what occurred with the movement in 2007, 2008, 2009, there are a lot of agreements about how the Sunni Community will be brought into the government whether its politically, security, military, but then once the u. S. Left a lot of these things didnt actually occur. And that led to many grievances within the Sunni Community. Which led then to the protest movements in december 2012, which then eventually led to the Islamic State piggybacking off of this issue in december 2013 when the protest camp in ramadi was destroyed by the maliki government. So theres a lot of chain of reactions along lines within the Sunni Community. If they can get these assurances though that they can be part of this broader iraqi project, then i think they would be willing. But i do think theres still some skepticism even if they dont necessarily like the Islamic State. Aaron just referred to the u. S. And certainly one of the things that we continue to hear about iraq is the role of outside parties stirring the pot. Iranian intervention, iranian influence, what are the constructive things that you think foreign parties can do to try to promote internal reconciliation . Well, john, you have two fronts to that question. You have the political process internally, which he talked about which is the project in the making, how do the interdependencies between politics and internal and you have the fight against isis or daesh. In the fight against daesh we certainly need tremendous support in controlling the border. So our neighbors should have a real project in for example stopping jihadists, tourist jihadists to come from north africa, going through neighboring countries and going straight to syria or iraq. So they have to do that. Or fatwas coming from some of the gulf can you be tcountries,l with that. So from a security perspective and fight against daesh. For their sake and as much for the sunni sake, we tell everybody this is a global problem. Then you have the political stability, how do they support it . Iraqis with the last election and the specifically after the fall of mosul have realized what a role our neighbors should play. And they have more or less supported each other in that discussion. We are now have a much clearer understanding what turkey can do for our internal politics, what jordan has been able to do and others as well. To that effect i think we are getting much better understanding and less involvement of our neighbors in our internal affairs and more toward the stability of the country. Thats a good sign. So we think that our neighbors have matured up to that challenge. Iraqis internal politics have also matured up. Your neighbor, your Community Neighbor whether theyre kurdish, shia, others, regardless are there support you from the outside. So we are a project in the making. And we are developing in the right direction. But on the fight against isis i still think we need a lot of support. Are you finding that some parties think that isis can be useful pressure against iranian influence in iraq and can help sue for the kind of political deal afterward they want . John, were seeing isis very similar to the taliban situation in afghanistan. And we can see what afghanistan has led to with this lack of aggressiveness against taliban at the time and allowing it. We dont want to emulate that copy. We dont want to be a copycat to that situation. We want the fight against isis for their sake and our sake. That for the stability of the region and the globe as a result of that. So i think we are looking for a more responsive, mature reflection of what has taken place. And we dont want our neighbors hand to be burned by the lack of engagement in the fight against isis. Are you hearing when you travel in the middle east people who say, well, we dont want isis to win but we also dont want the iranians to win iraq completely . Is that something you hear . Certainly, john. I think to a certain extent isis is viewed still as a useful tool in checking iranian influence, especially in a postiranian nuclear deal environment. As in iraq is still viewed at least in saudi arabia and in other capitals as an extension or an iranians fear of influence. As a matter of fact its definitely far from true, but it is still treated as that. That goes for both the iranian for the iraqi theater and the syrian one. Unfortunately, no one regionally wants iraq to emerge as a strong state. Iran still views iraq as a weak entity attached to it or aligned with it as favorable to a stronger iraq. I would say that saudi arabia definitely does not want the iraqi democratic experience to fully prosper. And in fact i dont think that the saudis have ever made a strategic decision to reach some form of a deal with a new iraqi system, to embrace iraq as an arab state with a new system. I think that hasnt been done before. And im not sure it will be done in the future. Can i add this small point here . Absolutely. Its important to look at isis as a global problem rather than just an internal domestic iraqi one. We have our faults. Nobodys denying that. We may have contributed to its strength, however when you have a problem in north africa or when you have chechnya or chinese or american joining isis, that has nothing to do with internal iraqi politics, has nothing to do with sunni, has to do with the global problem has to do with global resolution as much as Global Warming is a problem we have to work with. I think thats important for our audience to appreciate at least that iraqi politics internal you cant help regardless how much you help on the iraqi politics you have a global phenomenon which you need to grasp and get control of. Thats where i think may be missing. Aaron, one of the things that seems to me when people report on foreign fighters, we hear a lot about foreign fighters in syria, we dont hear a lot about foreign fighters in iraq. In fact, what we keep hearing about daesh in iraq is that its merging loyalists or baptist who is are growing beards and putting on different uniforms. Not to dis your beard at all. Is there Something Different about daesh as it operates in iraq versus daesh as it operates in syria . Yeah, at least on the first part its definitely true. I would say vast majority of foreign fighters are actually based in syria. Though you do see foreign fighters in iraq as well, but theyre not really involved with the administration of the areas that theyre controlling. The foreign fighters are primarily used as suicide bombers in the iraqi context. Whereas the foreign fighters in the syrian context are more used in terms of the administration. So just yesterday there was a report of syrian as well as another involved in a suicide bombing in iraq yesterday, or at least thats when it was announced. So theres a difference in that context. Another thing to think about too is that this organization while many people began to repay attention to it in june 2014 after the fall of mosul, this is an organization that has had a presence nonstop since 2002, 2003 when zarkawi first came to iraq after the fall of tor ra bor ra in afghanistan. So they have a lot more history as well as connections. Theres a lot more local ties within the iraqi context whereas in syria the organization itself really didnt start to put down a foothold until april 2013 when abut bakr al baghdadi. Iraq obviously a larger challenge. I think those are some of the basic elements in terms of the differences. Thank you. You mentioned oil prices being a constraint on military operations against daesh. But they must be a constraint on everything the government of iraq is trying to do including being inclusive of groups who feel they dont have a share of the pie. But if the pie is shrinking, its harder to give out more shares of a shrinking pie. How does that affect all the things you were talking about, including the problem of National Unity as we see more and more that the kurdish region of iraq is exploring its own way . More since 2004 when the prices of oil boomed up and so on, we tried to use money as an enticement of the politics. That also increased corruption and increased other type of mismanagement or bad governance of the institutions. In the fall of mosul with a real soul searching going on, changes the political process in iraq as well, now we have said that this is nonsustainable. And we cannot proceed with such a strategy of only enticing people through financial ways. And by the way, majority of the enticement were for politicians for the communities, so that effect i think we have learned the harshness. And now the Prime Minister he has the mandate to reform and also to start new areas of looking for revenues such as government bonds, investments and others. To that effect iraq has done tremendous change, a big sea change in policies for reform in relation to funds and financial and extended support with the world bank and others as well. Thats taking place. But i take your point and i agree with it. We need to be very careful as not to really alienate people because were saying to them we havent got moneys to restructure your schools and others. To that effect the allied half aware and working on what they call postdestabilization projects. To that effect we have to seek support from the gulf countries when they talk about marginalization in iraq we say, okay, these areas have been liberated, tikrit, others as well. Put in your money wherever you have been talking about marginalization. How is that going . Not to the extent we wanted, to be honest. Because it goes back to the fundamental point which talked about and this is an area of frustration by the way. This is an area which says to the iraqis who is supporting you at the moment you need and the shotgun of isis next to your head . You have the neighbor next door who says im happy to help. And youve got all of the other neighbors saying, well, were conditioning our support. When your house is burned up, would you want to have a conditional support . Or would you want an open spot . Well get to your neighbors. Addressing irbil, what is the mood there . How does the situation on the ground far away from baghdad relate to the strategy in baghdad . Well, i think one, on the isis front, things arent going well. We still have very coherent cooperations by the peshmerga, but i think politically were seeing clearer signs of a split about what to do with kurdish as an entity, what relationship does it have with turkey, iran and officials in baghdad . That point i think and the extension of the term for the next two years or potential extension, it really expose where the clergy is. It has disagreements. There is real political debate around how to function either within iraq or otherwise. I think that at this stage the u. S. Can actually help in creating more unity between the kurdish parties. Encouraging reform within the krg because the krg does need reform. Uniting the peshmerga, unifying those forces and encouraging kurdish parties to have a broader dialogue internally and with officials in baghdad. The solution thus far has been to just mostly blame the Central Government for the problems kurdistan faces. I think if we begin to have a broader discussion of what needs to be done, kurdistan would probably move forward even as a democratic process moves forward there. Would a more given what weve seen of opinion polls in the kurdish areas suggest overwhelming support for independence from iraq. Would this sort of reform democratic process, would that make it harder to keep iraq as a whole together . Well, i think its difficult for anyone to say that theyre against independence formally. But there are definitely different opinions of when do you get there, in what form and what sort of a relationship do you have with the rest of iraq . I think they are disagreeing when it comes to that. Some favor an incremental process that keeps baghdad closer, eventually these are kurdistans neighbors, you need to deal with them at the end of the story. What needs to be done, i think, is just encouraging that sort of debate between tehran and baghdad and kurdish officials. Certainly reforming these institutions i think in kurdistan is key. Forming the government, having a process that is much more representative, i think thats key to having a more stable kurdistan be it that an entity formerly within iraq or an independent entity. Aaron, the peshmerga have been some of the most effective fighters against daesh, but daesh seems principally focused on iranian influence. Is there a changing way that theyre talking about kurdish fighters, about battling kurds as this battle unfolds . Well, just like the iranians or any other entity, they view them as an enemy. Obviously theyre using different types of derogatory terms for kurds as they do with other groups of people, but i think they realize that theyre not going to be able to push any farther north at least in the iraqi context where the kurds have been able to hold the line since the u. S. Coalition started doing things a year ago. Therefore theyre focused more on the broader sectarian issue, i think, because it probably gets a little more played possibly. As a result, you know, you see more fighting in that regard instead of them trying to push back into northern iraq. But at the same time that doesnt mean that if there isnt an opportunity that theyd be willing to do it. As weve seen every once in a while, there will be like a suicide bombing that sneaks through into kurdistan. So for the Islamic State its an expansionist imperialistic type of entity. And as a result nothing is out of bounds for them. Mr. Ambassador, you mentioned the reliable neighbor next door. And the reliable neighbor next door, iran, is also thought to have a whole series of ties to the Popular Mobilization forces that is accused of being a sectarian militia attacking sunnis. What is the strategy for creating a genuine, capable Iraqi National army that doesnt rely on foreign trading, foreign funding, sectarian implications, those kinds of things . How do wu get from where we are today to where youd like to be . We talked about the construction, that includes the military, after the fall of mosul there has been and will continue a significant restructure. At this moment the end game of the setup of the army is still not complete. We need to understand what do we need to protect and therefore how should our army structuring be mirroring that whether its a border, internal, so on. We also note that important projects such as National Guard legislation requires very careful handling politically and very careful handling structurally as to who do they report to. We dont want to create and fund local politicians to have their own forces under the title of National Guard. At the same time we know that the majority of those people who have joined the Popular Mobilization cause are doing it lifting arms based on the call, for the protection of their country. And they are less ideological and more nationalistic. And theyre also not looking forward for being permanent members of these military setups, but want to do it just for the sake of liberating the towns and then going