second was the oil nationalization crisis of 1951 and 1953 in which the iranians attempted to assert control over their major economic resource. in the end the effort was frustrated in part because of a cia sponsored coup against the iranian nationalist leader. the second two occurred after the islamic revolution. the first was something i was involved in personally, which was the hostage crisis from 1979 until 1981. and the second was the crisis involving the hostages american and others in -- held in lebanon during the 1980 -- during the 1980s and a part of that, an incident that touched us here is iran gate or iran-contra. >> go back to the first one. you said the cold war is thought to have begun in azerbaijan crises. what did you mean by that? >> what had happened is the alibis. the british and the russians in september of '41 had all -- haddock bid iran as a supply line. the soviet union was fighting for its life in nazi germany. the u.s. joined the occupation after the u.s. joined the war affidavit the war, the russians did not leave as they had agreed to do. and instead demanded autonomy from iran. the document was the first item on the newly formed united nations. of the first five resolutions of the u.n. security council beginning in january of 1946 the three of those five involved iran and azerbaijan. what role did the iranians play? >> many people think i do have more about the operations of the cia. people will argue about this endlessly. what we do know is that early 1953, inheriting a difficult situation from president -- from president truman. gave the order to plan an operation inside -- inside iran, gave the order to the cia. plan an operation to bring the prime minister and place him with someone more in accordance with our interests. so what was the final outcome? did the prime minister get put in place? how did that happen? >> a fascinating story. the shah in fact, was reluctant to move against mosadan. he was presented with a plan to replace prime minister mosadan with a military man. the shah did not like the man very much and didn't want to see a military man. thinking he might be jumping out of the frying pan into the fire. the way he was persuaded, there were stories that the way he was persuaded that he was told this is going ahead with or without you. if it -- that mosadan would be replaced by daanother. he said if this doesn't go better, you would be looking for a job elsewhere. he went along with it. >> how did that help toward the iranians to the west. >> specifically to the united states. iranians traditionally had a very pessimistic view toward the british. the british had divided the country in spheres of influence in the 21st century. they were part of the race for resources within iran. they took very lucrative oil in the 20th century. they bought it essentially for nothing and continued control over iran's one resource that it had and dictated terms for the iranians. for example, back in the 30s, the iranians said, well you know we should renegotiate this and we want to take a look at the books. of this company that operates in iran. they said, no, you can't do that. we will do the accounting and we will give you a check for an amount that we decide is due to you. this is the situation. toward the -- the united states up to that time was seen in iran as -- as a friend of the national movement. iranian nationalism you can say or the struggle for iranians to become masters in their own house to get control of their own destiny started late in the 19th century, early in the 20th century. and although the united states was not a big player in the struggle when we did play, we were on the right side. were there reasons for it? at that point, basically the u.s. changed its role in the iranian view from being a friend and supporter from the iranian nationalism to being something of a new great britain. >> in negotiating with iran you talk about both sides of the 1979 hostage crisis. what was the dry cisse. -- crisis. >> there was one that the united states and iran could after this could build some kind of a relationship on our side based on anti-communism, anti-communists and anti-soviet imperatives and the dislike of communism and the russian expansion would create a set of interests allowing for at least a certain degree of cooperation -- of cooperation. not what had happened under the shah, but at least a new basis for engagement. in that case, we misread the what was going on with the revolution when those people were in control had no intention of having a relationship with the united states. they didn't not like the soviet union very much. but they didn't want that kind of relationship. on the iranian side, there was a view that the united states was out to undermind this revolution at all costs. where the united states had other interests. and as far as i could tell was perfectly willing to look at the new reality in iraq. >> in november of 1979, where were you, what were you doing? what was the biggest event happening in your life? >> that's almost 33 years ago today. we're just a month short of that. i was in teheran serving at the embassy. >> in what capacity? >> as a political officer. i was still -- this is my second or third tour. third tour in the foreign service. so i was fairly new and i'm attempting to figure out if there was some way that the united states could return to reality in iran. about ten days before we heard that the united states had decided -- president carter had decided to admit the shah to the u.s. for medical treatment. >> did you think it was a mistake from over there. >> i did. i thought basically -- it wasn't the only one. that was the end of any chance halfway to a normal relationship. it was the chance for any moderation within the new iranian government. and perhaps most important, or personally, it was the end of us. >> did you know that ahead of time? did you know there would be some actions? >> we didn't know what, but essentially when we heard this, and it wasn't just me, the sense was the message was you're expendable. our collective goose was cooked. >> the day of the takeover, walk us through it. >> the day of the takeover, sunday, the first day of the work week. there were demonstrations in -- there were demonstrations already scheduled in teheran. one of the routes of the demonstrations was from east-to-west right in front of our embassy. one of the groups preplanned now as we know, stopped, shouted some slogans that was nothing. >> students. the polytechnic and instead of march -- instead of continuing to march across the part of the area of the demonstration, they attacked the embassy and came over the wall. we were defenseless. there was a provisional government in iran that had no power to defend us. there were some people at the embassy in police uniforms who disappeared as soon as the iranians came -- the attack came to the iranians. would be true in any country where the host country is in a foreign mission. >> were there marine guards? >> there were marine guards. >> were they allowed to fire? >> no, fortunately, that was one of the best decisions they take. >> this day, i feel i owe my life to the good discipline they were not armed. so one of the priorities became avoiding -- >> where were you in the embassy? >> i was inside the embassy. >> were you watching all of this happen? >> we were watching this happen. and then we moved into all -- behind a hard line, a sealed heavy door on the top floor. i should point out that it was not only about -- we were not only about seven americans but an equal number if not more iranian employees who we're also responsible for. but once again, let me take my hat off to our young marine guards whose discipline and train ing training really saved all of lives that day. >> john lindbergh, prior to that, were you burning embassy papers documents, anything like this? >> we had far too much paper in the embassy. we destroyed as much of it as we could. you've seen the pictures of the reconstituted documents. what happens was the destruction was a two-stage process. in those days, the technology wasn't as advanced as it was today. so what happened was the first stage turned the paper into linguistny. the second stage turned it in to con fete ty. the second stage broke down. they recovered the linguine, unlimited manpower, unlimited time and the skill that's gone into making persian carpets this for hundreds of years. they wove back together at least what they saw as the most sensitive of documents. they also public -- they recovered a lot of things undamaged which they published in about 70 volumes indexed classified. it's quite you -- it's an historian. it's acting like a very valuable source for students of diplomatic -- students of diplomatic history to see what the industry was reporting. some of my reporting is in there. some of the same reporting appeared on wikileaks. this is 1979, now. i read it and i think, that holds up. sometimes its's embarrassing what you wrote 20, 30 years later but it seems to hold up. >> how long was that day. how long your behind the hard line? what was the process of the next couple of events. they got to the hard line. i think i mentioned this in my forward to my book. i ended up in a decision with probably one of the worst in my career. i ended up outside of the door attempting to talk them down or to slow them down -- to slow them down. that obviously did not work. they pulled a gun -- they had a gun on me and a gun on our security officer -- our security officer, and threatened to shoot us both if the -- if the door was not open in five -- in five anybody minutes. i've often pointed to that incident as the worst example of negotiations in my career. >> so that said, did the door get open in five minutes? >> unfortunately, it did. or i thought fortunately at the time. were they bluffing? i don't know. i don't know. but i'm glad -- i don't know. i think it was perhaps ambassador langen at the foreign ministry or ann swift who was the senior person on the area, they did open the door but to me at the time it was quite a relief. >> how long were you held, where else were you held? what does that experience mean to you personally? >> we were held 14 months in various places. >> around teheran? >> around teheran. outside of teheran after the failed rescue attempt. three others were moved to other places. they were worried about another rescue attempt. after i came back from -- after they brought us back from esfahan in august, i believe, i never went back to the embassy. stayed in various places. some prisons and other places around teheran -- around teheran. >> how were you treat? >> not very well. the iranians, it's interesting. the iranians themselves, many have a narrative that says we were treated well. we were not. i was of the of the 14 month, i was 9 months in solitary with little communication with the outside world. i obviously wasn't killed, but i wasn't beaten. i was beaten up. this was not ant us. this was an internal iranian matter and factions within the revolution, the hard core was using us to go after its rivals, particularly the nationalists, the liberals, the intellectuals, the religious intellectuals. those who might not be hard core enough for this revolution. and they did it. i mean, they used us to get at their -- to marginalize their enemy, throw their enemies out of the government. reflecting back -- reflecting back on it i have often said this publicly that of this whole affair were -- was the iranian people. what happened to us was difficult, uncomfortable, frightening at times particularly for the families who didn't have word for -- didn't have word. but the long term victims i think were the iranians. because what this whole incident did managed to create a climate of rule without government without rule. anarchy and mob rule where simply laws, procedures, did not apply -- did not apply. and anyone who could organize a street mob the stronger street mob would prevail. and even today the authorities cracked down -- feel they can imprison anyone who questions what they are doing, whether that be a lawyer a journalist, a filmmaker, a translator, member of the intelligence -- of the intelligentsia. and it was this particular action which set the kind of climate that allowed this repression. it also gave the green light to saddam hussein to start this destructive war against iran using poison gas with tremendous effect. >> you mean the green light because -- >> the green light because he thought america would support this? >> not just support it but he saw iran had isolated himself. saddam hussein invaded in september of 19 080, iran had no friends. the arab countries in the region, with the exception of syria, the united states, other western countries, basically either support -- actively supported iran or sat on the sidelines. in a shameful incident, i say this -- i say this with all candor, even when saddam used poison gas against the iranians it was very little protest. reaction. we cozied up to saddam hussein during all of this. this was all a climate set by this -- by these events. no, we were willing before the embassy was taken -- the united states was willing to continue some kind of a military to military relationship with the iranians. maybe not as vast quantities of military equipment training, spare parts, all these things. and would like to continue it. it's all of that. and iran consequently was in a much weaker position. vis-a-vis the invaders. >> iraq invaded september, 1980. you were not released until january of 1981. >> that's right. >> so what did you know of the iraq-iran war where you were? did you know anything? and what do you remember about the release and coming back. >> here's the chronology as best as i can reconstruct it. sometime in august, this was after the shah died. the shah died late july, 1980. >> 1980. >> in august, the ayatollah khameni calls in his advisors, the closest advisors and says, let's settle -- we need to settle the hostage dispute and assigns people to do it. i believe it was early september when warren christopher meets with the iranian counterpart, a relative by marriage by ayatollah khameni's son. they meet in germany. basically the outlines of the deal are there. the war comes and the contact is lost. originally the germans had been the intermediaries. eventually the contact is re-established. but it takes months of difficult bargaining, the team led by christopher with the very skilled mediation of the algerians. the release came just after jimmy carter left office just after ronald reagan had taken his oath of office. >> was that coincidental? >> of course not. obviously, this was a last slap. the iranians had figured they had cost him his presidency. now they were going to deny him this particular satisfaction of seeing our lease while he was still president. there is a conspiracy theory that said that there he was, in fact coordination between the iranian side and the republican campaign of 1980 to prevent us from being released before the election. it's an interesting theory. i've never seen anything -- any documentation for it. i would think after 30 some years, something -- if there's anything to it something would have come out. >> where did you fly out of? on what kind of plane seeing the fellow hostages, the reaction? >> these things i remember well. as i get older, i can't remember where i left my car keys in the morning. but these thing ss going well. i was -- >> in teheran. >> in teheran. >> i was in buses. i was blind folded. i think they shoved me to the bathroom not -- not out of any spite, just because that was the only room that was there. but it didn't matter to me. i was happy to ride on the roof or the baggage compartment. >> did you know you were leaving at that point? >> yes, we knew because -- i mean, you don't know until you're actually out. but we had been visited by a group of algerian medical people. we knew they had been mediated. and so the iranians tried to convince us that some of us were going. and that statements that we made to their television under an interview about presumably how nice we were treated and how happy we were would determine whether we stayed or went. but the algerians gave that away and said no, no, you ear all going. you're all going. so we knew. we got to the airport. there were 737, 727s, i believe, which were there onboard. when i got on the plane i saw -- i saw ambassador langen for the first time in 14 -- in 14 months. i saw the swiss ambassador there, ambassador eric lange was there checking our names off his -- his list against his list making sure that everybody was there. there were iranian reporters there. and after a while, they closed the door and we took off. i know that people have different opinions of air aljari. but i'm a great fan. >> given all of this history from 33 years ago what's -- what have we learned about iran and negotiating with iran? and the current situations that we find ourselves in with iran? >> i would like to say, peter, that we have learned something. but i'm not sure. what we've -- i'm not sure what we've learned. if you look at our relations today, they are not very good. and we're in right now a very dangerous -- the iranians are in a dangerous place. there's a lot of talk of war. there's a lot of talk about air strikes. a lot of talk about an iranian nuclear program, an iranian nuclear program. being the eternal optimist that i am i didn't think we would be in such a bad place, even after what had happened -- what had happened in 1979 and 1980. when we flew out of teheran in those planes, if you had asked me i would have said, in five years, seven year, ten years at the most tempers will cool. we in the iranians will realize that we have mutual interest, that we have things to talk about with each other. not necessarily as friends. but as countries. as states do. because we talk to many states with which we are not friendly -- friendly. we from time to time talk to north korea -- we talk to north korea. we talk to syria. we talk to many places -- many places. but it hasn't happened. it's a very unusual and almost unique situation that we're in with iran. where this estrangement, this inability to talk to each other has gone on now for 32 years. and despite efforts to change the relationship to break it, i think -- i think this president, president obama made a very sincere effort to begin the process of engagement, to begin some kind of talk even if we don't approve or don't like many things, he made the effort starting at the beginning of his administration administration spoke about it in his campaign in 2008 took a lot of criticism from it including from the current secretary of state, mrs. clinton. but it hasn't gone anywhere. and we seem to be just about where we've always been. i compare us to two sides on opposite sides of an abyss. glaring at each other across the abyss, calling each other names. insulting each other, threatening each other. and this has been a very difficult pattern to break. what i see today, what i hear today is that both sides have fallen in to patterns that are familiar to them. we know how to do this. people in teheran know how to bash us. we know how to bash the islamic republic. we're good at it. both sides have gotten good at it over 30 years. but we do not know how to do is to break out of what the late richard caan the professional -- the professor at the university of pittsburgh said about it in iran, he said back in the '80s that the u.s. and iran are in a downward spiral. what we don't know how to do apparently is to break out of it. so we are unable to do that, perhaps it's too hard for us. we have the diplomatic capabilities of either side. perhaps it's the current downward spiral or threatening situation. perhaps it suits the interests of various -- various parties. but whatever it is, it's familiar. it's comfortable. we encounter difficulties as we always do, it's very easy to revert back to this traditional, dysfunctional kind of action that is if not productive is at least familiar. >> have you been back to teheran? >> i have not. >> i have not been back since -- >> did you think about it? >> i have often thought about it. i would very much like to go back. not going back is not by choice. i'm not welcome. inside iran, there are many iran ian ian -- iranians who are prevented from leaving -- prevented from entering. perhaps what i would most like to do is to take my children and grandchildren back there. we have two children. they arer rappian -- iranian americans. their mother is iranian, they were both born there. >> married to an iranian? >> yes, 56 years now. >> did you meet her in teheran? >> we were both teachers. so at the time of the revolution, we had been married -- we had been married 13 years and had two children already. and the children remember iran. they have wonderful memories of good times there. and now they have their own children who are one quarter iranian and probably the only relation they have now is their grandmother's cooking. but they would -- i would very much like for them to see that part of their origin. >> was your family there in november of 1979? >> fortunately it was not. >> why -- >> some of my in-laws were there. and were able to get out. my wife and children stayed -- did not come to teheran. it was in the service we called unaccompanied post. the post without families. they stayed in -- we had been in saudi arabia before -- and stayed on in saudi arabia. it was a good place for them. it was a great relief for me being captive knowing that they were safe and in a secure place. >> finally, any ptsd issues for you? >> none that i'm aware of. i know it hasn't been easy for -- i know, these things are not easy for some people. you can tell, probably peter, one of my best therapies is talking about it. talking about these issues. once in a while things come back about the incident. but as i said to you the damage done to aus i think was much less than what was done to our iranian friends and relatives. >> and we've been talking on book tv with professor john limbert, negotiating with iran wrestling the ghosts of history. you're talking book tv on c-span 2. >> the berlin wall fell 25 years ago on november 9, 1989. we revisited the historic day tonight with archival c-span video featuring george h.w. bush from the oval office. reaction from senate leaders bob dole and george mitchell. and speeches from president kennedy in 1963 that galvanize berliners and the free world. that's 8:00 p.m. eastern time here on c-span 3's american history tv. >> monday night on "the communicators," christopher yu, the professor of the law school and director of the center for technology and innovation. >> the people who oppose it should take a look at the internet header. it's the guts. the magic that makes the internet world. that's what makes everyone speak. that's a service flag, different service classes, high bandwidth, low latency different forms of prioritization, that was designed in the internet from the beginning. people said that's an old artifact. when we redesigned the internet they kept that fuel, they kept a label fuel to do another form of prior toization services. if you look at the design to suggest that this was never intended to be --

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