the u.s. institute of peace. >> thank you very much. hello, everybody. thank you very much for the commission and its cochairs, for hosting this very timely briefing on the political and security crisis in the democratic republic of congo, or drc. congress is launching u.s. policy toward drc and the wider great lakes region of central africa using tools such as the foreign aid appropriations process, legislation on minerals, sexual violence, child soldiers, he met generally at international adoptions, oversight activities and direct engagement with regional leaders in civil society. over the years many members of congress have paid particular attention to human rights violations in eastern congo which is long been an epicenter of regional conflict. perhaps in recognition of such engagement success against presidents since the 1990s have appointed former members of congress to serve as high-level special envoys and advisers on the great lakes region, most recently as you all know senator russ feingold as special envoy as the in the obama admin stationed in the 114th congress congressional concerns about drc democratic trajectory grew at the end of president joseph second term came to became clear elections would not be held a schedule. what would be the countries first ever electoral transfer of power between administrations. congressional committees of jurisdiction help regular hearings on developments in the great lakes region and just policy responses and the senate and house each passed resolutions calling on executive branch to consider punitive actions against those responsible for human rights violations, corruption or impeding the democratic process in drc. today's conversation follows a a hearing before this commission last november at which point had already provoked significant domestic unrest with implications for regional stability. despite the subsequent signing of a political agreement between the ruling coalition and opposition, a credible electoral count has yet to be issued. the security situation threat the country is badly deteriorated. enduring conflict and needs to become more complex while new hotspots have emerged in areas such as south eastern province and the central region. we have an opportunity today to hear from a panel of two experts on the drc and the region about ways to address these myriad challenges. first, steve hege of the u.s. institute for peace will lead us off with an update on the political situation, the links between electoral stalemate and the sacred situation, and the regional contact. mike jobbins will describe current conflict dynamics in several locations. adotei akwei of amnesty international will address ongoing and emerging human rights violations, and aditi gorur of the stimson center will discuss challenges facing the u.n. peacekeeping operation minus go in the context of a larger debates over your support for u.n. peacekeeping -- monusco. one final note will go to qnx after that and i'd like to make sure that there's an opportunity for congressional staff in the room to ask questions if they have any. so if you're a congressional staffer please prepare your question for the first round. thanks very much and over to you, steve. >> thank you very much, alexis. cochairman, members of the commission and its staff, thank you for holding this important breaking on current development in the democratic republic of congo. it's a pleasure to be here to join you today and share some humble insights into the current political impasse. in line with the request of today's moderate i will try to focus my initial remarks on the current challenges related to the implementation of the december 31, 201 2016 global inclusive agreement as well as highlight some of the diminished legitimacy of the nearly all government institutions and how that has influenced the broader security situation. at the end of 2006 as alexis mentioned, the catholic bishops conference stepped in for an au led mediation process combined with a national dialogue initiative which had initially established a partial agreement with opposition leader from the government. though these efforts by -- did not necessarily halt the violence which took place marking the date of the end of the presence mandates the process culminated in a very successful and celebrate new year's eve agreement. what is offered to as -- agreement the government signatories of the earlier au led agreement, the opposition coalitions around -- g7 agreed broadly to the following, transition of 12 months to organize elections, the maintenance of president kabila and other government institutions in the interest of preserving continuity in order to prepare for elections, the creation of a national unity government led by prime minister from the opposition which will be given equal treatment throughout that period. the end of political prosecution, the release of political prisoners and reopening of media and equal access to public radio and television. the establishment as full of the committee responsible overseeing the implication of the agreement known as c nsa. finally most important the provision of any constitutional change which would allow for president kabila to run for a third term. while the agreement has not -- resolution which endorsed it in late march 2017 nearly eight months from its achievement of limitation has been wracked with the challenges of the prospects for achieving its main goal of organizing election for the end of 2017 appear partially nonexistent. the february 1 death of a long-standing opposition leader and runner up of the 2011 election was the first and most important shock to the process of implement the sense of the agreement. he himself was supposed to lead the cnsa and as he left an enormous vacuum amongst opposition. nevertheless, they continue to mediate talks to define the implication of the agreement which would eventually to enable tatian agreement known as the people's house agreement of april 27. however, a month earlier they withdrew its mediation role and handed over responsibility to president kabila to definitively move forward with the implementation. sadly the goodwill built up and its mediation role has disappeared and after -- shifted back towards more confrontational relationship. civil society for its part has been divided throughout the process and the crisis had ramifications with numerous standoffs between assemblies and governors. while there's been that gentle detergent with a skewed situation of the elements have been widely viewed by the opposition is orchestrated attempt by the government to justify further delays in the electoral process with some actually dull process has become somewhat fraudulent. nevertheless, the discretionary power of the presidency and his goodwill seem to be driving or the appearance of his goodwill seem be driving the process more than actual sense of the implementation. president kabila nominate opposition dissidence in early april with a you allow decision which was viewed as a consensual at the time. furthermore mitchell control and balance of power within the government of national unity have not been achieved, major post in the transitional government have remained within the presidential majority of the ruling coalition. establishment of the cnsa for its part was severely delayed and nonconsensual. while is given a mandate at 12 months it took nearly eight months before it was actually, its members were named on july 22 with the president, presidency being given to another opposition dissidence. his position was vehemently rejected by the majority of opposition leaders. and so society for its part has strong criticize the cnsa as not being independent or impartial. as alexis pointed out another incredible sticking point has been the failure of the publication of electoral calendar which has been a point of contention for many of the participants in the process, though the head -- calendar would be public, publicized shortly. nothing has followed. unfortunately there needs to be clear benchmarks including when candidates will have to be submitted. this would be critical to clarify and would represent the presidential majority as well as the opposition coalitions. with regards to voter registration, there have been several important challenges. first enrollment of youth who are younger than the age required has been alleged by certain groups, serious obstacles for organizations to observe have been also identified and is also been certain challenges with regards to payment of stalking underground. the border rows are supposed be finished by the end of july, but as a stance now ten provinces are still under enrollment and 13 have not been completed. with regards to the opening of political space, it appears there also been selective application of key provisions with several activists including fred and christopher having been released, major cases including opposition leader having been completely blocked. only certain tv channels as well have been reopened and does not necessarily equal access to public television. at the outset there appears to be context for political opposition as there's not one level of government which remains within its constitutional limited mandates. senators and provincial deputies have overstated mandates now for over six years. nevertheless, the presidential majority has surprisingly emerges stronger since the signing of the agreement. the ruling coalition has not suffered any further desertions and hasn't been able to bring certain amount of resources through money contracts in the meantime. though the president future himself remains uncertain, some political elites around and continue to push for a third term while others see their own future of ascending as a candidate for the presidency in contrast to the presidents aspirations. furthermore, a longtime ally, has become increasing outspoken for the need for kabila to step down. as in the eyes of psalm, the perpetuation of instability and weak governance in the drc is much more favorable to the short-term economic and long-term political objectives. for their partners are no visible signs of cracking within the security services, although there are concerns about the use of commando like units and efforts to militarize the police force with the recent naming of an army general as its head. kabila's drink is due to the weakness of the political opposition which remains deeply divided. the political negotiations and the buying up a splinter groups of make up the majority of opposition post within the government has to large extent tainted many individuals opportunity and their affiliation with president kabila. i son was proposed to be prime minister but he has not seemed to reemerge under his leadership as strong as it was prior to the agreements. he has not shown himself to be a strong leader on the streets. for his part, he remains in exile where is trying to sustain his popularity but his ability to mobilize clinical support outside the drc remains to be seen. he has been able to halt the presidents son-in-law who could've been a major player, otherwise one person was sentenced to year in prison for real estate project in general terms most of the oppositely are speaking more to the international community and are to the congolese people. now they're calling for kasai destefano and are unwilling to take part in the agreement as result of the -- as outlined. with frustration remain and what is perceived as an illegitimate government and a splintered opportunist political opposition, outburst of urban violence or the soiling of urban insurgencies are increasing and likelihood. one of these groups which is coded number of violent attacks on police posts, presence and central markets is the political religious cult of the dk -- be dk. dating back to the 1960s, be dk has sought to reestablish the congo states which encompass part of drc, ankle and the public of the congo which a florist in pre-colonial times. violent expression against bdk dates back to 2000 it became more so in 2008 when you're 200 buildings were burned at least two wha200 people were killed wn police opened fired on supporters. it's a leader created the political party in 2010, which eventually led to his election in the 2011 elections. unfortunately it had been dormant for several years and reemerged recent with several violent attacks, eventually freeing him. in conclusion the publication of a realistic consensual electoral calendar is more critical than ever and certainly more important that meeting december deadline of the agreement. while rejected by the opposition, the recent declaration of the south african development community is a realistic acknowledgment that alternatives are needed to make sure elections proceed forward. given the potential perception by condition of political landscape for the presidents majority are more favorable, a renewed push for movement towards organization of elections may find more success. president kabila establish an election preparations committee within the majority, and told the senior party leadership to prepare to win them. once underway in a more satisfaction from international to ensure a truly fair,, transparent and credible enabling five for elections in which all candidates can participate and compete equitably. thank you for your attention this morning. >> thanks very much. mike. >> thanks, alexis. takes to steve, thanks to congressman for calling this together one year after your hearing which two of a lot of attention to the crisis in congo last year. it's a privilege to me to give you an update on where, where the country is been and what we've seen over the last year. i'm going to keep my remarks focused primarily on the local dynamics of violence, recent events in the kasai and the east of the country recognizing it's a large area. i submit them a statement which will be online, by colleagues will distribute after this event and i will just touch on some of the biggest abuse you. in those three regions for document four of the key trends we see unless we take from that, of the three things were looking for from the u.s. congress and where we're looking for youth leadership to address some of these issues. so since the commission last discussed the drc, thousands of congolese civilians have been killed, hundreds of thousands have been displaced, many of whom have been displaced into all the conditions and as a direct result we've seen polio breakout for the first time in three years after declaring the country polio free. we now see risk of a cholera epidemic in tanganyika and we see a worsening humanitarian crisis at a time when the world is dealing with far too many. congo is once again among the leading homes of displaced people 20 years after the war broke out in the first place. in central kasai, violence broke out over a dispute that steve alluded to around the chieftaincy, and political competition over the leadership of the chieftaincy, the chief at the time, the government opponent offered resistance through a series of events was killed, and that event, the killing of the chief triggered an insurgency that very quickly took on political tones, took on ethnic towns, in the context of a region that was strongly viewed as opposition bastion and weathers been a long history of strong sheets but also of -- sheets -- between committee and the states resolving them. at the moment i think perhaps others will talk about some of the grave human rights abuses we've seen in the kasai. but when i would say at the moment, what we can say is that although there's been a relative decrease over the last weeks, there's very little reason to think that anything is resolved. the grievances, the trauma between communities, the grievances over the past and current conflict are likely to remain for a foreseeable amount of time. given the role the government has played in the violence and in repressing the militancy, the insurgency is difficult to see how either the government comes you of the parties to the conflict can gain credibility and lead up peace process without significant grassroots leadership and engagement. in tanganyika, about a year or more ago, we saw great awakening a political consciousness among the pygmy population who lived a long time in a situation of comparative disadvantage. historically landless. that's why i rarely have access to political power, red hat axis two school systems and thus have lived in a subservient economic and political situation to their neighbors. that erupted into violence over the late 2016 and we see now have my displaced. we saw some very promising peace efforts at the beginning of this year that since languished. and as of violence has persisted, just earlier this month the governor of the province announced a new military campaign to resolve as a new strategy to address the situation in all of the humanitarian consequences that are likely to flow from that. finally to touch briefly on the east, beginning from the northeastern border in south sudan all the way down to the border of tanganyika we see a resurgence of local insecurity and local tensions. whether that's where we see spillover from the central african republic crisis, where we see in migration of new farmer heard or complex, where we see a resurgence of -- the militia group close identified with the community to tensions in the northern part, and to what we says particularly worrying signs in the southern area, increasing amounts of hate speech, political friction between communities as we gear up for local political competition in the next election. and then finally found the planes will we've seen the operations of armed groups in the context of the as yet 60 or 70 years old chieftaincy dispute over the leadership of the planes. so we see a fragile situation across the country and there are four points want to make about that. first although the origin of each of these complex is absolutely political and is result of the current political and some were the result of the current political impasse, jockeying for power by local political elites and mismanagement and failure of local mechanism to co-opt and manage local conflicts, the fact that this political competition is leadin letting the genies oue bottle does not mean that where once there is a political transition that these complex will go away. the think you are driving the violence are linked to decades of trauma, mistrust between communities and existential competition in the context of extreme poverty. those things are deeply rooted and driven by the same dividing lines we've seen for decades in congo, which is competition over land, over local political power and national political power, and the legacy of mistrust across ethnic identity lines. those of what's driving the violence and ultimately regardless of what happened with the political transition at a national level, these are going to be the lingering problems that will need, lingering in whole. secondly, it's a difficult as you either monusco to provide a military solution to any of these complex pick the things that drive a baby said to be bashed against the rocks, the things that lead a pygmy to be tortured for collaborating with the neighbor in tanganyika are not things that any military force is well-suited to respond to, let alone foreign peacekeepers or a congolese ary that is inherited the legacy of the rebellions from which it was forged. therefore, we need to recognize the solution to these complex is abundant and we need to resort civilian solutions come make sure we're putting support in the hands of the ordinary congolese citizens, religious leaders, traditional leaders, civil society groups who will be the ones will ultimately drive the solution, any kind of solution that we can hope to see. third, although today were talking about new complex in tanganyika and the kasai, the possible resurgence of all complex in the east, we could be taught about almost anywhere in congo tomorrow. the broad conference of political patronage systems, deeper grievances and the capacity to use weapons characterized in many communities. steve talked about the bdk challenges in the west, but this could be anywhere and this will be anywhere until we adopt both, childers a change in how the international community addresses these complex but also the ultimate political culture that is preventing about how power and a local disputes are managed in the country. you know, and finally i think would be a mistake, i think it's time to put together the notion of the idea that the country is governed by big man and has been governed by big men and big clans riding on the back of passive citizenry enmeshed in the local disputes but incapable driving change. the conflict conflict we see they are as much even though i talked about jus the historical roots and talk about the legacies that apply to them, their driven as much by frustration and aspiration, social change, the chance and a desire to purchase made in medicine lives in a different way. the increasing connectivity, as a pygmy great awakening in tanganyika was driven in large part by cell phones. violence, some of the risks are being played out over groups. -- what saps grew. this is a change and this is an aspiration come something we need to recognize, that this is in politics as usual in congo in the sum of the contours on some of things that seen before. and so with that i think i would like to close with a couple of thoughts for what would like to see from congress first of all thank you for keeping the attention on this country given everything else that's going on. but we still need your support. we but also the congresspeople who are working for peace everything they need your support. although the so military solutions and although we know humanitarian solutions won't end of the suffering we see in these places, at the end of the day those of the vast majority of the resources we have. the little bit of resource the conflict crisis fund with a small mechanism usaid had to put resources enhance of conflict affected people and conflict affected communities they keep cultic psyches of spiraling out of control, vessels deployed in the central african republic, deployed in peru to come also being sued without both in the budget proposal that's been sent by omb as well as some of the early drafts making the way to congress. that's mistake and strips us and ordinary citizens of the best tool to prevent these conflict and getting out of hand. secondly, we need to recognize that 20 years after the congolese war started, millions have died can billions have been spent while i and i think everyone would acknowledge the tremendous efforts have been made, it's not enough. we need to recognize when you to take a different approach to fragility, different approach to how we engage across government and engage in civil society. and finally, let me just and by saying, although the situation that we layout is perhaps in some ways leak and in some ways old, i was talking to a congolese friend yesterday was telling me his nephew just graduated college with a degree in criminology and is moving to become a police detective. i was talking a couple of the days some young pygmy kids became frustrated with the conflict in tanganyika, i can form a local organization and setting a piece committees throughout the province. even as much as some of these seem like some of the same old challenges and same old problems, we need to recognize that there is a different aspiration. probably the best ally that the friends of congo whether in america, whether in congo itself have is this aspiration of young people to make a change and to start afresh because it will be a generational change in congo and there's every reason to try to make that the moment for a new partnership between our country and the democratic republic of congo. thank you. >> thanks, mike. adotei. >> yes. i'd like to thank the tom lantos commissioner organizing these earrings and more importantly for refocusing attention on the crisis in the drc. i'd like to build on what mike just said which is that the human rights issues in the drc are not, were not treated by this particular crisis. they go back sadly decades. some can argue back to the 1960s. i mentioned this because it's important to realize that much of the human rights violations and the suffering and the crises were created over decades back, that governments, the lack of rule of law, accountability and the inability of external actors to help the country chart a course forward and probably in many cases engagement of regional powers that destabilize whatever political momentum there was towards improving governance. this has led to a number of areas of human rights concerns where there's quite broad consensus. there has been fairly consistent violent repression of protests and demonstrations. protests were banned in 2014 and the police and security forces have regularly used extraordinary violence to crack down and disrupt protests organized by political opposition and human rights activists. the country has been wracked by armed conflict, both steve and mike mentioned kasai where the level of abuse has been fairly appalling. extrajudicial executions, summary executions, abductions, unprecedented level of gender-based violence, looting of property and distraction of livelihood have all contributed to a chronic humanitarian crises. there's also been, despite the present and the funding, the inability of the u.n. peacekeeping force to protect civilians adequately, and 2017 has sadly brought more of the same. violations included the right to freedom of expression and the right to receive information. we are aware of radio france internationale ming suspended from broadcasting. radio and television on by opposition leader were closed. there's been a high level of threats against journalists and driven efforts to limit the public access to information. including social media shutdowns in december 2016 and 2017. i have already mentioned the use of excessive force against demonstrators. in addition to what was done on the streets, there's also been the use of the courts, the harassment and intimidation of human rights defenders. the arbitrary arrest and detention of pro-democracy youth activists and members of the opposition. these crises or these tactics have further been exacerbated by the lack of any sense of the plan to address the power transition, which i think steve mentioned. in other words, as they are being arrested vista alternative or no site in future for the way to go or the opportunity to move the country forward. protesters that amnesty did research on were met by brutal actions by the security forces in both amnesty and the joint human rights office of the u.n. documented disproportion and excessive use of force. to date there has been no comprehensive investigation and something no one has been held accountable. in several cities authorities have banned and crushed protests organized by the opposition and civil society. measures have prevented many congolese from expressing their grievances over the electoral process. public meetings and demonstrations organized of the presidential majority were facilitated, in other words, it was biased towards the ruling party. the government has also use the justice system, and this is been applied against members of the opposition as well as members of the mp who left the party over president kabila's effort to seek a third term. i'd like to turn to the kasai region. i mentioned attacks and the fed to investigate human rights violations are the security forces. armed groups have formed new coalitions and increase their recruitment using explicit anti-tranten rhetoric to justify the actions and to question the legitimacy of the current government. steve mentioned the reports of the recruitment of child soldiers. enter ethnic complex is on the rise in different parts of the country in major cities. the government seems of lost its will or capacity to react to local conflicts. i think with our dimension the conflict that was linked to the assassination of the chief, the traditional authority, but there also are reports of the rise or the return of the adf which is a ugandan armed group that is killed over 700 since 2014 and continues to grow in strength. of course we cannot talk about human rights violations in the regions without talking about the deaths or the murders of the two u.n. experts who were found dead in march. they been investigating allegations of the use of mass graves by the governments own security forces in an effort to conceal some of the violations that they have committed. the drc is on the verge of another major humanitarian crisis as armed conflict is on the rise. in the east, the adf has killed more than 700. this despite the robust presence in the drc of the u.n. ethnic tensions between the trial regions have cost the lives of hundreds of civilians, distraction of property. there have also been reports of political interference in the conflict politicians are said to be fueling tensions. the situation led to the resurgence of self-defense groups as similar to -- attacks against civilians from both communities. 150,000 people according to u.n. have been displaced in the regions in the north. the joint verification mechanism international conference of the great lakes region confirmed that m23 has resurfaced in the region. the group took rwanda and took control of the city and its run distance in 2012 embassies the area for about 18 months and despite being defeated and being put into camps they were well guarded as the city operating again. according to u.n., about 3.89 people have been entering displaced in the democratic republic of the congo, 1.4 in the kasai region alone. this conflict created by the implementation of the new decentralized legislature has left hundreds if not thousands dead. unicef states that at least 600,000 children have been displaced as a result of the conflict in kasai. 2008 been used been used by armed groups, 4000 have been separated from their families. there have been hundreds of extrajudicial executions, an estimated, estimates range from 1000 to over 3000 having been killed. i think i'd like to turn to the recommendations about what we need from the united states government. because clearly the electoral process that is been discussed already is going to need international intervention. one of the biggest challenges we have is a document or the absence of u.s. diplomatic and political presence in addressing any type of potential resolution to the crisis. congress has a history of having paid attention to the drc and other lesser-known conflicts, and the been consistently engaged by virtue of its oversight of the budget. that means that the international affairs budget needs to be maintained and robustly maintained. the united states cannot be an actor without being influenced for any resources to help bring about international consensus, and more importantly, to help push regional consensus in moving forward on a political settlement, which i think i would agree with is the way forward. we also have an absence of leadership in the state department and the absence of an assistant secretary of state. while you are incredibly talented and committed u.s. diplomats, nothing can replace having the most senior u.s. diplomat for the region in place and engaged. as long as that absence continues there's going to be i think a noticeable lack of political will to act and to the difficult things. there have been references to the 31st of december agreement, and i would as a human rights organization stress some of the things referred to aaconfidence building measures e incredibly important. the release of political prisoners, the investigations of human rights violations as well as the improved protection of the human peacekeeping force, and the national forces in protecting civilians. i would probably end by just joining mike by saying the situation does for all intents and purposes appears bleak, but the energy and the commitment that we see from our colleagues in the drc and i the fact that they're still fighting for this transition to happen is probably the most important indicator that there is hope and that there are ways forward. they just need the partners to do it. >> thanks so much. last but not least, aditi. >> thank you so much to the tom lantos commission for inviting me to speak to you today. i'm really grateful for congress continued interest in the drc at this troubling time for the country as we see the government using repression to maintain its unconstitutional hold on power. and as a c ethnic violence continues to grow and spread. i've been asked to focus my remarks on recent challenges from the u.n. peacekeeping mission in the drc. going to focus on two. despite its track record of success in many areas, monusco plays a vital role in monitoring and reporting on human rights violations ensuring public assess to unbiased information to its radio station, maintaining the infrastructure that enables physical access to many parts of the country, and reducing instability and eastern provinces. the missions role as a human rights monitor is becoming more critical now as the congolese government continues to imprison, abuse and expelled journalists and human rights activist. monusco currently faces two main challenges in managing the human rights challenges that were described by my colleagues. first, the limitation of the december that first framework and second, inadequate support from u.n. member states. first on the framework. supporting the implementation of the december 31 framework is now the central piece of monusco political strategy in the drc. however the government passed on resisted efforts to move forward on imitation and there's little confidence in the free market among national stakeholders. if the framework fails monusco will be put in extreme a difficult position as a peacekeeping mission that mandates provide support to an illegitimate government. the u.n. secretary sees three possible scenarios for the situation could unfold and each of those poses its own challenges from monusco. first is the best case scenario. the parties make a good-faith progress towards application of the agreement in 2017 and credible elections are held in 2018, and monusco would have to assist with providing sufficient security for free and safe elections and then reorient its activities toward stabilization support to new government. i think most of the members of the panel would agree that scenario is the least likely one. the second center is the status quo. the government continues to use stalling tactics were making no real progress towards the implementation of the framework picky elections are not held and there is no realistic prospects for the future. third is the worst case scenario. the december 1 framework is explicitly abandon, protests met with even more severe human rights violations by the government. the country becomes extremely unstable on a scale that monusco is unable to manage and president kabila consolidates his hold on power. one of the most difficult aspects of the status quo singer is determined at what point the governments violations of the december 31 agreement are so egregious and so unlikely to change that the framework should be considered abandoned. the government appears to be trying to use a combination of token gestures towards the mentation and attempt to stir up into good as a pretext for delayed elections. in order to disguise its efforts to stall implementation. that makes it difficult for the mission to pin point the moment at which the government should be considered illegitimate and when it needs to hold the government accountable for that. the second challenge that i wanted to talk about is inadequate support from u.n. member states. the drc government knows it holds the trump card. u.n. peacekeeping missions cannot deploy without the consent of the host state government. president kabila issues of the threat of expulsion of the mission many times since taking office trying to control monusco said actions and only the threat, only the international community can diffuse that threat by sending strong political messages to the government that this behavior will not be tolerated. that hasn't happened. on the contrary in march, the you successfully pushed for the monusco troops shootin sitting e reduced by 3600 troops which could be interpreted as a symbolic victory by the kabila government and remember that last year the kabila government unsuccessfully tried reduce to demand a cut at 1700 troops. the city council pushed back against that. so this recent troop cut seems to roll back that progress. the budget cut of $100 billion the 2017-18 financier despite increase operational operatives will be interpreted as a sign that the u.n. security council is not truly invested in monusco is success. for many years you number states have looked for a way to withdraw the u.n. peacekeeping presence in the drc which has been costly and which is made little progress toward lasting peace. president kabila looking at your number states inpatient to wrap up monusco and their investment may believe he can wait out the crisis can block effective action by the mission and not face any real consequences from the international community. regional neighbors which could provide critical support to monusco by pressuring the government to comply with the december 31 framework have also done too little. on the contrary, the drc government has recently made progress ensuring regional support. thanks to its the pack at which to import neighbors it is secured condemnations of u.s. and eu sections, statements echoing the idea elections may need to be delayed because of insecurity in the kasai and announcements of non-african interference in the drc is domestic affairs. these actions legitimize the governments noncompliant and make it more difficult for monusco to use its good offices for the importation of the agreement. i want to turn to a few recommendations. the good news is that there is evidence of strong local support from u.s. and its partners can help to improve peacekeeping missions negotiating positions with civilly obstructive or hostile host state governments. the obama administration announced its decision in january to live trade sanctions against in july if the sudanese government met several conditions including reduced obstruction of the human african union peacekeeping mission in darfur. during that time a permission found that its freedom of movement and its political influence on the sudanese government improved. so strongest leadership on the drc could help change president kabila's -- a good offices roll and move the country towards elections. first, the is government should continue to pursue sanctions targeting individuals involved in actions that undermine democratic processes in the drc as well as their business interests. the decision by the u.s. on juna powerful message for the u.s. government should expand the strategy of targeting business interests of serious human rights violence. it should consider placing under sanctions the family business interest that enable the congress government to undermine democratic processes. second, the us government should put pressure on the drc government over its alleged role in the killings of michael sharp and members of the u.n. panel of experts and continue to call for a through investigation. this will reinforce the drc government that u.s. will not tolerate attempts to silence and intimidate u.n. workers. third, the u.s. mission to the u.n. together with the rest of u.n. security council should give monusco clear guidance on when the kabila government will be deemed illegitimate and what the missions response should be. one option may be to establish a bad line for noncompliant with the december 31 framework and if that line is crossed to provide monusco with the new mandate to spin in activities tha provide support to the congolese government. the u.s. mission should also engage in discussions with the good counsel about alternative strategies that could be pursued if the december 31 framework fails. for example, supporting a new interim authority while preparing for elections as was done in the central african republic or even replacing monusco with an african union mission which doesn't require the consent of those governments. fourth, the u.s. government should engage diplomatically with the neighbor states to ensure that they do not legitimize president kabila and to encourage them to put pressure on him to abide by the december 31 agreement. in addition the white house, what a good recommendation of my colleague, should assess possible nominate an effective u.s. ambassador to the drc and appoint an assistant secretary of state of the bureau of african affairs. without leadership on this issue is unlikely we'll see change. fifth and final abuse government shouldn't advocate for or support for the cuts to monusco budget reductions to the mission trip sitting without a clear strategy behind it. it should base decisions about meniscus budget and trips you on realistic investment of what it wants the mission to jeep and what resources that were required. thank you. >> thank you everyone. i think we touched on sort of the wide horizon of important issues in drc. like i said up front i would like to make sure that any congressional staff any ideas get a chance to ask questions if they have any. so if you're from a congressional office and you have a question, please raise your hand now. and don't all speak at once. all right. i just wanted to make sure. in that case, i would use my moderator prerogatives ask a question and then we'll open it up to the audience. and just to clarify our cut off time. [inaudible] i will ask my question first and then we can go to open q&a. a lot of important terrain was covered here, and i think the panelists, you did a great job of sort of highlighting how come in a very short period of time the situation in drc and the secret situation has migrated away from the framework that the international community has viewed for many decades, that primarily looked at kivu come at the expense of other important issues, that this was her much of framework in place for a long time into a more complex, more diffuse, and arguably harder to address in some ways sort of burgeoning security situation that we really haven't seen in quite some time. i wonder if i could ask you very briefly to elaborate a little bit more on some groups that we and washington spend less time talking about. so steve in particular, you mention bdk. mica, you touched on armed groups. without going into a ton of details due to time constraints, could you talk about how these emergent actors pose new challenges to international community tools that we've used, that we have relied on for a long time to address issues in drc? .. >> now, sort of vacuum of political legitimacy and the process that created new institutions where there was no support for those new institutions, new governors, this sort of, the same thing where you have institutions that could potentially manage and have for several years managed some of the local conflicts that haven't been able to respond and haven't been seen with legitimacy needed to sort of respond and voice channels of expression of discontent by different groups. again, i think there's a broad malaise with political institutions given lack of legitimacy and political parties. edps was a strong social network for decades, keeping communities together and largely keeping the region he willtively peaceful and the same in congo with other political parties. however, we see these institutions are no longer representative of the aspirations of people and you see the attractiveness of violent actions and that, i think, is certainly a big challenge as you've said for international action. the attractiveness of a movement that comes to a central market and is able to commit violent acts, and in the absence of real mobilization, all the challenges of getting people in the streets to move forward, there's a certain level of eagerness of youth and other disaffected individuals who see that at least putting words into action and that, i think, is certainly disconcerting. >> thanks. just touch briefly, alexis. the point i would make about the conflict and the horrible humanitarian consequences is ultimately there are very deep reservoirs of justices in congo and thorny blockages for legacy of injustice and things that involve indigenous people and among the thorny and deep-seated inequality. in my grandmother's lifetime, they use today keep a pygmy in the bronx zoo. and there are some that dates to colonialism and before and others to the recent wars. there are a set of issues that are not addressed and don't have a channel in the moment to address them. and it pushes people to take things in their own hands, that's what's happening with the growth of the militia, which is the primary militia group that emerged and others turn to leadership and that's why, that's part of the eye peel of mesionic logic around these groups. i'd be happy to share more off line in the specifics to this. >> in the audience, please go to the microphone and identify yourself before asking a question and we'll take a couple upfront. yes, can you-- >> sure. you mentioned the u.s. sanctions and some recommendations along those lines. so i was wondering if steve and the other panelists could comment on impact of the sanctions so far and what impacts further financial pressures might have on the policy priorities of getting electoral calendar published on time and making sure they're moving ahead with the political preface and not towards further violence and instability. >> thanks, anyone else? >> yes. >> again, could you comment on the decision to pull back from the mediation, whether there's any prospect for them stepping back in and/or is there another body that could play the kind of role that turned out to be so effective last year? thanks. >> we'll go back to the panel. >> okay. was there a sensitive nature to the lack of u.s. diplomatic leadership, since the u.s. risked losing in a region that desperately needs some kinds of pressure that clearly are not currently in place, just one other thing, very interested in what you were saying about grass roots peace building and it seemed you were revving -- looking at budgeting and expanding. >> we'll go in order, if that makes sense and pick and choose which elements you'd like to comment on. >> on sasha's comments on the impact of sanctions so far. it's impacted calculations from the government side and impacted shifting of positions and it has put security commanders to hesitate a bit more about more repressive measures, led to some shifting of command positions and so, i think that it's certainly-- while on the other hand it's hardened other actors and that certainly cannot be discarded, but there are certainly some value to having that as a tool in the absence of diplomatic engagement which doesn't necessarily exist without an ambassador and other senior leadership. and with regards to the mediation, absolutely, the fact that they were brought in and that the president accepted them as mediator was extremely important given the credibility they had with the broad population and the stances they had taken about the respective constitution. the agreement in and of itself, the main provisions of the agreement were generally accepted by the population. so it's a certain disappointment at their withdrawal, but he think their calculation from their end from the credibility of implementation process or seen as too closely associated with the shortfalls of that process, so there are institutional calculations. and yes, it would be wonderful for them to take up a strong position, that doesn't necessarily have to be within the frame work of the agreement, but it can be with consistent calls for the publication of the set of an electoral calendar. once we move to that, then they have a huge role to play in assuring a fair playing field and prospects amongst all actors and that's the role in the society in general. i'm not sure it has to be a formal role. it can be a traditional role as moral authority throughout the count country. >> maybe i'll take up the question of peace building. one of the challenges we've seen is frankly endemic as we look at similar places as sudan, yemen and elsewhere around the world is that we have-- the international community in particular the u.s. has two very good tools at its disposal when dealing with emerging crises. one is the management, better coordinated and effective and the second is deployment of peacekeepers. both of those deal with the symptoms of the crises, but they're not taken well-suited to addressing the kinds that we see and those causes. it's hard to see how political efforts or political will or pressure on situations will resolve this kind of grass roots issues. and so, that's where peace buildi building steps in. it would be first and foremost be led by them working together, which we see coming, but they need international support and that needs to come -- that needs to be part of the international strategy. that's why we look for the complex crisis funds and u.s. aids and management and mitigation and support of civilians. those are the accounts that are most under threat and at the same time the ones most needed to prevent sort of the next wave of humanitarian suffering. we're concerned as people who work closely with the funds and care about the congo, cutting these are a penny wise and a found foolish and we'll see these needs continue to mount if we don't have more problem solving. we'll have more problems to pick up afterwards. >> i think i'll touch on a little bit on sasha's questions about the sanctions, but by starting by talking about the largest issue of transparency and accountability. to weaken the transparency of dodd-frank as well as the potential threat to the minerals legislation are going to hurt not only efforts to bring better governance and accountability and potentially weaken or stop the use of resources illicitly gained in our main armed groups and facilitating the use of armed groups. congress doesn't benefit from that, neither does any of the friends of the country who want to put pressure on political actors doing bad things. amnesty, obviously, doesn't have a position on personal sanctions, but one cannot dismiss the fact that that is now a consideration and i think steve mentioned that, that the calculus now has to include the potential for actually being impacted by the global rules and that's something that has to be, i would-- i suspect be a tool that the state department would not want to lose. i think the question, daniel, that you mentioned about time is actually a bigger one. we were talking here about the current around the fighting in the region going back 20 years, and then you also talk about 50 years. you know, in other words, there has been conflict in the drc in political crisis for well over 50 years. there may not be an explosion point at the end of this, but there's certainly an erosion that is just more hard to fight against and i think that's what mike is stressing is that there's only a certain amount of capacity that can sustain people in their struggle for justice and governance and we're losing that. we're expending that with no real outcome at the end of it and i think that that's dangerous and when you combine that with the cuts that we're talking about to capacity building and sustaining civil society groups that are going to be key to this, you are looking potentially at a very, very damaging and weakened country come to the end of 2017 and still facing a political crisis. >> i'll just say one more thing on the question of time pressure. so, i think that there is-- there is sometimes to be here. we have all been talking about the december 31st frame work. we're only a few months away from that frame work drawing to a close and without diplomatic presence in the region we are going to lose the chance to take advantage of that frame work. the best case scenario that i laid out earlier is for that frame work to be salvaged, pulled back from the brink of defeat and for elections to be held. if we don't take advantage of that, of that opportunity by placing diplomates in the region and appointing state and department officials, then we're losing opportunities. and then, just quickly on sanctionin sanctionings-- sanctions, i think the evidence is anecdotal so far. to speak one official in the congo talked about the eu sanctions, the travel bans and pointing out that a lot of these senior officials view brussels as a second home and just the idea that that option is closed off to them really puts a big mental strain on them and can have a psychological impact. i don't think that we should neglect that psychological effect. i think there's an opportunity to use sanctions as a tool to get-- to get members of the government to see that it's more in their interest to abide by the december 31st frame work than to abandon it. so, whatever tools the u.s. government can support to put pressure on them to shape those interests he think would help the situation. >> thanks very much. we're slightly over our time so thank you very much to the whole panel and please join me in thanking everyone up here for a free discussion today. [applaus [applause]. >> tim, did you have any closing remarks? all right, thanks, everyone. [inaudible conversations] >> book tv went to capitol hill to ask members of congress what they're reading this summer. >> one book i'm reading now, just about finished is sebastian younger's book called "tribe", the author of "perfect storm." i chair the veterans committee in washington. it's about ptsd and integration of our veterans into society. it's a great broook. i recommend that you read it. i serve as co-chair caucus of literacy in washington and that's one thing i urge you to do. this summer we read a lot of boring things in washington, papers and policy papers and all that, but just for fun this summer i'm going to read david ballducci. i've read every book he's written starting with his first one and never given up on it and he's a great writer and jon meacham's book on andrew jackson. the reason i'm going to read that, he was the first person to hold my seat. and there two presidents there, andrew jackson and andrew johnson, folks i'd like to read about this summer. >> book tv would like to know what you're going to read. @book tv or post it to our facebook page, facebook.com/tv. book tv on c-span2, television for serious readers. this week on c-span, tonight at 8:00, with the budget as something for congress to handle, we'll look at pending proposals for the federal budget and friday, a profile interview with sonny purdue. >> my political history was, i tell people when i was born in 1946 in perry, georgia, they stamp democrat on your birth certificate. i made a political decision and i call it truth in advertising, in 1998, to change parties and became a republican at that point in time. >> followed at 8:30 p.m. with a conversation with black hat and def con author. >> there were only maybe people in the military or maybe banks, this is a hobby. as the internet grew and there were jobs, and people are putting things on-line and there's money at risk, all of a