Transcripts For CSPAN2 Panel Discussion Focuses On Security Situation In Afghanistan 20170224

We are delighted that you could join us today for a rollout of the new report that we have done on afghanistan and forward. As we were thinking about the president ial transition we thought it was important to put together some papers for the next president before we knew who the president would be. Really recommended what would protect and vent American Interest in any number of topics. It scenes that afghanistan is a war that continues 16 years on that this is a critical area where a new administration would have to grapple with us strategy, objectives and a way forward for the campaign. So we commissioned a senior fellow here to lead the development of the report. He is not president and ceo of strategic leadership group. He is also a former military officer four times in afghanistan. Once commanding an airborne Infantry Task force. And pioneered deed as has been written up in many case studies and books as a model for how they can be effective. He then went on to be a Senior Advisor for several generals. And i was fortunate to have him as my Senior Advisor when i was secretary of the fence on that. So he was the right person for us commissioned to write this report. And within weeks we hope that he will be in nearly phd from Kings College as well. Thank you for coming quest. Joining is also his ambassador ron newman. He is formally Deputy Assistant secretary of state. But also threetime ambassador. Very Senior Foreign Service officer with many sort of kudos, he was ambassador out of syria, iran and finally afghanistan from 2005 to 2007. He has also served in iraq on the Coalition Provisional authority and the political military multinational command. He has been at the nexus of policy, politics and military operations on several occasions. He is also a wellknown author. Writing the other war, winning and losing afghanistan which came out in 2009. He is a frequent commentator and a tremendous resource. I remember when i was undersecretary anytime i wanted to understand, i was having a hard time understanding something about afghanistan and i was one of the first people a he was one of the first people we would reach out to. So we are going to start the Panel Discussion today with giving chris a few minutes upfront to summarize the report and his recommendations. We then turn to ambassador newman commentary and we will the back and forth on the discussion for a while and then we will open up to your questions and comments. So, chris. Thank you very much. Becky everybody for coming. I cant thank michelle enough for giving me the opportunity to continue serving in afghanistan when i was finished my tour as a commander. I called at the pentagon or the personnel people and said, i would really like to keep working on afghanistan in washington d. C. And they said well, you can log on in afghanistan but not in washington d. C. We can go to washington d. C. But you cant work on afghanistan. So i was stuck in the army staff. And when the Obama Administration was coming in and michelle was getting on board as the under secretary of defense for policy. I got directed to go down and brief michelle about afghanistan. And i did. And after the conversation she said what are you doing now . And i said working in the army staff. Is that we want to be working . No, i would actually rather be working with afghanistan. And then i got a phone call saying you are working for me now and were going to do a new strategy review for afghanistan and pakistan and i would like you to help me out with that. So that was a tremendous experience in them being able to work with you, the years following has just been absolutely delightful and i appreciate your leadership and your support. I also want to think for their support through this process particularly sean brimley. Paul, lauren, neil, jarrell and kevin, my Research Assistants on this. Thank you all very much. Ron thank you for being here today for all of your support during this process. We are also going to have ambassador Jim Cunningham here but he was at a lastminute family emergency so unfortunately he could not make it. I also want to thank the working group, they are listed in the report but they provided a tremendous amount of support, challenged all of my ideas and made this whole process better. So in terms of the report, i am a true believer in afghanistan. Im a true believer in the people of afghanistan and a true believer in the future of afghanistan. But i also know that we are not going to get there from here. And the situation has evolved and developed such that without a significant change in strategy, were going to continue to have problems in afghanistan that are just going to make the situation worse. Overall the situation in afghanistan is an unstable stalemate. What i mean by that is, it is a stalemate in the sense that neither side is likely to win outright. As long as they continue to enjoy external support. It is unstable in the sense that the taliban continues to making battlefield gains. And as long as they continue making battlefield gains, they are going to continue the military campaign. It is just that simple. In terms of the taliban, they are a sustainable insurgence. What i mean by sustainable insurgency is that they have got durable support inside afghanistan so they can continue building fighters. And supportive spirit and have external sanctuary in pakistan and donor support from the gulf. The Afghan Government meanwhile these two situations and insurgency with sustainable support and host nation government that is unable to take territory from an insurgency. Means that the likelihood of a clear outright win for the government statistically is about zero. In fact, since the Second World War they ran some interesting studies on this. An insurgency that has sustainable support that i spoke about. Has been successful every single time. That doesnt mean that they overthrow the government but in a negotiated, they may overthrow the government. But in eight negotiated outcome they tend to be better than the government. Conversely, a government that has been unable to essentially win the battle of legitimacy and insurgent control and contested areas has been unsuccessful every time. It doesnt mean that they were overthrown, they might be, or in a negotiated outcome they have had to give more than they have gotten. And that is also the case even with significant amounts of external support. So in terms of that is what i mean by an unstable stalemate. And in terms of the likelihood of an outright government when, at this point it is very unlikely. As it is an outright taliban win. Just to briefly talk about the taliban and the Afghan Government, some of the protagonists. The taliban is an insurgent group. And who aims to eventually govern afghanistan. And they will use a variety of means as an insurgency to gain control of territory, people and contest others. They will certainly use military attacks. They will use shadow governments, terrorist tactics, assassination, intimidation, propaganda, the whole range of what insurgencies generally use. They have got sanctuary in pakistan that is not likely to go away anytime soon. They have made, started to make inroads among groups which are actually significant for them. Their ties to al qaeda were difficult after september 11 and for many years beyond that. They have been improving recently. They fight however, with Islamic State awhich is the affiliate and afghanistan. They are internally fractious movement. They have many different fractions. Although those different fractions are very loyal to the taliban. Or to the taliban sort of identity. So there has often been an aspiration to maybe fragment the taliban and get back to defect and that continues to be unlikely. Their decisionmaking is actually very slow. They tend to run decisions kind of like the traditional where everybody has got to veto. Sort of at the un security council. So, as long as there are people among their inner circle that believe the military campaign ought to continue, and since that is a status quo that is probably what it will produce. There is a huge status quo bias within the organization and it will take some time, and very conditions than what they face now, before they make significant changes strategy. With respect to the Afghan Government, sadly, under the Karzai Administration they have been through a plutocracy which has damaged their legitimacy and different areas. It doesnt mean all government officials are not right, certainly not. I know a lot of government officials that are just absolute patriots. But, there are too many that are engaged in this and it creates all negativity that is damaging the governments ability to get the support of the population. They still have the challenges. Both the president and chief executive, both want to reform the system. Both recognize the system needs to be for reform but their vision for reform are very different. Which makes that reform process a real challenge. An even more challenging than just the disagreements on the fact that they are very powerful warlords who have so much invested in this kleptocracy that they will prevent, actively undermine any efforts to reform the system. And it for many of them they are also willing to threaten violence to protect this sort of reform and this makes this reform political reform, a very highstakes process. Unfortunately, too many of the army and police have been in this which undermines their ability to fight and win on the battlefield. And certainly there are a lot of commanders who are doing the right thing and when Afghan Forces are well led, they tend to fight very well. I have fought alongside event and ive seen what happens when forces are well led. They tend to fight very very well, very very driven. A lot of Afghan Forces are doing that. Too many however, are poorly led. When not led well enough and have commanders and others who may be compromised in their incentives. And so this is creating problems on the battlefield. Which are helping the taliban sustain. There is also an afghan strategy for the war. Which i find remarkable after 15 years. We have never had a common strategy for how we bring this war to a successful conclusion. And that has resulted in the United States and afghan partners tending to move off in different directions. With respect to the region, afghanistan lives in a very tough neighborhood. And they have a lot of predatory neighbors. Pakistan is of course predatory neighbor exhibit a. They provided sanctuary to the taliban. Plenty of donors provide funding to the taliban. The relationship with the telephone is not necessarily puppet master but more of what some call where if the taliban were left to their own devices will continuing doing what pakistan wanted to do. Which is destabilize afghanistan. But when they get out of line, pakistan will indeed crackdown. The pakistanis do this in many ways out of fear that afghanistan will become a state of india. And if it is a client state of india, then the indians and the afghans will team up to essentially dismantle pakistan. And so, the closer that afghanistan gets with india, the more nervous pakistan gets, the more nervous they get the more they allow the insurgency to provide support that which then brings afghanistan closer and get this very damaging, very destructive cycle. In which for pakistan, they will prefer afghanistan to be a client state. They fear afghanistan will be indias client state and so what they, if they cannot have one, and they want to prevent the other, then they aim for an unstable afghanistan because in their logic, and unstable afghanistan is not able to inflict the harm that they would expect to stabilize afghanistan. The United States of course as designated pakistan a major nonnato ally. And in aiding assistance the nicest gives 742. 2 million per year to pakistan. With respect to india, they prefer that, to keep pakistan boxed in. They certainly do not want afghanistan to become a client state of india. They many historic relations with afghans and afghan elites. They also recognize that there tends to be an inverse proportional, an inverse relationship between violence in afghanistan and violence in kashmir. When violence and afghanistan goes up violence and cashmere tends to go down and vice versa. And that is certainly not lost on india. I ran, and i will stop this is the third reason i will address. Also view western afghanistan as part of them. They tend to look afghanistan through the lens of that conflict with saudi arabia. Hearing that if a propakistani group gets control of afghanistan, then that will be used as a lever by saudi arabia to undermined iran. So all of these conference are affecting the National Conflict within afghanistan. For the United States of course, we have had our own challenges. And we are certainly, can be our own worst enemy at times. Since the beginning of the war we have tended to super mpower various elites and warlords which has been very damaging. In fact, at times when the president in the early years went to us asking us to back him in working against the warlords, we tended to say no. I know it is part of the reason why the kleptocracy evolved. We have also had inflicted civilian casualties which has been very damaging with our relationship with afghanistan, the legitimacy with the International Mission and to the patients of the afghan public. Weve often frustrated afghanistan with our policies. I was in in october. And i noticed that the two countries were like way, the most unpopular from the perspective of the audience. The two must unpopular countries were pakistan of course going away and the second most unpopular country for people was the United States. And they view some of our policies, for instance with the National Unity government or policy with pakistan was to in particular as being damaging for them. And some afghans even actively wonder whether the United States really wants peace in afghanistan or if were just sort of stirring the pot to justify a troop presence. And certainly that is not a healthy situation for the relationship. Part of the reason why these problems have been and continue to happen is we tend to operate bureaucratic silos. Within afghanistan. So defense doesnt stay the intelligence immunities tend to do its own thing and no one is really in charge of this full range of american efforts on the ground. And so what happens is you get seams or gaps between the silos that people can exploit. And you get friction points where efforts in one silo can damage efforts in another silo. And weve seen that over the past 16 years repeat itself. Bottom line is the taliban gaining ground. The Afghan Government not being able to regain their initiative. Your predatory actors within the region that are creating instability and a lack of mission and strategy. What we were done in 2011 and 2013, not only failed but very damaging the eyes of many afghans. And the United States policy had been way too sluggish and way too bureaucratic. So what do we do with all of that . We looked at three options. Option a is withdraw. Keep funding afghanistan and try to manage the risks of International Terrorist groups coming back to afghanistan. Option b was an openended commitment. Keep 84 trips there and a8400 troops there and as Jim Cunningham put it put it on autopilot. And that includes managing the policy from the white house in washington d. C. And then option c is an openended commitment. It is simply unrealistic. It is based on the fact that a negotiated outcome is probably the most realistic way to gain a favorable and durable result in this war. So we have got to make, with the figure how to make this right for negotiations. It was the Afghan Nation has advantage. And then, and they need to be building the foundations of the Peace Process. And not just a deal with people get around the table and try to hammer out a deal in three days. But a process that will probably take 10 to 15 years or longer. Afghanistan has been at work for nearly 40 years now. There is a lot of tensions and issues wrapped up in whatever Peace Process might unfold. As we laid out three conditions for how we set the conditions to bring a negotiated outcome about in which the Afghan Government has the advantage and we expect the sacrifices and service of both Afghan Soldiers as well as americans. So we laid out three objectives. First we have to stabilize. That means that we need to stabilize our troop presence and essentially say were going to be there at this level or an enhanced level. As long as the Afghan Government wants us. So get rid of the withdrawal timelines. We are going to stay there as long as the Afghan Government and people want us to be there. At the same time, weve got to get developing a Us Afghanistan policy. Get everyone on the same sheet of music. And we have to apply, we be better at applying assistance. I think we can get more of that. Second objective is promoting afghan sovereignty while reducing destabilizing regional competition. So weve been trying for a long time to essentially finesse everybodys interest. Try to find that sweet spot where the interest of all afghans and as well as all the region, pakistan, india, iran etc. Can all be met. We have the conclusion that sweet spot probably just does not exist. So a way around that is afghanistan essentially declares themselves to be a neutral power. Backed by the United States and regional then you have got to have a process that adjudicates and manages that. If you cant find a way to manage the socalled great game if you will, and in a productive way than this is perhaps an alternative to just remove the game altogether. And the third objective is you have to begin the process of building the foundations for a Peace Process. That of course may take 10 to 15 years or longer to unfold and is probably going to require a thirdparty facilitator. To begin to construct this process to build these foundations. And these processes will have to occur at local levels, National Level and at international or regional levels because it is sort of the dimensions. And then finally, we need to stop the United States, stop operating by bureaucratic silo enough liquid somebody in charge of the full range of United States efforts in afghanistan and will talk more about that as well. The report also determines or lays out what might be reactions to the strategy. And the United States bureaucracy. And then we also mail some identifies and rest and ways to manage them. And i believe that through a strategy like this, that you can actually bring the war to a favorable, durable conclusion that respects the service and sacrifices of afghans and americans alike. And set the stage for that kind of future that thing afghanistan and Afghan People aspire to and want to achieve. Thank you. This is a new report, new recommendations and the new strategy. What was the main take away and in this work. Thank you for having me here. When is a consult but i did have a chance to make a few interventions. I think anyone that approaches the report with Henry Kissingers clip in mind that the state Department Reports always had three recommendations. Nuclear war, surrender and whatever it was that the bureaucracy wanted to achieve. I think this is better than that actually. And talks about in terms of the prevention of strikes against United States so what that has to require is not just playing with semantics or a suspension expert but very seriously at the question we could argue if the position is right it is important to recognize if there is incredible definition. It also allows one to focus on what is important to us hollywood to afghanistan in the first place and there are reasons for that week tend to be frustrated we have serious issues not just the says im tired and i want to go home but it fixed into the context of winning. Then it does something and in terms of the quality of the government prepared and also recognizes this would be longterm proposition ban over the years we have been fascinated by somehow getting this to happen. In because we changed people all the time i used to refer 1 5 to this with the annual passage of the good idea ferry. With a new bright notions that did not work very well and we do that to so that common sense rationality. Then you have to look at the other options. Also what is quite important is the talk of running the of policy with a Single Person prompt and i address that a couple of years ago i dont think it will ever happen but in any event afghanistan has suffered from our policies repeatedly the constant desire of washington that given what christopher about pot of a cacophony of voices with differ messages which of the one hand was confusing to the afghans but was also a constant temptation and played to their own benefit. The dozen stop us from doing it repeatedly. But this policy under broad guidance i will try to explain how it is important of the one anecdote. Because washington is always full of ideas to do this sort do that as a staple of conversation and talking to itself out to run things having to deal with foreigners but unfortunately we dont do that assault from washington for good there was a technical issue but the industries could not get together if chasing around and around and finally to forbade Single Council and then to go with different issues they did not want to do that. And at 1. 10 million worth of diesel fuel to be cut off. So i was putting pressure on and it was not working very well. Eventually the minister of water and power that was doing this to undercut him but if of purpose was to force his removal and that was trying to press him. The updated ee deaver setting for console pdf to first understand the sphinx to find somebody who has his confidence with a technical issue to use uh gobetween the of very afghan way to do things to hash out the differences to face confrontation in eventually we worked it out. And then we had uh typical reconciliation dinner so i tell you this story you can decide and you could operate the policy to tailor the reaction of sfax flood in 5316 years that is why this is a is the idea in washington with a great deal of met gordy in the field. One although operational is an important idea. Want to go back to your first recommendation to stabilize the of battlefield in the talk about different type of stalemate that they could no longer win on the ground and at the negotiating table. So in your view with but the taller than the goes toward the Peace Process . The bottom line the gains outweigh the potential benefits when becomes too painful and then that Decision Making process that may be the military campaign is too costly. Am part of of the reason why is the gradual drawdown of International Forces. So with fat they can say first of all, they know it will reduce every year. Things will be a little bit better and then to calculate as the International Forces go down the likelihood that television can improve the gains that was one of them problems to undermine the efforts of the transition of the fight successfully that we try to do all of these things and that is a bad position to be bargaining. But to stop the drawdown to say we will be there as long as the Afghan Government wants us we need a few thousand more troops out one level lower it is absolutely right and we need to stabilize troop levels and air support and that will give us to the point to reach a High Water Mark now what we might be a will to do over time is the Afghan Security forces and improve to the point that they can regain Battlefield Initiative and to retain areas of they can do that and stabilize the battlefield then to chip away at those areas then you have a situation with the Afghan Government to be in a position of advantage of negotiation that is levied need to try to achieve. Within the Afghan Government to deliver services to the Afghan People to gain legitimacy to spend years with those efforts are there other incentives or conditions that you think the International Community needs to use with that reform process Going Forward there are bad start from that realization one is the major driver of corruption most conditionality is directed at putting pressure on or diminishing the state there is a mismatch where we have leverage and the driver of corruption is for shortterm survival that doesnt mean you cannot do anything about it. And looking at corruption acrosstheboard in that this phase beyond. But essentials lee to moderate the level of efficiency and performance is they got their peace but the bridges that they build build, the building stayed up. People are in them. The window and the orphan got their russian and the call will. But that delivered to the people but that is the next phase of the afghanistan at much higher levels so the security ministries that is talkedabout in the balance. But you cannot take get all on. If we arrest on some of those things in behalf to press for more accountability that let their units go to hell to be corrupted need to insist to first think they are against the low wall but if the Afghan Government cannot find support to truly discipline the most egregious performers, the we are at that point where we have to start looking at basic assumptions the emir substituting willpower and they can never replace it. There is a certain tension between conditionality and uh communication there is a certain tension there of conditionality but has not worked so well. So are there examples where in this worse that you can explain the results . This important to understand the nature of the corruption and there are different kinds of disease. There is a big banner that could mean anything from the checkpoint to the form of government and everything at this point. Lowlevel corruption is clearly illegal actually it is very easy to deal with. Corruption by individuals in that larger context of the system you can eventually be put enough pressure to deal with the problem is even a more aggressive form of the dizzies but otherwise it is fatal in and throw the whole system but the difference between patronage is top down and loyalty goes up. Money flows up those powerbrokers from kabul in the offshore banks seldom money will flow up and and you do what you need to do to paid the rent and turn a profit. So some of the reports is a police chief of from a very lucrative twoyear one province. The Border Police commander generally 50,000. 1 who works at the ministry of interior to become chief of police and then be chief of police for a certain period of time not everybody plays this game but many of them do. So whenever betty plays the game the numberone incentive it is not winning the war it is beating the system to turn the profit and that is how you take care of your family i will give you to specifics of the business of promoting people that is something and it is happening or not happening it will be much harder to say we have those mechanisms with continuing levels of pressure. The we have to pick those egregious targets in the major of discussion. To put specific pressure on individuals and even take the rap that is more art than science. He is exactly right with discussions in kabul with the Afghan Government about having review boards with the best performance of provincial governors and for those that earn a performing in the review board would make a determination with the things like that would be very helpful. You just cannot dismantle overnight so the first Vice President turns over for questioning with the abusive backed against another afghan. So there is a system emplace that the United States any International Community can suspend or cut off funding. And also to do a much better job to measure with the Corruption Perception index. From 2008 but down this year i think they are number nine. But that is the index that when corruption is not getting better. And then there in is penalties and then there is a bonus so we have to do some things to make conditionality to depersonalize and make the objective as possible to have a sense of who are the spoilers with the Afghan Government in a way. I will open this up for all of you. The Peace Process. And with that Peace Process people are coming to the negotiating table what you are describing is a gradual process to gradually move towards a number of years to for 10 or 15 years it is a discouraging number. With the case studies and experience where did that come from . And then either things we can start doing . And then to get around uh table as the Peace Process it is gradual and deliver it with a very broad confidenceBuilding Measures. With us, but is Building Measures can be concrete and comprehensive to make agreements and the Peace Process of Northern Ireland to be a gradual and deliver process it took it a decade or more. And the reason why this is different is as the of mujahideen parties try to create another Afghan Government against them. And in 1993 the islamabad accords tried again and that did not work. With United States was working to open the Taliban Office in none of the of preparatory work was made in afghanistan among the Afghan Government with of Peace Process the outrage in afghanistan wasnt i hope the United States learned lesson and there is a lot of polarization with the Afghan Government i dont see a peace deal. Just to underscore two points every time we looked like we are urging what we set up is a taliban it looks like it comes more from us than the afghan and that is a losers game. So it has to be support for him. And second is to recognize fighting in negotiating is a parallel practice they are not alternatives with the clearest formulation that i have heard it is the israeli Prime Minister how can you negotiate with these terrorist . 1 2 to fight them as there is no negotiations. And then when you get yourself and to open position the can negotiate and your new paper makes an important point which is the need for the thirdparty voice because it is hard enough to do this and also to be a concession. Into try out ideas and and to give an answer with that process for what you will talk about. We will open for your questions. Said in a with the afghan american and chamber of commerce were talking more engagement is there any by and from those native bias with a longterm process works is this sustainable . That is a great question at all know how what they have developed with the nato partners. So this could affect the ability to provide up close and personal. Thises of process and led general nicholson is talking about and periodically this is not that of the Company Level and be understanding and that leads to casualtys blacks. So given the description of the lay of the land when to use those same ingredients that i find difficult and with the trajectory of things with 10 or for 18 years. The fourth option is not predicated to sit down around the table with a resolution and to build confidence and economic systems to lay out those incentives for people who want to identify. Also the of political reconciliation why cant we see our position there . But essentially not as that long verse stretch. We understand. Let me come to my point. But the process is not one of a grand bargain of reintegration rather than reconciliation with the taliban it is one of what we do to make gains in the process to peel off the commanders. In the and in marginalizes part core so then the get the best of all outcomes. And there is a little bit of that but there has spent an aspiration over a very long period of time. The one he defected from the taliban after being shah a number of times in 2010 it is unjust realistic and there it is interesting and the merging research that although the television and leaders but theyre not willing to defect. Is very important so that kind of model with that process with a 30 major layers it is importance with the local grievances to get people that way with the national and interNational Level we would do this for another five years than we are out. And in a context of wills and that is why we to look this approach. To mention before the tension and when you have conditionality is you or willing to take something away and to follow through on that. Was the seventh specific things with that overall commitment to long terms for . The idea we will lay out a grand vision is what we have tried repeatedly and then not carry through. That is why you need a process. In with the need of an even bigger threat to. And from what i would like to see is sketching out what you word like to take away for those squandering on an individual basis and on a targeted basis and is much more art than science. And with those individuals. But less specific with the application. And those of have been Significant Holdings with the occasional afghan politicians we can do that. Is a very targeted individual. Not trying to frame everything it is very difficult for us the way we like to operate. And with those issues . So the taliban gained 15 more ground to enjoy a safe haven and is a bumper crop that fuel some of taliban and also corruption so how du deal with all three . So can you push back the land is in particular with the high con the network . People have been talking about if people said i could retire right now. But again i was here in the spring. What do you do . Is an eradicate and then so that as medical warfield . That is a great question. So in the ideal world the United States could put enough pressure to turn against the insurgency of the taliban. That is a demand from afghans that we do that and allowing that to happen to give them 742 million that enables them blunden using other money to support the television. It is very frustrating. In what is most desirable. In to be comprehensive and in afghanistan and kashmir and to be on the regular television. And with at expectation god pakistan to go to war is a realistic. And the most favorable and durable outcome is from the Peace Process to recognize the will not change. And will not change the of poppy issue. , and to stabilize the support. And those military operations. I like those who support sanctuaries to pay higher price without necessarily making it 100 percent do or die in report talks that is inappropriate policy can we get there . Gas. On one condition that if the afghans will show the political will for those who fight and the leaders to account they are doing very well with the commandos right now. If you look at those places where they are losing ground it is much deplorable leadership in those places as if particular lack the equipment and talking with those few machine gun bullet holes but you can turn that around with leadership if they only take that political will. If they come together they can deliver quite a bit. So command makes us difference there is nothing short term that you can do with that strategy so you have places that they have voluntarily giving this up. And just to be the shortterm results boded is the only realism that very is. I am from afghanistan things for the comprehensive support. And it will create more insurgency were they are perceived the majority will warlords and then they see and then they sit themselves to be trapped in a society where they are targeted and then that automatically creates resilience. So my question is to engage with afghanistan and they are appointed all over the country to be sold out from hundreds of thousands of dollars and to bring peace and how does that foster the insurgency one way or another . With the problem of corruption so it is a complex issue but one of the girl problems of afghanistan. You are absolutely right you have to be agile and targeted and we have to coordinate with actions with that type of activity if people paid knoll penalties for that then the behavior simply continues to give much more authority of u. S. Activities on the ground and also talking how we need much more robust monitoring. And coordinate with the president and the chief executive. From my perspective we have a new season to talk about your conference with the reform parties. Yes he is putting into longrange reforms and it is delivering results several Business People told me tax collection had gotten more honest but it was not for bribes. And banking regulation was much more on this. And his difficult to produce Small Businesses but some of these things that happening they are small and will not snowball but that determination is real and leased to tolerate not in his pecuniary interest with the search for purity of afghanistan. But there is a notion and with both of them that they set to on the upper wall of supporters that theyre not under control and command. There are things to work with that under his control the senior level people now while really leaning forward with this public discussion even if they did not fit prickly is an important milestone. They are not hollow words of the cannot summon the political words then it is a long step back zero little progress that government has to deliver. This is the strategy to put the political and national power. With the military clearly to play a supporting role. So the lighthouse 30 the review from the pentagon next week on isis the and it will be included in the regions or if there are any immediate actions of the white house. Then they made no zero qualms of that apparatus. So preparing for policy and what that might look like . I know the of master pretty well. Is even general mattis say little bit but this is a broad vision. We have three general officers and George Marshall in one of whom was a disaster and listening to npr and as the book criticizes for the interference this dereliction of duty is the military not professionally standing up . To have the professional duty but in any event that is the important attribute it comes with too few of our leaders. And the people need to be responsible and accountable to be very reluctant core of set their we created another bureaucratic silence. This is the very particular point that we drive equipment from afghanistan. We have not done at as badly bent that that will not be resolved of the study and then we lose the first one. Look at the of hopis wall peace is a challenge of of Peace Process is the recommendation adding a few thousand extra advisers and a recently had done some research to have a completely different picture and what they presented was a morale problem. Theyre killing fellow afghans begin is now they are engaged but interestingly enough the already predicted vaughan americans withdraw so the recommendation it risks back into the campaign. Because we will not appear on the battlefield in this more making statements to that quietly dont make the statements. Then americans might and withdraw but Research Shows the television has a problem. Prepare not killing westerners anymore but they have more owl issues that is a critical point but we are television tell the and and to write those fellow afghans that may be less attractive but the point is very good but there is not big banners around that we look at these three objectives so of these efforts of conditionality with the old pakistan the regional environment with the donation of the Peace Process as well. And how they enter into the negotiations you first have to have a mutual stalemate with the gains are too painful for both sides you have to have alternative to the status quo that is attractive to both sides. Still looking at forging that path now getting more pressure from the television taliban. We are just about out of time so if you have an opportunity to make the case to President Trump from the u. S. Interest perspective the what they werent questioning pablo to review the policies and that is not going well. We have then there 16 years and to translate into where you arrive from u. S. Policy but from the u. S. Interest perspective the case you would make for or against to create the opportunity for the terrorist groups of the National Interest of the United States so the problem with the openended commitment with the printer port on autopilot without conditionality wiry spending 23 billion per year . Servite are they killed . Why have we spend more on the Marshall Plan to rebuild why should we continue doing this . And then we have a real disaster on our hands. It shows how the conflict will be favorable and the key steps to get there and to measure progress said a strategic level to give people paid things moving in the right direction to a favorable outcome in this helps people keep the faith that is from the National Interest standpoint. I want to see them succeed by have many friends in afghanistan i want to see the country succeed. It is very hard to win in afghanistan is not hard to lose. Keep that in mind for close second the price you pay for a listing could be very high we tend to forget with a lot of criticisms for future attacks on the homeland for lawenforcement and intelligence we have not had a certain amount of lot. One alert with that at your peril. Brcs slow learners churchill said dick boyce trust americans to make the right decision after they have tried everything else. We are trying to reach that point. [laughter] but we have learned. There is some critical points you can profit from what we have learned but you have to be willing that you cannot profit shortterm the body tries to sell a policy on shortterm success defining how you would be criticized. [applause] [inaudible conversations] by a fear is republicans going off in their own direction. I am worried about the congress and people dont understand Republican Leadership and that political battle. Sobor had something atrocious about it. It is conducted within a common unit at the same time absolutely affirmed and denied a common unit. Instead of just excepting the price he would offer me ill send the tobacco over are my own account and offer to Pay Commission for of this developing trade to the english merchants berger most of them are in london. Fiber up of feet and then my religious experience with the feelings of important openness that there is no superior or inferior. The morning of may 19 hearing she could do ourselves warm in front of the medical and legal experts and have occurred tried on charges of mental incompetence could be held against her will with the insanity. Due to technical difficulties we cannot bring you the first few minutes so we bring you the conference an