don't speak pashtun or farsi or what they need to do. can they give that? >> i'll give an answer, but i'll tell you i did not bring you up to be a prop for the last answer, but it was how i wanted to end. okay? this book is 70% about what our troops are doing every day. it's not about strategy. i bring that in. i try to show what's happening on battlefield after battlefield, and the grit of the young men that gets to the military ethic, there's going to be another point -- if i can figure out how to calibrate it. there is an america, a military ethos, and you cannot be a strong superpower if you can't have it, and no one in western europe has it, and it's now gone from the united kingdom, which breaks my heart, but it's in the united states. i don't know where it comes from. the grunts that i know are one-half of one-half of 1% of the eligible population. 75% of all males the ages of 18-20 are not physically or mentally capable of being recruited into the military. scary to begin with in our country, and of -- somehow, there's this small group who volunteered for the military, and then they volunteer to be riflemen knowing exactly what you do with the rifle, and they want to be the warriors and guardian, and the interesting thing is that they're reengistment rates are so high now, they can't keep everyone who wants to be in, and i was -- you go out on patrol with these kids, and it's -- it's -- i was just -- i shouldn't say "kids," but i can because they are my sons and grandsons. i was just out with them two weeks ago, and this platoon, god bless them, their platoon commander lost his arm and leg to one of these iring's eds, and this coreman running to rescue him was blown up and killed. the platoon commander wants to stay on active duty in the marine corp., and they also lost two others killed and eight others evacuated, so 12 out of 40 were gone when i got there, and all they want to do every day is em out, take the fight to the enemy, and make a difference, and this is what they were doing. they were scratching on the walls the difference they were making, which is what to expect of tough kids out there fighting. they have their flag and the other side with their flag. that causes me to believe we have a core group, and it was actually larger than we think it is, and the press really has not been as careful as they should be in indicating this is a fairly large proportion that will go in harm's way. it's in their blood. 70 years of age, and i still do it. that are certain people who do it, and there's a lot of them, and as long as we keep the warrior ethos in the united states of america, every single person here is proud of the troops. that is so different than what now exists in britain and other places that's incredible. there's something about the american spirit that i think is great. when i taught in vietnam, i thought we were losing it, and now i'm convinced we are not losing it, and that military ethos, warrior ethos is alive enough i'm con viptioned we send advisers there, turn back, and we can give a pile of forces we need, not tie them all up in afghanistan because right now we have the pirate attack, now libya, and general mathes in charge of the central command is a wer ewatch. he's a good friend, but he's scary. i'm amazed if he does not take action against pirates that makes everyone's heads spin in the next two or three months. we can't have all forces this afghanistan. we have other uses for the forces. i think we have enough to keep it going. i thank you, all, very much for spending this time with me on a rainy night. thank you. [applause] >> today, the young adults, having trouble starting in life because they have come of age in a hostile economy, they are paying money into a system to support a level of benefits for today's retirees they have no chance of getting when they, themes retire. there needs to be a rebalancing of the social compact. it's an important and difficult challenge for the country politically because not only is social security and medicare half of the budget or about to be half the budget, but the biggest thing we do, but it is symbolically -- the statement in public policy that there's a country we are a community in this together. these are programs that affect everybody, and the old math of the programs does not work. >> paul taylor on the looming generational showdown on booktv's "after words," and in a few weeks, your chance to talk with military strategist and former assistant defense secretary bing west taking your calls, comments, e-mail, and tweets live from noon to three earn on "in-depth," booktv every weekend on c-span2, join the online discussion of neil joseph's biography. look for the book club tab at booktv.org. >> the pentagon completed a review in the shooting, cause of death for 12 navy yard workers in washington, d.c.. this is as secretary hagel briefed reporters and how workers should be screened and how to create security perimeters around military filleteds. this is 40 minutes. lost 12 members of its family in a senseless violent act. i said at the time that where there are gaps or inadequacies in the department's security, we'll find them and correct them. accordingly, today, i'm announcing steps dod is taking to enhance physical security at our installations and improve security clearance procedures responding to lessons learned from this terrible, terrible tragedy. these new measures are based on the recommendations of two reviews that i ordered in the aftermath of the shooting including an internal review led by secretary of defense, michael vickers, and an outside review led by paul stockton, with us today, and retired admiral gary coleson. secretary may bis joining me here this morning directed the department of the navy to conduct its own reviews of security standards, which complimented our work. i appreciate the hard work and thorough analysis in all efforts by all these people. the reviews identified troubling gaps in dod's.com to ddod's eighty -- ability to detect and respond to someone working for us, decides to inflict harm on this institution and its people. to close the gaps, we take the following actions recommended by the reviewsment first, dod will imprelim a continuous program of personnel with access to dod's facilities or classified information,ing inning dod's contractors, military, and civilian personnel. while individuals of security clearances undergo periodic reinvestigations, i am directing the department to establish automated reviews of cleared personnel that will continuously pull information from law enforcement and other relevant data bases to help trigger an alert if drug tear information is available. for example, if holding a security clearance is arrested. second, the department will establish an insider threat management and analysis center that can quickly analyze the results of the automated record checks, help connect the dots, and determine whether follow-up action is needed. it will advise and support department of defense components to ensure action is taken on each case. third, we'll centralize authority and accountability for physical and personal security under a single staff assistant located within the office of the undersecretary of defense for intelligence. these responsibilities are fractured in the department. this action will identify one person within dod responsible for leading efforts to counter inside threats. fourth, the department accelerates development of the manpower centers, identity management enterprise services architecture. this program will enable dod's security officers to share access control information and continuously vet individuals against u.s. government data bases. in addition to the actions, we will review best ways to move forward op three additional recommendations offered by the independent review panel. we're going to ensure that these ideas from a full panel of recommendations of the security report that was completed by the office of management and budget earlier this month. a recommendation in line with the october 20 sp guidance from the director of national intelligence. second, we will consider the alliance on background investigations, conducted by the office of personnel management. undertake a comprehensive analysis of the cost, deficiency, and effectiveness of returning the clearance review process to this department. third, consider developing more effective measures to screen recruits, further destigmatize treatment and ensure quality of mental health care within dod. i directed under secretary to develop an implementation plan based on recommendations of the reviews and report back to me in june on the progress that's. made. everything that the department of defense is doing is supporting the broader government wide review of the oversight of security and suitability standards of federal employees and contractors. that review was approved by president obama earlier this month. that was led in coordination with the office of the director of national intelligence of personnel management. i think we understand that open and free societies are always vulnerable. together, we do everything possible to provide the people a safe and secure workplace as possible. i'll conclude saying our thoughts and prayers go out to the victims and families of the terrible day. we'll continue to do everything we can to prevent such a tragedy from happening again. we owe them nothing less. i appreciate your attention to this, and now let me ask the secretary to review with you the findings of his review, and as you know, we have three individuals who will go into specifics how we intend to implement the recommendations and directives, so, thank you. secretary? >> thank you, and good morning. on september 16th, last year, entire navy family suffered a devastating tragedy at the washington navy yard. for more than a decade as a military organization, we experienced the pain of combat losses, but six months ago, we lost 12 patriots who made the same sacrifice in the service of their nation here at home. it is with the memory of the three women and nine men in mind today that we are releasing the results of the investigation into the shooting. in all this, our first concern has been for those lost and those wounded and their families. over the past few days, navy liaisons who have been with the families all along reached out individually to provide them with this information. immediately following the attack, we conducted a number of rapid reviews and assessments of the basis and policies. based on the reviews, we've made changes to force protection on the bases. our units have completed self-assessments to ensure their own compliance and our departmental leadership engage directly with commander officers around the world to stress their role in protecting our civilian and military personnel. where we identified issues is involved changes to broader policy and forwarded those recommendations through dod to the appropriate agency and department. we work closely with reviews set up in the dod with secretary hagel has explained and broader government-wide review, supporting them with the information developed. we'll implement as quickly as possible a recommendation laid out by secretary hagel like the continuous evaluation program for security clearances. i want to thank secretary hagel for unwaiverring support for navy and entire family throughout and for ensuring that dod's internal and external review built our efforts. i pointed to admiral john richardson today to conduct an official, comprehensionive investigation in accord dance with the manual or jagman report. in the circumstances surrounding the shooting to include review of the policies and programs and how well that guidance was executed. there are 11 major findings and 14 recommendations in the report when admiral richardson will speak in detail to. i accepted all representations and directed additional actions taken to strengthen contractor requirements and provide greater oversight on how a sailor or marine's performance is evaluated and reported. more detail lists of actions the department has taken recommended by reviews andest vest gageses made available inin form to you. i thank admiral richardson and his staff. they put in long hours and did an excellent job working against a very short deadline. i'd also like to again, express gratitude to the first responders for the first critical actions that day. the nature security force, nca agents, local, federal law enforcement agencies and agents responded to the active shooter situation with complete dedication and commitment to help the men and women in washington navy yard that ran towards danger to protect their fellow americans, a brave and selfless action. in the aftermath of the attack, it was important our response be timely, strong, and responsive. i authorized immediate support services for the fallen, wounded, their families, the people in the building 197, and those elsewhere on the navy yard, and for the entire navy affected. the outpouring support from the community and nation was overwhelming and deeply, deeply appreciated. i pointed to washington navy yard task force led by the navy who is here today to ensure that that support was continuous and comprehensive. this task force is in existence as long as needed to make sure everyone in need has what is needed. those who participated in the response has been magnificent including the the assistants who work directly with the families very soon after this event. those who were working at the navy yard that day have been magnificent two, only two days after the sering event, i went back to the navy yard, and an overwhelming majority of the people were back at work. making sure we have the world's finest navy and those wounded have also returned to work. we expect our sailors and marines to go in harm's way, but even in the theater of war, the danger posed insider threats is in cities, in an office building, near our nation's capitol, and it's almost inexrepsble, but as we saw, can be real. the secretary said we cannot completely eliminate the threat, but we can and will guard against these events addressing the findings, even if doing so does not prevent the attack because it may prevent a future one. that is one objective of the reviews and investigations. a parallel reason to provide answers to our navy family. it is for them that we conducted a clear-eyed and thorough review in how loved ones, colleagues, and friends faced danger that day. it is for them that going forward we'll do everything in the power to safeguard their security. thank you. >> three individuals who conducted three of the reviews to come up here and take questions for you. we have about 20 minutes to do that. richardson conducting the jag investigation, stockton, who, along with admiral eric olson conducted the independent review, and then behind me, working for mr. vickers, working on the internal review. they have a couple quick things to say, and then we'll take questions, and i'll moderate questions. >> thank you, good morning to all, and as was pointed out, i led the jagman investigation. this began on september 25th and completed november the 8th, and we examined in the effort compliance with existing requirements at the time of the incident with respect to aaron alexis at the navy yard, had a team of investigators, and these people consistented of a range of experting inning protection, government contracts, installation management, emergency management, medicine, and law. investigation begin top priority, and as i told the team, this effort among the most important work in the navy at the time. we organized this investigation along five lines. one line, the perm history of his prior military service and appointment history. the other line was the perm security program designed to vet and continuously evaluate personnel per suitability for access to classified material as it applied. third line was to force protection plan designed to prevent unauthorized access to secure facilities at the washington navy yard. fourth line was the infinite response and emergency management programs at the washington navy yard, and, finally, fifth effort addressed the response for the response after the incident. the specific details of the shooting, the motive and the tactical response of the criminal investigations are not part of the jagman. the investigation team reported 11 findings in five areas and made 14 recommendations. this addressed the program as it applied, and the washington navy yard program, the washington management program, and post inmy gnat response. the 14 report recommendations encompassed actions to improve the program, execution by contractors to improve the navy's capability against all threats with the focus on the threat, the critical gap in the force protection and emergency management programs on the navy yard. in closing, finally, most importantly, i'd like to add my condolences to those already expressed for the victims and families. i'll turn it over. >> thank you, admiral. , as said, i'm the principle deputy under secretary for defense of intelligence, the sunder secretary for intelligence who is unavailable today, on an overseas assignment this week. we were asked by secretary on september 30th to conduct one of two reviews, commission by secretary hagel, a review led by the organization, and i want to thank tim, dave, and teresa, director, deputy director, senior adviser, and adviser who led the review for us. as mentioned in a minute. he commissioned a second review, independent panel that they worked through, and our focus was on two areas, installation curet and personal security and role on security investigations. we have four recommendations outlined. in addition, most found consistent with the work that we concluded, and so a lot of those are not consistent with, but incorporated in the four main points that secretary hagel so listed. three recommendations that the independent panel put forward we accepted as recommendations for further analysis, again, secretary hagel mentioned those. it's six months since the tragic events of september 16th last year when we lost members of the dod family, and in our view, unacceptable to have another event such as that occur. we're committed to reducing the risk of insider threat across the defense department and look forward to working hard, putting our best efforts forward to do so, and we look forward to the question. we have an independent review of the same issues and take a bigger picture look at the challenges of revamping the security cleerches process in the united states. we started out by making the argument, and i urge you to get a copy of the report because i'm only going to talk about it in overview terms today, the department of defense should replace the underlying prejudices behind installation and security. for decades, the department has approached the security from a perimeter perspective. if we strengthen the perimeter, build our fences, if you will, against threats on the other side, we'll be secure. it's broken, and the department needs to replace it. cyber, all threats, they are inside the perimeter. what the department of defense should do is build security from within. the admiral and i entirely concurred with the recommendation made by undersecretary and as you heard, we went further. recommending three additional initiatives that the department will now be considering. it was our assessment that in the department of defense, far too many people have security clearances. since 9/11, the number of those eligible for security clearances in the department of defense tripled k african-american the department got away from determining that personal have a need to know, they need access to security clearance in the positions they ought to occupy. we've urged they go forward, reassess whether people in particular jobs actually need security clearances or not, and we believe significant reductions can be made in that population in the department of defense, and therefore, in order to conduct monitoring of those that remain, who have clearances, will be able to focus additional resources and follow all the terrific recommendations that they have recommended. others seek mental health care. we have to do everything we can to ensure personnel ho who want the care get access to it and are not punished for it. there's a number of recommendations proceeding down the path and strengthen the good relationship between the veterans administration and the department of defense to make sure our veterans get ac says to the health care they need. finally, we reached the conclusion the department should reassess whether itments to continue dependence on the office of personnel and management, to conduct investigations, and the background investigations that constitute the key step forward and grant security clearances. opm is already making important improvements in the oversight that they conduct for the private sector contractors that conduct these investigations. we believe that the department should take a deep look at the other models that exist, including the state department's decision to be responsible for its own investigations. there are big structural advantages to walking down that path, and so we've urged the department of defense consider taking back to itself responsibility for conducting background investigations as the key step forward in granting security clearances. there's a lot in the report. take a look at it. i want to, above all, thank secretary hagel on behalf of admiral olson and myself for the opportunity and honor to address the key issue to ensure as best we can that future attacks of the sort that occurred in the washington navy yard never occur again. thank you. >> okay, thanks. >> you mentioned the general concept of the outdated approach building fences rather than the work force threats. it strikes me as a lesson supposed to have been learned going back to 1997 in some respects. something that come up before, and is it just an entirely new concept for you? >> it's not a new concept, and i have the honor of helping to lead the investigation of the fort hood incident and the development of recommendations to, for example, strengthen sharing of information between the fbi and the department of defense. major improvements have been made including those made already by secretary hagel. the challenge here is that the threat continues to intensify. that is, we have inside the perimeter cyber threats, connectic threats that we have not historically in the department of defense structured our policies and programs to handle. we need and continue to strengthen those insider security initiatives in order to match -- in order to exceed efforts by our adversaries to attack us from within. >> cyber threats are important, and here's a classic example, bob. as the department of defense, department of homeland security, and other federal departments make sure that their perimeter's secure, against sql and other forms of cyber attack gettings stronger, then the incentives grow for adversaries to attack from within. >> thank you. >> "wall street journal, probably for mother sell. can you explain how this continuous evaluation process would work? does this afghanistan everybody with any kind of security clearance? is it going to be the kind of thing where someone gets a restraining order or gets a divorce that that is flagged and evaluated, and does this need approval from odni or somebody else before it goes forward? >> yeah. i'll mention a couple things, and admiral, if there's anything from the perspective, feel free to, but just from the per speckive of the department broadly. our current system of security is based on a periodic basis, five years, ten years, and the assessment is that that approach limits our ability to understand the evolution that may occur in a person's life that may have them evolve from a trusted insider to an insider threat. we would have a system which is i.t. based, but in part, a system relying on effort perts and ability to link in as well. to be able to evaluate information from a number of appropriate channels, and collected in one place to ensure that insights are gained, and so i think it's important to mention the continuous evaluation recommendation comes in conjunction with the recommendation to build up this, a threat management and analysis center where the function of conducting that evaluation occurs as well as the necessary training and potential education for the work force. as to the -- whether this is just a dod only approach or something that is more government wide, there is a sense you'll know as you study the reports, there's the omb report with the evaluation process and strong roles, if not thee lead role for ensuring the effective implementation of this in the office of director of national intelligence. >> every's clearance? >> it is intended to affect everybody with clearance, yes, which in the dod context, as you know, two and a half million individuals hold active security clearances. implementation has to occur over time. we have studied e slalluation from research and development and a pilot approach we envision we have to continue to do pilots on an expanded basis and fade in over time. >> for any of the three of you, can you go into specifics oh they destigmatize the appeal for mental "health affairs"? >> paul, do you want to start from the perspective, and we'll join in afterwards? >> this question ought to be drastically changed, and despite efforts of those who do, despite best efforts, that question, i don't believe gives us reliable answers, and i believe self-reporting is unreliable, and there's no evidence that it's a valid way of understanding the degree to which mental health care is needed by a particular person, and then secondly, i believe we need to do more to reach out to those members of the department of defense community and ensure that they know that when they seek help for mental care issues, that is not, repeat, not going to in any way affect their ability to serve. we need to go the extra mile, especially in today's environment, to ensure that message gets through. >> the department very much appreciates the work that dr. stock ton and admiral do to incorporate this analysis into the independent panels' work. it is important, as we move forward, to think about the services that we can provide to both our military and civilian work force to help them as they determine they may need to seek mental health counseling and ensure we do that in conjunction and parallel with the other efforts we've undertaken here to do deal with the threat challenge. >> to go back to the question, what is the appropriate inputs for continuous evaluation? will there be something that's limited to, you know, criminal arrests, that sort of thing, something more than that? what happens for those clearances who over the course of say two years, five years, ten years don't have any criminal arrest record or anything like that? are they just monitored like they would normally be monitored right now? >> the bottom line is the inputs that would go into a continuous evaluation system are the same appropriate inputs that would occur under a periodic reevaluation model, just done on a push basis. so we have a periodic reinvestigation model that revisits a data set every five to ten years. we move to a continuous evaluation approach in its first phases where we query the data bases on an on demand poll basis, and as the system matures, moving to a model and technique that would allow more of a near realtime poll or push of data on a cleared individual for which a potential flag would be raised would merit further investigation analysis. >> looking at additional inputs, but a more efficient matter of accessing the data base? >> at this time, we are -- we would start with the inputs that we have available to us now under the current model. it's not to say that as times change, as technology changes, as what the government deduces is a useful input to the security clearance process, as those evolve over time, we want a system to accommodate the changes in practice. >> i add a point to that. you'll see in the independent review we raised the question of whether additional sources of data ought to support this continuous evaluation process. we made the strong recommendation that if the department of defense goes down that path, that additional steps be taken to further strengthen respect for privacy and civil liberties in the process, and the fair information principles system, transparency, the same principles we have in the fifth approach that the federal government takes overall, and if we're going to ramp up the deeing to which we have to ensure civil liberties. >> yeah, military times, in your jagman report, does it identify any particular individuals that were found to be negligent or performing duties as described in the existing regulations in a way that contributed to this, or was this basically did you just identify some flawed policy? >> well, what our report did, investigation did identify is that primary responsibility and accountability for the incident restless african-american alexis who used access to get inside the defenses and do harm to the fellow workers. beyond that, the investigation was primarily focused on where -- as i said, with the personal security program, force protection, physical security, and infinite response. we did identify gaps in all of those areas, and laid those out in our findings according to three categories. the highest category would be those findings that if the proper procedures have been followed, the chain of event that led up to the shooting on the 16th of september would have been interrupted. those findings, primarily concern the responsibility for the contractors for whom he worked, the experts incorporated and hp enterprise systems. to comply with security requirements that require them to continuously evalwait their personnel, and if they observe behavior that raises questions about an employee's suit abilities for ax seases to operations or installlation, those concerns should be identified to, in this case, the navy, and those requirements were not met. they did observe those behaviors and did not make reports, and so it was impossible to act on the information. the second category of findings are the proximation of the finding not as direct as in category a where if proper procedures were followed, that may have interrupted the chain of events. those findings concerned oversight of the contractors, execution of the security program, earlier application of the personal security program, early in the career, and the final category were those findings, even if they had been proper procedured followedded perfectly, they would not have interrupted the chain of the events on the 16th, and those primarily concerned the force protection antiterrorism measures at the washington navy yard as well as the emergency response planning and the post-incident response. >> a quick follow-up. describing the behavior of the venders before the attack and ability to see behavior described, is it your understanding they knew about it and actively decided not to inform the navy, or did it ever occur to them, having seen the behavior on his part, to tell their people they deal with in the service about this after it took place? >> right. those details were difficult to definitively arrive at, but it's our understanding that with respect to the ceo perts they did have a good knowledge of this behavior and decided not to make that report. with hp, it's less uncertain. >> time for a couple more. the figure tripped since 9/11, and government work in the country changes, what would have been a normal path of growth, and in trying to cut 10% of people who have -- 10% of people going forward, where will they come from? what sector are you looking at? is there one you can see where you can lose 10%? >> >> we recommend a thorough assessment of need to know. whether they occupy particular positions in the department of defense actually require access to classified information, such a review is not happening in a long time. it's my working assumption begin the terrific growth in the number of those who hold security clearances in the absence of such standards, there's folks with clearances who do not need them, and in the era of the pressure on the defense budget, anything we can do to downsize the number of people with security clearances so only those who require them can then get the intensive, more capable cons yows monitoring, that's a great way of proceeding. >> this was put on the task list to look at thanks to his work and work with the independent panel as part of the implementation phase of the work going forward that secretary hagel asked us to do. we owe the secretary answers by june on a number of different poppics. implementation on the four recommendations he articulated, and considered departmental judgments on three recommendations we accepted from the independent panel for further review to include the possibility of a 10% reduction to the security -- the secret level security clearance work force. >> am i correct that from the time the first shot was fired, this is about the immediate incident response, the time the first shot was fired, this is perhaps for admiral richardson, by the time the first shot to the last shot on that day, was it over an hour, am i correct? >> no. well, the response was carried out over the course of over an hour, yes, but in terms of those shots that resulted in fatalities, that was a much shorter time. >> how long? >> that was, we assessed, 23 minutes. >> okay. quick follow-up question. on a military base, i think, you know, a lot of americans might ask -- on any military base in the world, particularly one in washington, d.c., is it acceptable that a shooter, even an insider threat could fire fatal shots for 23 minutes before being taken down? >> well, i would say that any sort of incident like this can never be considered acceptable, and that's why both secretary hagel and mavis moving ahead as forcefully as possible to min mize the possibility of this happening again in the future. >> any criticism of the length of time the shots were fired in the report? >> no. again, that tactical response was not the detailed tactical response was not in a preview of the jagman. that's the per view of the ongoing criminal investigation going on right now. we did not look into the details. >> thanks, everybody, appreciate it. >> the health care problem in the united states is not going to go anywhere in theceps if we do not deal with the issue of innovation, if we do not translate all those findings that occur at these at the university level into health care products that are affordable and that they cure them and as long as we do not understand the -- how to treat or cure them, there's no point. really. in talking about the solution of the health care problem. it is going to provide health in children, but when it comes to drugs, the premiums, when it comes to subsidies, where do they come from? taxpayers money. it's not they get the dollars out of the trees. no, people have to pay for that, and there is a limit. the economy is basically the science of limitations, and so if we don't deal with a better system of working on prevention or working with understanding u 40 we take care of the health, there's no point. what is going to happen is what happens in columbia right now, this which people are covered, like what happens in panama, everybody can have access to health care or what happens in europe too, in which people are covered, but when it comes to the medications and access to drugs, then governments are having problems affording them. >> the future of health care, sunday night at eight on c-span's q -- q&a. >> renegotiater and peace talks with israel discuss the status of the talks in the visit to the wilson center in washington, d.c.. he praisedded efforts of president obama and secretary kerry in bringing the two sides closer to an agreement. this hour long event begins with wilson center directer jay harmin. >> climate and the security in the building, and join us to welcome someone back who is a wonderful friend of the wilson center. i'm the president and ceo of recovering politician, someone who cares very deeply about the work they are doing. as most of you know, our scholars closely track the ever-shifting plates of the middle east, nearly half of our ground troop briefings which you listen into feature hot spots around the globe commenting on breaking news, focusing on egypt, iran, syria, and the peace process. our middle east program led by the fearless, our iranian inmate, has held 63 events in the last year alone, and that program, too, is keenly interested in this latest washington leg of the peace process. two weeks ago on theside lines of israeli's prime minister benjamin netanyahu visit, we visited with the chief negotiator of the peace process and hosted here at the center the minister of intelligence. as a member of the u.s. congress over 17 years, i traveled more than 25 times to the region, and i continued to visit, and i just invited myself to his home next year along with my large family. i was in gaza in 1998 when the plo removed provision of the charter calling for the elimination of israel. he was there too and dennis ross, just a few feet away from me, was crying. we all naught that peace was at hand. since then, there's been countless missed opportunities. i strongly believe, this is my personal view without a two-state solution, both sides lose. israel forfeits legitimacy as a jewish democracy, especially once the palestinian population in the borders is the majority, and palestinians pawned in a local and regional power game for too long miss out on prosperity. the arab peace initiative on the table since 2002 and what is called the greatest missed opportunities so far. one of the people in a small -- on a small list of the most important people keeping the dream of a two-state solution afloat is our friend and e renegotiater. this is his, as i mentioned, second visit to the wilson center, and his only, thank you, major public address on the sidelines of the president a base's visit in washington. he was born in 1955 and still lives in the same house in jericho. in true fashion, he's the scholar and policymaker, beginning the career as a professor of political science at the national university and as aaron david miller, whom you'll hear from in just a moment has said of his friend of 5 # years, he's, quote, seen it all and remains a champion of the palestinian national's narratives, unquote. from madrid, oslow, camp david, and the kerry process, a good name for it, he's remained a constant. the last time he was here, he said, quote, my cd is one line, negotiating with the israelis. i i was not born to be a mercenary for territories. well, we agree, and we hope to add another line soon or to replace that with another line soon with another word soon. that word is "peacemaker," and he's decided not to make opening remarks. instead, he just wants to start a conversation with aaron and following that, we will take your questions. i also want to recognize a league of arab states, the ambassador of the u.s. who is here somewhere, who is not here -- yes, he is, there he is. welcome, mr. ambassador, and, now, let me turn the program over to two very special people, aaron miller, and our dear, dear friend. >> thank you, jan, thank you. >> jan, thank you very much, and for your extraordinary leadership in the center, and thank you, all, for coming at such an early hour. i have four questions for you, but i want to begin with just one personal observation. we've known each other for a very long time, since the early 8 os, before madrid, the process, through camp david in july of 2002 to the collapse of camp david to the darkest years of is -- israeli-palestinian conflict, and to the president. we had arguments, disagreements, yelled at each other, celebrated with each other, we've actually sed a few tears with one another as well. throughout it all, i want you to know that you maintained a releaptless belief in one primary conviction, and i agree with it as well, and it is the notion that only through negotiations in perfect and as flawed as the process is, can the israeli-palestinian conflict will resolved, and negotiations are not perfect. they are based on human weakness and frailty, the need to make extraordinary decisions that, in part, force people to give up dreams and aspirations. .. >> your conviction has made you formidable with negotiations, representative with a calf has to be to understand. so i want to welcome you again. i have a question for you when i will start with the obvious. what can you tell us about his meeting with barack obama yesterday? >> thank you. i have six grandchildren now. [laughter] [laughter] >> isn't a 10th candidate [inaudible] he can be difficult. and contrary to what people have expect did, we are coming out with an official document and we are still at the stage of discussing the ideas. but i think that no one and if it's more from the talks and no one stands to lose more than past and. i did not affect my pontus for anyone from i am doing this for me. it is time for palestinians to have a state of their own and in 2014, this year, january, 27 palestinians died in damascus. this happened in 2014. and it's becoming so difficult. do we really want obama and john kerry to succeed. it means that palestinians will have a home to come home to. and we hope that this nine months will bring with it the solution and it's doable and can be done. >> what is the expectation? you mentioned the fact that there was a sense that maybe out of the meeting with come a piece of paper or a formal document. what is the ultimate document that americans will put on the table max. >> i hope that americans will put on the table something that is fair and i hope that americans, more than anyone else, i have discussed this with you as an american peacemaker. the day that the americans will talk about what is possible in square about what is needed to including american diplomacy and what does the israeli prime minister -- what can you do and what can he not do. they come to us trying to convince us of this and i hope that americans today will move in the direction of what is needed. and it's really two states, 1967. we want to exist in peace and security in these borders. we are renegotiating july 29. it had been at least 7.5 months. 579,000 housing settlements. it was supposed to be palestinians and i cannot wait and what is this behavior and why the settlement activities? i agree with you that the most important thing for palestinians is renegotiating in peace is cheaper than exchanging bullets for five minutes. so when people say we cannot solve this by talking, it's over, it's a disaster, it's a nightmare. and so what is it? i know we have renegotiated some sometimes it's fragmented. and who said life is about friends and assess? and up until today and we do have a lot of reasons with palestinians and do they see us as the neighbors and that is why it is part of the solution. so i hope that this american administration, and look, there is a difference now. >> i was going to ask you about that. >> asked me. >> we have dealt with the least three u.s. presidents and at least a half-dozen secretaries of state. >> it is time to move on. >> i was a lot taller before i started here. so how is john kerry different? >> i've known him for 26 years. and you know that he knows me inside out. and he is a man who is really a believer in the solution the middle east is changing and he does realize and he believes that this region needs number one, piece between israelis and palestinians. john kerry knows that it can be mutual and so on. and he knows that the second element is democracy. and anyone who says they are for democracy -- [inaudible] this is part of delivering the middle east and stability and human rights and transparency and he's a firm believer in the. >> one more question on the americans and then the israelis and palestinians and we will go to the questions. you know as well as i that the traditional fashion i say this with ultimate detachment and objectivity. the american mo in negotiations, at least since the first bush administration has been essentially to operate in the arena of the possible and not in the arena that is required. a traditional method has been to take israeli ideas and alter and change them and try to market them. and i'm just reporting that it not a moral judgment that an accurate assessment of the way american peace deals have operated. there could be legitimate reasons, but it is a fair description. so if your point of departure and i would like to just to comment about it for a minute. and what is required to be in agreement and how do you reconcile that with praise for the secondary? >> the lease president obama and secretary kerry are allowed to speak about what is possible and what is required. this is on the table. this is what we are discussing about this. and there is a political geography and all of these nations change i'm number one is the options and we don't want to affect this as a sham i'm not a racist. once i said this we have accepted many things and i cannot elaborate about now and there are still settlement all over. and there is a solution, one that is created by the. people are wrong on this day there can never be part of the solution. but what they are doing is creating us. blacks and jews and others can be racist. all people can do recess. this kind of situation would psychological tools and economical tools. i ask all of them to help me through my hometown and we came into this with the negotiations and you want to do that again and then they start a smear campaign, look at what it did to me. and it's not a history of the left or liberals or even the senators. it is the breaker of bones he is the current prime minister, is he a transform talk to matt if he willing and able to make the kinds of choices necessary? predicts including a peace agreement but advancing this process to its next phase. >> [inaudible] >> it looks to be like this. stop smearing me come i can't do it. too stiff for 1967. and he is bringing someone to have him under this with these four numbers. they are going to be a partner so what is that? he really has to make up his mind. i'm not going to do the blame game here. i know that israelis and palestinians are going through a transformation and i'm not comparing this conflict with any other conflict. this is about history and religion and faith in the 20 years. difficult on me and difficult on them. it's time for decisions today, not negotiations. it's time for the president to stand tall with a solution. yes, i do this and that. and then it's time for this to make peace. to say that i recognize the data palette and tutsis in this life. none of them have done this. you stand tall and addressed their neighbors. speak to them and prepare them. making slobs with this and every other category. everything isn't one. every year i hope that we can bring the students these students to say yes, i am on board with the solution. >> the final question and i have asked this question last time you're here, israelis and house means become masters. >> [inaudible] >> israelis and house them in have become masters of the blame game. so my question is borrowing a line from one of michael jackson's better songs, men in the mayor. >> man in the mirror, okay. >> he said he really want to make a change in the place to start is by looking in the manner. now, i believe that. i really do believe that. we have all taken long looks at we have done wrong and right. so if i were asked in if you were to look in the mirror as a palestinian, how would you critique your own approach to this negotiations and what responsibility. but if you could detach yourself for a moment, what is it that you would've changed? and palestinians made no mistakes during the course of these negotiations and a. >> i'm going to count the mistakes, there is a long list of things. imagine all that either. they make mistakes. my situation, i'm in the process for this and i cannot leave my home without the permission of the commander. and so it can be my last thing in this situation. i'm not excusing myself. and are we admitting that we are making a mistake? we are making mistakes. we're just like you and the regions and the nigerians and argentinians. we are normal good people and we turn out to be not perfect at times. so stop looking at me and expecting to me to be perfect. because that is the irony of thing where the israelis and americans. they have expectations. what you do best and not. and i am not perfect. but we have come a long way. and we are coming a long way. and no though palestine will come back to the map. we will not compromise. for democracy, humanize, accountability, transparency, and that is what palestine will be about. mistakes will be committed. people will misuse their officers that will not stop. but i can assure you the you hear about it in palestine. >> thank you. you have been very patient with questions. but not for three state solution. so what are the plans to reconcile two amax that, that is a russian word for today. there are some other ways to make hamas a part of the palestinian side in this trigger assertion. >> hamas is part of this we have a political party that differs and now, you are offering them to go back to the elections. the one authority and we have obligation as far as the solution and so [inaudible] for the first time in 40 years we are part of this and i was asked to respond as a vote of confidence in this position. i'm number one dad told him and this includes your role as an individual and hamas and as an individual. but he committed to all of this in the country. he came up throughout history and then i was in fear and he trusted this because in some directions we have this ability to respond to him and hamas failed. i hope that hamas will accept our logic and the only differ we go back to the people and this is the only way to have this under consideration. >> benoni 23 years, it's good to see you. >> you knew me when i was 13 years old. [laughter] >> yes, we both had dark hair. >> okay. explain to us what the big deal is and calling israel the jewish state. it seems to me that is the only prices ought to pay to get your state, that it's not such a big price and the complicit in all the things that the plo and the palestinians have accepted. >> so now we have the question about this and the jewish state business. number one, i don't know how women find themselves. even if they have their own committees that the this forward with solutions and find themselves in a way that they want. but i promise that i will never interfere in this constitution and that is for them to do. number two that i agree with the israelis and we have a range of issues that we have for negotiation. we define issues like security and conditions with neighbors. no one can bring it completely forthright with the negotiations. some came and decided to introduce this is part of the jewish state. so i? as individuals we have a birth certificate. when i was on the moment that went to the ministry of health and they put my name on birth certificate. and that is what they call themselves, but data of israel. in exchange that is part of this is a september 15. let me be frank and honest with you. i recognize that this is part of it with the thinking. but israelis cannot design this fact that i have this. i have my religion and i have my story. i'm not asking them to believe in a. i'm not asking them and it is built 10,000 years ago. in my hometown as well. i don't say come and accept this and whatever you have. >> it is not my story and what is the possibility. now you have a passport saying that so what can we create today the would have to say no to? what we do today so we can put them in the corner and that is what they do. so we must, therefore, i don't know how many years. south and north of the border, 510 kilometers that will come from the north or south so why is it that it must insinuate that and we need to reach negotiation with it and that's what we need to talk about. whatever they want to say, i am not going to interfere in that. >> did you have a question? >> thank you. >> taking you back to amass and gossett. what do they understand that a two state solution are they 100% against a two state solution? >> i am not a spokesperson. but i know that there part of two governments in both programs there were provisions in the program. this is under the jurisdiction. and once an agreement is reached we could reach public reform. and they say that we accept this middleton we recognize it. so they have their own vocabulary and their own energy. as i told you i am under this and when the state of palestine is gone this is my obligation. and i believe once an agreement is reached that this is a fair demand and we are going to work on that and do that and i think it will pass for the best. it will pass with a huge situation. >> please identify yourself. >> yes, my name is derek. >> you said yesterday and repeatedly that basically there is no document or proposal or anything in all of this is conversation. it's are you saying that this has been nothing more than a conversation and how is it different from the times that you negotiated with mr. miller 20 years ago. >> number one when i say that we don't have an official document and americans have not asked for any official document, we need more discussion am not saying that those discussions are meaningless. and that is what we are talking about very seriously and in-depth and as i told you i believe this. no one benefits more from this than palestinians do and no one loses more and then us on this. so we hope we're doing everything to ensure this to succeed in the subject of the settlements was on the table yesterday. especially with the extent of what happened since we began in july. this was supposed to be a part of it and to view that is four times the natural growth shows that it puts puts us in a very difficult situation convincing house means that it's doable. and we need to keep his whole life going. that is the most important element of what we are doing. and i hope that we can continue working so we can achieve our joint ambitions. but now i think that we are going to have to talk about another day, which is march 29. so we pay for this. personally made the deal in july of 1990. we committed not to go to the u.n. agencies in exchange. i hope that we will be honoring this. because it is not encouraging in the question to any palestinian will be if we cannot agree on in agreement, they will deliver with border settlements and so on. so it's very crucial that the israeli government honors its commitment. which is separate from the negotiations. and we agreed not to go with this. but then they came under attack with my colleagues for this deal and it's giving a chance that is worth that. it is worth it. and people in politics have their choice to take a comfortable position on the right position and it may be whatever, but i don't think that they will make a difference in the movement of societies. i hope that march 29 will be an honor and an obligation in this way. >> right over here. >> hello. i'm with the national defense university of the pentagon. i believe in the past you have said you felt like american negotiators cook up a deal and men brought it to you. do you believe that that has changed now or do you think that that is part of the case? >> i feel a difference. i really do. i think president obama is someone who is genuinely trying to achieve historic change in the course of history and he does realize this. but it begins with a solution and they know that we have to be a part of this. what these people do, they come to us. and i've heard this before. [laughter] >> and today the differences there and i hope that once the end product will be able to reflect the american ideas. because what is neede. because what is needed, what is required, what is fair. the relationships between humans and husbands and wives. if we miss this term, nothing will be part of it. you can't be sustained without this. so what we need from this president and the secretary was done more than anything else since march 6, 2013, some two dozen 14, this man has 46 meetings at best about 27 meetings with me. one lesson we ring commitment that the secretary has its full backing. and we want them to succeed. and this means fairness and what is needed. >> yes. >> wait for the microphone. >> yes. >> thank you so much for being here today. i'm a student at georgetown university. he mentioned that senator john kerry believes that the relationship between the israelis and palestinians will lead to changes in the middle east area my question is do you believe that and if so, what cold peaceful relations as israel has with egypt and jordan ultimately leading to changes in the middle east or will people not take that seriously enact. >> will answer this question with a few dimensions. number one, the description with this history could be whatever people want to say is. look at what each of winter in the past three years. and there is a muslim brotherhood who accepted the credentials of the israeli impasse there. and the second way is for israel to understand that bilateralism works and wireless them failed. and number three is and that will change the course of the culture as was said in the beginning there is a document which is the most advanced strategic document since 1948. it's very simple. other nations will have part of this as well. and by the way this document was authored by in the saudi king and that is the most important and ties the backing of this is a part of it. >> we have time for one additional question. every post and in the world, millions of descendents and refugees could come back into the state of israel. and we have an agreement with the israelis and we have this issue and i have not spoken about security or about borders. i did not speak any of these issues because i am under oath to john kerry. but i don't want him to get angry at me. when he gets angry, he really gets angry. [applause] and i don't want to do that. so what is the difference between me defining the nature outside while we are talking about the issue inside. and that we cannot sign an agreement without israel agreeing on this but they can sign on all the core issues that they will not even look at without. and palestinians have their own at the end of the day and it's at the heart of the negotiations on the table. and i'm not expecting israel to sign anything that they don't agree upon. but this is an issue for negotiations and not for public diplomacy are blaming near anything and i don't want to be part of defining this nature. it's time to define my own mistakes of transformation. difficult as i'm going through this. >> i think that we have reached the end of our time. i want to thank you for coming. i hope revson next time you come -- well, you will get an invitation to come back. and you've been candid and forthright here today. i want to thank all of you here today. [applause] [applause] >> coming up next, a special tuesday night edition. we have military stories and first peter mansoor with his book "surge: my journey with general david petraeus and the remaking of the iraq war." and then we have the book plenty of time. and then we have more on the military strategy of orion in the book the wrong war. >> shortly after world war ii, there was growing international sentiment that a military guard force was needed to guarantee the security of the foreign service establishments around the world. we have the fundamentals of security. >> reckless driving, drinking, and early marriage. >> sunday at 4:00 p.m. eastern on c-span3. >> in his book "surge", peter mansoor talked about how the u.s. military strategy shifted in iraq war. and how was executed in the army and earnings per the author talked about his book at the new america foundation in washington dc. this is an hour and a half. >> welcome. i'm part of the security program here. with great pressure that i get to welcome the author of this stunning new book. one of the key books about the iraq war. and we have so much of the key events with the real history and an element. he was executive officer to general petraeus and he has a phd in military history at ohio state. so we are pleased to have you here. and as he gives his presentation we will have a part of this. and we will produce some responses with the operational studies with the u.s. army. he is studying for his phd at texas a&m and i think the part of the american experience and i'm really pleased to have both of you here. we're happy he's giving this presentation now. >> 10 or 20 years down the road i wrote yesterday about the iraq worker but a couple of years later i was at a conference with a veritable who's who in the united states and we are talking about what to do in iraq. the iraq war and in afghanistan, what to do there in 2010 was an issue of major concern and unbearably the discussion involved when it happened with sectarian violence. and in listening to what the various experts have to say, not one of them having holistic public understanding. so i understood where the sources were for it as we have developed an archive of documents with this history and the documents and we are declassifying the documents with history that would not have been possible without their assistance. so what went wrong remark and it would be a war of liberation we are taking down saddam hussein with the american forces remain in tact. and we had a long part of this occupation with the country. donald rumsfeld also looked at this but its robust intelligence and surveillance and they wind up fairly rapidly. and we have to take advantage of this. and then it he is marching up in the supply lines are being attacked here at he was merely relieved of command and this was how the secretary of defense has been as we have dealt with things they simply stuck their head in the end it's that it's not happening. as late as november 2003 don't tell me there is an insurgency he is busy combating it. in addition to the assumptions in the first few days of his tenure he gets to baghdad in may may 2003 with the iraqi society and some of the documentation is going to have to take place and he had blocked off several hundred and probably would've been okay. but instead burma decided to do this all the way down to the division level and thereby got rid of not just the top leaders of the iraqi government and advisers the tens of thousands and they are doctors and engineers and civil servants that would remain in place and not only that but since many of these people were suing and it was bad and good to get rid of them but some people were willing to give us the benefit of the doubt. and instead we alienated them. we created the political basis and they will fight for eight years against us and the iraqi army and it wasn't an instrument of regime control the way that they work. and so we had to eliminate those instruments. that the iraqi army was an institution that could have been rehabilitated to help stabilize this and said it was disbanded. as he said, i was acknowledging the obvious. but it's a pretty disingenuous statement because they had also, what they don't say is that they have taken the weapons on them and had we wanted to bring him back we could have areas how i know this? because when it was pointed out that we had several hundred thousand armed young men, we decided it could offer them back pay. and a stipend. that would give them something with which to start their new lives. and they all showed up and it would've been very easy to have a recruiting table right there saying we wanted to continue to guard the country and so forth. and we would've gotten a significant portion re-create the iraqi security service. with this dead but tens of thousands of officers that were denied their jobs and pensions and political futures and then they were deprived of their honor and many decided at that point to take their military accounts with them into the insurgent you. and so then they created the military basis for this. and we capped off these two disasters decisions by empowering a highly sectarian group with the iraqi council. twenty-four of them. they proceeded to divide up the iraqi government among themselves and they had to actually create this so that each member can have a ministry they could control and then they proceeded to hire everyone in there who wasn't a member of their poop particular political party with their political adherence to give them jobs. what little confidence had remained was done away with in this includes a political basis for the downturn in iraq. i think that it's my contention that we created the mass and then by our decisions in the immediate postwar. back love gary larson. this is american generals in iraq. planning other camping, if you notice. and it really says something that the american army and its very practically excellent and they didn't know a lot about counterinsurgent day. so the idea they didn't know a lot about counterinsurgent day. so the idea that you go out and capture the operatives and it would be raids after rates and not a lot of thought put into the other aspects that they eventually became very good at but not in 2003. we were there and things were spiraling downward but not rapidly. it's what we were going to do? well, that's a good question. i don't think that we had a good answer to it. we lack a strategy to guide the way forward and down at the troop level with what we lack in an operational concept that drove operations in a uniform and coherent manner. and we lack enough resources underground. even with these headwinds. there were some good things that were done. unit by unit there were a lot of learning situations that were done. the first stage of the iraq war covered this pretty well. but it was hit or miss and depended upon the unit commander. there is a lot this and they came in and by the time they left they were framed a pretty good and then we had that learning process all over again. even so there were some successes that we failed to capitalize on. we defeated the first ramadan offensive in 2003 and right after that these three events really took the wind out of the insurgency. and it's my contention that had we reached out at this point with political outrage that we could brought them back support this as a way forward area from january to march of 2004 was very peaceful and there was a downturn in security but we didn't take advantage of it. and it was crafted really without a lot of input and therefore they resisted it. this period ended with the april april 2004 uprising across central iraq. uprisings or in the bases by the first armored division of the commander in the dealt them a fairly significant blow. the marines were on the way to dealing a blow to the insurgents when they were told to stop because the press, especially the arab press was against what was happening and there was a lot of misinformation about what was happening with tween them and so forth. when they were ordered to stop the situation spiral downwards and the insurgents ended up seizing the city and holding it until the second battle in november 2004 which killed two dozen insurgents in the process. so we didn't take advantage of the opportunities that we have in the spring of 2004 with a military success on the battlefield. instead we withdrew from the city and withdraw forces from their bases inside baghdad and other cities are in the know in baghdad went to four major operating bases in the peripheral of the city and this was a major mistake. and it was predicated on the head of the u.s. central command. that we were a virus that had infected the society and the longer we were positioned the more we would create and that we were the problem. and the problem is when we withdrew from the cities, no matter how many we had in those spaces we could not control the neighborhoods from the periphery and the result is that the people were positioned locally and they rose up and they began to control the urban terrain that was increasingly the insurgency and the militias that were gaining in the strength and in the power showing how different unit are described. one approach is the massive invasion 2004 another approach was mcmasters approach until 2005. faced with a similar problem and we surrounded it and isolated in a slowly deferred and reposition this inside the city to make sure that the insurgents could not rise up again and controller again. by doing this he said eventually altered the dynamic of the battles. it was a great example of warfare and one unit among many. and it was pretty clear that it was not the answer in the second battle was part of the kinetic road in this period was spiraling downward but not a crisis point of february 2000 and with the destruction of the fourth holiest shrine in islam. it's up to this point the shia have been fairly responsive to not make the situation worse. so therefore they could outvote everyone honest and they would eventually gain power in iraq. but after this incident and the shrine destroyed, they said it the iraqi security forces defend the religion the faithful well. and that was all they needed to rise up and begin in baghdad and elsewhere. they kidnapped and tortured and killed sunnis and drove them out of their homes in this campaign began in february 2006 gained force and strength throughout the year al qaeda was gaining control of the province according to the intelligencer would say we are no longer in control of this. but even then there is a glimmer of hope when we talk about that. nevertheless by december 2006, more than 3500 iraqis being killed every month due to ethnic sectarian violence. the problem is that it failed to address this strategic approach and on a rapid transition a security responsibility with iraqi security forces that were fundamentally unready to accept the responsibilities in those cases especially in terms of the police were complicit in the sectarian violence that was ongoing. part of the problem is they simply didn't understand what was going on on the ground. i know this because i had general casey's documents as well as those of general petraeus. and if you look at the plan in april 2006, it has a list of things that could go wrong in on that list of wildcard is sunnis are sparking sectarian violence. and it's late now you are still putting it into the plan not as a fact on the ground but something that could happen. and it's just an unwillingness to recognize the reality of what was happening. and this shows what was happening. civilian deaths plus the coalition data and the iraqis are in more places than we are and you can see this trend upward throughout 2006. and this would be equivalent to more than 35,000 u.s. citizens dying every month due to violence and it is pretty much a significant number. and here is where we are. we don't understand this is what happened. all we can do is that this has happened. okay. what did i just do? okay. here we go. the shows in geographical terms what was happening. insurgencies in terrace have more sway and we can be that the tigers river valley and they are significant concentrations of terrorist forces and it was a fairly significant thing. it was clear that the united states is headed for defeat. i worked for the joint chiefs and they put it this way. we are not winning, so we are losing with them by her side. they were undertaken by the national security council and the state department. but to his credit president made the decision to serve. and it was really didn't betray us and guess what, it was president bush. he's the one that decided to serve against every political had one going against him include members of his own party think it out. but more important is how those forces would be used in accordance with the doctrine that was published in december 2000 that. so first it was the provision of more force if that enable them to change and the force. more importantly the movement of those forces backing off, positioning them within the communities that they would protect. protecting them was the only way to drive down that violence and enable the politics to move forward. we had a 20,000 troops into the mix during the same timeframe, increasingly those forces were better trained as our advisory effort took hold and more importantly or as importantly they were partnered with u.s. forces side-by-side so they could model their behavior after troops and the u.s. troops could keep an eye on iraqi security forces to moderate the basic instincts. we improve this with a number of isolated or gated communities and use the biometric standards to figure out who was planting the ied's and so forth are that there were better synergies between the operations forces rather than as separate elements on the name space. they were working better together. he got up. .. bring them into the support of the government because you can never defeat them all. if you have to fight them all, and beat them all, that is a pretty tall order, especially in a situation like this. learning and adapting going on, but it was more systematic because there was a counter insurgency doctrine everyone had to follow. two leaders mandated the entire force operate under the same doctrine. and we revamped our detention procedures to make sure the jihadist didn't control the inside of the facilities. as c. the rebellion against the al qaeda that started in ramadi, iraq. the surge was the reason the awakening spread as rapidly and fast as it did. what most people don't know and i catalog in my book is general petraeus went to ramadi, iraq and saw what was going on and ordered the commanders to support the awakening and this is what allowed the awakening to take off. absent from the surge, the awakening is confined to ramadi, iraq and maybe one other province. but it expands well beyond that given patriots orders. the creation of the sons of iraq program was clearly part of the surge. these were armed neighborhood watch units that reported to u.s. military leaders. general petraeus learned about one such opportunity and when we learned about that he, in his usual manner, said this is a great idea and he will implement it through multi force national iraq. so as the militias came in offering to secure their own communities, we would make them where a geneva convention compliant uniform and only later did we agree to pay them and we did this to prevent backsliding to the people who could outbid us. the seize fire in august of 2007 would never have been declared or accepted had the surge not improved security dramatically already. and the government's willingness to conflict in other cities wouldn't have been attempted had the surge not provided the environment to allow them to feel bold enough to do it. i will cover ten misses of the surge and end with these and we will have conversations. the first myth is that the change in counter insurgency doctrine didn't matter and that u.s. forces already adapted and in any case security was already improving. i think this is false. it was published in 2006 and finally put a stop on the tatics in the united states. as far as security being good before the surge, or i am sorry, the facts the violence ebbed. here is a graph of the violent incidents in iraq. you can see that as the surge begins in january of 2007, the number of incidents is at an all-time high and stays that way for several months. june of 2007, after a lot of surge troops are on the ground, does violence begin to ebb and ebbs substantially. the surge begins rights here. violence had not ebbed. the aawakening was a reason for the insurgeance. well it was a huge part, yes. and i think i described this, it is general petraeus' push that he gave to the awakening that allowed it to expand beyond the confines of ramadi, iraq. myth three, all we did was put the insurgency members on the payroll. i think i mentioned this. there are the original closes. we only paid them $16 million a month and that is cheap at five times the month given the mount of security they gave. at the height, there is 103,000 sons of these men of iraq. that is added at a fraction of the cost of united states troops. it wasn't a strategic shift is myth number four. it was a strategic shift. it strategy is the ways and means to achieve an end. here is the ways and end that were adjusted during the surge. in the middle of the diagram is everything al qaeda need to survive and everything we did to counter that. and that is a significant amount of actions. it isn't all tactical adaptations on the ground. in terms of ends, this was a changing in that as well. the ultimate goal was a representative of iraq, a democratic iraq that could be a u.s. ally in the heart of the middle east and against the war on terror but we decided sustainable security was the best we would do. we would get local initiatives and get to a long-term solution where reconciling was possible. myth five, the surge was merely a hearts and mind campaign. if that is that is the case, why is the first six months of the deadliest timeframe the troops war? there was a lot of fighting involved. myth six, the city was stabilized prior to the surge. here is a map. the more orange the more violence. at the beginning of the surge, there is a lot of ethno centric violence. by the end of the surge, there is no violence to speak of, and thus it is the surge that caused the violence to ebb. the seize fire in 2007 was the real reason for the improvement in security. i covered this. they would not have offered the seize fire had the surge not imed security oaralready. this is a quote from general casey and it says that we are loosing. many of the risks idea in the campaign plan have materialized. the assumptions didn't hold. we are failing to achieve our objectives and we need to protect the iraq population from secretarian violence. we didn't believe this strategy was succeeding and either did the folks that worked on the creation of the surge. and the iraq study group report were caught in a mission with no foreseeable end. myth number nine, the real improvement was from the improvement of special operative forces. general mccrystal would disagree. i know general petraeus does. it was the synergy both the two with the conventional forces taking and holding ground and the special operation forces being able to then target insurgeant and terrorist operatives that created the dynamic that helped to improve the sim -- situation on the ground -- and the final myth is all of the surge did was create an interval for the withdrawal of iraq. u.s. forces are there 60 years later in south korea. it is only a democracy several years after the war. but president bush wasn't allowed to see it through the end. president obama was elected on an anti-war platform. his vision of iraq was like vietnam in the sense we need to get out and allow the locals on the ground to sort it out. by removing u.s. forces, it removed removed the glue that was holding the security situation and then the political dynamics raised their heads again. and it has to do a lot with how we handle the election of 2010. the situation now is spiraling back downhill and it remains to be seen what is the end of the war in iraq. and that is it. i am watching general petraeus back. and i would be happy to have a conversation now. >> thank you. >> thank you for those remarks. it was just slightly over seven years ago that walking across the deserted food court of the pentagon city mall the night after general petraeus conformation hearings and went to baghdad and the then colonel motioned me to walk over and said he wants you to go over to iraq and that started four years of working with general petra s petraeus. there are themes you talked about and cover in "surge" i would like to tease out more. as someone who was there, a smaller cog in the machine, it is a reminder of how much activity was going on in the heard quarter in iraq at the different level and the core levels and the iraq government and united nations. it is an amazingly complex landscape that they have to manage and synchronize. it is incredibly difficult. it reads like a cookbook because as i am turning every few pages i am reminds of the strategic command has to be prepared to deal with this particular kind of problem and fulfill this kind of role and execute this responsibility. it is dozens of different s strategic functions that are not captured in military doctrine so i think we should take a look like yours and get it into the military doctrine so don't have to relearn this every time we do this in a foreign country, which as little as we would like it not to happen, it is bound to happen again and i hope we are better equipped so we can have the knowledge of how the counter

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