I dont know. And the reason im thinking, you know, the comparison that would make that point best is saudi arabia, qatar, right . I mean, qatars a very interesting place in the sense that it has no citizens, right . I think its about 275,000 now, everybody else is an expat. All there is is money, and there has been extremely effective use of that money and qatari diplomacy. And if you compare sort of the last ten years of diplomacy, aljazeera, qatari use of money with the saudis, you would absolutely conclude they punch below their weight. But if you compare to iran, you know, iran has roughly three times the population of saudi arabia, and the percentage of the population that is in a sense involved in the life of the country, that is, for example, has a decent education, are professionals, women who are active in some way in the economy, iran is a much more, much more modern country than saudi arabia. And it isnt surprising in a way that the saudis would have a very hard time taking on a country with three times the population and that is much more modern. Sort of striking thing to say about the ayatollahs iran. But i think its true. So i wonder if really if you look at the country even with its wealth, the amazing achievement maybe one could say is the qataris. But if you take them out of the equation, i dont know if saudi arabias really punching below its weight. In the days when it was punching way above its weight, that was when it was spending all this money to spread extremist ideology around the world. Yeah, yeah. So that you had wahhabi imams in wahhabi mosques in wahhabi schools growing up in indonesia still have it. Yeah. So that was not a good thing. Yeah. No, and im not, im not casting a judgment value on it. Im just saying in terms of, again, and i think the point of the article was that if you measure, if you had those resources and you were in saudi arabia and you shared those goals would you do better . Yeah. Then you certainly could do better. Again, im saying that im not saying that would be good for u. S. Interests, certainly. Im just trying to clinically analyze it which i think is important to try to do in the region right now. I mean, i think, you know, an important point, last thing id say here is that i think especially since 2011, but i think it preceded this, the region had slipped into this multidimensional, multipolar competition for power. You just talked ability saudi arabia about saudi arabia versus qatar, thats just one feature of it. And you look at sort of turkeys role and its purported role and how it, i think, in many ways did not punch above its weight and quite below, were in a period of transformation that its not simply whos backing whoms military forces or armed forces, its the use of media. Its using money in the way that we saw in egypt after morsis ouster and the coup, quite visibly staking a bet on disturb and if theres an overall trend in the middle east, i think its true, those countries that are a little bit less economic strong, you know, they lack the wealth but also divided politically are quite often sort of the, these mini cold wars of the region are played out in places like yemen. Lebanon, weve known this for years. But it continues to go on. And syria, i think, right now is the most dangerous place. Lets talk about syria for a second. I guess in some ways looking at it, trying to look at it from the saudi perspective, whats the real issue . Is it just that the United States appears to want to rebalance the region . As the former National Security adviser, tom donilon, said basically rebalancing the saudis and the iranians off of each other, or do the saudis have a case. Wait a second, our problem is not being rebalanced, our problem is with the Islamic Republic of iran. Thats the issue. And i guess in some ways i think syria might be more accurate picture of whats happening around the region. Like what the iranians are fighting for and how the iranians are fighting. So, yeah, if i could just get your thoughts on syria first. Well, from the saudi point of view, i think, its pit clear, King Abdullah used the phrase shia crescent. From the saudi point of view, you americans handed them iraq this is a quote that brian read, and they still have that view and youre not doing anything about his what in lebanon. Hezbollah in lebanon. Now youve got hezbollah troops and Expeditionary Forces in syria fighting. This is a matter of the shia becoming the dominant force in the be region, and what are you americans doing about it . Nothing. You dont even recognize it. And all you want to do is negotiate with them. I think thats the fundamental saudi view. Theyre fighting to win, and you guys dont even seem to recognize that this is a fight with the shia. And that is not the american view. If they were to really put it that baldly, i mean, its not like the problem, its not the shia, its theyre a revolutionary regime, or that theyre really that up front about saying only in private. No, i think, i think the, i think these are not the speeches officials make, but but i think in addition to the problem of the saudis of iran, you know, there is a deep religious conflict here. Rivalry, i was going to say, but i think conflict maybe nowadays a better word. And there we have, obviously, an american saudi gap. Our problem is with the Islamic Republic, our problem is not with shia or persians. Yeah. Well, i would say on the syria case, i mean, again, another example in my view of how saudi arabia has a stated goal. They would like to see assad go. Its actually an a in alignment with u. S. Policy. I happen to believe that u. S. Policy actually is not in alignment with that stated goal. I think thats an obvious point. [laughter] if you look at 2013, any serious sort of neutral analyst will say this has been a very good year for the assad rediswreej in term regime in terms of its ability to stay in power. A horrible year, a horrific year for the Syrian People and even for many people who are part of sort of the who were sympathetic to the assad regime, because the conflict continues. But in terms of the state of play especially since the spring, the wind is a little bit more at the assad regimes sails. So i would, again, go back to what the stated saudi ambition withs are and what ive seen on the ground and heard from the analysts that i think are credible and go in and out of Northern Syria and other places is the absence of any strategy to advance their goal. And maybe it is the saudis. Yeah, the saudi strategy. I mean, its quite similar tot u. S. , but i think you get it this terms of not only the Obama Administrations posture, but much of sort of republican and democrats in congress, this reticence to go into so, in fact, you can evaluate it and just say we dont have a strategy that will meet our goals. But the saudis are doing things. Theyre doing things in ways that actually, i think, wont maybe not topple the assad regime, but almost certainly is creating this security problem that could quite rival if not already the challenges weve seen in yemen or in northwest pakistan and other places. And thats what i think is the thing that everybodys starting to become aware of, but i fear in 2014 the situation could slip pretty rapidly. Why . Why do you think . Well, look, in some of the recent visits ive had there and its out there in the press and brookings has a really good, you know, monograph out yesterday talking about gcc private support to some of these militant groups, the recent sort of trends with madrisse leaving, this is not an encouraging sign. You can criticize u. S. Policy, and im happy to do that because i think theres a gap between the stated goals and what the actual policy is doing on the ground. But i think that gap is even greater given saudis sort of stated selfinterest. And as elliott described it, theyre not being terribly effective, i think, with undermining the regime. I agree with that. Pardon me. I think if i were a saudi can spokesman saudi spokesman, what i would say to you is, right, but thats the fault of of the americans. Right. You know, you guys have had a feckless policy from the beginning, what can we do . The iranians are . There to win. Were trying to fight. Were doing what we can with help from some others in the region. Very hard to do with you americans on the sideline. But weve kept assad there winning. Weve from winning. Weve kept the rewell onalive. Now rebellion alive. Now, its true lets call them the nonjihadi elements of the opposition are declining versus the jihadi elements, and thats fault, you americans. And you come in with us in the beginning, we wouldnt have had this power vacuum that has led this to be a magnet for jihadis from all over the world. Were not prepared to see assad win, because that means that hezbollah and iran have won in an arab country. Were not prepared to see that. You handed them iraq. But iraq, after all, at least in the sense as a majority shia country. This is a country thats 74 sunni. Were not prepared to see the shia take it over, and youre not helping. Uhhuh. I think its, actually, a very powerful argument. Well, ill ask you both, i mean, at what point do the saudis have a real point when they differ with american policy, and at what point is it just when brian challenged the title of the panel, alliance, no, i think it makes sense. Its not alicense in that way alliance in that way. Its relationship, right . And it seems to be in lots of ways a problematic relationship insofar as elliott was describing it, a lot does have to do with oil or security. And historically its been a lot of times the saudis are screaming at the americans from the side do this, do that. And as elliott was saying about bandar and bush, its best to lead them, guide them, influence them. But at what point when the saudis are saying, as elliott was describing, at what point are they right . Its either we need you as the superpower leading, or youre wrong on syria, youre wrong only iran. So how do we distinguish the noise from when theyre correct . Look, i mean, you could argue and be they would certainly argue theyre already right in this regard. And i would just respond in terms of, again, back to u. S. Strategic interests and how, again, having a clear plan of then how does this end and where does this go. Can if you wanted to go into an allin strategy in the way that, again, i dont think it wont happen. I almost, can almost say for surgeon just based on my own assessment. From the u. S. Side. Yeah. Look, you look at sort of the fallout from what would have been a failed vote in congress, i think, on very limited strikes. So selling this case to the American Public will require a fundamental change in something that happens on the ground of, if not on the order of 9 11, but something sort of the the administration will also have to, the president has been undermining the policy of doing anything more active in syria for two and a half years. Right. So theyre going to have to change as well. Yeah, yeah. What im suggesting here is i dont think theyll have that wakeup call unless theres something seen to directly affect the u. S. Interest, Something Like the teetering and collapse of jordan, which is one of our closest and steadfast partners, if not allies. Something on that order will require and, again, its the administration primarily, but i would say also the United States to wake up, to say, look, the muddle east after 10 or 12 years, and i testified in congress at the end of september, early october on an issue related to the middle east. And i got it from both sides saying why should we care . And for those of us who care about the region, i think what we need to do is outline what is a practical case, and when it comes to syria, i think a practical case for engagement if i were advising the administration in a clear way on syria, it would be, you know and i think theyre doing in the to some extent assess what these actors are doing right now, saudi arabia, qatar, kuwait and others. Weve got a london 11 group. I would focus a little bit more on the ground game and whos doing what on the ground. A lot of the emphasis is on geneva ii, and thats going to convene. God bless them. To me, diplomacy does not have much of a chance of impact unless its linked to Power Dynamics or not ground. And to me, and ive written a little bit about this, fine for secretary can kerry to talk with lavrov a lot, whats missing is a regional contact group. Elliott may be skeptical of this, but the Bush Administration when iraq was at its darkest moment took part in regional diplomacy conferences. I think turkey took the lead on it. And, again, maybe it didnt do much practically, but perhaps it was one of those pieces in addition to a military surge that led to a more pragmatic dialogue of how do you actually, you know, at least get to an end to some of the worst behaviors that are leading to the fragmentation of syria. If that makes sense. Theres no regional strategy, as far as i can tell, to shape the actors who are now engaged in syria. Where im in complete agreement is things have got to go bottom up, not top down. If you can negotiate a deal that doesnt reflect the reality on the ground, if you want a deal, youve also got to change reality on the ground. Yes. Were not doing that. Im thinking the more and more i hear you speak, brian, even though you distinguished yourself from elliott and me and the Hudson Institute, were agreeing on a number of things here. I hope youre not getting uncomfortable. Well, no. The point where i might disagree if we carried it through in terms of specificity policy because i think its easy enough to say, okay, heres what you would do to change the balance of power on the ground, but as i think people like secretary kerry might tell you, when they made a modest decision in the spring of this year to arm some parts of the rebels, i think there was a delay in doing that, and theres still a slowness in it. And part of it was a low appetite amongst those in congress. I mean, im not blaming them, but theres just no appetite overall. If post9 11 and i think heading into the iraq war there was, and, you know, a great appetite and power to actually shape what the u. S. Could do in this part of the world. Unfortunately, i fear it was squandered. And i think its continued, my personal view, to be squandered in part because we believe sort of the, you know, we made some mistakes certainly. Ive criticized the previous administration. But hen we believe we cant then we believe we cant do anything, and collectively, what im saying, not just in the mind of president obama or others, but across the political spectrum theres very little we can do. And thats what worries me the most as somebody who hopes to continue to work on this for the next 20 or 30 years, theres this sense of we dont have power to do anything which we talk quite a lot about on egypt, i think, the u. S. Policy on egypt evinces this. It clearly demonstrates they think they dont have much influence, and i think it becomes a selffulfilling prophesy at some point. I would just add one point about i dont know if this is the saudis punching under their weight or if its just a fact of life and they dont have the weight. But they are very much opposed to u. S. Policy, very critical of u. S. Policy to. But theyre completely unable to do anything about it. Its striking. I mean, that is they dont have the influence within the administration, and they certainly dont have the influence in the u. S. With the public. They cant move public opinion. Now, maybe thats asking too much of a foreign government, although at times the british have been able to do it, at times the israelis maybe have been able to do it. The saudis, though they spend a ton of money on pr firms in washington, cant do it. So theyre left kind of fuming ineffectively but havent moved the needle. Yeah. One of the interesting things i did want to come to this is when people have been saying if the americans are out of the picture or if that seems that way to the saudis, the saudis will look for other options. And we keep hearing about, again, im not sure exactly what that looks like, but one things we have heard about is excellent coordination, secret but excellent coordination between the israelis and the saudis. And one of the things that struck me over the last couple week, the criticism of the interim deal with iran as many people are, many of the people including myself used to writing critical, critical apprisals of this administration will not just write and its not good for our allies in israel, but its also not good for our allies in saudi arabia. So to yoke these two with things together, this is kind of different. So in some ways i think the saudis might be benefiting from the fact that they and the israelis are in line at least on, at least on iran policy. But i would suggest, you know, some have suggested this could then more expansively, you know, lead to something else, and i think there are just inherent limits to whatever tactical cooperation there could be on iran. I think the Biggest Issue for the saudis, again, will be the arab israeli conflict, the Israeli Palestinian conflict that if you look at those statements back in 2002, 2003, and your administration was on the receiving end of that, its still an important core issue. Now, again, the other place i might push back here a little bit is that i think that when people talk about the u. S. Not being present in the region and were less of a force, i think thats highly inaccurate. If you go, as i did this fall, and you see what our footprint is like in the gcc states, if you read secretary hagels speech in bahrain and we can all have problems with how he said that and what he said its quite clear that theres no other military force that will rival. And if you look at the planning of the pentagon even at a time of budget cuts, theyre i see no sign of retreat of u. S. In the region. Separately, and and maybe this is the way to segway into iran, also on the interim deal theres been a lot of talk about a major shift here as well potentially. The u. S. And tom donilon hinted at this. I would say this is probably more modest than has been portrayed when you look at not only the fact that the security threats that iran presents to u. S. Core strategic interests, their support for terrorist groups and other things, the fact that weve been there for decades in the region i dont actually see us retreating in any way. If we were going to do that, we might have done that in bahrain or other places if we really wanted to make that a clear issue. But even if, and i was talking to people in the administration dealing with the sanctions on iran, they made an interesting point, said even if on the slim chance that we can get to a final agreement and i dont think theres a