>> senator, i'm not familiar with that issue. i'd be glad to take a question for the record be, if you'd like. >> okay, thank you. that's it, madam chair. thank you very much. >> [inaudible] verify one thing on the nsa situation. it's my understanding that this judge, judge leon, made his restraining order which has been -- or his injunction which has been stayed, and that was announced last month, a district court judge in southern california, jeffrey miller, announced his opinion in a case which involves a bacilli malawi who was convicted on three counts of support for terrorism, specifically financial and monetary, specifically involving al-shabaab. he was tried, he was convicted, and then a case was brought exactly on this point. and the judge's opinion last month said that the program essentially was constitutional, that no one had a fourth amendment right on metadata. just my view of the situation is that i welcome a supreme court review. it's been more than 30 years. we didn't have terrorism when smith v. maryland was put forward. that was 1979. and we didn't have cell phones as well. so perhaps it is a good opportunity now that we have conflicting opinions -- and we have 15 fisa judges that have never found the case unconstitutional as it reviews the program every 90 days and reauthorizes it. so i think most people believe, well, now a federal court judging has declared the case or can declared the program unconstitutional. well, there are differing opinions now. that's the state of play. and the assumption is that it's going to be appealed and that the supreme court will eventually make a decision which is really the appropriate thing. i also want to say that i don't believe there's any member of this committee that has supported the program that wants to support a program that's unconstitutional. we do want to support those things which can enable us to protect this country, and we believe that that program is one of them. not the only one, but one of them. and it is our intention to review other programs and to look at these programs with some serious scrutiny based on the law. so i think your position is really most important in all of this. and that's, of course, where senator wyden has been pressing, and i've been pressing on the olc opinions. because unless we know the administration basis for sanctioning a program, it's very hard to oversee it. and we have been all during -- and i was going to ask this question, i mean, olc attorney jay bibby wrote congress may no more regulate the president's ability to detain and interrogate enemy combatants than it may regulate his ability to troop movements. well, where am i going with this? where i'm going is we have to know what regulations, what rules, what laws enable a president to move and say, yes, do this. and if we don't see it, it's very hard to exercise oversight. now, an administration might want that. they may not want us to exercise, do oversight. but that's the purpose of our being. and i really want you to know that close up and personal, because you are going to encounter some heat from us in that regard. and i think most of us have been here a are long time -- a very long time, and we know that we need this information. and not just, well, we can give them that, but we can't give them that. and that's why holding up things that this committee has asked for, specifically with respect to the detention and interrogation report, is so very sensitive with us. i have been after the staff, complete the cia reviews. where it's appropriate, we change the report. where it isn't appropriate, annotate the fact that the cia disagrees and why they disagree. but let's get on with it. let's get it, let's vote to declass tie the summary -- declassify the summary and recommendations and findings which is about 300 pages, and we're prepared to do that. i mentioned it today and, again, the staff said, well, we've asked for this information from the cia, and we haven't received it. so we can't really complete what we need to complete. so i would like to ask that our staff sit down with you and explain to you exactly what it is and that you take some action. because we have been able to -- not to, obviously, have a positive response. that's cumbersome rhetoric, but it's off the top. and will you do that? >> um, yes, senator. i fully would like to, if i'm confirmed, work closely with this committee to make sure that you get access to the information as appropriate, and i've already taken back your concerns about, um, the pieces of information particularly that senator udall mentioned were outstanding after i had met with him. >> good. well, if you would, please, let me know what the response is, i would appreciate that very much. >> okay. i'll make sure that happens. >> thank you. and i will also note if there's no response. so thank you. mr. vice chairman, any other comments or -- >> only thing i would add is that we have, the chairman and i have made a request of the entire community about all programs that are operational-type programs within the agency as well as other entities within the intelligence community, and we intend to do a full overview of all of those programs, some of which we may find we didn't even know about. so once your confirmation is complete, then we'll look forward to working with you in that respect to make sure that we have access to the details of all programs at the agency and other entities within the jurisdiction of the intelligence community are provided to us so that we can make sure that we have the tools with which to do our job. so thank you very much. >> just thank you for mentioning that, mr. vice chairman. if i may, staff just passed me a note and said you don't have to mention this, but i'm going to mention it anyway, and that is that the declassify be case process for the -- declassification process for the benghazi report is going very slowly. and anything you can do to be helpful in speeding that up, we very much appreciate. yes, senator king? >> a bit of a concluding statement. you all have some of the most important jobs in the united states government. some of the most important jobs in the united states government because i'm convinced we're engaged in a war. september 11th was pearl harbor, in effect. and it's a different kind of war than we've ever been engaged in before, and intelligence is the first line of defense. people are not going to come in this convoys or in waves of airplanes across the ocean. they're going to come in the hold of a ship with a destructive device that looks like a suitcase. and intelligence so critically important. so i want to stress that. but, ms. krass, i also want to stress to you your important role in the agency that you are going to be the counsel of, presuming you are confirmed. you are not the defense lawyer for the cia. you represent the people of the united states in advising the cia as to what the law is. please don't misunderstand that responsibility because you have, i believe you and we, this committee, has a special responsibility because unlike virtually any other part of our government, this is a secret part of our government. the public -- all the checks and balances of the public and the press and the access and the interest groups aren't present. and, therefore, those of us who have the responsibility of overseeing the conduct of this agency, i believe it's a essential and weighty one. and you especially have one. and i understand human nature. i practiced haw myself. you always want -- law myself. you always want to tell your client how to do what they want to do. but i think in this case you have to be, you have to resist that temptation and be very strong in your advice. because otherwise there's nobody else manning the barricades of the fourth amendment and the fifth amendment and the fourteenth amendment. you have to help protect us. a secret agency in a democracy is almost a contradiction in terms. i understand why we need it. we definitely need it in light of my other comments about the importance of intelligence in this new kind of conflict that we're engaged in. but we have to realize that throughout history secret agencies tend toward abuse. it's, again, that's human nature. and we need to have all the strength that we can muster to protect against that, and you are, you're a key person in that process. so i hope you will really think hard about who it is you represent, and it's the people of the united states. it's not the director of the cia, it's not the directer of national intelligence. you have a gravely important role, and i appreciate your willingness to take it on. i'm impressed by your experience and background. but just -- i don't mean to lecture you, but i just think it's so important, i had to say it. so thank you very much, and thank you, mr. ambassador. >> [inaudible] well said. senator heinrich, i believe you're next and then senator levin. >> you know, in the interest of time here, i'll submit some additional questions for the record. >> thank you. and perhaps i'll just announce that we'd ask all written questions be submitted by 5 p.m. on friday, and is we'd ask both of you -- and we'd ask both of you to please respond to them as soon as possible. then we can, hopefully, vote on your nomination. senator levin? >> thank you, madam chairman. your response about providing documents, you said that you would do so if appropriate. that's a pretty big loophole. what's not appropriate? give us your menu. what documents do you believe are in the possession of the cia that we should not see? >> well -- >> predecisional, i assume legal opinions, right? >> yes. but of the cia general counsel is in a different position, um, and so i would -- were i to be confirmed, i would make sure that you were provided with an explanation of the legal basis. i know on some occasions steven preston provided the committee with a, an oral briefing as well as a written paper explaining the legal basis for classified matters and i would, of course, be comfortable doing that as well, whatever would best serve the committee's understanding of the legal basis. in terms of what is appropriate, i think that -- >> many what else wouldn't be appropriate, what would not be appropriate for this committee to see? >> well, i'm not sure not having sort of insight into what types of documents that the cia has and generally provides or doesn't provide to the committee, but it would seem that the absolutely the presumption would be that it would be appropriate to share. there may be situations where there's privileged material, and so -- >> what kind of privilege? be more specific. >> where there could be attorney/client-privileged material, for example, where there could be another way, though, of making sure that the committee was informed. so, for example, sort of a white paper type approach instead of providing the actual deliberations within the agency between the lawyers and their clients, a summary of that that was prepared with the intent of sharing it with the committee but still was true to the underlying reasoning. >> any other documents? >> i -- >> that aren't appropriate? >> i'm, i don't know. i really don't know the universe of documents that we could be talking about. >> because you used the word "if appropriate," so we assumed that you had something in mind when you said that. >> i did. i had in mind the attorney/client privilege when i said -- if nothing beyond that? >> there probably would be, as i said, wrapped up in the attorney/client is the deliberative, some documents could be deliberative. >> and you don't think even if there's no attorney/client relationship that we're not entitled to deliberative documents? putting aside the attorney/client relationship. >> i think there can be situations in which deliberative documents, even if they're not between -- i'm trying to imagine a situation where there wouldn't be an attorney as part of the scenario, but deliberations without attorneys could be something that would protected by the deliberative process privilege. but as i said, i really think it's important for you to still understand not only the legal basis, which is what i feel like what i would be responsible for if i were confirmed, but also understood what types of operations and intelligence activities the cia's engaged in. >> i'm going to explore that further with you for the record, because it's a very important -- our chairman's been trying for a long time to get documents and has been, i think, much of this committee agrees with her. it's been a frustrating experience. either can't find documents, or there's some kind of a privilege which might exist. it's just pretty vague stuff, and it's very, very, it's just not acceptable for an oversight process to be told that. and our chairman, i think, has the support, again, of most members of this committee in her determination to get answers is and to get the documents. just one other question. going back to the question that i was alluding to before, i i want to talk to you about waterboarding for just one minute. in your judgment, is waterboarding torture? >> yes. both the president and the attorney general have said that waterboarding is torture, and the president has outlawed that. i would like to say, though, that for the people who were involved in the eit program who at the time relied on what was then authoritative advice from the department of justice and who did so reasonably and in good faith, i don't believe they should be punished for -- >> that wasn't my question though. in your opinion, is waterboarding -- you've given us the president's opinion -- >> i said, yes. >> -- and the attorney general's opinion. i want to know your opinion. >> senator, my opinion is, yes. >> all right. and is it torture within the meaning of the geneva conventions? >> i have not looked at that specifically, but be i think it would be a violation of common article iii, yes. >> thank you. thank you, madam chair. >> thank you very much, senator. do you have other questions, senator king? or mr. vice chairman? let me thank our two witnesses. i know this is always hard and a tense time, but we very much appreciate. you are on the record. what we do is sensitive, and the need really is for cooperation. and we believe that the american people deserve that to the extent we can achieve it. so you're both in vital positions, and we look forward to having a positive relationship with you and, hopefully, we'll be able to move these nominations shortly. so thank you very much, and the hearing is adjourned. >> thank you very much. [inaudible conversations] >> tonight beginning at 8 p.m., american history tv in prime time brings you programming featuring works of u.s. capitol art. up first, the chief of art and archives for the house of representatives talks about images of key figures of the american revolutionment after that you'll see a virtual tour of statuary hall and learn about how states learn which to submit to the commission. and we'll finish with a portrayal of legendary frontiersman daniel boone. u.s. capitol art on american history tv, tonight, 8 p.m. eastern on c-span3. >> what's going on today comes down to two words, and they're not my two words. fundamental transformation. those are obama's words. and i asked a couple of questions. when you look at the constitution and the power of the president, does the president have the power to fundamentally transform america? of course not. >> no. >> and why would you want to fundamentally transform america? that means you don't like america very much, do you? that means you don't like capitalism, private property rights very much. that means you don't like our constitutional system very much. when you keep hearing this fundamental transformation, change hard, we need more time for change, you need to understand this is a direct attack on our constitutional system. that's what he's talking about, that's what he means. >> sunday, january 5th, best-selling author, lawyer, reagan administration official and radio personality mark levin will take your calls and questions "in depth," live for three hours starting at noon eastern. booktv's "in depth," the first sunday of every month on c-span2. >> and online for december's booktv book club, we want to know what your favorite books were in 2013. throughout the month join other readers to discuss the notable books published this year. go to booktv.org and click on book club to enter the chat room. >> the brookings institution recently published a study looking into the funding of syrian opposition fighters by gulf nations including kuwait. the author of the study, who's also a reporter in the region, spoke about her findings. you'll hear about how money so licited -- solicited and channeled into syria. this runs about 90 minutes. >> all right, welcome, everyone, to today's panelbe on private gulf donors and extremist rebels in syria. i'm william mccaptains, i direct the -- mccants. i'll be moderating today's panel. to my left is elizabeth dickenson who's a gulf correspondent for the national newspaper based in abu abu dhab. she's the author of the new brookings paper, "playing with fire: why private gulf financing for syria's extremist rebels risks igniting sectarian conflict at home." to her left is kristin diwan chos an assistant professor at the american university school of international service. she's also a nonresident fellow, senior fellow at the atlantic council's hariri center. and to her left is tom ceeting who's a former managing direct director for jpmorgan and an i tin rant scholar of counterfinancing. beth, i want to start with you. when i began to look at this issue back in 2012, i didn't start looking at foreign financing for extremist groups in syria, i was mainly focused on the groups in syria, particularly one of the larger salafi groups. and it's one of the more vocal groups online. they put a lot of material out on facebook and on twitter, and i noticed several times they would give very public shout-outs to individuals in the gulf and thanking them for money and material that they were sending to the group in syria. so i began to look around, try and find more information. there was not a lot in the english language press. you really had to follow this stuff in arabic on social media. yours was the only article i found, and this was back, i think, in early 2013, one of the first mentions of this kind of fundraising going on in the gulf. and for that reason, that that's why mark lynch and i collaborated to send you over to kuwait to do some on-the-ground, honest to god field work to figure out what these funding networks are like. how did, how did the kuwaiti fundraising network for syria, how did it first get on your radar, and why did you pursue it? >> well, i think we had a similar experience. watching sort of social media surrounding the syrian conflict, you would see occasionally particularly beginning in the summer of 2012 a lot of mention of kuwait. but there was no clear connection, and no one had sort of put the pieces together. so i started hearing this more and more and decided that, you know, as someone who was tasked with following kuwait, it would be worth following up. so it took about the first six months for me to piece together the social networks. and then as you said, in early 2013, we were really able to pretty e detin if tiffly say that kuwait had emerged as the funding hub for the syrian rebels. and i had a very particularly striking first interaction with one of the donors who i met with that really gave me sort of an insight into sort of the mentality and how this all began. the first time i sat down with one of the donors himself, i was, of course, very concerned that he was not going to admit to me what he was doing. so i'd concocted a very elaborate strategy to extract the information from him, and i had my interview set, and these are the questions i'm going to ask. very broad softball be, you know, i hear you're interested in syria. oh, yeah, oh, yeah, i'll show you my iphone. he scrolls through, oh, last week i was in aleppo giving these arms that you see in this picture -- [laughter] yeah. and, you know, he's -- so this is the attitude that you very quickly uncover when you begin to start digging into these networks. these are individuals who really believe in what they're doing and have really gone sort of all in in supporting these opposition groups. >> why did the funding and the fundraising get started in kuwait and in other gulf countries, but particularly in kuwait? why did it get started? >> well this is, i think, a really important story. you know, we've been able now that we've established what's going on to go backwards if time and figure out how it did begin. and like the syrian uprising itself, the kuwaiti involvement began out of a hope that something positive could happen in syria. and so beginning in the summer of 2011 long before it was militarized at all, a lot of syrian ex-pats living in kuwait and elsewhere in the gulf where there's a very large syrian diaspora, they began raiding their own personal -- raising their own personal funds to begin sending back into syria. at some point these syrian ex-pats in kuwait began to communicate with one another and form a group of people who would then go around and pool their money and pool their efforts. at some point a decision was head to reach out to the kuwaitis who had access to far larger amounts of of money, far more important businessmen in kuwait, they had sort of a network of people who had been giving to these causes in the past. so they tapped into that network. and this fusion of syrian ex-patriot involvement and kuwaiti donors was really what started the movement forward into funding the rebels on a large scale. >> and that was 2012? >> yes. so this began in, actually, in the fall of 2011. so very early. at some point during those meetings between the kuwaitis and the syrians, a decision was made to begin partitioning the money between humanitarian relief and armed sort of -- lethal aid, if we can say. and at in this point something y critical happened, and that decision was that the kuwaiti donors themselves said we want an armed uprising, and the way that one syrian ex-pat described it to me was they said to him, you know, we want to shorten the duration of your suffering. to do that, we need to have armed groups. so i'm certainly not trying to suggest that the reason the syrian conflict is armed is because of kuwait, but i do think that it was a very significant factor informing some of the early brigades. so some of the donors would actually bring groups together and arm them in a very particular way. >> and what's the ideological flavor of the people doing the fundraising? is it a mix of secularists and ultra conservative salafis? >> we've seen a very interesting wave in the ideology of the people who are involved. so at the beginning, um, syria was a cause that really invigorated people across the spectrum. so you saw donors, you know, from the sort of secular -- sec la, maybe not, but very mild islamists all the way to the salafis were involved. and the popularity of the funding was just gaining and gaining. then then as the conflict itself became more complicated, you had a huge dropoff this sort of the public's support, the sort of broad base. and it really whittled down to just the true believer types, the sort of real extremes of the spectrum that were very interested in an ideological sectarian agenda for the conflict. >> and why was it kuwait in the particular that emerged as a hub for this kind of fundraising? >> well, kuwait is sort of the, has sort of the perfect storm of conditions among countries in the gulf. so the first and very obvious way that kuwait is very different from the rest of the gulf is that it's sort of, it's the most democratic country in the gulf which is something, actually, very beautiful about kuwait. you go to kuwait, and you can talk about politics in a way that you can't in saudi arabia or in the uae. political parties, political groups are legal, freedom of association, all sorts of sort of political activity that we would recognize ngs, it's all legal in a way that it's not in in the gulf. the second component of that was a very, very weak counterterrorism financing law passed in 2002 that failed to criminalize counterterrorist finance. which meant that if someone with was caught sending, let's say, you know, someone was in the most extreme case caught sending a thousand dollars to al-qaeda, the kuwaiti government had no tools in their tool books to go after -- tool box to go after that person. so given that, kuwait really emerged as a place in the gulf where people knew this could happen in an easy way. i think something that, um, that i've grown to sort of really more understand as i've become more, you know, deeper involved in researching this is that the networks that have existed in kuwait with, that exist in kuwait for this financing on syria have likely existed for a decade or longer before syria. we now have access to them because a lot of these people have chosen to broadcast their fundraising on social media in a very public way that allows us to literally map out the social networks of these groups. but it's very clear that these guys have been operating for a very long time. so i'll give you a very brief example. one of the -- in the early days of the conflict, one of the reasons that a particular syrian ex-pat told me -- expat told he he approached a particular donor was he had a reputation of being a very effective jihadi funder, and he knew this man had been involved in the past, and his reputation was widely known among a particular ideological circle. >> i notice when i look on twitter and follow the hashtags for the funding that a lot of the people sundaying to the pleas for fund -- responding to the pleas for funding are not necessarily in kuwait. a lot of them are from the surrounding gulf countries. why is it the case that a lot of gulfies say from qatar or saudi arabia are finding it necessary to send money to these bundlers in kuwait rather than some local fundraiser? >> yeah. for all the reasons that i mentioned, kuwait is just a place where you can operate and sort of not get caught. so for other gulf citizens, it's very much more difficult. for example, in saudi arabia there's been a very proactive came pain to -- campaign to discourage sheikhs from raising money, there have been a few that have been told, hey, stop doing what you're doing, you know, sort of chastened and then stopped. but what doesn't raise the same red flag is a transfer from qatar to kuwait. so at the beginning of the financing in 2012, it was to the extent that there were accounts in saudi arabia that would regularly wire, let's say on a weekly basis, to an account in kuwait. that was sort of the clearinghouse, and that money would then be moved into syria. because given the business and familial ties between the other gulf countries and kuwait, that simply didn't raise a red flag at all. >> so how much money are we talking about? be couple hundred dollars? thousands of dollars? hundreds of thousands of dollars? >> well, i had another sort of surprise moment in researching when i was talking to another donor who had gathered in his, basically, like a public gattering space where people can come in and out on weeknight evenings to talk politics. you know, i'm discussing the fundraiser that he had with him and at one point i'm like, oh, do you remember how much it was, was it a couple thousand? how much was it? and he's like, oh, yeah, i remember perfectly, it was $300,000 -- >> for one gathering. >> in one night, you know? that's a huge amount of money. but what scared me more is i asked him afterwards, oh, where did the money go? oh, i have no idea. [laughter] so to answer your question how much money is being raised, this is guess work. i don't have bank statements to show you because despite the fact that kuwait, you know, has a very lax legal regime, people are hiding their transactions. and one of the main reasons for that is fear of the syrian regime who is thought to have very good contacts in a lot of the exchange houses in syria. so a lot of the transfers from kuwait would be partitioned into, you know, hundreds or more parts and moved through syria in very strange ways to try to evade these syrian regime contacts. but based on sort of a number of individual events that i have, that i know have taken place and people who have told me how much money was raised, i would estimate that it's hundreds of millions of dollars that has gone to the rebels. >> yeah. and there was a washington post article saying the reporter had talked to a u.s. intel official anonymously, and he'd also quoted the same kind of figure. so can you give us a sense for how, the mechanics of how this money is raised? like, is somebody going door to door and asking for donations? is, are folks just writing a check to some anonymous address? i mean, how is the money actually being gathered? >> yeah. so the way i like to think about it is the solicitation for the money is public, but the way that the money's collected is often very private and very close and sometimes even in person in cash or very specific sort of controlled ways. so the way that the campaigns are solicited is very similar to something that all of us would recognize as a good ngo campaign. so let's say, you know, you want to support one mujahideen. that costs you $7,500. so these earmarks are a very effective way to give people a clear idea of what exactly they're -- [inaudible] with their donations. .. particularly at the beginning there were bank to bank transfers. those have become less common now but any beginning you would see even on twitter accounts a twitter account would take it to the syrian people, here's the bank information. they would be a screenshot right there at the account information, the routing number, the amount, the currencies that were accepted. it was like really transparent. it's gotten less so but they would use them instead of doing that now they will say here's an instant message account. you can send a message to the server on your blackberry. they will send back the account information. so then a final level of collection of the money is simply in person. if you're in kuwait that's easy. you can hold an event and put a box in the middle and everyone will give. if it's overseas and you're afraid to make a bank donation, there are lots of examples i've heard some individuals from the gulf getting on an airplane with a suitcase and showing up and visiting the donor himself. this is fairly easy to do. if you have been to the kuwait airport i don't think anyone will stop you with a suitcase full of cash. it won't happen. so this is i think increasingly frequent as people are becoming nervous about being caught doing it. >> and indies fundraising appeals, our distinctions being made about that there is kinds of aid that they are dealing for? divinity appeals court imaging eight and it gets repurposed or is it just a call for cash donation after the person that's raising the money will do it as they see fit? >> this is one of the big complications and i think in thinking about, i guess tackling this big question of whether this is an issue. a lot of the advertising uses all the forms of what's considered -- charity basically. it's for the orphans, the widows, to feed the hungry, to help the needy and for jihad. so to separate these things is very complicated. for example, i spoke with one donor who spends a lot of his time building hospitals but he doesn't specifically working with one particular brigade. what is that? is a humanitarian? is a partisan? but still nonlethal. he works with armed fighters so where does that put him in terms of legal assistance? i don't have to answer that question. i mean the answer to your question is it's very, very much intertwined. >> so many of the people giving contributions feel like it is a zakat contribution and they are allowing them to do speed is absolutely. i should put a final caveat, there are some of the register territories in kuwait are some of the more competent and extremely effective charities in the arab world. so these registered charities are not what i'm talking about. and it's a pretty important distinction, because kuwait is the single largest in managing donor in the arab world to the syrian conflict. and without the contribution it would be, the u.n. would really be in trouble. psyche what to make of this section that what individuals on sort of makeshift foundations are doing, not sort of officially registered ngos. with one exception that i know of, but otherwise i don't know if any crossover. >> the flavor of the current fundraising seems to be for the private donor, seems to be very much the older conservative sunnis. was there ever a time in 2012 where you have the more moderate elements of kuwaiti society that were raising money in kuwait to send a more moderate elements in syria? >> absolutely. and particularly at the ache of the funding in 2012 it really was a broad base of people. what's really been alarming to watch over the last year as i follow this is those people who were involved in the more modern elements have backed away partly because they are disillusioned. because they haven't been able to sort of effective change, but also because they are scared of what's happening in terms of the more extreme elements. they are very nervous about some of the more extreme elements targeting them. so this is metered to what's happening on the ground in see where you now have in fighting between rebel groups, between more extreme and more moderate rebel forces. so this is very much happening in the donor to me as well when there's a lot of concern that the more moderate donors are going to be somewhat targeted or sort of isolated socially. >> so you talked about how the money is gathered in kuwait. how is the money moved into syria? because i get the sense it's not quite often not quite as simple as just making a wire transfer. >> yeah, this part is little harder to sort of pin down but we do have some clues about how it probably is happening. it is probably, some of it is probably moving to exchange houses. so the place where you would go to exchange your dollars into kuwaiti currency, the same places you can make a deposit their and then clear that deposit in syria. so this is one way to do it. it is there and will be partitioned on the streamside. so you have maybe 100 recipients. there are increasing amounts of cash moving, particularly through turkey. so sometime in early 2013, turkey was added as an additional step so the money but no undergo drug to kuwait to syria but it had to stop in turkey where he could go over the border. a final way we think it's moving is through traditional moneylenders that are very common across the globe. these are basically -- i'm hoping my colleague can give you more coherent exposition. but the agents are basically a western union were no cash changes or crosses a border physically. so basically i'd run up a tab, if i'm an agent in dubai i would run up a tab of how much i've sent to syria. the agents industry will run up a tab of how much he has received from the same agent and based on transfers back and forth they will equal out. if there's ever a lack of funds on one side, then a briefcase of cash moves across the border. but that's the basic system. >> i want to talk about the affect of this is that on the insurgency in syria. it seems to me having watched the conflict began in a much more plural, had a much more moralistic tone in the beginning and it has become much more sectarian now. my sense, one of the things that seems to have been driving that was the perception that the world had abandoned the sunni muslim community to the whims of the assad regime and this really fueled a lot of the same activism in the gulf to raise this money. would you agree with that? and what effect has that had on the insurgency? >> that, i agree with that completely. i think one of the main sort of motivating causes -- cries you hear is sort of all, syria, everyone else has abandoned you but to wait will not big cities sorts of appeals to sort of the forgotten us of the conflict. but the kuwaiti donors have also exacerbated in other ways. of legal and specific example where feuding between two main donors actually contributed to the fracturing of the rebels on the ground. as you see between two men outside of syria had dashed in one of them was a kuwaiti donor and the other one was a donor, a cleric in syria or they had a very high profile the argument on twitter about whether rebels should join the military council. the sort of western backed groups that were being tried, that the official opposition was trying to create in 2012. the kuwaiti cleric said no way, no way are we working with the west. this is not something we believe in. a saudi cleric said yes, you should do this. unity is a good thing. so they had this very high profile clash. effect that that is the rebels, the two men couldn't work together because they're doing is basically said no, not working with that guy. so this was a huge split between -- to rebels. so they have that sort of dispute between them and it was largely in part because of this feud that the donors themselves had. there's also been a large degree of ideological adaptation by the syrian brigade receiving the funds and that is sort of become itself a fulfilling prophecy. site the beginning it was like if this guy in kuwait once the to act a certain way to get money, like fine, i'll do it. we will make the video, fine. but i think is exactly as you mentioned, as this conflict has gotten so much more difficult, the humanitarian tolls have gotten so much more worse. some of those ideologies have begin to sort of take old and really stick in a sense that it's so hard to grapple with what's happening to my community. if i can reach out, if i have this explanation that is some sort of divine fight that i'm fighting him and makes it a little bit easier to sort of settle. and, of course, going along with that there's been very active ideological propagation from kuwait into syria and then within syria within each brigade a lot of the brigades have specific units that are particularly intended to sort of codify their particular beliefs. >> and it's also the case that the money can be quite attractive, right place because those not a lot of strings attached to this money. there isn't a congress is breathing down the neck of these private donors. the money is just being delivered in suitcases or in garbage bags. it's very attractive, particularly when the same kind of money is not coming from other allies of the syrian opposition. >> it's not only attractive. it's the only game in town. for a very long time it was the only way to get funding. there are lots of rumors about wish both states are backing which gulf military. but we know that this is happening on the private donors. from everything that i know about the gulf states themselves, it's been a very much on off. the private donors have not stopped and went to build a military board which need is consistency to these has been absolutely elemental in building these groups. >> so your paper that you wrote is very much about the sunni fundraisers in kuwait and sending money. primarily because they're the most public about it. but the shia private citizens in the gulf are also raising money, too. i know it wasn't the subject of your paper but i wonder if you got a glimpse of any of it and what your thoughts are? >> this is something that really needs to be further investigated, and i'd like to in the future is, i get during when i returned to kuwait communism it's not jus just the sunnis coe it's just the sunnis commits also the shia that are raising money. i couldn't find any evidence of it. on his last trip i did find evidence, and i found a number of videos that i do believe that it is going on and i believe it could a significant amount of money. basically the shia community in kuwait is fairly small and i don't want to say it's particularly insular that it is extremely strong community. so i believe the way the fund-raising is probably happening in the shia side is much more private, no, gatherings in homes, personal connections, one businessman with all his friends and say hey, brother, we need to do the to support our brothers in syria. so much sort of quieter. but it's notable that a number of the most prominent businessmen in kuwait who are shia also have very significant foreign investment in syria. said both the personal stake in the business stake in sort of the maintenance of the status quo, which is, goes a long way to explain at least some of the cash flows out of believe are moving. this funding, at least what i've so far toward a tap into, like the sunni side and i want to stress this, is sort of equally sectarian in nature in its rhetoric. i don't think that either side is an angel here. both sides are employing rhetoric that is truly despicable, and is really demeaning to other people that live in their own country. >> right, and that's the final question i want to ask you before turned to christen. what risk is there to go societies and particularly to kuwait applying this kind of sectarian activism? even though it's being aimed abroad, what risk is there at him speak was i think there's a great risk that a degree very naïve to think that something is happening so close to home the people are so actively involved in can really be kept out of kuwait's borders. added don't think it will come in ways that we would recognize as armed conflict, certainly. but i do think there's a growing tension between a king or get in kuwait, and so you know, people unless they give us a we are so scared, we are very scared of what's going to happen to us. we are scared of rich vision -- retribution. they're supporting hezbollah against us. they're going to come and attack us. this rhetoric is very strange to hear in kuwait with an extremely diverse and -- it's a very nice a society, certain like every society is, but you didn't hear the sort of direct conflicts in the past. and to do think they been exacerbated by people's involvement. >> okay, thank you very much. kristin, can you give us a sense of the political and the social context for this kind of fund-raising? why is it happening now? is it different than the kind of sectarian activism you might've seen in the '90s or the 2000s? spent sure. first i would like to say i really enjoyed reading all of her work. a lot of things i'll be doing will be providing context or amplify things that she said. she covers a lot of ground, in her report. and one that i think is worth again amplified although she said is that kuwait has historic reserve as a main center for fund-raising for islamist movements. that's been there for a long time, and the reason is for a couple reasons. one, kuwait is really rich. not only that, it's been rich for a long time. so that kuwaitis have a lot of wealth and, of course, the first rule of fund-raising issue go where the money is. in addition to being really wealthy though, kuwait also has this really long history of civic activism, definitely the political space to do that. it goes way back to the 1930s when kuwait was the first state in the gulf have an elected parliament. later when the state achieved its independence from the subside was doing a other able to work with the ruling family to put forth a constituent that created a constitution that allowed them for a really strong parliament or a parliament i think does have an impact. they can really affect things. and all of that means there's a lot of space then for organizations. you have as long a movements organizing in kuwait for a very long time and the muslim brotherhood came back in kuwait way back in the 1950s. was already creating social reform societies. salafi movements also came very early to kuwait and they started forming charities very early pick an extensive network of charities. i was will impress what is in kuwait in the late 1990s, early 2000s, just the pervasiveness of collecting money at that time. i mean, any store that you went into would have a little booth we could collect money. there were kiosks collectincollectin g money for different causes. i'll never forget seeing this one important salafi society having this huge sign written in blood across the top of it saying, reading chechnya. said they were collecting money at the time for chechnya and there was a really impressive bloody sun. so not only have they had these charities but they've had charities that are extremely networks internationally, that are as have been set up at collecting money both for charitable purses, for imaging purposes and also the experience both in afghanistan, then in chechnya and bosnia collecting money as well for more militant cognizance. i think what really struck me what i read over this report, thought about it more, when you look at who's giving money and she kind of hit on this, especially the ones that are funding the jihadists in syria, it isn't so much the main presence, the ones you think of initially. i know the names of all the muslim brotherhood of charities in kuwait. a are not the ones that are giving the money. i think they're getting something entering aid. even some of the main salafi ones were not showing up so probably. i think what's fascinating to like it is one of the big things easier is the change that's happening across the region that i think comes a lot from the media really and the empowerment of individuals get from things like twitter. so that you have basically individuals that are well-respected sheikhs that may have a presence that have been taught by international causes. a lot of this goes back into this that kerry and -- she goes back to iraq as well. a lot of sectarian language came in with pocket change in iraq. and just now ability of those individuals to reach out and to collect money on their own that way. i think that would be making i see that's really different is that it's not coming from the big institutions so much but from private individuals have been able to find their own audience and find support to these new mechanisms. >> elizabeth mentioned in her report that a lot of the fund-raising might now that's taking place among the salafi committee. and i wonder if you might take a few minutes to just talk about the shape of the salafi community in kuwait, and the fact that a number of its members are in parliament and have a particularly strong voice in opposition to the royal family and how that might help locate the government's efforts to rein in this sort of fund-raising. >> right. the salafi move is very strong in kuwait. it's very deep and very internationally connected. has always been a good relationship between the salafi movement in kuwait and saudi arabia to me, so that you had an effect answered that very influential sheikhs our in saudi arabia had trouble with the saudi government, sometimes they would come to kuwait and set up in kuwait. you had this long flow of both people and of ideas flowing across the gulf, particularly quit being a strong center for the. because it was more open and provided a place of refuge for people who are having political trouble elsewhere. what this means is that kuwait has kind of all of the different versions of socialism you'd find anywhere throughout and beyond. you have salafi movements, that would be pro-market, pro-saudi monarchy even. and related to movements that are like that. you have oppositional movements to give new movements that are trying to fuse solecism with democracy. all these different elements are present. at the same time because of the presence of the parliament he did have salafi movements that are been able to enter the apartment and get a strong presence there. he also a lot of sympathy for salafi movements amongst sort of the more tribal areas of kuwait which have been growing in influence. and they are able to use their presence in the parliament are putting pressure on the ruling family. again what i thought was interesting though, if you look at the names of the people that have the most significant in the fund-raising for syria, these are not people that i run across looking at policy in kuwait. they are not showing up in the kuwaiti parliament. they are even speak a lot about domestic kuwaiti politics. i've been watching opposition politics. there's also little bit of a defense between some of the salafi movement are movements that are ver there in case on international issues, kind of independent religious sheikhs, and also may be more working on a sectarian issues actually a looking at iran and these kinds of things and looking at those sorts of issues rather than playing for domestic kuwaiti politics. >> can you talk will get about deaths point that she makes in the paper injuries when she titled it "playing with fire," that this kind of sectarian activism abroad risks stirring up a lot of sector intention at home? to you think that's true? and do you think it's happening or will happen soon as a result of the? it? >> yeah, it's certain happening. i think it started even before dashing it started happening. a lot of that language coming, and soon started happening after the iraq war, and you actually a lot of sunnis that gain to kuwait at the time that were displaced in the sectarian conflicts that happened in iraq it and i think they had a lot of influence actually in importing sort of the more sectarian view. as you said, kuwait has very open politics. there's always some competition but at the same time you had even political blocs in apartment that were made up of sunnis and shia. and just to give one example of that, this blog broke down in the middle of these issues of what escalation of what's happening in iraq and also in lebanon when 70 parliamentarians showed their support for them and then the block could not together anymore which i think tell you something about how the sectarian policies of the region are becoming much more prominent in kuwait. series of courses to expect too much higher level. because now you actually have, i mean, a conflict a special with hezbollah entering into the conflict, where everyone actually has their own players and a lot of the fears that were built up from the iraq war, from these other things, about shia looking at the rise of salafi, what that would mean for them as a minority in kuwait, but from the sunni side looking at wow, you have iran becoming a much more stronger power in the gulf, they have their own actors to look at hezbollah how they're able to act into another foreign setting. i think it's just as elizabeth talked about, the fears on both sides are coming together. i think the problem in kuwait is that, i mean, it's one thing a lot of people like a lot about kuwait is politics are much more open but at the same time it allows the state for the rhetoric and comparative politics to come out in the open. >> okay, thank you. tom, i want to turn to you now and talk about kuwait counterfeit financing laws. one of the points that beth mixup, points out in her paper is that kuwait became attractive as they have for this kind of either fundraising. because its laws are particularly lacks. can you talk about that? can you put kuwait's laws in the context of the gulf and in the region? are they particularly lacks? >> sure, okay, just by adding my congratulations to beth on the paper. i think to answer the question you need to go back to 1989 to i won't take too long to get to the present-day but in 1989 the financial action task force was set up and initially it was set up to counter money laundering, the function of the trade from latin america. fast forward to 9/11, and in fact one of the things which is often overlooked is the first shot in the global war on terrorism fired by the then administration was a financial shock, executive order which basically put in place the option for -- sanctioned organizations that seem to be financing terrorist organizations. the same time the ball was thrown to -- they need to come up with an addition to your money laundering regulations and guidelines that direct terror financing. from that moment on the countries around the world were monitored and audited by organizations like the imf to determine the extent to which their implementation of these recommendations, so-called nine special recognition were appropriate and they're doing their utmost to counter terrorist financing. these mutually vibrations are conducted on recognize the most recent mutual evaluation of kuwait was done in 2010. and in the context of a peer analysis it's fair to say that kuwait was not doing a good job. and if you look at the wikileaks cables from around that time you can see the usage message was clearly very frustrated by the lack of progress that kuwait was making. and the report at that time highlighted what they called many shortcomings with legal and law enforcement framework for countering terror finance. for level of preventative measures, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. and from a positive perspective they were at that time 49 different elements that fatf review to countries on. they fall into four categories. and 37 of the 49 categories were rated noncompliant or any fashion only partially comply by fatf. that's 75% failure rate. >> how does that compare with the other gulf countries? >> during the period between 9/11-2010, the other gulf countries made a terrific effort to make up the ground that they felt needed to be made up. if you look at the noncompliance and high-risk jurisdictions which fatf published in october this year, kuwait is notable for still been on the list and it's been company which wouldn't probably want to be in with, cambodia, laos, places like that. now, in 2012, kuwait made a concerted effort to try and make up for these deficiencies, and there is now the law that beth referred to come there setting up a financial intelligence unit that this is all stuff countries did many, many years ago. and i think there still some frustration that these issues haven't yet been addressed. and even if rules are put in place and it's announced that things will happen, whether there's enforcement and whether the rules and the laws are used to deal with deficit financed, and, indeed, whether you can use them because is what is being conducted at the moment in kuwait is actually terrorist finance. whether those are actually use or not is an entirely different matter and we already talked about the way in which politics works in kuwait, which it may not favor implementing and enforcing those regulations. >> that was my question is that a lot, it seemed to me a lot of the fundraising that beth talks about in her paper, you can't properly construed as financing for terrorist organizations because a lot of the group in syria have not been designated. most of this money is not going to save the front, for example. so what tools then does the international energy and kuwait have for curbing some of this funding if they feel that it needs to be curbed for one reason or another? is it possible to curb it under the rubric of countering threats -- threat financing that is so focused on terrorist organizations? >> i think it's very difficult. i think there's a hard way and there's a software. the hard way clearly, if one can prove that money is going to organizations that are designated, then steps can be taken which as most recently as yesterday by the u.s. treasury were taken by designating a couple individuals not from kuwait but who were providing finance to designated organization. it is an alternative way, and that is that financial institutions are very concerned about their reputation and about being tainted by anything that would damage their reputation. so whilst you may not be able to directly target individuals who are transferring money and would rather they didn't transfer money, you can let it be known that these individuals are perhaps not doing what you would like to be done. you will very quickly find the services they receive from banks, said will start to be withdrawn. that would cut the funds per se but will potentially inject if you factor which might make them think twice before continuing to do what they are doing. >> has that ever worked anywhere? >> it certainly has. but if you look at the period after 9/11, saudi arabia very effectively curtailed a lot of the donations that were going on, combined with the fact, a lot of those kinds of donors felt that the cause for which they were donating money wasn't going so well in afghanistan and later period. but then something might happen which turns the tide of sympathy or puts forward a cause to donate money, so you saw the situation in iraq where the documents were found where poor al qaeda writing saying we're having a bit of trouble with money, would you mind sending us 100 grand? because he was effectively raising money for his cause in iraq at that time. so i think it is possible to use soft pressure to curtail donors, but it will require the kuwaitis to perhaps be more aggressive than they might want to be with these individuals. >> okay, thank you very much. we are going to open it up for questions now. i think we have mics around the rubric if you just raised your hand and wait for the microphone to come to you. we have one kind of over there. >> thank you, good afternoon. i'm with the european council on foreign relations. thank you very much for the paper. i think it is very, very interesting, and i'm curious as to whether you or any other panelists have look at how the creation of the islamic front and the sort of the attempt to kind of bring these groups under one operating bandit even that military councils -- they basically don't work anymore. but do you think this is going to in some ways can stamp is competition from private donors? obviously there is a kind of open question in the minds of government in the gulf as to the behavior of the citizens and how it may come back to bite him at the end of the day but am wondering what your thoughts on that. and also i wonder, i know it's not the core focus of the research, but is there any reflection on how this kind of proliferation of arms and malicious in a country like syria ultimate effect what happens there in the long-term? i mean, we've seen certainly the world has seen what kind of impact this has elsewhere but is there any kind of consideration that this might ultimately come to do more harm than good? and again because there is no clear wary of understand where the money flow goes. the most destructive groups certainly aren't getting tons of gold money. they're getting it from elsewhere. because to do a lot of damage. just curious if you can reflect on some of those points. >> yeah, on the islamic front i was looking at this the last few days. a lot of the really prominent to we get backers have come out in support of the islamic front. but i suspect that what we will see a sort of everyone is equal but some rebel brigades within imf are more equal than others situation. so, for example, although they are now under the same umbrella i think the groups will continue to receive better funding, particularly from some of these individuals and other brigades. so i wouldn't expect -- i mean, i don't know, i can't predict the future but i wouldn't expect these donors to change the financing in any way. i would expect them to continue in the networks they have already established, and just work, and then those rebel groups will continue to work together. >> have any of them reacted to the formation? >> they have. one of the most prominent donors, one of the backers, has come out and support publicly of the islamic front. yeah, we see these alliances and does. this and seems to be different because it's bigger and it seems they had a bit more coherent. but for example, there's some evidence a man was involved in brokering arrangements between himself and other individual programs at different points in time. the big question is whether this alliance is different from other alliances and it has any holding pattern. but yeah, i wouldn't expect the funding pattern to change. in terms of sort of regret about what this could do to syria in the future, yes, i think is one of the main reasons is these broadscale funding in kuwait a sort of dropped off and actually just the very hard-core elements that remain. so, for example, if you look, those of you have a copy of the report, there's a quote on the first page from someone to raise money for moderate brigades and he basically was just making the fact that basically his and others' support is gone and so may different directions that it's really just sort of destroyed the opposition by making them totally incoherent and unable to work together. >> i think we have a question in the back. >> hi. i'm a syrian -- i just recently came back. really, what are you talking about, the funding. i have seen the kuwaiti and saudi, nina, things arrived in syria. mostly dates or close. there's nothing about weapons. the weapons, lease my experience -- most of the weapons are really from the syrian army. most of the sophisticated ones even. they capture them, the syrian army. the really cannot talk about, you know, favoring this group or that. because one example that when the headquarters, we need weapons, we need weapons, they refused to give them. then suddenly they overtook their headquarters. what i'm saying, always the refused to get in, even if there was a weapon for maybe mostly qatar but not only possibly and not kuwait. i don't know, we have so much propaganda from the other side saying the gulf coast is giving, you know, the head of intelligence is giving him and stories, all life, you know? none of the weapons -- most of the weapons is from the syrian army. >> no, i really appreciate you making this point. and i think i would emphasize again just how much humanitarian aid the kuwaitis are doing, how much work they are doing and these charities are doing sort of, they're really the unsung hero of the humanitarian crisis in syria. over and over again the kuwaitis are the only, they are the ones, the first donor in sort of every case for humanitarian work. i think ther that is an aspect f this that is sort of, i think i mentioned one example of it, where exactly do you draw the line on this? if you're supporting a hospital that is run by particular brigade that is humanitarian aid, does that sort of a legal component? it's a spectrum. it's not black and white. i think that you raised one of the questions that makes this so complicated, is that yeah, a lot of this money probably does go to things that are very much needed on the ground. these rebel brigades, they understand that if their control in every combat also means the bakery, but also means the hospital. and the means provided for people. no one else is doing that, frankly. because these groups are the only ones that have access to these areas. so i really appreciate your point, thank you. >> i would also add, i would also add that the paper was not about states in assistance by bt private individuals. and a lot of the assistance or weapons comes in the form of money. said the groups on the ground condemned by the weapons they need, whether they do deals with some low-level guy in the syrian army or whether they go across the border to buy the weapons, crates full of weapons are not showing up. the money to buy them is. >> i'm in touch with a guy who does a substantial amount of fundraising, and clearly people give money to specific kinds of weapons. one case in kuwait, he had attended where the aim was to raise money for as many shoulder launched antiaircraft missiles as possible. $75,000. they raise enough money for 11. there was a certain amount of matching bidding going on amongst high profile individuals who attended this event. i'm going to be to do and some of his i'm going to be for three, that kind of action. i think money is given specifically for purchasing weapons. where the weapons come from, i don't know. >> you have a question here. >> and i'm with the wilson center. i have to cook questions. there was a report this week about 10 kuwaiti shiites killed in syria, working with hezbollah. i was wondering if you can elaborate more about the help -- stomach and in syria and what kinds of funding, fighting with the syrian regime and stuff like that. the second one is, isn't there, i mean, just commenting on what was said. i agree, because there's a few now that when you concentrate on the issue without making distinction, and thank you for making the dissension between the legitimate organizations that are helping and the ones who are buying weapons and raising money for weapons. you really are going -- there's a fear that the government of kuwait now out in the field will be sanctioned and then the syrian people on the ground are going to suffer. thank you. >> so, on the shiite angle, i unfortunately don't know much more than i've already sent. i think this is something i would like to look into further. it's clear that fundraising is happening. i don't know the extent but imagine it is probably comparable to what's happening on the sunni side and from the amount of money. and kristin, maybe you can help me but i believe that our long-standing historical ties between sort of support for hezbollah and the shiite community that could be tapped in sort of in those networks. i've seen lots of reports, both sunni and shiite kuwaitis going there to fight. but i do anything confirm that i could tell you. >> i don't have any specifics on what's happening now, but it isn't just in the shia committee parallels where the shia committee in kuwait was also a real center for shia islam, especially across the gulf. there were some very prominent activist that came from iraq that settled in kuwait and are based the internet influence in transnational networks throughout the entire gulf. and some of them when industry as well. those were parlayed as well into business contacts on another site. so there's activist communities and you also have a higher level businessmen that were working for the syrian government across the gulf, a lot of men are waiting with this unit government as well. during the time in the gulf have a lot of money and were looking to invest abroad, but those relationships were established. >> beth, on the second question, about good funding versus bad funding, can you talk meant about what saudi arabia has attempted to do? there's been a lot of fundraising for humanitarian relief for syria in saudi arabia. but they've also attempted to crack down on -- can you talk about that a bit? >> this is a great example because i mean, across the gulf the syrian crisis, it's really struck a chord with the people. and that's because it's such a terrible conflict humanitarian wise, such a visual conflict. we are seeing -- people go close to it because of the images we see on youtube and twitter. is also just a lot familial connection in the gulf to see. in that sense is a very close, personal conflict for many people in the gulf. and the gulf country government has realized that their population is deeply motivated to help the syrian people. and saudi arabia's taken a very interesting strategy to sort of channel all of that release into one public campaign. they had this gigantic telethon where they got the religious establishment involved. they got the charities involved. they got all the tv networks, and just everybody was giving to this one popped. i think this was their way of sort of channeling that, those international passionate emotional responses and the very, very sincere desire to help into one way that they could then use for imaging purposes that that was a bit more control. so anyone who is trying to do fundraising sort of outside that umbrella was asked to join that umbrella in sort of an inclusive way. in the saudi government through i believe they would move that into common use that for humanitarian work. the uae has done something similar with the uae red crescent. gulf countries understand that citizens want to know. so i think they've taken these strategies as sort of a way to be, to turn that into really active philanthropy. >> if i may, there's a bigger picture issue as well, which is -- one of those is a specific recommendation that indicates that charities, ngos are deemed to be a vulnerability in the counter terrorist effort to do things like this procedure talking about may well be driven by the fact that actually controlling where charitable monies are going to not just with a going but what they're being received from is something which the global threat finance committee if you look at very closely. is not the forum for the other unintended consequences for the but actually monitoring where charitable donations are going, where they are being transferred to is viewed by many people as a vulnerability. so trying to control that or corel -- corelle that or make that go through safe corridors where you know where the money is going, you know that countries are heavily incentivized to do if they want to get a clean bill of health from the fatf. >> another question here. >> thank you very much. i'm with the iraqi embassy. thanks for such a very informative panel, very informative. before the question may be a little bit of personal expense on what an insurgency is. when i was a young guy christo as part of the 1991 uprising in iraq, and we did control some 14 of the 18 provinces in iraq. our problem wasn't much -- it was more support. so there is more to actually supporting an insurgency than just buying the weapons were giving them that. there is much more, so the government does have a point. yes, a lot of the weapons is captured, as we did in 91 from the army. but there is more to supporting an insurgency than that, and this money can go to a lot of nonlethal, non-weapons, but it certainly is in support of the insurgency. my question here is, it's very hard to draw the line in countries like the gulf states between what is private and what is public and what state involvement is. you already alluded to the fact that some parliamentarians were supportive. who either went to syria or some of them -- but my question to the panel, the attitude of the kuwaiti government, the kuwaiti government is less sanguine in public about others talking to a. but what is happening in kuwait is natural structural problem the two of you allude to, the people are fundraising are using a lack system against the very government that is using it against him. you know, no structure put in place mentioned to comply. or is it that there is some complicity at a certain level by looking the other way rather than just structural failure? i would be interested to hear the panels of you. thank you very much again. >> start with beth. >> sure. i do think the kuwaiti government is aware of what's going on. they may not know the extent of it. i don't know how deeply -- it may be a case of not wanting to look too deeply, but they certainly know it's going on. so that i can say with near certainty. out give you an example of some sort of on the ways it's been difficult for going to do anything about it. so one other publications as transit alluded to, a lot of the people involved are politically important at the moment. one particular individual that you mentioned is a former parliamentarian. on twitter he said let's get people to the street. there would be 10,000 people in kuwait city tomorrow. so that sort of person you're giving with sort of the kuwaiti government is particularly difficult. not there's one example that i felt was very telling is, there was a great story about two different fundraising events that were held. one was held with the presence of one of these mps who supports the syrian opposition. and one was held without the mp. they were both in public. the one without the mp was broken up by police very easily. the one with the mp wasn't touched. the police sort of came and then they were like, too complicated. so they actually didn't break to do. the way the donors start a look at some of these mps as sort of as a political cover, way to give them more space to operate. so even if the mps themselves are not raising a ton of money, they are providing space for other people to raise money and creating a huge headache for the kuwaiti government. >> in the good wishes talking about around 2012, this was a time of really really broad opposition activity in kuwait. you have the opposition at the time taking the majority of the parliament in one election, and really threatening to be able to constrain the ruling family anyways. some people were calling for parliamentary monarchy, being able to choose a prime minister. they basically push their move. i do think is a complete the empty threat at the time. a lot of the parliamentarians are now former mps because those mps are not out of politics, lost the game against the government. but i think particularly in 2012 there was a vulnerability for the government and pushing against this opposition that was very resurgent at the time. the particular vulnerability the government had his because he had a lot of like you've let politics that were coming from the streets, they could negotiate. the mps themselves were not controlling everything but you also had a lot of new kind of tribal politics that when you that the government wasn't controlling very well at that time either. and because a lot of these tribal areas that have been very loyal to the government before were turning oppositional, the politics meant the government itself was very reliant on the shia blocs, political blogs, to keep their political position. .. >> within the community. i don't know anything about this, but there's been a lot more ruling family factionalism, too, in kuwait. there's been a lot more competition within the ruling family. i have no idea how this plays out, but at least there's the potential that, again, on what has been a very popular issue coming out in an issue that's unpopular maybe played against you by a competitor within the ruling family. i think one thing that's sort of interesting to think about, though, is a lot of the height of this has sort of passed now, and the ruling family has a lot more influence right now and seems to be able to kind of control this, and a lot of the way that they actually got more of the public coming back in sympathy to their position is because of how bad things were going in syria and because of the fears that kuwaitis had that this was going to be imported into kuwait. and people just started to think this is getting too hot, the sectarian rhetoric's getting too hot so that this message that the government was employing of national unity became very resonant, i think, to a lot of the public. so that might give more space to the kuwaiti government to do more on these issues now. >> tom? >> i think anything i'd add is, obviously, it's not just these donors who are raising the money, but clearly within the establishment, within the mosques, etc., and i don't know anything about kuwait if these terms -- in these terms, but i would imagine going against those kinds of organizations is, you know, is extremely difficult for the authorities. ask that's one of the questions that comes up regularly is, you know, how should these pots of monies, how should they be controlled, distributed, you know, and different countries use data for that. >> okay, thank you. more questions? yeah, we have one down front. be. >> thanks very much. i'm garrett mitchell, and i write the mitchell report, and i want to take you back to your title, which i assume was not a casual decision. um, playing with fire, why gulf financing risks igniting sectarian conflict at home. it's sort of a two-part question. where's home, what's the, what is the real danger that you see here? is it -- and i don't mean to underplay this -- is it simply about syria and what's going on in kuwait, or is it something larger about a trend that perhaps this identifies about the role of big money in big conflicts? and i must say as i've listened to the conversation today, i've sort of gone back and forth between a sort of this is the way it should be, but it doesn't sound like the end of the world, and then i come back to the title of playing with fire and igniting sectarian conflict at home, and i say, well, maybe i'm not hearing something that i should. so i really would love to get some clarification there. i must say in listening to it, it also sort of reminds me of the angst that we express here at home about the role of outside money and big money in our electoral politics. so if you could expand on that, that would be helpful. >> thank you. >> yeah. i think the thing that scares me most talking about this and the impact that it'll have, by home i guess i meant kuwait and more broadly the gulf, so this is a geographical reference. but the thing that scares me the most is that i fear that what's happening with the donor community now is just the beginning of the birth of a new network of extremist funders that is not going to disappear easily or willingly. these networks probably existed in the past. i know for a fact that they've expanded during the syrian conflict, because there are new actors that are, you know, known to be new in the donor community and that have established new networks. these networks aren't just in kuwait. they extend far into saudi arabia, qatar, bahrain. these are groups that now have access to one another in very, in an instantaneous and easy-to-access way through social media, online, blackberry messenger. you name it, they can talk to each other. these are not networks that are going to be quashed easily. and i think the longer the syrian conflict goes on, the more entrenched those networks get, the bigger they get, and frankly, the more, treatment they get -- extreme they get. because watching the conflict in syria doesn't privilege moderate ideologies. it privileges ideologies that take an extreme interpretation of the events that are happening because they're just so graphic. that is my biggest fear. and when i am mapping sort of the social networks of these donors which, you know, thanks to social media we can now sort of instantaneously do, i do map them to bahrain. i can show you how salafi communities are connected to salafi communities in kuwait which are connected to salafi communities in qatar. i can show you pictures of a qatarty and kuwaiti donor who are in syria together having raised money through kuwait. these are networks that are not going to disappear. >> okay, thank you. there was a question in the back. yeah. >> dan layman, syrian support group. elizabeth, thank you for this. my question is about the story you told during your section. you said there was a public fight on twitter. as we know now, under islamic front, they started con consolidating their gains. since they took over the warehouses on december 6th and 7th, they kind of started setting their command structure in stone, and at the very top the military held, and then the tentative head of the political wing. so i'm just wondering if there was an end to that story and eventually they worked it out and now those groups being under the same command structure and those two leaders working very closely together, just wondered what happened there. >> yeah. i don't know if there was, like, a meeting and they shook hands and had tea, and everything was better. they did sort of both come under a not -- a lot of flak for that fight, so i imagine they both sort of backed off from their positions. but, you know, i think at the end of the day this is sort of an opportunistic alliance, i think, and i'm not sure, you know, hopefully it has more staying power in the sense that it would give a lot more coherence to that very important question who is the syrian op to decision. because i think, you know, up til now we have not been able to answer that question in a coherent way, and if this allows us to do that, i think, you know, maybe it's a positive thing. but i hesitate to think that the alliance at the moment in its current form is anything more than an opportunistic group of brigades that are decided to work together and pool their experts. >> more questions? yes, please. >> hi. sally jepsen, i had kind of a hypothetical question. a lot of people have become more pessimistic about the possibility for successful geneva convention and see a more likely scenario being a fractured syria where different opposition groups control different areas. i was wondering what you thought this impact would have on the donors in the gulf, whether they would maybe, um, stop sending as much funds or whether it would increase division among the different donor groups. >> thank you. try it? >> i don't honestly have a lot i can add on the subject except to say that all the donors that i'm aware of have stressed the need for the structural integrity of syria, and that's something that the gulf countries themselves have also really emphasized. so i don't imagine that they would take kindly to the fracturing of syria. i don't imagine they would stop fighting if it took place. >> yes, there's a question over here. of -- >> hi -- [inaudible] thank you for this. i had a quick question on turkey, actually. you touched on the role of turkey in terms of the money transfers, the donors transfer money to syria through turkey. of course, i know there are two separate issues, one legal with monies going to help the syrian refugees and the other one money to get weapon, to provide weapon, and we know that these groups are providing some of the shotguns probably, for example, from turkey and providing these shotguns to syria. are you aware of, i mean, is there any role of this money in this trade? and what kind of transactions are, in fact, in terms of these transfers, money transfers through turkey? >> um, i don't know of any role of turkey in terms of the money transfers. if you're talking about exchange houses, the role of turkey in sort of the financial movement that i'm aware of is in terms of cash. so the easiest place to go in and out of syria is the turkish border with syria in the northern syria. so a lot of it is the cash money would be moved to turkey and then literally sort of walked other the border by one of these guys. that's the involvement that i'm aware of from turkey. but, you know, i personally do not report on turkey, so i don't know the specifics. but i, from my reporter colleagues i know that it's sort of, the border has become sort of a wild, wild west. and, you know, there are shops set up with military fatigues and, you know, i think you have a good story maybe that would be helpful here. >> yeah, yeah. so i guess two comments on turkey. first of all, something of an anecdote, but this chap i know who works for an ngo, and he was telling me how he goes to the store in istanbul to buy suitcases to carry cash down to the border. more specifically, turkey is in an interesting position because turkey was another country that was under a certain amount of pressure from fatf to upgrade its compliance with that regime. and i think turkey demonstrates, to some extent, how much power these recommendations have. because if you read some of the reports from the credit rating agencies, actually fitch referred earlier this year to the fact that had turkey not cleared its name, per se, then they may have downgraded its credit rating because being sort of blacklist or graylisted would have been made it -- would have made it more difficult for them to gain be access from capital markets. so in the all is quite closely linked together. so i think what happens in turkey will be interesting to watch, and i think the authorities there should be aware of the extent to which they are inadvertently or other wise facilitating that money moving. >> [inaudible] >> hold on a second. wait for the mic. >> in the latest meeting of -- [inaudible] what syria was in the fact on this decision? >> i have, i have no idea. how fatf makes its decisions is not -- >> 36 members of fatv refused the request of turkish government to -- [inaudible] there are 11 countries on that including yemen, kuwait, etc. but turkey wanted to -- [inaudible] and the u.s. administration objected to this request, and other 36 members objected to request. i'm wondering if syria wasn't -- >> i don't know. >> wasn't a factor on this issue. >> i don't know. >> so i, we're getting near the end. i'd like to ask a last question. mainly to beth and to tom, but, kristin, if you have an opinion, feel free to jump in. but i, i'm sure those on the panel know, many in the room know the general mood in d.c. is that, you know, this isn't a conflict that we should be involved in. there's nothing we could do to really affect the course of it. and i want to talk about that move specifically with reference to this foreign funding issue. i think a number of people will hear, beth, and read your report and hear what you're saying, and they'll say, well, look, i mean, the united states could have done all it wanted to to fill this vacuum and provide assistance in syria, and these folks in kuwait would have still raised the same amount of money, still have been sending it there. and even if we wanted to do something about it, tom, that there's not really anything you can do. i mean, if you talk to u.s. officials, and i have in the past although i understand there's a bit of a change of attitude now, but in the past you talk to u.s. officials, they're just like what can you do, it's just such a messy problem. we don't really have the leverage to do anything. so i wonder if you can address that. >> well, let me -- [laughter] let me give you a european perspective, first of all. so there is -- and i'm sure you will be aware of -- there is a very significant concern in europe about the blowback effect of the conflict in syria. so, you know, as people do more and more research, it's becoming clear that the number of people who are choosing to travel from european countries to syria is quite considerable. money is clearly involved in that. how do they -- who is paying for them to travel to syria, who is financing them once they get there. so i personally think that money is, like many things, is at the center of this. and i think trying to address the financing -- and i'm not necessarily saying this is all through kuwait, but trying to deal with the finance issue, i think, is important because the numbers are increasing dramatically. and if you look at a small country like belgium and the number of people that are going from bull belgium to syria, there's a big problem brewing as there is in the u.k. as has been commented on by the security service there. so i think it is important. it's difficult to get your arms around it. but, you know, without money i think the general view is without money perhaps there would be, you know, less willingness of foreign fighters to travel, and from a european perspective, that's probably the most interesting thing about this discussion. >> beth? >> i guess i would go back to a conversation that i had at the end of 2012 during a conference in doha that was meant to try to unify the very fractious syria opposition. i remember very vividly talking to one of the local military guys that had been brought in to that conference, and i remember talking to him, and he was basically sort of, you know, making his case can, pleading that, please, the fighters on the ground are living such a hand-to-mouth existence really at this point that any flow of funding will sway them this way or that way. i do think that there was really something to that, and i think that the amount of money that, you know, we're estimating being talked about, hundreds of millions of dollars, that would be very easily outweighed by any sort of one major, you know, donation from, you know, be it the west or if the gulf decided to actually, you know, get their act together and really sort of in a clear way help the opposition rather than individual parts of it. i think that there was a moment perhaps when more unified support could have brought the opposition together. i now think that that moment has passed, and i'm not convinced anymore that western support would be able to unify the opposition given how fractious it's become. which basically leaves us in a position where i don't know what can undo the damage that's been done up to this point in terms of creating a coherent syrian opposition. i do think that getting the gulf countries onboard the project is unifying some sort of syrian opposition would be a positive thing. and i think that the gulf countries are extremely important in getting any successful geneva discussion moving forward. and, you know, we talk a lot, you know, is the regime going to attend geneva? are the rebels going to attend geneva? how about saudi arabia, is saudi arabia going to attend geneva? because, to me, that seems like an equally important question and maybe one where we could have a little bit more influence. yeah, i think, i think the u.s. missed its moment. >> tom, you have a brief follow on? >> yeah, i mean, just one follow on. you have to ask yourself the question where would the money come from if it didn't come from where it's coming from. and if you look in north africa, the answer is probably kidnap for ransom. so even if we address the flows of money that are traveling at the moment, you know, maybe we open a separate can of worms. >> kristin? >> you know, i'm somebody who thinks the u.s. has been sort of too involved in the region, and i can definitely understand sort of desire to pull back. and there's not much appetite in the american public to enter into another war. but at the same time, i think it's very easy to read elizabeth's report and see that as an indictment of u.s. policy. i mean, i, i think, you know, if the u.s. were playing a much stronger leadership role, i mean, this is what, this result we get is what you get from the u.s. not being very strongly present and organizing and kind of talking a leadership role in syria. whether we should have taken that leadership role in syria or not, i'm not completely sure yet. but i hope that policymakers are reading this and thinking about it because there's a broader issue here. if the u.s. is going to be less forward in a lot of our policies, the gulf states have shown they are going to step up. that's the message from syria right now -- i mean, from saudi arabia right now. they are going to be more proactive in the region. we saw it in bahrain, we've seen it in the syria, and the case in point we see not even a state we're talking about. this report is talking about private actors that can have this effect behind it. so, i mean, regardless of what our policy on syria's going to be, i think this is a good case study for thinking about how the u.s. is going to play this new role, what role can we play maybe in between not doing, you know, much of anything and not playing, you know, an all-in role, but how can we start to manage and work through, you know, some of these real outcomes that come when we're not playing that strong role. and, i mean, we have that perfect opportunity right now working with iran and the negotiations with iran to try to think through those. and i hope we don't just sort of leave everything to chance. [laughter] >> well, thank you all -- >> [inaudible] >> -- very, very much for an excellent panel. i hope you'll join me in thanking -- [applause] docs knox. [inaudible conversations] >> all this week we'll bring you encore presentations of our hourlong "q&a" program. today watch reagan administration budget director david stockman on his work, the great deformation. here's a short preview. >> guest: i think the success that has been attributed to reaganomics is totally unwarranted. we had the greatest keynesian deficit binge between 1981 and the end of the bush administration, the first bush, those 12 years are all really the reagan program. and so we did have an economy that rebounded, because volcker killed inflation, and the deficits were enormous, and they stimulated the economy. but they established a precedent for continuous, chronic, massive peacetime deficits and put the republican party, the old defender of the treasury gates, into the position that cheney eloquent -- so ineloquently expressed, deficits don't matter. and that was the beginning of the end. because in a democracy if there's not a conservative party that is defending the treasury, the taxpayers and fiscal rectitude, you're going to have a free lunch dedecision between -- competition between tax cutters, the republicans, and spenders, the democrats. and that's why you have $17 trillion of national debt today and why it's out of control and why we have kind of a doomsday machine. >> and you can watch the hourlong interview with former michigan republican congressman and reagan administration budget director david stockman today starting at 7 p.m. eastern on c-span. >> tonight beginning at 8 p.m. eastern, american history tv in prime time brings you programming featuring works of u.s. capitol art. up first, the chief of art and archives for the house of representatives talks about images of key figures of the american revolution. after that you'll see a virtual tour of statuary hall and learn about how states determine can which statues to submit to the collection. and we'll finish with a look at the portrayal of legendary frontiersman daniel boone. u.s. capitol art on american history tv, tonight 8 p.m. eastern on c-span3. >> if you're offering services over a twisted copper pair, there's one set of rules. if it's over coaxial cable, there's another set of rules. over the air one way, yet another, over the air another way, yet another. and the market has converged well beyond that. these are 80-year-old concepts, and we need to move on. >> you follow the technological trends that are transforming, all digital businesses, the first that i would probably observe is the dramatic shift from hardware to software-centric systems. the minute you are able to do more in software rather than proprietary hardware, i think the full creativity of software engineering comes into play. >> in five years from now, what's the concept of a channel? you know, today we think of channels kind of being linear, you look down on your remote control. how many of us really watch, you know, linear television in realtime? other than if it's a sports activity, we've kind of gotting into this time-shifting model. now you're seeing this device shifting. i may record it on my dvr in my living room, but i want to watch it on my tablet. >> experts on the future of television tonight on "the communicators" at 8 p.m. eastern on c-span2. >> today is the 100th anniversary of the federal reserve which was signed into law by president woodrow wilson. this morning on "washington journal" we discussed the recent decision by with fed chair ben bernanke to adjust his agency's bond-buying program. this is about 45 minutes. >> host: at the table, greg ip of the economist. he is u.s. economics editor. good morning to you. >> guest: morning, paul. >> host: thanks for being here. let's take a temperature of the u.s. economy. how is it doing overall? >> guest: well, it's interesting. if you go back a year ago, we were creating around 150,000-200,000 jobs per month. but even though the raw numbers are very similar, the outlook is quite different. a year ago we were heading into a period where we were still trying to negotiate through a number of crises, in particular europe, we still had to get past the fiscal cliff of spending cuts and higher taxes. a year later we've absorbed those shocks to the system, and it looks like things are looking up. there isn't going to be any new fiscal austerity next year, the unemployment rate is dropping, the crisis in europe is fading into the rearview mirror, and it looks like people's spirits, especially in the stock market, are quite buoyant. >> host: what still needs to be worked on? where are the not-so-bright spots right now? >> guest: well, it's still the case that we do have austerity in the pipeline. if you look at some of the numbers, this year it's estimated that higher taxes and reduced government spending removed one and a half percentage points off the growth rate. next year that'll be around half a percentage point, so we still have to deal with that. we have not yet seen the full absorption of the real saiption that the federal reserve is going to begin dialing back some of its stimulus programs. we could see higher interest rates, and that could weaken the housing market. we could see a pullback in the stock market, that could -- or confidence. and more generally, forecasts like the one i just gave you which is rell thetively upbeat for next year, we've given the same every year, and each year something seems to come along to set us back. >> host: our guest is greg ip of the economist. phone numbers on the bottom of the screen as, again, we take a temperature of current conditions, what is working, what still needs to be worked on. lines for republicans and democrats and independents out there. we also have a separate line just for the unemployed. if you're still looking for work, call 202-585-3883. and, of course, we'll take your tweets and your comments by e-mail as well. our guest has written -- a lot of other folks have been writing about it lately -- that's the 100th anniversary of the formation of the federal reserve, and here is a look at the economist story on it. age shall not weary her, is the headline. tell us more about significance of the birthday. >> guest: so there's an old saying that there's only two things that can get congress to act, crisis and christmas. [laughter] dealing with the aftermath of the great panic of 1907 had both of those elements. over the following six years, a number of commissions in congress tried to come up with a permanent solution to the panics that had gripped the united states over the last 40 or 50 years. the solution was to create a central bank. but the two -- but there was a great deal of debate over what shape p that central bank should have. and not until woodrow wilson in his first year in office forced the two sides to compromise were they ready to produce a bill which he signed 100 years ago today. and it's interesting, paul, because some things never seem to change. we're still having many of the same fights we had 100 years ago, is it doing enough for main street versus wall street, is it too powerful? >> host: we'll hear from ben bernanke in just a moment but ask greg, first, about the fed move first, the tapering if that's the right word to use. how important is that, and what are the next moves? what are the next signals? >> guest: i think we could call this not the end, but perhaps the beginning of the end. by which i mean if you go back to 2008 when the crisis was at its worst point, the recession was beginning, the federal reserve threw all its conventional ammunition at it. they lowered the short-term interest rate to zero which left them without more traditional tools. so they initiated what became known as quantitative easing, the purchase of long-term bonds paid for by simply creating money out of thin air, and they did that in two successive rounds which did not succeed in producing the upward momentum they wanted. so they began a third round last september, 2012, which became known as qe3 with the wrinkle that they weren't going to stop until they were convinced the economy was getting better. and in the last few months, ben bernanke and his colleagues at the federal reserve concluded that men mark had been -- benchmark had been reached. they're not saying they're going to tighten monetary policy, they're merely saying they're going to loosen it at a slightly lower rate, hopefully a year by now the whole process will be done. they will not be purchasing any new bonds. >> host: let's hear from the fed care as he made his announcement last week. >> as you know, we've been purchasing $85 billion per month in longer-term treasury and agency mortgage-backed securities. starting in january, we will be purchasing $75 billion of securities a month, reducing purchases of treasuries and mortgage-backed securities by $5 billion each. it's important to note, though, that even after this reduction we will be still expanding our holdings of longer-term securities at a rapid pace. we will also continue to roll over maturing treasury securities and reinvest principal payments from the federal reserve holdings from agency mortgage-backed securities into agency mortgage-backed securities. our sizable and still increasing holdings will continue to put downward pressure on longer-term interest rates, support mortgage markets and make financial conditions more accommodative which in turn should promote further progress in the labor market and help move inflation back towards the committee's objective of 2. our modst reduction in the -- modest reduction reflects the committee's belief that progress towards its economic objectives will be sustained. if

Related Keywords

Qatar , Doha , Ad Daw Ah , Istanbul , Turkey , Dubai , Dubayy , United Arab Emirates , American University , District Of Columbia , United States , Afghanistan , Iran , Laos , California , Syria , Aleppo , Lab , Lebanon , Kuwait City , Kuwait General , Kuwait , Michigan , Washington , Bahrain , Malawi , Iraq , Israel , Cambodia , Geneva , Genè , Switzerland , Saudi Arabia , Belgium , Maryland , Yemen , Kuwaiti , America , Saudi , Turkish , Syrians , Iranians , Kuwaitis , Iraqi , Syrian , Gulf States , Israeli , American , Abu , Sally Jepsen , Steven Preston , Daniel Boone , Woodrow Wilson , Elizabeth Dickenson , Sunni Muslim , Jeffrey Miller , Ben Bernanke , Greg Ip , Garrett Mitchell , Al Qaeda , Shia Islam , Jay Bibby , David Stockman , Kristin Diwan ,