The things we do with the budget resolution, on the bus appropriation bill, separate appropriation bills that follow, sequestration across the board cuts to allow agencies, departments, to allocate their resources. Hopefully that will enable us to look at risks, areas of risk, put more money there and areas of risks put less money there but in terms of what we can do to help you do your work better, give us one good idea. I will start. Having answered my question, you had given my response and it is recognizing that this country there are a number of risks that we face. Is a large country and part of the conversation we have to have, the department of Homeland Security administration and lawmakers and American Public is we cant mitigate every threat so it is understanding those that have the most significant consequences and ensuring we are having a conversation, mitigating them, personnel to go about doing that so having the conversation that we have today over the course of time, what is critical, you have already taken steps by moving away from sequestration, that will be helpful to us as well but i think recognizing that we have to manage risk and we cant prevent every incident. As long as we are adapting. Federal protective services be very brief. In a unique position, we have to weave our way through state, local, federal, civilian contractor environments and we do that with a very small force. Your help in helping us to in your support helping us to move through, navigate through those areas is critical, quite frankly because we are trying to look out and predict, if you will, what is coming down the road to keep our people save and we need the support of folks like yourself and this committee to help us to work through some of these challenges. As quickly as possible please. We believe that continuing to evaluate those employees who have access to classified information or facilities is critical and we need to have resources to be able to conduct those evaluations and have access to records that are sometimes publicly available, sometimes not available in order to do those evaluations and general support for that approach to doing business is essentials. Before you arrived, i with saying to senator heitkamp we are fortunate to have four attorneys general on this committee and a great deal of expertise in this particular area so welcome. I think the witnesses for being here. I wanted to follow up with you, mr. Lewis and ask you how other dod policies might affect the security clearances at facilities, and those who can gain access to them in particular as the thought of any dod regulations that need to be reviewed or revised. For example the current discharge regulations and how they are implemented. As i understand it in the case of mr. Alexis had he been dishonorably discharged that would have raised a flag and that would have gone directly to hold the security clearance. Could you help me understand in light of this case is this something we need to think about . One of the things i am wondering about as well is the breakdown with the reach out, obviously that was beyond but is there anything we need to do on the Mental Health end looking back on this and i understand that 2020, when you look back at something you can see things that you didnt see at the time. What im trying to understand is anything we need to look at internally on those two issues from the dod perspective or anything we do to serve on the Armed Services committee working jointly, the committees we should be doing. I do not believe there are issues with how the discharges occur. Not to get into specifics but generally, based on what was known at the time of the discharge, it was not considered to be an unusual determination to an Honorable Discharge in that particular case but the larger issue is how do we collect, identify and collect relevant information that allows us to constantly adjust our perspective about cleared individuals and individuals interested positions and that is the challenge. I hate to keep blowing the same horn but continuous evaluation process not just collecting information but having staff available to evaluate the information and take action on that information, to me that is the real issue here. I appreciate it. Senator collins, senator heitkamp and i have one where there would be random checks that are important as well after you receive your security clearance, a pretty lanky period on which there is a review and unless theres a reason something is flat to. I wanted to ask also mr. Lewis, what steps have we taken, and will get this whole situation with what is happening, implementing, and to weaken legislate, understand what steps you are taking in positive action. The federal protective Service Looking closely with federal partner is to look at again processes and procedures for folks going into Federal Buildings but also looking at the Communications Process as well as to one of the challenges, the fact that so many of responding agencies, the level of communication and how youd do that, we are looking aggressively at how we do that, not just in the washington d. C. Area but across the United States because in a crisis situation communications become critical, and as such good timely communication is essential to a positive result. We are looking in a variety of areas and taking questions as they come about from the navy yard as to how to improve processes across the spectrum and the federal protective services. I also wanted to ask you, mr. Patterson. Is it accurate to say general patterson, that at p. S. Doesnt use Risk Assessment consistent with the Interagency Security Committee standards . Trying to understand where we are with this. I know there was also a report that the interim facility Assessment Tool wasnt consistent with this assessment standard, it excludes consequence from assessment and i want to understand if there is a difference, why is it there . Is it something we should be more uniformly putting in place or is there a reason for it . Theres a reason. We have just built what we call modified Infrastructure Survey tool and thad particular tool was developed within the department, who had developed a tool over a period of 6 or 7 years and we fought this was the full we could modify because it brought what we believe all the areas of the requirements to bear. What we look at with our full is specifically vulnerability. Look at the vulnerability of a facility. Separate from the vulnerability peace we all said to threat assessment. We connect with the joint Terrorism Task force, local Law Enforcement, any number of agencies out there to get blood we believe, very indepth comprehensive perspective on the threat we also provide our federal partner. The peace that is not part of the process is the consequence and we havent figured out how to do that in the federal facility. What does that mean . We are working to better define what is it when you are asking for consequent in the federal sector what is it you are looking for . We know that when we help a federal partner to begin to pull together and understand the emergency occupancy plans, we help them to understand and go to the consequence peace and when looking at establishing federal security level we are also looking at the consequence peace. We havent figured out how to incorporate that in an algorithm method that will allow us to provide reasonable and rational meeting to consequence a lead facility. We are fairly certain folks like irs and Social Security and others have stepped through the consequences of losing a facility and if there was the event something happens to the facility we havent figured out how to incorporate that into a full. We are working to figure that out. I appreciate your answer and i want to thank all of the. We look forward to working with you on this important issue. I am going to excuse this panel of witnesses. Thanks for being here. I would say for work from here, just keep in mind all those people, hundreds of families who lost loved ones in Oklahoma City keep in mind at fort hood, those who lost their loved ones, keep in mind if you will the families of the 12 men and women who died at the Washington Navy yard and think of them, celebrate christmas or some other way, the familys sitting around the christmas tree, dining room table, theres somebody missing. We need to do our best everyday to ensure those empty chairs, people that are not around because of a tragedy like the one i just mentioned, keep their families in mind, and Going Forward this is not just about process, complying with recommendations, it is about saving peoples lives and making sure they can share their life with their families. Take that with you, thank you. [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] the second and final panel, welcome. Glad you could join us. Very briefly introduce you and welcome your statements and ask some questions. First witness is mark goldstein, director of physical infrastructure for the United StatesGovernment Accountability office, and audit arm of the United States congress, we are grateful for the work you and your colleagues do, in the area of government property, Critical Infrastructure and telecommunications. At the request of this committee and other congressional committees g a. O conducted 12 reviews of federal facility securities and federal protective service became part of the department of Homeland Security in 2003, reporting oversight of contract cards, facility reassessment, cooperation with local Law Enforcement, planning and budgeting for security challenges tampering protection of federal agencies. Witnesses advocates emphasis on the first syllable, stephen amitay, director of the National Association of Security Companies. Mr. Amitay has worked with congress on federal agencies and Government Accountability focusing on legislation and other issues related to issues since 2006. Final witness, david wright, of bent National Program director union, the American Federation of Government Employees. He has served in his present capacity since 2006. He is a 27 year veteran of federal protective services and served as inspector, performed myriad responsibilities necessary to that decision from responding to crimes to overseeing contract cards to security assessments, mr. Wright brings a wealth of experience before this committee, to find solutions that face the federal protective services. We thank you for that and welcome you, your prepared statement for five minute and the entire statement will be made part of the record. Thank you for joining us. Let me ask a question. Were you here for the first panel . Good, that is great. Thanks for staying. You are recognized, mr. Goldstein. Thank you for the opportunity to testify. The federal protective service and protection of Federal Buildings. As part of the department of Homeland Security federal protective Service Responsible for protecting federal employees and visitors, 9,600 federal facilities under the control and custody of the General Services administration. The federal facilities demonstrate continued vulnerability to a tax or other acts of violence. Facility and security assessments, approximately 13,500 Contract Security guards deployed to federal facilities. My testimony discusses challenges interest in sharing contract guards who are deployed to federal facilities and properly trained and conducting Risk Assessments at federal facilities. It is based on g a os work from 20082013 on contractors assessments and programs and preliminary results of ongoing work to determine the extent to federal Agency FacilityRisk Assessment methodology is aligned with federal Risk Assessment standards. Our findings are as follows. Of ps faces a challenges, properly trained and certified, deployed to federal facilities around the country. In our september of 2013 report, providing active shooter response and screener training, and according to Guard Companies, they have not received training on how to respond during incidents involving an active shooter. Without insuring all guards receive training in federal facilities. And prepared for this threat. Similarly an official from a contract Guard Company stated 133, 38 of its 350 guards have never received screener training. As a result guards deployed to federal facilities may be using xray or magnetometer equipment but not qualified to use which raises questions about their ability to screen access and control their facilities. One of their primary responsibilities. Gee ao was unable to determine the extent to which the guards received active shooter response and screener training in part because of ps lacks a comprehensive and reliable system for guard oversight. F prius agreed with the a os recommendations that they take steps to identify god that require training and provided to them. And continues to lack of effective management control to ensure its gods met training and Certification Requirements for instance although it agreed with our 2012 recommendation of a comprehensive and reliable managing information on guard training and certification and qualifications it does not have such a system. Fps continues to face challenges assessing risks at federal facilities. Amitay reported fps in a manner consistent with federal standards. Gaos work and Risk Assessments and federal facilities indicated is unchallenged for fps and other federal facilities. Federal standards Like NationalInfrastructure Protection plan, riskmanagement framework, and provisions state Risk Assessments should include fred fulmer ability and consequence assessments. Recess until decisionsmakers identify and evaluate Security Risks and implement measures to mitigate that risk. Instead of conducting Risk Assessments, interim vulnerability Assessment Tool referred to as modified Infrastructure Survey tool to assess federal facilities that develop longerterm solution. But it does not assess the consequence, the level duration of nature potential loss resulting from an undesirable event. Reassessment efforts, a tool that does not make consequence does not allow an agency to fully assess its risks. Xp as has eliminated knowledge of risks at 9,600 federal facilities around the country and officials stated they did not include consequence information because it was not part of the design. Gao will issue a report on this issue early next year. In response to our recent report, they have agreed with recommendations in the 20122013 report on sp is contract guards and Risk Assessment processes. That concludes the Opening Statement and i will answer any questions you may have. My name is Steven Amitay from the National Security companies. This is the nations largest Security Trade Association whose Member Companies employ 300,000 Security Officers across the nation servicing commercial and governmental clients including numerous federal agencies. And works with legislators and officials at every level of government to put Higher Standards and requirements for Security Companies and private Security Officers. Of most relevance to todays hearing since 2007 kahan nasca has worked on legislation related to the federal protective Services Protective Security officer program, the contract Guard Program and also worked with the federal Interagency Security Committee on its 2013 best practices for armed Security Officers in federal facilities. Not including military services there are 35,000 contracts Security Officers across the federal government. And costefficient countermeasures reduce risk and mitigate threats to federal facilities. To further ensure security at federal facilities at p. S. And security contractors need to Work Together to address issues and challenges with the program gao has ide