maloney, deputy director of brookings foreign policy program and following the conversation they'll take questions from the audience. live coverage is here on c-span2. c-span2. >> good morning, everyone. thank you for braving the aftermath of cyclone bomb and polar vortex. i'm the director for middle east policy and welcome to everyone in the room and everyone joining us on the brookings webcast and via c-span at home. we have an extremely important topic this morning and an excellent panel to discuss it. we often have debates on middle east policy on interests and what the u.s. should do in terms of immediate policy and pursuing its interest and we often have debates what the u.s. should do in terms of its values promoting its vision of the good life, its vision of what the world should look like and once in a while an issue that very clearly encapsulates both and this is one of them. it pertains directly to some of the most important policy issues regarding the middle east in recent years and decades even, with the jcpoa in play, and the president about to make decisions about that. and we also have the issue of democracy in the islamic republic of iran and the people on the streets calling for a change. we have, as i said, a stellar panel with us so i'll mention one more logistical thing, which is you can follow also with a hash tag, iran protests and if you're tweeting about it, please use that hash tag. we're happy with us an iranian-canadian filmmaker and activist and reporter for news week for many years from 1998 to 2011. he was incarcerated by the iranian government from june 2009, a time that is reminiscent of this one to october 20, 2009 and he wrote most notably new york times west seller called "then they came for me", it was later a movie was made based on it by somebody you may have heard of jon stewart, it was called "rosewater". and founded the iran citizen journalism news site. and it's important for people following this and journalism is not a crime and we're extremely happy and honored he joined us. with him on the panel will be our very own suzanne maloney, she's the deputy director of our foreign policy program as well as my colleague at center for middle east policy. suzanne is our iran expert extraordinare and energy and gulf energy issues. among her many achievements i just want to note two books, in 2008 "iran's long reach" and an excellent book published in 2015 by cambridge university press called excuse me, "iran's political economy since the revolution". she was formerly on the state department's policy planning staff and now one of our leaders here at brookings and moderating one of the very best we could hope for here in washington. susan glaser, the chief columnist and host of news new weekly podcast, the global politico, and her list of accomplishments was long, a founding editor of politico, editor in chief of foreign policy reported from krohning, from tora bora, from afghanistan, from iraq, from the soviet union as co-bureau chief in moscow, and for a variety of different outlets and we're extremely happy that you've joined us, susan. so thank you all. please join me in welcoming our three panelists to the stage. [applaus [applause] >> well, thank you. thank you to all of you for braving the cold out here this morning. we're grateful and i can't think of a more timely event in 2018. i don't know about you guys, but i'm exhausted by 2018 already. and you know, certainly, it's a good reminder, the outbreak of these protests in iran and the question already of what to make of them. i can't think of a better panel to figure that out and, of course, we'll get to your questions as well, but i think a lot of us are starting out this morning with questions around, first of all, is this panel discussion, is it going to end up being an after action report essentially on a series of protests that are remarkable, but little understood and possibly fizzling out? or is this the beginning of a new movement that we will be talking about throughout 2018? so that's a question that i have beginning this conversation and, of course, the timing is remarkable because we are here in washington and once again, we see the convergence of one of our internal foreign policy debates, president trump as you know, faces a deadline next week to once again certify iranian compliance with the nuclear deal and called the fate of that nuclear deal into question with his decision last october, not to certify it, but at the same time not yet to withdraw or to proceed in any other radical way. how, at all, does the outbreak of these protests affect that decision and how do we understand the opaque trump administration policies to the middle east, but not exclusively so. what kind of information do we have about the protests? what does it tell us about the state or lack thereof it seemed to surprise just about everybody, not only here in the united states, but arguably even inside iran at this moment. so, what have we learned as a result of this? i can't think of anyone better to start out that conversation than who has deep experience inside iran and the iran wire project he helped to found, providing valuable insights from the country inside what's going on right now. let's jump into that. we can talk later about the washington piece of this story. it's been incredible to sort of watch not only every middle east hand in washington weigh in with takes and debates and how much we're self-absorbed. right, suzanne? and we spent half the time, as far as i can tell, reading the critiques, discussing and debating what we did in 2009 and whether or not that was the right thing, as much as discussing what we should be doing in 2018. but what is happening in 2018? is this the end or the beginning? >> well, thank you so much suzanne, to organize this and thank you so much for coming. before that, i just want to say that a lot of people in iran, especially from the government, say that this series of protests was organized-- were organized by foreigners. if it was so, it was a very bad, you know, decision because it was at the worst time. it was between christmas and new year, where most people were off and journalists were off. i mean, so i think that's-- it in itself can show it was not organized by-- what's going on in iran? from what we know, the 28th of december, last thursday, thursday before, the 28th of december there were some demonstrations and there are circumstantial evidence, we do not have concrete evidence yet, that there was a demonstration organized by the government itself, and by the hardliners in order to protest against rouhani's economic policies, against poverty and against unemployment. so, but between 2000, 3,000 people gathered in the city, iran square, which is marchers square, and i'd like to translate the names of the places in iran because they are very symbolic as well when you see the demonstrations on envelope avenue, and people say death to the dictator, and next to the monuments which means freedom monument. so, i think it's very interesting to understand what the names of the streets and monuments mean in iran as well. so, there were-- there was a small demonstration organized by the government in masha and then on friday, we saw demonstrations all over the country. and then, of course, it became more widespread and two nights ago, three nights ago, i was counting the cities and there were at least 54 cities involved in the demonstrations, some people have said that it's up to 70 cities. so, the demonstrations, we do not know exactly and i think anyone who tells you they know who exactly is demonstrating is lying. no one knows exactly who are the people in demonstrations, but it seems that most of the demonstrations are because of poverty, unemployment, and economic situations. most of the people who have been arrested during the protests are young. the average age, they say it's under the age of 25, either teenagers or in their early 20's, that means that the oldest of the people who have been arrested, they were 17 in 2009. so they didn't even have the right to vote at that time. and many of them did not take part in 2009 protests. so, the-- there were different kind of slogans chanted during the demonstrations and some chanted about the economy. some of them chanted against-- and the first time they brought out pictures of ayatollah, and commander of the force which is the extra territorial branch of the revolutionary guard, and different groups within iran and outside of iran had their followers in different cities taking part in the demonstration. so that's why you saw that in certain cities they were chanting for the monarchy, the father of the shah and also the crown prince who lives in this area. there were some chants in favor of a city, which is his birthplace. there were some chants just about the economy, and people were saying that we are not-- it is not-- political protests, this is only about the economy. so it's a very confusing picture that we see coming out of iran, but, it shows that there's a fertile ground for protest. there's a discontent, widespread discontent all across iran and even the government, when you go beyond what they're saying, you can see that they're admitting that there's a wide discontent in iran, that can be triggered by anyone, any group, into protest, as soon as there's a measure of the space for people to protest. so, in the last couple of case, we have seen organized demonstrations by the government itself, against the-- what they call this. and they have narrowed the bandwidth and shut down apps which has been the main way for people to communicate. so, we have seen less protests, maybe in the past couple of days, especially today, there were prayers around iran and demonstrations after the friday prayers organized by the government itself against the quote, unquote, sedition later on today. this is a brief-- no, i think you're right to highlight there are so many different slogans. there's also the question of is there any leadership this time. in 2009, of course, it was taking place in the context of elections, and the green movement had a very specific set of political leaders. it had an apartment apparent set of commands. i'd be curious what you make of the political context in which this is occurring. the reformants are in the government and they're part of the crackdown. they're not joining these protests. what do you make of that, suzanne? >> i think that's one of the key differences between what's happening today in iran and what happened in 2009 and there are a number of distinctions that are worth considering and exploring, but the lack of an obvious figurehead, the lack of an organization that is spearheading this, at least in so far as we actually know, that is quite distinct from both 2009 and prior periods of protests, the 1999 student demonstrations in tehran, for example. and it bears noting, of course, that iran has experienced routine demonstrations, labor strikes, periods even of significant unrest that are somewhat localized, over economic grievances, typically, over bureaucrat particular and administrative issues, you'll see they'll demand back paion a labor unions that are active. i think what's interesting about what's happening today is this contagion effect that appeared to happen so very quickly, within 24 hours of the very first protest, whatever sparked that first one, to whatever extent it may have been orchestrated as an attempt to undermine president trump rouhani and his economic reform agenda, whatever sparked it, it then morphed almost immediately into places around the country, 24 cities, i think, on day two, and then continued to mushroom and also quickly move from slogans that were focused on economic grievances to what, i think, can only be seen as radical and very deeply alienated slogans about the government. and then, we didn't-- that happened progressively over 2009, he was there and can speak to it from a firsthand perspective. it took some time and there was, in fact, quite a degree of disagreement among those who were organizing and leading the movement in 2009 about to what extent this should be about asking the government to respect its own rules, to adhere to the constitution or to what extent it was now time to articulate anti-systemic, anti-islamic republic messages. >> and that's quickly become a very anti-government, broad-based, kind of-- they have different critiques or citing different slogans, but it seems that most of the protesters, would you agree, are basically against the government in some broadway. they're not asking the government to reform? >> no, they're against the government as a whole. they're against the islamic republic of iran, they're against the corruption in the past four decades. they're against cronyism that's going on in the past four decades and they do not distinguish between the reform and conservatives, they look at them as part of the system. in 2009, the demonstrations that started with a clear objective, to recount the vote. >> the vote. >> that was it. people, millions of people in big cities were going through the streets, asking where is my vote. meaning, where are my rights as a citizen of this conduct. the protests were peaceful. the protests were silent, actually. the silence was deafening for the government. and there were clear leaders. there were basically three figure heads. we have the three figureheads for the-- not that much of a leader about you figureheads for the protests. if those protests-- for that movement, we can call it the green movement, these recent protests they do not have a clear objective yet, there are people around the country who say they're not happy with the system. they say death to khomeini, to the revolutionary guard and i've not heard a slogan what they want, what is the clear objective. that he is shoe the confusion to the iranian people as well. and when you talk to iranians, in middle classes they cannot identify with many of the protesters because they say we do not know what they want. and at the same time, because of the desperate situation of many people around the country, because of the sheer poverty, because there are so many people who have nothing to lose, there is some violence and there are some people outside of iran who are inciting violence, so there's-- for example, a person who lived in this country, he has a challenge for people to banks and he has some followers. he may not be a leader, he is a -- his name is mohammad asany. he's a former game show host in iran, a cross between drew carey and howard stern, you imagine, if you have a revolution led by drew carey and howard stern. so, he's that kind of a character and he's asking people to torch mosques and torch banks and they do it because they're desperate for change. and that has alienated many people in iran as well who do not want to be associated with this because they think that it can lead to iran becoming something similar to syria and the government has been very good in terms of taking advantage of people's fear for-- as you-- suzanne knows better than i do, that iranians have always fear of lack of security has always been the primary fear for iranians. in the early 20th century when there was chaos in the country and people could not travel between cities, the father of the shah took over the country, he established rule of -- certain rule of law and the people were happy with his rule for a long time. then during the 1953 there was chaos on the streets and seemed to be out of control and there was that coup, people do not come to the streets and support him. and at the moment, the government knows that people really fear insecurity in the country. and they're taking advantage of scenes of violence, torturing the mosques, torching the mosques, violence, slogans, in order to portray these demonstrators as the government calls them 40,000 hooligans who are being manipulated by outside forces. >> well, that's a very resonant one. let's talk about the causes and the people and who they are. how quickly it spread to the cities. one of the things that commentators remarked on it does not appear to be the traditional upper middle class, big city type protests. it's almost like the iranian version of trump country, those who perhaps supported former president ahmed dejad. >> what is happening, so many people who know iran didn't know anyone a part of these pro tests. it's worth noting, the numbers are different this time around from 2009, when the government talks about 40,000 hooligans that's their upper estimate of how many people have been participating in these protests, even if it's off by a factor of 10, it's still significantly smaller than what happened in 2009. but, i think it's that question of deep alienation among the people who were expected to be the base in terms of the legitimacy of the islamic republic which came to power and has consistently sought to enhance its legitimacy with its own people by talking about social justice, by talking about, you know, sort of the disenfranchised, the dispossessed. this was a major theme of the revolution. it's been a major aspect of economic policy throughout the post-revolutionary period and if they've lost that constituency, if that constituency feels not just angry at one leader or one faction or one policy, but if they've lost that constituency in a sense that those people are prepared to engage in violence and prepared to repudiate everything about the islamic republic, then it's got to be deeply unnerving, and as said, the question even if the protests die down and i still think we have some question as to whether that is in fact happening, what is going to be the next baspark. how can it be anticipated and how can the security forces and government try to forestall it. we've seen that round up student leaders who don't appear to be directly involved in what's happened the past week, but what i think they're trying to do is innoculate society as much as possible and prevent anything from sparking again. >> and that brings us back to this question of the crackdown and the playbook and you can speak to that both with your own personal experience from 2009 as well as what we're, you know, leading and observing from the reports out of iran today. tell us a little bit about your own experience in 2009 and, you know, i was struck in going back and looking at your remarkable memoir, which i recommend to everybody here, "then they came for me", there was almost a prepared quality to when they came to arrest you, it appears they had almost instantly from the beginning of the green movement protest worked to construct a narrative for how they would communicate about what these protests meant and that it was an outside agitator and that you had been, in fact, designated to play a role in the regime's explanation for what had occurred. >> yeah, so i think what happened in 2009 was directly related to what happened in 1997 when there was a pro reform candidate became president. that took conservatives by surprise, that when people saw any possibility of a peaceful change and a different candidate from the chosen candidate of the supreme leader, then they voted for him and they voted for him four years later and he became president. so, during the first four years of this and the second four years, the conservatives, they tried to gather information about the reformers. they tried to look alt the paradigms of part of iran, especially former soviet union, how the regimes in those countries crumbled and they wanted to prevent such a thing to happen again. that's why we saw the mass murder of-- mass killings of intellectuals because according to some people who were interrogated at that time, those intellectuals were the leaders of the movements of eastern europe and they want today get rid of the future. so, the revolutionary guard between 1997 and 2005, they prepared themselves for another wave of reformists movement. and at the same time, the reformists, they proved to be very ineffective to the point of irrelevance and people became disappointed in reform that's why many who voted for him in 1997 and wanted change voted for ahmadinejad. and then four years later we had the green movement and the revolutionary guard again had a scenario for the inevitable protests that would happen after rigging the vote. and as you said, their scenario at that time was that these protesters are led by certain people within the reform movement who are being directed by foreigners, so, when i was arrested, for example, maybe 90% of my interrogation was not about what i did, it was about what they wanted me to confess, that i had put so-and-so in touch with foreign embassies. they were asking me to give the details of how i put in with the british embassy, i'd never m met. and you know, they were saying that other people are confessing, why didn't you confess and you know, so, that's-- i didn't confess so i was saved because of that. but this time around, i think the revolutionary guards, the people who are in charge of iman khomeini foundation and supporting 10 million families around the country and many imams who pride themselves with being in touch with the poor. many conservative leaders religious leaders around the country were surprised by demonstrations. ... he didn't mention ahmadinejad by name. a high-ranking former official. his name is mahmoud. he could have said that. then the revolutionary guards who is an interrogator two nights ago on iranian television suggests that it was, american, saudi, israeli plans and they come up with this really strange ideas that each social media is playing role for the american intelligence. that twitter is supposed to be organizing. instagram is supposed to be a messaging service. so they don't really know as well. >> they're struggling for a narrative? >> they're struggling for a narrative. because they see all these disparate slogans as well. they're surprised some of these 40,000 holly begans, efforts in support of the shah. i have not had a chance to ask the revolutionary gadd, why do we have 40,000 hooligans in the country. who are these hooligans? accept there are 40,000 hooligans. how come we have not been able to rehabilitate 40,000 hooligans risking their lives to be killed? what are the economic background of these hooligans and who are these people coming to streets? we has journalists are struggling with questions, as you guys in washington are struggling with questions, i think the revolutionary guards themselves, the system itself is also struggling for answers as well. and the answer is not easy. and it is almost impossible for this regime to provide. because people are protesting against the economic conditions. that has been compiled for the past 40 years. people have different kinds of grievances. you see that there are some ethnic minorities like arabs. they are protesting in the city that is one of the poorest areas of iran i have ever been too. there are people in mashat who lost their investments in different banks and pyramid schemes and financial institutions. so there are multilayers of, there are different layers of grievances. >> it is not just you rigged election. >> many grievances have to do with the revolutionary guard involved in economics in iran. the revolutionary guard are also not a military force, they are the biggest industrialists in iran. they have some of the biggest industrial contracts in the country. they are somewhat, the biggest industries and some of the biggest companies in iran are run by the institutions that are under direct supervision of the supreme leader and they can not be fully audited. i recommend suzanne's book about the boneyards, the foundations, you see the depth of corruption. so for rouhani government who, he himself admitted that only 1/3 of the budgets is in my hand. the rest is basically controlled by the supreme leader. he can not do anything yeah. >> your point about rouhani is good one this question of rouhani perceived certainly here in washington, elsewhere outside of iran as you know, a moderate, at least in the iranian context. we perceived the nuclear deal as an example that would lead potentially to further reforms. one question i have, for both of you is, to what extent are we seeing rouhani and those around him come up to the limits of what incremental within the system reform is possible? you mentioned the soviet union and the regimes studying of the collapse of the soviet union as something to be avoided. i was thinking about a classic late poem, fatal half-measures, right? is that what we're looking the at with rouhani, that he basically himself unleashed this because he is not able to deliver fully for people? what do we think, what does it tell us about the future of reform inside of the system? will it simply be a pretext for more cracking down? >> i would say my theory is that that it is very similar to what you just suggested. that, you know, rouhani was the last, best, attempt to try to moderate the islamic republic. this has been sort of an on going effort really since the birth of the postrevolutionary state when, even baked into the construct of the states there were more moderate and representative institutions and more theological and authoritarian institutions. there has always been this tension and each go around were attempts to create a more moderate path and a more moderate outcome for the islamic republic has ended with the triumph and the further domination of the authoritarian forces. so the demise of the provisional government after the seizure of u.s. embassy in 1979. the attempts by president rafsanjani at the end of war with iraq, as much as rouhani has done to reform the economy and bring iran further back into the world, ended badly. the reformist movement, i think in many ways the most ambitious and most optimistic element of reforms of iran during the president of mohamed hatami sought to seek a dialogue with civilization. precepts in the iranian constitution do call for rule of law and representative government. at every point they found themselves outwit, outflanked by the capacity of hard-liners to control the coercion, coercive instruments of the state, to use any means necessary to sideline those who were seeking reform. and what we've seen is this sort of successive series of failures. i was, in 2013 optimistic about rouhani. i thought in fact this might be a path forward to focus once again on economic reform with at least some social liberalization. to engage in the world in a way to bring iran's rehabilitation at least partially. he succeeded in the sense he was able to bring about the nuclear deal. that was no small accomplishment of the iranian side. he has run up against what is the limits of the islamic republic because the economic reform package he has been trying to enact and is really necessary if iran is going to create jobs and address the inequality and poverty that has become such an obvious issue over the course of the past week, those are really politically difficult reforms. they're structural reforms. they're long-term changes that need to be made. at the same time, he has been limited in his ability to attract foreign investment at levels sufficient to overcome the problematic business environment simply because the nuclear deal was a transaction. it wasn't a transformation. it wasn't a wholesale change in iran's relationship with the world. it couldn't bring about an end to all the restrictions on the iranian economy. it was sold that way to iranians. one of the questions we will all be watching, and thinking about to what extent are sort of expectations raised around the nuclear deal part of the mix that has created this very radical element that is deeply alienated from the islamic system as a whole. my guess rouhani's problems, even if the security forces manage to get control rouhani's challenges are greater than ever. there will be greater political division making his economic reforms more difficult. the political risk factor and u.s. policy will loom large for interhavings investors in a way it might not even a month ago. >> right. you brought up the sort of washington part of this narrative. so first of all, how have we affected or not affected things so far? you mentioned that already the government has decided to creates a part of its narrative this is imposed by the west, imposed by the united states. another cia plot against the country. when in doubt that is usually a pretty good course for any threatened government in the region but president trump made a very decisive move on twitter to jump into the fray here and we've been having here in washington a debate about president obama's decision back in 2009 not to do that. you said in your own tradition, suzanne, you had vigorous debate inside of your own family whether it was right to intervene publicly in this or not. president trump just, did a very trumpian thing seems to me and jumped right in with his tweets. did that affect the situation do you think? did he handle it correctly? >> i think he handled it correctly. i know a lot of people don't like trump in this city and in this country but to the protesters in iran, to the protesters in iran in 2009, or in 2017 and 18 sexual harrassment, the russian investigation, the health care reform, none of those really matter. they want to hear from the president of the united states and it was really disappointing for people not to hear from president obama in 2009. for, i know that he had his reasons. he didn't want the, to taint the reputation of those leaders, such as -- demonstrators. i think that is wrong because whether obama is quiet or president of the united states is quiet or vocal, they will blame america for everything in iran. i mean that the easiest, most expedient thing to do for the government, but i think in this case trump was correct in tweeting and i like what roger klein of "the new york times" said, he retweeted trump's tweet for first time and he never thought that he would do that. i think that was a correct decision for president trump to do that, and i think by the end of the month when there is opportunity to renew some of the waivers or not to renew them, that would be another good opportunity for president trump to act as well. i tweeted this morning because i've been asked this question several times in the past few days that what should america do? i think there are three things that the united states government should do which can be quite effective. up with is to lift the travel ban for iranians. because that has created anger and disappointment in the american government by the majority of iranians. and it's really unnecessary and it's wrong to have that travel ban on iranians. the other thing is, to not to lift the sanctions, not to renew sane shuns on iran broadcasting corporation and iran ib has been under the direct control of the supreme leader. has been one of the main instruments of suppression in iran. they are, it is not broadcasting corporation. even, many iranians don't watch irb anymore i think it is very important to be able to impose sanctions on them. and also i think it is very important for the united states to condemn violence on both sides. it's wrong for the iranian government to suppress peaceful protesters who are just asking for food and for better economy and, even if they are chanting against the government, and they are peaceful, they should not be suppressed. they should be listened. at the same time it is wrong for anyone to incite violence. it is wrong for anyone to ask people to go out and torch banks and mosques and destroy buildings and i think the violence should be condemned and by the united states and international community. >> so, suzanne, first of all, what do you think will happen here in the washington part of this policy debate as president trump faces this next round of decision on the iran nuclear deal? they have already, this week, imposed a new set of sanctions that relate to companies and entities involved in the development of ballistic missiles, and so what do you think is going to happen here on that end? and tell us your perspective which is interesting on this rear view mirror fight we're having whether obama screwed up in 2009? >> i'll start with the last question because i have thought about it. i defended the obama administration at the time and continued to for a long time and i understand the calculations that went into that decision which everyone perhaps all the way up to the president himself has later regretted. secretary clinton has come out and described this is one of the greatest regrets of her time as secretary of state but i think it was a reasonable calculation at the time based on both the sense that an american emprays of what was at that moment the serious, legitimate, opposition uprising that ever really, we had ever encountered in iran since the earliest years of the revolution that anything that we did that could hurt it needed to be avoided and so the do no harm principle perhaps applied at that time. the obama administration also was clearly focused on the nuclear issue, which was a crisis. a bipartisan crisis here. it was not sort of a strange fixation and felt that weighing in was going to in some way complicate the prospects for finding a diplomatic resolution to that crisis and that in effect was a hire priority in the sense of serving the interests of the iranian people and the people of the region as well as u.s. interests. so i understand what motivated it. i think it made sense in the context. i don't think that, you know, it is defensible in retrospect because it didn't succeed. it didn't protect the protesters and leadership from taint and allegations that they were somehow in the americans pocket. it didn't really advance opportunities for protests because america was somehow on the sidelines and it didn't really facilitate any diplomatic progress. there were early talks in the weeks after the start of the green movement that initially appeared optimistic but you know, it took a number of additional years and a lot more sanctions pressure before we were able to get to the negotiations that could in fact produce the nuclear deal. so i think the lesson learned from that experience is we should never stay on the sidelines it is the obligation of the united states, quote, unquote, leader of the free world, to the extent we still aspire to that position, speak on behalf of those asking for a better life and condemn violence against them. i think, while i would prefer some more scripted, president trump's tweets that might be in a little bit more persuasive i think it is the right instincts to be out in public on this i would like to see more from european governments that have been a little bit more reticent. >> let me press you on the trump thing. your point is well-taken, maziar, the swamp here in washington broadly speaking is not a huge fan of president trump's tweets when it comes to foreign policy interventions. do you think it really accomplished anything constructive, suzanne? you made sort of an allusion to this but clearly the trump administration, but the president himself has de-emphasized and democracy and promotion of democracy around the world as well as human rights. it is not been a feature of this administration's foreign policy we've seen the president himself lavish praise on autocrats in the region. it seems he is very openly taken the side of saudi arabia around the regional enemy and adversaries. so you know, is this undermining the potentially american promotion of democracy by simply appearing to opportunistically use this kind of rhetoric only when it is involving one of your adversaries? >> we've always been opportunistic in the way we try to advance democracy in the middle east and so much as i would like that to change i won't pin that solely on the trump administration. i would prefer a policy that was more even-handed across the region that appreciated the risks of authoritarianism outside of iran but to the extent that we're focused on this moment in iran i think it is right for the american president to be speaking words of support to those who go out in the streets. they pay attention and listen. maziar can speak more on it than i am but i have been accosted by individuals where were you, where was your government in 2009 when we needed you? i don't think it would have made the difference in terms of the outcome then and i don't think it will make a difference in terms of the outcome now but sometimes we simply have to do what the right thing to do because it helps those actually taking the risks. >> you both mentioned the trump -- >> also, before that i have to emphasize that hypocrisy is not only the monopoly of the american government or others. >> we're good at it though. >> actually you're not very good at it. if there was olympics for hypocrisy, the iranian government would win the gold medal because they are shedding tears for protesters in ferguson for example while they are denying many people in their own country, many of their open citizens basic rights. they are talking about the zionist atrocities in palestine whale they have been silent, totally silent about what has happened in chechnya, and what is happening to the muslims in china. so when we are talking about hypocrisy, yes, of course we have different standards for the united states but we have to always remember that the other side is not that innocent as well. >> yeah. that is an excellent point. i'm glad you brought it up. we haven't talked about one thing. i want to open it to questions. we haven't talk about the role iran's policy in the own region, that hypocrisy you talked about, what role if any, that might have played in these protests. you immediately saw a lot of questions being raised about the millions or even billions of dollars spent by iran on the citing basically the civil war next door in syria. its involvement in yemen. its involvement in lebanon. the question whether this is a backlash to this, number one. number two, perhaps the reforms inside of saudi arabia, some people have suggested have caused iranians to look critically at their own country when it comes to how repressed women continue to be, for example. so i'm curious, what both of you think about the role that the iranian foreign policy is, adventurism abroad, played in the backlash at home. people spending all the money elsewhere in the middle east. it sort of made iran great again. >> one of the main slowing -- slogans in every city not gaza, lebanon, to i dedicate myself to die for iran. what we have to remember what iran is doing now is similar to the shah's policy before the revolution which was very similar to the israeli foreign policy which was promoted by ben-gurion, that you have to support and have good relations with other states in order to keep the enemy away from your borders and you have to take the, you have to have alliances with other states and why israel has good relations with ethiopia, iran, other countries, in order to contain their surrounding areas. so iran has been somehow following that idea. and also iran intervened in other countries affairs before the revolution as well, but, the problem is the fact that the way that they are doing that, the bragging about these interventions is very different from the shah's time. the fact that people are poor, people are unemployed, people do not have, one point, one out of seven iranians live under the poverty line. so when they see that iranians are helping the lebanese whose houses were destroyed by israel, it just creates a resentment, it just creates a resentment of course in their own government, but also in the, what is happening and also when they look at the more, i think, sophisticated arguments is in terms of what is happening in syria, and the way iranians are helping brutal assad regime to torture its own people, to gas its own people, to kill its own people, that creates resentment in their own government and also what it is doing in the region. >> suzanne, i want to get you, does it create fear, maziar, that they will do the same things at home as well if necessary to suppress any outbreak of civil war and revolution? is the message, you don't want what's happening in syria to happen here an we're willing to use all those tools here? >> i think this time what we have seen is that people who come to the streets by the government's count, there are 21 people have been killed in the past seven days. there might be more. usually there are more people and the government's statistics but i think this time we've seen people who have no fear, who have nothing to lose, who come to the streets. according to their government, to the government again, 40,000 hooligans came to the streets and hooligans, they have nothing to lose. these people are desperate. they are poor, and so, they don't care whether they are going to be killed or not because they don't have anything to lose. >> i want to get back to one of the questions you posed and i inadvertently ducked a little bit earlier u.s. policy response because of course iran's regional adventurism plays into the trump administration's rationale for the opposition to the nuclear deal and the president back in october you recall declined to certify iranian compliance with the deal largely because of this conviction everything else that iran is doing is somehow invalidating even whatever technical compliance there may be with the terms of that agreement and over the course of the next 10 days we will see the expiration of the waivers and suspensions of all of the u.s. sanctions that were required under the nuclear deal. the president will have much more meaningful opportunity next week, even as compared to what he did in october. he really will have an opportunity, either to to continue to abide bit nuclear deal, will have to take action extending the waivers and explicitly pull the united states out of the deal and decline continue the actions are in fact in compliance. it is all very technical but fundamentally what the president does next week will determine whether or not we have are in compliance with the nuclear deal and at this stage it is really difficult to predict how he will act. there is an effort you know way to craft bipartisan legislation on the hill that might create some sense that the president has in fact achieved his aims through decertification, and that might give him the excuse to continue the waivers, that was sort of the gameplan but they won't have the legislation ready and passed before next week. even if they did, is that sufficient? has trump seen in what is happening in iran a sort of confirmation of his own narrative that the regime is fundamentally one that should not be dealt with and look, iranians themselves are saying it as well. my guess he continues the waivers. my guess the nuclear deal continues for another three months but i think even that uncertainty is going to further erode business confidence in iran. it will further complicate iran's economic rehabilitation. with that, let me make one final point. there are a lot of people out there, including in this country, including in iran, that trump helped precipitate events in iran not abiding by the deal. that is not true. we've done everything we're supposed to do. we have kept to the letter of the law on the nuclear deal. we relieved all the sanctions, suspended all the relevant sanctions. what we haven't done is go out and try to croat new opportunities for iran and that is something that the obama administration was clearly torn about in its final months after the implementation of the deal but i think it is important to insure that this narrative that is being fostered, mostly by the iranian leadership that somehow you know this is all the united states' fault, that the united states has destroyed the iranian economy, that is fundamentally not true. >> all right. let's bring in you, with some questions. i would, we have some microphones here. the only thing i would say is, identify sure self and please do make it a question before so we get a benefit of their thoughts. all right, in the back here, ma'am. yeah. >> thank you. i have two pages of comments and information. as you said i probably couldn't use all of it. no just one question. >> there is always one. >> the question, truly is, whether or not it's a curse of geography for iranian people. as it comes to the question of soviet union, as it comes to the question of the his policy about the greenbelt for iran, and how do you differentiate between the 2009 green movement demonstration as opposed to what it is now? green movement was basically after getting another mullah, another religious cleric into power. and mr. musabi, who used to be prime minister of iran during worst time of suppression and persecution of the opposition. during this time people are not asking for anymore mullahs. they are hungry. they want food on the table. they want freedom. they want security. how do you differentiate, actually talking about doing away with the islamic system. why your position doesn't see that, i'm really baffled? >> i think we spoke to this a little bit, but if you want to elaborate whether the key difference from 2009? >> i think we had talked about it. >> okay. more questions. please make it a question. you. >> is it on? okay. so there is so much information -- >> can you identify yourself? >> i'm sorry. gavin hawkins. there is so much information through the media around the middle east in the last decade or so that i have been conscious of politics but it seems there is so much information that people form an opinion before they form any like real historical understanding or context around an issue, average individuals that is. so if you were to explain the middle east and iran to like a child or someone who didn't really have an opinion on the subject, how would you give the most basic understanding to someone who really didn't understand any of the topics at all? >> how would you describe brain surgery to a four-year-old, five-year-old. it is very difficult. it is a complicated question actually, i'm joking but i think it's a complicated question and four-year-old children and people who think as simple as children should not be in charge of making policy for the middle east. we need more sophistication and understanding of the complicated history and complication of different people involved and people, different interests. the curse of geography, that lady said, all that has to be understood by someone in order to make the right decision. unfurther natalie in the -- unfortunately in the past few days we see people who have very simple answers maybe a child can understand but those answers are usually wrong because they're simple and i think simplicity and, simplifying things really here is not the answer. >> you wanted to ask a question? >> you mentioned earlier the soviet union. many cases of democratization, including soviet union had frustrater that precipitated the fall. talk about the frustrater. khomeni is not young. is there difference between the reform plank and moderate call flank? what is the chance these demonstrations would lead to the true fur of iranian, islamic republic? >> that is really interesting question although here the analogy might diverge in a little bit, one of the defining characteristics of the political establishment of postrevolutionary iran is that it is fractured. schisms can really happen. we saw this in 2009, a really important schism for a time appeared to be putting into question the legitimacy an continuing functionality of the iranian government. they managed to come back together after 2009. there was even i think to some extent something of a coalition around president rouhani. he was elected not just because he was a good campaigner, not just because he managed to as a long-time relative conservative co-op reformists slogans and appeal to people who had been disaffected in twine but he also benefited from kind of elite maneuvering in which mohamed khatami almost that point persona non grata in 2009, leader, figurehead for the reform movement came together with a number of more centrist conservatives to kind of manage the machinations around the election in a way that would benefit rouhani. it was actually some consolidation within the establishment that led to the rouhani victory and that came only for years after the most serious uprising and the most serious splintering that we have seen in many years so, you know, there is a, i think these developments call into question how the elite relate to one another. as maziar said, the fact that you have reformists who are, if anything, as alienated and as dumfounded by what is happening on the streets as the hard-liners. they're not rushing to the barricades. they're not endorsing what is happening. in part because some of the slogans are explicitly targeting them, saying we don't want any of you. throw all the bums out as another scholar said in an interview this week. we'll have impact. i'm not sure fracturing of the elite will be the fatal flaw for the islamic republic because it has been part of the context ever since the beginning. >> i think in terms of comparing iran and the soviet union, one of the clearest similarities that i see is allocation of the state's resources to security and military. and that is what led to the demise of the soviet union because every resource in the country was allocated to security, to intelligence, and after this, a series of protests, i think that will happen in iran as well. that there will be more intelligence officers trained. there will be more presence of the police and the guards and the in the different cities, especially cities we saw the protests. already we see more security forces in cities like kevansa and smaller cities around the country and also at the same time we'll, we'll see more protests by citizens as soon as there is a measure of space available to them and that can be demonstration after football match. as you know, iran is going to play in the world cup this summer and at least they're going to play three matches, portugal, spain, morocco. if they beat spain, just imagine iran beats spain or draw with spain, there will be demonstrations. part of that demonstration will lead into protests against the government. there might be a funeral. as we saw a couple of years ago there was a funeral of a a, not a very popular singer in a earnings a very bad singer. imagine if michael bolton dies, god forbid and there will be a demonstration after his funeral, that happened in iran two years ago. who one knew who he was. he was not a very good singer but his death led to funerals an protests. that has happened. that is actually how iranian revolution started. iranian revolution started in 1978, february 1978 or january 1978 when there was a critical article about khomeni in a newspaper. some people came to the streets in january 1978, demonstrated. some were killed. there were funerals for those people. every 40 days there were demonstrations. that led to 1979 revolution. i'm not saying that this will lead to a revolution but i'm saying there are similarities between what happened then and now. so. >> hi, my name is adam. i would ask the panelists to speculate about if and how and to what degree the conservative elements of the iranian power structure are capable of, and inclined to reform, just for their own survival? in other words, so, rouhani has tried it. khatami has tried it. rafsanjani tried it. these are the elements that blocked them. is there a possibility that you know, in this sort of moment of self-reflection and analysis they say, look, we've got to loosen up or we've got to take some measures to prevent this from happening again. rather than with an iron first, they find some other conciliatory or evolutionary way to do it in terms of changing the economy and changing the security structure? i know it's a long shot but do you think it's possible? >> great question. >> i was talking to an analyst a few months ago, according to him who is very close to the reform camp, according to him best thing for iran as you suggest, a group of revolutionary guards and a group of reformists come together, in order for them to survive, in order for the regime to survive to a certain extent they have to understand making money is better than to make war and chaos. and then they have to do something against their radical elements within the revolutionary guards, against some the more idealogical cohorts of ayatollah khamenei. that will require certain action as an on searcher he is someone in iran with good knowledge of what is going on, he would not see someone like that in existence at the moment. that can happen, some difficult group of officers or they see the situation is not tenable. they have to do something radical and they do it. at the moment i don't think people will be happy with reforms at the moment. i think row happey any is capable of creating any reforms. going back to history, rouhani was the first person who called khomeni aman khomeni in september 1978. and you know, so he has been participate of the system since then, and even before that it was a revolution. it is very difficult to expect him to become all of sudden the nelson mandela of iran and it is not going to happen. but i think if there is some logic within some groups within the system, they have to understand that the situation is not tenable with can mauney in charge. that may happen africa -- after his death. >> that would require transformation in terms of ideology and in terms processes of government and the way, manner in which the islamic republic conducts itself at home and within the region. i don't think iran needs revolutionary change but evolutionary change isn't going to be enough because as we see people are fed up. and it may only be 40,000 this week but 40,000 over time, particularly with other precipitants can turn into 400,000 and four million very, very quickly. so my sense is, that we have had at least 25-year experiment with trying to reformer ran through economic, through political and social efforts, and it always has proven insufficient and each time there have been conservatives who peeled off, at least some extent supportive of some aspects of reform but fundamentally there is an unwillingness at the core of the regime to reconsider position of the absolute authority of the supreme leader over vast swaths of the state and the security forces and the judiciary, and there is, you know, other elements of the ideology are just fundamentally fixed at this point. so unless there is willingness on part of a conservative frond to rethink those core elements of the ideology, i think reforms will continue to prove insufficient. the frustration is going to build up, and the question is going to be, you know, can the islamic republic survive? >> it also goes back to my recommendation of condemning violence because i think in order to persuade different regime members to jump ship and to reform themselves they have to have some assurance of no retaliation and no violence in the future. so i think, it is only through peaceful, non-violence that we can, resistance that we can see some better fought ture for iran. and for that to happen we need some people within the regime to jump ship and change their positions. with violence, when people call for the execution of the revolutionary guards, or clerics, that can not happen. that can be counterproductive. >> suzanne, there was a piece we ran in "politico" magazine this week that said that the islamic republic is doomed. it was written by your husband. he made the point that the crackdown is inevitable more or less. and these cycles that we've seen of reform followed by reactions mean that the regime is incapable fundamentally of reforming itself. that seems to be, you know, sort of the question challenging that premise. where do you come down on that? >> i've been in a different place than my husband, including right at this moment where he is speaking across town and you know, i think that, i would say this. that at a time where many people in town were, in this town were comfortable with the conventional wisdom there is the, the regime is stable, the country is consolidated, there isn't a real possibility of anything revolutionary taking place, there were people in this town who were in fact saying the opposite and were often condemned as people that knew nothing about iran despite the fact that they have greater capabilities in that regard than they're often credited with. where i come down is fundamentally this i think we're seeing the end of a certain episode, the latest reform episode. i don't see how there is a different strategy of, kind of evolutionary change that satisfies iranians at this time. i think it has to be some kind of a transformation. ideally, if we understand what iranians as a whole broadly would prefer, it would be, to some extent gradualists but it has to be transformational. it can't be sort of biting around the edges. and fundamentally i don't think that is consistent with the islamic republic as we know it today. and so you know, you think about iran. iran has this incredible young population but, phenomenal resources, people who are well-educated, literate, engaged with the world. this is a powerhouse country in every respect except for the fact that it's led by a really problematic government. it has had these fundamental debates over the course now of two decades about the nature of power and about representative government. there is 100 year history for a push for accountable government. so there is a huge amount to be optimistic about with respect to iran but it's, it hasn't come to bear, it hasn't borne fruit under the islamic republic. the islamic republic in many ways i think sacrificed so much of what could make iran great again. and so you know, i don't know that iran will ever find a nelson mandela but it needs a political leadership that can help lead the country to a better future. >> all right. i think we have time for one or two more questions. >> hi. elise alexander with the u.s. commission on international religious freedom. maziar, you had brought up earlier some of the different layers that have fed into these protests including some of the ethnic groups and border provinces, some of the kurdish groups have weighed in as well but we haven't seen as much going on in istanbul and ba judge stan. can you -- balujistan, why that has not played in and not taken off more? >> tell you the truth i do not know why the demonstrations happened where they happened. i don't think that anyone has provided the answers because then we look at the map of demonstrations, we don't see that many similarities between different groups. and yes, according to if, according to some people the demonstrators are poor and are the owes -- oppressed people. there are no more or oppressed people in is stan and balujistan. we've seen violence by people in sistan but my guess is the because of of ayatollah can mauney and leader of the and many respect hamid and hamid is under a lot of pressure by the government and different intelligence apparatus in iran maybe that is a played a role. maybe hamid asked them not to come out and protest. that is the only reason i can provide. but it's a puzzling matter. when you look at it, people talk about unemployment, yes, there is a high rate of unemployment in all the cities where demonstrations have happened but there are certain cities in iran with higher rates of unemployment and we have not seen demonstrations in those cities. >> okay. in the very back. >> thank you, my name is tom, i'm a graduate student at georgetown university. earlier we talked about the protests single the out iranian support for what is happening in syria, yemen and iraq. what do you think these current protests might actually cause the regime scale back their support and what might implications be for the rivalry with saudi arabia? >> good question. >> i think iranian government most probably will stop bragging about its victories in syria, yemen and iraq. and that is really, this bragging about their foreign involvement is a new, relatively new phenomenon. up to 10 years ago we did not hear much about the quds force. we did not know who the commander of the quds force. commander of the quds force. it was only after their victories in iraq and alliances in iraq that the iranians started to talk about the extraterritorial involvement and especially, in the past go years with the, again quote-unquote victories they have had in syria and sending troops, not only iranian, but also afghan and pakistani, shias to syria, to help the assad regime, that they have started to brag about this involvement. i think they will scale back their publicity about that, but, i don't think that they're going to scale back their real involvement in those countries. so i think we'll see less of nasrallah and hezbollah and the shrine defenders as they call the people who are in syria but i don't think that they're going to scale back their real support. >> i have the same speculation, which is that, fundamentally this is, iran's regional activities have survived even at times of significant economic pressure. you didn't see iran retrench from the region at the worst period of multilateral sanctions on iran. it isn't an expense that the state can't bear. they won't need to, in any way shift their posture as a result of a need to move money and devote more resources to domestic priorities in the aftermath of those processes. i do think that the optics may change, and there is, there are some studies, ashan has done a wonderful book on the revolutionary guard. has suggested there was a deliberate attempt to sort of publicize the victories over isis, precisely because iran like much of the rest of the world including the united states, was slow to pick up on what was happening with the development of this group and soleimani and the guard needed to re-establish their own bonifides at home. you know, the point is, this is done on the cheap, not just financially but also in terms of iranian boots on the ground. there are a few hundred iranians, at least by most estimates on the ground in syria, but commanding much larger forces that are drawn from hezbollah, from iraqi militias and most interestingly these shrine defenders, the brigades of afghan and pakistani shia who have been mobilized and that has insulated the iranian population to a greater extent from at least the casualties of war but what's been happening recently there has been more publicity around and support for those non-iranians who are fighting these battles. so there have been public funerals for afghans who have been killed in syria. khomeni embraced the families publicly. there is more direct discussion about the support for those survivors of those killed in those actions. i suspect what is happen as maziar said will cause some kind of a shift in the way that the leadership talks about these engagements. all right. i think we have time for one more question so, last question here. right here in the front. >> hi. i'm marine fasal, afghan-american journalist, freelance. my question about the royal family of iran. i heard you several times mention that the current protesters, although we can't precisely narrow down exactly what their motive might be, that they, we can say that they are poor, and they have nothing left to lose. yet i heard you say that there is an appeal now for, that some of the slogans we're calling for members of the royal family. if that were to actually evolve further, can you tell us whether you think that all of iranians society would actually have an appetite for a return for a modern monarch? >> i can easily say that all of iranian society does not have a appetite for the royal monarchy's return but there are some people nostalgic about the era. there are people who are no, sir that gibbing about the image that they have of the shah's time and the fact that iranians were respected around the country and many iranians were well off but of course, that image is not accurate because there were many people who were not well off and there was a lot of oppression going on, otherwise you would not have a revolution in 1979. so i there is a a part or whoever is a part of the dynasty who is around has a role in the future of iran, like many other countries we see monarchs going back but i don't think the majority of iranians want to return to pre-1979 revolution time to have a monarchy. at least that is not in the cards now. >> suzanne, have you been surprised by this as an element of the slogans in this round? >> i think it came as a surprise surely to me. and that being said, you know you could always find reservoirs of nostalgia as maziar said, inparticularly the founder of the dynasty command ad great deal of interest and respect among ordinary iranians, in the sense he was someone who was seen as kind of the father of the nation and also someone who managed to assert control at a time of chaos and threat and, to some iranians the prospect of a kind of a great man who could do the same at a similarly insecure time is appealing. i don't think that translates to any real prospects of any kind of a monarchy but i think it underscores the slogans. the fact that you her people chanting monarchist slogans underscores the sense that there is at least among these current protests some agreement about what they don't like but very little positive agenda forward agenda that they are aligned around. and that in many ways is parallel to what happened in the mobilization that led up to the 1979 revolution. there was a clear sense of what, of agreement among the revolutionaries about removing the shah. there was no clear agreement about what would come next. so if we ever get to a revolutionary period in iran we're certainly not there yet, i think building that positive agenda will be a crucial factor to insuring there is any kind of a better future. >> i think there is a sentiment among many iranians to reject everything that this government stands for, that includes the islamic republic. so they want to return to the palace era. they reject islam itself, many people. there is a big movement toward a pre-islamic religion in iran. many iranians becoming or they are not religious anymore. and also i think there is a, this image but also i think another group that's involved in these protests is the mek, the mujahideen, that although i think it is a cult and i don't think that they are capable of running anything, including a country, there are some support for them. and that is mainly the responsibility of the iranian government because they killed some of their members in the beginning of the revolution, maybe iran 10,000 mek members were killed. imagine 10,000 families who have lost someone. in many cases they were tortured to death. in many cases there were no court hearing for these people. that has created resentment among many iranians who have lost mek member among their family. . . and see what the your brings for us, but i want to thank both of you for starting us off in 2010 with uniquely well-timed conversation around some significant events that are happening inside iran today. and so thank you to all of you. >> thank you. [applause] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] [inaudible conversations] >> u.s. employers added 148,000 jobs last month. it's a modest gain but the labor department says the unemployment rate remained at 4.1% for third straight month. this time last year the jobless rate was 4.7%, making today's rate the lowest since the year 2000. >> history professors and authors participate in the annual meeting of the american historical association. live coverage at 1:30 and 3:30 3:30 p.m. eastern karen c-span2, online c-span.org, and on the free c-span radio app. tonight on a special presentation of booktv and prime time on c-span2, books from 2017 the focus on the u.s. military. >> booktv in prime time starting tonight 8 p.m. eastern. >> sunday night on "after words" federal appellate judge john newman looks back at his 38 your judicial career and this book "benched." >> as a judge of 45 years having gone from the active life of making decisions and going to court and advocating a case to judging, was that a difficult transition for you, and did you ever miss the life of adversity so to speak? >> it wasn't difficult. it has been for some, i've known people who became judges and so disliked the decision-making process that they left the bench. i was an advocate. i was glad to be an advocate. i found the decision-making process while it was different enormously challenging, enormously satisfying. while i like being to his attorney i had to say i love being a judge. because the opportunity to resolve disputes, large and small, they all mattered to somebody, but some of them have large public significance, and that's a very satisfying role. watch "after words" sunday night on booktv on c-span2. >> marine corps commandant general robert neller joined locking martin ceo marillyn hewson, sir jeanne shaheen a former defense officials to talk about military readiness. fox news national security correspondent jennifer griffin moderated the panel. this hour and 15 15 minute discussion with part of the reagan national defense forum at