Speaking at Westminster College in his speeches one hour. As the proud army guy is gratitude introduce our general perkins. And to be irresponsible every u. S. Are me soldier and as a graduate of the u. S. Military academy of west point general perkins has sold numerous leadership positions. Special assistant to speaker of the house, Battalion Commander leading over 1,000 personnel in macedonia, Brigade Commander leading over 3,000 over the invasion of iraq 2003, executive assistant to the vicechairman of the joint chief of staff meeting over 10,000 personnel with the transition of forces in 2010 from iraq. From 11 through 2014 general perkins commanded u. S. Army education at fort leavenworth. Trade development and support developing u. S. Army doctrine all of which that provides those elements to the u. S. Army and to hold a masters degree in with the strategic studies and the Naval War College please join me to give a round of applause and a warm welcome to general perkins. [applause] and mr. Ambassador things for being a big supporter it is a great chance for me to get out. And given the United States army medic is always great and if we need to change direction down hesitate to tell men looking for to that as much as anything else. To be a proactive citizen in our democracy as i traveled around the world and using that term democracy that responsibility is put on the shoulder of a person. And in this complex world. So with the title of the lecture understanding that we dont make policy we executed. So it is our job to understand so as you can see here with the Army Doctrine command. Because the army loves decorative as we refer to it as tradoc. Maybe you can give division to free of some questions those that i am talking about. Is headed is the tip of the iceberg. That means for the gender in this challenging world so one of the things we do for the army were looking now to the year 2025m building an army that is not too far around the corner. And we love those geopolitical situations and the challenges we will face and what are the things of that once we have all that to decide the army so to lay out that concept and then write the requirements and then basically put together a blueprint this is what we wanted to look like. That is a responsibility. Suspending the day at the recruiting station and you look at the strip mall and we recruit and i think we have some recruiters out there. And with those kids from the audience. And also be run basic training. And with advanced individual training. Between helicopter pilots and to that is a Broad Spectrum and that makes sense to say this is the person and then to recruit those soldiers and officers and i want you to build the army and to constantly improve the army with Lessons Learned to design the army and then we constantly improve the army we have built. Training doctrine command is very large at 16,304 locations around the world we dont hit everyone every year but were doing a number of things with that the new to report back to the board of directors and what i want to focus on is the future and what we are doing about it. Please put up the first slide. When i well as growing up in the army it was the height of the cold war and to be at the height of the cold war and as those for mercer dismembers and though whole army soldier that soviet union and with that great introduction in the early 80s. So we focused our army to defer or defeat the soviet union and the Central Plains of europe. And redesign the army that way and to beat embattled was our doctrine and i am in charge of writing of the followup manual for that and we have a Gold Standard so i refer back to that. And then it would look eerily similar to this. And to describe that environment were operating in so we have a known enemy enemy, we know a lot about it then sent they knew exactly how we would fight the soviet union and we knew what coalition we would fight. That was nato and in that Coalition Tuesday and would be a nato on monday we went for decades ago got in or out of nato. So what we had was a challenge focused on a well known enemy. And we were part of nato. And then to build an army and that with the known problem you by certain kinds of a but it and d train people a certain way. So we did have a known problem so what you will do is take your tank this is your location and then the soviets will come over in the way we will trade you is every 90 days to go up to the scene to the same location and do it again and again and again. And rehearse that over and over. But if that goes up then you just execute. Then did he go a certain time the u. S. Then rehearsing every 90 days. And to rehearse the script from when i came in the army. To save the world is changing. And to describe that environment. And as i come to understand is to predict the future we have the perfect track record to be wrong so lot of people took that into account so well and they say give me a prediction. So what will we do in the peninsula . Than to say i dont know. So that is it . If you will not do anything more about it . But the issue is that is all i need to know. I dont need to predict the future that describe it in predicting it is a level of specificity and it is so specific if you dont of a dozen have been you optimize the army but we are describing the future in a way to provide enough clarity how you start putting those peace is in place so i said that is what were going to do. So when we published last october and it does exactly the same thing. And come up with the exact same product. Only that was completely different and im sure you know, that. Is the Army Operating concept to say it is completely the same the only completely different. So with those Naval Academy graduates so i describe this one has an operating concepts to describe that environment. But is the unknown and unknowable and constantly changing. That is like the heisenberg principle. If he knows something about it and you know, what will happen then it will not have been. Because we did a lot to prepare for it. But it never happened. So this describes the future and so does this. The Central Plains of europe began to nato . So both of these describes the future in general terms in describing an unknown problem family have to know one thing about the future. That is all i need to know. Were not predicting net or what is happening in the middle east known or unknown because then you know, the type of army if you decide the future is of unknown in you come up with a Different Army and capabilities. Septuplet in perspective i was the army general i want to be in the country that has that air force. Very good and well thought out maybe two stealth these kind of things to be very specific. That is good because i want that kind of needy. As a future guy ford the army and what they really wanted me to do. Sometimes you army guys are shortsighted. Seven basically predicting the future of what would happen in. And they have done some stuff. And then it would respond with the negative question. So i want you to predict the future is that the question to be asked . To buy me some time . I dont think that is possible. Lets assume i was here 50 years ago. Without lovell of specificity so lets assume it was 50 years ago and youre asking me this question. Fifty years ago the World Trade Center was not even built. So what will happen . I dont know so then we will build to the tip of manhattan and then why is he talking about these buildings . Let him go. So as i predict they dont exist now but we will build them. Then what happens with a very large attack . And the result is that it causes more depth than pearl harbor for girl m1 of the and the results is too Tall Buildings that dont exist. And then they will come crumbling down. We dont have any building shut United States will undergo attack and then these two little buildings adjoining this will come crumbling down. So as to say it will undergo an attack worse than pearl harbor. What will the enemy be armed with . What about the debt to raise or neutron bombs . Then what about pearl harbor what is the difference . A box cutter. So they would cause more deaths and pearl harbor . Yes. By now i am thinking this guy is in left field. I am sure therell be a worldwide control mechanism there must me hundreds of thousands somehow they will descend upon new york. What is the commandandcontrol lot apparatus to synchronize these un known box cutters . It will be radicalized die from afghanistan so you are telling me some guy in a cave in afghanistan will coordinate people with box cutters to create more casualties than pearl harbor . What is the United States . And then have more death m. Pearl harbor . End then to say he has been a happy hour but i would be pretty close. Who would believe me 50 years ago . That is the problem when you try to predict the future you cannot get a right. There are so many nuances or twisted is impossible to do so that is a prediction if you know, what is going to go one that is why we said we will not go down that road. Because and i am betting 50 years from now we could not understand i am convinced we wrote down what we think that will happen but once you come to that conclusion then you go down a different path because if you think you know, the future if you think he will not been you expand those options available to keep as many options opened to withstand uts test of time. Generally that is not a material solution. That is the road that we went down this is a very linear approach. With a very specific path with a very specific enemy. The with the cyberand the air and the land it with those special Operations Forces and then to pull this together in a way to do that more than anybody else. To be innovative and adaptive. And then to renovate a the quickest in to buy equipment and then to develop leaders that can think. In with that leadership for the future. And before you know, what kind of leaders to make any will develop a different kind of leader. So this is the of Mission Command philosophy that gets to be the type of leader we want to develop based on the description of the future. For what we thought we knew was the problem in the Central Plains of europe and the reverse that scenario and so in the future we cannot do that with the tenant perkins of the day. So will he go to the balkans or the baltics . We have no idea who the enemy is. We have no idea of the caveat is. The coalition was nato. That was it. So we dont know any of those things. He will not recur on every 90 days. So high d develop that . And with a different philosophy. And then to change the philosophy of leadership. And with command and control and to ensure compliance with the command. And then with Mission Command in a row we want to see happen to and then to explain that initiative. In then where to begin in any given point that might be the position of a vintage with the taliban or Hurricane Sandy bird dealing with those locations or whatever your mission it is a special place and a geographical place with a Coalition Building but that is a relative advantage because the future is unknown and constantly changing. That is why you dont always see that initiative but you exploit that. You cannot be content thinking what would happen. Below is position yourself to be in the right place for what could happen down the road when i was growing up it was commandandcontrol. And that assumes you knew what to command somebody to do. And then you dont control that initiative. End to understand the problem and then talking about those two ruth under state and that all the soldiers need to understand the world therein understand the caveat is and the culture and all the relationships. Indeed to visualize how you take those resources to have available based on your understanding of the of problem with a position of the vantage than once you visualize in those members of the coalition and then with that, and understanding of the problem. So do you to describe that visualization use still give direction but generally this is the most difficult part. So what we have to do today is trained them to a understand just to comply with the act of control is not adequate they pretty much wanted me to comply and succumb to them that the death control but now that is no longer possible because you dont have any level of specificity but we describe the visualization and empower them to exploit the initiative. That is the difficult way to run an army because it requires a Huge Investment and spend a lot of time with people so first of all, the even know how to understand those complexities so within your organization which and you may know well to influence people theyre not even in your organization. Seven if you are the 101st airborne and to deal with the ebola. And then describe what you are doing to them. And also with the second squad. Youre going to have to build teams within organizations and outside and get to figure out how you inform them as to what youre doing and how youre going to influence people. So this is a very tough way to run an organization especially United States army, 1. 2 billion people in over 160 countries over the world. You can only attempt this if you have a very well trained well disciplined and well led organization. Because if you dont have a welltrained, well that and well disciplined organization, you dont empower that. What do you do with an ill trained, porter led to, ill disciplined organization . You control it. I spent a lot of time traveling around the world. What you find is the less professional the army, the more they focus on control. The more professional the organization the more they focus on empowerment. I could even tell within the United States army a as a go frm unit to unit to unit, units whose primary method of getting something done is extreme amount of control is generally a less well led unit. Units that are very much about empowering subordinates generally is better trained, better disciplined and better lead. So i grade leader thought of how much control they have but how much they empower people. I can figure that out in about five minutes. Just talking to them seeing how they interact with people. Because you cant fake it. You cant think that because it takes a huge amount of effort, time and investment to make that happen. Dont want to be rude but i want to work her, so what do we have . Where good . What id like to do so i could kind of finish up with one think him if i go to questions us have a bit of time of time to wrap up with one thing . Are we kind of set up to do that before i go to the last slide . Okay. While resetting up for questions so i dont run over but i do want to sequence that, so again recapping this, talk about the leadership aspect, this is been a deliberate process the army has gone through. Its pretty revolutionary for the army even those in the army dont realize it. One of the recent is our first field manual, our first doctrinal manual was written in 1904. From 1904 until last october, just about every piece of Army Doctrine was written to do with known problems. This manual was specifically written to deal with an unknown world. That sort of a gamble we are making. Were putting all our bets on the fact the work is unknown and will constantly change. If, in fact, the world 20 so does exactly as any of you predicted today, doesnt change, this is the wrong book. This does not optimize an army to deal with no problems. We are banking on that the world will become more unknown and change more quickly. As i go around to organizations and do a lot of Leader Development stuff in the army, try to get ideas, a lot of people in organizations have never come to the conclusion it. They are developing their leaders but they dont know what for. They are taking the latest book, and so theres some organizations where you may develop your leaders are different than others because it depends on what the organization before. People never forget what they are for. They take the latest leadership book and think its one size fits all. I would argue its not. Are we ready for official questions . Now we can start asking questions. I will save a little time at the end to wrap up a couple of things. Right here. [inaudible] so this command unit that you are in charge of, didnt exist before the second invasion of iraq . And if so, did it have influence . And then, what was that input . You probably were not there then but maybe i was Brigade Commander during the invasion. Youre talking about what we call yeah, so tradoc existed and it was formed in 1973. Interesting story about tradoc came to be. So it was pulled together, it was up in 1973. So where was the army in 1973 . Coming out of vietnam, right . And so the army as whos coming out of vietnam at that point was sort of pivoting back to central europe. The army leaders took a look at the army and they go you know what, the army we have is probably not the army we want to deal with the soviet union to guess as were coming out of vietnam, although we had unbelievable heroic activity and great courage on the battlefield, we had a consumed our noncommissioned officer corps, consumed them and did not pick we did not have a culture of training. We did not have a modernization program. We had drug problems, race problems. Our leadership said i need to change the army. We need to change it from what we had in vietnam to something to do with the soviet union. They formed training and doctrine command to drive change. So as we went back into iraq in 2003, that time youre talking about . I was a Brigade Commander at the time. I tend to reserve all criticism for myself and or the organization i am associated with. I was then armored brigade command at the time and, with the lead force that invaded it. I would tell you probably one of the problems we had as a look back on it now is, is we thought we knew what we were dealing with. I was pretty sure i had good intelligence. I had sa