Property. And it went to court and went to lord mansfield, famous jurist, who ruled that slavery so odious, that was the term that he used, that it cannot be tolerated on english soil. Crucially, it could be tolerated in the colonies. But thats another story. [laughter] but not on english soil. And the United States, the founders of the country were almost all slave owners. And they could see the handwriting on the wall. If the colonies remained under british rule, probably these laws would apply here, and theyd lose their property. That was surely a significant element of the revolution. And it runs right to the present. I mean, right to this moment the civil war is still being fought. Simply take a look at the electoral maps. Say the map of the election in 2012, red states and blue states. Its almost identical to the civil war. Its the confederacy, can which now call themselves republicans shifted names [laughter] and the rest which was the north. A large part of the motivation behind the effort to shut down the government is just revenge. We want to shut down washington and win this war finally. The United States never developed class parties like labor parties. They didnt amount to much, but at least they were something. But the u. S. Never had them. Its always had sectional parties. And its a reflection of civil war which has never ended. It also hasnt ended in the prisons and elsewhere. Its a very deeply rooted thing in this society and hard to extricate. Yeah. Well, i hope you all join me in thanking noam chomsky once more. [applause] thank you all so much for coming. There are books available in the back. Thank you also for the questions. Booktv is on facebook. Like us to interact with booktv guests and viewers, watch videos and get uptodate information on events. Facebook. Com booktv. Up next on booktv, margaret mcmillan, oxford university, examines the leadup to world war i. This is just over an hour. [inaudible conversations] well, welcome, everybody, to todays council on Foreign Relations meeting. I look back at the buildup to the great war with margaret macmillan. Im david andelman, editor of world policy journal, and id like to welcome members participating in this meeting through the live stream. You know, i was saying at lunch that i have a little surprise for our two guests here, because i checked a hundred years ago today just out of curiosity. November 4, 1913. Of the United States was preparing to muster 500,000 troops and gear up for war against a major power. President wilson had just given an ultimatum to that nations head of state, but we didnt go to war. At least not then. That major power was on this side of the atlantic. It was mexico. Um, and menace posed by the president was the great menace of that moment. So i found this on the front page, where else, of the new york times. [laughter] and the next 17 payments of that pages of that days paper, there was not a single mention of europe, whether there was any menace from europe. Whereas our two featured authors today have so masterfully chronicled a quarter century apart, but nevertheless currently the seeds of a world war were germinating. Europe was building toward a far broader and more deadly confrontation. So to examine all these roots, its my great or pleasure to welcome margaret, and her new the war that ended the peace, as masterful as describing the words denouement in paris. Very close to my own heart. And on the far side robert whos i wont actually lift it, but thats the book. Of. [laughter] a its masterful, i must say. And it, of course, showed how the great war truly paved a way towards understanding the great current that were already building in europe. And, of course, its been a great passion of mine, especially finish much of my life, in fact, since college. Especially my last book, a shattered peace very vie 19 versailles 919. And thats coming out just in time for the anniversary of the start of the war next summer. Speaking of which, there are many ways of approaching great turning points. But fundamentally, they come down to personalities. So, margaret, in your new book, i want to quote something on how you start off. And ill quote a few words from you. A few generals, crowned heads, diplomats or politicians, had the power and authority to say either yes or no to mobilizing the armies, to compromise, to carrying out the plans already drawn up by their militaries. So is the big question was, was it, in fact, Uncontrollable Forces that were inevitably moving the world towards war, or was it in the end quite fallible individuals . Well, i dont think there were forces moving the world inevitably towards war. Im very reluctant always in history to talk about inevitability because it means we throw up our hands and say theres nothing we can do. And i think there are some choices. And i think what you had in europe before 1914 was certainly forces pushing towards war, an arms race and so on. But you also had at the same time and i think these should never be overlooked very strong forces for peace. You had a lot of people in europe who thought we were so progressive, so advanced we wont ever have a war again. You had the very large Second International at the working class and socialist movements which had said repeatedly that they wouldnt take part in a capitalist war. So it seems to me that europe was poised uneasily between these different sets of forces, but i wouldnt, myself, use the word inevitable. Robert, youre known as the consummate biographer as we can tell from so many of your works. But in dread knot, your point seems to be naval strength. We usually think of the Second World War as the last great bastion of trench warfare. You quickly share to the likes of vicki and willie, the crowned heads of europe. So which was it . Was it the dread knots or was it, in fact, the people who were pretty dreadful . [laughter] the dread knots were created by the people. William ii was victorias eldest grandchild. He spent his summers in england. He desired to be he was half english, and he desired to be accepted by his english family and by the british people as that. And his mother was victorias oldest child. Etc. , etc. He was also the heir to the german throne, and he was subject to the imperial aptitude and swagger and so forth of bismarcks germany. Germany became, in that generation from the time that williams grandfather became emperor after the collapse of france, became the greatest industrial and military power on the continent. With the great army. But i wholly agree she said it better than i could have that all these factors industrial, military and so forth were at the disposition not play things, but the apparatus which individuals were operating. And, therefore, it was very important who these individuals were, what their antisee departments have been die nastically, gene logically, politically. William was the emperor of germany. He was physically afflicted and psychologically, i think, afflicted man. He was, he had great power for i wont say, call it evil, but for destruction. And he was constantly shifting back and forth between a sort of pallid desire to do good, to be recognized in europe as a factor for good sorry. Im launched from her, what she said. I would say the dread knot race was because william wanted a great navy, high seas fleet. Britain and france had already gobbled up all the colonies. But no one knew quite what the german navy was for. Certainly the british didnt. They asked themselves, hes got the most powerful army in europe, why does he need great navy . Who was it supposed to be building against . Well, see, that raises a very interesting question. Margaret, it seems to me that one of the seminal events of the leadup to the war and the war itself was really the end of a host of empires that were led by these great leaders. And its really a conflict that brought probably more empires to an end in one fell swoop than any other conflict probably in history. Youre the historian more than i, youd be better able to say that more than i, but did these empires by 1913, had these empires and the people who ran them simply become unten and this was one of the forces that got us into this conflict . I dont think they became untenable. They still thought they were tenable. And the nationalist movement which was going to tear them apart, of course, was very much speeded up by the First World War when people in africa and asia saw what the europeans could do, they no longer believe inside the myths that these people were somehow better to rule them than themselves. I think what happened is so much of the world had been divided up, and this wasnt much left. Well, there was, there was china, but i think there was a general feeling if we try and do that, we might really end in a war, and there was the ottoman empire. And the powers were circling around both china and the ottoman empire. I think what was more important, and this goes back to what Robert Massey was saying, you couldnt be a great power without having an m pyre, and we dont think like that. There was of this belief partly because britain was the dominant power until 1914 that the empire was what made it dominant. That you couldnt be a great power, and that meant having a navy. And i would blame also, i mean, certainly wilhelm plays a huge part many this. You have to put blame, but the capture of the American Naval thinker is huge here because he poplarrized and, pressed the idea that great expressed the idea that great powers have navies. You cant be a great power without having a navy to protect your trade and your empire. Wilhelm read that book, and he said, you know, im entranced. Ive never read anything so wonderful. He orders that copies be put in the cabin of every german ships. And i think i read somewhere that sermons should be given in churches. This is true. I didnt know that. [laughter] well, he always went overboard on things. Theres a very narrow slice, isnt it, of time. Because nowadays, of course, navies are important, but theyre certainly not by any means seminal since the arrival of airplanes and missiles, so on. Theres a very narrow slice of time that this sort of thing would become so critical and that there were individuals who headed up governments and so on, who would be willing to bow down in the face of that, right . Yeah. And the trouble with wilhelm was both his personality, this very erratic person who had this love hate relationship with britain. I mean, he wanted to emulate them, but he also feared them. Very complicated. The trouble with wilhelm is that he was in charge of a very powerful nation, and it wouldnt have mattered if hed been the british king because the british king had no power under the british constitution. Wouldnt have mattered if hed been the king of albania. Would have mattered for the albanians [laughter] he was in charge of this powerful country at the heart of europe. You suddenly have this huge power and getting more powerful because its industry, its economy were booming. And it had this very powerful army. And so when wilhelm took germany in the direction he could take it, i mean, he had a great deal of power under the german constitution, and i think this what made him so dangerous. In are struggling to enact his legislation and has struggled with decisions. I have always been a lifelong democrat and i remember adlai stevenson, the first candidate i voted for but i have come to believe that in that period of the 50s, in retrospect glad the Dwight Eisenhower was the president. He had the experience, maybe not the articulation, but the experience and the presence and the reputation to stand up to crucial of cruz of krusc v kruschev. Personnel matters. I think the buildup of the german navy which the kaiser hankered after for the reasons margaret has eloquently express was not intended as a real challenge to britain. It was intended as an addon to military power, going to be a great world power. And the british army was expert but tiny, relatively. They only had their navy. It provided them with a is a police the seas for among other german commercial trade. But any evidence of another continental power, building the ability, creating the ability to invade across the channel and bring their army into britain was unthinkable and that is why liberal government came in, they have all kinds of social plans, education, old age and so forth, they spent every pound on battleships. Every historian sees major events through their own prism. The cause of the war, timetables dealing with troop movements. The question, robert sees a lot of prisons as the dreadnought. What is your prism in this crucial period in world war i. A very refract of prism, more like a kaleidoscope. I have trouble picking one name and i dont think there is one. The congruence is timing. Things happen in particular sequence and what you have by 1914 was certainly precious building up to tending towards war and a growing acceptance of the possibility of war which is dangerous. What struck me more and more, people said not if there is a war but when theres a war and there was an expectation there would be a general european war. Even some people think it might be a relief, one of the images of the news that the time was a thunderstorm. Very oppressive, very heavy and the relief to get it over with. And a quick short war and have peace. Would you also had was a very dangerous cents by 1914 that we can get through these crazies because of a series of crises which are getting closer and closer to get there, the crisis over bosnia and a series of crises in the balkans in 19111914 and a sense of complacency that we got through all these, we will get through the mid 10s and in summer of 1914 at first people didnt take it seriously. The british in any case were preoccupied with the possibility of civil war over island. In july 1914 the headlines are about ireland, not what is happening in the balkans or what austria, hungary are doing so you have a combination. They were prepared to accept it yours could be used as an instrument of policy without terrible expense even though they should have known better and also expectation of the other hand it is another crisis, we will probably get through it. You didnt get them, british and particular, didnt get people taking the crisis seriously until was too late. I spent three years in belgrade. One of my tinderboxes, my wife and i traveled to albania earlier this year. Fascinating as to the role as that Tipping Point if played in all of this, seems to be very crucial to the priorities of powers involved. Could this war have occurred could it have occurred without a lot of the tension in the balkans leading up to all this . I think it could have. When britain and france nearly went to war, russia went in 19061907 so there were others but the balkans were particularly dangerous because of where they were. In number of interest in that rather like the middle east today or perhaps the South China Sea today, not just local interest. You have a lot of backing competing local nationalisms becoming more vociferous rather than less but what you had a great power interests the you had the russians with the sentimental spot, mostly and the War Department was much more important and the straits going from the black sea into the mediterranean were hugely important, over half of its exports went that way, a great deal of industrial machinery coming in, vital to the passageways for the russians and head to hungry seen as an existential threat which had to be destroyed before it helped destroy austria and hungary and germany at interest in the balkans and italy and you have a combination, very dangerous local rivalries with outside powers being dragged in. Reporter i would be interested because you have a longer perspective in terms of research over the last quarter century. Do you have any sense anything we have learned since then through the archives, you could respond to this as well, thinking about this era, since you first wrote dreadnought a quarter century ago. I have got 5 or 6 books to read that i know of beginning with dreadnought to learn what later, fresher research has taught us. I have never been felt, i have never been asked to this kind of conference or panel on this subject. I have not fought about it much. I have been going back to russia. But i will be very interested to read what you and max hastings and the fellow who thinks the russians started the war, and others. The war began that is enough. I dont think publishers or others would agree with me. And i am going to look, beginning with your book to see what you say i need to rethink. Talking about the balkans i always felt the government in vienna was very worried about the serbian influence, sort of Magnetic Pull on the serbs within the empire, and they had been looking for an excuse to do something about it if necessary militarily and increasingly militarily, and the pretext was perfect, the black hand of a young man under that influence. Fascinated the area. And everybody in europe, nobody approved, i dont know what you call it, and airaside, but when serbia gave its ultimatum to austria gave it to serbia and along with a lot of other things, the final thing the serbs could index said was austrians must be a part of Judicial Panel which was going to interrogate and trace back the connections the assassination had to serbia and so forth and the kaiser was aware and the german general staff was aware that austria was germanys only ally in europe, austria was crumbling in its adhesion to the Imperial Administration in vienna and they really needed to do something and they decided we are going to make this ultimatum as a hit and they bombarded belgrade and occupied it and so forth. The emperor tried various ways to stop the progression of war, letters and so forth. I have always seen that not as just a pretext but a culmination of this very dangerous balkan situation and Everybody Knows german general staff had planned for a war against france when and if it happened, as a part of the war against russia, going to strike france down first, six weeks to paris and it didnt turn out that way. Before we turn to our members since the council is known for that i am disagreeing with him. Before we turn to our members the counselor is known for great thinking about todays world as well. I want to read another passage from your marvelous book, the world facing similar challenges, and social protest movements, others coming from the streets between rising and declining nations like china and the United States. I will leave open the question of which is which and then you continue. During previous crises europes leaders and large parts of their people supported them and chosen to work matters out and preserve the peace. Is clearly failed. What lessons can we draw from this kind of dynamic if there isnt . Not very helpful ones. Serving precepts, offer clear lessons. But the national relations, rising in power, as yet uncertain, but not very tactful. They often have a place in the sun and nations that have been hegemonic power is, not only enough to accommodate these rising powers but it needs management on both sides and i hope that is something the leaders of countries like china and the United States, not the declining purpose as powerful relative to other powers as it once was. And familial relationships, and the progenitors. I dont think family relationships help at all. We know about family fights or civil wars can be. The rulers of these countries, george v, they were all cousins and identify completely with their countries and particularly they were put there and george felt much the same, identified themselves deeply with their countrys but what you have is nationalist pushing. And what is the word i want, widespread democracy is a good thing and Public Opinion is a good thing but Public Opinion can make relations more difficult rather than less. If you think china and japan Public Opinion doesnt play a part, you have a very Intense National opinion in europe before the First World War spread of mass media which put pressures on governments even when they would have preferred to be accommodating but another possible lesson apart from the need to adjust changing is great powers can get drawn into things by a lesser allies and dont have enough control as they would like to. And gave serbia recklessness, and behaved in a reckless way because they thought big brother is there and after hungry which is a lesser ally of germany became the again and use to worry about it. And hopefully could control austria and hungary but in the present age great powers cant always control their smaller allies. The United States and israel, there are times when the United States and pakistan, china and north korea, because the prestige is tied up with protection the lesser power, give a lesser power a free hand to behave as it wishes. A very good segue into our next segment. I would like to invite members to enjoy living with our questions, a reminder this meeting is on the record. Wait for the microphone, speak directly into it, stand, name and affiliation, one question, keep it concise, to speak. We will look back. New york university, professor macmillan. Some years ago, david wrote a book on the same subject, iraq last summer. The focus of the book was to save vienna was and there would not have been a war and keyser was less bellicose in the end. Your book is sitting right there. Which we thoroughly enjoyed. Tried to sort it out because in the end, the chief of the german general staff would have done what kaiser told him, kaiser had Constitutional Authority to make war or not to make war. And both often pulled back, was not the man closing the architect of germanys victories in germany and if kaiser had been firmly on the side of peace that would be no choice but to agree but in the end kaiser gave way and he was affected by the knowledge that a number of his officers and he adored his army, it was always my army and number of officers were pulling him in because he backed out on previous occasions and it is a very revealing conversation, was a close friend in summer of 1914 and he said three times i am not backing down this time. There was a dangerous sort of pressure on him to show that he could a bold and decisive leader. And very pessimistic about germany and in the end it was kaiser who made the decision. We will go on debating it forever. The question was because many stuff, the german mobilization plan was for a war into france and at one point had a separate plan for waging a war against russia in support of austria and hungary and they stopped updating that plan in 1913, they didnt effectively have a plan. The mobilization plan was a beautiful plant, and they knew where every train was with people getting a cup of tea or a cup of coffee, extraordinary, but i think the real problem with the civilians who failed to acquaint themselves with that plan and allow the military to make plans when they should have known better and looked at the plant. In a final crisis, kaiser said can we mobilize against russia . It cant be done. And the Railway Section later on was remarkable for moving millions of troops and equipment about. It could have been done and tend to believe him but kaiser didnt have the nerve to stand up to the general and their expertise. Steven blank. Two word often associated with war, war and inevitability. They are connected. At counterfactual question, would it be possible but to the actual beginning of the war for it not to have happened . I think so. You can certainly see the steps when austria decides to offer its ultimatum to serbia, that is one step, germans give a blank check to austria and hungary but still not inevitable. I would ig russian mobilization which triggered german mobilization would have been possible to stop. They had done this before and wait it is brinkmanship over the brink. In previous crises they use mobilization to put pressure on the other side so they couldnt sit down again. I think probably, once the germans went over the frontiers into belgium, luxembourg and france it was too late and that was one of the great flaws in retrospect, the plan, the shortterm name for the german plan, it was that it was seamless the you call the soldiers and got a monotremes and got them moving and they move seamlessly across the borders. So the germans were the stopping point. Once they were on foreign soil, a probable start but it could have been any point until the second of august. Do you think the british really expected those in belgium at that point . Once the germans started rolling, they feared it, and gave an ultimatum and says if we dont hear by 11 00 on august 4th that you had stopped and also wanted the germans to promise they want to switch all their troops from west to east with russia where fighting already started, at that point it was possible to start and the germans in the military were not afraid of the british army, it was a Contemptible Little Army and said we are dealing with it one hand behind our backs. The one empire whose aftershocks are still being felt with new tremors everyday is the ottomans. I wonder if you could explore for us what led the ottomans to decide to enter the war shortly after in 1914 . What was their stake . You had on the Central Power side several that had been their adversaries before, they themselves had been nibbled away bit by bit. What did they hope to game . And even taking you ask question that i ask the affidavit from, i think the ottomans made a calculation that Central Powers were in a stronger position and would win and we had close relations with germany, German Military mention to try to train the ottoman forces and the germans learned a great deal of money and in the process by the railway, and the germans have less of a menacing than russia where there were huge conflict and conflict all along the common border in the caucuses but also conflicts in the black sea and they were aware of the russian goals and the russians had been talking for a while. It was common knowledge, they would seize the straits and that would have been a terrible blow for the ottoman empire. They calculated it was as the conflict broke out joining Central Powers but it was and it was a terrible burden. What is always amazing to me is they managed to stay in the war as long as they did that in the end, beyond the point of all hope and in this end that brought the disintegration of the empire but it was very much a calculation, perhaps the wrong calculation but initially it seemed like they would do a okay. City university of new york, a question for the wooden. Now that you have written this book does it make you think anything different about the conduct of the war itself, and if you were asked to do another edition of paris 1919, would you say new things . I would not do that, the questions about the what i find increasingly interesting, what we just referred to, we tend to focus on the orders of the war and the tremendous strain the war put on european societies and the people who fought in the war and had to support the war, but how long they kept going, even russia was seen to weaken great powers held together until 1917 and was capable of maintaining troops in the field so it seems to me that is a question we havent fully explored. The second thing which strikes me more and more is why couldnt they stop it . Why by 1915 when it was clear you had this dreadful stalemate on the western front why was there no hope of peace and was it that kept them from going on and on and when it became clear the war was consuming them all and both of those would make subjects for interesting books. My question regards causality. In 1967, Fritz Fischer brought out ball war of germany using the archives to posit, it had taken advantage of a crisis and snowballed it, he did not have access to many of these files in east germany and my question to you is having access to it now, a major cause of the war . I dont have access to it because i wrote my book 22 years ago. And i dont have the strength that margaret is going to do in the future to clarify these items. Germany, the war wouldnt have happened without germany. It would have happened in some form without all the other continental powers. The germans ignored the treaty in 183839 which created belgium which prussia, the german empire signed, also australia, the british behind act for britain was the two determinants of british policy, the royal navy must be superior to any other power or loop of powers. That is all we have got. There must be no continental launching pad adjacent to the British Isles which could be used as a stepping stone or a launching pad for an invasion by a Continental Army which is going to be larger. I think the british stuck to those rules sequentially when they saw the german building of great navy, and there was a chill, various british officials including churchill tried to draw down, tapered off, stopped building snowmen me. Why do we need these . If you stop we will stop. The kaiser basically said nobody tells germany what to do. The british built their navy, we are going to build hours basically. As far as the belgium invasion, incursion, became an invasion once belgium decided to resist, britain did that for two reasons, they explained it or excuse it if you will on this treaty but they didnt want anybody that close, napoleon stood and looked across the channel, during and hitler did and this was in absentia, but kaiser, so they felt they had to fight to preserve the security at the home islands. I dont know whether that enters your question, but i think britain could have stayed out and perhaps would have despite its understanding. It wasnt the treaty but its understanding with france if the germans had invaded belgium, a dont know that and that is another thing. What you said, why they didnt stop in 1940 or 1950. The french for instance recognized consequences, they have already seen germany standing when he was a young man standing and watching, they couldnt have tolerated that. The trouble was when one side felt like stopping the other business, they send victory and what also happened is you get those hideous lawsuits and the worst losses were taken to battles in 1914 was difficult to say to people this was actually a mistake and we are going to stop now and everything will remain the same. We all know what happens once the killing starts, it is very difficult. I want to ask one question. Was there, were there any on either side . And rode those pieces and there was the thing through the pope. Benedict. I am a protestant so i dont follow these things. Perhaps i should. There were some through sweden but how serious they were, there was a growing feeling there should be peace in Different Countries and you got the socialists who voted enthusiastic for war credits pulling back and how serious those things where i dont know. Lets go to the back of the room. To the back of a room. This is a power game question which i am sure you have been asked before. If the plan had worked and the germans did take paris in six weeks how do you think the rest of the 20th century would have played out . What we have been better off . An interesting new book says there is no sleep that is overstating it a bit. The best criticism of the plan that you could not do that very quickly came from a german general who was not an admirer who said you cant roll up a great power and carry it away like a cat in a bag and i think the french would have fought on. Their army would have remained largely intact and it is more than likely that germans would have found they were dealing with the sort of low grade of war the occupation of iraq had to deal with. I am not sure history would have necessarily settled things quickly. I think the russians might have cost on. The russians suffered a huge loss in late summer of 1914 but there was still a huge amount of Russian Forces and russia always had its great asset in land and its capacity to retreat into its interior. It is possible. It is possible, to go back to your original assumption that france might have sued for peace, it would have been a very unhappy continent of europe if germany had won if it had managed to persuade the french to sue for peace it probably would have taken a big chunk of the belgian and french coast which would have brought it closer to britain and you would have had a triumphal germany in which i think a more reactionary element and nationalistic element would have been strengthened. They are already there in German Society but in europe there was an interplay among forces. There were pacifists and moderates and liberals forces in germany, they would have been squashed by a german victory and the reactionary circles around the kaiser who talked about cracking down and getting rid of the constitution, dissolving the union and socialist party would have had the upper hand. Europe would have been dominated by an unpleasant germany which i suspect would have become more authoritarian as the years went by and sooner or later the british would have had to do something because from the british point of view of a continent dominated by one power is a bad thing. You might have had two generations. Yes. Yes indeed. Yes . Margaret mcmillan made a very sound point. Frank wisene. Margaret mcmillan made an excellent point underscoring how commonplace the prospect of war became as you got close to 1914. At 18, i remember reading in your great book how ordinary the thought of war became european statesmen and officials. A half generation earlier, in the time of bismarck, solve very, europeans got their Heads Together and stayed out of work, put the preservation of balance. What happened in that half generation that made war so much more likely in 1914 . That is a very good question. I think partly you have to remember what people making decisions are remembering and what they experienced and what you had is a generation of is really and even people who remember the napoleonic wars and what happened to europe and how they damaged european society. There was a willingness to invest a lot of teeth and stability after 1815. By the time you reach the second half of the century those memories have gone. A bit like generations who came out of the Second World War and want to build a new world order and prevent such things from happening again and that generation move from the scene and the other generation dont have the same visceral reactions because they simply havent experienced it. The passage of time made a difference. I think you also get, sometimes you get a good crop of statesmen and sometimes you dont. You have you had israeli and mel bourne and bismarck, an extraordinary statement and my criticism of bismarck is he was a genius who left the system behind the only coppery. That made europe and germany so problematic after his removal from office but i think it is the same willingness and appreciation what it could mean. Ended deeply human characteristic and if the evidence mounteds up and we can discount at, and 2011 dismounting up that any future war certainly by 1900 that involves likely to be a stalemate with neither side Strong Enough because of the growing power of the defenses and generals who thought about such things tended to ignore the evidence or dismiss it or say no. But at the american civil war, comparable losses and european general say those of the americans were not proper soldiers, civil war, we fight proper wars, you got this time and time again. And was a general unwillingness, and another phenomena in which you often get. Again degeneration by 1900. And we like excitement, and andy and regeneration. We missed out. It is easy to see them glorious when you havent experienced it. You get the sense when this was seen as a glorious conflict to participate in. The initial reaction. Not everyone greeted it with excitement. There was a lot of dismay when the war broke out. There was a sense we have a chance to prove ourselves in ways we havent had up until now. Thanks so much. Thank you. I am executive editor of opinion at reuters. You both have been talking about how there was this idea of a happy little war that they hadnt experienced war in this kind of way and also talking about the allies, the lesser our eyes, and i wonder if theres any comparison to be made with the neocons who helped create a drum beat for war going to iraq. I think actually, i think you would have a lot to say about it too. You want to go first . You know my opinion. I already said i am a lifelong middleoftheroad democrat. That said, that is all i am going to say. I think those who havent fought in war can idealize it. Even political leaders, we have generations up until kennedy and nixon or even in george bush sr. People who experienced war firsthand and they have a different attitude towards war and so did the generals, the generals are often gungho on war more than civilians are because generals know what it will cost and how difficult it is to do and you got among the neocons a certain you get it elsewhere among the canadian government, a lot of talk about war and being taxed and you should be careful with such talk especially if you are not the people who pay the price for it. To within neocons of that time . Some of the generals, some of the statesman. On both sides. Some of the british imperialists who talked about how we need to fight. We shouldnt look back at that and say they were lovely pacifists. One footnote. Kaisers father frederick was not like his son. He married an english woman. He was a liberal. If he hadnt died of cancer after 99 days or 90 days and fate handed the throne to this tormented young man who needed to prove his manhood etc. Etc. Etc. I think given the german constitution the power of kaiser which we all cited as a major factor, frederick could have could have what . Could have changed germany. Plans to make germany more constitutional form of government models much more control over the government. He wanted to strengthen Civil Society and germany, to live peaceably with its neighbors and one of the tragedies really, it would have made a difference, and really wanted to do everything in the opposite direction. It is on its way. I want to ask my friend margaret a way out question. Given the fact rising power, the true rising power of the United States and it was visible even at that time, could the United States or any other outside party have played a role in stopping this war had they wished to do so or had the disposition . The United States was a rising power but so was germany and what was interesting is it was managed very well. They scared each other because they nearly came to war in venezuela, came to an understanding and a very successful example of changes in the balance to be managed. I dont think the United States could have stopped the war. I think they rightly felt it was had no interest in it. The europeans wanted to go crazy, let them. You can disagree but that is how people saw it. Theres a rising power but not the power to come. It was in the process of translating its growing economic power into military power. It was beginning to build a big navy but that was pretty new and its army was very small and the American Army was smaller than the army of italy which was a smaller power and the United States didnt have the capacity at this stage or the will, the reaction as far as we can tell from american Public Opinion, they have gone crazy over is there and dont want to get involved and American Opinion was all the irish living in the United States in britain. Hand a huge german population. They were all of german descent in this period. It wasnt clear cut which side it happened. And loyalties were divided. In november of 1913 the United States was mobilized on this side of the atlantic and they had plans to raise 500,000 americans, they were distracted this they have to worry about the great military power Woodrow Wilson ran for a second term on the theme he kept us out of war. It was american entry into the war that made germany quit