This event was hosted by the National Endowment for democracy in washington, d. C. The challenges of moving from what i call authoritarian rackets, protection rackets, democratic protection rackets, governance, and the paradigm itself focuses on the dynamic of the conflict and identity in the air of a political system, that paradigm is by no means limited to the cases of the arab world. Lets look at ukraine right now as an example, where the issue of identity politics and hypocrisy intersect and democracy. But i think the issues of identity conflict are especially precedent in the arab world for a variety of reasons, and its not something that we really expected in the sense that when the revolt started of course in tunisia in the rural area, not in part of the metropolitan capital but in the rural areas it was about a revolt searching for social and economic equality and dignity. And so many of the initial slogans in the rebellion not only in tunisia, i much prefer the notion of the arab political rebellions in the arab spring as well as in egypt and elsewhere, these rebellions or in part or large measure a nation about issues of economic and social justice and dignity and things like that. Tom friedman wrote a long piece months ago about the whole intersection in series you between the issue of water scarcity and the environment of the rest of it and how that played a Critical Role in the revolt in syria. The people were sort of caught unaware by the extent to which the issue of identity politics has loomed so large. I use the term very deliberately because i dont think the issue as ive written in the past, i wrote a piece some two or three years ago, you know how time flies, called islam is not the solution for the problem. I argued the issue is much more about how different segments of these communities can learn to live together democratically as opposed to having a kind of peaceful coexistence or not so peaceful coexistence in an authoritarian system. I think, therefore, that the identity issue is a large but many people were surprised by it. I remember a piece about six months ago when he said he was shocked that the issue of secular islam is egypt has loomed so large. I was thinking my gosh this is a man who knows egypt well, but sometimes its not easy to sort of stand back what you know and see the terrain. The terrain was very much organized. The reason i was not so surprised about the fact that things shifted so quickly from the focus of a social and Economic Justice and dignity to a struggle over identity is that the political system that in large part been organized around what i call protection racket systems in which governments regime is backed by Strong Military in many cases, provided social, economic protection to vulnerable minorities or communities in return for their acquiescence to their power. That sort of relationship which i called a long time ago a ruling bargain, that relationship men in many respects the dynamics of identity conflict were institutionalized deeply before we saw the arab political revolt explode in the political arena and deeply embedded among contesting political elite who did or didnt necessarily have linkages to those other social groups that were revolting against a system they saw as corrupt, inefficient and unfair. When the elite politics shifted, it shifted in the context of a protection racket system and didnt necessarily at all transcend it. I think in that sense it was, in retrospect nothing was surprising when you look back, thats for sure. But i had been thinking about this stuff for a long time and while i was hoping that it would shift to the pragmatics of socioeconomic struggles, it didnt. Now come when we think about transitions i think we think about the transition paradigm. I still think its in many respects still an important intellectual contribution but the paradigm assumed that democratization would emerge not because people were committed to democracy and election but because people were using democratic rules as a mechanism of conflict resolution initially, the notion of democracy without democrats. And sewed to the extent to which heres the paradigm but i think the authors of the paradigm were correct. You need some sort of a political bargaining or packed to make a transition. Its different difficult to have a pact when the struggle is not over economic and social issues explicitly but over identity. How do you bargain identity issues . Much more difficult than dealing with demand of labor and inflation rates and so on compare the struggle of brazil over egypt. Brazilians were not configure their National Identity. The polls are not trying to figure out their National Identity of the struggle in egypt was over National Identity in many ways. And the question, therefore, is how do you move from an authoritarian protection and racket system to a democratic one . Indication of a different set of variables and do not going to do a boring Political Science dissertation hear about those variables but even the word variable scares me a little bit. Or even dependent variable. But i think the structure of that relationship really helps in retrospect begin to understand the difficult as well as the opportunities. In egypt you had a basic struggle between a military led regime that had offered protection to different elements of the community, to copts, to the business community, to secular intellectuals. But the key thing about the protection racket in egypt, two things. First of all it was maintained by a powerful military which sustained itself as we well know, and in the end the protection racket that would provide protection to i thought it was a mistake. The democratic crisis, part of the democratic solution, but look we are today. I think we have in egypt is a system that is about as close to fascination as we can now it really is. In the technical sense of the term, instantly ways. Tunisia benefited from tunisia had a strong divide, no doubt about it. But they didnt have a military to appeal to to resolve the collection action problem. So the either talked of the fight. They fought a lot. Still sure theyre going to fight a lot but at the end of the day they appeal to their own sense of selfinterest but also to the armatrading will of the trade unions and other institutions and result of creating a constitution. And there i remain optimistic. I think its much more difficult in countries such as bahrain and syria we have a small relatively small minority that sees democratization as an existential threat because an election could mean that they are overwhelmed by the majority. The alawites, there was a piece in the time about this today, the alawites did not see any democratic outcome they can live with. Structure there are cases that are much more vulnerable to reassertion of what theyre doing isnt. I think the kind of authoritarianism we have in bahrain and egypt is worse than anything we had before but you also have the opportunities. I see them in tunisia. I still remain not completely pessimistic, lets put it that way about yemen. And olivia, i cant be overly pessimistic because what she did not deal with the issue of militias early on you have a path situation. There are a variety of outcomes in egypt. I would only close by saying the following. In the wake of the revolt in tunisia and egypt, there was a sudden surge of optimism, and those of us have spent our careers writing about the mechanics, you and heidemann and all the other guys, you were wrong. Its not a question of whether we were wrong or right but we have to put aside Great Expectations and look at the context and really embed our understanding of whats possible in the complexities of these systems. They are always in their own history. So we have to take those histories and legacies seriously. Thank you very much. Okay, thank you very much. It probably wouldve been a useful service if i had told the audience what you had written, but, in fact, you did it very well. It probably was transforming the arab worlds protection racket politics. Not bad, dan. Its almost as good as liberalized hypocrisy. And Hillel Fradkin in this volume has shared with us some of his work on islamist thought and mobilization. Is the title is Arab Democracy or islamist revolution. So, three years later, hillel, which is it . [inaudible] well first, before getting to that i want to thank as others have larry and marc for this work and for the work of the National Endowment for democracy. Marc observed early on in his remarks that the worlds attention is moving on from the arab spring because of the crisis in ukraine. Thats extremely rude of Vladimir Putin to done so, but it does mean this may be the last time for some time that we will have an opportunity to discuss these matters it has other issues will emerge. I will talk a little bit about the article i wrote and what it said and how it looks today. But to focus by remarks that way i think requires me to go under the 15 rounds with olivier which would be timeconsuming and unfair to all of you. So i just really want to begin with what was largely the task, which was to reassess the arab spring some three plus years, and to indicate what we have learned. And by this i meant i suppose it meant that weve been asked to offer an interpretation of what has happened over the past three years. So i thought it would be best to begin by stating what has happened or what are the major facts concerning the arab spring, at least how i see it. And for this purpose i would include in such fact regional developments that go beyond the circumstances within the specific arab countries that underwent revolt. I think its proper to include them for several reasons. First, which bear upon as ill indicate to our subject, first because the countries of the middle east have a habit of thinking of themselves regionally, i sometimes acting as such. And such has been the case in the arab spring with the various countries both acting upon the region and being acted upon by it. This is of course almost inevitable in any part of the world but it is especially the case in the middle east because most of its countries share not only a geographic place, but the Common Grounds of being muslim and of identify themselves as such. And second and related to it, because the question of islam and its relationship to these revolts became almost immediately an aspect important to understanding them and has remained so. The net result was that all muslim countries in the region, nonarab as well as arab, saw themselves as having a stake, whether positive or negative come in the outcome of the revolts, and to the extent these were necessary or possible they have mostly acted as such. This is proven i think of brought into deep consequences for the fate of the arab results both in themselves and regional politics as a whole. The most obvious crucial and appalling case is serious and its civil war. For this war and the revolt which launched it has by now drawn in one way or another almost every country in the region. And, of course, it is now being caused as a struggle between sunni and shia islam. Thithis consequence was ousted o speaking anticipated. I wont claim to have done so, but in the end it may prove to be the most significant consequence of the arab spring for both arab and regional politics. Almost as obvious is the case that egypt whose revolution dynamics has attracted the concern and intervention of other countries, both arab and nonarab, especially turkey in the latter category. This region engagement also was part of the fact of the arab spring. I will come back to this, that the dynamic of turkeys own politics but, of course, the core of the arab spring was the arab countries and the revolts. At the beginning the revolts presumptive have presumptively two goals. First two over the existing autocrat. The second, the replacement of autocratic regime as such with a new democratic regimes. Where does this stand . Four of the five autocrats are gone. Exception is bashir alassad who now looks as if he will survive. And a part from Moammar Gadhafi seemed the worst of the lot. But the establishment of new democratic regimes has largely failed to materialize. One possible exception is tunisia. What happened . There were different factions in Different Countries that contributed and no doubt will explore today those differences in our discussion. But here i would like to focus on egypt which seems to me the most crucial or important case for several reasons and it also happens to be, was larger the focus of the article in the journal and this volume. First its the largest arab country and was the model. It was the country in which the greatest hopes were invested. It did have a genuinely democratic revolution in the sense that it held more or less, and may be inclined to forget this, more or less free elections, multiple free elections which produced a new regime. The islamist regime of the Muslim Brotherhood supported by other islamist parties. As we all know that regime has failed and is in the process of being replaced by a new regime whose character is still uncertain but may amount, i take this this is a dance of you, to the restoration of hypocrisy if perhaps it is somewhat of a new kind. So what happened . How did this, what was the dynamic, the trajectory . Que . Que x at the beginning, and here i will make reference to the article, at the beginning of the egyptian revolt it seemed to me the main beneficiary of the new political opening would be the brotherhood. That did prove to be the case. It also seemed the brotherhood would be inclined to move relatively quickly to fulfill its 80 year old vision of islamic governance. I drew this conclusion from the statements of authoritative leaders as well as the history of the brotherhood movement. The question at the time was really how quickly and, of course, how successfully in the event, and i think i was prepared for it to move fairly quickly, but as quickly as it did. It moved very quickly and for a while successfully. And i think partially because it was buoyed by very considerable public support on the front end at least, and the support of related islamist allies like the sole of his. What have we learned from this experience, this particular expense of egyptian experience with egyptian revolt did, in fact, provided to be the expression of popular will. Which for that reason i think we may describe as a democratic open. But its first expression was kind of religious population not particularly devoted to democratic order. This plus other advantages is what led to the brotherhood in the first place. It is populism as a team, presented certain questions or problems. What kind of religion would promote and how would it govern . These issues were never resolved. In particular the brotherhood never solved the issue of governors and tried to address them in an increasingly autocratic mode. I would say it doesnt excuse them but they had a lot of help because of the frustrations they encountered with the resistance of various authorities within the government. This managed to produce both resentment and chaos and the eventual family. The brotherhood political skills proved unequal to their ambitions. Where does that leave egypt today . It would be nice if the brotherhood failure led to the emergence of an alternative Political Movement democratically inclined in a western fashion, but such has not been the case because for such a movement was always weak and it appears weaker still now. I think part of the reason is, was underscored in the new book that the constituency of egypt is a very traditional and conservative on. It doesnt have a natural instinct feel for the kind of alternative, that kind of alternative. This is not i think to say that popular will can no longer express itself. And it does but it now endorses a new and charismatic savior, a person in general sese. It is over what the slimming and how to interpret it. Insofar as he is a genuinely popular, top you will still seems to some power. Moreover, it seems to me the religious coloration of such population may not be over. He himself is suggested might try to appropriate in some fashion and is notable he can have the support of some salafis and its overthrow of morsi. The net result may be a new regime which is religiously populist and authoritarianism at the same time. Whether this can work will depend upon whether his Clinical Skills are superior to those of the brotherhood. At the present time i think this is great, his main opponent in the elections will be the National Socialist popular group. We will have something of a test in a new term of which kind of populism is most appealing to the egyptian public. I think some kind of test for a lot of reasons. What is the bearing of a particular egyptian expense to the broader realm of the conflicts . I confess i dont have a clue, but any series since i do have three observations with which i will end. First, as in egypt, the perspective and of hypocrisy led to the religious passions into the political sphere. I think it could not help but do so since the nearly briefly empowered social constituencies defined themselves religiously, what dan was saying earlier about identity being the question. In some places more come in some places less that as we are not all of one mind it has led to religious quarrels. To put a heightened role of politics. For example, and especially in syria. Second, however sisi may play things out in egypt a possibility today of a religious populace but authoritarian model may be explored elsewhere. Such at least is presently the case in turkey where Prime Minister or the one is pursuing it under the rubric of advanced democracy primers are erdogan. At the end of the answer and many wondered whether it would follow socalled turkish model. And so it may although innocent now which would be very, very ironic. Finally over all our topic remains subject to question raised in the spring of 2011 in the wake of the death of osama bin laden. It was raised by a lebanese professor who said at the time, the problem now is not how you destroy something, you can resist something come its how you can build something new, a new state, a new authority, a new relationship between the public and leadership, a new civil society. Arab spring has yet to find an answer to that question. Thank you. Thank you, hillel, for those eloquent remarks. We are not going to give the floor to tarek masoud. Ill note that tarek has two articles in this book. One day he wrote actual i think almost three year