booktv. he talks about the shifting alliances in the fight against isis and the u.s. government's relationship with the kurds and the current situation in syria. [inaudible conversations] >> good afternoon everyone and welcome on this very snowy day. this book roundtable with david phillips. i am professor of political science at barnard and deputy director for social sciences and programming. on behalf of of the hammer institute and columbia university and want to welcome you to this book launch, book conversation "the kurdish spring" a new map of the middle east authored by david phillips sitting here to your right. david is director of a program on peacebuilding and rights about the study of human rights. he has worked as senior adviser to the united nations secretariat and the foreign affairs expert and senior advisor to the u.s. state department. so positions, different academic universities conflict resolution program director at the american university program on conflict and peacebuilding. he's a visiting visiting scholar for middle east studies and a professor at the academy of kenya. he has written numerous books. this is the latest one and he has been involved in peacebuilding operations practice, theory, analysis throughout the world and has been to some far corners of the caucasus so can testify to the thought and care he puts into his analysis. he is extremely prolific. the timing of this book takes him to one of his long-standing areas of focus iraq, the kurdish areas in the middle east. so what we will do today is have a conversational format about the book, its timeliness and they will link ups to some current themes and towards the end we will throw it open for some of your questions. david, welcome and it's a pleasure to be with you. maybe we could just kick off by telling us how did you become interested or involved in kurdish issues and the kurdish question? >> i move from the himalayas where i was working with tibetan refugees on capitol hill in 1998 and i assumed a position with the congressional human rights foundation. my first week on the job saddam husein attacked the kurds using chemical weapons. i was visited in my office and the braeburn house office building by a neurosurgeon with whom i became fast friends and is now the governor of kirkuk. now he is brought with him photos of kurds who have been victimized in fallujah. i write about it in the preface of my book. he brought gruesome photos of kurdish civilians who perished during a chemical weapons attack in the village of fallujah. these photos depicted old men in traditional kurdish garb sprawled kurdish women and girls in colorful clothing and headscarves laid dead in the street, faces twisted in anguish anguish, foam running from their mouse, pained expressions frozen in death. 5000 kurds perished that day that the attack on holub joe was not an isolated event. it was part of a broader campaign that was launched by saddam husein and implemented by his nephew. he was called in arabic means the spoils and over the course of one year 182,000 kurds perished in 4500 villages were destroyed. my first assignment in washington was to respond to this gruesome attack using wmd. because of a close personal associations i have with the kurds including the visit soon after the attacks i stay deeply involved with kurdish issues over these many years. >> tell us a little bit especially for the nonspecialist in the audience give us a sweep of the kurds in present-day iraq turkey syria and iran and the historical trajectory in the 20th century of various parts of the book to telling the stories. what are some of the common themes and what are some of the particulars around the kurdish communities in these different countries that you observed? >> there are about 32 million kurds who live in those countries. that makes them the largest stateless people in the world. during the first world war the kurds aspire to establish a nation of their own and while they were sitting at the dinner table carving up the map the interest of kurds were neglected. at the paris peace conference president wilson repudiated this site's eco-agreement and he addressed the congress in the winter of 1918 saying self-determination was a cherished right and peoples and nations should not be sovereign to sovereign as though they were at chattel and some great game forever discredited. the kurds hoped as a result of the paris peace conference to be able to achieve their national aspirations. the treaty of 1920 established a whole panoply of new nations states. it also created a commission including british french and italian diplomats to study autonomy arrangements for kurds living in the territory of those four countries. that commission concluded that within a year of the treaty that kurds should be given the right to submit a request to the league of nations for independence. so the dream of a kurdistan seemed within reach but for the war of liberation that was launched by mustafa kemal. his war of independence rejected the treaty of severin. the allies had been at work for many years and didn't want an ongoing confrontation with turkey so the treaty of severo was repudiated and renegotiated and the treaty of lausanne was finalized in 1923. the treaty of lausanne did not mention anywhere in its text the word kurdish or kurdistan so it really represented a blow to the kurdish aspirations and it initiated a period in the 20th century where the kurds suffered terrible human rights abuses under the boot of the countries where they resided. that lasted until the end of the century and those abuses were significant. the kurds hoped they would have unified state. when they were sold out by lausanne they rebelled. sayeed in turkey launched a rebellion in 1925. that was suppressed. they adopted a series of laws called turkey vacation where the use of the kurdish language was prohibited. kurdish place names were denied. there was a resettlement law. the kurds were relocated and there was a series of security measures launched against kurdish rebels which brought huge human suffering to the kurdish population. ultimately as part of the decolonization movement the kurds express their grievances through the establishment of the kurdistan workers party established in 1988. it initiated an armed struggle against turkey which resulted in the deaths of 30,000 people over the course of several decades. at the same time in iraq which became independent in 1932 the kurds saw their aspirations tonight. king faisal was an arabist. he believed in a pan arab approach. the kurds rebelled. they launch something called the maha bodnar public which was suppressed many thousands of kurds were killed. when saddam husein and the baathists came to power they negotiating autonomy provisions. these were merely in name only and never implemented so the kurds rebelled again and many many thousands were killed. in 1980 iran and iraq ended up at warp. it was perceived in baghdad that the kurds were supporting iran. it was part of an effort to create a security buffer on the iraq iranian border. as i said earlier almost 200,000 people is the result of that policy. in syria there was the surely been movement which was a kurdish independence movement. many kurds who fled from turkey when iran was put down and adopt in syria. they are too the kurds suffered as a result of that baptist regime. their identity was denied. there were citizenship laws that were adopted in the kurds were denied citizenship rights. they were not provided identification cards so 300,000 kurds were essentially denied and a privilege of employment or education. they couldn't marry or hold property. they joined with other opposition forces and put forward the damascus declaration 2004 which is really the root of the opposition in syria today but throughout the 20th century the kurds in syria suffered a terrible fate. the same can be said for the kurds in iran. they lost the kurdistan democratic party of iran. they supported the overthrow of the shah with the expectation that they would be given greater autonomy and rights by the new regime. they were denied those rights. in turn they boycotted the constitutional convention. they were distrusted by ayatollah khamenei. kurds are mostly sunni and they weren't seen as loyal to his regime. as a result of that we see across the four states were kurds reside rebellion movements that were launched. the pkk in turkey, the kurdistan democratic party in iraq what has become the p. y. d. in syria and the kde pim iran. the kurds are factionalized and there are deep divisions but when they are under duress they come together to defend their collective national interest. by the end of the 20th century we started to see a little bit of a turn in fortune. the u.s. established a no-fly zone over iraqi kurdistan in the kurds were able to govern their own affairs and that experiments in grassroots democracy inspired kurds throughout the region to seek something similar federal arrangement where power was decentralized. >> is an extraordinary tale these dispersal against the four states in the struggle of the four states with their own challenges and parameters of regimes. you hinted at some turning points there in your last comments but how have kurdish movements and political organizations networked with each other? has the relationship also had some tensions? has it evolved? give us a sense of how in resistance to kurds have managed to find political expression or not in various points of history? >> because they were fragmented before poor countries they never coalesced as a coherent kurdish national movement. in each of the four countries there are kurdish national movements but they are divided by tribal affinities, by language. the kurds of iraqi kurdistan enjoyed special privilege because of assistance that the u.s. provided after the gulf war. the kurds and other countries didn't benefit in the same way. we see a systematic crackdown against the kurds in syria by the baathists regime of assad. in turkey there was a resettlement policy. several million crews were relocated. villages were destroyed en masse. kurdish political and cultural rights were systematically denied. one of the things that bashar al-assad did successfully was to manipulate the kurds in syria against the regimes in iraq and turkey. the kurds unfortunately have always been the victims of regional and great powers who pitted kurds against kurds and kurds against the regimes and the algiers accord in 1975 essentially expelled kurds from iran and the pan kurdish vision of a republic. the kurds until recently have never really coalesced as a group. i say until recently because the defining moment in this transition was the recent battle of kobani in syria. what we saw there was a truly remarkable occurrence. the kurds from the four countries join to defend kobani against the islamic state fighters and kobani was occupied almost entirely by isis until the u.s. launched airstrikes and decided to deliver weapons to the people's protection units which is a part of the pyd the kurdish syrian party. the pkk which has strong loyalties with the pyd wanted to join the battle and kobani so did the kurdish militant group in iran. in iraqi kurdistan and the peshmerga negotiated an arrangement with 155 of their fighters transited through turkey to join the battle so you had kurds from all poor countries essentially fighting together against the islamic state. initially the obama administration said kobani has no strategic value but it changed its view. it decided to launch airstrikes and to deliver weapons over the very strong objections of president erdogan in turkey. kobani is an emblematic event in the formation of the new kurdish national identity much the way hollister was in 1988. >> very interesting. let's bring ourselves up to date and delve into that a little bit more. it seems that the rise of isis has fundamentally affected and changed kurdish u.s. cooperation. take us through some of the big changes going on now on the ground but also politically. how has the political terrain shifted because of isis? >> in may the kurds in iraq went to the u.s. government. they went to the government of baghdad and they warned that isis would launch an attack against iraq. their warnings were ignored. that phenomena of wishful thinking and ignoring reality has been a defining characteristic of foreign policy in this region and of the obama administration in recent years. june 10 the islamic state stormed across the border. they seized mosul which is the second-largest city in iraq. the iraqi army garrisons they are, essentially fled abandoning all of his weapons. over an eight-year period the u.s. had invested $13 billion into a train and equip program for the iraqi army and in a 24-hour period the iraqi army folded. they left office state of the art military equipment made in the usa. islamic state forces rushed south through the deserts of anbar. they got to within a birdseye view of baghdad and shiite militias came out to meet them to prevent the occupation of samarra were the golden mosque is located. there was an understanding that have been reached between islamic state commanders and barzani of the kurdistan regional government that they would respectively leave each other alone but that understanding was abrogated when on the eighth of august isis pivoted and attacked iraqi kurdistan. i was actually in turkey on the border at that time. i had a flight the next day that was scheduled to go into erbil. airspace was closed. all commercial carriers canceled their flights because the u.s. initiated airstrikes to stop the islamic states advance. up to that point the position of the obama administration was to wait until iraqi's farm aid government of national unity before they responded to the isis advance. that policy was overtaken by reality and overtaken by events. when the isis seized the village of mark morris 28 miles from erbil the president made his decision to launch airstrikes. that decision came at the 11th hour but it was a critical decision and to the demonstrations credit it came just in the nick of time. so the first response of the u.s. was to hault the advances of isis. you all remember there were reports of a humanitarian emergency in on mt. sinjar. that policy of stopping territorial advances quickly morphed into addressing the humanitarian crisis. the u.s. delivered the humanitarian supplies and air airstrikes against the isis fighters in sinjar. ultimately it was the pkk and the people's protection units that opened the humanitarian corridor allowing tens of thousands of the yazidis to fully mt. sinjar. the second phase of the operation was really humanitarian in its focus. america's approach continue to evolve to a point where we now have emphasized we have taken territory. we assisted kurdish peshmerga and some iraqi forces in the battle to retake the mosul dam. the peshmerga also launched a counteroffensive to regain territories and shingle a region on this syria turkish iraqi border. peshmerga liberated mt. sinjar and the villages around sinjar and all of this was happening at the same time as we were getting involved in kobani. so isis is a real threat to iraq, to syria. it controls a third of iraq's territory, a half of serious territory. they're eight to 10 million people who live on those territories under isis control. isis is well-armed because of the arms that they seized from the iraqi armed forces. they are well financed and when they came into mosul they took $340 million out of the mosul bank. they were operating 18 oil wells and refineries and generated revenue for hostagetaking through selling historical and architectural artifacts. it's estimated that the annual budget for the islamic state is going to be $2 billion. so they are a force to be reckoned with. >> i want to back up just a little bit and i ask this question of you because you have always been very straight with criticizing u.s.-iraq policy and you have done so across both administrations in terms of the governance of iraq and some of the decisions that were made after the american military intervention there. so i want to get your take on the failure of the united states to reach a status of forces agreement with iraq. at the time there were different issues in the negotiations status of contractors you know different rights of command and control. also the u.s. according to gates' biography told the iraqis they should consult with some other countries that have posted u.s. military forces in the past and it turned out that backfired because of the japanese and the koreans. they got all the details of issues that should be of concern to them. so we have this parting of the ways, this withdrawal of u.s. forces. what is your take on that? was that just one of these pivotal points and at the u.s. had withdrawn would we have seen the isis problem in all of its theory and complexity now? >> so isis goes back to the invasion and occupation of iraq. it was originally established as al qaeda in mesopotamia. the surge of 2006 and 2007 was intended to deal with the sectarian conflict between shia and sunnis. it was the election of nouri al-maliki and his descendents to the prime minister that further polarized iraqi society. we should ascribe responsibility to the withdrawal of u.s. forces where it belongs which is with president bush. in 2008 he announced u.s. forces would be withdrawn. the day we set the withdrawal, timing and procedures for withdrawal were negotiated with the government in baghdad. the status of forces agreement to which you refer is something that the obama administration tried to negotiate with maliki's government. they broke down for a variety of reasons mostly because the obama administration did want to stay. the iraqi government did want to happen there. the rationale for u.s. forces staying as a residual deployment was a hard case to make. so by the end of 2011 as you saw the u.s. essentially withdraw all of its assets from iraq, and mind you this was after we had invested enormous amounts of troops and treasure, 4500 americans killed, 30,000 maimed $2 trillion spent. let's not forget 130,000 iraqi's that we know of who were killed. so it was really time for that war to end but in order for iraq to be viable and stable in the future we needed to have the government of national reconciliation. nouri al-maliki was just the wrong person to be in the prime minister's post at that time. he replaced sunnis from the armed forces. he created his own shia led battalions. he turned to iran and iranian backed militias assuming a more and more prominent role in providing security around the country. so the sectarian divide in iraq is fundamentally at the root of the country's problems today. we talk about a government of national union in iraq. maliki left. i'll abbadi replaced him as prime minister but fundamentally nothing has changed. a body is iran's choice for the prime ministership. the u.s. has also fallen into a little bit of a trap which has further polarized sunnis in iraq starting with arab spring and 2012. the traditional allies of the u.s. in the gulf felt that we were too quick to throw hosni mubarak under the bus. we announced assad would go in syria and then we didn't enforce those warnings. we didn't enforce our red lines. with the recent nuclear negotiations with iran which essentially will preserve iran's nuclear program we have also seen in the sunni muslim world has the u.s. acquiescing to shiite demands. even today when we looked at the armed forces in iraq come, the battle which is going on right now for tikrit where there are 30,000 iraqi forces to retake the city from isis is dominated by suleimani the iranian revolutionary guard. he is not commanding from afar. he is on-site. shiite militias are on the frontline. the capabilities of the professional iraqi military still leave an enormous amount to be desired. .. the same fate. america's loyalty and support. >> interesting. another neighbor, turkey. take us through turkey's performance, strategy, objectives throughout this whole prices, the multiple constituencies and how you view the turkish role. >> turkey is proven to be a false friend of the united states. it has betrayed the interest of other strategic partnerships. >> also? >> establish the church's -- the strategic partnership and 2,011. the pipeline is built on the eastern mediterranean. oil would be exported and spoiled. in 2013 $50 billion worth of turkish good sold. there was an additional $30 billion worth of construction. there was a lot of economic cooperation. what happened in 2012 was a shift in the country's approach. felt deeply offended. he turned against the sun with him he had whom he had worked to establish friendly relations. he felt that the us would lead an effort to support the free syrian army and the syrian national council that they would be a regime change. when that didn't happen to be decided to support sunni extremists. fighting the government. ultimately for so turkey r the islamic state. so turkey was serving its own national interest without regard for its long-standing to the united states. when isis invaded iraqi kurdistan regional government sent an envoy asking for weapons and support. they were told by the turkish counterpart that they cannot respond because they were presidential elections coming up on august 10th. after the elections the envoy went back to asking. during the battle president equated isis saying that they were a a terrorist group cut from the same cloth. turkish times above and watch the battle unfold without coming to the rescue of the -year-old defenders. i should add that 40 percent of the defenders were women. this was a huge strategic and public relations disaster. they showed the loyalty reports that were published. logistical connections between turks and the government of turkey and the islamic state fighters. the g hardy highway through turkey to syria. they provided weapons and financing and logistics. injured and. injured in the battlefield they were transported by turkey's ministry of health and given healthcare in the turkish hospital. so let me elaborate a little bit on the ideology. the deputy prime minister of turkey so that women should not smile or laugh because it is an islamic and they should not draw attention to themselves, this is no different in ideology than the islamic state. the differences the turkey doesn't chop off people's heads. they use other forms of coercion to advance their perceived strategical. so so put them in the same category. turkey agreed to sign on in name only. there was no agreement, no implementation of the agreement to allow the air force base in southeastern turkey to be used as a staging ground for coalition warplanes. there was an agreement to train and equip the moderate syrian opposition. turkey did not implement that agreement. it was just announced ten days ago that they would set up a train and equip program. even now there is confusion about the purpose. turkey is saying it is to turn against the regime. the us is saying that the train and equip program is to counter isis. both of them asked for turkey so. repudiated and within hours the president of turkey himself disparaging ansident of turkey himself, disparaging and degrading remarks. decidedly undemocratic turn. if we were constituted they are today turkey would not qualify as a member. nato is not just a security that coalition of countries to share values. authoritarian leadership and is no longer describing -- is ascribing to western ideals and will govern its own direction. a serious question about the us turkey alliance. >> let's talk about the possibility of the kurdish state. the viability, the political obstacles i would have to be overcome? are we any closer to that now? and you see the dynamic in northern iraq playing out? what are some of the signposts we should vote for? >> we have this conversation engine on the verge of independence. falling apart. he cannot control its territory. when isis turned and attacked iraqi kurdistan that changed the whole dynamic. two elements for independence or security and economic viability. security has been restored in iraqi kurdistan but it has not been restored as a result of us weapons provided to the pittsburgh. when and deliver weapons. the united states. it was iran. was iran. and they have the weapons that they need in order to deal with the isis armor have been provided by the pentagon. the coming from germany. france is providing 20 mm armor piercing munitions. the us is still providing light and medium weapons. i was in iraqi kurdistan a month ago. they explained the problems that they had with the pentagon getting the equipment that they need the desire for heavy weapons including offense of heavy weapons like tanks and artillery. they said that the training has been sluggish. i asked a us official. having trouble organizing. the population was repudiated. so the us is a a major obstacle to iraqi kurdistan independence. the the positions of security, economic viability of being established but they have not been falling on. the us has asked the countries not to buy the oil it is going to morocco. the us intervened repeatedly not to buy the oil. traditional and a tanker off the coast of galveston and the us by the legal action to federal court to block the offloading of the oil. we want to have an income in order to procure weapons and defend ourselves. so they have not been allowed to do that. so is not going to declare a -year-old will declaration. the frontline states. like the united states to. let's to the bush administration's credit. as long as the us and turkey opposes there will be a cdi. there needs to be some kind of negotiation. like aig and the iraqi government signs of baghdad agreement. essentially that renewed the distribution of funds from the central government. a. a 70 percent payout of national income that goes to iraqi kurdistan that was suspended in january 2014 because the kurds were moving to develop and export oil without a revenue and royalty sharing agreement with the central government. the baghdad agreement is central to a revenue-generating agreement it allows the payout to resume. it establishes an important precedent of negotiating the differences. meanwhile, they need to start acting more like a sovereign state rather than a a tribal militia. they need to establish greater transparency. the barrels of reserves. crackdown on corruption more inclusive and participatory. the operation launched in 1991 they have gotten a running start on building the institutions and establishing a democracy. they are far ahead. i think they have a positive democratization affect when each country where they live , the events. will they have a national election? has an independent. if they pass the 10 percent by in everyone's going to need kurdish support. so they will be the dealmakers there. the they're. the kurds and syria have established an autonomous entity. it's a reality. it is not going away particularly now that they have shown battlefield prowess. when the assyrian christians were seized in northeastern turkey it was the was the syrian kurds came to the villages. so they are earning a reputation as a responsible actor. they are conducting their affairs in the interest of kurds under their control encouraging region. but we're but we're not going to see an independent kurdistan anytime soon. looking at a three to four your project. hopefully it is not something which will be achieved through the political dialogue. it will be between baghdad. >> let me ask you one more question and invite the audience. giving us the map. what about is bringing stability to the region. all of these moving parts. the kurds should be part of the long road stabilization strategy, long-term outlook in the region but what advice are you giving policymakers now regarding this new middle eastern now? >> there should be closer security cooperation between the us and iraqi kurdistan. weapons should be delivered directly to the airport. light and medium defensive weapons and offense of nature. our training program should be intensified so the are better skilled to go into battle. had a conversation with the state department 48 hours ago about these very subjects. i made the.that in treating the kurdistan regional government is not going to encourage the breakaway. treated with dignity that they have shown to deserve. they should be working closely with the kurds in syria. invited by columbia. it's submitted his visa application. the us still hasn't acted on his visa request. capable of taking them on. we should we should be meeting with them talking about security cooperation for supporting a political objective. >> we don't have a relationship? there occasionally meetings but he should be inviting for full-scale. capitol hill. closer cooperation. when it comes to turkey we should recognize that the pkk is now a force for democracy and stability in the region. their participation was critical to defeating isis. direct negotiations between in the turkish national intelligence agency about a peace deal. the government of turkey is negotiating with the pkk the pkk is a way of galvanizing those negotiations and recognizing the positive contributions they should be removed from the list. we should keep in mind there were only listed in the 1st place right after september 11 11th as part of the deal that establish turkey as the head of the stabilization assistance force. so i advocate a kurdish centric politics. looking at kurds as sources of stability as proponents of democracy and having a a positive influence on the regimes in the region. time will tell whether or not the us pivot's. it's and provides the kind of political and diplomatic support that they deserve. it will serve us national security interest in democracy in the middle east region. >> on that note i think i think this will be a good time to open it up to questions from the audience. there is a microphone. that will make its way around. i would i would just ask that you identify yourself right here. there is identify their institutional affiliation and institutional affiliation and ask the question. that would be great in aid organization to benefit refugee children. going to the capitol of kurdistan, very westernized, very liberal my jaguar dealership and the sushi restaurant. an amazing an amazing thing. how normal it seems. when you stand on the border the fighting can be seen from the border for the frontline is $26 away. so small. the us government is hesitant to assist with air raids. so how safe is it in this time for aid workers to go? >> thank you. i was on the border i was having images of kurdish friends of mine worked with for many years swinging from street posen lampposts. we really came within a day. the administration intervened to prevent that. we didn't want another consul general collapse. we had major us oil corporations headquartered. there was also an obligation to have been steadfast allies and friends. today she is still precarious. recently attacked for kirk. they lost a major offensive against even on the horizon. but we can't assume that the kurds would withstand an islamic state assault. we need to stay focused and continue our security cooperation and expand the kind of assistance that we have been providing. the us can take the lead but that we should do it in coordination with other countries that are supporting the kurds. when kurds. when you look at the potential security partners of the us you have the iraqi army you have the shiite militias the committed terrible atrocities there were thousands she had been for slaughtered. what we will happen if it is retaken telling you have the so-called moderate syrian opposition despite the great effort of the us to find them. so when you think about security we need to think about the kurds in the region. it would not be in our security interests nor would it be correct for the us to allow iraqi kurdistan to fall to the islamic state it has a tenuous situation. ultimately the kurds will prevail. so you'll be okay. we'll have a great sense of normalcy. but we have to remember it's a real fighting force. if we don't if we don't keep our eye on the adversary and support of friends the islamic state could very well roll into iraqi kurdistan. i have always maintained that the us should stop trying to placate its adversaries and start working more closely with its friends the only thing that they can agree on is there shared dislike of the united states. smart questions. that's great. from turkey. middle turkey. i have two questions and one short comment. the 1st question is about the beginning. >> and we ask you to speak slowly and clearly into the mic? >> okay. >> question and comment about the beginning of history. the beginning of kurdish independence the following establish a a commission for the independence of kurdistan. but it was interrupted by the independence war. but why we ignore the elephant in the room. the uk and france were there in this region and they colonized iraq, syria when the middle east region. why region. why they do not let the establishment of kurdish state in their own colony territory if they were so good? this is my 1st question. second is about the current process in turkey. the government is innocent. but they are negotiating. >> your 2nd question. >> yeah. >> this is my 2nd question this was unimaginable. in turkey trying to be a part of turkey. the democratic issue. an issue for independence. >> thank you commander going to have to cut you off the. so initial uk french reaction. and how do you judge is process? >> the agreement. clearly written in france carved up the map of the middle east. they fought to institutionalize those divisions by creating mandates. kurdish national aspirations that required military confrontation turkey and with dark forces. and after fighting along will war no great power had an interest and continued violent conflict. the us was offered as a protectorate of the kurds. he didn't want the us to become a colonial power. he did nourish that responsibility. clearly the problems that exist in the region were set in motion and then institutionalize later. so your question about the negotiations the pkk what you should be absolutely clear that they do not want an independent kurdistan. they want to enjoy democratic equal to the citizens of turkey. other citizens of turkey don't have rights and democratic privileges. in 2012 they are pursued a decidedly authoritarian tendency. a peaceful protest over environmental issue. headed issue. had to have heavy-handed police response accusations of police brutality and protests. a systematic crackdown on freedom of expression. article 301 of the penal code still exists. article eight of the anti- terror act similarly is broadly interpreted. so they decidedly adopted authoritarian tendencies. these negotiations that he's having an unmotivated by any respect for the kurds are a desire for restitution. a motivated by one single. everyone wants to establish an executive presidency. thereby further consolidating his power. in order to do that he needs support of kurdish members of parliament. if the kurds pass the 10% threshold in the general election and are seated in the parliament they will represent a swing vote. as. as lawyers that possibility exists these negotiations will continue. a leading kurdish personality told me we have seen lots of democracy openings but very little democracy. ultimately it will be judged by what it does not what it says. they should be circumspect about entering into agreements. >> in the back. >> did you comment a bit on the internal politics? you mentioned that there have been real divisions in the past. those divisions affected by what's happening now and can they come back in some form places always been a balance the patriotic union of kurdistan which has its base and was headed by the president of iraq. that balance has shifted over time. but also a new party change. and they fare very well there is political pluralism and iraqi kurdistan there is also still opposition and systems of nepotism. two sets of security forces two groups of this paragraph so kurdistan democratization