An element, a memoir. Colonel mansoor is a professor at ohio state. He was executive officer to general petraeus. He has a ph. D and holds the Raymond Mason chair and military history at ohio state. Happy to have you. After colonel mansoor to this presentation we will have joel rayburn, a long front of the American Foundation who was sort of produced some responses to what colonel mansoor says. Is writing an opera study of the iraq war for the u. S. Army. Hes also studying for his ph. D at texas a m university. We are really pleased that both of you here so welcome to both of you. Colonel mansoor will give his presentation at the podium now. Thank you. Thank you, peter, for that kind introduction, and thank you all for coming today. I really appreciate the new America Foundation sponsoring this talk. I was not going to write this book. I retired from military in 2008, and although i knew that the restored to be told, i was going to let it take some time to digest and develop. And i was thinking maybe 10, 20 years down the road i would write a history of the iraq war are but a couple years later in the summer of 2010 i was at a conference with a whos who of counterinsurgency experts in the United States. We were talking about what to do in iraq are of course the iraq war im sorry, in afghanistan. What to do in afghanistan in 2010 was an issue of major concern in the United States, and invariably the discussion default into what it happened in iraq and what happened during the surge and why the sectarian violence was reduced so much in that period. And and listening to what the various experts have to say, it was good to me that not one of them had a holistic understanding of the iraq war, and especially the surge your right then and i decided to put aside the research i was conducted on the liberation of the philippines in 194445, the subject of my next book. Much nicer ready for the people who are thoroughly dead and, therefore, cant disagree with what you have to say about them. And i decided to write this book. This is three years in the making, and i understood where the forces were for it since we have developed, collected an archive of documents of general petraeus while the surge was ongoing with an eye toward history eventually. Those documents which essential command and into the National Defense university and i am indebted to the folks there, both those places for declassified summary of documents that are used to write this history. Empanada been possible without their assistance. It would not have been possible without their assistance. What went wrong in iraq . The Bush Administration made some assumptions going into the iraq war that it would be a war of liberation, that the iraqi people would support the taking down Saddam Hussein, a very brutal and hated it to be. And that since they would cooperate with the american forces, government and infrastructure would largely remain intact and, therefore, the United States didnt need to plan for a long occupation or an extended rehabilitation of the country. Secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld also looked on iraq as a laboratory to test his theories and to validate really the revolution in military affairs, the idea that hightech forces with precision guided missions and intelligence aspects could collapse an enemy state relatively quickly, beginning at the center of gravity and then wind up the war fairly rapidly with fewer casualties. And that this was the sort of wave of the future, the u. S. Will take affairs, was going to take advantage of. Unfortunately, the enemy didnt cooperate. Lieutenant general scott wallace, commander, as he is marching up country towards baghdad, supply bunch of being attacked by guerrillas. He makes a comment to the press that this is not the enemy we war gamed against, and force candidates he was nearly relieved of command. This is sort of part and parcel without the secretary of defense and the administration dealt with things that went against the perceived notions. Recently stuck their head in sand and said, its not happening. So when there was evidence that an insurgency was developing, well, it wasnt an insurgency. It was nearly dead end, the last remnants of the Saddam Hussein administration. Once we got rid of them then everything would be okay. As late as november 2003 president bush any meeting of the National Student council said, dont tell me that theres an insurgency in iraq. Im not there yet. This is in the midst of the first ramadan offensive. In addition to these assumptions that were made, proved incorrect, there were two really key decisions made in the first 10 days of the head of Coalition Provisional authority. Tickets to baghdad in may 23 and the first decision he makes is to be baffled by Iraqi Society. Some debaathification is going to have to take place. If you lop off Survivor Army of 2000 of the top assets, it probably would have been okay. But instead, bremer decided to debaathify all the way down to the Division Level of the baath party and thereby got rid of not just the top leaders of the Iraqi Government and their immediate advisers, but tens of thousands of iraqis who were joined the baath party because is the only way to get a decent job. So who were these people . Doctors, lawyers, engineers, university professors, civil servants, all the same people that our own war plans assumed would remain in place to make sure iraq continued to function in the postwar period. And with one stroke of the pen he got rid of them. Not only that but many of these people were sunnis and they were now denied a job, pension, participation in the political life of the country, what they viewed as the d. Unification they started, instead of agreeing that Saddam Hussein was bad and they couldnt get rid of him and they would help us with the new iraq, i think initially i got that since being on the ground, some people were doing to give us the benefit of the doubt. Instead, we alienated them. With one stroke of the pen, we created the political basis of uncertainty. The second decision was to disband the iraqi army to a National Institution that for eight years against iran, many shia in the iraqi army. It was an instrument of regime control the way the Republican Guard were, but we had to eliminate those but not the iraqi army. The iraqi army was an institution that couldve been rehabilitated under new leadership and used to help stabilize postwar iraq. And instead, bremer disbanded it. In his memoirs he said, i was just acknowledging the obvious that the soldiers had taken off the uniforms and gone over its a pretty disingenuous statement because what he doesnt say is they take up their weapons from within. And that hadnt wanted to bring them back and call them back to the callers can we couldve. How do i know . Because when it was pointed out to brimmer that we now have several hundred thousand armed young men without jobs on the streets, he decided that we would offer them back pay and they could come and click the back they and the second, and that would give them something with which they could start their new lives. They all showed up. It wouldve been very easy to have a recruiting table right there saying we want to continue your job, help guard your country, prevent looting and so forth, we wouldnt have gotten all of them but we would have gotten a significant portion and we would not have had to recreate the Iraqi Security forces. What this did not only put hundreds of thousands of armed young men on the street, but tens of thousands of officers, most of them were sunni, and they were denied jobs, pensions, illegal future, and most important in iraq the society Iraqi Society, they were deprived of their honor. With a second stroke of the pen, bremer created a military bases. We capped off these two disasters by empowering a highly sectarian group of iraqi politicians, the iraqi governing council. 24 of them, and they proceeded to divide up the Iraqi Government among themselves. They had to create new ministries of each member could have a ministry to control. And then they proceeded to fire everyone in there who wasnt a member of their particular political party. What little confidence that remained in the Iraqi Government was done away with by this decision. So these were, this was the political basis for the downturn in iraq. I think that its my contention we created the mess. We created it first by ill considered invasion. But then by our decision in the immediate postwar period. I love gary larson. This is american generals in iraq. I guess that would be tommy franks, planning out their campaign on the calendar, as you noticed that every day this is still something needed. It really says something about the American Army in the beginning of the war. Its very often silly focused, very tactically and operationally excellent. And they did know a lot about counterinsurgency. So the idea that you go out and kill and capture insurgent terrorist operatives and it would be rates after raids after raids, and not a lot of thought putting into the other aspects of counterinsurgency that we eventually became very good at but not in 2003. We were there now and things were spiraling downward, although not rapidly. What were we going to do . That was a good question. I dont think we have a good answer to it. We lacked a strategy to guide the way forward, and down at the troop level and outlined Brigade Commander lacked the concept that drove operations in a uniform and coherent manner. And we lacked enough resources, certainly lacked troops on the ground. Even with these headwinds, there were some good things that were done. Unit by unit there was a lot of learning going on. I think the army history of the first stage of the iraq war covered this pretty well. That it was a hit or miss but it depended on the unit commander. There was a lot of learning when the unit came into iraq, and by the time they left they were trained up and they were pretty good, but then new units came in and you had that learning process all over again. Even so, there were some successes but we failed to capitalize on them. We failed to schmidt we did to be the first ramadan offenses in october 2003. After the we captured Saddam Hussein. This took the wind out of the sails of the very early baathist led insurgency. My contention that had we reached out to sunnis at this point with the reform of debaathification decree and some of the political outreach, that we could have brought them back as a way forward. They period from january to march 2004 was peaceful. There was a down turn in peaceful in iraq but we didnt take advantage of it. Instead we create a transitional Administrative Law that was crafted built without a lot of sunni input and, therefore, they resisted it. This period ended with the april 2004 uprising across southcentral iraq. Uprisings that were in the case of the southcentral iraq, was put down by the First Armored division, a unit of which i was Brigade Commander. And we dealt the army a significant blow. In fallujah the marines were on the way in giving a blow to the insurgents when they were told to stop because the press, era press conference from it against what was happening and there was a lot of misinformation about civilian casualties and so forth. And when they were ordered to stop, then the situation in fallujah spiraled downward. Certain insurgents ended up seizing the city seizing the city and holding it until the second battle of fallujah in november 2004, which killed 2000 surgeons and about half of the city and the process. We didnt take advantage of the opportunities that we had there in the spring 2004. For military successes on the battlefield. Instead we withdrew from the city. We withdrew our forces from the basis inside baghdad and other cities and put them on the periphery. I know in baghdad we went to four major Forward Operating bases on the first degree of the city. This was a major mistake. It was predicated on the u. S. Central command believe. Is belief that we were a virus that infected Iraqi Society and the longer that we were positioned among the iraqis in their cities, the more antibodies in the form of insurgency we would create. That we were the problem, not the iraqis. The problem is when we withdrew from the city, no matter how many mounted patrols we launched in the Ford Operating bases we could not control in neighborhoods from the periphery. And the result is that the people with the power was positioned locally rose up and begin to control the urban terrain of iraq, that was increasingly the insurgency and the shia militia that were gaining in strength and power. A real study in contrast, again showing a different units a different approaches to counter insurgency, i described one approach and that was the invasion of fallujah in 2004. Another approach was h. R. Mcmasters approach to the third Army Calvary Regiment in 2005. Face with a similar problem, insurgents controlled the center of the city. He didnt attack it or instead he surrounded it, isolated it and then slowly it but it declared it and then to hold it he positioned his forces and iraqi police and army inside the city and smaller compound combat outpost make sure the insurgents could not rise up again and control the terrain. And by doing this is a tinge of the dynamics of the battle. It was a great example of counterinsurgency warfare, but it was just one unit among many. Nevertheless, it was pretty clear that attacking iraqi cities to say them was not the answer, and fallujah, the second battle, was the end of that. This period of the war spiraling downward, but not at a crisis point and ended in february 2006 with the destruction of the shrine, probably the fourth holiest shrine in shia islam. Up to this point the shia have been fairly responsive to calls to not make the situation worse. The ayatollah understood they were outnumbered and, therefore, they could outvote everyone else and they would eventually gain power in iraq. But after this incident with this major shrine now destroyed, he said if the government, the iraqi secret forces cant defend our religion, who will . That was all that he needed to rise up and begin an baghdad and elsewhere. They torched mosques and made neighborhoods, kidnapped, tortured and killed sunnis and drove them out of their homes. And his campaign that began after february 2006 gained force and strength throughout the year. In the western part of iraq, alqaeda was gain control of Anbar Province, this according to the Intelligence Report of a marine colonel who said were no longer in control of Anbar Province. Alqaedas. But there is a glimmer of hope in the city of ramallah become and will talk about that later. Nevertheless, by december 2006 more than 3500 iraqis were being killed every month due to sectarian violence. The problem is that Multinational Force iraq failed to adjust to this approach, with focus on killing and capturing insurgent terrorist operatives. And on the rapid transition security responsibility, secret forces, forces funding under to accept those responsibilities. In some cases, especially in terms of Iraqi National police, were complicit in the sectarian violence that was ongoing. Part of the problem and Multinational Force iraq is a silly didnt understand what was going on on the ground. I know this because i got a hold of general cases documents as well as general petraeus. If you look at the Campaign Plan review in april 2006, this is now two months after the shrine bombing, it has a list of wild card, things that could go wrong. And on that list of wild card is sunni terrorists destroyed a major shia shrine, thereby sparking sectarian violence throughout iraq. Its like this happened two months ago and are still putting it in your plan, not as effect on the ground is something that could happen. Its an unwillingness to recognize the reality of what was happening. This shows what was happening. Civilian deaths. The purple is iraqi data plus coalition data. The bluetooth bullish and data. The iraqis are in more places than we are so they count more bodies. You can see this trend upward throughout 2006 with the number of civilians dying. By december it had reached critical proportions, equivalent to more than 35,000 u. S. Citizens dying every month due to sectarian violence. Pretty significant number. And heres where we are as a search is announced. We dont understand that this is going to happen. Happen. All because he is that this is happened come and if thats a stock chart, you are a buyer. What did i just do . Okay, there we go. This shows in geographical terms what was happening. The darker orange areas are areas where insurgents and terrorists have more sway. And you can see that the tigris river valley, the Euphrates River valley, and, of course, both portions of baghdad are significant concentrations of insurgent terrorist forces. It was a fairly significant challenge. By late summer 2006 its clear that the United States is headed for defeat. We put it, i was on the council of girls that worked with the joint chiefs and we put it to them this way. We are not winning, so we are losing and time is not on our side. Parallel strategic reviews were undertaken by the National Security council, the joint chiefs, the state department. But to his credit president bush won. He made the decision. Victory has a thousand fathers and everyone has been writing saying it was general odierno. No, it was general keane. No, really david petraeus. Guess what . It was president bush. Hes the one who decided the surge against every other client wind blowing against them, including a number of his own party saying get out. But more important than the surge was how those forces would be used in accordance with the new counterinsurgency document that was published in decembe december 2006. So what was the surge . First, it was a provision of more force than able to change in the strategic approach. But more importantly again, the movement of those forces, backed off those big bases positioned them within the communities that they would protect, that protecting the iraqi population from ethnic sickening violence was on the way to drive down that violence and thereby enabling politics, police the politics using bombs and bullets as its grammar, to move forward. The iraqis surged along with us. We had a 2030,000 troops to the mix. They added 135,000 troops during the same time period. Increasingly those forces are better trained as her adviser efforts to old. More importantly, or as important, they were partners with u. S. Forces side by side so they could model their behavior after that of the u. S. Troops, and u. S. Troops could keep an eye on Iraqi Security forces to moderate their instincts. We improved techniques of population control, blast barriers, a segment that baghdad into a number of isolated or rather aided communities. Used scanners to figure to be logged in neighborhoods and he was planting the ids and so forth. There was better synergy between conventional Operational Forces rather than being two separate elements on the same battle space. We are now working Better Together your we had enough forces to pursue the enemy throughout iraq into a limit the safe havens that cropped up in the previous three years of the war. We greeted a force of Strategic Engagement to cleave off forces of insurgency, bring them into support of the government. You can never defeat them all, you have to fight them all and beat them all. Thats a pretty tall order, especially in an insurgency such as that we faced. There was learning and adapting going on but now it was more systematic because you had a counterinsurgency doctrine that everyone had to follow. You had 200 general odierno and general petraeus the mandated that the entire force operate under the same doctrine. It wasnt a hit or miss affair that had been since 2003. And, finally, we revamped our detention procedures to make sure that jihadists didnt control the inside of the detention facilities and that they werent sober turned into jihadists universities. So what did the surge do . It acted as a catalyst to impose a lot of other factors taking place. The most important of which was a tribal rebellion of alqaeda which begin in ramadi. The surge was the cause. It predated the surge for several months but the surge was the reason that the awakening spread as rapidly and as fast as it did. Most people dont know, as i can cataloged in my book, general petraeus wind to ramadi a week after to commit an assault was going on in the ordered all of its support to managed to support the awakening with all the forces at their disposal. This is what allowed the awakening to take off. Out of the surge, the awakening in my belief is confined to ramadi. Maybe Anbar Province at most, but given the force of the surge and general petraeus force of the Surgeon General petraeuss orders, it expands well beyond that and becomes a major factor in the defeat of alqaeda. The creation of the sons of iraq program, that was clearly part of the surge are these were armed Neighborhood Watch units that reported to u. S. Military leaders. General petraeus learned about one such opportunity, and when he learned about that, basically his usual manner said, this is a great idea, were going to implement it throughout iraq. And so as the insurgents and various militias came in and offered to secure their own communities because they were tired of the depredations on their king or days by other folks to come into a coherent chain of command, they would make them where Geneva Convention compliant uniforms. Only later did we agree to pay them. We did this to prevent backsliding to make sure they wouldnt turn back to the people who could outbid us. The jaish almahdi ceasefire in august 2007 would never have been declared or excepted had the surge not already proved that you improved security dramatically in the country. And, finally, the iraqi governance willingness to confront the terrorists would not of been accomplished or attempted had the surge not provided the wherewithal and again, the environment in which maliki felt emboldened enough to do it. Im going to cover real quickly 10 myths of the surge and i will end with these 10 minutes and then we will have some conversation. The first myth is that the change in counterinsurgency doctrine did not matter. U. S. Forces have adapted to the environment. And in any case security was already improving in iraq. I think this is patently false. The counterinsurgency manual that was produced and published in 2006 finally put a uniform stand on the operational construct and the tactics used by u. S. Forces in iraq. Before then itd been very hit or miss. As far as security being good, before the surge or im sorry, violence had already and your kid is a graph of the violent incidents in iraq. The pointer is not working. So you can see that as the surge begins in january of 2007, the number of incidents is at all time high and remained tied for several months. Thats really allowed it to expand to revive a. Myth number three we only put the insurgents on the payroll. I already addressed this by the way we only paid them 69 a month and that is cheap at five times the price with the amount of security they gave locally. 103,000 light infantrymen we added to the force with the fraction of the cost. Host team. It was meles a tactical adaptation. It was a strategic shift. And the strategy is the application of ways and means here is the way that were adjusted during the surge. What they needed to survive but on the outside is Everything Else it is a significant amount of action and not all with the adaptations on the ground. And in terms of ends the ultimate goal is to have a representative iraq that could be a u. S. Ally as part of the middle east war on terror but in the near term but we decided sustainable security would be the best we could do but we did have a local initiative and eventually it long term situation with reconciliation possible. Myth 5. It was mostly win the hearts and minds campaign. The fact is this is not a campaign to win the hearts and minds but to control and protect the population to beat the insurgency and there is a heckuva lot of fighting involved. Myth 6. Ethnic cleansing has torrey stabilized prior to the surge. Here is a map of the ethnic sectarian violence and at the beginning of the surge january to sell some seven that sectarian cleansing have not solved the problem. July 2008 the surge evans was no violence to speaker of the us it is my contention that is the surge that caused it. Myth 7. I have already covered this. Again there would not have been a ceasefire offered if it had already approved. Myth 8 the strategy of the accelerated transition of the Security Forces would have achieved the same outcome with more time. But this basically says many of the risks identified have materialized some did not hold but failing to achieve our objective. We need to protect the iraqi population from sectarian violence. He did not believe his strategy was succeeding in the Iraq Study Group reports a conversation and has no foreseeable end at that time. Myth 9 the real reason was the improvement capability of special Operations Forces. General a crystal would disagree with this. The synergy between the Operations Forces conventional forces taking and Holding Ground special operations ed able to target the insurgents to create a dynamic to help to improve the situation on the ground. If you have insurgency that existed but myth 10 all it did was have a decent interval. That is not what it was designed to do. George bush look darn as the model would have spent south korea. Hoping to stabilize after a very difficult war. Italy became a vibrant democracy several decades after the korean war. In his vision is that of the above to allow the locals on the ground and by removing u. S. Forces to hold the security situation in together. With the political dynamics acid do with how we handle the election of 2010 and spiraling back downhill and it remains to be seen for the future of iraq. Bad as it. Now general petraeus is back in that is it a and i will have a conversation now. Thank you for those remarks and it was slightly over seven years ago walking across Pentagon City mall the night after the confirmation hearing that the colonel who wishes on the phone said they want you to come out to iraq so then began the work with general petraeus. There are things that you talk about today to ease out a little more fully maybe a little more grounds for discussion. Leading the surge with military bias it was a reminder how much activity was going on in the headquarters is in iraq at the Different Levels at the core level liaison to the u. S. Embassy and United Nations and Iraqi Government and so on. Amazingly ambassador crocker and general petraeus and general a hero could do. So among everything with that complexity better reading with military eyes and also reads like a cook book every few pages i reminded the custody joe strategic counterinsurgency command to be prepared with this problem to execute this responsibility does in the strategic functions that have not yet been captured of the military doctrine in it is important to take a book like yours to begin processing to learn this every time we have the major contingency campaign in a foreign country which does little as we would want it to happen is certain to happen again at some point in time my hope we are better prepared or better equipped of how a counterinsurgency command like iraq and the mission work so we can be at a more advantageous starting point. Also a reminder of these commander have stooped old ps Operations Command to oversee tax corporation. Trade the equipment to me and that generates those iraqi forces that you mention to join on the battlefield. With that counterinsurgency no longer are those Detention Centers that you use intelligence to map out inside the detention command for those hatter of the battlefield the and on and on. So many levers and the ability to synchronize is a rare treat. And luckily general odierno could pull that off. A lot of those levers did not exist and the functional commands were not present but only i will argue to get to the latter stages but general petraeus had to create his own so did general odierno to have the tools. The second theme is picking up from 2007 and 2008 put it down at some other point . If you had done in 2003 what was done in 2007 could you have done it earlier or fully exploited the opportunity that might have existed in the way they were exploiting . There is some precursors for the surge that were not present earlier in the war. The first there is a change of secretary of defense december 2006 between secretary rumsfeld and secretary gates. And i think the military leaders at the time say it probably could not have taken place without the change. Second, one of the things you get in the pages of surge and in the book the end game is a new year in cyclopedic knowledge of Iraqi Society and culture and relationships of those political factions and it shows just how little we knew about iraq. It was a very hard learning process that we had to pay for in blood between 2003 and 2006. That this situation is everybody ramadi because the shakes have fled from pressure and in june 2003 level of knowledge to see where the sea was word to exploit or extraordinary. In your opening chapter we talk about before the surge the Major Development that is missed in the campaign as it is planned for is the indicators of the emerging ethnocentric eric warner there is the insurgent problem in the incapacitated state to handle that insurgent problem. But along the way when you get to the point to help build the capacity that is part of the ethnocentric war that ask if your strategy is part of itself is a strategy that you come to. That is the major fact the polling the rug out and i was also emphasizes general petraeus in 2007 codifies to the entirety of his command some things better learn to by trial and error liking and bar. And as one former coalition officer put it to me recently that the adaptability of the Tactical Units from other Coalition Unity and u. S. From 2003 through 2006 was a process of buying time so the seniors could do what they should have done in the first place. One of the takeaways from your buck colonel mansoor, what the iraqis are dealing with is the ethnocentric struggle but i would add in many cases is the survival and has created that this is tom regime disappears but they also deal with the aftermath of the collapse the extent to which the disappearance of that iraqi state politically socially economically that touches every iraqi said difficulties the forward army has to restore order to stabilize the environment have said all infrastructure of modern functioning state it is completely gone. That is something that is difficult to appreciate outside iraq with the people on the ground and to their workplaces and west baghdad will to do upper middleclass that had been turned into an utter waste plant from mounds of trash that residents themselves had put in place with the post apocalyptic scene and i thought to what would Beverly Hills look like if you removed the police and picked up no trash with no Running Water for four years. That is what parts of baghdad looked like. And i would also say to draw another analogy with the unnecessary collapse with the expanding of the iraqi army in it disbanded itself spring 2003 is like going to the deserted pentagon. They are going to come back you can order them back to work and it probably should have been done in my opinion and having said that, let me say i am not speaking on the department of army or u. S. Defense. [laughter] in any way. I should preface that. But to extrapolate from your book to today to get the key to the understand the violence the problems that you describe that were tackled over the course of the search talking about the awakening with the elite powersharing pact with the Major Political parties with the terrorist sanctuaries in syria and the containing of the shia militant groups to unravel this situation as it stands today. Unfortunately if we continue on that we would see it probably back in 2006 if iraq. Hopefully forces will intervene. Added a certain point it is corrosive. But you identified very well that those of gimmicks are moving in the opposite direction. That naturally segues. Is it entirely fair to blame the above the administration after all the negotiator obviously made a big effort to make it work with the Iraqi Parliament how would you assess that . First 2. 0 president bush personally got involved was discussing almost on a biweekly basis. And obama never developed a relationship with him he just did not have the clout. That is a difference between a Vice President and president. But if you backtrack before that the reason we can extend the sofa is for the elections of 2010 and allows u. S. Forces to operate. The one was won by the shia reding in the party supported by the sudanese. We had been telling the sudanese the sunis it will be okay in your voice will be heard in they won the election we did not back the winner of the election we did not even give him the opportunity to to form instead our guys and almalaki it was the equivalent of the smokefilled room that they supported almalaki another term and then the other was sidelined. Said they learned it doesnt matter because the next Prime Minister means we are left out of the process. This is the reason why no one supports the extension of u. S. Forces. What was our reasoning . I believe they thought almalaki was a good ally for a stable iraq going forward. I think it should have been a system that democratic rules and rule of law was respected. Now back at the situation of 2008 but the number could go up. And old clothes in the wrong direction. But in your view what happens to take that down . I dont think we should do anything. Not until he reverses the political decision that alienated the suniis in iraq and until then because there was an agreement in 2010 to share power but did not abide by it. But until he agrees or laos legitimate protests why should we . How do you assess the strength of the weaknesses of al qaeda iraq now theyre back in fallujah and ramadi where they were pushed out. The tribes have not aligned like in 2006. They know nothing good will come with the lightning with al qaeda. So it was broken down but theyre more on the sidelines. I dont think al qaeda can never create a safe haven everytime they try to hold the ground with military force but on the other hand, the situation continues to spiral downward. And tell you have a resolution among the elites with a political way for word with your presentation your critical of the whole concept concept of the war managed by said said, thousands of miles away . Obviously when petraeus came he had a different level of authority are there any lessons to be learned . As that structure makes sense . It does because Central Command has a wider ability the problem we had 2004 during the surge is they should have been focusing on the wider region. And instead it was like kids playing soccer everyone wanted to follow the ball. What we felt is we should look at though wider region. Look at the suicide bombers with all of the arab countries to have an influence. And they really dealt with that. General petraeus ended up doing interagency video teleconference to discuss issues why should that be the commander in baghdad . But at the time the focus was on the wider region we thought there was too much emphasis what we were doing but not enough of the rest of the region. The military goes through major experiences they were too difficult to process. That we will never do that again. Out is the u. S. Military position this time around . Clearly there is an effort underway but what is your assessment . It is too difficult to learn but i would disagree with that characterization. There was an unwillingness in the campaign if we could do that but that is what we were handed a and i agree none of us what to do longterm counterinsurgency again. I hope it doesnt happy but it would be nice to be ready. I am a little nervous the army is doing in operational study of the iraq war. It reminds me of Lessons Learned out of world war wind. When it was critical of army performance and the french army the American Army does a pretty good job. With the number of committees for two years in as a result to have the practical doctrine is a true statement that those that are doomed to fight the last war to look at that to get the right context to understand what went on for what they might face in the future with iraq and afghanistan for iraq in vietnam with the counterinsurgency. Of vital question in terms of research how did you go about it . What i really needed so a lot of it was requesting chunks of the archive and i had my own notes for the campaign in the secondary sources. It was easy research i did not have to spend a lot of time because they already knew what i was looking for with no archive time at all. Now to identify yourself. Line your opening slide the overarching reasons for lack of success are you being a little rough on jerry barber and easy on rumsfeld with the iraqi army is inconceivable that those decisions were made in isolation in the Defense Department. There is a good book yet to be written with some hard facts but i would not hold my breath it will ever come out but they do know that the ambassador bremer he said i and the president s representative in if he felt something was not right to say that secretary rumsfeld says to disband the army could you imagine that level of discussion . In fact, president bush says we should have discussed it. We might have come to the same conclusion but at least you would have discussed a. So you might be right you dont know but rubber in my view did not push back at all. Research fellow of the National Security program i just have a question you never mentioned the population Displacement Trust so there was displacement and the segregation of the population and i would argue that was one of the other variables that contributed with the population of segregating bad not returning home to move out of mixed areas could you comment on that dynamic . I am not sure i disagree but wonder why you stick to if there have been that another time without those variables would it have been possible . My take was the awakening, the violence reaching a saturation point had to have been there for the surge to have happened. Echoes to the slide of the sectarian violence was making matters better why was there so much at the beginning of this search and why did it continue . With commanders on the ground at least in baghdad with fiske regularity there was more mixing even through the search in that narrative would have you believe that is not what that commanders on the Ground Report there was still a lot of the mixing of the population not the segregation of the population but the biometrics standards that basically stopped that she a militia that made it more difficult for any terrorist for those she a neighborhoods but of the appoint i agree there is not a causal explanation but in the book with the conclusion i say the surge transplanted at a different time or place might not have worked i did not say that was the way to go before. I fully acknowledge that it came into play it was extremely important but without the search there is that catalyst to bring it to fruition i dont think iraq is in a better place 2008 if over 2006 in fact, that after i think it would have fallen apart. As a followup not using that as the majority but. I talk about that in the book the psychological impact were not withdrawing or turning it over a report during to the end. That the president said we are all in. That meant something to the suniis and the general population and the political leaders. When there was no indication president obama was all in iraq. Of course, then turned over to the Vice President. When they testify september 10th tell me the atmosphere. It was tense, as a real the acting character was general petraeus it was high stakes for todays considering the pressure and scrutiny they were under the with that testimony. What was the stakes . The move to force a withdrawal with the administration when those hearings were over i knew general petraeus had squash that. Not to create a political dynamic of what was happening on the ground and i said you just bought us six more months. It was true. I was in baghdad 2007 by a retired from the marine corps. First rolla doctrine called amphibious warfare that we used in world war i and world war ii by the army. The second thing is general schumacher the elements for success with the brigade modules with an amazing transformation how there were 10 different brigades in those very impressed by that. But the fact you can have units from different parts of the United States and europe i commend all of you for doing that. You did a great job. What would you say to the state department . Part of that prt was not funded how do compliment or supplement the effort with lack of funding and for leadership . I recognize that is not their job but to have their responsibility with other sources of money to use. Given the fact that Defense Department has not been significant resources what would you say to this warfare to complement the program . Is a truism for the of military search to have capacity that civilians bring to the counter insurgency. One of the things that was done that prevented the reconstruction teams that have resources to secure civilians with the capability in a the brigade area with the reconstruction aspect. You know, it was not perfect. And the retired military and thank you for your service by the way. I am not sure how to do this better other than the u. S. Agency for International Development put on steroids much larger than it is today with more of a force. I dont see that happening. To give the state department more resources because people dont think we will fight maybe we wont but certainly it would be nice to be able to ramp up when needed. But you are right that civilian capacity is critical. I point to the introduction of a new currency in iraq and it worked wonderfully. The military did not have that type of capability with the civilian capacity was not perfect. We have a few more minutes before the colonel has to leave. You make policy by personal policy is a rumor at state with those mistakes that were made early by ambassador bremer could we have picked better people in the beginning are those mistakes like petraeus and crocker that could learn and thats what makes them a good leader . I have a comment but the question is if you provide counterparts what would you would buy is from the lessons George Mason University analyst and coordinator. I darr appreciate very much what you are trying to do it and the importance of it i think it underscores to problems one is the policymaking problem the other is the planning can you talk about the role of your organization to better form the policy decisions made at the outset because we do know in the 90s they did a pretty good job to anticipate the problems that arise in iraq and secondly, the process itself a. M. From the retired state department. I want to ask about the map president bush and his commitment to south korea and obama and vietnam with the rationale of hitting a 60 or 70 year occupation is there a parallel strategic rationale to maintain the 70 yearold occupation of iraq . So if we just had better people in place it would have gone more smoothly . I reject that notion. We did not have the right people in charge 2003 at a political level also not the right organization. With an organization not designed to conduct the irresponsibility is but not until 2004 of fourstar general commander sidebyside it was too much for anyone to handle. With the budding insurgency you couldve had the best person you could have imagined and still could not complete the job. In terms of ambassador crupper back in 2003 would things have gone better . Possibly. That is the better analogy but then you have to work through Donald Rumsfeld and allow him a lot of leeway to do things a certain direction as was indicated it is just like germany 1945. So im not sure better people would have known that that is the fun thing about history. You dont know. Second . The big lesson is really political. The problems that iraq is facing is a result of political impasse if you king get over that to bring in all of the citys. It is a political way for word to deal with the military aspects of counterinsurgency but the apache helicopters that is always. You can plant the way all day long until the root causes of the problems are addressed. And unfortunately that has to go to the top. It is interesting to give them a piece of their mind and with those primary sources reading all that i have read but what was part of being a spouse yes there were plans on the shelf we needed 300,000 troops he was o. K. So it was not very good price. A bigger issue is how do we train and educate our leaders so they give better vice . To have very rigorous military education. And with south korea. I can give strategic reasons. The middle east has a lot of loyal we all love green energy to be dependent on the hydrocarbons and that will continue to matters benghazi flyback and as you fly back . It is like saudi arabia and ohio. [laughter] thank you very much. [applause] in you will be willing to sign books i presume