Ok. Get it down to a dull roar. Let us get it started. Thank you. We are going to dive right in to the final panel of today which is on u. S. Taiwan policy. We are very honored to have three distinguished guests on the panel giving us their insights today. I will keep the introductions to a minimum because these people are familiar to most of you in the audience. Dr. Mika greene, my colleague here. Asiar Vice President for and our japan chair here. Obviously, a professor at georgetown and a former staffer at the nsc during the george w. Bush administration. He is acting as senior director for east asia. Another Foreign Service officer, extremely experienced. And one of the most Renowned Experts on u. S. Policy u. S. Taiwan policy. In the triangular relationship among u. S. , taiwan, and china. Another state Department Officer who is also currently a resident at georgetown university. We are honored to have him here as a senior fellow helping us think through a lot of these interesting issues that are happening in east asia right now. Without further a do, we will turn it over. The first thing that i did s book. Alan romberg everyone told me to read his account. Let me make a few comments on andi think we, the u. S. , taipei should approach a dialogue and our relationship and cooperation as we enter tool political cycles at the same time. I look forward to seeing how i am misquoted tomorrow. [laughter] and your questions. It is always useful i think to start with interests, objectives , and for the u. S. , in particular, i think it is worth thinking about the importance of u. S. Foreignpolicy strategy and u. S. National security interests. Obviously, taiwan is a variable that is it is often the variable in the u. S. China and the largest foreignpolicy challenge the United States faces in the decade ahead. In that context, everyone will immediately recognize the importance of getting taiwan policy right. Is the argue that that wrong starting place as critical as that dimension is. Focus on thent to importance of taiwan on its own merit in u. S. Foreignpolicy interests in asia. I would mention three things and in all three categories, arguably, this next president in washington and taipei will find the relationship more important. Hasfirst interest the u. S. And i use theture core interest term with some intention. The first core interest is in taiwans success as a democracy, including the ability of the uphill the people of taiwan. That is a very important u. S. Interests. China power as chinese power rises, there will be a contest between beijings material power and the normative core values that have underpinned the pacific. Taiwan will be at the forefront of that question. , i would also argue a core interest is one that is coming back. That is the fact that taiwan sits right in the middle of the first island chain. One of the most problematic manifestations of beijings new power but more importantly its assertiveness is what is happening in the maritime domain. Beijingdegree to which has demonstrated willingness to use informational tools to toimidate claimants territories and waters in the first and Second Island changed island chain. Over the last decade, and may be i was too dumb to think of this, but i think it the nature of the problem has changed. Now, we have to think of the security of the whole island chain that stretches from japan through the taiwan straits to the philippines. And the Second Island chain that goes straight down to guam. Andhe years before the next almost all 1969, documents start to the reference of the security of the first island chain. This is not new in our history but it is coming back. Taiwan was in the middle. That means we do not want taiwan to be a vulnerable flank were a vacuum in terms of maintaining stability in the first chain. Taiwans defense capability matters to us. Is the third interest economic integrity and growth of taiwan. There is a tough balancing act acause growth depends on robust Cross Strait Relationship which is in u. S. Interest but also the integration of taiwans economy into the expanding Trans Pacific economic framework. Tpp of course but there will have to be stepping stones to that. In that context, we should be thinking hard about this election and what it means to the u. S. Not in terms of the outcome but in terms of what the next presidency should focus on and on what we hope they will focus on to help us support a future for taiwan that is in our interest. I should say, it goes without saying, that i do not think the 12 president , there are name,ates that i cannot i do not think it has changed very much. I dont think it will change that much. In terms of process then, how should we here in washington, and taipei talk to each other over the coming year and a half or two years as we have our president ial cycles. Taipei, based on my experience in the nsc, i would say that for taipei there are three notes. Other people have theirs, no surprises. That means dialogue. It does not mean calling at it means constant dialogue. No surprises from taipei. It should go without saying that there should be no unilateral changes to the status quo. What is the status quo . Jim kelly was asked this once. Like the Supreme Court decision on pornography, if it like a duck, it is a duck. This flows from a constant and honest dialogue with political leaders in taipei. That have memany that robust in the last years. And third, and this is about the future of the next government in writing. O free worth the candidates thinking about the Defense Budget which has never come close enough to the 3 promised by the dpp. The market and the nontariff barriers, they are a shackle around taiwans ankles as we should be thinking towards themoving robust integration of taiwan into a pet. In to apec. Administration no taking sides in the election. No appearing to take sides in the election. Do not say anything to the Financial Times that looks like youre seeking sites in the election. Second, no pressuring candidates to take a position that are not realistic. I do notlar think the u. S. Government should be pressuring the leader to accept a consensus. If one of my core interest matter that taiwan as a democracy should set its future, we should not be dictating that. We should be setting up clear parameters of what would harm our interest but we should not be saying what outcomes should be. We can do what people call intellectual facilitation. My eightyearold does that now. That kind of intellectual facilitation. Violation of is no the six of assurances. Six assurances. If you need to know what those are, alan can give you them, chapter and verse. Finally, i think that both sides is a broad point, we should expand dialogue. There are some examples on how not to do this. When i was in the white house, before i took over, we had two parallel and inconsistent dialogues between taipei and washington and this is no big secret to those in this room. , with one dialogue certain officials in the Bush Administration that the deep and another dialogue that the blue camp really liked. Had tothe thing that we do in 2004 was consolidate our in the whiteiwan house and discipline everyone. It is important for the u. S. Side to consider this and not have a message to be too personalized. There has to be an administrative understanding of it would be a big mistake if either candidate or party cherry picked what they were hearing in washington if they are serious about governing. That will backfire. There needs to be a consideration of the administrations view. Some care about not saying that candidate a or b and our elections will be radically different for type for taiwan. I do not have a fix for that. Describing all of the disciplines that taiwan should have in its elections. [laughter] we are going to have problems. There is a robust and surprisingly unpredictable political debate in both parties, especially the republican party. I do think it is highly likely that whatever you here at of this campaign, u. S. Policy will not change that much when the dust settles. I hope the Administration Takes a page from Ronald Reagan when talking about these kinds of issues. I interviewed George Schultz recently for a book and he told me the story of the first highlevel visit Ronald Reagan had in the white house after the third communique. This senior chinese official came in and said we do not like this and it needs to change. Ronald reagan said you are right, we need to toughen it up. Which is a classic George Schultz model moment. There is a lot to be said for that. In this dynamic electoral process in taipei make it appear that in our best in that our interest in their success has diminished. [laughter] you can do an interpretive dance. I am going to speak from some notes because that is the only way that i can discipline myself to speak within the time limit i have. I am going to approach this issue a little bit differently from mike but i think we consistently with what mike has said. Room andle in this when i look around that is an understatement, are familiar with the basics of the u. S. Policy towards taiwan. As viewed from taipei, the key document of course is the taiwan relations act. As we know, especially those of us that it had the privilege of sharing the wisdom of richard bush, while the tra is an important statement of policy, it is less precise as the statement of commitment. I think it would take something of a revolution in americans year for the u. S. To abandon the very strong sense of responsibility that we have for political oriwans security foundation. I for one do not see that revolution coming. Hand,s. On the other policy towards taiwan is not only based on the tra which it is, but also importantly shaped by the three u. S. Prc joint communiques. At their core, is the fact that while the u. S. Does not accept the prcs view of the Cross Strait Relations, it also has chosen a pursuit of a policy that is at odds. , weummit to some extent can see this in the form of parallel statements. This is not only seen in the individual points of each sides words but it is also seen in the carefully negotiated linkages between the positions of one side and the other. Can people see irresolvable inconsistencies in this crucial documents and those do exist. But i tend to focus on their important bridge differences and sometimes perhaps creating what i would call constructive ambiguities but at the same time leaving the initiative from our perspective in our own hands. Is a disadvantage not being at a lectern. Other policy statements have been made over time to explain or stand on the language of those documents. Sometimes, colleagues from the prc want to cite statements made by american president s, is actually in private, but have gone beyond the communiques that might seem to lean in beijings direction. I would argue the reason why this communiques remain what some have called the holy scriptures of the relationship, is that every president has reaffirmed them. While they are generally not legally seen as treaty commitments, they are formal negotiated statements that are carefully crafted and affirmed by every private i every president since they have been issued. It is in my view that it is critically important that people not forget that and in many respects they do create commitments. Example, when for secretary of state christopher in the Clinton Administration and later officials in the george w. Bush administration insisted that neither side should unilaterally seek to change the status quo, that was an important elaboration but it was based on the fundamentals of u. S. Policy already contain in all four of those documents. Coming at times sometimes when there were stresses in Cross Strait Relations or when doubts have been raised about u. S. Collaboration was meant to underscore that the United States would not simply stand by its efforts were made to push things in a direction inconsistent with the u. S. One china policy. That neither would it simply stand by if efforts were made to use coercion to change the status quo. Mike just went through some of that a little bit with regard to that period. Is not that the u. S. Seeks to push the situation towards reunification or to block such movement. The point is that u. S. National interests demands that all concerned seriously take the american commitments with regard to peaceful, noncoercive, and nonprovocative management of Cross Strait Relations whatever direction that two side ultimately decide to take them in. Including americans some american officials may favor movement in one direction or another. We have seen the public debate with some people wanting to shape the situation so that some sort of reason of fixation is virtually inevitable while others believe it would be very harmful to u. S. Interests were that to happen. Bring taiwan even more closely involved in the u. S. National security orbit. Lets underscore a point that i have made over the years. U. S. Policy is not and should not be designed to tell people on either side of the straight what their ultimate relationship should be. , what it should do however is to provide to promote the profound u. S. National interests of the relationship be conducted without provocation and without coercion. Look at the upcoming president ial election in taiwan for example, all of these considerations are very much in play in the United States. Pointedand, as mike has out, strong support for democracy in taiwan. On the other, emphasis on smooth relations across the straight avoiding provocation or coercion. May see even that level of involvement as undue interference. It is simply a reality. All the u. S. Has no desire or intention to become involved in either the election itself or in Cross Strait Relations, as i is that, it does have idle interests at stake and in my view there is no doubt that the u. S. Is prepared to act on those interests. In light of that reality, it would be reckless and irresponsible to leave any doubt about this in the minds of those on either side of the straight who are involved in the political or policy process. Similarly, americans need to be aware of the seriousness and depth of commitment, feelings and concern among people on both sides of the straight about their own interests and their own principles. If this process plays out, it would be both arrogant and reckless for the united ace to ignore those realities. Some people in taiwan may believe that because the u. S. Supports taiwans democracy and security, that means the u. S. Will back them as long as they take positions that rhetorically echo u. S. Positions. Some of the mainland may believe that because the u. S. Has committed not to promote separate status were taiwan, but has a great it steak and constructive and productive u. S. Prc relations, that this means washington will pressure people in taiwan to accept the areas prc demands. Any such expectations on either side would in my view be madly badly misplaced. The consequences of failure to understand that could be quite serious. Any such avoid misperceptions, we have seen the u. S. Government in recent months layout a variety of point that will serve as benchmarks against which future actions will be judged. To thece has been made importance of maintaining a firm basis for maintaining peace and stability Going Forward. High quality the of unofficial relations with taiwan in recent years has been importantly is also clear that the prc use of portion, seriously affects American Attitudes and generates the response. Mike pointed this out in regard to recent reactions in east asia and it is no less true with as it iso taiwan elsewhere. Once the election is over, applying the kind of lessons that we can take from this administration, i am confident that the u. S. Will remain attentive to any indications on either side of the straight that peace and stability will be endangered. The issue is not simply embracing the goals. It is a matter of policies and actions. That supported. Let us not kid ourselves. If a new Administration Takes office in taipei that does not embrace one china, it is virtually certain that there will be consequences in terms of Cross Strait Relations. Termst trying to argue in of beijings principles, many have strongly urged the mainland not to react to strongly or as the u. S. Administration has put it, to approach taiwan with flexibility and restraint. Otherwise, there could be serious and unforeseen consequences. If that that is not a judgment we can make. Similarly, there may be pressures on the winners in taiwan. Wins, but especially if the dpp emerges victorious, to make a sharp break from the past than the rhetoric so far has suggested. That too could have unforeseen negative consequences. Here again, it is not a decision that we can make for them. Americans, especially i would argue those in the government can do, is to make clear that these matters are not just sensitive and important in beijing and in taipei but also for washington. To takethe u. S. Needs account of the likely reaction on one side of the straight or the other, anything that washington might do in this mainland or in the they need to take account not only of the likely reaction on the other side of the straight but also in the United States. Just as people on both sides of the straight will decline to coin a phrase will be listening to the actions of those on the other side during the campaign, between the election and the inauguration, during the ascension of the new administration and may and once that new administration is in office, the u. S. Will also be doing that. Itsit will determine actions and its reactions in accordance with the basic tenets of the u. S. Policy towards taiwan that have been in effect for 35 years. Thank you very much. [applause] instructions are to speak about economic relationship between the United States and taiwan. As people mentioned, im with the state department and i want to make sure that eve