as assistant secretary of state for diplomatic security, he testified about changes made to improve security at foreign posts. he was joined by members of the state department best practices panel, which made security recommendations of its own. this is a little less than three hours. [no audio] >> we are experiencing an audio problem with this event. we are working to fix the technical difficulty and will continue running it. hopefully, the audio will come back shortly, here on c-span. [no audio] again, we are experiencing audio difficulties. we apologize for that problem. we are working to fix it. we will have it corrected, hopefully, shortly, here on c-span. [no audio] again, experiencing some audio difficulties with this recording of this hearing on c-span. we have found another version of the recording. we are going to play that now for you from the top, on c-span. [no audio] come tomeeting will order. the chairquorum for persons taking testimony, percent to house rules. without objection, and the opening statement and any other member of the committee who wishes to provide one is included in the record. ago,tle over two years four americans serving our country in benghazi, libya were killed. two of them were killed when a facility and the manic of our country was set on fire. and two of them were killed when they dared to fight back and defend themselves and others. stevens, tychris woods, and glenn doherty represented us. they represented our country and our values. we asked them to go. and they were killed because some people hold a deep-seated animus toward us, simply because we are us. friends,mily and the and the loved ones of those killed, we can never adequately express our condolences and our gratitude. you have helped each of us understand these four were not just pictures on the television screen. they were sons and husbands and fathers and brothers, and friends and fellow americans. i remain hopeful that there are some things left in our country that can rise above politics. that ourain convinced fellow citizens are entitled to all of the facts about what happened before, during, and after the attacks in benghazi. and they deserve an investigative process that is worthy of the memory of the four who were killed, and worthy of the respect of our fellow americans. some question the need for this committee, and i respect their but the markent, of a professional -- indeed, the mark of character -- is to do a good job with a task even if you don't think the task should have an assigned in the first place. and given the gravity of the issues at hand, i would rather run the risk of answering the question twice then run the risk of not answering it once. willing to reconsider previously-held beliefs, in light of new facts and evidence, and i would encourage my colleagues and others to do the same, as we know that all the documents have not yet been produced, and we know there are still witnesses left to be examined. and we also know there are witnesses who have been examined in the past, before whom additional questions may be warranted. so i would ask each of my colleagues, given their vast, varied, and exceptional backgrounds, to put those talents to good use on the half of our fellow citizens. the house of representatives constituted this committee, and they did so for us to find all of the facts. and i intend to do that in a manner worthy of the respect of our fellow citizens. citizens have certain legitimate expectations. they expect us to protect and defend those we send to represent us. they expect us to move heaven and earth when those who are representing us, under attack. they expect government to tell us the truth in the aftermath of the tragedy, always. and they expect that we will not continue to make the same mistakes over and over and over again. which brings us to this hearing. benghazi was not the first time one of our facilities or our people have been attacked. beirut, kenya, tanzania are three that come to mind, among others. and after these attacks, groups come together and they make recommendations on how to prevent future attacks. that seems to be the process that is followed. a tragedy or an attack comes, we commission a panel, a blue ribbon commission, to study the attack and make sure it never happens again. yet it does happen again. for those who believe it is time to move on, for those who believe there is nothing left to discover, that all the questions have been asked and answered, and that we have learned all the lessons there are to be learned -- we have heard all that before. it was wrong then. it is stunning to see the similarities between the recommendations made decades ago and the recommendations made by benghazi. if you doubt that, i want you to compare the recommendations made a quarter of a century ago with the recommendations made by the benghazi irb. we do not suffer from a lack of recommendations. we do suffer from a lack of implementing and enacting those recommendations. that has to end. to use the recommendations of the most recent arb. it is also fair to ask why we have not done a better job of implementing recommendations made in some instances decades ago. attack? it take an why not anticipate rather than react? in conclusion, the people that we work for you and to see the right thing done for the right , and in the right way. they want to know something can of partisanhe din politics. they want to trust the institutions of government. to fulfill the duties of those we serve, and in honor of those who were killed, just maybe we can be what those four brave men wear, neither republican nor democrat, just americans in pursuit of the facts, and theice, no matter where journey takes us. with that, i recognize the ranking member from maryland. >> thank you very much, mr. .hairman i thank you for holding this hearing today. i know every member of this panel is dedicated to ensuring that our work honors the memories of the four americans who were killed in benghazi. etched in ourbe memory banks. ambassador chris stevens. sean smith. tyrone woods. and glenn doherty. i want to thank our colleague for opposing -- for proposing the topic for today's hearing. mr. chairman, i want to thank that topic, song we can see what has become of the arb recommendations. too often, over the past two years, the congressional investigation into what happens in benghazi has devolved into unseemly partisanship. we are better than that. opportunity toan focus on reform. pastan we learn from the to make things better in the future? mr. chairman, i agree with you that over the years recommendation after recommendations have been made. the question is, as you said, what became of them. i do believe that in life there are transformational moments. that is, something happens. ,t causes you to stop and pause and try to figure out how to remedy the situation and make it better. the problem is when those moments come, and when they come to all of us, the question is whether we pause, make things better -- because usually, if we don't, we repeat the urge, and usually things get worse. and this is one such transformational moment. the kind of oversight that can be productive -- it can be critical. it but it can also save lives. that is why i want to thank every member of this family for agreeing to do this. we are in the business of trying to save lives. that is a very serious mission. i sincerely hope the select committee will stay on the course of constructive reform and keep this goal is our northstar. it would be a disservice to everyone involved to be lured off this path by partisan .olitics today we will review the county reviewable -- review board. admiral mullins, the former chairman of the joint chiefs of staff -- during our investigation, the house oversight committee heard directly from both men about how seriously they took their roles. itassador pickering called "a debt of honor." the report was independent. it was adopted unanimously by all board members. and it was a blistering examination of what went wrong at the state department. recommendations, and secretary clinton accepted all of them. report,ey issued their the state department inspector general issued his own report, finding that, and i quote, the department wasted no time addressing the recommendations. the department has been working on implementing those recommendations for the past year and a half, and congress should ensure that it finishes the job. today, i would like our witnesses to provide an update on the status of several of the board recommendations. first, the board found that the department response to the deteriorating security situation "inadequate,"s and it was inadequate at the point in benghazi, at the embassy in tripoli, and here in washington. ambassador pickering explained that the post did not take action despite crossing several tripwires that should have caused officials to review security more closely and develop a stronger response. the board recommended that the department change its procedures to make sure the security briefings are reviewed immediately. today, the department reports that it has created a new folks tohat requires report tripwires as soon as they are crossed. so security officials can review them immediately, and take action if necessary. i want to know if this process is now fully operational. and if so, how it has been working so far. board also found that we should not have relied so heavily on local militia groups, like the february 17 militia, to protect our post. reliance, and i quote, misplaced, and found these security forces were "poorly skilled." the board recommended the department strengthen security, and i quote, "beyond the traditional reliance on host supportingsecurity high risk, high threat posts." department reports it has 17 new marine security guard detachments, and another new marine unit to enhance security in changing threat environments. in addition, the state department is now using new funding from congress to hire 151 new personnel in the bureau of diplomatic security. i want to hear from our witnesses about whether these actions are sufficient, or whether we need to do more. also found fault with the deputy assistant secretary who denied repeated requests for additional security in benghazi. at the time, this official oversaw the security of all 275 diplomatic posts around the world. to address this problem, the department created a new position to focus exclusively on the security needs of roughly 30 folks experiencing highest threat. the board praised this action, stating it could be a positive first step, if integrated into a sound strategy with the organization. today, i want to hear from the state department specifically about how this new position is working, and whether they believe we should make additional changes. everyone understands that ,iplomacy, by its nature sometimes requires us to be in very dangerous places. our diplomats work in high threat environments. eliminategh we cannot every risk, we must do everything that we can to keep americans as safe as possible when they are serving overseas. with that, i want to conclude by recognizing the tremendous sacrifices that are made every bygle day around the world our diplomatic corps, the intelligence community, and our military service members, on behalf of the american people. and i remind my colleagues that this is our watch. i said to the chairman before we started, this is bigger than us. the things that we do today and over the next few months will have lasting effects even when we are gone, and that is how we have to look at this. we prepare not only for the present, but we prepare for the future and generations unborn. thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, gentlemen from maryland. the committee will now recognize and received testimony from today's witness panel. the first witness will be the honorable greg starr. the second witness will be todd kyl. the third witness will be mark sullivan, the chair of the independent panel on best practices. welcome to each of you. we will recognize each of you for your five minute opening statements. there are a series of lights, which mean what they traditionally mean in life. this is an investigative hearing. i will need to administer the oath to the witnesses before taking her testimony. so if the witnesses would please rise and lift the right-hand. do you solemnly swear your testimony will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth? may the record reflect all witnesses answered in the affirmative. secretary starr, you are recognize for your opening statement. rankingman gowdy, member cummings, and distinguished committee numbers, good morning. thank you for inviting me here today to discuss the recommendations made by the independent benghazi accountability board, also known as the arb. x would you pull the microphone just a little bit -- some of us have had a couple of birthdays recently and/or hard of hearing. look forward to working with you as you examine the issues relating to the 2012 terrorist attack in benghazi. the attacks at benghazi were tragic. lost bye honor those we internalizing the lessons from that night to protect our people in the field as they carry out our countries foreign policy work every single day. kerry'sretary leadership, the commitment is being honored. like you, we want to keep our people safe. the recommendation was to riskce the department to management, ensuring that when our national interests require us to operate in dangerous places that we identify the risks and take the proper steps to mitigate them. the department has made important strides in that regard. i would like to highlight just a few examples of how we are implementing the arb recommendations, including giving high threat posts the attention and resources they need. however, even with this progress, it is essential for us to acknowledge that while we can do everything we can to reduce the risks, who we can never eliminate it fully. high threat, high-risk posts require special attention to confirm our national interests require us to operate there, and to provide the right resources to do that. we have instituted a process, , to do that. one example in action is our recent return to the central african republic. the department suspended operations there in december of 2012. this year, using the vp2 process process that plans for how we go into these operations, the department engaged in an analysis that determined we should and could . we worked with our colleagues at the department of defense to assess the security situation on the ground and develop a comprehensive plan for our return. we are proud to report we deployed dod and state personnel just last week. while we must closely monitor conditions on the ground, our return demonstrates that are enhanced risk management procedures are working. another example of our enhanced risk management steps since benghazi is how we improved it training. chief of mission personnel, including both security professionals and all foreign service personnel, are better prepared for operating in high threat environments. we have increased the expanded training for special agents. they receive high threat training specifically, and we have also expanded what we call our foreign affairs threat course for foreign service colleagues that go to all of our high threat posts. we are working toward making this counter threat training universal for foreign service personnel and employees for all of our posts overseas. fire as ao combat weapon, we partnered with the city of new york fire department and the asymmetric warfare group to enhance our training curriculum and implement countermeasures in response to fire and smoke as a terrorist weapon. finally, with your help, we have added to our security resources. recommended we expand the number of diplomatic security personnel, and we have done just that. we are well on our way to finishing that off and hitting all our targets. it also recommended we augment the marine security guard program, each we have done as well. while these are just a few examples of department efforts, i believe they highlight some of the key progress we have made. i will not outline all of the things we have done, in the interest of time, but i am pleased to report we have made what we consider to be tremendous progress on the arb recommendations. we have closed 22 recommendations, and seven are in progress or nearing completion. protectedere better and better informed to manage the risk. we work on ensuring that our hasign affairs committee safe platforms for carrying out our national interests. i want to thank congress for the resources you have provided to improve and sustain this diplomatic platform, and i will be happy to answer any questions you may have. chairman gowdy, ranking member cummings, and the select committee for asking me to testify on our panel report on best practices. in the aftermath of the attack of benghazi, libya, we provide issues relevant to a report. our panel was committed to identifying best practices on throughout the u.s. government, the private sector, nongovernmental organizations, and international partners, which can establish and affect the list -- the risk management process, improve the security of u.s. diplomatic facilities abroad, and enhance the safety of department of state and foreign affairs agency personnel , not only in high risk areas, but globally. we identified 40 crucial recommendations to achieve this goal. we continue to stand behind our report in the strongest possible terms, and believe that the 40 recommendations and the supportive narratives which were derived from well-known and established best practices, provide a clear roadmap for an absolutely necessary organizational paradigm change throughout the department of state, to support the current direction of expeditionary diplomacy in the application of proven enterprise risk management enhancements. i spent a career of almost 23 years as a special agent with the bureau of diplomatic security and the department of state. i am uniquely familiar with the history and operating culture within the bureau and the department of state. azhar pennell interviewed hundreds of people in the u.s. gain the truth in numerous high heaven threat locations, i could not have been more personally and professionally proud and heartened, along with my fellow family members, by hearing and witnessing the admirable work of men and women of the diplomatic security service. world, theound the team faces challenges and risks to divide a safe and secure environment for the conduct of u.s. foreign policy, and they do so with distinction. the men and women of the bureau of diplomatic security are truly dedicated public servants, and are owed the gratitude of the american people for their service to this great nation. as we stated repeatedly throughout our report, best practices will not save lives resourced, are implemented, and followed. , as was5 years ago mentioned in the chairman's opening statement, a number of very similar recommendations are made after the east african embassy bombings, and little has been accomplish by the department of state since them to improve its approach to risk management. while we are pleased our report has finally been officially released by the state department, we are disappointed with the decision not to implement recommendations number one, the most important one, and recommendation 13. in a meeting with deputy secretary higginbotham and , westant secretary starr were encouraged by their candor and support for our report, and the commitment to adhere to the recommendations. continuing sense of responsibility, we voiced our concerns in a recent letter to deputy secretary higginbotham, both those recommendations not implemented and those apparently relying on pre-benghazi rss is to demonstrate or achieve implementation. now is the time. clear the smoke. remove the mirrors. now is the time for the determined of state to finally institutionalize some real, meaningful, and progressive change. as the ranking member said, this is a transformational moment. they cannot lose this moment. words and cursory actions by the department of state ring hollow, absent transparency, and verifiable and sustainable actions to fully put into practice the letter and the intent of our recommendations, andill facilitate diplomacy safeguard the americans who carry out our national security priorities around the world. the department of state owes it to people who have given their lives in service to our country, and to those who continue to serve in dangerous locations around the world, to continue to identify and implement risk management best practices. additionally, we urge the department to institutionalize the process of outside and independent counsel in guidance of risk management for actresses sooner than 2016. the accountability review board recommended this be a manual process. concur that this remains a critical need for the department and should begin as soon as possible. in our view, this is a decisively important step in the department must take to ensure a continuing dialogue on security best practices, within the -- with input from outside independent experts regarding high threat and challenging locations. finally, i would like to take a quick moment to introduce another member of our panel sitting in the audience. host: -- a man who is a great american. >> mr. sullivan, you are recognized for five minutes. kylhank you for asking todd appear beforeto you today. i consider it an honor to have served on the best practice panel with outstanding and dedicated individuals. our team of todd keil, richard murphy, andthy stephanie murdoch have a 175 years in law enforcement expertise. during our years, each panel member has gained an understanding of the importance ofhaving clear lines leadership concerning security matters. we as a panel also understand things do not go as planned. and when they don't, it is vital to implement lessons learned, in an effort to prevent them from happening again. they panel report reflects the independent views of the panel, based upon our best professional judgment, experience, and analysis of the best practices, informed by interviews, travel, and extensive research. it was a pleasure to serve with this dedicated group, and i appreciate the professionalism and hard work. i would also like to acknowledge and thank all of those interviewed in the course of drafting this report, from the u.s. government, private sector, international organizations, and foreign governments. the best practice panel was the result of the accountability review board for benghazi, which recommended that the department of state establish a panel of outside, independent experts, with experience in high risk, high threat areas, to support identifyc security, best practices and recommendations from other agencies and countries, and evaluate united states security platforms in high risk, high threat posts. i'll report provided 40 recommendations in 12 different areas. those areas are organization and management, accountability, risk management, program criticality and acceptable risk, planning and logistics, lessons learned, training and human resources, intelligence, threat analysis and security assessment, program resource and technology, host nations and guard force capability enhancement, regular evaluation and change management, leadership, and communication and training. it was the opinion of the panel, all 40 recommendations would strengthen department ability to protect personnel and work safely on a global platform to achieve american foreign-policy goals and objectives. thatanel's view was recommendations were realistic, achievable, and miserable. on august 20 9, 2013, the panel delivered its final report to the department of state. of the 40 recommendations we offered, the department accepted 38. of the 38 accepted recommendations, 30 have been in addition,and the implementation process for the remaining eight is ongoing. the two recommendations not accepted are, the department should as a matter of urgency establishing under-secretary for diplomatic security and number 13, a way for us to establish security standards should only be provided subsequent to the implementation of mitigating measures, as agreed by regional bureau or other program managers , advised by department of state and informed by the department of risk management model. lookedt practice panel across a wide spectrum of private and nongovernmental organizations to identify effective measures to enhance department ability to ensure a safe and secure environment for employees and programs. not surprisingly, the panel found that many institutions, including governments, referred to the department of state bureau of diplomatic security as the gold standard for security, and seeks to model their service after the bureau of the nomadic security. any organization must continually evolve and improve in a dynamic environment. the panel continues to advocate that the way forward should be characterized by cooperative efforts that will provide a framework which will enhance department ability to protect americans. in order to be effective, we must be innovative, so we ensure institutions adapt and evolve to meet security requirement needs. in any environment where uncertainty permeates, one certainty we share is the collaborative effort needed in our country to ensure the safety and security of all american lives. it is also a necessary certainty that we honor and protect the memories of those citizens who have been lost as a result of violent attacks, with dignity and respect. i would like to take this opportunity to thank the department of state, the overseas post that hosted our panel visit, and the bureau of diplomatic security for the outstanding support they provided during our endeavor. i would also like to thank the chairman, ranking member, and members of the select committee for inviting us here today, and your continued efforts to make america safe. i look forward to any questions you may have. >> the chair would now recognize -- n from indiana. >> i would like to thank the panel members for being here. you dedicated your careers, whether it is protecting the ,resident, or foreign officers and we would like to thank you for that work. in preparation, i look to the department of state website, and learned there are reports that show -- i am certain you are 1970's, therehe have been over 500 attacks on our diplomatic facilities abroad , in over 92 different countries. from 1998 through december of 2013, there were 336 attacks against u.s. personnel and facilities. these include things like rocket attacks, firebombings, attempted murder, arson, takeovers, vandalism. not until 1987 that the state department started what are called accountability review boards. arb's sinceeen 19 that time. -- as ie reviewed only understand, it is the mission of thearb's to review only most significant attacks against our personnel, and to review security and intelligence, and whether or not government employees reached their duties. as the chairman and ranking member have brought up, in the 1998 east african bombings, 300 lives were lost. 12 americans. the rest were africans. was convened them, and made several findings and recommendations them. this follows what was called the panel, 14l -- enman years before the east african arb. those recommendations were found in east africa in their arb. at the time, the secretary of state accept it all the recommendations in the east africa arb. here we are 14 years later, and some of the same recommendations have been completed by the benghazi arb. we seem to have a long history of repeat recommendations. i think there is a significant difference between recommendations and then lamentation. and i would like to talk about how that happens and how that has happened. in fact, the board in east africa urged the secretary of state to "take it personal and active role in carrying out the responsibility of ensuring the security of the u.s. diplomatic personnel abroad." of u.s. diplomatic personnel abroad. and it was essential to convey to the entire department that security is one of its highest priorities. assistant secretary starr, are you familiar with the east africa recommendations? >> not every specific recommendations, but with the report, yes, ma'am. >> and do you agree with the report? >> yes. >> are you aware that after the benghazi arb, then-secretary gave her personal assurances, as well, that she put overall responsibility for implementing all of the arb recommendations in the hands of the deputy secretary. are you familiar with that? >> yes, i am. >> and that was, in fact, in her letter to -- in december of '12 to at the time the honorable john kerry, chairman of foreign relations. she indicated that the deputy secretary would be overseeing the implementation of the arb. are you familiar with her letter? and then are you familiar with the fact that when secretary kerry became the secretary of state, he initially kept it at the deputy secretary level, is that correct? and could you please speak into the mic, thank you. >> yes, ma'am. >> today, however, overall responsibility for oversight and implementation of all of the recommendations is with an office known as management policy right-sizing innovation. is that correct? one of eleven separate offices that reports to the undersecretary of management. >> mpri is tracking. they are not necessarily responsible for implementing, but they are doing the job of tracking the implementation, yes. >> and it is their job. and so i'd like to just point out, for those who might not be familiar, and you, too, are an assistant secretary reporting to the undersecretary of management, is that correct? >> yes, ma'am. >> and so, with respect -- and you say that they are tracking the implementation. however, that is the office that is day in and day out going in and trying to ensure that all of those recommendations are being followed. is that correct? >> one office, yes. >> and so at this point, the arb recommendations, it's really not at the secretary of state level, it's not at the deputy secretary of state level, the second level, it's not with an undersecretary, but the tracking is happening at the fourth tier. is that correct? the tracking and making sure that day in and day out is at the fourth tier. >> the tracking is going on at mpri. but i can also give you further information about how it is, in fact, being closely looked at by the deputy secretary herself. >> and the deputy secretary, are you familiar with the inspector general's report, sir? >> yes, i am. >> and the inspector general, who issued the report in 2014, also believed that at the highest levels in the department, those are the individuals that must be personally responsible for overseeing those recommendations. isn't that correct? >> yes, it is. >> and, in fact, indicated in the i.g. report that that's how lasting change and cultural change would happen. is if implementation were at the highest levels of the department. >> yes. that is true. >> i'd like to ask mr. keil, if you might, your best practices panel indicated that where a security function is placed in a department is a statement of how that organization values security in its personnel. do you recall that finding? >> yes, ma'am, very well. >> and can you please explain with respect to recommendation number one, which has not been implemented by the department, can you please talk about the importance of that recommendation of elevating the importance, actually, of mr. starr's position, to a higher level? can you please talk about the importance of that recommendation, and what you understand as to why the department is not elevating the importance of security within the organization at the current time? >> as we looked at other government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector, it became very clear that the placement of the chief security officer with responsibility for the safety of the programs, and the people, clearly depends on where it's placed within the organization. especially at the department of state where visuals, because of the culture of the department of state are so crucially important. the placement of that position, it was crucially important. mr. starr previously served up at the united nations in charge of their department of safety and security. in that organization, he was an undersecretary. that position was an undersecretary. the united nations recognized that important and that diplomatic world where you see things really matters. and, ma'am, if you'd actually look at our recommendation number 40, we recommended that the secretary should establish a comprehensive change management strategy throughout the department that is led by the deputy secretary for management resources. so those two things clearly come together and are crucially important. >> and in your view, the best practices panel, when they looked at the organization of the department, it was clearly your view that overall responsibility for security from a visual standpoint, which is important in large organizations, was too low on your chart? >> from a visual standpoint and also from an operational standpoint. i remember on the first day when we brought out the chart as part of our panel mr. sullivan was trying to find the bureau of diplomatic security and i had to keep pointing him further and further down the chart until he identified it. >> and while it might not just be where it's placed on the chart visually, it has to do with command and control, does it not? >> exact. command and control and informed decision making. >> and, in fact, when you are a lower level on an organization chart that requires you to then move up within the organization to get approval for things that you'd like to do, is that correct? >> yes, of course. >> i'd like to just briefly wrap up with mr. sullivan. and with respect to -- you've led a large federal agency, the secret service. is that correct? >> yes, ma'am. >> and you understand the span of control, and so with respect to the need to lead lasting cultural change in an organization, which is what i believe this panel is going to try to lead and to do, where does that need to start? >> i think it needs to start at the top. >> and when you start at the top, which would be the secretary of state, if you want to emphasize within your entire organization the importance, and in this place of security, the deputy secretary or the undersecretary, which are considered principles in a department, is that correct? and that's the highest levels? >> yes, ma'am. >> and with respect, do you have any other comments you'd like to make with respect to mr. keil's assessment? >> when we look at management, that is a very large and very complex directorate. it has important functions going on there but its personnel, budget procurement i believe there may be about 20 or 21 assist avt secretaries or deputy assistant secretaries reporting up to that undersecretary. and for us, quite frankly, this was not about an upgrade in title. quite frankly, from my perspective, i don't really care what the title is. i just think there needs to be a direct report up to the, you know, in my former position, and i may be biased, you know, i reported directly to the secretary. we had the deputy secretary of the fbi was on our panel, and the fbi directory put it to the attorney general. we just believe that it's a -- that that's the way that this should be structured. we think internally and externally, it tells people, you know, where security is thought to be, and the importance of security. but again this was not about an upgrade in title. this was just about clarity of who's in charge of security. >> thank you. and i yield back. >> the gentle lady from indiana yields back. the chair will recognize the gentleman from washington mr. smith. >> thank you, mr. chairman. talked a lot about process. who is in charge. how can we -- i always think one of the first recommendations when everything goes wrong, going to go back and review who was in charge, how we can change the process, how can we sort of move around, who was -- who was and who should be responsible? but what i really want to focus on is what should be done. regardless of who it is, who is in charge of it, the challenge i see, and i've, you know, as i've traveled around the world to various different posts, i'm just, you know, awed and amazed at the risks that people who serve in the state department take every day. i went to a consulate we have in peshawar in pakistan, and just listened in to the personnel there talk about going back and forth to work every day, all the security that's involved. we are in a lot of dangerous places throughout the world. and most of the people in state department that i talk to, you know, take a certain amount of pride in that. it's their job, they're going to tough places to make sure that american interests are respected and watched over. but the question becomes, how do you protect them? so, you know, we've got the recommendations, these recommendations, what have we learned about what you can specifically do forgetting for the moment of who is in charge of doing it to enhance security at high risk posts. security atk posts? i guess it will be two piece. how do you identify the high-risk posts, first of all? and second of all, once you identify one, what do you do? how do you then try to enhance security and make sure that people are protected? and if you can tyie that back into what played out in benghazi, what should have happened as a result of that identification that didn't. and then the broader question about high-risk posts and how you approach them now and befor before. >> thank you. we have always rank ordered our posts according to threat. we look at the threat of terrorism. we look at the threat of civil disorder. this is done in a process every single year with a tremendous amount of input from the post itself, from the emergency action committee on the post, which has members from all the different agencies that are represented. we rank order these posts and give them ratings for terrorism, for civil disorder. for things like crime, counterintelligence, human intelligence, technical intelligence. >> and then the question, the real key question there is then what? once you identify them, how do you try to better protect them? >> we look at these posts and for years we have worked through the overseas security policy board to craft security policies and standards. physical security standards. technical security standards. procedural security standards on what we can do at these posts, at these different threat levels. once we decide and we see that a post is in our highest threat. so let's say a critical threat category, we're going to devote more rsos. we're going to look at what is the size of the marine detachment? does it need to be larger? in terms of the posts, that plays a huge role in when we decide which posts we want to rebuild after the capital skurlt cost sharing program. and we prioritize, replacing the most vulnerable posts with more, with newer, much more robust, much safer facilities that we build with funding from congress and offiverseas office and buildings. we look at threat and make determinations now in the aftermath of benghazi. w our highest risk 30 posts. we sent out teams specifically to those posts, and in addition to making sure that they meet the security standards, are there things that we need to do in addition to the security standards that make sense? these were multiagency teams that we sent out. we continued to look at the threat information from every post around the world that we get every single morning. we start at 8:00 a.m. every morning looking at the threat information that we get. but one of the critical lessons we learned from benghazi is there are many times, andny we know this from times past, that we don't get specific threat information before an attack. if we did, we would thwart the attack. and congresswoman brooks talked about how many attacks we have suffered over the years. that's our document that we put out to ensure that people know what the environment is. or we may evacuate the post. there are times we go to the the u.s. military and ask the department of defense to augment our protection on the ground. in tripoli we had nearly 100 marines with us, so on a daily basis we look at exactly what's happening on our post overseas. try to make sure we're aware of whatever intelligence is out there. try to make sure we're fully aware of the larger instability question and what does that mean to us and put the right resources in the right place and take the proper steps. >> so as a result of the arrb on this specific instance, what do you think you learned specifically about benghazi? what should have been done there that wasn't? and actually let me ask mr. sullivan that question. >> our focus was not to evaluate what happened in benghazi. our focus was to come up with best practices. during the course of that, we did become aware of certain things that did happen in ben gau benghazi. when we met with tp assistant secretary, and we met as a panel, we quickly determined that we were going to take our approach from a tactical approach to more strategic approach. we recognized that, you know, they didn't need us to tell them what type of weapons to get, what type of fire equipment to get. that we needed to approach this from a strategic perspective. i think one of the things you see in any type of situation where things go bad is communication. i think this comes down to communication. and you know, we made recommendations under planning and logistics. we made four different recommendations there. and i believe for any type of a trip, whether it be to benghazi or wherever you go, there has to be a cohesive plan. there has to be logistics. you have to do a very good job of risk management. obviously, there was a communication breakdown for that visit to benghazi. i think it was mentioned earlier that there were numerous trip wires. i think in that spring, starting in march of 2012 and going up until july or august of 2012, there are numerous incidents that were occurring that needed to be communicated. that needed to be discussed. they needed to talk about what were the mitigating measures they were going to take to protect our people at that mission? and again, i think that unfortunately, four people paid the price. because that communication didn't occur and that planning and logistics quite frankly didn't happen the way we were recommending it should occur. and which i have ever confidence that assistant secretary starr and his staff are working on right now. >> do you want to add something on that? >> i think, congressman, the first question is it's not about how many people you send, how many walls you build. the first question has to be, and that's where we change from a tactical approach to a strategic approach. the first question has to be -- do we need to be there? do we need to be in benghazi? and the department lacks a risk management process to make those informed decisions. do we need to be in those places? do the risks -- are the risks less than the national security priorities or the policy gains? the department does not have the process to determine do we need to be there and do we need to stay? that's the center and the heart of our report. the department needs that process. not just give them more people. not just give them more guns. do we need to be there? if the national security priorities outweigh the risks, fine. then go. there's nothing wrong with that. we're not saying don't go. but you need a risk management process, which the department lacks to make those determinations. we're not saying don't go. but you need a risk management process, which the department lacks to make those determinations. >> congressman, my good friend todd kyle here. could i just say, perhaps it should be past tense. lacked as opposed to lacks. this is one of the things that we've concentrated on most over the past two years. it is the heart of the vital presence validation process. >> and talk about that. the chairman talked at the outset of the necessity of this panel. but we've done that with a number of different reports. and as you point out, we made this change now. so what is different about that communications level as a result of the arb and some of the other studies that we've done? >> sir, the biggest single change that i would really like to point out is the department's acceptance. not just acceptance, but embracing this concept that first and foremost, as todd just alluded to, we need to ask the question, why are we in the most dangerous places? and the 30 places that we identified as the highest risks, that's exactly what we're doing. going through every single one of those 30 and doing this vital presence validation process. the first step is, what is our national interest for being there? why should we run these high risks that we've already identified as a high threat, high risk post. and if the answer comes out that the risks don't outweigh why we should be there, the national interests, then we're going to make decisions that either we have to put additional security in, or we're going to have to wait. >> and we've actually in the last year pulled out of posts in the result of that process, correct? >> not as a result of that process. that's the longer strategic process. the risk management process and the principles of it, yes, exactly so. we have pulled or closed post because of that thing. >> thank you, gentleman. >> the chair would now recognize the gentleman from kansas. >> you said in you recent testimony there was no immediate tactical warning. that's the saying arb had found before, is that correct? >> that's my understanding, yes. >> and it is also the case that in your experience that it's often not the case that there's an immediate tactical warning. >> that is very true, sir. >> and so i want to talk about that intelligence. you in your opening statement didn't mention anything related to findings 21 and 22. in fact, in unof these matters. if you don't have the threat analysis right, all the various things you talked about is meaningless if you don't have the threat analysis correct. if you don't have the right intelligence and have it in the right place. would you agree with that? >> yes, sir. but i would just add it's not just the intelligence. you also have to look at the entire situation in the country. it's analysis and intelligence. >> i would agree with that as well. there were some 20 incidents referred to in and around from march 2012 up until the death of the four americans where there was an incredibly deteriorating situation in and around benghazi. would you agree with that as well? >> the situation was deteriorating. >> and in fact, number 21 said careful attention should be paid to that kind of thing. and your only response to that particular finding was the department has addressed this recommendation. can yo u the u tell me what tha? what it is you've done to address that recommendation? >> i can discuss part of it in open session, sir. literally we start every morning at 8:00 a.m., looking at every bit of threat intelligence and threats that come in from a wide variety of sources, not just the intelligence community, be u from our posts in the reporting. beyond that, we bring in personnel from the regional bureaus, the political officers and others that are with us that we're not just just looking at the threat intelligence. as you pointed out and we well know, in many cases we don't pick up the threat. >> is this different from pre-benghazi to post-benghazi. >> this is different, sir. we are incorporating the regional bureaus with us. we are looking at the political reporting in addition to the intelligence reporting. we are looking at the sources that we get from private companies, from ngos in the area, the entire question of instability. what is the overall threat profile, and, i would say that a much better job of looking at the entirety of the threat situation as opposed to just whether or not we know -- whether there's a specific threat against us. >> and after all the the incidents in the previous years that were accounted so elegantly this morning. you weren't doing that before the incidents of september 11th, 2012 or before the arb's findings. is that right? the state department wasn't do that, is that what i understand from your testimony? >> i think we're doing it better than we were before. >> and can you tell me if any of the changes would have made an impact on the lives of those four americans in benghazi? had we been doing those before that date? >> hard for me to say, sir. i was at the united nations at that time. i can tell you that at the u.n. when i was the undersecretary general, we were aware of the deteriorating security situation in benghazi. on the date of the attack, september 11th, 2012, i still had u.s. personnel in benghazi as well. >> let me change topics a little bit. one of the findings of the best practices panel that now dates over a year ago was the state department had not interviewed the ds agents who survived the attack at benghazi special mission, as of that date. is that still the case? >> the agents were interviewed by the fbi. the agents were interviewed by diplomatic security. >> so the state department now -- was the the panel incorrect, or did you conduct the interviews after the panel's report, the independent panel's report? >> they were done prior to the best practices panel. we had discussed tactics tw the agents, but we had not fully debriefed them on the incident because we had the fbi 302s. >> it would be pont to know what the folks on the ground saw, right? it would be very important to know what those people saw. >> yes, sir. >> the same for the folks there that night. but there previously as the department of state interviewed all of those persons at this point? >> i hesitate to say all. we have interviewed a number of them. >> were they conducted vinlly or in groups? when the interviews were conducted by the department of state, were they conducted individually, or were they group interviews? >> individually. >> i ask that question because you know the arb conducted group interviews. i've seen that dynamic. i was in business 16 years before this when the boss is sitting around, the underling isn't quite as candid as they would be. if you look at the findings and evaluate they're sufficient for you to do what you need to do, that's important to know the the basis for what the arb did as well sochlt the interviews were conducted by the department of state individually? >> yes, sir. >> thank you. mr. kyle, mr. cummings' reference to state department general's inspector report, it indicated at least two secretaries of state have asked the question about whether the arb was a sufficient process. that is is it capable of handling investigations of the complexity that we see here. do you think that the arb itself is sufficient to make the transition from facts known about incident to conducting good security policy moving forward? >> i think there are limitations. they have significant limitations in what they can and can't do. it clearlymd impacts their effectiveness. >> and back to you. finding 23 goes to some of those limitations. it goes to the authority to recommend disciplinary action on the basis of unsatisfactory resources. are you prepared to testify today you'll help us continue to make sure that the arb does, in make surhe ability to make , in sure that the leaders of organizations are held accountable for any errors that they may have made. >> yes, sir. and it's my understanding that we have been looking at this and working with congress since december of -- sorry. january of 2013 on this. may i also just say that one of the points that i think is important to make is while the arb in several cases may not have the expertise to look at everything, the fact that the arb recommended that we consider putting together a best practices panel that could then delve further into the specifics, i think proves that the arb can make recommendations that can go beyond what they can do and look even further. i think that's a very good example of the fact that while the arb might not have the exact expertise that you're talking about, recommendations can be made to bring in other experts to do these things. >> i appreciate that. so you think it's important that the arb have the capacity -- at least recommend some type of disciplinary action against senior leaders. >> the arb already has the ability to recommend disciplinary action if they find a breach of duty. think think we're looking at whether they find a lack of leadership. i would support that as well. >> that's exactly what i was asking. mr. starr, i know you weren't on that. none of you were. i want to make sure we understand precisely what is there. i also wondered if you had a chance to review any of the intelligence that has been gathered as a result of the capture of abu cataldo, who had known -- who would have known a fair amount, would you have had the chance to implement that in the arb>? of the debriefings. we're looking at some of the debriefing material that is relative to us. and we are taking proper steps based on what we find. great, thank you. mr. chairman, i yield back. >> thank you very much. mr. star, i want to pick up where miss brooks left off. how is the department tracking compliance with the benghazi arb recommendations? can you tell me briefly? >> it's correct that the npri office is the one actually doing the tracking as we go through these. but i can tell you that i've had many meetings with the deputy secretary, myself, anyone that has anything to do with a response of a particular arb answer or best practices panel answer or the management panel answer where we have sat with a deputy secretary and literally gone through every single one of the recommendations. where are we? how have we answered it? what is the response? how far along in implementation are we? we have these meetings about every other month. she's out at the the moment. but literally she has been on top of this and tracking it since the beginning. >> and so, you said that there were seven arb recommendations that have not been completed. is that right? is that what you're saying? >> we are still in progress or nearing completion on seven of them. but they're not totally fulfilled. >> and do you have a time line on those? >> some of those, sir, are what i would refer to as evergreen recommendations. and i'll give you an example. one of the recommendations was for better language if r the security agents. since that time, we worked with fsi and specifically put together some courses in arabic and french. we call them alert courses. they're much shorter. they're specific to training d.s. agents and the types of language capabilities that they need in a short period of time. we have the courses in place. but the reality is it's going to take me a long time, you know, as agents get ready to rotate overseas and put them into the training and then get them trained. so that's the type of recommendation that's going to be actually open for a long too many. >> so but all of mine aren't like that, are they? some of them will be closed in 2015. >> let me show you where i'm going with this. they will come in, say they're going to do things. and then they wait. there's no checking up on this em. a new congress comes in and the next thing you know it hasn't been done. we want to be effective and efficient. this is a moment we have to take advantage of. so can you of those seven, the things that you know can be done in a definite amount of time, can you give us a timetable on those so that we can at least while we are a committee can hold the department accountable. is that a reasonable request? >> i think it's a reasonable request. we can supply you with the information where we are on those recommendations in panel. i would say, sir, that there is no doubt in my mind that we are going to implement every one of these recommendations. # i think one of your questions is whether or not we have been implementing arb recommendations. one of the exercises we went through last year was to review every single arb recommendation that has been made sinceggx 198. the office of npri. that aus that is tracking these. we sat down with them and went through every recommendation in the past to make sure we were doing our best to fulfill those and that office is going to track these in the future as well. i think -- i can understand some hesitancy about if we drag these out they're not going to get done. >> i can assure you, sir, while i am there, while secretary kerry is there, we are going to make sure every single one of these recommendations is fulfilled. >> as i get older, i realize that we're not going to be here for so long. we are in the places that we're in for a season. and it may come to an end in any and all kinds of ways. that's why i want you to, as i said in the opening under my watch. i want some definite timetables. so that we can hold somebody accountable. other than that, he said it best. we'll be going through this over and over and over again. can you understand what i'm saying? but you just gave me more information that i would like to add onto your list. if there are crucial things that we've been looking at, recommendations from 1988 that you are working on, would you add those -- the significant ones, going back to miss brooks now, that you haven't been able to complete that you're working on so we can have a timetable in that? i think the most important thing that we can do coming out of this, and i promise the father of tyron wood, and i looked him in the eye and he asked us one question. every family said the same thing. make it safer for somebody in the future. so are you with me? i just want to make sure you're with me. >> yes, sir, i am. >> all right. so will you come back to us, how much time you need? give us what i just asked for. >> let me take this back to the department. let me work through this. i will try to get you these answers as fast as possible. >> 45 days? >> absolutely. >> very well. mr. chairman, we can talk about this. it may be appropriate later on for us to have a hearing just on the progress that has been made. and i would -- i know that's the chairman's decision. but i think we need to mike sure that we stay on top of this. the independent arb found that the trip wise, security incidents that are supposed to trigger reviews and responses were, and i quote, too often treated as indicators of threat rather than essential trigger mechanisms for serious risk management decisions and actions. the senate select committee on intelligence came to a similar conclusion in the bipartisan report. it said, and i quote, there were trip wires designed to prompt a reduction in personnel or the suspension of operations at the mission in benghazi. and although there is evidence that some of them have been -- operations continue with minimal change. as a result the arb recommended that the state department revised the guidance to post and require key offices to perform in depth trip wires. is that right? >> yes, sir. >> and in response to this recommendation, the state department set up a committee in washington. as i understand it, the purpose of this is to review trip wires when they were triggered to help ensure that relevant and regional bureaus respond quickly to deteriorating environments. miss star, who is on that community? >> regional bureaus. representatives from regional bureaus. thest chaired out of the crisis management group. i think the biggest single change, sir is that in past years the trip wires were usually something that the post itself would look at. it's part of their emergency action plan. if they crossed a trip wire, they would determine what action needed to be made and report to us what decisions they were going to have. at this point the major change is any time a post crosses a trip wire it has to be reported to washington. at that point cms gathers a group that reviews what trip wire was cost. they look at the implications and we make decisions based on what should happen in. now in many cases the post may have always made the recommendation. but this is a much greater degree of oversight and much greater emphasis on action if a trip wire is crossed. >> can you give us an example of what happened with regard to that? >> i would say that trip wires are not just security concerns, but i'll try to concentrate on security concerns. the activities the kiev and ukraine recently. at the beginning of those activities. when it was clearly unsure what was happening and we had civil disorder in the city, the post reported quite a few trip wires were crossed for inspablt and security. decisions were made at that point. we made the decision to move them out of kiev. we moved them out until the situation had ceased and rectified itself. we looked at reverse trip wires. was the situation really changed and what had changed? then we made the dogs to return the families after the situation ended in the middle of town was resolved. >> i look forward to sreceiving the information that we requested. >> thank you, mr. starr? the arb found that systematic failure in the security of posture in benghazi. and it was inadequate for the special mission compound and just a little side note here. three days after the attack we had been calling the embassy. we were told it was a temporary mission facility. and now it's being called a special mission compound. was there any reason for the terminology continuing to evolve into something? >> i think, sir, as it was neither an embassy or consulate or agency, there was just some -- >> do you call it a temporary mission facilfacility? >> i think that's probably the right definition. >> all right. so, all right. anyway. they had hired the blue mountain, i believe. is that correct? to do the screening of any visitors in the protection? >> my understanding from the arb and oh reports is it was a contract with a blue mountain security company for libyan individuals and agreements with, i think it was the 17th militia. >> it was the host country security? was the 17th brigade. >> well in the absence of a practical and real host country security, i think that was the be they could do. >> but the blue mountain was unarmed. is that correct? >> correct. >> who is responsible for vetting these contractors, like blue mountain, who will be used at some of these facilities? >> in terms of vetting and in terms of contract performance and those types of things? >> yeah. >> normally, sir, it's -- we have an open competition process. it's open competition. and whoever can bid on it and meet the requirements does it. i think in contingency like situations like we were finding in benghazi that probably very little competition. >> so are -- was the lowest price? >> tags right. are you aware the two contracts were counciled and that the rso at the facile -- at the temporary mission facility had recommended they not be used? >> i read reports of that, sir. >> okay. you were once an rso, correct? >> yes, sir. >> in your distinguished career, do you ever remember recommending that a service not be used? that you were familiar with anywhere, and then them being hired over your protest or your recommendation? >> not in my expeeps, sir. >> okay. >> but you would have at some point recommended somebody or maybe not recommended anybody. was it your job to look at the performance of these people? >> if we fine that our contractor is not performing we have a variety of ways. we can qynéér> all right. you had mentioned february 17th the martyr's brigade, i believe is what it was called. we were told that was basically the host company security. is that true or not? >> i would hesitate to call that host country. i think at best it probably had control in the area of the city. this is based on what i read. >> is there an individual at the post that would be responsible for ensuring that the 17th brigade was responsible and dependable? >> sir, i wasn't there at the time. as a former rso i can probably tell you there were likely limited choices and one of the things that an rso would do at that point if faced with limited choices is try to train them the best he could. >> he would have to train the february brigade? >> if he found they were not up to the levels that he wanted, he would engage and assist in the training in making sure they understood the guard orders and making sure they had the capabilities necessary. >> and they were hired in case there was an attack inside the compound to respond, who would have had the contact information, and who would have been responsible on the post for contacting this protected brigade of martyrs? >> there were, as i read the reports, sir, again, i was not here at the time. there were personnel on the compound. they had telephone conversations with their own groups. >> with their own groups? >> with other personnel in the groups? and there was a communication in the operation center making phone calls. and there were phone calls being made from the anex. >> okay. let's go the trip wires that mr. cummings was talking about. the foreign affairs handbook describes it as events that activate, initiate or set in most post plans to prevent harm to the post. the u.s. citizen community or other u.s. national interest. the handbook also notes when a trip wire then occurs, it requires that an action be taken. are you familiar with that? >> yes, sir. it's my understanding that the trip wires are preplanneded, preapproved measures that should be taken in light of a security related incident or threat. is that true? >> that is true, sir. >> as the state department emphasized the purpose of having trip wires? >> has the state department? >> having trip wires? >> yes. when a trip wire is breached, that breech is enough to take action? is it not? >> at a minimum, it's a warning that the post must review what has occurred and then determine whether action needs to be taken. at a minimum. >> take action rather than just requi requiring they sit around and reevaluate the situation? >> well, sir, trip wires are written in advance of activities. we try to cover a wide variety of situations that could occur. predicting the future and exactly what your actions are going to be is very difficult. i think the purpose of trip wires is to indicate that wait, something has just happened. this could be significant. we need to consider whether or not we need to take action in this case. >> okay. it was normally a post activity. now once wire is tripped it is watched. >> would you consider a hole being blown in the perimeter wall of the temporary committee, would you say that? >> i would say that's a good indicator. >> and that event would have probably -- should have caused some action or discussion, correct? >> yes. >> would an attack on another diplomat coming into benghazi that caused the country to pull o out. >> i'm assuming you're referring to the attack on the british ambassador. >> i am. >> i certainly thing think it's indication of instability. >> so those are two trip wires that you would consider insignificant, would you not? >> yes, sir. >> and what was done with the security after those two trip wires were tripped? >> sir, as i said, i was not here at that time. >> well, you've read reports. >> i'm aware that the rsos were increasing physical security. they were engaged with training in the facility. they had run drills with the annex. i think from what i read they were doing the types of things an rso would do when he sees the situation beginning to deteriorate. >> well, thank you for your testimony. thank you all for being here. and let's hope we can get some results out of this tragic event. >> the chairman now recognizes the gentleman from california, mr. shift. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i want to thank you for conducting the hearing today and for the way you have worked with us to bring together wnszs and follow up on arb recommendations. i greatly appreciate it. i want to ask you gentlemen something in a bit of a different direction than the question you've had so far. i think serve on the appropriations sub committee. and i have the opportunity to meet with a lot of foreign service officers, both here and washington and around the world. many have described to me what they consider the benghazi effect. on their jobs. and by that, they refer to such a heightened concern about security that many of them feel they cannot fulfill their mission anymore. that they are confined to pa bunker or not allowed to undertake things they think are necessary to job responsibilities, and i think this sentiment was best expressed in june by vice president of the american foreign services association who wrote, does our collective response to benghazi threaten to make the foreign service less knowledgeable about the world and less influential with a host country and the u.s. government itself? that's a question that ambassador stevens might have asked. and i wonder if you can share your thoughts on it, as we implement the recommendations of the arb and of your panel. how do we make sure we're not preventing people from doing their job? we all acknowledge this is a dangerous thing. as many i colleague pointed out, our facilities have been attacked literally hundredses of times over the last couple of decades. it's happened in the past. it's going to happen again. we want to protect our people as best we can. but we want them to be effective. that's why they're there. if you could each share briefly your thoughts on are we striking the right balance, or has the benghazi effect meant we are undermining the able of our people to do their work? >> congressman, you are going to the heart of the question of risk management and how do we implement risk management? over many years we've made great strides in building safer and secured facilities so that an attack on a facility that could hurt everybody in one attack, we've done great things in terms of protecting that. and i think if you look at the number of attacks against our facilities and how few have been successful, most have been driven off with casualties by our security personnel or others only. we made great strides in. we can't lock people inside embassies. the whole point of diplomacy is to get out. and in many cases it will be the most restrictive for the foreign service personnel. but we have to get them outside of the wall as well. and that means protective security details and armored vehicles and working the host country security services. every single day we run motorcades outside of our embassy in kabul or iraq or tripoli, we were taking risks. but every single day we were judging what that risk was versus the need to get out and making sure that we could balance those risks and we were not getting our people out for not very good reasons. they had to be very important reasons. in lower threat level posts we're operating almost normally around the world. we have physical security around the post, but our people get out every single day. that's the work of diplomacy. talking to people, understanding the country, representing the united states, and bringing information back, and you don't do that without talking to people. so i think all the efforts we've made in terms of recognizing what are the highest threat, highest risk posts, doing risk management and making sure we're getting the people out when we can, but understanding if too many people get injured or it's too dangerous, we can't operate. and if we're not taking the threat seriously enough, we won't be there either if we get too many people killed or injured or the threat is too high, those are the types of things we need to weigh every single day. and we do. i can understand the] of foreign service officers. no, sir, they cannot live out in the open economy. they cannot just go to a coffee shop. but we are still getting them to the meetings they need to get to. >> i don't think that's the issue for them. as much as they would like to be accompanied by spouses and go to a local coffee shop, what they've expressed to me is not that which they understand, but they can't undertake the meetings they want and the places they need to go to have the meetings and the contacts they need to gather information for the government, to convey the u.s. position to people, they condition do their job because they're confined by a hyper conservative point of view perspective back in washington. and you get that feedback, and are there any situations where you feel the pressure has been such top be so risk avoidant that we're not allowing people to do the job. >> i think in the immediate aftermath after benghazi. i think there's a deep appreciation of that attack. an the pendulum may have swung the other way for a while. i think today with the systems we have put in place. with the risk management we're doing every day. the additional resources that you're giving us, i would not agree with that same, sir. i think we need to take precautions, and we do. i talked with ambassador deb jones when we were in tripoli. i talked with the ambassador about whether or not we're getting out enough and doing the things we're doing and they say yes, we are. and let me ask you another question because i have limited time. one of the problems with benghazi is the overreliance on the loyalty of the local militias to provide security. are there any places around the world today where you feel were continuing to place an overreliance on local militias for security of our facilities? >> that was something we talked a lot about. when you go into a situation like that, and no matter where you go in the world you're going to have to come up with that evaluation. if you don't have that capability, no amount of money you're going to pay in the contract is going to rock that. it goes back to risk management. if you don't have the capabilities locally, you have to go and bring them in yourself. i can't speak to who has them and who doesn't. but i really think when you look at the reaction of that guard force, leading up to that, those trip wires that were spotted there, i mean, that was a real concern. and again, i just go back to there might have been the will, but there was just not the capability. >> on either question? >> i think first of all, sir, one of our recommendations, i'll start with as mr. sullivan pointed out in his opening statement, when we first started with our panel we thought we would look at these tactical issuesover building bunkers and higher walls. we quickly realized that wasn't the answer because that doesn't facilitate diplomacy and we moved to thexpda=ímqiq% and looked at the department and overseas post and risk management. we asked ambassadors, deputy chiefs and foreign services officers as we traveled overseas, tell us about the state department's risk management process. without exception, each one said there is none. and they make it up. and sadly to this day, while they may be making(syprogress, that is still a significant concern. risk management process, as you indicated, sir. the foreign service is a dangerous business. we have to be out there. we have to do these things that are national security priorities. but we have to do it under a risk management process that's effective and sustainable andzú transparent. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i yield back. >>en thank you, the chair will now recognize the gentleman in ohio. >> mr. kyle, how many years experience do you have in the security field? >> approximately 30, sir. >> and how many years did you serve the state department in the the area sf. >> almost 23. >> did you get good evaluations in high reviews, strong reviews? >> yes, sir. >> so good that you were put on the security detail to protect the secretary of state. is that accurate? >> yes, sir. sectarian warren christopher and madeline albright. >> and the most recent service in the public sector was assistant secretary of homeland security. is that right? >> yes, sir. >> and that's from the obama administration? >> yes, sir. >> you trust the agents in the field, mr. kyle? >> i trust them. they know the ground truth. they know what's going on. they're the guys on the ground putting their lives on the line just like you did. when they make a recommendation to the state department, you take that seriously? >> yes, i would. >> are you aware the guys on the ground in benghazi repeatedly asked for additional security and were repeatedly denied? >> yes, sir. from what we saw. they said this thing is out of control. we need more good guys here. and it was worse than that, wasn't it, mr. kyle? >> probably, yes, sir. >> because they said not only we need more. but what they had was reduced. is that accurate? >> yes. we heard testimony he was on the ground in benghazi. he said we couldn't keep what we had. we're the united states of america. we have facilities all over the globe. my guess is the security people will say we can use a few more folks. but wasn't the situation in libya and benghazi unique? >> when you look at the intelligence and the numerous incidents, yeah, i would prioritize benghazi. >> we had assassination attacks on the british ambassador. this is as bad as it gets. the state department says you're not going to get that. if you were an agent on the ground, would you be boblying for more help? >> i would be extremely frustrated and try to push every button i could possibly push. >> you get the request from these guys on the grounds for more help. would you have fought to make that request happen? >> my last position, i was a regional director for the bureau vetting those requests from the field. i would have put a significant amount of priority on benghazi. >> so you had that job? >> yes. >> before benghazi you had the job? >> yes. >> and you would have went to bat for them? >> i would have. >> what's the overseas security policy board? >> it's an inner agency board that is a genesis from the beirut embassy bombings. the kbhigs that maded the security services. the standards. it's an inner agency board that creates physical security, technical security. procedural security. >> so these were standards developed interagency. so state department standards, is that correct? >> state department leads. >> and the resulted from the embassy bombing in beirut where 64 people were killed. 17 americans. >> yes, sir. >> and were the standards followed at if benghazi facility? in talking with people and based on my experience, it was a purposeful effort to skirt the standards. >> so the standards weren't followeded? >> no. >> so my understanding is there's a waiver process you have to follow if you're going to deviate. was that followed? >> that was one of our recommendations, sir, and when you're not following the standards, you don't have to following the waiver process. >> so they didn't follow standards or the waiver? >> correct. >> what's your overaum impression of the arb report? >> mr. sullivan and i testified before the house and oversight government reform committee. the ambassador referred to the arb as being fiercely independent. in the same hearing, admiral u mullen admitted to oversight and government reform that he was reporting on arb proceedings through the senior staff of the safety department outside of the requirements of being a member of the arb, i don't think that fits anyone's definition of being fiercely independent. >> you don't think it was independent at all? frankly, i share your belief. when secretary clinton gets to a point, when sheryl mils calls them up and asks them to serve. when neither are interviewed. when they get a draft report before it goes public, in essence they get to edit it before the rest of the world sees it. when admiral mullen told the committee, told the committee, now think about this. he's been on the job a few days as the cochair of the supposedly independent arb. be on the job a few days. he discovers that she's going to two days later come in front of the oversight committee. he realizes she's not going to be a good witness. what does he do? just what you referenced, mr. kyle. he gets on the phone and calls the chief of staff to the secretary of state and says charlene lamb is not going to be a good witness. she's not going to reflect well on the state department. he gives a heads up to the very person he's supposed to investigate. of course this wasn't independent. we asked mr. mullen, why do you care if she's a good or bad witness? your job is to get to the truth of the american people. not to get to the heads of the >> it's recommendation number one. most of the others hinge on the implementation of that recommendation. >> yes, sir. it's designed to give accountability to one particular person at the state department, is that correct? >> to identify those who are -- >> yeah, something miss brooks talked about in her opening questions. >> yes, sir. >> designed to give accountability and responsibility to someone at the state department. and is this the first time this recommendation has been put forward, mr. kyle? >> no, sir, our panel was a bit surprised to uncover a memo from now 15 years ago that secretary of state madeline albright signed ordering the creation of an underdsecretary deputy of security. >> that wasn't followed. we have a recommendation from madeline albright, the lady you protected,that say wes need to create an undersecretary after americans were kill nld the east african embassy bombings. >> yes, sir. >> and that wasn't followed. has the state department said they're going to implement this at all? >> they said it's one of the recommendations they're not going to implement. >> they're not going to implement. my question is simple, mr. chairman. what is it going to take? what is it going to take for the state department to put in place the practices to save american lives? they didn't listen to the guys on the ground. the pros that know what they're doing. they didn't listen to the guys on the ground that put their lives on the line. they didn't follow their own standards that were developed in 1983 after the bay rue embassy bombing. they didn't follow the waiver process to deviate from the standards and now they're not following the panel ee's numbere recommendation. what's it going to take? the ranking member in the opening remarks said this is a transformational moment. somebody better tell the state department that. think of this track record. i hope it's right. i hope they get it. if they're not going to listen to two guys with the experience that mr. kyle and mr. sullivan have and say the one mange thing we need is person of accountability. the one ming thing that everything else hinges on. talk about the arrogance of the state department. hopefully one of the things this committee can do is convince them to follow these guys. at least convince them of that. thank you for your service. amazing work for your country. we appreciate your work as well. 42 seconds, i would yield. >> wli don't you answer the question of the state department? >> you can is ask him that question. the way this works -- >> reclaiming my time. that's -- you're welcome to do it, mr. chairman. i think you spent a lot of time on mr. starr. i chose to focus on mr. kyle who has 30 years of experience, appointed by the obama administration, 23 years in the state department, viewed so highly he was actually on the protective detail for secretary of state to warren christopher, secretary of state madeline albright. i chose to use my ten minutes on mr. kyle. minority can use their ten minutes on whatever witness they called. this is a hearing they called. >> thank the chairman from ohio. now recognize the gentle lady from california, miss sanchez. >> thank you, mr. chairman. and thank you to all the witnesses for joining us for what i hope will be a productive and forward looking hearing on what can be done and what is being currently done and what we have yet to do in terms of trying to prevent a tragedy from benghazi from happening again or at the very least minimizing the potential for something like that to happen again. i am going to begin my questions on the same realm of where the questioning left off. talking about the security accountability framework within the department of state. the best practices panel, led by mr. sullivan, determined, quote, clearly defined accountability and security at every level is fundamental for effective security management within an organization. and the panel recommended the development of an accountability framework. is that correct, mr. sullivan? >> yes, ma'am. >> in response to that recommendation the department created a security accountability framework that the department explained clearly defines key actors, their roles and responsibilities, and governing you. can you please describe the responsibilities at each of the various leadership levels? >> i think the first leadership level starts with the secretary of state. the secretary acknowledges that he is ultimately responsible for the security of our personnel overseas. beneath that in the accountability framework, the next person that has the direct responsibility for security is me. assistant secretary for diplomatic security. and i would have to say that we looked long and hard at the recommendation of whether it needed to an under-secretary position or assistant secretary position. it was a rental by the panel. the department looked at this very seriously. ultimately, weighed all the points behind it and made a decision what was probably more important is whether or not i, in my position, had the direct access to the secretary that was necessary. and under accountability framework and f.a.m., i'm directly responsible to security threat information and security threats against our people. i still do report to under-secretary for management. we think that's key because isolated and alone diplomatic security would not have some of the capabilities we have with buildings operations, imn and others. i want to put that back on the record. one of the things the accountability framework talks about is that all of us in department of state are responsible for security. specifically designs the roles of the department secretaries and what they do. it defines roles the under-secretary for political affairs and under-secretary for management has. the most important thing it does is define roles for other assistant secretaries, the people i work side by side with every single day, who run the regional bureaus, the wha, era bureau. and it assigns security responsibilities to them. in fact, their job descriptions have been changed to reflect the security responsibilities. >> let me -- let me -- >> all of this is contained in the accountability framework. one final thing, which i think is critical, we can't do the security we need to do unless every individual foreign service officer understands that they have a role in their own security as well. and it goes to defining that. >> so, those expectations have been communicated, then, on down the security framework, is that correct? >> yes. >> and state department employees have a clear understanding of what the chain of command, so to speak, is for security decisions and security decision making? >> overseas it was always clear. it ran from rso and chief of mission. it was always clear overseas. it was a little less clear within the department who had the responsibilities. this document goes a long way, taking information that was already in the f.a.m. and putting it together into a clearer framework, yes. >> if i can go back for just a second to the number one recommendation about creating a different position that would be in charge of security explain some of the thought-making process that went into the ultimate decision not to accept that recommendation and essentially make you responsible for security. >> well, first and foremost, i think it has to be acknowledged that i am responsible, whether i'm the assistant secretary or whether it be changed to deputy -- i'm sorry, an under-secretary position. the department looked at this and and had to weigh different things. under-secretary has different responsibilities rather than one focus on things. if you look at other under-secretaries and the range of things they do, it's -- one of the things the department made sure of is this position, my position, a, we are access to secretary and other leadership. second, that i wasn't being diverted from the just pure security role by other duties. under-secretary position would carry other duties. my predecessor was the assistant secretary for diplomatic security and the chief of overseas foreign missions. the office of overseas foreign missions. one of the things we did in the aftermath of benghazi was to separate those two functions. now there's an ambassador in charge of overseas missions. i'm not distracted by that role. i focus exclusively on security. >> i have two other questions i would like to ask. mr. sullivan, do you think the new framework that the department of state has clearly defines accountability and responsibility for security? >> congresswoman, we haven't been fully briefed on that. what i heard just now, i think that's a great start, but clearly there has to be accountability. people have to know who's in charge of security. also the point that was made earlier, how all the employees feel around the world. i think that that leadership is important to let them know they're valued, that they're supported and that those people making decisions are going to be made accountable -- every employee will be made accountable for those decisions they're making. >> thank you. i want to hit on the issue very quickly. i have very limited time about temporary staffing. several investigations into the attacks in benghazi found the temporary staffing of security officers was what contributed to poor security at the benghazi facility. the bipartisan senate homeland and governmental reform committee found, for example, dsa agents were remaining for relatively short periods, often no longer than a month. the independent accountability review board concluded that the utilization of temporarily assigned agents in benghazi was problematic. i'm quoting from their findings. the short-term transitory nature of benghazi staffing to be another primary driver behind the inadequate security platform in benghazi. staffing was at times woefully insufficient considering the post security posture, considering the high risk, high threat environment. the end result was a lack of institutional knowledge and mission capacity which could not

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