Close to the militant industrial complex, it seems that this new doctrine will before related in aggressive terms. Nuclear tactical strikes are not just a method of last resort but they will actually be used in a very aggressive and forward moving fashion as well as a certain level of threat is perceived. Do you see this approach you are proposing here will actually make its entry into this new doctrine . Is this based on your ideas, on your theoretical developments that you yourselves have worked on or does this reflect a more technical approach among Russian Military circles that is kind of above or below the current hysteria that surrounds the question . One of the interesting things about this project and doing the research was going back into the different strategies that existed on the soviet side in the cold war. They dont follow in a nice clear statement. This doctrine is not a significant change from the historic position on Nuclear Weapons. They were always just weapons. Usable in the event they have retained an enormous arsenal of nuclear arc of nuclear artillery. This was always part of their war fighting doctrine. I think it is chet it is telling they have not been used. I think it is likely they will not continue to be used. In the awareness that Nuclear Weapons are weapons, that they are not there for some abstract notion of reserving mutually asserted instruction, theyre there for use and have a deterrent function because theyre usable, that is completely reasonable. This is not so different from american thinking and the contemporary context as well. The level of engagement russias nuclear power. I dont believe this is a huge departure. I dont believe it has to be destabilizing. I do not belong to the Russian Security community. Neither is he. Though i dont belong to the Security Community i think that there is selection is going on and it will be just one of the products of this reflection. The Security Community adapts much more flexible. Taken into consideration they emerged from the borders suddenly. Middle east russian chinese relations are strategically though it does not prevent both sides from taking a certain security measures. I would agree that this approach is not much different from what has been developed after the second world war. We write that Nuclear Weapons are always considered as just another. Just another instrument. Thank you. Congratulations to both of you. Having seen the paper developed it is an impressive document. I have a couple of questions. Thinking about how either american or russian officials would react to the change you are proposing it strikes me that current russian officials would be far harder to sell on this and that they have somehow become more better students of shelling than their american counterparts and more interested in concepts such as a secure second strike and focused on the utility exclusively. What happened . How do we understand how we went from war fighting to Nuclear Weapons to what we have today. That is the first question. This question about arms control and transparency, it is worth thinking about how we achieve transparency. They have been the only means historically of providing forward. The Data Exchange and inspections and even the commitment not to mess with the other side home means, only if they are legally binding in the context of arms control. Verifying compliance it is the only way we have figured out how to do the transparency we described. We have never had that before and it would be a different thing. The question about whether you are talking about on Nuclear Weapons or just to teach it Nuclear Weapons comes up. It is the same principle of nonstrategic weapons. This paper changes how we think about it. This is the Legal Framework where the legal from her can be found to ensure transparency. I do believe we do care about political issues. The debate was predominated the classic american approach. We have more intensive debate. It is also just a weapon. We have five future generals. We think the debate is not developing. The adoption of second strike capabilities, strategic and shelling, i think it justifies larger military budgets. It is a way of articulating Strategic Concepts that justifies much more military sent the terri spending. They had requests about this insane proposal. This argument continues to hold. What would be the harm in unilaterally reducing your Nuclear Arsenal to the level at which you could simply destroy the other country . Is a pretty powerful deterrent in and of itself. I think that is a very subversive concept for defense complexes in both countries. It was an accident, a high product a byproduct. We should be focusing on agreements that simply provide transparency. It was quite unlikely to achieve in the current context. We would be much more likely to achieve just the transparency and just the observation verification. Both sides have an interest in that. Russia would be interested in making sure we are not mobilizing to attack in to attack. We are facing a lot of crises these days. Whether we are talking about on Nuclear Weapons or strategic Nuclear Weapons, in many ways we are advocating class to turns. Straight out to terrance. To the extent of your capabilities that involve nuclear artillery, those may enhance the turns as well. If we are concerned about the baltics or ukraine, then limiting the Nuclear Weapons and removing them from a strategic doctrine would advocating their use. It may be a way of limiting conflicts in the future. The conflict has remained relatively limited. The question i want to ask it is about the implications between the two sections of the paper. If keith was right in saying a possession of nukes has moderated what might have been an excess of american or unrealistic reaction of some kind, lets say that is true. Lord knows we have had enough difficulties in recent months. Of we know there is one issue in which russia would be even more incensed of american policy changes shift. That will be on the question of nato enlargement. What if ukrainian leadership takes the lesson from these events that it either has to nuclear rise ukraine it had a physical custody over weapons it could not fire. Nonetheless it had them. Of it gave them up and now is in this very difficult situation with its neighbor. The alternatively if you cannot build your own and ukrainians could do this only against a very stiff resistance of the United States who wanted to do that, the alternative would be to join nato. Is it possible this would be an unintended side consequence of what you are proposing and is there nonproliferation . I think that is a false choice, nuclear rise or nato, to provide your own security. Ukraine is in the situation it is in now. In addition to the fact that a social movement overthrew the government and the government lakhs legitimacy in parts of the country that created the conditions in which separatism can grow. Him or is no question separatism was supported by russia. The real problem is ukraine lacks state capacity. Nuclear weapons were not solve this particular problem. Him with ukraine would ukraine fire Nuclear Weapons of moscow . I dont think so. Would there have been secession . We had secession in chechnya print this is a different type of problem in chechnya. This is a different type of problem. They dont play very Important Role in dealing with internal challenges like the ones the Ukrainian Government is facing. I think that ukraine cost choices ukraines choices it is billed the state or die and effectively achieve legitimacy. Build the state or die and effectively achieve legitimacy. It is a political problem. It is not a military problem. It is removing oligarchs from power, removing private companies, removing the private he the privately supported information. If ukraine could have been a nuclear state, who could absolutely assure the Nuclear Weapons will not get into the wrong hands . Those that can employ them regardless of the intentions of the ukrainian or american government. Them i want to talk about the role of conflicting strategies in syria between how the conflicting strategies of both countries will affect the strategies of the two countries. How will the situation in syria affect the compatibility of the two nations . I think strategic compatibility gives us a sustainable framework. I think strategic compatibility will leave us selfish of our diplomatic action. It makes the diplomatic action more solid, primarily on the russian side. When it deals with problems like the syrian problem, it is more about bilateral relations. The danger is not cases like syria. Him if there were circumstances in which both countries perceived a vital interest was at stake, those are the ones at real risk. Him if there is a lack of common interest in areas of vital interest, where there is equal resolve on both sides, that could escalate into a broader conflict that would undermine the stability of the relationship. The u. S. And russia can have very different views and pursue different policies on a variety of conflicts throughout the world but not fundamentally destabilizing their relationship with one another. That is the historical norm in international politics. We would like to avoid armed confrontation. The capability of the relative powers is not going to play an Important Role. We have limited ambitions. We enjoy the situation when the survival interests are not contradicting and overlapping. This is one of the arguments in the basis of power. That gives us luxury to develop the entire concept. With regard to Missile Defense, the assumption is if the country has Missile Defense capabilities it will make the use of Nuclear Weapons if Missile Defense did become the norm between the two countries, what with that have on quantities necessary. What are missile both United States and russia have a level of technological sophistication in their weaponry that they should be able to defeat any Missile Defense. Missiledefense is largely a filter for other countries. If not for the type of weapons that the United States and russia are likely to have in that sense it is not destabilizing. Russia and United States would no longer have a deterrent. It would simply be in the realm of conventional weaponry. Kings that are real threats to the United States and potentially similar threats to russia. In terms of unilateral reductions, we are faced now because all machines have a lifespan the rockets we built during the cold war are coming to the end of theres. It is not a question of do we reduce but do we rebuild. We are now faced with a choice of if we could start it all over again would we build the arsenal . The answer is clearly no. It is a question of letting certain missiles go through the end of their lifespan, building new certain missiles that are sophisticated, and that is a different model than the cold war and a much more reduced force. Him that is what we mean when we say reductions. Him that is what we mean when we say reductions in not returning to those cold war levels. We will be able to develop the Nuclear Forces which will be able to penetrate any american defenses. If russia will feel unsecure unprepared. This is an area where transparency will be important. Russia has to have some familiarity with the Technical Specifications of our Missile Systems to know that it doesnt negate their nuclear capability. We should be able to provide that information because it enhances our security. I have three questions. Do you guys see a world where there are no Nuclear Weapons echo weapons . Does your paper just getting rid of the icbm component . And did you guys have any good or funny stories from the research that you put into this paper . Do we envision a World WithoutNuclear Weapons . The answer to the first question is there is no answer is no. The stories are so politically incorrect that i cannot tell them in this room. I could envision a World WithoutNuclear Weapons in the same way i could envision a World Without spears as the primary methods of warfare. And the contemporary context i think taking away some of the most powerful weapons you have without new weapons emerged is extremely unlikely. China has not been a party to any of these bilateral cold war agreements. That is the dark shadow on this paper. We talk about the u. S. Russia relationship. China is out there. China is a threat to both parties. That is going to have a nuclear deterrent. There is no question about it in the nuclear context. This is political talk already. The upturn the the opportunistic point is that neither russia nor americas feeling from danger feeling of danger from china is objective in nature. The cases are very subjective and not by the objective threat of china but by how we perceive china. That makes the situation looks better. In terms of funny stories, when we started writing this paper we were hammered for being too pessimistic. Increasingly we are hammered for being too optimistic about the nature of the relationship. Even if trust is nonexistent. The myra memories conversations. What i still dont quite understand is if it was possible to achieve another armscontrol agreement between russia and the United States, if we were able to obtain that we have, wouldnt that still be preferential to the proposal you put forth . Or are you trying to say in fact i squirmed when i heard you say this are you saying that doing your own thing is preferable to negotiating bilateral treating a bilateral treaty between russia and the United States . I would suspect there would be plenty of russian generals that would like to hear what you had to say. I thought part of what you had to say was unless the u. S. Is interested in reducing its nuclear are so Nuclear Arsenal can do so without concerns. They should be comfortable of that. My concern is how you would sell that here. Those in the nuclear zero community would be worried about taking unilateral reductions that do not get us closer to a world of nuclear zero. There are plenty of people in this town who you will never be able to convince the United States needs to unilaterally reduce its weapons, not only given a certain level of russian capabilities but in the new context we are in. I am still uncertain how we are going to sell this. There is a chinese saying that that words make bad deeds. I did not believe in the continuation of the arms control negotiations would be good as i do not believe continuation of any cold war preferences would be good any cold war practices would be good for continuing National Security security. I think the problem with arms control is they read assigned to achieve parity. Parity, largely in nuclear capability. In the current context with american superiority and everything about Nuclear Weapons, i think it is not likely to symmetrical reductions in nuclear arms will not achieve symmetry insecurity on the two sides. I do think that unilateral reductions could occur. We have certain financial constraints. We may want to invest those resources somewhere else. Would you allocate resources to something that is a fantasy that is not likely to obtain . I wouldnt if i faced a budget constraint. This country faces a budget constraint. I dont think we would do things that are unnecessary. It is plausible. You just mentioned the u. S. Should allocate resources toward more strategic defense things. Do you think we are entering a new era in u. S. Russian relations that would be more beneficial to the u. S. The thing to be wiser to allocate to the u. S. To allocate Resources Americas ability to project its power more effectively echo more effectively . I want ask you to comment on improving american security. I wont ask you to comment on the ruling american security. I think better Nuclear Weapons may be a good goal for funding. That would be a reduction in number. I do think priorities in other areas should be pursued. Manned fighter jets would not be first on my list. I think that is going the way of catapults and things that are no longer going to be important. Of not convince the navy paid navy plays ace im not convinced the navy plays a centrally Important Role in what you are suggesting we spend money on. I am not opposed. I am a Lieutenant Colonel air force pilot. I wanted to talk very quickly. I understand the argument in terms of its not a nuclear not a numbers parity game. What you feel about an asymmetric jump lets say the lungs the longrange Strike Bomber gives a true largely penetrating capability against a country like russia. How does that factor into the arms control debate and this idea of stability between the two countries . How does russia feel given the fairly extensive use under the bush doctrine of preintervention by the U