if you look at what was discussed very early on in the nuclear posture, the one area where we didn't have much of a disagreement and where very conservative planners on nuclear forces and very progressive voices on nuclear issues came to some agreement was to understand that regardless of what size we need, we're going to have to have some reinvestment in the nuclear complex system. people -- the delivery vehicle and the industrial base supports it. we can debate about whether we need the facility in new mexico or the facility in tennessee but we recognize we're going to need some level of that. this budget cycle has shown us we're still very far away from getting that type of agreement and if we want to have any set of reductions we'll have to work on what that is going to be. but the flip side is true. if we intend to get any real sustainable investment plan we're going to have to have reductions to support that because you're not going to be able to convince the congress you need to spend money on that unless you show some of them that it's a path down. so if he went don't have both pieces of that puzzle we'll have a very unreliable nuclear arsenal than we need to support our security and that i think is a loser for all constituencies. sorry i went on a bit long. >> thank you very much. now we're going to turn to another facet of the nuclear weapons question focusing on some of the issues relating to nato policy and europe and the tactical nuclear weapons problem. treena, a senior researcher, thanks for being with us. the floor is yours. >> thank you. first thank you for inviting me. i'm really honored to speak to such a distinguished audience and pleased to be in audience. it's always a treat to come to washington. in my studies over the years, it has always seemed to me that nato is nuclear addicted. so the questions that i've asked myself after the publicication of the review is is nato still nuclear addicted? the simple question or the simple answer to that question is yes. although now with the promise that nato is now willing to consider not to have any of the flying around at home and europe as long as russia is willing to do the same. unfortunately, i suspect this is not a position with great prospects. so they've asked me to do a brief assessment. now, perhaps i should say even though i know this is a very knowledgeable audience is it somehow slipped through attention don't blame yourself because you could say that since the announcement at the summit about 18 months ago it has turned into a secret review process. it started out being something that was agreed to say the concept because germany had launched a question of nuclear weapons and no one could agree to that to get into the strategic concept. the agreement was then to launch a major review of nato's overall deterrence and defense posture. that was then going to be presented at the chicago summit just a few weeks ago. what happened after that was it started out being quite a public affair but after a few months i think nato realized that they had actually bitten off more than they could chew and the process turned into being an almost secret process. it has rarely been referred to since then in public. a few months into the process no one in nato would go to gathering and talk about this as it was published at the chicago summit without so much as a press briefing. so not surprisingly, it has only had sporadic public interest and i think the knowledge about it is quite limited within gatherings like this. now, when it was announced at lisbon, many including myself welcomed the process as an opportunity to get a proper discussion about nato and the posture and particularly the future of the forward deployed american nonstrategic nuclear weapons still based in five european countries. perhaps 95ly i also hoped that in light of changes, in light of nato's role in the new strategic concept and in light of the additional capability in terms of dissent might also discuss alternative ways of showing commitment of reassurance and on sharing of risk and within there. unfortunately this does not appear to be the case and i have to agree with former u.s. senator sam nunn that at best deserves a grade of incomplete. so what's in the documents? well, i think you are already guessing what i'm going to say. there's not a lot in there. it's mostly hot air. despite the really complicated and conceptual issues, the document is less than 3,000 words long which includes long prose about the less central issues that the airlines could actually agree ob. moreover, the document is written in a complex language that seems to be designed to detract from rather than to add to clarity about these very complex and hugely important issues. most importantly the document effectively dodges the main issues and it fails to completely answer some of the most essential questions, what is the purpose of nuclear weapons? especially the forward deployed weapons? how has that purpose changed since the end of the cold war? what is the overall defense and tee deerns posture? it doesn't answer these questions in any depth. in addition the document, the implications are to innovate cooperative security and crisis management to court along with the original collective dissent. despite the significant changes brought about by the strategic concept, it reads as if none of these changes matter. so this is puzzling and it is also disappointing. because the recent core tasks and the new case sensibility clearly opens up new possibilities of how to show commitment and cohesion in the alliance. it has been completely unable to suggest new ways of assuring nuclear sharing and possible alternatives. and the value of burden sharing through practical participation in the other two core tasks that i mentioned. so sadly overall the document constitutes a victory for france and those central east european allies who maintain russia as the main security concern and who basically joined nato in 1990 rather than a nato that is ready for the security challenges of the 21st century. so the list of pros and cons. i would suggest the following positive aspects. first it is positive it was made public. it was only agreed shortly before chicago. secondly it's positive that the document makes rhetorical reference to the possibility at least of reducing or withdrawing nonstrategic nuclear weapons. thirdly and this may be stretching it here as positive but it's positive that the weapons of mass destruction disarmament committee which was established as part of the process will be replaced with the new committee that can function as a consulttive and advisory forum because nato needs to have that. however, this may turn out to be a turic victory as the mandate has to be agreed which could take a very long time because france is basically against this. it's also positive that it contains a commitment to developing confidence and transparency measures vis-a-vis russia and does not close the process but rather appears to be open for continuation of internal debate about the issues raised and in fact i have to say that i think this is the most positive aspect of it. now, unfortunately it seems that on the negative score sheet there are much more substantial and ironically although the -- well, substantial issues and ironically although the document endorses the status quo the reality is that the stacetuss quo simply cannot be maintained and i list problems in additions to the ones i've already talked about. the third problem is that even if no agreement can be reached on changing nato's posture, it will change. however, without an agreement the change will come through the disorderly internal nature process of national nuclear disarmment. when some countries are going to -- will decide not to replace the dual capable erik with nuclear capabilities. germany certainly seems certain to do that and wants the decision to withdraw, then holland and belgium are likely to follow. the likely outcome is disarmment by default. the other invisible change that is also surrep tishesly is an organization of the gravity bombs. they state that it will ensure that all components of nato's nuclear deterrence remains safe, secure, and effective. what this basically means is that the existing bombs will undergo costly life extense programs which will upgrade the capability considerably by changing the bombs into precision guidance. parallel with the disorderly nuclear disarmment is hidden a nuclear escalation also by default. the overall effect modernization of the overall capable erik to include joint strike fighter with modernized guided weapons on the 6 1 will constitute a considerable upgrade which will certainly not go unnoticed in russia. thirdly, another huge mistake in the dttr is it's made contingent on resipcal russian measures yet russia has made it clear it will not discuss until all forward deployed weapons have been removed from europe. however, as nato has already removed 90% of the weapons unilaterally the 180 or so remaining hardly constitute a good bargaining position against the more than 2,000 weapons. i think nato is about to repeat the mistake of the 1980s when it leaked the information to the soviet. nato simply asked and not make it contingent on what russia does. another problem is that the d bpr is completely unclear on nato's stance on the issue of guarantees. it sounds like they have adopted a policy of guarantees but when reading the document closely it appears that nato is simply acknowledging the different national positions of the three nato countries, the u.s. and the u.k. give the guarantees, france does not. such a policy is not a good foundation for coherent nuclear nato posture. and finally, it completely fails to ask the questions about the weapons especially what nonstrategic weapons are for. as it does, it cannot possibly provide the answer to what constitutes an appropriate mix of conventional nuclear and defense forces. nato needs to ask appropriate for what? sadly, as this is exactly what it is set up to clarify to have failed on that count is a real indictment i think of 18 months of work. now, have i got time for? >> a couple of the next steps. the next steps and this is the really difficult question. because one of the aspects or one of the effects of the way the dbpr has been conducted it has painted itself into a corner and it is not a good corner. i don't see any constructive next steps within the parameters left by the ddpr especially problematic is that it has restricted the maneuver by making the withdraw contingent on resipcal moves so we have a stalemate situation. it's also problematic to identify the next step because although the official line from nato is that it shows nato unity, in my opinion it has basically divided the alliance into two camps four for withdrawal and bad russia/good russia. i think on doing this which has been consolidated it has been a decision that has been consolidated over 18 months it is going to be the next step that nato needs to address. within the parameters of i think nato's best option needs to be to return to recommendations that was submitted last april as the first step nato should see increased transparency with numbers, type location operational status and the level of storage security and these are questions that could usually be addressed in the council and hopefully lead to a better atmosphere and a more constructive working environment within the council. moreover, following the american elections this year, renewed effort at reaching an understanding with russia, would if it could be successful provide an environment that would be more conducive to further discussions on nonstrategic nuclear weapons. but for the time being, as i said the best thing about this is that it didn't close the process. so now that the restricted process is over, nato should start a real dialogue and proper analysis which might be able to apply a holistic approach to the overarching question, who, how, and from what. and what is the role of nato's nonstrategic nuclear weapons and why in fact does nato need them? after a suitable break not too long i hope nato needs to get back into the process of talking about these issues with an educational focus that is why the nuclear committee that i spoke about is really important. and speaking as a european and this is my very last point then i can say this sithes also time for the u.s. to take the lead and to seek the influence the central europe peans. the united states has had a background decision in this and has basically left it for the europeans to sort out the issues on these matters. but european allies will never agree on anything unless there's a crisis snapping at the heels or some very clear leadership exercised by the united states. so there you have it. i can say it. i'm european. so the nato needs to get back to its traditional way of dialogue and persuasion under american leadership in the committee of nato in the nuclear group and in the committee that hopefully will get a name and hopefully will get a mandate. thank you. >> thank you very much. so i think we have a clear message for our speaker that more needs to be done. there is reason to change our thinking about nuclear weapons, find ways to reduce the risks but the path ahead is complex, not clear. i take leadership and creativity. and now it is your turn to stimulate the discussion with your questions. we have a couple of microphones that will arrive if you raise your hand, if you state your name and ask a question and address it to one of the speakers. why don't we start over here. >> yes. one of the road blocs to transparencey regarding tactical nuclear weapons has been the reluctance of nato itself to acknowledge where they are and numbers. and as a result, u.s. government cannot confirm or deny except for germany those facts even though everybody knows of course where they are. so can we conclude from what you have said that nato is now willing to acknowledge where the tactical nuclear weapons are? or will nato only do it if russia adopts a certain amount of transparency as well? thank you. >> well, obviously a precondition would be that nato would be willing to give the transpashesyir as well. it's not a oneway street. everyone knows where the nuclear weapons are. everyone knows how many are there. i think by now. so there's not really that much on those issues. where i think the issues would be much more in storage and the site security would be issues that would be interesting on both sides. and russia would have an interest in getting to know some of those issues particularly on the issue of the old storage sites in what has happened to the sold sites in central and eastern europe. i think there would be some room for maneuver there. but clearly nato would also have to move on the transparency issues as well. >> i think the challenge in this as you well know is russia is not concerned about our weapons in europe so there's not -- you can't leverage whatever you have there because it's not a threat perception for them. very early on in the administration there was a willingness to say we don't need these. let's make some decisions and we'll deal with them on our own and basically i think some of the institutional biases came to bear both in the peng and in the state department, unfortunately. so i'm sort of an outliar here. my approach is simply pull them out and force the russians to justify to themselves and to their own people and the europeans why they need thousands of nuclear weapons themselves. >> just to be clear what the independent experts estimate is there are some 180 u.s. gravity bombs in five european nato countries. and russia is estimate bid independent experts to have some 2,000 tactical weapons on their territory. we have another question in the middle. >> when the administration's budget was released a number of members of congress said that the money for the national nuclear security administration was inadequate and said that you were basically walking away from the commitments you made in the start treaty. so i'm wondering if you can go through with us the thinking on the budget you presented and is the administration living up to its commitments? >> i think it's a very partisan game that's being played on the administration's budget and i think it's unfortunate. the criticism of people who know in fact the details but think it's good optics to argue the contrary. the facts are this. that in the context of new start the president submitted a plan as requested by congress which said it was our intention to pursue programs and capabilities necessary to maintain a safe secure and effective nuclear arsenal and our estimate was those capabilities would cost about $ 5 billion over the next ten years for the nuclear complex part separate from strategic launch vehicles and so forth. after the budget control act came into force, there were new restrictions on how much the president would be able to request and so people wanted the president to basically say we're going to ask for money that legally we can't ask for and the president said we're not going to do that and in fact we went to work very quickly saying if this is the money that's available and this is what we need how do we ensure we get what we need? and that was a very open process over the next ten years there's a reasonable estimate that we can provide for what this will cost us. congress chose not to fund that number. the house in particular controlled by republicans who pushed for the 1251 report chose not to fund the administration's request and shorted it by roughly $800 million. the lab director came to the nsa and said we don't think you're going to get the money that we all agree we need and we think we can save you -- this is the lab director coming to us saying we think we can save you money, perhaps an unprecedented step and saying we think we can do plutonium work without building the cmrr in new mexico. it's a big facility. it may cost about $5 billion and what the lab directors are worried about is we're going to be able to build the facilities and not be able to fund the people who do the real work. so they said ask the entire council representatives from strat come, undersecretary will this work and they said yes so we went to asking and said here's the new plan and congress is screaming you broke your promise. so i think it's just partisan gamesmanship largely designed to detract from the president's preimpressive accomplishment on investing in the nuclear complex in a reasonable way and my hope is that the congress will finally come to its senses and do what's right for the nuclear deterrence that we need. >> tonight ask a question for the chair's place about how we move forward in the next one to two years regardless of who is in the white house with russia the next steps in reducing u.s. and russian stock pilse below the new start levels which are 1500 deployed strategic war heads and that needs to be met by 2018. new start creates a verification system that's going to be in place until 20 21. and given the difficulties of a formal negotiation with russia, and given the challenge that will happen the next round of negotiations, because we need to deal with not just deploying strategic weapons but also the tactical weapons, are there some alternative approaches? in other words, might there be a way just as george w. bush did to use the existing treaty framework to provide the transparency and the verification necessary to assure both sides but to reduce the two countries and deployed strategic arsenals below the start levels? is that worth considering given the very difficult relationship between the u.s. and russia on various issues, missile defense, syria, other types of things? >> well, i think if there are a hundred people in the room you probably have a hundred different plans. the first i would argue we need to have a decision preferably a bilateral decision which quite frankly just means us to go down the numbers immediately. these are very modest reductions. i forget the number just released of the new start aggregate was but i think we're roughly at 1750, we're going to 1550. you could pull 200 weapons out in a few days if not a few weeks. i think we need to get the new guidance in place that the president has direct support from strategic command and the chairman of the joint chiefs saying yes we looked at the plans we can go lower give that flexibility. and then i think you have those verification framework in place to say let's go down to lower numbers more quickly. you can go below 1550. you can reach a political agreement and then have the verification in place to show in fact those numbers have been reached. of course the challenge is you don't have in place for the strategic nuclear weapons and i think that's why the views are very valuable here that the confidence building and transparency measures are really what's needed. i would argue that the u.s. should do that. we need to find a way to manage the alliance correctly so that the withdrawal of those weapons don't lead to a new schism but we should give russia say a year privately and if they don't move within that time period say we're going alone and push them to come with us. >> the only thing that i would add is i think that until the elections, anything that even hints of doing something unilaterally is just not going to be on the table. on the other hand, the process -- and i certainly agree with john -- grinds along in the penguin inside the beltway -- pent gon. things are going to happen the way the u.s. pent gon and in coordination with the agency wants it to happen and some of those things are budget driven. they're going to try to save as much as they can realistically but it's not going to be private agreements with russia or anything. that's just my opinion. >> all right. thank you. all right. other questions? yes, sir in the middle. thank you. >> i think it's safe to say that within this broom there's broad consensus in support of further reductions and yet to date our nato allies have been extraordinarily supportive of the new start process. my question is comes to the fact i imagine going forward and seeing levels go down substantially more i guess i want to ask particularly dr. flock hart but other distinguished panelists as well is there a point at which the u.s. extended deterrent which i recognize is more than just nuclear weapons. but is there a point at which our nato allies, and some sooner than others, begin to get a little bit nervous about how far down we go? because we have taken all this as given that our allies -- and they've been wonderful in their support but is there a point where what the perceived benefits of extended nuclear deterrents begin to outweigh the value and how might we address that? >> i think the point is very low and realistically speaking we are going to have to face up to a ployment country number of two within quite a short period of time. i don't think there's any doubt that germany will not continue being a deployment country and once that is on the table i think holland and belgium are certain to with draw as well. the question is the weapons placed in those countries will then be transferred to turkey or italy or withdrawn back to the united states. either i think would still mean a an extended deterrence and you could argue that within the alliance as well. i think you could go down to perhaps you mentioned 20, you could go down to five, 10 weapons in europe and still say that there is an extended deterrence. so i don't think it's the numbers. i think it is much more to do with nato not being able to let go of the symbolic value that is attached to those weapons. i think most nato and including the central and east europeans, realize that they have no strategic importance and that this will provide just as much protection if i can call it that as those based in europe. so i don't think it's the numbers that is the issue. i think it is zero or more than zero that's the issue. >> and one point of clarification. the defense and deterrent posture view that was released by nato in chicago states that the supreme guarantee of allied security are the strategic nuclear weapons of the three countries in nato with strategic nuclear weapons in europe. it does not talk about the u.s. forward deployed tactical weapons as being vital to that. that deterrent capability. and the last i noticed our european allies are very supportive of further u.s.-russian reductions relating to strategic nuclear weapons. other points on this >> you know, when i was really young, jack used to call me in his office and explain the way the world has developed and of course i remember his lecture on why we had tactical nuclear weapons in the first place which was going back to really outdated thinking that the europeans were worried that somehow we were going to decouple our defense from their defense and that we needed to have in addition to the long range strike on the ground when we had the nuclear exchange, that russia wouldn't then -- they would have to launch at us and it wouldn't just be a nuclear war in umplete all of that is useless in terms of american and european strategic. does anyone believe that it would not be seen as a strategic threat to russia? if we think we need to challenge russia in a strategic way, we have lots of ways and the tactical military weapons don't have the military rule. >> i'm talking about [inaudible] i agree those are mibor but the question is overall strategic levels. there are a level of 300, 2500. is there some level of begins to make some allies nervous, maybe poland or turkey if there was, before germany and denmark do? >> i think if all we were doing were making everything we had status quo and started drastically reducing our weapons there might be an argument countries start get nervous, the concern is they might develop capabilities of their own. however, those things don't happen in isolation. what we need to think about is how to supplement your extended reassurance capabilities to these countries and that is a political process. it gets to how often you engage with these countries, where american troops are deployed, how you operate, what sort of capabilities are being purchased and i think there's a whole list of things there that we could do and should have done that we didn't that would then make it much easier for the united states to go to much lower numbers. but even if that were true i think we have a long way to go before these countries start to get nervous. >> we have time for a few more questions. why don't we go over here. >> one of the things you mentioned that it did not look at was what the effects of the european missile defense capability are. but i'm wondering whether you think the allies agree on what the missile defense capability is now and in the near future vis-a-vis the threats we face and whether you see it as performing primarily a military role or a political role. and if it's really the latter, what are the effects of building up a missile defense capability to perform the same kind of political role the weapons have in the past? are we just replicating the same problems that we currently have with russia over an issue that's primarily politically symbolic? >> ok. i think you can look at the role of this two ways. i think it does have a military role but it is not a military role that is aimed at russia it is direct at iran. and that's why they're there. but they could gain the missile defense capabilities could gain a very important political role internally in the alliance if it was to become the push for example for changing the tee ternt posture from one that is based almost completely on punishment to one that is based more on denial. and it's going back to some very old-fashioned debates that i thought i had seen the back of they say in 1990 but nerls those are the kinds of things that are being talked about. but if you have a different deterrence posture that has moved from punishment to denial then clearly you have a completely different decision within the alliance to discuss what is going to be the deterrent posture in the alliance. so that's the first thing that wasn't discussed. we just think it's a great shame. but i think it's not discussed because of the way the whole process was run but it was divided into three committees, it was not an overall discussion that was looking at conceptual understanding of what the deterrence and posture of the alliance should be. now, what the other role of the missile defense would be much more political because there would be a possibility to say already we don't have the nonstrategic nuclear weapons any more, they were not needed anyway, with this new deterrent posture but we can use missile defense as another form of showing commitment in the alliance that is completely the same as what has been happening with the nonstrategic nuclear weapons like that yowshow your commitment. so that was what i meant about the missile defense sharing. >> all right. any others on this? all right. we have a question over here. >> i continue on the missile defense question. there was this great feeling of friendship with russia and russia was not even threatened in chicago. so what's happened in between? and the next question deals with the economics or the plan to finance the missile defense. europe is in economic difficulty we are in the defense community and we're talking about pooling and sharing and actually more countries increasing its defense budget at this time. so how do you plan to finance the missile defense? >> well, the relationship with russia as i'm sure you know is worse than it was at lisbon but better than it was in 2008. so i think it's held on a piece of string. it's difficult to say what the relationship with russia is. and i think we also have to take into account that all the anythingtive developments are not completely without reason. i think that the offer given in lisbon sounded much better than what it actually is. i have great difficulty in seeing what russia can actually gain from what is being offered. so perhaps it's not surprising that there has been a downturn in the relationship and then i'm told that the russian presidential election which has also been important for that relationship because nato is perceived in russia as the enemy in the public it's very difficult to go out and say well now we're friends with nato. nato has been painted as the big devil and it will continue to be the big devil in russian public for a long time to come. so there are some quite severe restrictions. so the relationship with russia i think will probably get better. that's my hope anyway. the europeans think that the americans are going to pay most of it and that is the main diplomacy of it and then there's the opings for different europeans to contribute towards it but that is only an option and this is where my argument is that the option would then be to show commitment by actually buying into the new start. it may be a complete waste of money. i can't go into the details of it but i think that is the thinking that is going on. >> i think you're exactly right on missile defense. we placed it within a nato context, which we view as a great step forward. since this is to protect europe more than the united states versus the old plan. but i think what it comes down is on the delivery capabilities the idea that multiple european countries are going to spend a lot of money on the most expensive fighter plane system ever developed is nonsensecal. and the fact that the united states is going to be in a position to argue on one hand get your economies in order on the other hand saying you have to buy this plane is unsustainable. so our m-16s are going to wear out in 2017, not have a dual capability capability. and regardless of what was written, these problems are going to solve themselves and we need to think creatively about how that's to our advantage. >> well, thank you all. we are out of time for this panel. we will be returning to many of these subjects missile defense, tactical nuclear weapons, nuclear weapons strategy, deeper reductions in the arsenals at future events. i want to -- before i ask you to turn in and thank our panelists i want to invite the next pabble to get ready to hop up here because we're going to resume without a break. so you are welcome to do so during the course of the next session but please join me in thanking our panelists. >> as those in this room know we are now at a critical juncture in efforts to negotiate a resolution issues surrounding iran's nuclear program. after a long interval the six powers reengaged with iran on april 14. on may 23, 24 in baghdad the bodies discussed specific proposals. the six powers called for iran to end its enrichment of uranium to 20% and shift its stockpile out of the country in exchange for providing 20% enriched uranium in the form of fuel plates for the tehran research reactor nuclear security assistance and critical spare parts for civilian erik. the iranians presented their own five-point plan offering greater international access to its nuclear facilities in exchange for easing of sanctions and recognition of its right to enrich uranium. iran's chief anything slator voice t disappointment about the lack of sanctions released and complained that their proposal was unbalanced. the head of the six power delegation was more positive hoping for a tangible progress at the next round of talks in moscow on june 18 and 19th. meanwhile, the head of the international agency went to tehran to discuss a framwork or structural approach for addressing specific concerns about past iranian activities. by the end of june, the united states was scheduled to tighten existning sanctions that process iranian oil traps actions through iran's central banks, europeans are scheduled to boycott all imports starting july 1 and the centrifuge keeps spinning and decision about possible military dimensions of iran's nuclear program lingers. >> as with the israeli-palestinian dispute, it's easier to sketch out the shape of a real realistic ultimate solution than it is to figure out exactly how to get there. so to help us sort out this most difficult task we have a panel of three imminent experts. their biographies have been provided to you in writing. he's also been very active in discussions on iran and nuclear issues. ambassador wes ofion has served as iran's ambassador to germany for several years was head of the foreign relations committee and has spoken for iran's delegation to talk to the european union 2003-2005. he is now a research scholar and the author of a new book, iranian nuclear crisis. a memoir which will be launched here tomorrow. claudia croneberg is a member of the european parliament and shares the parliament delegation for relations with iron. an engineer by trading she has dock trats in business and administration that serves as minister of labor and speaks six ludges, the most difficult of which is finish. >> without further adieu let me turn to our speakers for brief remarks on where we are and the wake of baghdad and what we need to accomplish in moscow. ambassador pickering, if i could ask you to go first. >> thank you very much for the kind introduction. it's a pleasure to be on the panel. we have done shows together. we are, if it won't really destroy his reputation at home quite together on a lot of the ideas particularly importance of negotiations and i have just met and had the pleasure to discuss briefly. let me also cent omplime arms control administration on the new member and i believe you have made and continue to make a major contribution to thinking and indeed to constructive examination. i think in a way to policy. in this critically important area. i'm honored and pleased to be here and i'm delighted to have a chance to address this critically important issue. i was asked to address two questions. one, what is my judgment about istanbul and baghdad and secondly what is my view about the process of the head. i will do that against the backdrop of a third issue. i used to frequently tell this story about the man jumping off the empire state building going past the 24 ds floor everything was splendid. i have to modify that. the guy jumps off the golden gate bridge. he survives in the water and the currents sweep him away. we're sort of more in that mode at the moment than we are on the empire state building where even with the new york police holding the safety net the chances are 99.9% death. we struggle very hard and so have the parties to get us to the negotiating table and it's very important the maximum use be made of this. against that back drop it is extremely hard to see how and in what way this process will move ahead. there are 32 years of mistrust between the united states and iran supplemented by gallopping misunderstanding and indeed the lack of communications has been a thoroughly and i think completely dill tears experience for both countries the idea of being able to examine the worst case on both sides has become an art form and is more of a controlling piece than the ability to begin to talk. i think that's very significant. the p-5 plus one, depending on which side of the sthrick you prefer, is a process that is now begun and has hold a open during the future. my sense is that in every serious commitment of this sort, that crack must be kept open. the estimation of istanbul and baghdad is pretty much the golden gate bridge leap of faith story. the good news is that both have tended to produce a don'tuation of talks where as the old pattern was to have a one night stand replete with disagreements and spend the next eight months trying to negotiate the next meeting. i hope we're past that stage. the rule has some good sense the iranian side suggested that the noniranian side agreed to which is preceding with stage by stage and perhaps resolution of the problem based on the notion that there would be reciprocity. and while there was disagreement by half that iran would like to make this particular soast arrangements pretty exclusively the nonproliferation treaty. and while the noniranians could agree they also had other guide posts including the resolution that asked for cessation of iranian enrichment. i have a sense that coming out of the baghdad meeting there could have been three results. min mull, better, and slightly better. minimal was to have another meeting and they did with the benefit of the sand storm keeping there there another day have a meeting. i remember as ambassador to moscow there used to be an old soviet story that there was a contest and therd prize was a prize in moscow and the second prize two weeks in moscow. there is a strock and i think important piece that the new president of russia who is really the old president of russia has been president despite the fact that he has been prime minister for some time has gotten himself hooked on to this particular issue as he has been hooked on to syria and we have to do everything we can to help persuade him that some further success can last whether hanging on is important. the second piece is a small agreement as greg said perhaps the trr for 20% enrichment. and the third piece is we still have some endorsement worked out in iran over transparency but it was clear that was not going to work because in many ways the iranians felt they should receive something more in return for it. the third point tonight make is looking ahead. on here, an estimate of the situation has to very much take into account some of the imperatives that influence both sides. my sumation is that with the united states smaller is better. and to iran, bigger is better and that's certainly where the two sides are coming at this. in an election year, i speak quite frankly, the president takes great risks in making big compromises because the points of attack are mutt lied and indeed explaining why he went so far particularly very early in the game is a very difficult situation. on the other hand, the president has a national interest imperative in finding a diplomatic solution and the effort to continue to find a diplomatic solution is a small but not very conclusive. so keeming the process going is valuable but keeping the process going until after the elections with no movement also has a kind of conclusion of teryilt that will affect sooner than later to greet the something if something isn't achieved. so my own view is that the smaller is porpt and better from the united states perspective still remapes. from the iranian side there is very dell nill a significant degree of mistrust for the united states and has been for years in the sense that the real policy is regime change. and while we have perhaps tried more or less to avoid conveying that notion, from the iranian optic it is possible to see that almost everything we do one way or another is examined and looked at as a very serious challenge in that regard. to escape from that and to make some progress and to deal with what their preoccupation is. the notion of two features on the landscape make a certain amount of sense and we proposed some years ago that the essential trade-off would be some permitted enrichment. in return for much clearer transparency. and while this was not a sovereign answer it provided the be that we could think of at the time and seems continually now to swim in to the picture and i'm quite pleased that iran is in favor of that. i think underlying this particular process is the notion that something that large so soon from the u.s. perspective would be very difficult and something too small from the iranian perspective keeps in mind the lurking shadow, the 900 pound gorilla of regime change not dispelled and notice that the real purpose continues to be to take iran out of the nuclear business. iran is in the nuclear business for reasons that are difficult to fathle. and my friend who has said that in his own way to make a clear. why the hell would we spend billions of dollars and build 10,000 centrifuges for a program to which you have no apparent use for the output? and that worries us. it worries everybody. there is from time to time talk of going back to the reactive program and there's recent talk hopefully of building one or two reactors. but at the moment the large accumulation of enriched material and the large enrichment of technology is concerning and that's one of the reasons why there is a western preoccupation about enrichment per se even though it could be limited. underneath this and obviously suspects those -- i'm getting to my final points. there is a continuing problem about what i would call different interpretations. they believe it provides the right to enrich. but in my view it doesn't provide a right to enrich for purposes that are unrelated to civil programs and may be related to military programs and this is one of the difficulties. my sense is that a reasonable interpretation of the npt issue is you can do what you need to do in the nuclear sense in order to try to get a sufficient amount of material for your civilian programs but going beyond is difficult. and on the ironion sense i think it is anything that doesn't represent truth of diversion is permitted by the treaty and getting ready to make the decision or putting yourself in a position is in a sense the underlying deep difficulty or one of them we have to look at. my sense is that the next stage ought to be within the p-5 plus 1 an effort to get an agreement around the krr 20%. don't embellish it, don't foul it up with much more. maybe it could be slightly enhanced by some wlingnsdz not to institute some of the sanctions which have been improved, some small but not insignificant. perhaps sanctions on insuring petroleum cargos from iran could be a way of beginning to indicate that the u.s. is ready to move on sanctions. the second piece is much more difficult. but i think very important from the iranian side. and it goes to my deep concern about mist trust. i think that there ought to be a serious effort -- and so far i have to say iran has stood in the way of this -- of opening ballot rar conversations in the talks between the united states and iran at sufficient levels to convey assure that the real decision of country x and y is being conveyed. this could do a lot of things including some of the thing that is -- things opened with china. and it could talk about an end game in which weapons were prohibited in a binding international relationship but with no uncertainty. instead of relationships which include much more transparency i hope designed and carried out by the iaea a set of relationships in which we finally a gradual it is easy because we have our mindsets very close. it is difficult because normally, we leave nothing for you to discuss. i would like to thank the arms control association for managing this. i would like to touch on the subject to be helpful for face- saving issue for nuclear issue. defense issue is to emphasize the case. i think it is too much politicized. the second issue is what they raised about their rights on the mpt. many other countries have rights. the right is there. the argument is emphasizing, maintaining that responsibilities come first and then writes. iran maintains the right to enrich, and the responsibility comes after. in one step, they can agree on a simultaneous approach. the people respect the rights ever ran for peaceful nuclear technology, including the investment on their mpt, and iran also immediately at the same time accepted to sign the tentative draft agreement already agreed in tehran during the last visit. this is a war plan, which if grandson's, this would address the old ambiguities and technical questions of the iaea, including the possibility that i mentioned this could be used in order to end the chicken and egg game. the next point i want to mention is the point of the p5 +1 -- always, they have been focusing on suspension. i think in the future, they should focus on transparency measures. if they are looking for a sustainable solution, suspension will not worked, and the last 10 years of negotiation proves that. the fourth point is proportionate reciprocation. they agreed in reciprocation, but they say they were asking too much. they were asking and to address the possibilities in mentioned will additional protocols, everything. the maximum a man can do it is -- the maximum iran can do is saying, and it would never be successful. the countries are operating or bending in richmond. any solution should have the capacity to be a model for other countries. iran would never be ready to be a member of the mpt. the negotiations should have a broader region in order to make the model acceptable for others. six is to have a broader reach on negotiation. i think face-saving solutions can accommodate a broader cooperation between iran and the west, iran and the p5 +1 on bigger issues. if they have such a region, i think they would not update everything to the nuclear issue. seven is an issue that plays a very important role on the nuclear issue. that is why i really always i have mentioned in iran and the u.s. -- the need to have a direct talk in parallel with nuclear talks between iran and the p5+1. issue eight is impartiality of the iaea. after eight, nine years working on the iranian nuclear case, at the end, during my time at the agency, we have not seen a shred of evidence that iran has been wet and rising. the u.s. cable revealed that in the u.s. court, specifically on the iranian nuclear issue and the alleged military studies of iranian nuclear issue, the amount of focus on the possibilities i mentioned. iranians have a feeling that more cooperation they have had, more sabotage a more assassination of the nuclear scientists, if this is a big issue for the iranian side. the last point, or iran is extremely important. the u.s. -- the russian and chinese have other positions. the western powers always are looking for a piecemeal approach, but the iranians want to see the end game. that is why step-by-step -- a broad package to be implemented into a step-by-step plan is extremely important, but i think a real stockpile initiative would be the best achievement for both parties if they can agree. the p5+1 is asking iran to stop 20%. this would not be a sustainable solution. because maybe for a short term at the end, iran would never accept being a member because the others have rights of 20% which iran should not have. as a confidence-building measure for a short time, maybe, but they should think about the long-term solution. my idea is real stockpiles for 20%. what do i mean? a joint committee can be established between iran and the p5+1 to determine the percentage of the stockpile of 20%, which iran needs domestically. the rest either can be exported or converted to 3.5%. therefore, iran would accept zero stockpile forever. it is the best objective guarantee here rather than pushing iran to stop 20% -- even if it works, which i do not believe it would, even if they accept it, it would be a short- term solution. the second issue, as i mentioned, on transparency, the maximum question on iranian nuclear is the possibility that i mentioned. issues raised by the iaea. what the iaea and the p5+1 can expect -- the maximum level of transparency. they can define for iran the maximum level of transparency. if iran accepts to address the possibility, as i mentioned, it means iran would have to intimate additional protocols and would have to give access to the iaea beyond additional protocols. if iran is ready to sign such an agreement, then the p5+1 should also be ready for at least the upcoming sanctions on central banks and oil. [applause] >> thank you. [inaudible] first of all, i am and member of the -- i am and member of the foreign relations committee, and also the chair of the parliament delegation with relations to iran. as delegates and is located in iran. on the other hand, we are in the parliament. it consists of different conditions from different groups, and our goal is to understand what is going on in iraq. we follow the nuclear negotiations. we try to follow human-rights situations and many other aspects of the iranian society. we try to have contact with the parliament and also with society as well as people outside of iran. i am not part of the negotiations, but following the negotiations closely. the negotiations are led by the director of foreign policy in the european union, and i think this is why in the european union on the other side of the atlantic, we would like to talk about the eu 3 + 3 rather than the p5+1. but i do not think it makes a big difference. i first would comment on the current situation and tried to look at what i feel is too narrow a focus on uranium enrichment in the negotiations and then go on to the european -- what could be the next steps the european union could do. first of all, kathryn ashton sent a letter to the iranians saying that there would be respect for peaceful uses of iranian nuclear technology, and this created hope among the iranians that actually uranium enrichment could be discussed, that it was negotiable, and it would be on the table. they were willing, i think, to reduce their 20% requirement, but no such proposition was on the table. actually, the question was that the p5+1 insisted on suspension of uranium enrichment. i think the second thing -- there was this question that the iranians needed guarantees of being able to access 20% uranium because of their 1 million cancer patients, and no such guarantees were provided. i think there is a history. i presume that the iranians have had a hard time in getting 20% in rich uranium for these medical purposes. on the other hand, of course, giving up with a 20% in richmond, and the iranians would expect a relaxation on sanctions. no such proposal was on the table. i think there was this proposal of airplane parts and maybe minor things like that, so there was this clash, and the question of how to proceed. the iranian approach had been that the chief of the iranian nuclear establishment had said that they will not give up 20% in richmond. maybe what was just proposed, the idea of not filing 20%. but the stance is toughening the language is a different one. why do i feel that the focus on uranium enrichment is too narrow? i think the goal is to prevent a nuclear-armed iran, and the military aspect of nuclear weapons is much more than uranium enrichment. this is only one of the aspects. i think the other which has to be taken into account is in richmond of nuclear weapons and how far iran is from this aspect. i think we are talking about a longer time than just the one- year free time. much more than in rate -- uranium enrichment, and these aspects should be included also in the negotiation. the second question is the iranians expect some signs of a relaxed in sanctions, and western powers are now willing to give this. the question is, of course, i understand in the u.s. that congress is legislating on the sanctions, and it will acquire more time, and it will be more difficult to relax in sanctions. in the european union, it the -- it is the european council, the foreign minister that can decide on the question of sanctions. maybe there should be some discussion of sanctions on the first of july, european sanctions will go into -- there should be a discussion of the deadline. the third point is thenpc context. the iranian case shows that it is very difficult to define the peaceful uses as opposed to the military uses. we have actually a treatise with there is no clear divide on these two aspects. i think this is very detrimental for the negotiations. iran feels they have the right. but on the other hand, they feel they have not respect their obligations. a question would be what sort of rights. i think they should be in balance, but the iranian argument, of course, is that there are double standards in the npt and nuclear powers have not respect their obligations to disarm, that there are double standards in terms of other countries, which have other weapons, not pressured equally as aaron, and finally, the right to decide what that means and how will it be defined. in this case, the npt -- i think there's a fundamental case of the question of its future in this case, and we should consider that as well. if there is a military strike, which i hope will not be the case, it is a question of a country outside with nuclear weapons attacking a country within the npt. the question is -- how important is the npt for us in the future? the next question i like to take up is the question of regional security before going to the next step with the european union. i think the question is -- there are some security concerns. we all know this, and i think it is interesting to note that when the continuation of the npt was agreed in 1995, there was an agreement on the conference of nuclear weapons to be released. in 2010, it was agreed that the conference would cover the whole scope of weapons of mass destruction, and the conference would take place in 2012. we have the situation where this conference is going to take place. the countries that sponsor the issue -- u.k., russia, and the u.s. -- actually propose that the conference will take place in finland. the question is difficult, i know. no practical steps will probably be taken for a long time, but it is important that all these parties will meet at the same table and that we will be able to at least start the process. i think that these negotiations in baghdad and next time in moscow should also be seen in the ntext of regional security and the united nations conference that is coming up. they should not be isolated, and at least there is a time line. probably the conference will take place in december, it has been negotiated before that time, which also coincides with a new u.s. president, and then it would be very unfortunate. i would actually like to appeal to the arms control association. that it is important that actually this question of the negotiations will be related into the wider scope of regional security in the middle east. now, a few words -- how many minutes to i have? >> about two. >> ok, fine. the european district was at the next step -- the european union has accepted the u.s. approach. sanctions were approved in the end of january, and the intention was to send first of all a message to iran that the european union is serious, and second, send a message to israel not to strike and not to provide a military solution. i think the decision was unique in the sense that it was actually the first time the european member countries supported the common foreign and different policies. this was the first time the europeans actually agreed. this was historic. this was an agreement. there were different positions in the european union. one would describe them supporting sanctions, very tough sanctions. even tougher, maybe, then president obama on the sanctions line, and on the other end, sweden actually went along with the sanctions rather reluctantly. so there was an agreement. the european parliament had supported sanctions and had a long-term standing position that no solution is possible. so the european parliament stands on diplomatic solutions with or without sanctions. the problem is that that are leading the negotiations, but it lacks a long-term strategy on iran. contrary, the u.s. position, whichees iran as an enemy, the eu does not see iran as an enemy. there is no enemy picture related to the question of diplomatic contact with iran, so this is a different position. i think the european union should absolutely signed a long- term strategy, which implies cautious engagement rather than containment. as a first step in this long- term engagement, there is a proposal by the european parliament to establish a presence in iran in the form of a permanent delegation. second, it is important to note that the nuclear issue is only part of the eu cozy relations with iran and that these should be balanced with economic incentives as well as the question of human rights, which is very important for the european union and in particular, to the parliament. the nuclear non-proliferation issues would be combined with this incentive. and then there's the question of regional security, which is important for the europeans. i think we should at least support the conference, as i mentioned before, and see turkey as a very important bridge builder for a spirit finally, i hope the negotiations will continue, and i think for the nuclear non-the liberation treaty, and a military strike would be fundamental. >> thank you. [applause] we have about 25 minutes for questions. we're going to move quickly through them. i will use my prerogative to ask one follow-up question. we often hear cited as a model

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