Policy testified on strategical relations with china, south korea, north korea and india. Business 2. 5 hours. In the fans and Foreign Policy testified on strategical relations with is this 2. 5 hour. The Committee Meets his way to receive testimony on you as policy ends strategy in the asiaPacific Region. I am pleased to welcome our panel of expert witnesses come all with deep knowledge and experience in the region. The Senior Adviser and korea chair at the center for strategic and international studies. Aaron friedberg who is the professor of politics and International Affairs at princeton university. And the former Principal Deputy assistant secretary of defense for asia pacific security irs and senior fellow am having trouble with my enunciation. Strategic affairs at the endowment for international peace, an old friend of the committee. Americas interest in asiaPacific Region are deep and enduring, that is why for the past 70 years we have worked with our allies and partners to up hold a rulesbased order based on principles of free peoples and free markets, open skies, theen resolution of disputes. The challenges are mounting. Thehey threaten not just nations of the Pacific Region but the u. S. As well. The most immediate challenge is a situation on the Korean Peninsula. Kim jong uns regime has thrown its full weight behind his quest for Nuclear Weapons and the means to deliver them. Unfortunately, the regime is making real progress. A north Korean Missile with a Nuclear Payload capable of striking an American City is no longer a distant hypothetical. , one thatinent danger poses a real and rising risk of conflict. I look forward to hearing from our Witnesses Today about u. S. Policy options on the korean and insolent. For years, the u. S. Has look to china, north koreas patron and so strategic ally to bring the regime to the negotiating table and achieve progress toward an a new clear eyes the Korean Peninsula. We have done so for the simple reason that china is the only country with the influence to curb north korea must destabilizing behavior. China has repeatedly refused to exercise than influence. Instead, china has chosen to bully south korea for exercising its sovereign right to defend itself from the escalating north korean threat. In response to the alliance employ the Missile Defense system to the Korean Peninsula, china has waged a retaliationeconomic against south korea which has interested real damage. The twisted reality is that china is doing all of this to stop the deployment of a Missile Defense system which is only necessary because china has aided and abetted north korea for decades. I welcome the Trump Administrations outreach to china on the issue of north korea. As these discussions continue, the United States should be clear that while we earnestly seek chinas cooperation on north korea, we do not seek such ofperation at the expense our vital interests. We must not and will not argan over our alliances for japan and south korea nor the fundamental principles such as freedom of the seas. As its paver indicates, china as acted less and less like responsible stakeholder of the rulesbased order in the region and more like a bully. Its Rapid Military modernization, provocations in these china sea, and continued militarization activities in the South China Sea signal an increasingly assertive pattern of behavior. Despite u. S. Efforts to rebalance to the asiapacific, u. S. Policy has failed to adapt to the scale and velocity of chinas challenges to the rulesbased order and that failure is called into question the ability of americas security commitments into in the region. The new administration has an important opportunity to chart a different and better course. For example, i believe there is strong at four in asiapacific Stability Initiative which is similar to the european determent deterrence initiative. This initiative would enhance credible combat power and targeted funding to realign u. S. Military force posture in the , improve infrastructure, Fund Additional exercises, preposition equipment munitions and build capacity with our allies and partners. These are important steps that should be taken as part of the in copperheads of strategy the asiapacific and incorporates all elements of national power. I hope our witnesses will describe their ideas about what apsi should fund and how they would articulate in an interagency strategy for the asiapacific. Thank all the witnesses for being here today and i look forward to your testimony. Senator reid. Sen. Reid thank you to the witnesses for agreeing to testify. This hearing could not comment on more critical time as the north korean regime has engaged in an aggressive schedule of tests for its nuclear and missile programs. I look forward to hearing from our witnesses and whether they believe china can and will exert sufficient pressure on the regime to denuclearize the peninsula. If not, what are the alternatives . As a military strike something we should consider given the possible scope and retaliation . I would like to hear if there are feasible options on the table and how we should coordinate with allies in the region. We have heard concerns that the administration is has not yet articulated a copperheads of asiapacific strategy. What is the Maritime Strategy to deal with excessive unlawful Maritime Claims . How would a balance counter the narrative that china is the economic partner of choice . It balanced cooperation and competition with china especially given the importance of chinas cooperation and issues ranging from north korea to terrorism. Thank you for holding this important hearing. I look forward to hearing the testimony of witnesses on all of these issues. Before we call on the witnesses, we have a housekeeping item. Wait. T lost one, we will welcome. Dr. Cha thank you. There used to be a time when north korea interactions were considered isolated act via lonely dictator who was harmless and just looking for some attention with really bad hair. I do not think people think that way anymore. Between 1994 and 2008, north tests. Id 16 missile since 2009 they have done 71. Missile tests, including four nuclear tests. The leader in north korea has made no effort to have dialogue with any other country in the buton, not just the u. S. That includes china, south korea, russia, absolutely no interest in talking. All of this translates to one of the most challenging strategic environments for the United States and its allies and a very start dark strategic cloud that is that is starting to dominate the skyline with regard to east asia. Having said that, i think there Silver Lining to every dark cloud and in this case, there are four that could help to inform an asia pacific security initiative. The north korean threat provides opportunity for a closer coordination of policy between the next government and south korea which will be elected may 9 and washington. The new south korean government cannot afford ideological indulgences in a renewed engagement or sunshine policy. It would be unwise for for a new south korean president on may 10 presumably in the aftermath of more north korean provocations and possibly a six nuclear test to declare that he or she is reopening the case on industrial complex. This would serve to further marginalize south koreas strategic position as the new government would loose step with the u. S. , japan, and even china. To u. S. Is not adverse entering engagement. For it to be effective, much it must be used strategically and coordinate with a u. S. R. O. K. Strategy and the nuclearization. The second summer lighting has to do with trilateral coordination. The u. S. Welcomes an early president. H the presumably before President Trumps scheduled trip to the region in the fall. Allianceof coordination should be a collective security statement among the three allies. The u. S. , japan, and korea. An attack on one constitutes an attack against all. The third Silver Lining relates to china. Beijing is unlikely to let off on the economic dresser on south over the Defense System for i think another one or two financial quarters. South koreant businesses and tourism even more but they should spark serious thinking, Strategic Thinking in the u. S. And south korea about reducing the r. O. K. s economic dependence on china. Given the Energy Revolution and the u. S. And the removal of export restrictions, the two allies should ink seriously about new Bilateral Energy partnerships that could reduce south Korean Energy dependence on china and the middle east. Washington and seouls policy planning offices can Work Together to map out the south korean strategy for engaging asean as well as ossie countries. It should be a new a serious effort for creating new markets for production change in investment. Proven thathave south koreas future welfare cannot be left in chinese hands. Finally, the u. S. Should encourage new government and south korea to take a stronger stand in supporting public goods of the Korean Peninsula in neighboring waters. In particular, part of a new sean,ement strategy with a they could discourage further militarization of the South China Sea. Ath this would be distinctly positive platform for the u. S. And its allies in the region. Thank you very much. Do have a quorum now. These nominations have been before the committee for some time. Second . Is a the motion carries. I freberg friedberg appreciate the opportunity to express my views on these important subjects. I would like to try to make three main points. As senator mccain has indicated to i do not think the u. S. Currently has a coherent integrated National Strategy for the asianPacific Region. In particular it lacks a strategy for dealing with an increasingly powerful area of china. What we have instead are the remnants of their Strategy First put in place over two decades ago. And sitirational goals of policies and programs intended to achieve them that are now in varying states of disrepair and which are largely disconnected from one another. Second, china does have such a only for the asianpacific but the continental domain along its land frontiers. The goal of strategy has become increasingly clear in the last few years. To create a regional eurasian order that is different from the one we have been trying to build since the end of the cold war. Hasd, just because beijing a strategy does not mean it will succeed. China has many weaknesses and liabilities. We and our allies have many strengths. We have reached the point where it is essential that we reexamine our goals, reviewer strategy, and adjust our policies accordingly. The start of a new administration would naturally be the time to attempt such review. Its something becomes more difficult as time goes on and more issues a key melee. Let me try to expand on each of those points. When the cold war ended, the u. S. Started to expand the jia test Geographic Scope of the order by integrating the pieces of the former soviet union and the former soviet empire and by accelerating the integration of begun a process that had a few years before. As regards china, the u. S. Pursued a twopronged strategy, seeking to engage china across all domains, economic in particular, but diplomatic and others, and at the same time, working at our allies and partners in maintaining our own forces in the region to preserve a balance of power that was favorable to our interests and the security of our allies. The goals of that policy were to deter thetability, to possibility of aggression, while waiting for engagement to work its magic. The u. S. Hoped in effect to ,btain and to transform china to encourage its leaders to see their interests as lying in the preservation of that order, and to set in motion processes that would lead eventually to the economic and political liberalization of that country. As in europe, so also in asia. Our ultimate aim was to build a region whole and free and open an open, liberal region. It has become important a apparent that this has not worked. China is far stronger, far richer, but it is more oppressive domestically than at any time since the cultural let revolution. It imposes costs and other countries including ours and its external behavior has become increasingly assertive, even aggressive. Maritime domain. Balancing has become more difficult for us and for our allies because of the growth of chinas military capabilities. Accounts for this recent shift in chinese behavior . The short answer to that by aion is the driven mix of optimism and even arrogance on the one hand and also, deep insecurity. For roughly the first 15 years or so after the end of the cold war, chinas rulers followed the their leader that china should hide its capabilities and bite its time bide its time and advanced positiontablishing a as a preponderate power. Things began to change in 2008 with the onset of financial crisis and these changes have accelerated and become institutionalized since 2013 with the exception of ping. The chinese strategists concluded that the u. S. Was declining more rapidly than had been expected and china was able to rise more quickly than had been hoped. It was time for china to step up, to become clear in defining its core interests, and more assertive in pursuing them. At the same time, however, the crisis deepened the chinese leaderships underlying concerns about their prospects for sustaining Economic Growth and preserving social stability. So china is maybe more assertively both because its leaders want to seize the opportunities presented to them by what they see as a more favorable external situation, and because they feel the need to bolster their legitimacy and to rally Domestic Support by courting controlled confrontations with others whom they can present as hostile foreign forces, including japan and the u. S. The chinese actions are not limited to pursuing its claims and trying to extend its zone of effective control in the maritime domain. Along its land frontiers, beijing has unveiled a hugely ambitious set of infrastructure , the socalledds one belt, one Road Initiative which aims to transform the economic and strategic geography of much of eurasia. Chinas leaders have begun to articulate their vision for a new eurasian order, a system of infrastructure networks, regional free trade areas, new rules written in beijing, and mechanisms for political consultation all with china at the center and the u. S. Pushed to the periphery is not out of there if not out of the region altogether. U. S. Alliances would be dissolved or drained of their significance. Maritime democracies would be divided from one another and relatively weak and china would be surrounded on the continent by friendly and subservient authoritarian regimes. The u. S. Th century, if try to make the world safe for democracy in the 21st, china is trying to make the world safe for authoritarianism or at least is trying to make asia safe for continued communist party rule. They are trained to coordinate all the instruments a policy to achieve these ends. Military domain, building above , andntional capabilities modernizing Nuclear Forces in order to deter possible u. S. And from intervention and to raise questions about the continued viability of our security guarantees and developing other instruments, createconstruction, to facts without revoking confrontation. Economically, they have been using the growing gravitational pull of their economy to draw others towards them, and they have become increasingly open in using economic threats and punishments to try to shape the behavior of others in the region including u. S. Allies, as dr. Cha mentioned, korea, and also the philippines. What has been engaging in strategists are referred as Political Warfare, the attempts to shape the perceptions of leaders by conveying the message that chinas growing wealth and power present an opportunity rather than a threat to its favors. While raising questions about the continued reliability and leadership capacity of the u. S. China is waging Political Warfare against us. Holding out the prospects of cooperation, trade, and on north korea, which i think is now going to be again part of that process, even as they work to undermine and weaken our position in the long run. So finally and briefly, how should the u. S. Respond . , thestated at the outset time has come for a fundamental reexamination of our strategy toward china and toward the asia pacific the entire eurasian ma and more broadly. A serious effort along these lines would look at all the various instruments of power, the various aspects of our policy which are largely fragmented and out with separately and consider ways in which they might be better integrated and it would also waive the possible cause and gas costs and benefits and risks of alternative strategies. The use of the model would be the socalled solarium project, a review of possible approaches for dealing with the soviet in 19that was undertaken 53 during the early months of the eisenhower administration.