In their ability to gain opportunity, support their families, and have some modest aspect of the american dream. Right now people do not feel that and we do not have a system that is coordinated in a way to be able to put that together. We do have programs that do positive things that we should double down on. Whether that is apprenticeships or advanced manufacturing. We need to paint a picture, what are we doing in various communities . Whether that is world communities, or communities like the southside of chicago where there should be job prospects. I do not think either party answer that question. And that is going to be laid right at the feet of the next administration. I want to see a congress that works. I am tired of everybody bickering and nothing getting done. Ms. Bumiller thank you both, thank you to the audience. [applause] follow the transition of government on cspan as president elect trump prepares his ca cabinet. , live a demand at cspan. Org, on our free radio app. Next, egypts foreign minister talks about his nation strategic hardener ship with the u. S. And Ongoing Events in the middle east. This was part a of a forum hosted by the brookings institution. It is 45 minutes. [applause] good evening ladies and gentlemen. I am delighted to have the to welcome you all to the 13th saban forum. Privilege andal honor to introduce you to a very special guest, our keynote speaker this evening. His excellency the foreign minister sameh hassan shoukry. Here inry wellknown washington. To have her join him. He is one of the architects of egyptiannt u. S. Relationship, having served as ambassador to the United States between 20082012. In those dramatic years, his his wise judgment, and his diplomatic skills helped navigate the relationship through stormy seas, safeguarding and preserving the partnership between United States and egypt. He left washington with the admiration and friendship of many people, including myself. During his long and samehguished career, served in the many central roles in the ministry of Foreign Affairs and cairo. He is the very model of an egyptian diplomat. Cici014, president shoukry called minister out of ministert called shoukry out of retirement. He is one of the key players and shaping the middle east today, a do not envy. As part of this mission, he has been instrumental in the all important relationship between egypt and israel, which he visited this summer and again represented egypt at the funeral of the late shimon peres. This relationship between egypt and israel is critical for the peace and welfare of the two countries, but it is also central to the prospect of rotor peace and cooperation in the region. Cairo was and remains a key to regional stability and peace. Adat was the first arab leader to make a visit to israel, egypt was the first arab Company Country to make peace with israel, the First Capital to host an israeli embassy, and is leadership cic and involvement, israeli peace may again become possible. In this regard, relationships naturally depend on a third partner, the United States. It is no accident that egyptianisraeli peace was cemented in a trilateral handshake between president jimmy carter and. Trianglee strategic between United States, egypt, and israel can serve as the cornerstone for a better, more stable, and peaceful middle east. Having had the opportunity to converse with president cici with the minister recently, i know that this is the egyptian president s vision. We are truly honor and delighted that mr. Shoukry excepted our invitation to address the saban forum tonight. Ladies and gentlemen, please join me in welcoming his excellency sameh hassan shoukry. [applause] mr. Shoukry thank you for that introduction. I am honored and delighted to be with you tonight. At this important for him, i am definitely to be glad in washington and to see so many friendly faces. Ladies and gentlemen, it is indeed my pleasure to meet the back in washington today and share with you egypts perspective on the key questions and the Guiding Principles that government egypts Foreign Policy towards our troubled region. And to explore with you how egypt and the United States can join forces to navigate such a turbulent regional environment and such couple times. Five years ago, the dynamics that governed the middle east for at least six decades were evenundly changed, perhaps reversibly altered. A wave of largescale societal change swept the region and shook it to its very core, launching a unique historic moment that is at once promising and alarming. How to navigate these turbulent waters is the core policy question of our time, and is indeed what will determine eventually to quote dickens, whether we are on the eve of a spring of hope or a winter of despair. Such navigation is quite inconceivable without some form of a guiding principle, a framework for making sense of the epic we are in, and a guide for policy. The debate over the significance of the historic moment we are witnessing, as well as over how to navigate it, wovolves around t positions. The first is opportunities for longawaited change. Its proponents argue that it is time for change, the structures of power and governance in the arab world, this is what the people want, and this is what they should get, at any cost. This is probably the thinking that continues to guide strategies of regional and International Actors that seek to support change without necessarily being too fluffy about their allies. This is how extremists and eight handful of designated terrorist organizations find financial and military support in iraq and libya, to mention a few examples. On the other end of the political spectrum it is another diametrically opposed position in the face of a wave of messy social change to reverse the clock. Dysfunctional government that orses their people are the terrorist threat. All that was needed was to restore the regime. However decadent and dysfunctional that may be. If the price of old ways of governing is to quash every legitimate demand for change and crush popular hopes thereof, then so be it. We are also quite familiar with the consequences of this strategy, as well as its inherent futility. To stop the legitimate calls for change in the march of progress. The question remains how to reap the benefits the waves of change while minimizing the price thereof. This is the core dilemma of Foreign Policy planning and the execution in the region. Ladies and gentlemen, our isroach in egypt straightforward and i harp hypothesis is twofold. And our hypothesis is twofold. It is a prerequisite to breaking through the historical impasse that the region has reached and fulfilling the aspirations of millions of young people in the middle east, a region in which more than 60 of the population are under the age of 30. Second, compromising the integrity and stability of the institutions of nationstates in the belief is not the way to achieve the muchneeded and much desired change. The experience of the last five years has demonstrated beyond any doubt that undermining the institutions of the nationstate creates a political and social vacuum that is quickly filled by primordial institutions, sectarian militias, and outright terrorists whose ideologies are hostile to the hopes for democracy, modernization, and the revival of civic order. From syria to libya to iraq and yemen, examples abound. The challenge is to achieve change within the nationstate, not on the ruins thereof. The nationstate remains the most viable vehicle for modernization. In its more progressive version, it is the embodiment of civic order and democratic principles and policy. That is the hopes that the calls for change since 2011. Egypt traditionally is the intellectual and political powerhouse of the region. It demonstrated through two ways of its revolution in 2011 and 2013 that an orderly and responseve change with to the aspirations of the vast majority of the population while maintaining the integrity of the is anstate, institution viable choice. Egyptians demanded change, but they rejected the ruin of their state institutions in the process. They believed that they can have a democratic government that is at once representative and responsive to their needs and desires. Boldly committed to ambitious reform. The Foreign Policy of this rejuvenated reform and revised Egyptian State is guided by principles that are deeply embedded in our history and values. The conspiracy theories and conflictual world views to peace,ly committed element, respecting nations, and not intermission nonintervention in their affairs. There are always opportunities for regional and International Cooperation to face the challenges of our times. If egypt will change and democratize his government and embark on the most Ambitious Program of political and economic reform in modern history without undermining the integrity of the state, so can our brethren in the arab world and the region. The principal continues to guide the approach to our region. Reform nationstates are the answer to the aspirations of the civic uprising that swept the region some five years ago. Sectarian militias, bloodthirsty warlords, and identitybased cleansing are by contrast the product of the civil wars of the democratic aspirations of several countries of our regions that have regressed too. Ladies and gentlemen, few would disagree that orderly change based on the nation based on the reformation of nationstates would probably be the best way out of todays turbulence in the middle east. That continues to be the guiding principle that governs egypts policy in the region. Millions of it is difficult to remember that this tragedy started with peaceful and legitimate demands of the Syrian People that they are perfectly entitled to. Between the regional and International Powers that support various militias to achieve regime change in syria, of those who thought to diverse at any cost, Syrian People have to endure the bloodiest civil war in modern times. How do we break this vicious cycle in syria . We start with attempts to reverse the clock and restore the status quo are as delusional the reliance on sectarian militia led reformation. By contrast, the vision for the way forward is based on two theories. The first is to preserve the National Unity and territorial integrity of the syrian state and prevent the collapse of its institution. The second is to support the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian People in rebuilding their own state through an acceptable political solution that represents them all and furnishes an enabling environment for reconstruction efforts. This is why we continue to support the efforts of the United Nations special envoy and we call on him to resume political negotiations immediately and without delay. This is why we hosted two allinclusive conferences with the various opposition groups in cairo in 2012 and 2015, which brought together syrians from across the political spectrum and demonstrated they can agree on a comprehensive document that fromded a doable roadmap the foundation of the current plight in syria. You must have noticed that these documents for the foundations upon which every subsequent effort, syrian or international, practical Political Sentiment were premised. The revival of a reform National Stage means that external political engineering is neither desirable nor possible. The International Community is not in a position to pass judgment on the suitability of national stakeholders, let alone decide to exclude any of them. The experience in iraq and syria should have taught us at least that much. The same applies to libya. Wasrlying that agreement the thought that any viable sentiment should revolve around the three digit midstate institution, the council, the house of representatives, and the National Army. Achieving consensus among the three in the wake of violent upheaval is not easy. Problems and contradictions abound. Deadlocks emerge profusely. It does not mean that we can not take sides between the three legitimate institutions in moments of this agreement or even worse, decide to alienate one of them in the hope this might speed up the process of reconciliation. Several international and regional players have opted at one point or another to undermine one of these institutions or to replace the National Army with allegedly benign militias. But not egypt. We remain convinced of the futility of political engineering and we do not think any nonlibyan parties is in a position to award or exclude libyan stakeholders. Our vision for the via is based thenwavering commitment to implication of the agreement and follow a clear and sequential approach. To encourage the president ial council to fulfill its duty. Subsequently, we should shift our attention to ensuring that the house of representatives meets to endorse the government and undertake his constitutional work in preparation for libyan elections that would bring about elected libyan governing bodies to exercise full authority over a united and territorially intact Libyan National state. Meanwhile, we should devote efforts to supporting the libyan National Armys efforts in the fight against growing terrorist organizations in libya. I could go on and explore other cases of troubled nation states in the region, yemen or iraq, but they all follow the same pattern. Troubled nationstates faltering and creating a vacuum that is subsequently filled by primordial organizations and sectarian militias and they could all benefit from the same answer. Revise, reform, an allinclusive modern nationstate based on civic efforts in full citizenship. Modernizedor nationstates is not only the answer to the emerging threats in the region. It is also the answer to the oldest conflicts in our region. The palestinianisraeli conflict. Thet, as you all know, was pioneer of peace in the middle east. Our vision is based on full nation statehood for everyone in the region. Anare committed to bringing end to more than six decades of the conflict, without which we can shift the resources of our region to more productive channels. To do so, the palestinians should not and could not be an independent nationstate. Desperation and lack of any light at the end of what is a long tunnel could only be insurmountable in hopes of stability in the region. The structure of the two state solution is evident. They should return to negotiations in good faith. The president has offered publicly to support any forthcoming negotiation and to provide both agreement security guarantees. Ofid and large scale elements that have talked about in more than one area of our region hopefully do not occur in a bubble. Given the strategic importance of the middle east, it is only natural that several regional and National Powers may be seeking to influence the course of developments in our region. Egypt appreciates the stakes of the middle east are of interest to several International Players and whilst we insist on national over shift ownership of the arab worlds problems, a nonreformed the nation statehood as a key response to the challenges of our time, egypt remains ready to cooperate with our partners to bring satisfactory conclusions to the crisis that spread in our region. One that preserves the territorial and institutional integrity and social cohesion of nationstates is a core criteria of deciding whether or not we can cooperate with regional or international stakeholders. I am back today in washington full of promises and challenges. I come from a country that is moving to restore its leading role in a changing region. The chechen people have demonstrated the ability to take charge of their future through two revolutions in the span of three years. The first to initiate change, and the second two preserve egypts moral and social foundation. We realize we face inherent problems, but the determination to deal with these problems is unshakable. Egypt has changed in many ways, most important of which is the confidence of ejections in their andership and the faith fortitude of the people. This confidence and faith allows us to embark on a new chapter in our history. With problems head on, make difficult decisions and rise to the occasion to make a Better Future for our children and grandchildren. The necessity to achieve greater progress in the area of political, economic, and social reform while dealing with the internal challenges associated with societal evolution, educational, and economic deficiencies, as well as regional and global turbulence. Egypt has always been and will continue to be the beacon of modernity of the middle east. This will be reinforced by implementing policies based on a moral code and values derived from our history and heritage. Ladies and gentlemen, we are on the eve of a new u. S. Administration that has stated to worknt with its partners and restore stability to the middle east. How we address the challenges is in order. I believe we share with the United States and the administration a firm belief in the importance of restoring stability of the territorial integrity of the regions nationstates through supporting nationally owned processes of reconciliation and revival of these estates. How else can we face the growing threat of terrorism . How can we bring about the peaceful conclusion to the multitude of crisis in our region . Our countries are in clear convergence. In syria, we can Work Together for a peaceful settlement. In libya, we can work to support the full implementation of the agreement and an allinclusive government of national accord. We both share the same unrelenting commitment to the education of second eradication of sectarianism and terrorism. We see the need to relaunch efforts to achieve the two state solution. I could go on. I trust that you get the idea. The middle east is in turmoil. Egypt is key in cooperating with a new u. S. Administration to address the challenges there of. I have sought to outline our vision on how to address these challenges and i trust you will agree with me that this vision converges with the stated goals of the new u. S. Administration and the middle east. Thereby furnishing all the necessary conditions for a revival of our muchneeded strategic partnership. I thank you very much. [applause] thank you very much, minister shoukry, for honest during us with a very serious keynote speech for which we are very grateful. Agreedister has kindly to a conversation in which i will have a chance to follow up with some of his points that he made. I was quite struck by what you appear to be saying against a common agenda with the United States. The implication was with the Trump Administration. You spoke about the stability of president elect trump. Yesterday, he spoke about his focus being on being on stability. Principles that the you laid out about eradicating sectarianism, restore stability, and promoting peace are in fact the common purposes between the Trump Administration in formation and the government of egypt. . There is a great deal of convergence by the statements that have been made by president elect trump and some of his advisers in terms of the meetings we have had with president elect trump during the campaign. There is a clear vision in this regard, a vision that corresponds to our objectives. Our objective is to regain stability of the region and an expanse ofypt what we have achieved in other parts of the region. I think this is of mutual interest and it should not be in callsy thought that the for stability is a call for the confirmation of the status quo. It is a call for progression of societal demands of the , whichion of the region have clearly indicated the desire forge ahead in a new democratization, respecting the old rights, and a more Inclusive Society free from the scourge of terrorism and sectarian threats. When you talk about that, and you spoke quite eloquently in the beginning about the need for orderly change, the difference between the kind of radical change that the region has experienced two revolutions, particularly in egypt. Quo andhe status rejecting both and spoke about this model of orderly change. Again, i assume that the implication is egypt is going to be this model of orderly change. What this that mean actually in terms of a reform . Political reform, economic reform, within egypt . Openhoukry i think it is to the necessary involvement of to segments of society phrase and achieve the values of democratization and social reform that are necessary for any society to develop adequately. These are values of humanity. Wells that i think are shared in our common heritage. I dont think there is any debate. They are to be implemented within the ability of society to absorb, taking into account the various characteristics. What has happened in the United States and having the benefit of living in this country for a ariety years of years, variety of years, the United States today is very different in terms of the degree of maturity of its systems and its social and moral fabric. A necessary is evolutionary process, one that is a response to the aspirations of people in the middle east that was demonstrated in 2011 and continues to be a motivator of reform. Response from governments that are keenly aware of the ability of the people to take matters into their own hands, institute thate, and it is important the demands for change can be overreaching,n be but it is the threat is what has been what resulted in syria, in libya, in creating vacuums and anarchy and situations that can be detrimental. When you see more that happened the population has been pronounced because of their educational standards and the status of the instruction destruction of what people have think, anure is, i example of what we should avoid. Mr. Indyk when it comes to approachu outlined an which, i think, if i am interpreting it correctly, really leaves the issue of political transition to later. That from your point of view, the first thing is to preserve and try totions resolve the conflict and then deal with the political transition. Is that fair . Mr. Shoukry not really. It is not a sequential issue. It is an issue that has to be addressed all at once. From the perspective of the political process, because we cannot continue abdicating the same process that we have witnessed over the last five years and expect different results. The status of conflict and destruction continues. It is apparent that none of the proponents is able or capable of their success. We should change course. To change course means community. The United Nations Security Council, the you when envoy, must initiate political process among all the participants. They must reach an agreement that is inclusive of all of the political entities in syria. We take it for granted that such a process will necessarily change the nature of the dynamics of syrian governance. This can only be expected in terms of the consequences that have occurred out of these last five years. It would be ludicrous to think those who have suffered will opt for the status quo in any fashion. Mr. Indyk i think that is absolutely right. I dont know if you agree with this, but the Syrian People could accept a sod as their leader given the credible except assad as their leader given the credible distraction he has reigned on the people. Mr. Shoukry the process should take into account the interests of all the participants and segments of syrian society. It is up to the syrians to decide the future and manner in which they are governed. Mr. Indyk that is why i called you in my introduction the model diplomat. [laughter] mr. Indyk you talked about the unacceptability of countries that are supporting, i think you used the term substate entities. The use of substate entities to advance their interests. Again, i dont want to put words usesyour mouth, but iran substate entities to advance its ambitions in the region. Concern as many of your fellow arab leaders in this regard. Has a bits that egypt of a more nuanced approach to iran. Could you elaborate on how you see your on see iran in the region . Mr. Shoukry i think the arab world and egypt are a contributor to Arab National security, is always advocating that there is a possibility of the arab countries. We do not accept interference or without the from regional context from any state. This is a matter of sovereignty and a matter of cohesion of the air of entity arab entity. Based on policy, our principles of nonintervention, of respect of sovereignty, we recognize there are interests that we must all accommodate, national interests, not at the expense of what might be deemed as influence or interference. We have a clear vision. Consequences to any infringement of Arab National security. That is something that the arab world in solidarity will always rise to the occasion of. Mr. Indyk one of the things that has always struck me about egypt, because it is the most consequential arab states, and has a long history of civilization and cohesion of state, that you look at the region and you look at the other regional powers. Arabia, israel, turkey. When you look at the broader strategic picture within the see thosewd you other players . How do they fit into your broad strategy. Mr. Shoukry there is a great deal of cohesion in the regional error states and their commonality of purpose. We recognize the presence of the state outside of the arab domain. And it has always been our position that relations would should be based on principles of mutual interest and benefits. And that should not overreach into positions of influence or intervention. To manipulate the proceedings or manipulate conditions within a state. Wellfounded principles in the u. N. Charter and in and International Law and once i think we should continue to advocate to build the International World order a popular these are core principles. The more we are clear on the definition and limitations that the better benefit all will extract. Mr. Indyk i wanted to ask you what you said about the peace aocess and there is clearly strengthening of the relationship between egypt and israel that has been quite. Oticeable under president ceci and a greater egyptian leadership role of late than we have seen over the last five or six years. But, what ive heard you say this evening sounded more like you would be supporting perhaps an american led process rather than taking your own initiative to try to resolve this. On the other hand, egypt has been quite active on the palestinian front in terms of seeking a succession there. Can you give us a little more granularity in how you see egypts role and what you think can actually be done in the circumstances . Egypt is committed as part of its foreignpolicy objectives to consolidate the peace treaty with israel and to continue to regard the peace treaty as a fundamental component of stabilizing the region. And it has served for that purpose and continues to be a guiding example for wider east in the region and the end of conflict. But it is not only that we have supported the initiatives of others. President tly, the indicated very directly his vision for the end of the conflict and his readiness to be an active because of it in bringing together the two main proponents, the Israeli Government and the palestinian authority, in whatever form of renewed negotiations they would deem appropriate and they would be willing to engage in. Publicly thatted this is how we view the way forward to the end of the conflict. But there are many other initiatives the u. S. Administration, the current administration, efforts led by secretary john kerry have been valiant in their determination. The french initiative. The constant referral of the issue to the United Nations Security Council of which we are currently a member. We will continue to promote an advocate on the basis of the negotiations between the two sides. This has to be on the basis, the conviction of the two sides to end the conflict and achieve the two state solution as a viable way forward. It can be embraced by not only these two peoples but can be embraced by the region and the International Community. We will continue to provide whatever we can to support that process within the ability of both sides to recognize that this is a historic moment and it is in their best interests and the interest of the region and the interest of peace and security. That we finally end the conflict. Mr. Indyk as you know, i have had some involvement in the last go round of direct negotiations. One of the things that was highly problematic there was the fact that we had no agreed terms of reference. 338 do not apply to the israeli and palestinian dimensions of the conflict. Mr. Shoukry we have also. We have oslo. Mr. Indyk but it does not have a state of final negotiation. Has been a lot of talk of late that it would be useful to introduce the yet the Security Council and update to the resolution which would have parameters are principles that would lay the terms of reference for renewed negotiation. Is that something egypt would find useful . Mr. Shoukry to the degree it is useful, is the degree that the two sides would embrace such an implement. Again, i think we have a multitude of resolutions that have set the tone and have addressed many of the dimensions of the conflict but have not had the necessary impact to forge ahead in resolving the conflict. But any proposal or initiative or direction whether it is from the Security Council or elsewhere is it is no is necessary that both sides are fully committed to it and recognize the value of such a process to their interests. Mr. Indyk you have been very generous with your time. And with your insights. And we are all very grateful to you. Thank you very much. Mr. Shoukry thank you. Thank you very much. [applause] cspans washington journal, live every day with news and policy issues that affect you. Willg up this morning, discuss his research on illegal voting in the u. S. Jaeger, from the Sunlight Foundation will discuss her work on tracking conflicts of interest when it comes to Donald Trumps Business Holdings and ways he should deal with his business interests before being sworn in. And then Washington Bureau chief of the german magazine der sp iegel and Julian Porter borger will talk about terms of the donald Trump Administration. Join the discussion. Today, on book tvs in depth, we are hosting a discussion on the december 19, 1941 attack on pearl harbor. On the program, steve to me, japan, and the other of 1941 and cried nelson with his. K pearl harbor followed by an interview of the pearl harbor survivor. We are taking your phone calls, tweaks and email questions live from noon until 3 00 p. M. Eastern. Coming up next, a look at foreignpolicy and National Security challenges. That is followed by civil rights advocates discussing recent acts of racism and hate following the results of the 20 fix it 2016 president ial election. And at 7 00, washington journal will be live with your phone calls and a look at todays headlines. Initiativeignpolicy recently held a daylong foreign for him on National Security and foreignpolicy issues. One of the segments included Lieutenant General mcmaster, rector of the u. S. Army capabilities Integration Center. He talked about the importance of probably properly integrating technology and using military history to help create National Security strategies. This is just over an hour. Mr. Moyar good afternoon ladies and gentlemen. If i could kindly ask you to move towards your streets for what will be the final towards your seats for what will be the final time this afternoon. It is always a pleasure to reach the culminating discussion of the day. Foreign will be a wonderful conversation between Lieutenant General mcmaster and our fellow and the director of our center on military history, mark moyer. Before we get started and if you will forgive me for taking a moment, i want to take an opportunity to say thank you to a few members of the fbi team before we wrap up. In particular, elaine stern, Lindsay Markel are our excellent Government Relations team. At the fbi, very little have ans if not for them. And Daniel Barrow is our operations director. The three of them have done much of the great work that has made today happened. I am very grateful to mark for everything he has done as well. It is a new effort. In the summer of 2015. After she came to us from joint special operations university. Prior to that, he had been in the structure at emory or university. The frequency with which she is publishing books is quite stunning. Forthcoming history coming out next year. And at the end of 2018, he will have a sequel to his wellknown and excellent book triumph forsaken the vietnam war. Are fortunatepi to have him on the team and we are looking forward to this conversation he will have with Lieutenant General mcmaster. Thank you both. [applause] mr. Moyar and inks chris to you as well. I am dr. Mark moyer. I am the director of the center of diplomatic history. We have heard today about the reasons why we need a center like this. There are problems on the supply and it might side. And demand side. Military history is out of fashion at civilian universities which is why you have a Defense Staff and a lot of phd historians who are not teaching at universities. And on the demand side, there is a deficit of knowledge about history here in the policy world and also to some extent, a lack of interest. We are trying to rejects both of those problems. Politicalentists, scientists will often tell you that historians do not know how to do anything but tell stories. That is silly. Fidel castro does not do anything besides provide help to the needy. But i am going to start with a story because it is an effective way of getting peoples attention and after a day of bombarded with speeches and as being the last place, i thought it would hopefully help us provide a point of departure. Eight years ago, in this same town, there was a lot of talk about a new idea called smart power. One of the key elements of smart power was using nonmilitary means to alleviate conflict and it was said that under the Bush Administration there had been an overreliance on the military as an instrument of power. To usenow going nonmilitary instruments of power because these problems have roots that are not military. We will have civilian agencies taking on more work and the military is going to be doing less. In. It soundedory, appealing. We saw this put into practice in a number of places. Afghanistan. The Obama Administration decided to increase the Development Aid in afghanistan from 1. 2 billion dollars to 1. 4 billion. They undertook a civilian surge which took 500 civilians in afghanistan up to 1300. They set about trying to a smart power approach in afghanistan. Unfortunately, the results did not live up to the billing. Some of you here saw this firsthand. For one thing, we saw the state department, u. S. Aid to not get there experienced people to go to these countries so they had to bring in contract ors and temporary employees. The vast the geordie of those people never got out into the countryside because it was dangerous there and the civilian unions did not feel they were obliged to go there. We then did not have oversight where huge amounts of cash were going and they often ended up in the hands of the enemy or corrupt officials. You were actually exacerbating conflict rather than alleviating and you also had a problem if you wanted to do and a project, the taliban were there and they were going to kill your aid workers and governors. There was counterinsurgency gains but it did not have much to do with smart power. It had everything to do with military power. It was where the u. S. Military went into the areas, and brought the Afghan Government officials with them. Hugel argue that this waste of resources could have been avoided had we paid some attention to history. If the Obama Administration had looked back, not far, back to the Clinton Administration to find some of the same ideas. If you think columbia in the 1990s we had a lot of the same ideas. We were going to use nonmilitary power. We would not give money to columbias ministry military. We were going to get it to law enforcement. Crop substitution programs. Same thing happen though in afghanistan. People were getting killed. It was not until the government in both countries decided to put a heavy emphasis on the Security Side that you made progress. Wheres just one example there are some clear indications from history that the different policy should be reviewed. Oftentimes not so straightforward. What we often see is a situation where there are multiple president s. A classic case would be in iraq in 2003. After we took down Saddam Hussein, we looked for ideas for rebuilding the country. We focused heavily on nazi germany. Argue and in hindsight we probably should have looked at some other cases like japan in 1945 or the reconstruction in the American South after the civil war. We could have learned a lot from there. History will not necessarily fall into your lap. It requires a lot of serious thought. I would add that we cannot ignore, at times we had tried to do Foreign Policy without any ledory at all that has to disaster because it is based on unfounded assumptions. The question is how do we use history effectively . History gives us familiarization. Context. A counter confronting narcotics situation for example, it would be useful if you spent time studying five or 10 historical cases. When you go to the next one, you at least know what questions you will ask and you will have an idea of what solutions might actually work. Doing events, a variety of events to try to bring historians from around the country to interact with the policy community. We are doing a number of venues. Some public events. This is the largest one. Some that are specifically targeted for private government offices like to the pentagon, capitol hill, foggy bottom. Expect that we are going to fundamentally change u. S. Foreignpolicy doing this but we do think there is a lot of value to getting historians and the best ones to talk to people who are making decisions today. By we also think that beating the drum on history, that we will get people in the National Security community to spend more time looking at history and to think historically. You do not need a phd in history to think historically. We are fortunate today to have someone i think who is perhaps the best possible person to convey this message. Sitting next to me, Lieutenant General mcmaster who has a phd in history and at the same time, and incredibly distinguished practitioner. He first came to public attention during the gulf war in 1991 when he commanded an at the Cavalry Company battle of 73 east in which he routed a much larger iraqi tank force. This was a textbook study in new forms of armored warfare. 1890 seven, he published a book based on his phd dissertation called dereliction of duty which immediately became mandatory reading across the Armed Services. In 2004, he was the commander of u. S. Forces in iraq where he was able to achieve success against insurgents at a time when very few americans were succeeding in that regard. In afghanistan in 2010. He took charge of the international coalition, the anticorruption test worst. He is now at the Army Capabilities Integration Center where he is in charge of planning Army Capabilities for future conflict as we go forward. He has done a lot of other great things. But in the interest of time, i will leave it with that summary. I would like to turn it over to lieutenant journal mcmaster. Lt. General mcmaster thank you so much market. What a privilege it is to be with you. How many history majors are there . There are still some people to convert. I thought maybe it was just an audience of fellow historians, all of whom are talking about how underappreciated we all are. [laughter] but i think this is such a great idea. The idea of the center for military and diplomatic history for all of the reasons that mark identified. What i thought i would do is talk about how i think the center can help us make us better, better at defending our nation in particular. Better at defending anticipating the needs. And addressing the threats that are growing. Growing to our nation and all civilized peoples today. I will try to be super brief because what i would like to do is see where you would like to take the discussion and hear your ideas and thoughts. But this is an important center. From our perspective in the army and the military, thinking clearly about diplomacy and National Security is fundamental. Only fundamental to protecting our vital interests and preventing conflict but also ensuring that our military is prepared to respond to threats to national and interNational Security. And to be able to resolve crises at the lowest possible cost. In lives and blood and treasure. But thinking about future wars often neglected. Done superficially. Remember the orthodoxy of the revolution in military affairs in the 1990s . In the 1990s, it became traditional wisdom. The future war would be great, cheap, efficient. From standoff distances. Leave on a high note after doing some cool, military stuff. That people fight for the same reasons. Identified. Des the inherent uncertainty of war. You can find it on the internet. It has its own wikipedia page. If you type in shock and awe henry the four conditions we were going to be able to achieve which included total control of everything. It did not even acknowledge any kind of agency or control of the future course of events by ones adversaries. Warit did not acknowledge as a contest of wills. And our ability to prevail strategically in peace and in war depends on knowing who we are. And knowing our values. In academia do not want to study war in part because they confuse the study of war with advocacy of it. Do is thinkought to about war and conflict in the way that Raymond Bradberry thought about it in his purpose of writing fear and hundred one. An interviewer asked him if you was trying to predict the future. And he said hell no, i am trying to prevent it. Neglect as i mentioned continuities in the nature of war and locust exclusively on social or technical technological changes. The neglecty, it is of diplomatic and military history that perpetuates deficiencies in understanding which in turn can make war more likely. T is lacking sorely today is depth of understanding. We achieve new heights of superficiality in terms of our discussion of what is going on in the world and what we might do about it. Of thent years, many difficulties encountered in strategic decisionmaking and operational planning and reinforce development have stemmed from shallow or flawed thinking enabled and large measure by the object neglect of history. I think this center will help policymakers and leaders overcome the tyranny of the daily crisis because when you are thinking and reading about history, you are freeing your mind of the daily chores and engaging a subject more deeply. But i also think it will help serve as a correction toward a tendency of wishful thinking. It makes the future of easier. Usthis center, it will help go beyond what we should inc. About particular issues but i think the huge contribution will be helping us understand better how to think. What can be center do in particular in terms of how to think about problems . All, it will of help us understand better how to do as clouse would suggest that we do to take what seems if used like big problems and break them down into their constituent elements. Engage problems we are dealing with including isis or transnational terrorist organizations. And engage it on its own terms and recognize the complexity of these problems sets. The rightto ask questions. Asking firstorder questions. Sometimes we skip that stage. We go right into what we should do about it. And we confuse activity with progress. We dont properly frame the problem. What is the nature or character of the conflict . What is driving the conflict question who are our enemies and adversaries are smart what is their strategy question sometimes we skip right into it is the enemy organization, how do we go after them . How to understand historical events and circumstances on their own terms. How to trace event back to their causes. How to apply an interdisciplinary approach to the problems of diplomacy and war that includes anthropology, literature, philosophy, economics, and signs. History is inherently injured interdisciplinary. And how to think in time consistent with the historian carl beckers observation that the memory of the past and anticipation of the future should go hand in hand into friendly way without disputing over priority and leadership. Whenevere someone talks about the deep future or leap ahead of, run for the exits. Something crazy is coming after that. Is groundedly need projections into the future. A focus on solving real problems, addressing real threats, real adversities adversaries. We have learned that the countries that are prepared are those that think clearly in a grounded way. Who think about the future as the ancient greeks said we should walking backward into it. Paying attention to what is going on today and what has gone on in the past as a way to think about the future. Without the depth of understanding that history provides, the center will help provide, we will remain to what the philosopher of war warned against the tendency to regard war as something autonomous rather than an instrument of policy. Misunderstanding the kind of war in which we are embarking and tried to turn it into something alien towards very nature. In short, this center and the history that the center promotes is important. It can provide a strong antidote to future folly. Why historians have to make a special effort. And be unabashed about connecting historical knowledge and understanding to contemporary strategic and operational problems. About that. E humble historians should be particularly humble and duly qualified any analysis or historical analogies. But we must not hesitate to help. Military officers civilian officials use history to help think about concrete contemporary or emerging problems. So apply history to understanding the problems of today and tomorrow is just as important for citizens though as it is for diplomats and defense officials. Im glad this is more of a public forum here and i think the center reaching out to our to bens is going particularly important because citizens have to possess a fundamental understanding of war and of warriors if they are to remain connected to those who fight in their name appeared and if they are to hold our governments right . Our governments accountable. It could become increasingly difficult to maintain fundamental requirements of military effectiveness or to recruit young men and women into military service. And the connection between our military and our society something we might focus on as well. Preserve theyo were very those, too let when to let men and women to see themselves as part of the asus and in a covenant that binds them one another and the society that they serve. An absolute understanding of war and what it takes to fight it, Popular Culture cheapens and if thosehe Warrior Spirit a further separates warriors come often portrayed as flawed, fragile or traumatized human beings from their fellow citizens. So while the humility of the historian and historian sensitivity to the limits of reasoning by historical analogy are important to preserve, historians must engage on contemporary issues. So this conference, the work of the center, is important because, unless we access history in a purposeful way, its lessons will, as warned, lay inert in unread books. So i am looking forward to see where you want to take the conversation. What a privilege it is to be with you. Thanks. Thank you for those terrific remarks. You brought a few more points to my mind. You talked about taking the time to free your mind and thats when of the things we are try to do, to get in with a senior person, a role model for our project. I first met him in 2007 and he was working on on iraq. Had an idea they were thinking of and they forged a relationship in what was going on in vietnam and that brought me into the vietnam into the pentagon for an hour to talk to him and other senior officials. I think you had some value to them. Obviously, i can give them all the answers, but having a Historical Perspective was value. Its easy to get caught up in. He crisis of the day its valuable that way. We talk about complexity. I think that is one of the advantages of history and historians. I think the social sciences in many respects, not all of them, but many of them over civil fight things, especially when they try to quantify things or come up with grand theories. History makes you understand how complex things are, that things are not linear, that you need to spend a lot of time studying something before you can really understand it. He also raised the point of interdisciplinary work. We do actually support things that are the on up your history. I have written a couple of books in the put fence realm. We doing courage historians to use comparative history, where , maybetaking a subject you take five different administrations, look at their history for trends in certain areas. Another thing that came to mind, i recently read a book called super forecasting. Its an interesting book. T looks at forecasting , the experts you see on tv dont really predict things any better than anyone else. They just say things better. They did this study to see if anyone can actually predict these things. They found this group of super forecasters. Is ukraine going to lose another 100 kilometers of territory in the next six months . So the answer stuff like this. What of the interesting things i was, after about five years, the super forecasters were not like anyone else. It raises the question of how can we really think about the in history, it indicates how often we get the future wrong. So how do we think about that . You talked about the futures of, but maybe you can talk a little bit more, your historical sense, your historical knowledge makes you think about the future. Because in your position, he cant just say we dont do anything. So how do you work through that . Lt. Gen. Mcmaster i think the first thing the first way we think through it is in the continuitys of war. These are continuities that make war wars resemble each other more than any other human activity. So if you acknowledge what makes wageifferent, which is its for political outcomes, its political nature, the human drivers of conflicts, the interactive nature of war, it helps you resist simplistic analogies, like some of those in the 1990s. Some of them had to do with moores wall, computing power, for example. Understandu continuities. Of course, the character of war is always evolving and changing. So what we do is really look at four key elements. Four keyhrough these considerations in armed conflict. The first is threats, enemies and adversaries in the future operating environment. This is to make a grounded in granted projection a National Security. We dont have to be super amended to these days, unfortunately. We are concerned obviously with therevisionist powers on eurasian landmass, russia and china, which i think are engaged war. Form of limited and to replace the order with one that is more sympathetic to their interests. A verye pursuing sophisticated strategy that combines the use of unconventional forces under the cover of conventional forces. But also involves a very sophisticated propaganda, disinformation campaign, economic actions and lyrical subversion and so forth. So this is one threat set to look at both of those militaries are modernizing their militaries. Russia in particular has been aggressive in its use of military in ukraine and so forth. We are looking at russian , to see where our capability gaps are into better see where our strengths are so we can preserve and etc. I and accentuate those strengths. We look very closely at north korea. Its difficult to overstate the threat of north korea. Iran has been waging a proxy war against us since 1979. And then this one the middle east is terrorist organizations that are striving to gain key control of territory, property and resources. Look at each of these problems under our terms, but also recognizing that these problems are completely disconnected from each other. , enemies wills continue to calculate their actions and Pay Attention to where they might see opportunities associated with of the effect others are having on us and our interests. But what is common across all these complex that we see and potential conflicts is that they are fundamentally about the control of resources. Our potential enemies take they do four things that are common. They try to evade what they see as our strengths. Will not be the passive receipts passive recipients of their military powers military prowess. They will disrupt our capabilities. They will come after what they think is our Network Strike capability with sophisticated cyber. They are concerned about our air power. Russia has established air supremacy over ukraine from the ground. So these are the kinds of things there, across different adversaries. The third is those enemies will emulate our capabilities. China has engaged in the greatest theft of intellectual property. Finally, our adversaries will expand on other ballot bounds, began a, disinformation, political subversion and so forth. Kind ofts, will missions we think we would have to conduct in the future to concert to secure our interests. The third is technology, changes in technology, but also understanding from a Historical Perspective, theres always countermeasures. So understanding that a ration in technology to gain an advantage. Finally, history Lessons Learned. We can learn so much obviously from whats going on today in conflicts we are still involved in. Whats it like to be in this post were period . What postwar period are you talking about . We learn from conflicts and operations in other places. So learning from whats going on, we see around the world is important. Russian operations we are paying attention to. That is the framework with recruit we think through. Ofed on that understanding future armed conflict, then we describe how army forces in the future will have to be prepared to fight or how they would fight to secure our nation and our vital interest as part of eu joint force with multinational as part of ofres a whole family concepts associated with that Conceptual Foundation and the latest is in draft form called multidomain battle. Based on the conceptual boundaries in, we have to identify what are the required capabilities . Then we learn through seminars, experimentation, wargaming. We learn through a framework called the war fighting challenges. These are 21storder questions, to enforce to inform development. Repetitively or episodically. In the army, we get. Enthusiastic about things. We get enthusiastic about things. If its worth doing, its worth overdoing in the army, right . Counter uas, right . We have to learn under this framework in a sustained manner. We have to analyze what we are learning effectively and then bridge an implementation. I think there is a role for history in each of these phases. What do we read . We are reading history to understand better contemporary conflicts and threats. We are reading the history of technology and the interactions between technology and organizations and doctrine and so forth. A lot of great literature out there on technology. Literature on militaries that did innovate effectively and those that didnt. Comparing and contrasting the french and the period. In the war and the history that applies to each of these. Everything we do we have [indiscernible] from North Carolina coming in history to talk about and the history avoiding war and had to think of a changes in the character of warfare. A i was going to say synopsis. Of the first historians we had about two months ago was brian lane who has a new book out called elvis is army. 50soks at the army in the and makes the point that a lot of the transformation that we imilar to what was being said in the 1950s and they ran into a problem. Ultimately, the technology they wanted to introduce surpassed the capabilities of the military because you did not have sufficiently educated workforce within the military. Though certainly a lots of talks these days of personnel tried to find innovative or snow word innovative personnel. Isre would you say the army now terms of Human Resources and what further steps would you advise the army to make . Lt. Gen. Mcmaster so this is a big area of focus for us. We say in the Army Operating concept, in appendix c, its awesome. Wait until you get to that. Was what happened next, right . Our differential advantage comes from a combination of resilient, welltrained soldiers, cohesive teams and adaptive leaders with technology. Thats our differential advantage. We are at pains every day to say we dont man equipment. We acquit the man or woman. We equip the man or woman. From the very beginning, we assure we are congress of how the technology applies to the problem of war and warfare. How toalso understand integrate that capability into an organization that is going to apply it. So we have a rigorous experiment Patient Program where we get capabilities in the hands of soldiers very early. Example, in fort benning there is a cyber equivalent that we do in new jersey. I think the getting that equipment in allows soldiers to see how to apply it and then he gives feedback and informs our requirements. For example, we are about to buy and field an unmanned system that fits in a soldiers pocket. And it has a significant amount of range. Before you cross the street in where a area, an area machine gun might be covering, you can send this soldier born censor out and you have a realtime downlink of the sensor. Package for employee that, where it can be distributed, and also the design changes came from early extermination. For example, it wasnt very good in wind. It went up and blew right back into the wall. That is fixed now. The technology in and seeing how it applies help spirit of the second thing is to try to signify things. Book calledreat men, machines and modern times written in the 19 sexys 1960s. He said man has succeeded in creating these machines to help tame his Natural Environment. But ins but in doing so has created an artificial environment that is far more complex than the Natural Environment ever was. We we get to the point stress getting to the point where we are integrating technology that actually supervise things for soldiers. The iphone as an example of that. Its intuitive. Its easy to use. We are trained to involve a lot of our systems that way as well. And then theres training and education and bringing in the best soldiers we can come of the best men and women in our society. I think that there is an untapped desire to serve in our country. Iswhat i would like to see more young men and women volunteering to serve, increasing the pool of candidates so we can become even more selective. We are pretty selective already in terms of who comes into our army and our armed forces. That i think we have to do a byter job of attracting them a committee getting the rewards of service, which are less tangible and less visible than the sacrifices, right . And the difficulties of service. Long separations, hardships, obviously the fiscal risk, the loss of comrades and so forth. Parts of rewards are being bigger than yourself. Being apart of something bigger than yourself, it are rewarding experience in an organization that takes on the quality of a family. And then i think we have to stress more that our soldiers are warriors, but they are also humanitarians. We are confronting the enemies of all civilized people. With these groups like diester like dae like sh or al qaeda. They are taking action to protect innocence from this type of mentality. I think we can do a better job at attracting more in. 1958 look magazine article. The great historian jonathan shy is in the article as an army leaving. Ho is so the theme is that you are bleeding talent. You can change the dates in the names and you could be talking about today. But anot a new challenge, challenge. I think we are emphasizing this across all of our activities. Chris weve got about 15 minutes for questions. We start with the gentleman right here. Thank you. Tar heel native. The first off seems to be a reaction to the stalemate in korea. The second to the defeat in vietnam. The third seems to be in part where the reaction or not, they come in the wake of these conflicts. In the third to purgatory in iraq and afghanistan. Extent are these bureaucratic responses that provide a refuge and often a technological refuge that isnt exactly relevant to the roars the resources of our recent failures . Lt. Gen. Mcmaster thats a great question and that is a real danger. I think many of us are cognizant this couldger, that be a cathartic way. That war was really hard. Lets go on to a war that could be a lot more fun or something that could be solved quickly and so forth. I think we are cognizant of that. We are engaging, for example, in a study for rush and generation for russian regeneration warfare. But thats not saying that is what all wherwarfare is going to be. We are looking at other capabilities and Ongoing Operations and efforts in afghanistan and iraq. Conrad crane said it well. There are two ways to fight the u. S. Military. Asymmetrically and stupid. You hope that the enemy picks stupid, but they are unlikely to do so. I think we have to be prepared to fight across a range of contingency operations. We have never been able to predict with any degree of certainty what the next conflict is going to be. Not be so faro off the mark that we cant adjust once the real demands of the conflict reveal themselves to you. We are emphasizing it up ability, the ability to adapt quickly to circumstances, develop situation understanding incontact with these couplets problems. What we really have to do is recognize that there are no shortterm solutions to longterm problems. Ad if we try to take shortterm approach to a longterm problem, thats guaranteeing that we will extend the duration of our effort and probably increase the scale of it. We are really emphasizing in the army the consolidation of military gains as an integral part of war and warfare. Its not an optional part. I dont think we are try to support five things into some sort of effort to get beyond iraq or afghanistan into a much better kind of war. But that is definitely a danger. Across the joint force and some intellectuale community, there was some of that. Now. Much better its a multidomain battle. We are on the right path now. There was it an insidious a, well, you know, the wars in afghanistan and iraq, those were aberrational. Chris in the black Leather Jacket here. My name is keith hill. I would like to approach your answer to not the last question, but the one before in a different direction. I heard the army chief of staff mention the fact that the army is the only branch of the service where 51 of its the guard ors from reserve. That was done with general abrams when he was chief of staff. He wanted a situation where, the army went to work him a would be america going to war rather than just the army going to war. In addition to a lack of knowledge about history, wouldnt you say or would you say a more fundamental problem is the fact there is this disconnect between the average american in the military . Lt. Gen. Mcmaster i think there is a big problem. Is getting problem worse probably just because of the size of the army getting smaller. So those touch points being fewer. And fewer and fewer families having a direct stake. If youve got sons or daughters, brothers and sisters in the service. The guard and reserve is a critical bridge in our military and our citizens. Identifyhe more we can we can create opportunities can identify opportunities to a broader population to serve, the better. I think there are a number of initiatives we can undertake to do that. I think one is, you know, and idea that we can have a multicomponent contracts for recruiters. For example, i think we should do more of those. If youre coming out of high school and you dont want to defer college or a job or a civilian job that you want for more than two years, maybe come in for a twoyear active duty enlistment and then have a threeyear or fouryear National Guard commitment. There are some great incentives within National Guard service in terms of tuition, relief and that sort of thing. I think there is a lot more we can do. The other thing is engaging more broadly in our communities. I think military leaders, our sergeants and our officers in particular ought to get out in the communities as much as they the post as excessive less possible. Event thant a better a basic training graduation. It is unbelievable. Youll laugh. You will cry. Way better than cats. Almost as good as hamilton, maybe. [laughter] its amazing. They get more accessible. Any ideas you have, im easy to track down through these guys. Any suggestions anybody has on how to connect better, we are all for it. A twopart question for you. You spoke and some of the other senior letters have said that this is the First Time Since world war i at the army has not had a new combat vehicle under develop. Youve spoken about the personnel issues. Can you frame for us the broader situation the army find itself in in a Historical Context . And also, had his recent army history impact your efforts to develop future capabilities for the army . Greatn. Mcmaster questions. Old book called massive command . Before the all volunteer force and everything. The army culture is a servant of the nation. We tend to have a streak of recidivism in us. Can make do with what we got never thing on spam sometimes that prevents us from making a very clear argument for capabilities we need for the future. Terms of army modernization, combat vehicles aboutexample of really army deferred modernization. There are a number of good reports on this. But i think the csi report from six months ago is particularly good come in which the author talks about the mmm he of army modernization. Is that thehammy size of the army has been severely reduced. It is a huge reduction, way that we had in the active army prior to the wars of afghanistan and iraq. Those were breaking an active army. We grew the army. At the pick of the wars in iraq and afghanistan, we had 170,000 53,000 ofmployed, whom were reserve component, National Guard and army reserve. Of123,000 active in an army 570,000. So knowing you go to end of historicalere is a pattern. After wars, your commitments go up to consolidate the gains. On,wars are still going first of all, in afghanistan and pakistan area, in the middle east where you have a rotational brigade inchoate in addition to the forces that are committed in ,upport of Iraqi Armed Forces Kurdish Armed forces, Turkish Armed forces in iraq. And then you have a rotational commitment to korea and went to europe now because of russian aggression. One is capacity in the army. The second thing, in previous armyds of drawdowns, the had recently been modernized. We did a lot of important things to strengthen our forces for iraq and afghanistan. But those were niche capabilities for this particular fights that are not really the modernization priorities we need to deter conflict and respond to crises in the future, especially against capable nationstates. Both way ofhat deferred modernization and it is compounded by significant reduction in the modernization budget. So what you do . Get the armyyou the American People are willing to pay for. Have the means, the money you have, determine what you do instead of having the objectives drive it. The tendency has been come ok, the budget is cut, cut, cut, use spread less and less money over more and more programs and you get less and less for your defense dollars as a result. So we try to ruthlessly prioritize. Where trent to make the case for investment in Army Capabilities. Emagin going to the navy and say are you working on any new ships . No, where good. We like the ships weve got. [laughter] we are of great income as you know, the bradley, the tank. The are not the same from 1980s. Theres really so much you can do. When you look at the active protection come other Network Related demands in those vehicles, other protective ,apabilities, additional armor new infrared radar, you just overburden the vehicle. I think weve got to weve of a significant wave modernization. Chris over here. Thank you for your time. I want to ask you about military history. To the average person, they may seem to have their strong points in subject matter. He comespinion, when to military history, what is a conflict or diplomatic moment or war they feel that enough is been is being written on and needs more attention paid to. I would say,ster just in recent history, i would say the iraq war. Joel rayburn is here. Seminaldrafted a Operational History of the iraq war. I think with that is going to be is a tremendous jumping off point for historians to really dig into the aspects of that Operational History in greater depth. A large measure, weve been distracted by iraq, but not by the wrong question, but a question we asked and probably answered, which is should we have done it . Right . The great question to ask is who the hell thought it would be easy . And why . And then how did the war progress from that point on . I think the iraq war and connecting it to what is going on today. Those of this contemporary historys that will stand the test of time. What other complex need to be written more about . Gosh, you know, i think theres always you know, as my said,r at North Carolina dick allen, dont think theres too much written on a particular topic. Because there is always another good book or a different approach you can take or access to new materials. Look at what Rick Atkinson did in world war ii. He took the storage approach of doing multiarchival research but also getting a journalism background. They got all kinds of new materials. Look at what murrays book on the civil war the came out. Brilliant in terms of not new materials, but a different Analytical Framework to understand the course of the war and the wars outcome. Chris time for one last question. Back to the reporters question or front around the army platforms. Coincidencek its that we havent had a big five. I remember watching how the wargames went down. Lt. Gen. Mcmaster i rode a very entertaining monograph on that. I really entertaining. It was pretty dry. But it was called cracking the foundation. , the challenge ive noticed whether we have 450 or 570, take your number, we dont have a unifying threat, like we did when we came up with the big five. We knew exactly who we were fighting and that made it really easy to say we need a main battle tank with 120 millimeter gun and so on and so forth. , whether you want to talk about how many folks you need a harmony platforms you big challenge ive seen is what we a call future operating environment. Who the hell are we fighting . Given your role of Army Capabilities, how do you orient how do even approach building an army when you are fighting the blob or a vapor in this case . Lt. Gen. Mcmaster i think we have really concrete processes now. I think its not a problem at all. To mature opportunity our defense planning scenarios ined on concrete problems asia are broadly with the revisionist power. In northeast asia with unpredictable and armed to the teeth with conventional equipment. Arms with north korea and russia and what russia has demonstrated already with its capabilities. I can go through those of you have more time. Other scenarios as well. Well developed scenarios as a basis for our wargaming and park spearman tatian. It is allowing us to establish a very clean logic trail between the future operating environment , the future of armed conflict, scenarios associated with that, how the army has to fight us part of the joint National Team to protect the nation against those threats and adversaries, the capabilities required of through ourhen learning a dedication of the capability gaps and opportunities to maintain overmatch, integrated solutions doctoral is asian, redevelopment , integrated and specific requirements. So what is an equal when it of the big five today . These are really capability areas that we think are immensely important for the future fight. I mentioned combat vehicles. All the trends we see in future war are making close combat war less likely. Longrange capabilities are. Hose that are in jeopardy satellitebased medications. Precision navigation and timing. The whole Network Strike capability. We are going to work out countermeasures, but the enemy has with a counter that now. They focused on it. So what are the trends that we see that we have to cope with . All domains will be contested. In the 1990s, everything was dominance this and that. We had full spectrum dominance. It was ridiculous. It was never going to happen anyway. But now all domains will be contested. We will not have air or maritime or cyber or no or electromagnetic supremacy. Bet superiority will temporary windows across those domains. The second thing is that the battlefield is increasingly lethal in terms of range of weapon systems but also energetics and the democratization of destruction, with even networks, smaller forces having greater destructive power and give abilities. The third is complex battlefields. The forces that all operations will be degraded. So we can build exquisite systems that fail catastrophically. We need redundancy and systems that degrade gracefully. So what is it mean for us in terms of capabilities . I mentioned combat vehicles. Combat vehicles is tied to the larger problem set of advanced protection. That means Area Protection and also protection on specific combat vehicles and aircraft, you know, the socalled russian snow dome supremacy. Overa has superiority ukraine from the ground. A third area of emphasis for us is robotic and atomic reenabled systems that can do five big things rest. If you google the robotic a autonomous strategy. This is the ability for army forces to be able to project power outward from land into the maritime maritime space and cyber electromagnetic domains. So we are already developing capabilities now that have , easing evenomise existing systems that will give us the ability to sink ships. If you have a fires unit, they can do service to service, air to air or short a ship. Other critical capabilities ,nvolve future vertical lift which is a pretty good Program Going out it will give us a lot more speed, haloed and legs so we can suck the play. Dd you can bypass a two a forces. And this is underpinned by soldier and Team Performance and overmatch. That is getting more and more effective. We need to invest more. I agree with him in close combat capabilities that we are capabilities. But we are doing more there. Developing shorter fire the first shoulder fire weapon has a ballistic solution and integrated thermal site. And it ends firefights. If anybody has read the outposts by jake dapper, i recommend it. We dont want to put ourselves in that situation where we are a taliban platoon with a sec of rpgs can pin down u. S. Infantry units. So we are getting those into the field pretty quickly. I dont think theres a lot of clarity at all. You see this, this best the big six plus one capabilities tied in that logic trail all the way back. Chris thanks a mature coming and spending some of your very busy day with us. Everyone join me in a round of applause. [applause] and on that happy note, i thank you all for joining us today. Wish you all the best for the rest of the year. And a happy 2017. [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. Visit ncicap. Org] [captions Copyright National cable satellite corp. 2016] another panel from that same form looked at the presidency of president obama and jimmy carter and george w. Bush. Speakers discussed some of the major events that occurred during each administration and the Lessons Learned. This is just over an hour. Our next discussion is titled history in the first hundred days. By dr. Garyoderated schmitt. Gary will injure deuce them with more detail. I want to take a Moment Technology is the codirector of the [indiscernible] is most recent publication an edited volume totaled a hard at harda hard look power, assessing the defensive of key u. S. Allies insecurity partners. Thank you, gary, for moderating the discussion. Join me in welcoming our panel. [applause] gary thank you for joining us. Its a great pleasure to in thisd panel particular forum. And it is a pleasure to be joined by these three imminent scholars, historians and practitioners. So im the moderator. I will try to act moderate. Doesnt rude word that get tossed my direction. Promise we only have an hour so i do want to take up a lot of time. I do want to give each of our panelists there do introduction. He served in a number of positions in a senior advisory role at the pentagon and afghanistan and on the Senate Armed Services committee. He is a combat veteran and earned his phd in history from ohio state university. So mark will be talking about the possible Lessons Learned from the Prior Administration days. Chairsor mann suhr, the of military history at the ohio state university. Earned his phd in history. He graduated number one in his class at west point. Quite ad with distinction. He was a director of the armys Counterinsurgency Center at fort worth. He was the executive officer to in the david petronius iraqi sirs period. He will be talking about the Bush Administration. Least, max boot in theovide us insight Obama Administration. He has three wonderful volumes on guerrilla warfare, technology. Max is also a practitioner in that he was an advisor to commanders in both iraq and afghanistan. Not resting on his laurels. Max is now the process of writing a new book on Ronald Reagan and on Edward Lansdale and the vietnam war. Proceed following the order. The format is quite simple. Each speaker will go 10 to 15 minutes. Hopefully, we will have time for questions from you all. I will try to keep track of people when they raise their hands and have a backandforth discussion from the panel. Just one short comment on my part. I realize we only have an hour so i wont do a lengthy introduction to the topic. Worked in the white house i worked in the senate. Imho a lyrical scientist. My wife and i built a new house and i had a library at home. We were moving things. Like anybody living in a place years, you try to figure out how less you can move. My wife said why dont you go through your books . Recently, the American Enterprise institute where i work has also moved. Again, i had a fairly substantial library at the office that needed to be trimmed down to fit into my new space. So for the last two years, i have in going through the books. One of the most interesting things that struck me when i was doing this process is how many of the political scientist books eveni was tossing out though they seemed relevant at the time, they seem dated when i looked that at them anew. , theestingly enough library is now history. Chronologically, its less relevant, but some serious fundamental way even more relevant. We will begin with mark. Mark thank you very much, gary. For the kind introduction. Im glad to see that got her that i gary is now a moderate but has shifted to modern history. I think it is a great segue into ing how thrilled i am there is a crisis in historical literacy in this country. Explicitly damaged our ability to create effective statecraft. In terms of getting people more engaged, history can help inform. With that in mind, the other nice piece is history does change, at least how we interpret history and what happened in the past. I think that is a great example of that. I was considering which president to approach year, i throughout jimmy carter and i i saw marks reaction to this. Hold on a second here. Carter is one of our least studied president s. I hope when you listen to this, youll understand why. Ill try you a little story. Most president ial libraries have or generous travel fees to do research and take a look at the library and do papers and things. The Carter Library has none of that. Donors over the years who supported the establishment of the Carter Library dont support it anymore. Even though he is seen more often is our best expresident , people did not like him at the time. Even his own staff years later find that he was or at least talk about him being a horrible manager, and not a nice person at times as well. So the legacy the carter has ift is one that discourages think the active study of what he has done. Those of us to came of age during the Carter Administration, 1979 during the hostage crisis, always look negatively on carter. For me, he was the one who gave away the panama canal, week on the rations, lost iran, didnt pay our military. But when you start looking at carter i know this is some hyperbole but people forget. The b1 bomber, at least in his view, was canceled because it was because there was this thing called the b2 bomber that was under development. He was engaged in terms of what we now call the revolution of military affairs and a lot of things that were going on. Carter, theres no a bottom but. We think about the response to the iran crisis, the failure of the rescue mission, and the establishment of the u. S. Counterterrorism capability. The National Security adviser and the pentagon to establish that capability just outside the 100day window. But in july 1977, before any of this stuff was going on. So there is a mixed record, but i think it is hard for any of us to get through the emotions and the perceptions of the Carter Administration. With that said, tickets for to say there is a mixed record at best. But what is true to this day is one of the worst things you can call a democratic politician is worse than jimmy carter. Thinking back to democrats, when you ask them what you think of the carter at ministership, i perceive someone was there will not be able to print when i publish my book. Republicans are a bit more measured on this. I think its worth going back to 2012 and 2014. There are choice quotes that represent this. About ted cruz. The obama Foreign Policy is as feckless as hard as print Lindsey Graham obama makes jimmy carter look better by the day. And my favorite bobby jindal to president carter, i want to offer a sincere apology. Fair to say he was the worst president of this country. President obama has proven me wrong. I think its important to understand, if you go back to those first hundred days, you can start to see the seeds of what i believe caused the eventual demise of the Carter Administration. Im not saying that as a warning. But there is something a little bit different about the carter presidency when we talk about the first hundred days in more recent times. Im sure peter and max will talk , when we think of the first hundred days, we think about the president has a domestic agenda and and they are hit with a bunch of for policy crises. Us know what happens during the Carter Administration. I want to make a couple of broad points. The first is you have to look at the overall Foreign Policy lessons of the first hundred days within the context of carters overall record. Maybe thats the same for all presidencies, but with carter, it is difficult to decouple the for policy from the domestic agenda. And the first hundred days are defined by the larger context in which he assumed office. I will go into more detail in a minute. Second, i suggested up front the assumption of Mark Jacobson with about every power center in washington, media, congress, and in the end i think it dooms the Carter Administration well before the economic in foreignpolicy crises oftiatives get a lot playing. It is critical to understand the broader context in which carter comes to office. In the wake of vietnam, watergate, the crisis of confidence in government. It is difficult to overstate that. We see a bitterness in washington now. Communityn policy depression. This is similar to the postwatergate and postvietnam make iraq. Stanley hoffmann argued the reassertion of american idealism by the Carter Administration and that first 100 days was really their great success. Thecannot underestimate importance of tapping into the National Reservoir of moral and busy as him. During the campaign of 1976, carter sought to unite as part of his campaign. If you look at his campaign pamphlet, the top priority is our wholequote system depends upon trust. The only way i know how to trust is to be trustworthy. He was calling for a government that was on his, decent, fair. A competent to and treatment and truthful administration. As truthful as the American People. Carter sought to tie forward to be part of the disgraced nixon administration. Norida of course did himself favors in his first 100 days, in his first 30 days, ford pardoned nixon. For those saturday night live bands, my first memory is the chevy chase impression of gerald ford. Absolutely went to unbelievable undergraduate lampooning upward really had an impact and made people think he had a low intellect, was clumsy. And that did not have the same impact social media can have today but this is part of the game. Were going to be trusted, different. Making them part of the old regime. Saying we are going to change the old washington, that being part of the old washington. He was not met with the Foreign Policy crisis were met today. Having to deal with the existential threat of the soviet union probably makes up for that. That looking at before and policy side, it is quite compared to today. Secretary solis vance sworn in, lets see how that goes. He is sent to the middle east within weeks to try to restart geneva conference, the multilateral u. S. Soviet led attempt at peace in the middle east. At about the same time, carter senses famous letter to the dissident circle of saying, look we support your movement. This has great bipartisan support on both sides. The human rights agenda. It is never an issue over states or not the united and the Carter Administration should be promoting human rights around the world, more an argument over how much emphasis should be placed on human rights when it came to bilateral relationships with specific countries. Things are going well. He really upsets the soviets, which politically in the u. S. Is a good thing. There are some setbacks. In my own view, the Carter Administration fumbled in the attempts to solve the strategics arms limitation soviets at the time. But again, they are for years at this point. In april 1977, carter has its first meeting with anwar sadat probably theo administrations greatest accomplishment, the camp david accords. But it is important to look to the first 24 hours to understand the challenges for his administration and the problems they created for the themselves. Im much of this is the first act but it is close. 21st of january, carter fulfills a Campaign Promise and pardons evaders. Am war draft ford had already granted a certain amount of clemency to certain dropped innovators and carters pardon was not blanket. If you had committed a crime violencelved protest you were not pardoned but it came across as a blanket pardon and created a political liability and fed into the view that he was antimilitary so even if you can argue he was hawkish later on and his matter. Cy it did not very difficult for carter to overcome what he had done within office. T hours of his let me give you some broader themes. Let me talk to about the form of style and tactics. Carter came in believing it was his duty, his administration positivity to repair the crisis of confidence in government. The carter style reflected in many ways a personal flaw. Frankly, a holier than now attitude that he and the team from atlanta knew better. They vowed to drain the swamp and to change washington forever. Washington would be a good and moral place. A complete change. No oldstyle politics at all. Well, as one historian put it carter toit is about think about in terms of some other presidencies. There was a and in no sense a end air against about it. You just could not do it. Every president brings his people but most president s bring people are seasoned, understand washington, and know how to move around the city. That was not true of carter and proved to be very amateurish. Someonehis statement to and he said, it doesnt say the paper, where is that . There are some things that can be learned. This was the attitude from day one. The relationship with the press, itthe press secretary said, was a atrocious. They never learned how to work with the press much less manage the press at all. It was a hostile environment. In particular the Carter Administrations relationship with congress began on the wrong foot in the first 100 days and hampered them throughout. Upsetid not just republicans, but also tip oneill, the speaker of the house with the eye and returned phone calls, really end in match and insults. An unwillingness to trade political favors. This tangibly impacted carters agenda. There was no way to reach compromise even from the beginning and it hampered him on incrediblyt excite and on the Foreign Policy side as well. There is argument over when he talked to former staffers over relationsittee for an or forced carter to go back on his pledges with u. S. Troops from korea but what the staffers do agree upon was that it was congress that was the administration pause hand. How tonever understood work the administration. Youre talking about an intellectual person. A nuclear engineer. This pictures of him crawling around three mile island saying, i will fix this. A bad move from a pr standpoint. He is intellectually curious but he never wants to understand how washington works. He doesnt care. I may 1970 seven, that 100day mark, heard her head as one newsweek article put it, upset pretty much everyone in washington who had been an ally. Does this, liberals, the democratic party, his chief of staff Hamilton Jordan screamed at his team, can you name a single group that is supporting us right now . Only 100 days. At the same time, still that arrogance. Really dismissing the need to engage with these groups and felt, we can run everything from the white house. Another great irony, carters Economic Program is a little bit more conservative than democrats wouldve liked. Completely eliminated labor, especially the aflcio. Ininconsistency carter gets on right away. Goes back on campaign thomass, alienates his own voter base, and you get the loss for carter even before the general election and that is the primary challenge from the left from ted kennedy which although it does not succeed obviously, it damages carter considerably. Think just to make one or two final points, from the beginning i dont think carter was as painted ande is even before the soviet invasion of afghanistan, you see a hardening in his stance. About vance and brzezinski battling it out for the hearts and minds of the white house in terms of the soviets being tougher or more conciliatory but again i think the problem is that it is really the style and tactic. He alienates his base. Upsets his potential allies. His allies, while perhaps content with the white house were certainly never going to support him in the way he wanted. And icing on the cake, the Foreign Policy crisis in iran destroyedonstrated things. Confirmation battles. Battle over the panama canal treaty. That is normal stuff. I really think it is his style in the purge duke governess within the white house, within the executive branch, an approach i might add almost resulted in Vice President mondale resigning by late 1978 and carters ever playing his hand on trying to change washington. It it is really a twisted phrase by robert,. If you dont know who robert, is, you need to read his seminal report called bureaucracy does saying. Recognizeilure to governess cannot be done by the executive francesco alone. Foreign policy cannot just be done by the branch alone. Engaging media. Working with constituency groups, lobbyists, what have you. Carters stance sets them up for failure in the first 100 days. Other than that, how was the play mrs. Lincoln . [laughter] briefm going to try to be on the pain level waterboarding as our moderator told us we had. O leave time for q a i am going to talk about the administration of george w. Bush. Like all administrations, it had a checkered record of success. The aids initiative in africa. I am going to go will be the first 100 days because you all 2001, president bush came into office and wanted to be the education president. You probably all about that. Foreign policy was not his or take. Move into the war on terror in Foreign Policy after 9 11. Although the circumstances surrounding each Residential Administration are unique, think there are four broad policy it lessens the Incoming Administration can learn from the administration of president george w. Bush. The first one is not to let ideology guide policy without examining the Historical Context and the current circumstances of whatever issue is in question at the time. Terrific there is a book on grand strategy from the Truman Administration to the first of a Bush Administration. In it, the author says of the george w. Bush Administration Push a grand to strategy that was simply too grand. And this was the case if you think about the two broad policy initiatives. The war on terror and the freedom agenda. Really broad, sweeping attempts to reshape the world by democracy and free market capitalism and to do a lot of it by force of arms. But the freedom agenda had a fatal flaw in that was that it assumed that democracy and liberal market capitalism are universally shared values. That if you lifted the grip of dictators on the People Freedom that this was what they would automatically choose as their form of government and their form of organization. Byre is a good book on this Michael Mcdonald called overreach, that lays it out fairly nicely. For the most part, that is not the case. A lot of the world lacks the fundamental basis of individual rights and Robust Civil Society function, democracy however imperfectly. In retrospect, cia director george tenet concluded, we followed a policy built on hope ather the and fact. In die think the invasion of iraq bang which is signal the george w. Bush administration under widening the failure of Bad Administration to Pay Attention to the Historical Context of the situation. The cultural underpinnings, the religious overtones of the middle east. Not entirely ignorant, but not paying attention to how this factors could affect the aftermath of the invasion. The invasion was undertaken to disrupt the link you between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction decides the fact that Saddam Hussein there was no evidence he was going to use wmd terrorism. Mass it ended democratic governance in the heart of the middle east and begin the change of the various governments there, but that innovation unleashed forces that view in washington understood at the time. The administration got too narrowly focused on the application of military power at the expense of a deeper understanding of the type of work they were embarking on the type of war they were embarking on and the nuances of the land people would conquer and at least temporarily govern. If you readrd, president bushs memoirs, which i think highly of actually because he is so honest about it. It is astonishing about how so few of the decisions were actually keyed up for discussion in the national Security Council. The disbanding of the iraqi military, none of them reached the nfc level for discussion. Issues forp discussion is not enough. You have to have the right people in the room. A variety of viewpoints so that you do not end up succumbing to groupthink. You have to temper the excessive optimism that can come from people who are all of like mind about how great their policy is wargreat the work plan is. Knows a lot of stiff discussion over what could with whatever the strategy under consideration is about. The debate lays bare the assumptions underlying various strategies. Had the Bush Administration done this as the president admits in his own memoirs, it may still disbanded the iraqi army but it wouldve done so with a much more clear vision of what with thosegone wrong decisions in the second and third order of effects that mightve come about how they turned sour, which they did of course. The second lesson is to avoid strategic overstretch. The Bush Administration attempted tothe second sustain n hegemony around the world. It that it could do this primarily with the military instrument of power in that thought it could do that more or less indefinitely into the future, certainly beyond its administration. It can hand over the unipolar moment to whatever administration followed it. Hegemony comes at a steep price and the American People soon toting thecoming bills. Economic, moral, human, being the world will easement. Being thel the policeman. You could tell the Bush Administration was not being honest about the cost of the to the taxpayers. Initially the figure at put forward was 20 billion dollars. Into it is mourad i think the latest estimate as at 1. 7 t. In andh a probably another half a trillion for iraqi war veterans in the future. Expensivesecond most war in American History right after world war ii. An astonishing figure. The American People are right to wonder what they got for all of the blood and treasure they poured into it. War mightveraq been avoided altogether had president bush and the nfc not underestimated its costs, wrists, in uncertainties. President ,s the including the incoming one, must consider the potential downsides of various courses of actions and not just the benefits should there policies succeed. The Bush Administration rage the iraq won a best ive encased it analysis with little thought shown to alternative outcomes and their were warnings. A commander serving u. S. Army both warned to occupying iraq would take hundreds of thousands of troops and would take a lot longer than the administration was planning for. If you remember back to those days, invasion took place in march and the plan was to be out by september. This is what Lieutenant General jay garner head of the office of reconstruction and humanitarian affairs who was supposed to take care of her wrecked bang in the aftermath of the conflict, he got his Team Together in kuwait city before heading to baghdad lets review the bidding and make sure there is no humanitarian crisis, turn on the lights, turn the government over to the iraqis and leave my september and some person in that back of the room, probably Megan Osullivan raised her hand september . Hich [laughter] criminal mansoor waging two wars at one time was too many for the united mansoor waging two wars at one time was too many for the United States. Chairman of the joints chief of staff, admiral Michael Mullen put it plainly when he stated to the house Armed Services committees, our main focus it in the region in world right now is rightly and firmly in iraq bang. Currently in iraq. Had the Bush Administration limited its efforts to winning the war in afghanistan, and defeating al qaeda and focusing entire effort for its time in office, we would now be discussing the successful application of American Power in the postcold war world. Sadly, we are not. Bush administration couldve husbanded at American Power in other ways as well primarily by not creating more enemies than it had to. Listing iraq, iran, and north korea in the famous of axis of evil speech, the administration basically put those regimes on notice that their time was numbered and they were in our crosshairs. The problem was the administration only destroyed one of those regimes and the other two, iran and north north korea, immediately made a beeline for nuclear. Karen was getting there until iranuclear agreement was getting there until the nuclear agreement. In the case of iran, they also advised shiite groups that could attack forces in iraq directly turning iraq partially and this iraqrt of the recent turned into a quagmire and elerian is directly responsible 800 orling upwards of 900 servicemembers during the conflict. The Bush Administration wouldve done better to adhere to president Teddy Roosevelts admonition to speak softly and carry a big stick. That war lesson is should be a last resort not the first rule of. Laura is inherently risky and should be thought out ahead of war is inherently risky and should be thought out ahead of time. Understanding the kind of war in which we are marking and not mistaking or trying to turn it into something alien to its nature. The Bush Administration believed the wars in iraq and afghanistan would be over quickly. Be waged with shock and, speed and fire powder s. Bstituting for Number Administration did not understand was that may be true for conventional administrations to do story and army but the losing side is not simply going to roll over and accept the results of conventional battle when they have other options. Tothis case, to resort terrorism and guerrilla warfare and continue the fight with the week. S of the these weapons were existential conflicts for the television and for the bathurst regime. To much more thought needed be put into what actually happens when kabul and baghdad falls because military victory alone, as we discovered in germany, japan, south korea, does not ensure political success unless conditions are created conducive to longterm stability in the aftermath of conflict. Pundits can decry nationbuilding all they want to, but failure to stabilize Postconflict Society is a recipe for continuing conflict especially among those people who are on the losing end of the struggle. Lessone fourth and final and perhaps one that needs the most emphasis to the Incoming Administration is that allies are critical enablers of American Power. Americas unipolar moment is over. The United States cannot go it achieve itspect to National Security goals in the world today. Allies are not just window dressing to provide political cover for unilateral American Military operations. American states needs allies for legitimacy because votes in the United Nations to have an impact. They express the voice of the International Community in support of diplomacy but allies give is far more than just diplomatic support. They provide basis that enable employment of forces beyond the homeland. Provide support for Coalition Operations and they provide forces that balance those of regional powers such as china. And powers such as if we can encourage our allies in europe and the middle east and asia to do more and there defense but we cannot jettison them. By going in alone in iraq without real support from allies, the Bush Administration squandered the goodwill generated after 9 11. If you remember back, they played the starspangled banner in the changing of the guard at buckingham palace. There were american flags being flown all around the world. Only two nations did not support the United States. Think about all of that goodwill that has been squandered in the succeeding 15 years. We lost a real opportunity to harness the power of the International Community against the powers of disorder, chipping peace. Stability and the Trump Administration, for all of the uncertainties surrounding it, has the opportunity to do better. It remains to be seen whether it will season. It seize it. Well. Session. Pressing panel i feel this is going to be such a downer i almost want to switch from obama toforeignpolicy. My original plan was to talk about the obama foreignpolicy which has not been a resounding success. I do not know it i would say that obama is worse than carter i do not think i would go that far, because i grew up under carter and those are still vivid, dark memories. I think suffice to say that president obama has not lived up to the vast expectations that greeted his ascension to office. He spoke about all the opportunities that we had after 9 11 and under the administration. Still, there was quite a bit of goodwill in the world towards nobel obama who won a prize simply for not being george w. Bush. He came into office on the expectation that he would magically make the oceans rise and receipt. And fall. That he would bring goodwill to the entire world. That he would change americas image. That he would end our wars in the middle east. If he could not make everyone love us, then they would at least like us. He would not get caught in all of the problems that so greatly affected the Bush Administration. Well, here we are. It is hard for me to see that president obama has achieved any of his objectives. I will get to that in just a second. In the interest of fair and balanced analysis, i will give him a you points of praise. W points of praise. On the personal front, i think he is a very impressive, couple, five person dignified person who has been an exemplar as president in the way that he has handled the office. There has not been a single scandal on his watch. The image that he projects has a that has been a positive, dignified one. It has tried to be very thoughtful in the way that he exercises power. These are attributes we take for granted, but it may be in a few years that we are yearning for these attributes in the oval office. It came to foreignpolicy, he was kind of a bornagain free trader. Office, woke up, spelled the espresso, and realized that free trade is in our benefit. He tried hard, but not successfully, to push for greater betrayed. He hoped what would be one of his major achievements, the transpacific partnership, is now more dead than a doornail. But i think president obama has been a big supporter of alliances. I think he has been a good friend to nato. Some of the things he has done to expand nato capabilities have been positive. In particular, the decision he pushed with our european allies to expand the nato forces protecting the eltek baltic. Positive step forward, and i hope it continues under the new administration. It is hard to say that his policy against north korea has been tremendously successful we have seen a massive expansion of north Koreas Nuclear and missile capabilities on his watch. However, he did not follow the failed policy of the Bush Administration of the Six Party Talks which did not really get anywhere and attends to a piece north korea by anywhere by appease north korea by lifting some sections. This was one dictator he did not cow to. The best thing i can say about president obama is that as he took office, he did not immediately follow his Campaign Promises. If you have followed his Campaign Promises, we would have left iraq after he entered office very quickly. Ofwas kind of a combination while we did not leave iraq quickly and we built up in afghanistan to a greater extent than you would have expected a start his campaign rhetoric. I think that comes from two factors. The first of which was that he was pretty uncertain of himself in the realm of Foreign Affairs. Remember, he was a firstterm was not far from being a state senator and Community Organizer in chicago. During his first term, he seemed refer more to the team he put in place, which i think was responsible and reasonable. Folks like hillary clinton, bob , the, general petraeus cia, and other appointees. Listened to them, and he moderated some of his initial impulses. What they told him some of his Campaign Promises would not fly in practice. I think the great unraveling of the Obama Administration occurred during what he would cite as the high point of his administration. It was both the greatest i think in many ways the greatest moment of the administration, but also the greatest moment of hubris that set him up for his potential downfall. I spoke of the death of Osama Bin Laden in may of 2011. Its premuch assured it be much assured his reelection. However, i think what happened as soon as he killed bin laden was that he no longer felt shy or bashful about doing what he wanted. Coterie of aids wanted to do, he felt he no longer had anything to learn from the washington establishment, and he basically killedi and the guy who bin laden, so i am going to go out and do what i think is best. That, i think in the second term, in particular, he veered off into that even that hehe first are feared off in the wrong direction, because it was later off in the wrong direction, because he started to pull a large majority of forces out of iraq. The Intelligence Community certainly anticipated what a disaster this would be. It was not forced upon him. We do not really have time to go into the means and outs of it. However, having established that incident closely, i am certain that if you wanted to keep the troops in iraq, then they would have stayed in iraq. Lets witnessed the fact today that we have over 5000 troops in iraq. None of those troops are being prosecuted in iraqi courts, because there is no court date is going to be prosecuting u. S. Troops. That was the excuse that basically allowed president obama to pull u. S. Troops out of that peace and democracy was done. We no longer needed to stay in iraq. And then we saw what happened almost at the exact same time, the civil war breaking out in syria. All the setting, the United States pulls out of iraq, and president obama refuses to do more to do anything to and be end the syrian civil war. He stands back, and he does not want to get caught in this quagmire because he thinks that is the same mistake his predecessor made. So, he made a fresh mistake. I think what happened in the Obama Administration is that we veered from a high degree of interventionism under president bush to a high degree of noninterventionism under president obama. In afghanistan and iraq, we have lost thousands of troops. We have had many more maimed and wounded. We spent a tight of money in the wars in iraq and afghanistan. Those costs are real. Those are things that obama was desperate to avoid, because he did not want to be another president bush. He did not do any of that, so what happened instead . Resided over the worst strategic and human rights disaster in the 21st century. It was that his killed over 5000 people and displaced over 10 million people. It is created 5 million refugees. It has destabilized nearby location. The indirect consequences of the great civil war was britains exit from the european union. Syria has become and remain what general petraeus has called a political chernobyl. It continues to spew its toxins not only over syria but over the entire region. Place where iran and its proxies can expand their influence. It has become a nightmare. This is what has happened under president obamas watch. There is no way he can avoid responsibility or this disaster. He came into office saying that atrocities were going to stop. It would be a strategic goal of the United States. He treated the atrocities prevention board to stop the very kind of things going on in syria as we speak. The killing continues unabated. I do not think it will slow down anytime soon. Failure been a horrific for american policy that i think could have been prevented with more effective action early on. However, president obama was not willing to do that. That i think is going to be the biggest legacy of the Obama Administration the greatest failure that he will carry away from office just as bill clinton was haunted by the failure to stop the genocide in rwanda. However, it is also a strategic atrocity. Looking elsewhere, the picture is not much writer. If you look at the fact that all of our principal state adversaries im thinking of th korea, iran, and china all of them have gotten stronger under the Obama Administration. Remember in the case of russia that president obama began his term in office wanted to reset relations with russia. How is that going . Wantsns out russia really peace. Of ukraine. Piece they want a piece of the ba ltics. They are getting that under the Obama Administration with very little respect. He has imposed some sanctions with our European Partners on russia, but i do not think they are sufficient to create enough pain to make putin back down. He was caught completely flatfooted by the russian intervention in syria which has been pretty effective in achieving putins goals. He goes in and achieve something right away. That was to reverse the erosion of power there, and now he is willing to commit war crimes in aleppo. To reclaimng aside lost ground. It is good for the standpoint of putin but not for us or our allies. At the same time, you have china getting much more powerful. They are getting much more aggressive in claiming much of the South China Sea and East China Sea as its own, personal domain. We have not pushed back, in part, because of the sequestration that our defense but has taken. We currently have about 272 combat effective chips in the despite reports that we needed more around 350. Has done little about the erosion of our military capabilities which has put us at a disadvantage to the rising powers of china and russia. Beene way, iran has immensely strengthened by the Iranian Nuclear deal. You could argue whether or not that will delay the Iranian Nuclear program, but certainly this is not the kind of agreement that we reached with libya in 2004 that illuminated eliminated the nuclear program. Instead, it more simply delete it. Delayed it. It has been an incredibly destabilizing force that has caused the reaction from the sunni side from sunni extremists and others like saudi arabia. By allowing iran to grow as strong as it has on the back of the Iranian Nuclear deal, we are basically de facto and powering the extremists on both the shiite and sunni sides. They are united by one thing which is their mutual conviction that the United States is the great stan and their antipathy for america and our allies and our interest. It is hard to say that the story in the middle east is moving in a positive direction. It is hard to say that about events anywhere in the world moving in a positive direction. It feels a little bit like a 1980 tight moment where we had like a 1950r 1980 type moment where we are still waiting for our jimmy carter. Drilquip, thats what had two things. Quick, i not really just want to add two things. First, do not underestimate the power of personality. Present obama is a smart, charming guy. He wins a lot of popular to contest in places like europe, but it has not been enough to defeat our foes. Be wonare not going to goodness,e power of light, and reason. Second, watch what you say. He has been incredibly soaring in his rhetoric, and his rhetoric has not matched his actions. For example, the red line in syria. There is no reason that obama needed to say that there will be a redline over chemical weapons in syria. Personally, im not sure why it is ok for the assad regime to kill people with conventional weapons instead of chemical but not ok for them to use chemical weapons. I think you need to back up your rhetoric. Otherwise, it has been painful for the United States in the middle east and elsewhere. He will do not take our word seriously when obama says something. The third lesson i would take doy is do not reflexively things because it is different from what the Previous Administration did. This is something that i think the Obama Administration has been obsessed with. They are obsessed with saying they are not present bush ministration. Hs ad i was at a debate where both debaters were defending obama, buta sickly about 60 of their argument was that bush was worse. , mostas the biggest frequently referenced point in their defenses. Especially in trying to move out of a more active role in the middle east, i feel that the Obama Administration has gotten themselves in trouble. It is not unique to the Obama Administration. The Bush Administration came into office saying they wanted to be very different from the Clinton Administration. Forink it is very common various president s. The fourth lesson i would draw from the Obama Administration is that it is dangerous to walk too far back from the Global Leadership role that the United States has played since 1945. I think president obama has tried to recalibrate united. Tates International Presence he has drawn down in the middle east and europe. Those not really a build up in the Pacific Region besides a buildup of rhetoric. President obama came into office with the assumption that the United States was more heart of the problem and not the solution. I think we have seen is that if we step back, others will step forward. If we do not lead, then no one will and the result is catastrophe. The final lesson from the Obama Administration is that you have to be able to change course if what you are doing is not working. On this front, i would give points to jimmy carter who became a bornagain hot and started increasing the Defense Budget and battling the soviet union. I do not think is the obama has had that bornagain movement. He has done some minor back and forth in the case of afghanistan. Keep 500cided to there, and he has had to send back forces to iraq, but i do not think there has been a largescale recalibration of how the views foreignpolicy challenges. I think he has start he has instead stuck to his course of tried to crawl down u. S. Resins, and i do not think it has been u. S. Y to draw down presence, and i do not think it has been successful. If you look at the lessons i just outlined, which is do not overestimate the power of personality, watch what you said do not use loose language, did not swing too far away from the Previous Administration, do not walk back from the u. S. Global leadership role, and be willing to change course if what you are doing is not working out of all of those, the only one i would have any confidence that he would take to heart is number five. He changes course all the time. [laughter] but he will be huge. [laughter] i apologize. We are pushing up against our time limit. We had time for one question have time for one question. Then, if palest one to respond to anything the other analysts toe said, we will allow time do that. I think many folks are my number the show the hulk. I feel a little bit of that coming on now from resurrecting the Political Science side of me. Beg your pardon for the Political Science you are about to hear now, but what im taking away from all the presentations is that each president overpromised. There is a kind of theme that goes through all three administrations. President s come into Office Taking they can radically change things and they run up against real hard realities. The Political Science side of me wants to suggest that that beginning with carter beginning with carter, that was the first president that was selected for reforms taking place. The party wanted to change out its candidates for office. One has to wonder if there is a connection between the kind of selection system we have and the resulting president s that tended to overpromised. Now, you have a president elect that is not only good at overpromising but also sort of, again, making suggestions that he will somehow transform rings in ways that are likely not going to happen. So, sorry to apologize again, that we could take one question. Make it a very good question. If not, then that is even better i suppose that any last comments any last comments, guys . Thank you for the invitation to be here today. I want to give a shout out to all of the Alexander Hamilton Society Students here. Ive been to your campus, and i eventsjoyed a lot of the your organization puts on. Also, a shout out to all of the buckeyes in the audience. If no one else has any further comments, please join me j joinng the best me in thanking the panelists. [applause] on newsmakers this weekend, we hear from the Top Republican and democrat on the they discuss Community Relations with police and the effort to analyze police aggression. I decided to spend much more time on young grant. I spent a lot of time at west point tried to figure out how he at westage 29 out of 39 t