are living say, we and fascinating times in northeast asia and the korean peninsula in particular. we have entered a very difficult and occasionally disturbing and frightening few weeks in dealing with north korea. we have also been through a superbly managed visit by the president, a personal friend of mine. it was obvious during her visit that she has lots of friends and supporters in the united states. i am supposed to talk about the prospects for u.s. korea cooperation in dealing with north korea. i am nervous doing that in the presence of so many journalists during my days of a diplomat i was on the receiving end of their tough questions. i can show you my scars later on. it is a much friendlier gathering today. i feel comforted by that. since i know longer work for the government [laughter] , i can say what i think. [laughter] freedom is a wonderful thing. i managed to talk to a number of friends of the current administration who were raving about the outcome of the visit. big thingsme happened, not the least of which was one of the most important outcomes of the summit, the establishment of a good chemistry between the two leaders. anyone familiar with summitry knows how important it is to get the chemistry right between the two leaders. there is no question in my mind that the chemistry between president obama and president pok is there. it will help the two countries move forward on a range of issues in the coming months and years. it was alsoignicant comfort l, if that is the right word, in terms of the president's view of the south korean game plan going forward. , their new president is written and spoken extensively during the campaign about the need to reach out to north korea, build a relationship of trust, if possible, between south and north and try to jumpstart dialogue between south and north. that is something i think president obama and this administration feels very old. she had an opportunity -- feels very comfortable with. she an opportunity to talk about her game plan going forward. i think people are supportive of that. there is an understanding of why president gauck desires -- pok desires to try and reengage the north, to try and reduce tensions and remove the relationship with north korea in a different direction than it has been moving in and the last two years. moment ago,ed a also an understanding of how committed she was during her campaign to ongoing this course of action and to think washington is willing to see what can be done to help her in this respect. there was also an understanding in washington of a basic fact that is all too often forgotten when we are talking about korea. is name of the poland cella the korean peninsula. it makes sense for koreans to see what then -- can be done to move the relationship in a positive direction. there is trust and confidence in in theth korean allies mu president herself, i think that has helped solidify in korean's support going first to deal with the north. ,he previous korean president also a good friend to have a very good relationship with president obama, also sought to put south korea in the lead. unfortunately, north korea had a very different idea and rejected his various overtures very strongly. unfortunately, the self north -northonship -- south relationship did not move positively in that time. nevertheless, it is important to try again. if for no other reason than to keep the pressure on north korea and remind everybody where the intransigence lies. if any party is going to bring the relationship to a halt or move things in a negative direction, let's make sure it is north korea and not self arena. all the more reason to keep the heat on. he also ought to manage our withtations in dealing north korea. looking around the room, there are many veterans in this process of dealing with earth korea, and we all know how often we have been disappointed in the past. it is north korea that we are dealing with. our expectations or disappointing us in profound ways is what they seem to do for a living. we also need to keep in mind that there are limits to what north and south korea can do together. we saw that during the last administration. north korea was not willing to engage south korea on the terms that south korea had laid out. north korea was not willing to engage south korea in dealing with fundamental security nuclear weapons and missiles. the north koreans as a rule for to talk to the united states about those issues. believing that if they can make ,rogress with the united states on nuclear weapons or missile issues, that somehow we will drag south korea and japan along. talks are possible between southern north. we will see her north korea react. they tend to look at south korea as a provider of , agricultural support, fertilizer, food and occasionally even cash. as we have seen from the suspension of work at the industrial complex in side north korea, the border from south korea, that project is now on that north fact korea had withdrawn their workers from it has raised some interesting questions about whether north korea is any longer interested in the income 90 million u.s. dollars a year that the project used to generate for them. theiresult of removing workers, the north is now not going to get that $90 million a year, sso 53,000 north korean workers lost the family theers of theirs -- plus family members of theirs getting the other benefits, food, electricity, clothing, , those benefits will not be accruing to north korea anymore. that is another interesting question. the north koreans, as a result of the project, probably have 53,000 north korean citizens in their midst who are not happy that they are no longer employed and well fed and well showered and medical care, etc.. .lus all those family members this raises an interesting question about whether north korea will be able to keep those people happy. not that north korea worries too much about keeping their people happy. there are some interesting indicators, asking about why that project is no longer moving forward. there were some interesting indicators that suggest that the north koreans were concerned ,bout the potential solution spiritual and political collusion of the project was producing. the reasons of that some elements in north korea were prepared to forgo the income, because they saw the downside of allowing the project to go forward with to allow this political and intellectual pollution to spread into other parts of north korea. of myioned in the opening remarks, we have hit a difficult patch with north korea. i don't have to remind you of the outrageous threats we have heard from north korea in recent months. there are some interesting signs that we have moved into a new stage of this crisis. and threats of imminent nuclear holocaust throughout the pacific, we are not hearing that right now. suggesting we are moving into a new phase. i would remind you that if you look back over the history of our efforts to deal with north korea, we have seen an interesting pattern develop over the years, going back to the 1980's and 1990's. involving an opening phrase of ,rovocation and tension followed by a time of negotiation, followed by an agreement in which north -- receivese some some awards or benefit. followed by quiet, followed by a breakdown in the agreement, followed by more provocations. thisould probably ask you point, are we moving into the next phase of that cycle again? we can discuss that during the q&a. some of the reasons why north korea has decided to tone down the rhetoric and cool off the temperature. anybody who has been to north is the annualere ritual that takes place in april and may of every year where hundreds of thousands of north korean soldiers leave their barracks and go to the field to engage in weeding and planting and agricultural work. without that labor in the fields, the north koreans would not be able to eat at all later on this year. it is a critical component of the north korean economy to get them into the field areas those soldiers on the frontlines, if they are ratcheting up up tensions and running exercises, those soldiers are not doing that duty, but doing military duty. another reason for the toning down the rhetoric might be that it is difficult for north korea with its limited resources to tempoue the operational of its military. to continue those exercises. continue flying those airplanes in response to what we are doing for a lengthy time. it is possible that the north to calmwere compelled things down because it was getting difficult to keep those planes moving in the air and keep the tanks running. to show us that they were ready to take us on in some military confrontation. despite the fact that the temperature seems to be a bit lower on the peninsula, we cannot rule out the possibility of another provocation. when i speak about provocationreans understand tt h korea today is a very different place from south korea a few years ago. there is no doubt in my mind and the minds of south korean citizens that the next conventional military provocation that north korea engages in will be met with a commensurate oteri response by south korea. i hope north korea understands that. i also hope they appreciate the importance of the recent agreement between washington and seoul, the two governments agreeing on how to respond together to the next military provocation by north korea. very important agreement was achieved and the implications of that are profound in terms of there being a joint effort to respond to whatever the north koreans do next. is that if not korea does engage in future provocative behavior, we are more likely to see it in the area of a nuclear test or missile test. they have made it very clear that they intend to move forward very quickly with missile and nuclear weapons development. i think it is more a matter of when, not if, in terms of a nuclear and missile test. of a nuclearurs weapon or missile, i think we will find, as we have in recent weeks, washington and seoul on the same page together with tokyo, i suspect. this raises an interesting question about the role of china in this. that is something that did not come up in a big way in the earlier panel. i want to make a couple of points along these lines. china's role going forward, i think is still open to some question. there is no doubt that there have been some critical things said of north korea by chinese officials. indirect, but it was clear who they were talking about. we have seen a number of chinese academics, including some were very well-connected in chinese communist party circles. saying something very critical of north korea. and moreeen more chinese north korea expert advocating for a major shift in china's policy toward north korea. almost open-ended support and tolerance for north korea's outrageous behavior. caution you.y this is one take away i hope you'll leave with. please feel free to question me on this. i hope you would not over changes in china's posture on north korea. it is not clear that china's leadership, ise prepared to fundamentally change its relationship with north korea. that the from clear long-standing pillars of china's north korea policy, i think many of you are familiar with the us, among the pillars is china's desire to maintain north korea as sort of a buffer, keeping south korea and u.s. troops far away from the border. there are long-standing fraternal and ideological ties between north korea and china. china has long felt more comfortable with the notion of a invited korean peninsula rather than a united one. there are some in beijing who have said this to me, they like the idea of north korea existing under the -- a burr saddle. think how many assets are tied down because north korea exist. is china about to do a 180 degree about-face on its north korea policy? i suspect not. will they be somewhat more helpful? i suspect so. i am not expecting a fundamental turnabout in the north rim policy. -- in china's north korea policy. how to understand china's position, evolving position on north korea and how to influence it in ways that are more conducive to the direction we would like to see china move in. and how to convince china's , as some experts have already been convinced, aat north korea is no longer net, strategic asset of china's. liability. strategic increasing numbers of chinese agree with that. i am not sure large numbers of the chinese politburo agree with that. central task for the united states and south korea going forward, since we're are talking about coordination, is the disturbingh emerging new reality that we face in terms of north korea's growing nuclear missile capabilities. a lot of your familiar with the details here. in a word, north korea has made it clear that it is not going to give up its nuclear weapons. they have made it clear that expande determined to the capabilities. experts who study this a great that north korea will have the ability to deliver nuclear warheads on virtually every major population center in east asia, including every u.s. military base in the western and central pacific. and ultimately, will be able to strike parts of the western united states with those capabilities, in about four or five years time. i don't need to remind you that north korea in recent statements threatened to do exactly that. they have said they will use nuclear weapons against south korea, japan, the united states. some experts believe that north korea may already be able to deliver nuclear warheads on .reas just east of north korea u.s. bases in japan, south korea. in a already be able to deliver nuclear warheads to target in those areas, using some of its medium-range ballistic missiles. there is some disagreement within the american intelligence community on this. i side with those who believe that north korea may already have developed the capability to do that. , and a key question that arises for the united states is, how are we going to deal with this emerging threat? the threat we will face not only in the next few months, but next several years in north e threat of a larger and more dangerous north korean nuclear missile program, as well as the proliferation threat that north korea has posed and will continue to post. let me just wrap up by saying u.s. policyrent towards north korea, which is been carefully come to with our south korean and japanese allies, is based on a number of elements. including strengthening economic sanctions on north korea, increasing the pressure on north korea through sanctions and increased military exercises, increasing the scope of some of our military exercises, antimissile deployments in the region. we have talked about that already a little bit. measures that are being taken against south korean banking system. which we believe -- north korean thank you system. .- banking system it may cause them to return to the gold -- to negotiations. maybe it will convince them of the best option is to implement its commitments to rid itself of nuclear weapons. bebe those things will not effective in doing so. if that is the case, if north korea does not agree to give up its nuclear weapons program, if it is serious in the rhetoric we have been hearing, determined to become a de facto nuclear , what is to be done yet though what is the u.s. going to do about that day when it comes in the not-too- distant future? that is one of the toughest questions to face the alliance. it will be with us for a weil, but we had better begin answering it in the immediate future. thank you very much. [applause] i do appreciate what you have presented to us. i will go to the [inaudible] >> good afternoon. it is a great honor and pleasure to be here with you. it is nice for me and particular. asmet when he was in seoul an ambassador. managing andi was we got together on treasure and on a windy day, i don't remember the square he hit. anyway, he told me just before that his score is very improved. [laughter] most of my prepared parts are similar to what he said. i prepared some short comments for you your convenience. .ome points as you are aware of the principal two decades that the , southoreans politics korea and the united states have followed a predictable pattern. there was a cycle of north korean provocations. negotiations. and a breakdown of deals, followed by renewed provocations and negotiations. for south korea and the united states, it was a bad time in which they've used the dialogue and pressure in a two track approach. north korea's development of a nuclear weapon and the capability of north korea nuclear deployment is now going into a new dimension. [indiscernible] on northegic patience korea respectively. those strategies [indiscernible] north korea has advanced its nuclear capability. [indiscernible] the obama administration has threatened north korea for four years. a more accurate evaluation of u.s. policy would be [indiscernible] the former defense secretary came to seoul earlier this year and the stanford university turning the symposium on northeast asia. they were involved in the korean [indiscernible] process. -- solve theerve north korean problem. people in biggest diplomatic history. it seems to me that we could take the horse to the river. north could not make korea drinking water. -- drink the water. is it really time for creative and more effective north korea policy. , i think south korea and the u.s. should conduct [indiscernible] review of north korean policy. certainly, the fundamental , theems in north korea unrelenting nuclear ambitions. south korea and the united states should concede that the directorea policy has continuity and consistency. [indiscernible] north korea unconditionally. we cannot let north korea keep strengthening the abominable nuclear weapons. [indiscernible] with a new come up concrete suggestions. make this will pave the way for a new [indiscernible] negotiations are resumed. the press and north korea should not be discontinued. it is important to seek various ways to put pressure to make it feel the pinch. from.s. sanctions on asia 2005, which apparently caught north korea off guard. is important.a south korea and the united states after considered china's position during the nuclear crisis on the peninsula in the 1990's. now, we cannot get [indiscernible] without china's help. they must create conditions under which north korea cannot keep changing [indiscernible] that requires more active diplomacy rather than waiting until north korea changes. thank you very much. [applause] >> thank you very much. now it goes to chang, the of thent and publisher weekly publication. >> thank you. before beginning my presentation, let me just clarify one thing about myself. , i amot the publisher merely in charge of a small affiliate company, which publishes chosen weekly and monthly chosen. [laughter] >> i am promoting everybody. a even though i am not politics experts, as a journalist i want to share some of my thoughts on dealing with north korea. on our north korea policy of south korea and the united states. to discuss about some confusions that we had in dealing with north korea. the first confusion i want to our wrong expectations. but the problems with north korea could be solved through dialogues and agreements. it was not the case, as we know. orth korea has repealed keyified several agreements with south korea and the united states, included in the lessons for tour is in business -- license for tourism business in 1991 and of thent declaration denuclearization of the korean peninsula from 1992. and the inter-korean basic agreement from 1992. and even the armistice treaty that was signed in 1953. these agreements were all part [indiscernible] should we reopen dialogue with north korea with a new hope of solving the nuclear problem you g? can you suppose that any new agreements this time will really be cap?