Attack. In many instances security measures again well before a person approaches the facility. To maintain ae security cleared him and he was trusted as a defense clatter that contractor and granted access to a navy complex. He exploited the stress, and he hurt a lot of it is people. The aftermath, it is only natural that we wonder if all people entering a federal facility, in the that even employees, should be screened in some way . And often usedw phrase from ronald reagan, trust but verify . Manyof the examples of undesirable threats facing our federal the syllabus facilities. In addition to active shooters, agencies must develop countermeasures for blued that improved explosive devices, biological weapons, and other types of results. Examinehearing will federal agencys efforts to develop and maintain effective layers of security at their facilities, and prevent future attacks against innocent people. Facility security is not just about protecting the physical structure of a building, it is about safeguarding the millions of innocent people who work and visit these facilities on an almost daily basis. On facilitying securities is also about honoring the memory of the 12 men and women who died on september 16, earlier this year. By learning for that incident and doing all that we can to prevent a similar tragedy from happening in the future. Knowe who work with me that one of my Guiding Principles is if it isnt perfect, make it better. Our goal today is to make sure we know how to do a better job protecting people at facilities. We can start by asking some fundamental questions. First, we need to ask how do federal agencies determine what the threats are to their specific facilities . Not every facility is the same rate of large Federal Buildings in big cities, for example the offered murray building in oakland the city may be target for terrorists because of their size of what they symbolize. However the more likely threat is a small Social Security office, maybe a and rrs and wherecurity center, someone may be upset and acting badly. We must be successful in prioritizing these risks. As we all know, the world around us is possibly changing. So is the nature of the threats that we face. As a result, methods for security securing our homeland should always be under observation and under assessment. Because the nature of the threat continues to evolve, the methods we used to consider to ensure our homeland must involve my final question, how do agencies respond to these evolving threats . A security measure that made work for one facility may not work for another. Ablevery facility might be to be built from 50 feet away from the nearest road to protect from a vehicle threat. I would to know if agencies are sharing best practices. Is the department of defense working with civilian agencies to share his experience . What security measures should be able to did should be limited . Implemented . Years ofhave experience and education and security matters. Actions orknow what omissions have taken since the navy are shooting to secure facilities. Require some responsibility, and the federal protective services a point a department of the Homeland Security to protect those that are older leased by the general administration. The federal protective service has a difficult mission. The agency only employs about a dozen enforcement officers to civilianore than 9000 federal facilities. These facilitys are spread out all over our country. While Effective Services are was possible for assessing security at these facilities, and lacks the authority to let the security measures. The nadir prevents installing metal detectors and xray screening equipment at a facility, but it is the local Facility Security committee that decides whether to authorize and pay for those recommended security measures. Governmented Accountability Office report has highlighted, a number of internal management challenges have impeded the federal Effective Services ability to protect facilities. For example, the federal protective service must the bleep the Facility Security assessment in a timely manner with the share them offices it protects. This service has been able to do that and other agencies have sought to complete their own security assessments, creating unnecessary duplication and waste. The federal protective service must also do a better job of tracking and overseeing the training of the 14,000 contract guards that it uses to protect its facilities. Ensure that post is federal Law Enforcement officers and the Armed Security guards it uses are appropriately trained, equipped, and prepared. Training, the equipment, the preparedness of federal lawenforcement officers and Contract Security guards is essential to providing for the security of facilities safeguarded by the federal Addictive Service protective service. In the wake of the shootings at the navy yard and the West Virginia courthouse, we cannot afford to be illprepared for this type of threat. While director patterson has worked hard to improve the Productive Service performance, the agency has not received the subordinates from congress. Pattersonure director that i am committed to working with him to make the agency more efficient, and more effective. We can start by focusing on the costsaving and cost neutral solutions that are must more likely to be received by bipartisan support in congress. I have that todays hearing will help us to find better ways to improve security at all but all facilities. Theres much to be learned from the navy yard treasury to help us prevent similar incidents in us future tragedy to help prevent similar incidences in the future. Turn to theont senator from north dakota to see if once to make a comment, but i would like to ask her. Let us proceed. Ok. I just going to briefly introduce our witnesses, and reintroduce others. I want to introduce us our first itness, caitlin a. Durkovich. Where we have a newly confirmed secretary, jeh johnson, was approved yesterday by a vote of 7816. Im grateful to our colleagues, both democrat and republican for their support. And he him in place, needs a team to lead, including an able deputy Security Section a of Homeland Security. Durkovich was appointed in may 2012 and leads the departments efforts to strengthen and make resilient our need our nations infrastructure. To oversees its Mission Best Practices in the United States. Is generaltness patterson. Patterson was appointed to his vision on september of 2010, as rector mr. Patterson oversees the Services Mission to protect and deliver rater Law EnforcementSecurity Services to over 9000 civilian federal facilities. To safeguard the more than 1. 4 million daily occupants and visitors. Here served in the air force for over 34 years, thank you for that service. Finally, stephen lewis, deputy director, personnel and Security Policy within the office of the undersecretary of defense for the intelligence and United States martin of defense. Department of defense. Related to personnel and security. He has appeared before our Committee Just about a month ago in the first hearing on the Washington Navy yard bustle we welcome you all to today, and i ask ms. Durkovich to leadoff. I apologize to being late for being late. I will put my Opening Statement in the record. Welcome. Please continue, and your welcome to summarize as you see fit. Much. Nk you, very appear for you today to help honor the memory of the 12 men and women who died at the navy yard him at all of those who have been victims of violence in the federal workplace. As assistant secretary Work Production i have had the responsibility to lead the overall coordination of the nations Critical Infrastructure security and resilience efforts. One of the most rewarding opportunities i have is to serve as chair of the interagency security Aid Committee for the isc. To oversee the development of standards, reports, guidelines, and best practices of the facilities securities at nearly 400,000 cell billion federal facilities civilian federal facilities. The owl fred the murrah alfred p citying no, in oklahoma the work is based on real world challenges, and focused on cost savings by the on specific security needs of the fate agencies. Standards defined security measures and design an able magician of security policies. Recently, the isc proceeded that Risk Management process for the Risk Management standard. Those responsible for security theld use to determine that silly posse to a provides an integrated Single Source of Facility Security countermeasures are not federal facilities. Explains that risk may be addressed in various ways, the pending on the Agency Mission needs. For sample, the presence of a Childcare Center on site has historical significance and has merkel significance. 53 federal departments and agencies participate in the isc and take the lead in bringing ideas to the table, and drafting standards and best practices. When agencies cannot solve security related problems on their own the isc brings chief Security Officers and Senior Citizens gather to solve continuing governmentwide concerts. Isc mentorship also engages in the development of standards and best practices based on evolving realworld threats. Recent events have demonstrated the need to identify measures that can be taken to reduce the risk of mass casualty shootings in Workplace Violence and Workplace Violence. The department of Homeland Security aims to enhance preparedness three whole community approach. Active shooter awareness, countering and provides explosive environments improvised explosive devices, and Workplace Violence. We have hosted workshops and felt Online Training tools targeted at preparing those who work in these buildings. These events efforts and resources have been well received, nor applicable to federal facilities as well as commercial spaces and other government buildings. Cognizant of this growing threat, the isc this spring formed a federal active shooter working group of the wall and number of guidance documents previously existed on active shooter preparedness and response. This working group was formed to streamline the existing policy into a single cohesive document. To date, the working group has met five times, and is reviewed numerous documents, including training materials belched by the department for commercial facilities. It will also leverage Lessons Learned from real incident, such as the Navy Yard Shooting. It is my intention that our work will enhance fairness for an active shooter incident in a auto facility. Threats to our Critical Infrastructure, including federal facilities are wide ranging and presently evolving. Not only are there terrorist threats like a bombing at the Boston Marathon this past spring, or the complex shopping attack in nairobi, but whether related threats like hurricane sandy, and Cyber Attacks that have wrecked impact on the security of our Federal Buildings. It is impossible to anticipate every threat, but the department is taking a holistic approach to creating more secure and resilient infrastructure environments, to better handle these challenges. And the work of the ic exit devise these efforts. In cheering our ensuring our federal facilities is a large undertaking, but the number of departments and agencies ensure that those response will for federal Facility Security has resources needed to mitigate the threats. I would like to thank you for the opportunity to appear before you go and discuss the important work of the isc and ensure that these realworld events do not happen again. I look forward to answer any questions you may have. Thank you. Thank you for your testimony and work. Good morning. Is eric patterson, and im the director of the federal protective Service Within the National Protection and programs director of the department hope all went security. In order to test my plan for the committee im here to testify before this committee today. We are charged with protecting and integrating lawenforcement services to over 9000 still sell these owned or leased by the General Services administration, and safeguard their nearly 1. 4 million daily occupants and visitors. 1000 lawover enforcement officers, effective, and special agents who perform a variety of critical functions but including fds contracted protected Security Officer oversight, Facility Security assessments, and uniform please response. Our inspectors and special agents receive rigorous training at the lovers for training center, and in the field. This training ensures that our personnel are able to effectively respond to the tens of thousands of calls for Service Received annually, and conduct thorough assessments in these facilities. RelatedSecurity Risk, and byte counter replications designed to enable tenant agencies to meet standards for federal Facility Security. Theughout the fsa says, process works with stakeholders to identify and gather all necessary information to characterize the risk unique to each facility. They then build a consensus with the 10 agencies regarding the type of countermeasures and number of guard posts staffed by contracted officers. Roximally to 3000 approximately 13,000 appointees stand at guard posts. Reporting kernel activities, and responding to emergency situations. Ps those also ensure prohibited items like fire items other dangerous weapons do not enter federal facilities. Stop approximately 700,000 prohibited items from entering facilities every year. Fps part is with private committees to ensure that the cards have met the syndication training and qualification requirements specified in the contracts cover a subject areas such as crime scene production, actions to take in special situations such as building evacuation, safety and fire prevention, and public relations. Undergo Background Investigation checks to determine their fitness to work on behalf of the government, and are rigorously trained. To note it is important that bsos are not Law Enforcement officers. There are plays a private security company, and they do not have the authority to deputize in a lawenforcement cap in the capacity. They are aced on state pacific laws where they are employed. They conduct inspections and monitorctivities to compliance and countermeasure effectiveness. Additionally, within the personnel files, they are audited periodically to evaluate their altercations and trading records. In fiscal year 2013, they conducted 54,830 inspections and audits. The federal protective service to providing safety, security, and welding to employees every day. We continuously strive to further enhance our organization to meet the challenges of an evolving threat landscape. In fiscal year 2013 alone, the f ps submitted by imitation regarding 13 such incidents strategies to improve vacation. Six were successfully closed as implemented and seven are pending internal review for closure. Significant progress has also recently made to closing long standing recommendations relating to handling of training and oversight. While challenges undoubtedly remain, they have successfully closed six outstanding recommendations berkeley related to this program area, and is pending be engineered will reprocess pending the internal review assets, will close more. Renovations relative to our Risk Assessment methodology. We decided process to meet the Risk Management process for federal facilities, and to ensure the stakeholders have an understanding of the threats they face, there begun to provide a threat assessment report as a part of each fsa. Indeed to work with the isc to more consequences and impacts of the security assessments, and explore the inclusion of cost to quizzes a consequent is into the process. I would like to knowledge and thank the distinguished members of this committee to testify before them today come and i will be pleased to answer any today and i would be pleased to answer any questions. Thank you, general. Mr. Lewis, please proceed. Thank you chairman carper, Ranking Member coburn, and senator heitkamp. Toppreciate the opportunity be here today to address the procedures of the deity Facilities Security. I am steve lewis, director of the Security Policy and oversight directorate. On behalf of the undersecretary of defense for intelligence or usdi. Usdi is the staff assistant to the security and the deputy secretary of defense for rity matters data sets and sets dod Security Policy. This set standards for the protection of personnel, facilities, and related assets. Within the department, the ustrs responsibility is committed by those of the assistant security assistant secretary of defense. In the wake of the Navy Yard Shooting incident, the secretary of defense initiated concurrent, internal, and independent reviews to identify and recommend actions and adjust gaps or deficiencies in dod programs, policies, and procedures regarding security at dod installations. The reviews covered the granting and renewing of security clearances for dod employees and contractor personnel. In order to address the departments Facilities Security practices and policies, it is important to describe the retirement the requirement for military commanders or civilian equivalents to conduct a security evaluation of a facility or activity. The purpose of this evaluation is to determine the ability of the insulation to deter, withstand, and recover from the full range of adversarial capabilities. Based upon a threat assessment, compliance with protection standards, and Risk Management. Based upon the results of these evaluations, active and passive measures are tailored to safeguard and prevent unauthorized access to personnel, equipment, installations, and information by employing a layered security concept known as security in depth. The Department Requires the development and maintenance of plans to address a Broad Spectrum of natural and manmade scenarios. These include the development of joint response plans to adverse or terrorist incidents such as active shooters and fries access to facilities. Unauthorized access to facilities. Military commanders and civilian equivalents conduct a local Vulnerability Assessment and are higher every 3 years to headquarters assessment such as a joint staff phone ability assessment. Vulnerability assessment. He had worked hard to produce efficiencies and effectiveness info securities. Efforts to harmonize with other federal agencies, the military commanders located in dod occupied facility space not must utilize the Risk Management process, including the incorporation of the physical Security Standards and dod guidance, for example, the unified facilities criteria. Dod participates in interagency forums, along with representatives from many other federal agencies and departments. Fora unable the sharing of best practices, Security Standards, and threat information and support of our to enhanceresolve the quality of security of federal facilities. On acrossatives the department. The development of an Identity ManagementEnterprise Services architecture, imesa. Approachl provide an to information and complement ongoing efforts. Provide realtime vetting of information, require unescorted access to duty facilities, and these will be stateainst dod, federal, and other data sources. Imesa users will be able to authenticate credentials to enter a facility. Will enhanceesa the security of dod worldwide. I am going to call on dr. Coburn. Then we will lead to senator heitkamp. General patterson, go through recommendations that you all have met and when they were met. My understanding was of the 26 gao recommendations between 2010 and 2012, prior to the navy yard, only 4 of those have been acted on. Is that correct . Ofi can get you a listing all of the recommendations and your testimony, you listed several. Do that again. I dont think i listed them specifically. You said numbers, that is what i want. I can get you the specifics, i do not have the recommendations before me. The numbers are accurate. There was 20 six outstanding gao recommendations between 2010 and 2012. Them had been acted on an accomplished based on the recommendations. You gave a litany of others who have acted on. I was give you a general oversight of the number that we had give that to me again. Submitted, fps documentation foreclosure and consideration pertaining to 13 gao recommendations including humanrategies to enhance Capital Planning and improved telecommunications. Prove tenantnd medications and improve tenant communications. 6 were close, seven are pending internal review. That is half of them of that 26. My question to the secretary, were you aware that there were 26 outstanding recommendations made by gao. And only 4 have been acted on up until 2013. Yes. I am aware of the various gao recommendations that are open and that have been closed. From a more highlevel standpoint, the department has initiated an overall effort to make sure that all of the open , departmentsations Work Together with gao to address those recommendations and to take steps to close them. When did you initiate that . As recommendations are we beginto us by gao, our work i understand that. You said you initiated a process where they would be addressed. That is a standard process within the department. And we receive a recommendation from the gao, we have to submit a letter about whether we agree or disagree and that begins the process. I do not have specific oversight recommendations as the assistant secretary for the office of infrastructure protection, i handle recommendations specific to my programs, including the isc. Have five open gao recommendations and work closely to document we are doing to address those and provide regular updates to the gao through letters to document what we are doing and the timeline for which we think we will meet the mitigation measures or the measures that we have taken to address the recommendations. See if i have got this right. The interagency Security Committee does not monitor agencies for compliance. Correct . On the executive order, departments and agencies shall comply with the standards that are produced by the executive i understand that. They do note monitor the individual agencies to see if they are in compliance. Those agencies are supposed to, but isc does not monitor to see that it happens. That is correct. It is the responsibility of each individual agency to make sure they comply. Yes, based on the executive order. Lets go back to fps. How is it that your agency is complying with the standards set by the isc . With our federal partners. We make assessments, recommendations as they are outlined by the isc. And for a variety of reasons, a federal partner may or might not be able to implement. Because of cost or a variety of t they may decide that they cannot meet those recommendations. Once we do understand that they are not able to, we work with them to mitigate those shortfalls as much as we can. It is not as if we walk away. I am not saying that. For example. Active Shooter Training. Yes. A large proportion of our officers that we contract or have are not trained yes, sir. If i may explain. The reason is because historically, as i stated in my testimony, active shooter response, not awareness, but response, has been a function of Law Enforcement. Psos are not Law Enforcement officials. To put them in a position to where they are responding as a Law Enforcement officer requires at least coronation with the state. At least coronation with the state and a contractual agreement at least, state andon with the a contractual agreement. In some instances, our psos will be the only folks to respond in a prompt manner. We are working with the National Association of security k at how weo loo can provide training to where they can apply some response in that manner. The bottom line is we still want Law Enforcement folks to respond because that is where they are trained. We spend any number of hours with our inspectors and our agents in learning how to respond to an active shooter situation. We have not done that with our psos. We have to find a happy medium so we do not put our psos in harms way. We need to find out the right level of training for them to respond effectively. So, we have security personnel at Federal Buildings. But if we have an active shooter, we do not want them, right now, they are not trained to handle that. Is what theyre trained what they aree is trained in. To keep folks from entering the building. To help people evacuate in a timely manner. Approached or come in contact with a shooter, they are trained to engage. What theyre not trained in is to go find the shooter and take action. They are trained to engage . They are trained to engage, all of them. Ipass my time i am past my time. Senator heitkamp. Thank you. The first obligation of any employer is safety. You will find that in a lot of facilities across the country, whether they are manufacturing plants or processing plants of any type. Even in a major office. It is not only good employee management, it actually saves money. I think this committee is deeply concerned about the safety of Public Employees in buildings. Certainly, the navy yard is yet again another example where we do not live in a perfect world. Things thatere could have been done that should have been done differently that would have prevented it or limited the deaths once the shooting began . I want to go back to a couple critical points. Even though we have executive orders and we have all of the gao reports and recommendations, it is like the words get written but no one is responsible for following for follow up or implementation. No one is responsible to say, yes we have done everything. We know what the path forward is to enhance your safety. We made these recommendations and we hope that whoever manages thisbuilding or runs agency is taking safety seriously. I will tell you that i am concerned, listening to this, that there does not seem to be a lot of coordination. Even when there is, there is not follow up in terms of making sure these get done. Back to what i am not understanding, the engagement of an active shooter. On schooltask force safety when i was attorney general. We made everyone in the building have training. Our recommendation, which was carried out by many schools across the country, is that we trained on what happens if there is an active shooter. The person we needed to train, give the clearest training to, was the woman who answered the phone at the reception desk. In most Federal Buildings, the first person you encounter will under your general, jurisdiction. What recommendations would you make to change what you are currently doing in an active shooter situation . As an agency, we have thought long and hard about this. We have been working diligently with our vendors to take a look at where we need to be and helping them and helping us to understand how do we go forward now in training. What training do we need to provide for our psos . Have you considered that maybe someone who is Law Enforcement trained and authorized to engage at a higher level should be on duty. Not always to do the scanning and the screening, but have someone there who has a role in providing protection. About 600 inspectors who are Law Enforcement in a numbero are of our buildings on a regular basis. But we have thousands of put folks and i cannot in every building. We have great relationships with state and local authorities that we can call on quickly to respond if we have a problem. At this point, i do not have the resources that would allow us to put a Law Enforcement individual in these facilities. There is a possibility that we could deputize some of our contracted personnel. That would clearly be more costly and we would have to figure out how to do that. It is troubling that there does not seem to be a lot of creative thinking on how we can use the resources we have more effectively to protect folks. Mr. Lewis, i am this is a great tragedy. I know many people within your area are dealing with this tragedy. I suggest the best way is to assure people we have learned the lesson. Can you tell me what lessons your agency has learned from this. I know you are undergoing a review. Give us a peek into the thinking. Since we talked a little bit about active shooter awareness and training, within the department, we have incorporated active shooter awareness into the antiterrorism level on training. That has been introduced through the throughout the dod. Workplaceblished violence and active shooter prevention and response. This was in response to the fort hood incident. Place to notres in only deal at an awareness level, but in terms of response. Since the Washington Navy yard tragedy, we have really focused on continuous evaluation of our cleared and that of personnel cleared and vetted personnel. People who have access to dod installations. You can do the best people ion, but things change over time. We have to be constantly aware of what those changes are. Ilot on established a p continuous evaluation that will look at automated queries of public and dod records to look for issues of concern. His is an ongoing effort we are trying to expand it to include individuals who are visiting installations on a regular basis. And issued asmesa i mentioned. That would, in an automated fashion, allow for sharing of information of concern between ad facilities so that if installatione dod presented a problem, that would be available to other installations that that person might we going to visit. That is our focus. Of do we become apprised information as it develops and yearsit 5 years or 10 for the next reinvestigation. I would like to see better coordination and better follow up. Gao has recommendations that sit around for years and we come and h, we are working on it. That is a source of frustration. We are working on it. We are concerned about it. That does not cut it anymore when we are talking about safety of Public Employees and the integrity of your missions. I would like to see follow up on the gao recommendations, what the timeline is forgetting that its implemented. A moment toe address the coordination issue. I want to go back to the interagency Security Committee. We have last 17 years, had the chief Security Officers and other Senior Executives from 53 different departments and agencies who participate as part of the committee and look at evolving threats and involving hazards. Produce together to standards and best practices. Whether on occupant emergency plans, prohibited federal items in buildings, on the training of federal Security Committees. Certainly, the Risk Management practice that we released this past august. It is a highly collaborative body. There is not a formal Compliance Mechanism, the fact that these 53 Security Officers come together and work over months to produce these standards. It becomes incumbent on them to ensure their facilities adopt them. Softve some informal, Compliance Mechanisms we are looking at. Tools in development to better assess how facilities are implementing our standards and best practices. Mythted to dispel the that it is not highly collaborative. Coming out of the navy yard, we have established an active shooter working group. Designed to look at what happened at the navy yard and to leverage the work we have done over the last 6 years in the commercial facility space. We have Online Training, in person training, part of the goal is to look at the various documents, trainings that are available to leverage those so we can bring them to the federal workplace. Training is an important aspect. It is something that director patterson does as part of his responsibilities. There are other things we can do re augment that and to ensu that as we look at developing best practices and standards that we are encouraging and recommending that we exercise the traininge that we do. Sure that there are documents and materials available to employees. Be done a lot that can and i can be leveraged from the work that we have done with commercial facilities. That is the goal of our active shooter working group. Senator heitkamp. We request to have several members of the committee who have served as attorney general. Thank you for bringing that expertise to bear. , i am goingrkovich to ask you to help make real this interagency Security Committee. Notthrough the jargon, that you are using jargon. Bage. Ederal verg where did it come from, why did we create it, describe its missions. Working,u think it is how do we measure whether it is working well . Absolutely. Thank you for the opportunity. The interagency Security Committee can about after the bombing at the alfred p marra murrahg alfred p. Building in Oklahoma City with ition we had to do a better job protecting our facilities. Almost every agency participates in the committee. It is often the most senior physical security person in that department, the chief Security Officer. We take evolving threats and evolving challenges. It is the chief Security Officers who look at the threat and decide how do we as a federal family best address that threat and make sure our facilities are able to mitigate them. There is both a formal Risk Management process that the committee has produced. It is the standard by which we all federaluring civilian facilities with the military of dod, installations. It begins with determining what is the facilitys security level. You look at a particular federal facility. And based on what its function is, is it a headquarters, a field office, does it have historical significance, for example, the declaration of independence or bill of rights contained. Are there childcare facilities. That allows us to determine whether a facility is a level 5, the highest level, or a level 1 , which is more of your storefront office. Then we apply the security criteria. Based on the level and what we call the design basis threat standard. That weirable events have determined are most attractive for most likely to happen to a federal facility. It arranges it ranges from arson to active shooters and weatherrelated events. Based on those, what are the right security measures to put in place at these federal facilities. It is a riskbased process. As you pointed out, it is difficult to apply all of these. As you have noted, not all buildings were built 100 years ago with a 15 foot to 18 foot setback. We have to think about mitigating vulnerabilities based on realworld realities. We help provide facilities with options to include thinking resistant windows. The establishment of Security Committees, ensuring that individuals on this committees have the training they need to carry out their duties is a core part of what the interagency Security Committee has thought about. And again, when there are unique functions with inside a building, how do we make sure we protect those functions . Things like child care and other efforts. Is is the racist that the basis for what the interagency Security Committee does. We keep those how standards fresh and recognizing we live in a world where our adversaries are adaptive. When we start to see emerging s, we bringnew trend the 53 chief officers together tocome up with a standard ensure that all federal facilities are working from a certain baseline. With active that shooter. We are thinking about, as we start to see smallscale complex attacks, how do we account for them and ensure we have the measures and the training. That we have done preparedness to mitigate the threat. I think let me interrupt. Come back, you may have said this. Success, whatsure metrics are we using to measure whether or not the work of the interagency Security Committee is successful . Secondly, talk with us about across of best practices the range of the members who comprise this committee. Will answer your first question by saying i do think the interagency Security Committee has been a success. We have done an surveys, but if you survey each agency, you will find that they have implemented all of the isc standards. Those continue to be updated . They are the one to come together to help develop these standards. We do not have a formal mechanism for measuring what has been a minute. There i measuring what has been implemented. There is one school, we are working on others. Anecdotally, i am confident that all the member departments have implemented the standards. When they cannot, they are responsible for coming to us and telling us why they cannot. Talk about sharing best practices. Again and how this committee facilitates that. A benefit of the interagency Security Committee is that you may have a chief Security Officer who represents a level 5 facility that can talk about things they have done, a Headquarters Building that sits on constitution avenue. The things they have put in place to mitigate the fact that setback. Ot have a the very nature of the interagency Security Committee is the fact that we can convene the senior level executives to talk about best practices. What is unique about what we are isc, with a with the for over the last six years, we have been working with commercial facilities. Buildings, stadiums, then use where the public passes through. The publichere passes through. We have thought about security that might not be obvious to the public. How do we take those best practices to federal facilities . As part of the active shooter working group that we have, you will see a mix of what we are doing in the federal sector and the Lessons Learned, the leading practices we have developed into commercial sector. Dr. Coburn. A followup i want to put in the record a letter from dhs Police Deputy director of operations that was released november 22. New active shooter guidelines. I am confused after reading this. Not understand the engagement. If somebody is with a firearm in a Federal Building and we have a pso officer there, nothing here says they will engage him. Yes, sir. My point was that the original objective and mission of the pso was to ensure the safe ingress and egress of people in a facility. It was not to pursue an active shooter. That has always been the purview of the ground of Law Enforcement personnel. As we have relooked at how we have our psos engage, we were looking at legal obstacles that we may have to overcome as a result. As well as any state requirements that they may have to meet. About in talking that they will engage is an armed individual comes into that facility and they recognize that there are and ask that individual to drop the weapon. They are authorized to engage. If they are clearing the building and getting people out of the building and they run into the active shooter, they will engage. But they are not trained is to go from room to room. My point i and making from this letter is that is not clear. This is the new requirement for active shooters yes, sir. That is not a clear part of this. That was stated in november. In early december, we had a conversation with our vendors, to tell themndors we would be coming out with new instructions about how to engage. It is evolving. Right now, if an event happened today, they would be following this, that what you testified. Not what you testify. They would continue to engage. They priority is the safety of the folks in the building. They keep people in and help folks get out. If they engage the shooter and come into contact, they will engage. What they will not do today is pursuit i understand. It is not clear in terms of reading this letter that says they will engage. I will have to take a look at that. This is what you put out november 22. One other area to cover, general patterson. Contractedt fps security to do joint exercises with local Law Enforcement . A dry run. Much like senator heitkamp said. Yes. We conduct a lot of exercises. A number of active Shooter Training exercises you are missing my point. Contractors to do joint training with local Law Enforcement. They do it when we do it. Is ita contract of a requirement of their contract to local lawenforcement training so we have dry runs. Yes. Their exercise would be part of as we practice with local Law Enforcement. Have anre not going to exercise in every building. That is true. Fact that youhe have directed these contractors not to do joint training with local lawn force local Law Enforcement . I would not say that we have not. We do not have anything specifically that addresses joint training in our contract. I will have to get back with you. I do not have a contract before me. Senator heitkamp. I was not intended on following up, i want to pick up from where senator coburn has taken the discussion. If i can say it this way is best done when it is clear that this is a high priority. Publicerns me that employees and really the public sees someone sitting at a desk. Usually in a uniform. There is an assumption that come withpowers that that. That there is an aura of protection with that. Not include engagement and having folks who are at least capable of some kind of immediate intervention. If those rules are not clear, i think we have left the wrong message with people in public. And so. Know, for many of these buildings there was not any kind of electronic screening ray machines at the navy yard. Correct . If you scanned in through the turnstile and waved in, that was it . This is a building that has thousands of Public Employees. I can understand that if you are looking at the building that houses Public Employees for the Farm Service Agency in north dakota, you might not want to put any kind of screening device. For a building that houses and employees thousands of employees. It seems like there might be some cost benefit in safety and looking at electronic surveillance, some benefit in ned people attrai the front to engage. That we might look at those kinds of procedures. I do not hear that today. I thought i was going to hear that we are looking and doing costbenefit analysis. Not that my folks in north dakota are not important, i do not expect you to higher a to guard. Lawtrained i might expect you to think about that in a building that houses thousands of people in a city that frequently is a target, symbolically, of terrorism or these kinds of attacks. I would ask you guys to go back are saying what you today about how you can enhance security looking beyond simply continuing the process you have engaged in today. If i could address your concerns. Diligence indue pursuing this matter. We are working aggressively with the vendors to one, look at what statesties the entitle them to do with regard to engagement. We are looking at what authorities we could render to these folks relative to legally. From the federal sector. We are looking at how we might address this moving into the future. We realize it is a concern. One of the other things that i have spent a lot of time doing is engaging with the federal executive boards across the country. Looking at some of the challenges they are having and the concerns from their people in these facilities. How can we provide better training to those folks as to how to respond to an active shooter. That is very important as well. How do we get people out of harms way when there is an event in progress. I would tell you we are taking this very seriously. It may not come across that way in some of the testimony we are providing. We are spending a lot of time with contractors and with legal to find the ground we can take. Ultimately, we have to figure out who is going to bear the cost. How can we do this in a smart way but still provide the same result of protecting folks. Not toto the later ifr this, not to i were in your shoes, i have got 1000 people in a building in a city that is a target. Devices and we do not have lawtrained guards. Theart of when we set Facility Security level, the recommended security practices. 3 or above, wel recommend that there are guards on site. Up, at any Headquarters Buildings that you see along constitution avenue, you will find advanced screening techniques. Magnetometers, run bags through. Similar to the buildings today. Down to the storefront in the states, that is where you will not see that level of security. Based on what your security level is, there is a standard that goes with that. That is part of what the interagency Security Committee does. You make recommendations and there is no mechanism to mandate that those are carried out. Is that what we are hearing . Have a formal Compliance Mechanism to monitor what has been adopted. If i may. I want to clarify. Youral, what i am asking specifically on the gao recommendations is the date at which you submitted. The dates they were cleared. 2012 gao through recommendations. For secretary durkovich, is it Public Knowledge what Federal Buildings are rated what . Cannot go on a website and find out . I have to no. It is not Public Knowledge. We can make that available to you. Presents a security sure, i understand. Thats why i asked. I want to stick with the matter of gao recommendations. Gao has a lot of people but they have a lot of work. They have not been given the resources they need to do all we are asking. Starting withe, general patterson. Explain to us the process. In, they look at the work that is being done and how it is being managed. They make recommendations. Process and the giveandtake before they finalize fragmentation. Im sorry . Examines whaten, is being done, makes a recommendation and you have an opportunity to respond. Recommendations, especially high risk lists as a to do list. As we do oversight. Describe the back and forth that leads to recommendation. He said there were 26 . About 13 has been responded to. Half of that 13 has been accepted. The gao makes a recommendation, one of the first things we do is we sit down with my staff to take a look at what is what is the genesis and the challenge that we have for the recommendation. And the background on the recommendation. We move forward to look at how we are going to resolve the issue that or the challenge that gao has brought forward. What i recognize is that some things that we can handle and move forward quickly. Other things, not so. Will require extensive resources and we have to figure out how to do that. One of the challenges we have is rds,e have 13,000 psos, gua that we have oversight responsibility for. But we do not have Technology Available to do our best job in folks wheng those they come to work, when they theirin, to make sure certifications are up to date. One of the challenges i have set forth for the agencies to come up with a technologybased system that will allow us to move forward with that. To figure out, to know when a psoo is on post, when he selecs out, that swipes in, he or she has the proper certifications. That is an issue gao has brought. Lawenforcement folks out there to do this for 13,000 guards. It is a challenge. These guards generate about 170,000 records that we must review over a period of time. We are looking for an automated process to help with that. Science andth dhs technology to help us look for ways and some offtheshelf recommendations that we can begin to put into place that will allow us to better oversight these 30,000 guards. Guards. 13,000 it is challenges like that that keep us from moving forward as quickly as we would like. Let me raise a question. Contracted guards and 600 people working directly for you that our Law Enforcement. That is less than 22 people a person. Yes. We need an Automated System to do that . What about random audits. Every one of my regions is responsible for doing 10 to 20 random audits per month. Is thatthe challenge because there are so many records, in any given time, we can do about it today. An audit today. If that is not a record we are auditing tomorrow, the individual may lose certification based on expiration or having to recertify. Being able to automate our records would help us in better oversight. Why should you automate . Why should you force contractors to automate. That is an option. It is not an option, it is thing youommon sense would do. If you into contact with the federal government, you demonstrate people are compliant. Then you audit whether or not they tell you the truth. Rather than us running all 13,000 when they are not our employees. They are employees of someone who today contract. It goes back to contracting. Putting in a contract what you expect contractors to supply, certified people doing their jobs. Many of the contractors do have automatic processes. From time to time, we find discrepancies and recordkeeping. Then you fire that contractor. That is a reason for you to lose a contract. We will have somebody else have this contract next time. These are not nonlucrative contracts. They are making money off of every hour every car works. Works. Guard without objection. This letter will be made part of the record. I want to pivot a little bit. As a defense contractor with a Valid Department of defense id card, aaron alexis was allowed access to the Washington Navy yard. And otheremployees workplaces, he was considered a trusted employee. Not screened for weapons. Workplace violence continues to be a threat. I want to start with you, mr. Lewis. Could each of you answer the following two questions. You believe that we should consider screening employees as well as visitors at federal facilities . We shouldieve consider screening employees as well as visitors at federal facilities . Downside tohere a screening employees . Is there any potential downside to screening employees . I would like for each of you to answer that. Mr. Lewis. Current dod policy does not require that type of screening. Where someone goes through a metal detection device. It does allow for random selection of individuals for that type of screening. Are procedures in place. There is the action in place. We rely on the judgment of the Installation Commander to make a determination as to what is appropriate under local circumstances. The drawback to screening every employee coming through is the negative impact on mission a compliment. Mission accomplishment. There are facilities where there are 10,000 employees coming through in roughly the same window. Screening every employee would be disruptive to getting work done. That is the balance. Factoring in cost and mission accomplishment. General patterson . It is something that can be considered. We put a lot of trust in the system that we have. We put a lot of trust and the fact that we do Background Investigations. Once a Background Investigation is completed, we believe that the individual that has received that investigation is trustworthy. Decidepoint that we maybe we do not believe in that Background Investigation, that is the time we start looking at a system that we screen all our employees as they come in. It is a way to begin to mitigate, if you will, some of the risk. Would bethink it something that we would have to think through very carefully before we do that. I know that in many of our and some of our facilities, we have both. In thent department of transportation headquarters, they threw everybody. And others, the only screen visitors. To date, we have not had a problem in most of our facilities with our employees. If we decide we are going to creen, it might be a challenge because it is a new process that will require a longer processing time for folks to get through. We would have to work with gsa and others and how we organize that flow. At 8 00 in the morning when you have hundreds of people entering a building and they are accustomed to moving through and based on aadge security clearance, it could create a challenge. Secretary durkovich, same question. The interagency Security Committee has put some has put some thought to how we screen visitors. Part of that is based on the Facilities Security level. I would agree with my colleague, director patterson, in that we have to have trust in the system. At the department of Homeland Security, in addition to evaluating clearances, we ensure employees and contractors affiliated with the department undergo a suitability. In order to ensure that there is not a negative impact on the mission, we have to account for the fact that there are resource opportunity and costs associated with screening employees. The system that we have in place works overall. Incidentsely, we have where it is incumbent on us to look at those incidents and make sure we are leveraging the Lessons Learned. So we make sure it does not happen again. Overall, there is a downside to screening employees. As you know from your oversight of the department, we all have taken on a lot of work to ensure the safety and security of the American People and that its way of life can thrive. Obstacle tont or allowing our employees to do their important job everyday is an impact on the mission. We have processes that allow us to ensure that we have employees represent the highest standards. In thathould trust system as opposed to screening everyone. At certain facilities, we have measures in place, asterisk the patterson recognized. When i go to the nac, i have to swipe and show my badge. Bringing a vehicle onto the premises, there are dogs and vehicle searches. There are different layers of security. Before i recognize any questions. Let me ask one last question. Some of you have been before as before. Do here as can we far as what you are expected to do. What can we do in the legislative branch to an sure you are able to meet the responsibilities placed on you . For workplace protection. While you think about that, our colleagues are debating a budget resolution. A framework for a spending plan for our federal government for the balance of the fiscal year. It does a number of things. Three things to make it simple. Entitlement reform that saves sabotage poor not people. Tax reform that eliminate a number of tax expenditures. We have a lot of them. Met their purpose and need to be retired or modified. Use revenues that we generate to reduce Corporate Tax rate and use that for deficit reduction. Number three, look at everything we do and say how do we get better results for less money for everything we do. Those are three things i harp on. That we move away from sequestration to allow agencies and departments to say these are the ways we need to allocate resources. That will hopefully enable us to and be able to put less money there with less risk. If you could give me one good idea, it if you could speak very briefly. I will start. Haveme ways, sir, you answered my question. You have even my response. It is recognizing this country, there are a number of risks we face. It is a large country. Part of the conversation we have to have is with the department of Homeland Security and the administration, lawmakers, the american public, we cannot mitigate every threat. It is understanding those that will have the most significant consequences and ensuring we have a conversation about how we go about mitigating them, that we have the resources, personnel, to go about doing that. Having the conversation that we have today and over the course of time are, i think, what is critical. You have already taken steps by moving away from sequestration. That will be helpful to us as well. I think recognizing we have to that we have to manage risk and that we cannot prevent every incident, and as long as we are adapting ashen general . Protective federal services is unique that we have both state,ugh local, federal, and civilian environments. We do that with a very small force. Your help in helping us and your support to help us move and that of a todays areas is critical, quite frankly, because we are trying to look out and predict, if you will, what is coming down the road to keep our people safe. And we really need the support of folks like yourself and this committee to help us see through that and to help us to work through some of these challenges. , thank you. That continuing to evaluate those employees who have access to classified information and to our facilities is critical, and we need to have resources to be able to conduct those evaluations. We need to have access to records that are sometimes publicly available, sometimes not available, in order to do those evaluations. General support for that approach to doing business is essential. Thanks. I was saying to a senator that we are blessed in this committee four former state attorney generals, and it adds a great deal of expertise to this area. Thank you. I want to thank the witnesses for being here. I wanted to followup with you, mr. Lewis, and ask you about how other dod policies might affect the security clearances at facilities, and then those who can gain access to them. In particular, the thought of if there are any regulations the need to be reviewed or revise. For example, the current discharge regulations and how they are implemented. In the case of mr. Alexis, had discharged,onorably that would have raised a flag, and that would have gone to correctly to his fitness to hold a security clearance. Could you help me understand in light of this case, is this something we need to look at question mark . One of the things i do not understand as well is the whole break down with the reached out that was beyond but is there anything we need to do on end . Mental health an is 2020, looking back, so you can see things that you did not see at the time, but is there anything we need to look at internally on this issues from the dod perspective or anything we can do i serve on the Armed Services committee, the committees that we should be doing . Believe there are issues with how discharges occur. Not to get into specifics, but generally, based on what was known at the time of the discharge, it was not considered to be an unusual determination as an Honorable Discharge in that particular case. The larger issue is how do we collect, and identify, a wealth of information that allows us to constantly adjust our perspective about cleared individuals, and individuals who are in and trusted positions and trusted positions ent rusted positions . Continuous evaluation process, not just collecting the information, but having the staff available to evaluate the information and take action on that information, to me that is the real issue here. I appreciate it. Collins, mccaskill, and high cant say we and heitkamp refer to one where there is a lengthy security clearance. I wanted to ask also, mr. Lewis, what steps have we taken im sorry, i meant to call you general patterson i apologize general patterson, what the uc as we look at this whole see ason what do you we look at this whole situation at the navy yard that you are already implementing to make sure we do not find ourselves in the same situation . You are reviewing the situation and understanding what steps you are taking in a positive action that you can talk about here. Yes. Within the federal protective services we are working closely with our federal partners to look at processes and procedures for folks coming and going into Federal Buildings. We are also looking at our communications processes as well. One of the challenges during the navy yard was the fact that so ,any of the responding agencies the level of communication and how you do that, so we are looking aggressively at how we do that, not just in the washington, d. C. , area, but across the United States because in a crisis situation, communications become critical and as such, wood, timely communication is essential to a positive result. At a variety of areas and taking lessons as they come about from the navy yard as to how we improve processes across the spectrum within the federal protective services. Thank you very much. I wanted to ask you, mr. Patterson, is it accurate to say is general patterson it accurate to say that it does toolse a user risk commensurate with the Committee Standards . Im trying to understand where we are at this. There was also a report from gao that fps interim Assessment Tool was not consistent with this assessment standard because it excludes out sequences from assessments. I want to understand if there is a difference, why isnt there, is it something we should be more uniformly putting in place, or is there a reason for it . There is a reason, and we have just dealt what we call a modified Infrastructure Survey tool, mist. That particular tool was p. Protectionm i. [ folks who had about that cool over a time of about six or seven years. We thought that this was a tool that we could modify, because it brought what we believed all of the areas of the isc requirements to bear. Our pool is at with specifically vulnerability. That is what the tool is structured for. Separate we also do a threat assessment. We connect with the joint Terrorism Task force, with local Law Enforcement, with any number of agencies out there to get what we believe a very in depth comprehensive perspective on a threat that we also provide to our federal partner. The piece that is not part of the process is the consequent piece, and it is not part because we have not figured out how to do that within the federal facilities. What does that mean . That is one of the things were working with the isc to better identify. When you ask for consequence within a federal sector, what are you looking for . We know when we help a federal partner to begin to pull together and understand their emergency occupancy plans, that we help them to understand and we go to the consequence p iece, and when they look to establish the federal security level, we are looking at the consequence peace. We have not figured out how to incorporate that in an outdoor rhythm type method in and out are the type method in alg ortihm method to provide a reasonable and rational meaning to consequence 10 tenets of a lease facility. Certain that folks like irs and Social Security and others have set to the consequences of losing a facility or if there was in the thet something happened to facility. We have not figured out how to incorporate that into a tool. That is what we are working with with isc to figure that out. I appreciate your answer, and we look forward to working with you on this important issue. Thank you, senator. I want to excuse this panel of witnesses, and thank you for your work. I would say that you have background for work from here. All thosein mind hundreds of families who lost loved ones in Oklahoma City, in that bombing. Fort hoodnd those in who lost their lives. Keep in mind, if you will, the families of the 12 men and women who died at the Washington Navy yard. And just think of them as you celebrate christmas, or some other way during the holidays, the families sitting around the christmas tree, their dining room table, and there is somebody missing. Best every to do our day to ensure that those numbers of empty chairs, people are not around because of a tragedy like the ones i just mentioned. Keep them in mind. Keep their families in mind. Let that energize our efforts going forward. This is not just about prices or recommendations. This is about saving peoples lives and making sure they have a wood life and have a chance to share that life for good time with their families. Take that with you. Thank you. [captions Copyright National cable satellite corp. 2013] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] to our second and final panel, welcome. We are glad you could join us. We want to introduce you and welcome your statements and have a chance to ask some questions. Our first witness is mark goldstein, the director of physical infrastructure issues for the United States government Accountability Office. Is the investigative arm of congress. We are grateful for what you do. He is responsible for their work in the area of government property, and telecommunications. At the request of this committee, and other gaoressional committees, has conducted 12 reviews of federal substantive the federal facility securities as part of the Homeland Security in 2003. Tao room ports on oversight gao reports on oversight of guards, budgeting for security, and challenges hampering federal agencies. Stgephephenitness is drifter andutive general counsel for the National Association of Security Companies. He has led the Association Working with congress and federal agencies and the gao on programs of legislation, other issues related to Facility Security since 2006. The final witness, david wright, he is the president of the federal protective service union, the American Federation of government employees. Mr. Wright has served in his capacity since 2006. Mr. Wright is a 27year veteran of the detective services. His last 12 years he performed as inspector. Responding to crimes to performing Facility Security assessments. Mr. Wright brings a welcomed amount of experience to this committee to find solutions to problems facing the federal protective services. Tank you for that. We welcome you. We ask you to take about five minutes to make your prepared statement. Thank you for joining us today. A question were you here for the first panel raise your hand. That is great. Thanks for staying. Your recognize. Thank you, mr. Chairman and members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify this morning about the protection of federal disn ability buildings. We are responsible for protecting nine thousand 600 federal facilities under the gao. Recent incidents at facilities demonstrate vulnerability to acts of violence. Fpselp publish its mission, conducts assessments and has 13,500 Contract Security guards. My testimony discusses challenges fps faces in injuring contract guards that are deployed to federal facilities and properly trained and conducting Risk Assessments at federal facilities. It is based on work through 2013 assessments risk and results of gaos ongoing work to select federal agency Risk Assessment methodology aligned with standards. Our findings are as follows injuring challenges contract guards have been properly trained and certified before being deployed to facilities. In our september 2000 30 report, we found providing active shooter spots and screening is a challenge. According to Guard Companies, their contract guards have not received training on how to respond during incidents involving an active shooter. Without ensuring all guards received training on how to respond to incidents, involving an active shooter, fps has limited assurance that guards are prepared for this thread. An official from one contract itsany stated that 133 of 350 guards have never received screener training. Guards employed to federal Training Facilities may be using equipment, but they are not qualified to use, which raises their questions about being able to screen access to facilities. Gao was unable to determine the extent to which the guards have received training in part s lacks a system for guard oversight. Fps agreed with that recommendations and have taken steps to identify guards that require training and provided it to them. Fps continues to lack Management Controls to ensure its guards have met requirements. Although fps agreed with our 2012 reclamation in developing comprehensive system for managing information on guards training, altercations, it does not yet have a system. Fps also continues to face challenges assessing risk at federal facilities. Is notorted in 2012 fps assessing risk in a manner consistent with federal standards. Gaos results indicate it is still a challenge for fps in several facilities. Federal standards such as a National Infrastructure managementplan, risk frame and can state that Risk Assessment should include threat, vulnerability, and consequent assessments. This helps Decision Makers identify and evaluate risks and implement measures to mitigate that risk. Instead of conduct thing assessments, fps has been using a tool referred to as a modified Infrastructure Survey tool to a set to assess facilities. Mist does not possess the consequence, the level, duration, and nature of potential loss, resulting from an undesired event. Fps agreed that a tool that does not make consequence is not allow an agency to fully access assess its risk. Fps official stated they did not include consequence information. Gao will continue to monitor this issue and plans to issue a report early next year. In response to our recent reports, dhs and fps have agreed with the recommendations in the 2012 and 2013 reports to improve guard processes. This concludes my Opening Statement. I will be happy to answer questions. Thank you. Mr. Amitay . Name is stephen amitay, and i am the executive director for nasco. Countrys largest trade association, employing over 300,000 Security Officers, servicing urschel and governmental clients. Nasco works with legislators and officials to put in place Higher Standards and requirements for Security Companies and private street officers. Of most relevant to the hearing, 2007 we have worked on issues related to legislation related to federal retentive services retentive Security Officer program. Nasco also work with the federal Security Committee on its 2013 best practices for Armed Security officers in federal facilities. Not including the military services, there are approximately 30 5000 Contract Security offers across the federal government, and use of Contract Security is a proven and costefficient counter measure. To further ensure security, fps and contractors need to Work Together to address challenges with a program that gao has identified over the last several years. Improvements need to be made in the Risk Assessment process for federal facilities. These helmets are governed by isc standards. Has found out, often requirements of the isc are not met by federal facilities. One critical element in this process is the decision to implement security countermeasures for its facilities. In gsa owned or leased buildings, fps irresponsible for conducting the facilitys security assessment and recommending countermeasures. But as you noted in your opening remarks, the decision to implement those recommendations or the decision to mitigate risk or accept risk is solely up to the facilitys Security Committee which is made up of representatives from facilitiestenant agencies. Tenant agent representatives to not have any security knowledge or sprints, but are expected to make security decisions for their respective agencies. The lack of experienced decisionmakers on fscs is something security contractors have witnessed, and calls into aretion whether fscs making informed decisions regarding the mitigation or acceptance of risk. Tightened budgets have put Research Pressure on agencies. Countermeasures should not be rejected because of lack of understanding or an unwillingness to provide funding. Nasco supports requiring training for fsc members as well challengen able to osc. Both these provisions were included in legislation that was passed last congress in committee. After addressing the program that gao has identified, as well as other issues of the program, fps pace is not as fast as others or by, the commitment to improve the program is not questionable and there have been substantial progress made. Since the appointment of the director, the degree of dialogue and breads of cooperation between contractors has been unparalleled, and currently fps and contractors are working on initiatives. To address the lack of fps resources to provide training, fps is about to launch a program that will train and certify contractor instructors so they can provide this important training. Fps is moving to increase active shooter trading for psos, and they are looking at what other agencies are doing in this area come as well as seeking input from contractors. Fps is working to revise and standardize the lesson plans in its plan to require that circularly contractors decertify. Fps is coming out with a needed revision for guard manuals. S how to act,pso not following it is considered a contract violation. The format will allow for making revisions as needed. One area that needs review is the instruction elated to a psos ability and authority to act and liability to act in active shooter situations. Congress might want to consider providing dhs with authority to authorize psos to make arrests on federal property. Psois working to improve post orders and improve its management of training and certification data. For this latter effort nasco recommends fps explore commercially available technologies. Much needs to be done to address the pso program issues raised by gao. Fps has come a long way in the past decade with it secured a force. Nasco looks forward to working improve and congress to security in federal facilities. Thank you. You are now recognized. Make sure your microphone is on, please. We want to hear every word. Thank you for the opportunity to testify at this important hearing. I am david wright, president of the American Federation of government employees, local 91 eight, which represents federal protective Service Officers nationwide. We are committed to critical Homeland Security mission of securing our nation toss Federal Buildings nations Federal Buildings. Federal employees and facilities are extremely vulnerable to attack from criminal and terrorist traits. Fpsant to assure you my Law Enforcement officers are committed to respond to active shooter attacks. I am appalled that bureaucracy and inefficiency restricted our fps Law Enforcement officers whose office is less than one mile away from navy yard from assisting with the pursuit of the active shooter. It is because the navy does not recognize the security piece of the fps. This must be viewed in the context of the leadership required to a commerce the fps mission, which remains unfocused if not broken. At all levels. Fiscal security place a significant role in protection of all documents of Federal Buildings, but the frustrating inefficient and outright wasteful bureaucratic system of determining physical security countermeasures through a flawed facility assessment progress process and implementation by a facilities Pretty Committee who has to diverge their Mission Funding is i can think and not true security. Security in the Dirksen SenateOffice Building is not based on individual Senate Offices ability to pay. Why should other federal facilities the different . The fps workforce is beleaguered by new and modified security assessment programs and individual conflicting management danced throughout the assessment process. I have lost confidence confidence in the ability of the National Director to resolve this wasteful process. I understand the departments science and Technology Director has offered to make the integrated rapid visual screening tool implied with the isc. It was tested by both General Services administration and officials at the federal protective service. That would be a good start to remedying our assessment problems. The use of product Contract Security guards is a race. Theyre basically limited to the arrest powers of the citizen. The proactive Law Enforcement control and weapons screening at this building is a commerce by federal Police Officers who have tot authority to respond active shooters, and how can we demand less the Federal Buildings with thousands of occupants . 740 officersthe and agents providing the critical Law Enforcement reduction of Federal Buildings . Overall, quite well, given the dynamic mission, the Headquarters Staff with very littlefield experience. How is fps management doing . Not so well. Can we do better . Absolutely. Any organization is in trouble when leaders are not held accountable. A recent disclosure reveals that a regional director file dated rules when he arranged by a system violated rules when he arranged by system from a neighbor on the half of the government. Ive been told there are other incidents of this content by equal and higherranked officials. After accountability is established, performance can improve, with focused, professional, and ethical management that builds on best practices in the regions. Policer inspectors and officers adequate staff, tools that work, and direction on priorities, and we will make sure the job is done. In conclusion, federal employees and the public they serve deserve the best and most effective protection week can divide. Theyre not eating it now, and expeditious they are not getting it now, and expeditious action by congress is required. I thank you for this opportunity, and i am available for questions. Senatorl yield to ayotte for the first round of questions. Thank you very much. I appreciate that. , wanted to ask mr. Goldstein particularly on the gao report, and what you have found. It really troubles me when we think about that there is no comprehensive i believe you described it as a strategy or oversight model and then the fact that we are not sure, the people are receiving. There are a category that are not receiving activeduty Shooter Training and or screener training. How can we, from the gao perspective, what is your recommendation in terms of from the policy perspective, how we can move this as quickly as possible to address this problem . Thank you. We have been very concerned with respect active Shooter Training and training on magnetometers that fps has not been done a good enough job to ensure its contract guard workforce is able to get that training. One of the problems with the active Shooter Training, which people do not understand here, it is only a small part of one part of the training they receive any how. They get what how the they get a special training of two hours which covers special events of various kinds of might occur in the building. Out of the 120 hours they receive in training overall, only two hours good to special events, and only a fraction of that two hours covers active Shooter Training. I think it is important to contract guards are not really getting active Shooter Training for the most part. Were concerned they do not have enough training in that area. The same is true for magnetometers. The testing in Federal Buildings in 2009 and penetrated all buildings that we try to get into in a friday of different cities, with all making materials, we found that time that guards did not have the requisite training to be at post, and we find now several years later that many arts still do not have that. And these are the contract guards, correct . Yes, maam. With your site to the agencies that can pay the fee, how does your training differ . How does the training of the individuals that understand would work and maybe i have this wrong but would work on the federal protective services end do you know how the training differs . As federal Law Enforcement officers, we complete our training at the federal Law Enforcement training center. You would goes to the same training as any other federal officer . Yes, and there is a slight difference. We are talking contract guards. They are stationary at their posts, whereas our federal protective service inspectors and Police Officers are mobile. And if you were to the point of your testimony if you were to provide the services, for example, at the navy yard, that the federal protective service so i understand would you do more of a roaming capacity . You would not do the who stands. I am trying to understand what this looks like. That is the model i would look for, is a model that works here at the capitol and the capitol buildings, that you would have federal officers begin their career at the magnetometer, at the xrays, before they promote up and gain seniority and go out into the field. , is want to understand there other agencies with regard to this training issue on the fps contracting issues them is this something we are facing beyond the navy yard . I assume this contracting issue in terms of the training issue goes well beyond the navy yard facility. Is that true . The work we have done here focuses on fps. More broadly. Nt we have not looked at contract guard situations and what funding made the so just focus on the navy yard. We have found the kind of training overall that fbs gives it fps gives its contract arts that similar training is given by the pentagon protection, kennedy center, and they are aligned in early with the training you would give to a contract guard at a federal facility, but the problem is implementing it. It is where we seem to see the falloff, ensuring that the guards are actually getting it. Theres basically no credibility. We can check off the training box, but nobody is saying this person has actually done it, that we are attracting them. Basically, in a lawenforcement setting, you have to do a certain amount of training, that you have to complete every year, an part of that is being a in that position. That is not happening . As senator coburn noted, there is a contract requirement to have your protective Security Officers have to require training and certifications, and it would be a contract violation. So we are entering contracts where we do not have the required to train screening . The requirements are in the contract. With the x and magnetometer ofining, of the 132 hours required training for protective Security Officers, the contract guards, 16 hours are provided by fps. Screening. Ich is mag it is for their personnel to provide that training is an issue that the gao has noted. That is not a matter of the security contractors providing the training that they are required to provide. Providing the training to security contractors, but we should be reviewing these contracts to make sure that we are properly higher are teasing what type of agreement we are brokering in terms of the requirements for background and training, should we . Yes. A couple issues. As mr. Amitay says correctly, protective services not providing the training they are obligated to provide in the contract. On the other hand, fps is not gaining the assurance that it needs that the contract Guard Companies themselves are providing the training that they are obligated to provide. They are not doing enough of the checks and certification. Who is watching this . Youre watching it . Who within the chain of command, meaning the management of this, is making sure this is getting done . Each region is investigatory process to assure themselves and do checks and do audits. Some regions have not done it. Some regions have not done it or any random fashion at all where they can gain assurance. When we have looked at what they have done, not only did we find our breaches in many cases of guards standing without the proper certifications, we found disparities between our reviewed and the review that fps had done as well. I think some of those disparities are disparities in the documentation. There are instances where the guards have received required training. They have their cards or vacations. But there are issues with the documentations. For instance, with certain medical requirements, some statements of work require a licensed physician to sign off on those medical requirements. On others, it could be a nurse practitioner. Gao might come in and look at what the current requirements are for licensed physician and was signedhis pso by a nurse protection or practitioner, so that is in violation. Wet we are talking about is the documentation on the training for what were talking about is that the condition for the on the training for the screening an active Shooter Training. Variety of wide issues. We found not just the magnetometer and the active Shooter Training, but we found 23 of files we reviewed contained no documentation for required training and certification in a variety of areas, firearms training, drug testing him no indication fps had monitored firearms qualifications. It is across the spectrum of the kinds of certifications that guards need. My time is up, so i will thank you. Thank you for those questions. I will ask two questions. Is last one, the second one, i like to ask them in a situation like this, a couple from panels, different points of view, a rock range of perspectives from which to testify and answer questions. I want you to each pic maybe two go back to what you heard one another saying in response. It could be response to your testimony, questions. The impact of the first panel, some things they said, things they said in the testimony in response to our questions, and think about the ways for us on the side of the dais, that you would just like to put an exclamation point behind and say as he goat out of this room ds sake, keep this in mind. These are good takeaways. That is my second question. Think about that. I first question is i have is for mr. Goldstein. Talked to this to some extent. I will come back and revisit it very briefly. In the past decade or so, you have overseen 12 independent reports of federal Facility Security. You have looked at the armed guard programs, you have collaborated with state and local Law Enforcement and the human Capital Planning. Gao has also conducted what we call them covert testing. You talked about some of that that is going on of federal facilities. In other words, you try to penetrate federal facilities to test how security works. It is like what we do in the Nuclear Power plant world. Again, for the record, how would you assess federal Facility Security today . Over 30,000 feet, how would you assess federal Facility Security today, realizing we are on a where folksum, focus on this, going back to 1995, Oklahoma City is it getting better, worse, it is uneven . I think it is very uneven, mr. Chairman. Yes, there have been improvements since Oklahoma City and since the twin towers, of course. We have had more focus on this area. We have more physical protections in many places. We have more intelligence as well. But some of the basic issues stormy unresolved, the kinds of issues that you have brought up in some of your witnesses have brought up this morning. There is still inadequate attention to many of the things that are in the forefront of what we need to do in terms of getting into a Federal Building and making sure that not only that the people who stand on the front lines in Federal Buildings are qualified to be there and can do the service that they are that taxpayerso, are paying them for, but more broadly that we are wising using wisely using Government Resources in this area because we have not effectively adapted a Risk Management process to the federal portfolio. Virtually every building at a level three or a level for Security Risk is treated in the same fashion, and we did not prioritize across that portfolio in an effective way to make sure that we are effectively spending Government Resources. So i think we would still have a long way to go, sir. Ifollowup question you had to pick the next thing or the first thing that the federal protective services are doing in order to further improve federal Facility Security as expeditiously as possible . I do not know if that is a fair question. Sure. We have talked a lot this morning about two fundamental issues, Risk Assessments and contract guards. While they are moving slowly, theyre trying to move in the right direction in both of those areas. I think the area that still is with the security humidity is a three legged stool between gsa, the federal Security Committees, trying to figure out the best way to get security at Federal Buildings. Should there really be a significant role for individual agencies within a specific building for people who do not have a lot of security background . Should they be making decisions about the governments buildings . I think, while the isc has developed standards to try to improve the level of and effectiveness of the federal committees, that is an area where they need to spend time out to figure out if that is the this way to protect Federal Buildings. Good, thanks. Thanks very much. I asked you, mr. Amitay, to respond to my first question again. A point you would really like to say, for god sakes, do not forget this, and theres probably more than a few things that we ought to keep in mind, and we will. One or two, if you would. There you go. If you will indulge. Hearing theis focus at this hearing was an navy yard tragedy. In regard active shooter, look at our jurisdiction authority. Our guys responded to the navy yard. We were less than two minutes away, and we had people at the of and the Department Transportation facility across the street, ready to activate and use their training and equipment. We were held back. Real lowlevel stuff. I need you to demand accountability. Referred toee, as by mr. Goldstein, in 2009, after they penetrated 10 of our buildings, or fps director sat here and committed to this committee that he would fix the National Weapons detection Training Program. To this day, that program is not complete. Are they making any progress . Uneven. It is scattered across the nation. I think the big problems with visionyou finally have a visioneast somewhat of a , a headquarters, and i guarantee you once that vision leaves headquarters, goes down to 11 different regions, i think 3, 4, 5 different Senior ExecutivesService Officials and the message gets lost, thereby, once again reducing any semblance of accountability. Andave 11 different regions 11 different ways of doing business regardless of what our headquarters says. Ok. Thank you. Mr. Amitay . Yes, thank you. Going off what david just said, it is true that there is a vision now at headquarters. Art of that vision is to standardize the training him and to increase the training, and the lines of communication with the regions do need to be improved. That has always been a problem that it hase fact had to deal with 11 different regions. I think you will see fps david mentioned the National Weapons training protective program which is the xray and magnetometer Training Program psos. This will require additional training. Compare that to the current requirement of eight hours training and eight hours that is combined with 40 hours of Refresher Training every three years. That is a positive development. The delivery of this training that has been a problem and it has been slow getting it out. Stretchedthine inspectors should not be doing training. That should be their mission, and they are starting to turn over tor sp1 to turn it certified Contract Security instructors, and we think that is a great idea that will allow for cost efficient and faster training. An active Shooter Training f ps needs to be doing more with that. Other agencies are well ahead of fps in terms of training their Contract Security officers to respond to active shooter incidents. I have talked with several contractors, and they basically say that with those instructions and post orders, there is some confusion for psos as to what they can do in an active shooter situation. Obviously, as the instructions do say, when youre faced with an active shooter and the loss of life, you can engage him. Are they able to be more aggressive in terms of maybe detecting an active shooter, if a person comes in as being really suspicious, can make it into a guys face and see what he is doing . To delete the active shooter policy for this officers is do not let the threat continue, period. I think fps is working to improve the training, to bring it up to a higher quality. Theyre working also, as mark said, to try to monitor better their certification and training on themand, mark, stay with that, because we do think that there is technology out there. I sometimes cringe when they say we are working with the science and Technology Directorate, to basically try to come up with a Data Management system, something that, as mr. Coburn pointed out, that contractors must have. There should be greater integration and terms of the comprehensive Data Management system. So that fps and contractors can whoho has the can know has the qualifications. Mr. Goldstein, last word . One quick quotation for dr. Coburn. Gaos recommendations thereve been 26 and only four are in process and have only been in process for about four weeks, meaning there are 22 still open, and we will provide your staff with the exact information on those. Theyre interesting. Andrew for the clarification. Some points that have not been brought up that are relevant. The first, as mr. Amitay has said, it is important that there be better clarity in terms of contractors liabilities. We have interviewed dozens of contract guards over the last decade all of whom have felt they do not have clarity on what responsibilities are and when they can use force and cannot use force. And most have told us over the years that their companies have all but said dont you ever pull out your gun, dont you ever do anything with it. There is a lot of lack of clarity in this area. The second is the role of the federalr at the protective service. It would be great if they were able to, as mr. Wright said, to be able to roam around, do more things, be able to assure the security of the buildings they are responsible for. In many cases they are locked at their desk, doing other work. They are involved in getting contracts out the door, often still hundred officers, and the level of things that they are responsible for really precludes them in many instances from actually being out and about and being the eyes and the ears and taking care of the police function that they really have. That would be the second. The third, finally, is i do not believe there really is much coordination at all based on the work we have done in the past with local and state Police Jurisdictions, so that when theedy does strike that federal protective service has worked out in any kind of detail with local Police Jurisdictions exactly what kind of focus, what kind of approach, what kind of Counter Measures they can take in these tragedies. More work and speed on that area as well. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you all for being here. Thank you for what you do with your lives. Thank you for your preparation for this hearing, for your response to our questions. Mr. Goldstein, a special thanks to you, and everybody at gao for the continued good work that you do. Thank you. I do not have time. Our caucus lunch has begun, and i am late. So i will wrap it up here. If i had more time, one of the things i would get into is the issue of turnover among these contract officers. I do not think we have spent much time on that. I would just say, as a closing thought, when i was governor of delaware we had a real problem in the area of Information Technology training folks who work in that area for us as a state employee, developing their skills, and getting hired away by someone who would pay more money. And the governor who succeeded me was smart enough to realize we ought to pay and change up the way we awarded and incentivized folks who come to work for delaware and that arena. A similar problem in the federal government. If you look at the skill sets, there is a problem in attracting skilled folks in the cyber world, and the department of Homeland Security, as compared to the National Security area. There is a difference. Dr. Coburn and our staffs and colleagues are working in a way to reduce that the severity so just hire people who will work in cybersecurity that are trained away by others. We will work on that. It would be interesting to know what we lose it is one of the things that we come back to, quality of training, quality of training, but not only original training, but Refresher Training. The thought in my background is what is going on with turnover. I guess is there is a fair amount of japanese jobs, and a in orderings done to benefit taxpayers, but also to benefit the contract officers who good work. I would ask each of you to respond to that if i had time. If you would just raise your hands or by raising your hand, is that a problem, a concern that we should have . Ok, thanks for a much. All right. I would just say in closing, the hearing record will remain open for the next 17 months. [laughter] 70 days, until january 3, 5 00 p. M. , and the walrus crochet in responding and we will appreciate your responder questions. We hope you have a good holiday season. Thanks very much. On the next washington journal, we will address the decision by the fed to adjust to the bond buying program. Your advice for preparing 2013 federal taxes and a look at new taxes taking effect next year. Washington journal live 7 00 eastern on cspan. Youthis week we will bring encore presentations of our hour long q a presentation. Watch David Stockman on his work the great deformation. Middle or high school student, the Student Competition wants to know what is the most important Issue Congress should address next year . 100,000 dollars in total prizes. The deadline is january 20. More info at student can. Org studentcam. Org. This week on patty stonesifer, ceo of marthas table. What is it . It is a wonderful communitybased organization that was founded 33 years ago with the idea that everybody deserves dignity and opportunity. We provide food support and clothing support but also childhood care and afterschool care to ensure opportunity for those in our community and washington, d. C. What area do you serve . All over the city. We want to meet people where they are. Hunger is everywhere. We go into the public schools. We know food stamps and families bills are challenging. In terms of food, we are everywhere. 14 different locations. In terms of childcare and afterschool, we are at the corner of 14th. You came from a diverse career. How long did you serve microsoft in the state of washington . I was in the tech field for 20 years and 10 of those at microsoft. The other washington. How did you get into tech . I was also fascinated by journalism and the written word. I was a letter writer. I loved to write in my family encourage my writing. I dropped out of school, putting