Nasa, there was a liquid hydrogen like that led to the launch being called off. Live press rethink with bill nelson. You watching live coverage on cspan. We have with us Nasa Administration or nasa administrator bill nelson. And Artemis Mission manager mike. First i will handed over to mr. Nelson for a few remarks. Why while we didnt have the launch that we wanted today, i can tell you that these teams know exactly what they are doing and i am very proud of them. We think back to previous spaceflights. The shuttle was sent back to the Vehicle Assembly building 20 times. I have already shared with you my personal experience back in the early part of the Space Shuttle program. Hoop gipsons crew was ready to go and scrubbed with a delay over the better part of the month. We do not launch until we think it is right. These teams have labored over that and that is the conclusion that they came to so i look at this as a part of our Space Program of which safety is the top of the list. They will tell you, starting with jim, they will tell you this specific reasons they decided to stand down and what they believe the future holds. Just remember, we will not launch until it is right. That is standard operating procedure, and it will continue to be. Thank you, sir. Good afternoon, absolutely we are not where we want to be, but the vehicle is safe. I am going to give you the big picture of where we are headed with the launch periods, and then i will let mike fill you in on some of the things that happened today. Charlie blackwellthompson is back in the Launch Control center, working through some of the next steps that the Mission Control asked her to do today. Lunch. 25 is definitely off the table. We will not be launching on tuesday or in this lunch. Lunch. 26, and 27 will depend on the options that the team comes back with on monday or early tuesday morning. Michael will talk through those options with you. One thing i will point out, we may conflict with crew five. There is if there is a conflict when our lunch. And when crew five months ago, we need to resolve that conflict with them. And as we get to the latter part of october, we will look at other things. Our stay on the path duration that we have. And looking at a general course of action some of the storm activity that might be out there. There is a question of if we are confident. I like that question because its, are you confident you got out of bed this morning . The confidence to do another launch attempt today was born out of the fact that we understand borne out of the fact that we understand the Hydrogen Leaks that we had yesterday, we were confident coming into today. But as the administrator said, we will not launch until we ready until we are ready. There has been conjecture already, 100 plus folks, everybody engineers thinking about what is the problem. Thats what happens when we are talking about these things. Folks are giving options. We saw a lot of questions today all the way through when charlie decided it was time to scrap. An. Scrrub. We talked about this mission being risky, we are going to take the risks that make sense. Let me turn it over to mike for more specifics. Good afternoon, again, thank you for continuing to follow the artemis 1 mission and our program. Let me start with where we left off. When we reviewed our readiness into head into this a launch attempt, if you recall, the team stayed in the launch countdown following the attempt on monday. That gave us a head start on todays attempt. The team, when we came in for the tanking meeting, deciding whether or not to load the vehicle with the cryogenic fuel oxidizer today was on time or slightly ahead. It was a clean meeting we met at 0445 4 45 this morning. All of the questions were of no particular constraint to setting up our launch attempt. There were 46 windows cut out in the launch window. Most were just a few seconds. The longest were just about a minute. We do, at this particular time of year, have a high propellant bulk temperature. That gives us more performance out of the rocket. Essentially we have a hot rocket out of the performance to launch. And then as we fly to the earths atmosphere, that pushes the end of the q bar. We saw that we had positive margins, but lower margins on one specific area, the orion spacecraft. We expected that vehicle to get to 700 pounds per square foot of pressure up to the. Of maximum dynamic pressure. Just prior to the cryogenic loading operation, the team was working through a chill down. There was an inadvertent pressurization of the hydrogen transfer line with when the pressure exceeded exceeded what we had planned. Which was 20 pounds per square inch, it got up to 60 pounds per square inch. The hardware itself we know is fine. We did not exceed the maximum design pressure. But there is a chance at the soft goods, or the seal, in the Quick Disconnect saw effects from that. It is too early to tell exactly if that was the cause of the Hydrogen Leak that we had today. We do know that we saw a large leak at the eight inch disconnect today. That leak started when we went from the slope fill to this fast fill. This particular disconnect did not have a problem on monday. We did see a small leak not one of this magnitude. It was characterized as a large leak by our operations team. Our team tried three times to resolve the leak, and all three times we saw the leak. It was discussed previously, if you can stabilize all sides of that Quick Disconnect, we have a ground side and flight side. If you can chill that down and ensure that there is no differential temperature across that interface come, sometimes the heels leaks will heal themselves. Or resolve themselves. That was not successful. Initially, the team declared the scrub at 11 17, eastern time. The Mission Management team was still in the process of draining the vehicle. The team will put ashes nitrogen in their as not to condense water vapor in the tank area. And then we will swap to air. That allows us to get the tanks back to ambient conditions and for us to gain access. In the meeting that we had at 2 30 eastern. We talked about three options. The first option was to teammate and remain the indelible pad, but our confidence given the size of the leak was very low. The team leaned towards removal and replacement of the soft goods in the disconnect. The options were to do it at pad or at the Vehicle Assembly building. Either of those options do not preserve our ability to fly before the end of this launch. Which expires on the sixth. We will hear about schedule options next week, including removal and replacement of the soft goods on the Quick Disconnect at the pad. Followed by a cryo test, that is the only place we could get a full cryo test to ensure that we dont have further issue with respect to leaks at the temperatures that we need is to fill the vehicle on may launch. The other option is to remove and replace the quick desk connect disconnect soft goods in the building. We would need to build an environmental enclosure to do that. If we do it in the Vehicle Assembly building, it is a environmental enclosure. However, we cannot test the Quick Disconnect at the vab, we can only do that in ambient conditions. We are looking into why we did not see the leak of this magnitude on monday, but we see it on todays attempt. We are also looking at the chill down procedure, to look at additional controls such that we dont get the inadvertent pressure that we had today. We have talked about before, this is a very hard business. This is an initial test flight of this vehicle. We will fly when we are ready. As a part of this initial test flight, we are learning how to operate the vehicle, and we are learning all of the things required to get us ready to fly. We have demonstrated a large number of those things. We have had so many wet and round test. We are still learning as we go, to get this vehicle up safely. We are understanding the problem, developing solutions and risks versus risk impacts. We will review next week when we have those options pat fleshed out further. I will open it up for questions in the room and on the phones. On the phones, as a reminder please press star one. And in the room please raise your hand. With that will will start with reuters. Question for mike. If you decide to roll back, what is the quickest you could roll us back out to the pad . What would you need to do at the v. A. De vab while it is there . It would take several weeks. Depending on the required work at the pad, or the Vehicle Assembly, that would determine the schedule but several weeks of work it is difficult to determine how many days. Ap. Yes. Hello, can you hear me . Yes. I was wondering, if you do the repair at the pad and it goes well could you choose to maybe go in sit temper in september before the spacex launch, is that a possibility . And the way things stand now, which way are you leaning toward . I will take the first part of that. We still have our constraint on the range, on the range to test our flight terminations system. We have 25 days. We will talk with the range about what possibilities are. But in order to test and change out our batteries, we need to go back for that. I will let you handle the options. With respect to whether or no september, again, i believe its too early to tell. It comes down to what the analysis tells us and what necessary changes and mitigations are required in order to have the confidence that we have resolved this large leak at the eight inch Quick Disconnect site. Right now, it is too early to tell, we may have more information next week. And bc. N d. C. Nbc. You said that you believed that the line had been over pressurized, do you believe that that contributed to the leak and do you have a do you know why the line was over pressurized. We know that that is a cause, we are not sure if it is the cause. We will need to line up all the legs of the fault tree before we determine the cause. We tune in, the hydrogen, we did that on monday. We saw it start to go up, it slowed the rate and we did a manual fill. Thats part of the process. We need to look, as mike said, to automate that. To find places where it will cut out if it goes to high too h iggh. That is something we will automate for the next time. It is on the fault tree, but it is not understood to be the absolute cause. Thank you, i want to clarify, you are going back to the vab no matter what, correct . And mike, with this Hydrogen Leak that you had, what is the difference between the one that you were able to overcome on monday . We do have to go back to the vab. We do not have an agreement with the range to launch after our batteries have been tested within 25 days. In order to change them out, we need to go back. To get that kind of extension is something we need to talk to them about. Right now our position is that we will go back to the vab. To take a crack at the second part of your question. In terms of the leak that we saw on monday, it was a manageable leak. This was not a manageable leak. As soon as we got into the fast fill and we need to get into the fast fill as far as this delicate balance of you want to load within the capability of the Quick Disconnect, but you also want to speeded up to meet your window. You have a balance between the flow rate and the pressure, if there is an in balance you need to manage that. Yet monday they were able to constant temper that leak. They tried multiple times today, and it didnt work. In addition to trying to bump the Quick Disconnect and tried to reseal it. None of those techniques worked. The techniques that we used on monday, for this magnitude of leak, were not working in our favor. Cnn. Thank you. Im wondering if there is a precedent for receiving an extension on the range on Something Like this, has it been done before or if you were to ask the range, is that something that has been done before . We worked with them recently to go from 2025 days, showing them the technical data that they needed to see about the integrity of our system. I am confident that there have been other ones, i cannot quote the history, but i know that we did just renegotiate to go from 2025. Do you believe that the rocket could stay between now and the next attempt . My position is that i dont know, it is their call. We have data that supports it. I know our folks will talk to the range as soon as they are able. We want to respect that this is they are range that we are launching from. Limburg. Bloomberg. Can you walk us through what hardware you need to replace, where it is and how time intensive that work will be . I can take a crack at that. Right now we are focused on that eight inch Quick Disconnect and the soft goods seal that surrounds it. We need to get through the fall train analysis to determine exactly if there is anything else that needs to be accounted for. It is too early to tell what else may be in play, what other work may be necessary. The engineering review board or technics is or Technical Analysis that will happen, and then we will find what the team brings forward next week. What the teams bring forward and what we can resolve based on the data we already have on the fault tree analysis, to decide what we need to check in what we do not need to check. We will also have witness information, we will be very thoughtful about d mating the and biblical demating the embillical. We want to make sure we are not overlooking something. We want to look at this from an engineering standpoint to go through any potential cause or exclude any potential cause based on the data that we have. It is too early to tell where we may need to do work. Eric berger. Two quick words about hydrogen. Mike, if i stood there with book it with a bucket and gloves, how quickly would it fill the bucket, to understand the magnitude of the leak. When you are writing the authorization billed bill in 2010 to authorize this system, are you concerned about the leaky nature . I along with senator ted bailey hutchinson, along with folks in the white house, deferred to the people who best new the systems. To answer your question, no, we did not have any question about hydrogen. We deferred to the experts. Eric, to answer your question about how large is the leak. I would not use a bucket analogy. It is a concentration. When you have a fuel source in atmospheric air, that contains roughly 20 oxygen. When you mix the two, you only need an ignition source to close the fire triangle. When you get a 4 concentration of hydrogen in ambient air, you are at risk of having a flammability event, or a flammability hazard. We were seeing in excess of that by two or three orders of magnitude today. Im sorry, not magnitude, two or three times the excess. We were not going to be able to work our way through it like we did on monday, clearly, every time we saw the leak it was a large leak that immediately exceeded our flammability limit. A couple of techniques were tried, and we couldnt get there today. Space. Com i would like to talk about the nature of what has to be replaced, is that seal silicone, or is it other hardware why would you need that, is that to provide enclosure around that seal . The Quick Disconnect it is a metal poppet like device and it has a gasket around it. Im not sure of the gasket material if we were to see damage on the Quick Disconnect, that would let us know to replace hardware. If we saw an object or debris that would tell us Something Else was going on. Or if we saw a simple dimension simple damage on the gasket, we can remove and replace that. Our history of our testing is right here at the Kennedy Space center, tells us that a leak of this magnitude is usually resolved by the replacement of that seal. We need to inspect the hardware. We need to see what the hardware is telling us. In terms of what exactly needs to be done, there was a second part to your question i dont recall. About the enclosure. Yeah. The enclosure affords us the ability to provide what we call a purge at the interface. The perch allows us to push nitrogen in their to essentially inherit or push out any oxygen. It reduces the risk of a flammability hazard. If we just pump regular air in their regular air has oxygen. We eliminated that oxygen by creating an enclosure and putting nitrogen in to displace any oxygen, such that if there is a Hydrogen Leak, you have one leg of the fire triangle removed. Now a question now a question from wired. This is a question i think for mike. What are the risks to the secondary missions if there is a sale forget a significant delay . Is that a factor in determining the launch date if their batteries cannot be recharged . Yeah, good question. We do maintain an open communication loop with the customers. We will certainly inform them that we did not have our launch attempt today and what our next launch attempt looks like from a schedule standpoint, we will make a riskbased decision based on a host of factors. If you do need to go back to the Assembly Building you could top off the batteries for a number of those. Or they may not need to be topped off based on what we believe to be the known battery rate and battery state of charge. I personally have not seen all of that data. But it is part of the process of looking at a given launch timeframe. We will share that information with our providers and share the appropriate next steps. Whether or not any of those are at risk at this point, i dont have the data in front of me to answer that question. Thank you, mike. Another question from the wall street journal. Back to the inadvertent pressurization. That was it three times the amount of pressure planned for. Can you walk through what led to that . Have you seen that before in practice runs or at the testing facility . So, we are still reviewing the data, the sequence of events. But as i understand it, it occurred during the chill down prior to the loading operation associated with loading the hydrogen, the liquid oxygen. It was part of preparatory steps. There was a sequence of about one dozen commands required. Simply, the wrong valve was commanded. It was identified after about three or four seconds and rectified. That is what we understand. We know with the pressure profile look like at this particular interface. We are looking at, again, the sequence and, as was mentioned by our lead project engineer earlier today, we want to be deliberate and careful about drawing conclusions here because correlation does not equal causation. So, we are taking a look at the inadvertent over press. We are looking at what that meant to this particular interface. We are looking at the fall tree associated with the leak we saw. If there is a conjunction of potential causes on the fault tree, that will take us down one path. If there is no route because you can trace to that, that will take root cause you can trace to that, that will take us down a different path. We have looked through quite a bit of information already. But we have to work our way through this one methodically. Space news. If you are able to do the repairs on the pad, are there other factors that would allow you to stay there and not have to roll it back . I think what i said earlier is we have to look at the pass because for all ryan orion, there are constraints how they can spend time at the pad versus the wind. We have to look in that. If we are within that that is something we look at as a plus. If we can stay within that analysis. I think ultimately we are driven i the sps unless you have anything to add to that, mike. Yes. We need to look at what exactly what work exactly we need to do. There may be, depending on the fault tree analysis and any inspection work we do, it may be that the Vehicle Assembly building is the right place to do this work. We are out in the elements at the pad. That has a couple pros and cons associated with it. Cons happen every afternoon around here when you get a shower or thunderstorm rolling through. We do not want to have issues with that interface. Because it is out there in the environment. We will talk through all of those things. Again, i think its a little early to say what the right path forward is. A flight termination system is one variable we have to consider as part of all of this. As jim said earlier, the range and space force has been fantastic partners working with us. Our government, interagency work. We dont on that decision. The range owns is that decision. We dont own that decision. The range owns that decision so we would have to talk with them before any decisions are made. I am with the atlantic. Are you considering doing another wet dress rehearsal after you have implemented repairs instead of going into another launch attempt . Administrators earlier said we would not launch until it is right. In order to get the to get to that point, is there anything that would make you say, we will go back and test until it is right . I guess i will say that whatever the connection we are testing under ambience will actually mock different than crop act a lot different then cryogenics. Wet dress rehearsal four we saw it manageable the other day. For us hydrogen is difficult to work with. From our perspective, we may look at these options when we stand on the pad. If we change it at the pad, we do a cryogenic test there . What does that cryogenic test consist of . That is what the team will come up with. We tested this at the wet dress. This one sealed at the wet dress. I will take everyone back to the summer of 1990, the summer of hydrogen. They shuttle had been launching for nine years. They spent a whole summer chasing Hydrogen Leaks. Im not saying thats an excuse, its just a fact. We have seen a couple different Hydrogen Leaks. We are trying to dial the vehicle in. Whatever the fault was, we will find it and build confidence again. If a team says wet dress is the way to go, we need to figure that out. But from my perspective we have tested this and it has worked a couple times and it did not today and we will figure out the reason why. I would add that we know we dont need to do a full white dress rehearsal if we were to test out this interface. For example, we dont need to load in the interim or upper propulsion phases. We know those are fine. If we were to do a cryo test at this interface after work is done at the pad, we dont need a full wet dress rehearsal if that makes sense. Another question on the phone. David currently with discovery. You talked about it being inadvertent. Was that software that caused the over pressurization . Is that something you have not seen other times . I take it from your earlier answer that you are considering over pressurization could have affected anything pliable. Thank you. The first part of the question, the inadvertent command and over pressurization. Again, its a little bit early to tell what exactly happened. We are working our way through it. But we do know this was a manual sequence. It may have been the fact that we did not automate this particular sequence that could have been part of the reason we had the inadvertent overpressure. There are a host of other reasons. You know, when you are an operator working through a command sequence, that could have also come into play. We will take time to look through the data. We will go back and reassess exactly why this inadvertent command happened. In terms of soft goods, yes, its basically a seal that is a nonmetallic material. I dont remember what the particular material is. But yes, thats what i mean when i say soft goods. Thank you mike. This is for mike. There is some time between the recommendation to scrub and when charlie decided to call it a day. It was their troubleshooting being discussed as an option . Is there anything else that was going from the Activity Center today . Separately, is the sensor issue we were talking about a couple of days ago a factor at all in any of these scenarios . Thanks. I will start with the last question. The short answer is no. The sensor issue we saw the other day is on the engine side art of the engine bleeding used to thermally conditioned the engines. That really has not entered into the discussion. In terms of additional troubleshooting, there was a pause before a scribe was declared dust just to ensure we had exhausted all of our options. We had some discussions coming from our Engineering Team to see what a potential option may be. It turned out to not be viable. There were ongoing discussions to ensure that we had a really exhausted all of our options. That is why there was a little bit of a pause towards the end. Here in the second row. Im jacob, a student tech reporter at w ust news out of the university of florida and i have two questions. I heard earlier that the temperature affects how the rocket launch goes in some ways. As summer goes into fall, into winter, how will the mission need to be adapted Going Forward into the future . Second, i know this is when you dont want to hear now, but i will ask it anyway. How does the switchback affect the timeline of the Artemis Program as a whole . The second one, we are still planning artemis to artemis two in 2024 and artemis three and in 2025. Then in terms of temperature effects, because we have a combination of solid propellant in the boosters and liquid propellant in the core stage, the core stage really has no Significant Impact due to temperature other than what we call the boil off. That is, you cause the propellant to go from liquid to gas and you are not able to feed the engines. Its part of that. There is essentially no effect associated with that because it is the as we go from the summer into the fall, you load the cryo. Then you go and ensure that hank is full the tank is full but for you go before you go. The lower the bulk temperature of the propellant, the lower performance you get. We know that with the performance characteristics of these particular boosters, they have been tested through the full range, the summer months you get the most performance out of the solids. The performance is slightly lower in the fall. When we looked at performance numbers and they were eye watering in terms of margin to our assertion altitude that we were planning. We are not particularly concerned with performance to the rocket at this point. Back here. Thank you. Given these two cancellations and further delays, does this affect battery changes . I think we answered the cubesat question earlier. We have limited battery life on the cubesat. We understand that a k rate. The decay rate. The customers for the cubesats have been made aware of what customer access is before they were loaded and we have payloads in the orion capsule like radiation monitors and other things. We dont know what the installer baseline configuration was. The longer you sit on the pad the more radiation some of the sensors will accrue. We also have witnessed sensors to help us understand what we accumulated during the spy spaceflight portion as opposed to on the ground. There are a host of things that we plan ahead and track. At this point, we are focused on getting the vehicle ready. We understand the potential impact to the payload and to the cubesats whether in orion or on the space launch rocket as part of the 10 cubesats. Care in the second rope. I am from the university of florida. By questions for the senator. We understand that you are not going until you are ready and it is right. We know that scrubs are a very natural part of all space missions. That said, i have got to believe there is some level of disappointment. Can you describe the demeanor in the lcc, and specifically Charlie Blackwell thompson. What did you say to her today after the decision to scrub . The demeanor is very professional. They do their job, naturally, all of us, no more than all of us, including the lcc wanted it to go today. But, we also, these guys are the professionals and they know that it does not go into that is ready. Did you share any private moments with charlie . Any comments to keep her entertained and her team motivated . Any comments you can share . I will say this before mike answers that. This team is very aware of potential fatigue. Therefore, they gave should time off for the team yesterday after the mmt that occurs i think two days ago. They gave everybody the day off. So that they can regroup and rest. That is part of the lessons that came out of the challenger report. Fatigue was a factor there. In terms of the firing room and charlie in particular, one of the things i particularly enjoy about the agency is you surround yourself with amazingly capable people and amazing leadership and charlie is one of the amazing leaders in the agency. When i was talking to her about the scrub decision she was focused with her head in the game. You know, she was focused on the operation and the flight hardware. And ensuring her team had what they needed to get through the remaining operation. That is natural when you come from the operations realm. There is definitely time to reflect on that after you come out of the firing realm. On the drive home or once you are home. But that was neither the time nor place and she did not show any inkling she was focused on anything other than the right decision for her team and for the spacecraft. Space policy online. Marcia smith, space policy online. I know you have both discussed this already a couple times but i am already still unclear about the decision to roll back. Jim, you said you must roll back because of the fts batteries. You might be able to recharge the cubesat. You talked about how you think you have several weeks of work. If you go to the range and ask them to give you a couple days, several weeks, can you condense it all and concisely say, are you rolling back or not . When will you make a decision . We dont have an fts waiver now beyond 25 days. Until we have that, we have to rollback in order to satisfy the range requirement. We will work with the range to try and get that. But we have to decide what it is, what veneration we want based on the launch period availability we have and what they are willing to give us. That negotiation has not happened so as far as i am concerned we have to rollback to satisfy that requirement. That is where mikes if statement comes from. Because there is a possibility, but we dont have that today. I will be upfront with you, i dont always pick the best words. [laughter] i could have chosen a better phrase or better word in that case. Jim is absolutely right. Its not our decision. It is the ranges decision. They are the ones responsible for managing public safety. So when we rollback, unless we get a waiver, its a rollback scenario. I said if. I apologize for that. Probably could have chosen better words. If that is the hardest thing i had to deal with today, im happy about that. In the back. Good afternoon. Liz hurley wa ss huntsville. Can you talk to me about the actual cost of two backtoback scrubs . Do you feel there is a cost to Public Perception . There was so much build up this launch. So many people came to florida to spend a week hoping they would see a rocket fly. Is there something you are looking at now regarding the public . You talk about the backtoback cost and i will talk about the perception. [laughter] you know, space is the place. Everybody is really interested in this mission and going back to mars and getting ready to go back to the moon and getting ready to go to mars. One of these things that we did early on was we tried to stress that this is a test. A test has certain risks. We pounded that in every Public Comment we had. In order to get expectations in alignment with reality. Yet, human nature is what you know it is. People are ready. You saw the crowds out here on monday morning. A lot less crowds today. However, the nature of humans is that we want to see it and participate and yet, despite all of that that is why these guys are such consummate professionals. They do it by the book. And when it is ready. As far as cost, i mean i cant give you a number. There are commodities we use with oxygen, hydrogen. We do try to recover some of those as we drain back into our supply tanks but a lot of the cryogenics boil off so we have to have them topped off. I forget how many tankers we had after mondays attempt. I think like five or six waves. Charlie talked about the cost of the oxygen, hydrogen, i cant tell you often top of my head. Off of the top of my head. I go to commodities first. Obviously, we schedule resources to provide the comment tracking for us. Then, the labor of the folks here. That labor. Folks are working on that anyway. It is priced with assets that are not ours, out of nasas control, like oxygen and hydrogen. The cost of two scrubs is a lot less than a failure. Michael with nacchio. Natgeo. We are coming up on the 60th anniversary of president kennedys rise anniversary speech where he declared that we choose to go to the moon. Nearly 60 years later, how do you reflect on the upcoming anniversary and challenges we face as we choose once again to go to the moon . On the 60th anniversary i will be in rice stadium. There will be 4000 Public School students in the stadium. Just as it was 60 years ago. With Public School students. What president kennedy says was we choose to go to the moon and do other things not because it is easy, but because it is hard. This is a whole new vehicle. Its a whole new technology, a whole new purpose of going back to the moon and moon in preparation to go to mars. Yes, its hard. On the phone we have ken king from the new york times. You talked about how you will not launch until you are ready. Are there pressures from anywhere within nasa, from the white house, from anyone in congress . I can tell you from my standpoint no. If i knew about that i would try to stop it. But, we have felt no pressure whatsoever. I would agree. We are not feeling external pressure on any of this. This is something that is, as administrator nelson said, we are really focused on getting off and getting off safely. Because of the consequences of failure. We are not feeling any pressure externally. We are running up on the end of the hour. We have time for one more question. Ken kramer. Kevin cramer. Let me ask, you talked a few questions back about the possibility to do cryo loading to test the seal. How much cryo would you have to load to test the seal . What would then be the turnaround for a launch . In terms of how much cryo we would have to load is we would really just have to get through the chill down, slow phil, into the fast fill. Typically when you get it is the get into the fast fill if there is a leak that is where you will see it. It would be somewhere 5 plus. Thats not a significant amount of the liquid hydrogen tank. What was the second part of the question . Ive been up since midnight. How long could you turn for a launch . Like two or three days later . Again, it depends on a whole host of things. But, in terms of replenishing the commodities and setting up for a subsequent attempts, we know that we can turnaround either 48 or 72 hours simply based on commodity replenishment. If there were additional engineering investigations or additional work we needed to do following a cryo test at that interface, that something that would have to be factored into the plan. We would understand this better next week. In terms of the first part of the question its not a significant amount of cryo compared to the full tank. We will have an update next week on the path forward. Turn into nasa tv and social Media Channels to keep uptodate on the latest. Thank you for joining us. Have a great labor day. Thank you. Or online at cspan. Org. The conservative Political Action conference