suspect are on your mind. they want to make things better for our customers and in that process make gm better. they particularly wanted to know what we plan to though -- you do for those who suffer the most. s why i am pleased to announce we have attained kenneth feinberg. i am sure this committee knows mr. feinberg is highly qualified and is very experienced in handling matters such as this, having led the compensation efforts involved with 9/11, the bp oil spill and the boston marathon bombing. he brings expertise and objectivity to this effort. as i have said, i consider this to be an extraordinary event and we are responding to it in an extraordinary way. as i see it, gm has civil responsibilities and legal responsibilities. we are thinking through what those responsibilities are and how to balance them in an appropriate manner. ringing in mr. feinberg is the first step. >> i want to acknowledge, we know the families are here today we offer sympathy to their families and we have all of you in our hearts. reviewed many documents. theoon as the cobalt it road, drivers began to immediately complained to general motors that the ignition systems did not work properly. you can imagine how frightening it is to drive a car that suddenly loses its power steering and power brakes. -- new that it did not is it common practice for gm to except a car that does not meet gm specifications? >> no. but there's a difference between a part meeting or not meeting specificications and a part being defective. >> so under what scenario is accepting parts that don't meet gm specs allowable? >> an example would be when you are purchasing steel. you'll set a specificication for steel but then because of the different suppliers and availability of steel to make products you will assess the performance, the functionality, the durrability, the aspects of the part or the -- in this case, steel, that is necessary to live up to what the performance and the durability of the safety needs to be. that's an example of when you would have a part or have material that doesn't meet the speck that was set out but is acceptable from a safety from a functionality perspective. performance as well. >> is that switch acceptable? >> the switch? i'm sorry. >> is the switch acceptable? >> at what time frame? i'm sorry. ar at the beginning. it didn't meet the specifics for gm. is that what you would consider acceptable? >> as we clearly know today it is not. >> so in 2006 gm switched put in a new spring to increase the torque. am i correct? >> i didn't hear the last part i'm sorry. >> gm supplier put a new spring in to increase the torque. is that correct? >> there was a new part. >> now, in that binder next to you if you would turn to tab 25. this is an e-mail exchange between delfi employees in 2005 discussing the changes to the ignition switch. the e-mail notes that a gm engineering is asking for information about the ignition switch because quote cobalt is blowing up in their face in regards to turning the car off with the drivers knee. unquote. if this was such a big problem, why didn't gm replace the ignition switch in the cars already on the road? the cars with the torque well below gm specificications insteado just the new scars? why? >> what you just said does not match under tab 25. >> it's the bottom of the page there should be something there. just know what i said. i apologize for that but there was a statement made that cobalt was blowing up in their face by a bump of the drivers knee. >> clearly there were a lot of things that happened, there have been a lot of statements made that's why we've hired anton valukecass. we are spanding >> but you don't know why they didn't replace the switch? >> i do not know the answer to that and that is why we're doing this investigation. >> given the number of complaints, why wasn't this identify as a safety issue? >> again, i can't answer specific questions at that point in time. that's why we're doing a full and complete investigation. >> in the chronology gm submitted to nhtsa gm states it didn't make the connection between the ignition switch problems and the air bag nondeployment problems until late 2013. so my question is when gm decided to switch the ignition in 2006 tid the company ever examine how could affect other vehicle systems like the air bags? >> again, that's part of the investigation. >> should they? >> should we understand? >> should they look at how it affects other vehicle systems? >> yes. >> let me ask another question then. so when gm concluded and you heard from my opening statement that the tooling costs and price pieces are too high, what does that mean? >> i find that statement to be very disturbing. as we do this investigation and understood it in the context of the whole time line if that was the reason the decision was made that is unacceptable. that is not the way we do business in today's gm. >> well, how does gm balance cost and safety? >> we don't. today, if there's a safety issue, we take action. if we know there is a defect on our vehicles we do not look at the costs associated with it. we look at the speed in which we can fix the issue. >> was there a culture in gm at that time that they would have put costs over safety? >> again, we're doing a complete investigation but i would say in general we have moved from a cost culture after the bankruptcy to a customer culture. we have trained thousands of people on putting the customer first. we have actually gone with outside training. it's a part of our core values and it is one of the most important cultural changes we're driving in general motors today. >> i understand today. we're asking about then. i'm out of time. >> thank you very much, mr. chairman. ms. barra, gm knew about the defect in the ignition switches as far back as 2001. 13 years before the recall. correct? >> the -- >> yes or no will work. >> the investigation will tell us that. >> you don't know when gm knew about the defect? >> i will -- >> take a look at tab 7 in your notebook ms. barra. >> this is a gm document. and what this gm document talks about is the this switch. it says, tear down evaluation on the switch revealed two causes of failure. low contact force and low detent funker force. do you recognize that document, ma'am? >> this is the first i've seen this document. >> ok. well, so you don't know how long gm knew about this? >> that's right. and that's why i'm doing an investigation. >> ok. in fact delfi, the manufacturer of the ignition switch informed gm that the switch was supposed to be 15 minimum torque specificication but in fact these switches were between 4 and 10. didn't it? >> the specificication is correct that it was supposed to be 20 plus or minus 5. >> and these switches were between 4 and 10. correct? yes or no will work. >> we know that now. >> and gm was notified by delfi of this. correct? yes or no? >> i am not aware of being notified. >> ok. >> can i also correct i was -- >> i need a yes or no. i only have five minutes. i'm sorry. so as far as back as 2004, ten years ago, gm conducted a problem rezzluge tracking system inquiry after it learned of an incident where the key move data of the run condition in a 2005 shelvet cobalt. is this correct? >> again you're relating specific incidents that happened -- >> you don't know? >> in our entire investigation? >> you don't know about that? take a look at tab 8, please. and by the way, ma'am, i'm getting this information from the chronology that gm provided to nhtsa. >> right. and -- >> so let me ask you. again, as far back as 2004, gm conducted a problem resolution tracking system inquiry after it learned of an incident where the key moved out of the run condition. is that correct? >> yes. >> thank you. now, after the inquiry, one engineer advised against further action because there was quote no acceptable business case to provide a resolution and the prts was closed. is that correct? >> if that is true that is a very disturbing fact. >> yes, it is. >> that is not the way we make decisions. >> ok. again in 2005, gm received more reports of engines stopping when the keys were jerked out of the run condition. further investigations were conducted and engineers provide proposed changes to the kees. is that correct? >> that's part of our investigation to get that complete time line. >> well, taking from the time line gm has already done. >> which was a summary. >> ok. so as a result of the investigation, a technical service bulleten was issued to dealers that if car owners complained they should be warned of this risk and advised to take unessential items from the key chain. but this recommendation was not made to the public. no public statements were issued. no recalls sent. is that correct? >> that's my understanding. yes. >> thank you. in 2006, gm contracted with delfi to redesign the ignition switch to use a new detep punter and swing that would increase torque force. is that correct? >> yes. >> and for some reason, though, the new switch was not given a part number and instead shared a number with the original defective switch. is that correct? >> yes. now this new switch also did not meet gm's minimum torque specificications either. this one delfi said was in the range of 10 to 15 and it really should have been 15 at a minimum. is that correct? >> i have not seen the test results. you don't know that. ok. now, despite these facts gm continued to manufacture cars with these same ignition switches with the model years 2008 to 2011. is that correct? >> yes. and between 2004 and 2014, no public notices were issued as a result of gm's knowledge of these facts and no recalls were issued for the over 2.5 million vehicles manufactured with these defective ignition switches. is that correct? >> yes. >> and finally, three recalls were made this year, 2014. two in february and one just last friday. is that right? >> related to this ignition switch? >> now, i have just a couple more questions. the first question i have ms. barra, gm is intending to replace all the switches for those cars beginning on april 7. is that right? >> we will begin shipping material or new parts -- >> are you going to put a completely redesigned switch or the old switches from 2006 into those cars? >> it's going to be a switch that meets the -- >> is it going to be a newly redesigned switch or is it going to be the old switch from 2006? >> it's the old design that meets the performance that's required to act -- >> i have more questions mr. chairman. perhaps we can do another round. >> but an important part several members may be concerned. you say there's an ongoing investigation you cannot comment on these yet. are you getting updates on a regular basis as this is going on? >> from mr. velucas? >> from anybody. >> are you getting updates? >> yes. >> thank you. now go to chairman of the full committee mr. upton for five minutes. >> again ms. barra for being here this afternoon. i want to make sure that we ask similar questions of both you and of nhtsa. we want to learn about the documents that were submitted on a timely and appropriate basis to nhtsa and in fact what did they do with that information. the documents that we've looked at produced show that gm received complaints about its cobalt ignition switches for about two years that ultimately resultd in a redesigned ignition switch from 2006. who within gm would have known about those specific scomplabets? -- specific complaints? what was the process back then? >> i was not a part of that organization at the time. that's why i'm doing the investigation to understand that. >> so you don't know the folks that would have been reported to at this point. is that right? >> i don't know the people who would have been handling this issue at that point. >> but you're getting updates. what's supposed to happen? looking back what should have happened when these reports came in? >> anyone general when you have an issue, a product issue, a safety issue, a field incident, any type of issue that comes in, you have a team of engineers that are the most knowledgeable that work on that. if they see an issue they elevate i had to a cross functional team that looks at it and then it goes to a group for decision. >> we know that the ignition switch was in fact redesigned because it didn't meet the specs that were there. is that right? >> yes. now, i would guess that engineering 101 would normally require that when you assign a new part or replace a new part, or replace a part with a new part, that that newly redesigned part in fact should have a different number on it. is that right? >> that's correct. >> so that didn't happen. right? it did not happen. >> correct. >> who within gm made the decision to move forward with that redesigned switch without a new part number? do you know who that is? >> i do not know the name of the individual. >> are you going to be able to find that out for us? >> yes, i will. >> and will you give that name to our committee? >> we will provide that. >> is it likely that that same person was the one that decided not to recall the defective version? where did -- where in the time line is that? >> i don't know. but that is part of the investigation that we're doing. >> do you know when it was that it was discovered, what year, what -- where in the time lime it was discovered that in fact a new part number was not assigned? >> i became aware of that after we did the recall and the time line was put together. >> so that was just in the last month or so. is that right? >> that's when i became aware. >> but when did gm realize that no new part number was assigned? >> that's part of our investigation. i want to know that just as much as you because that is an unacceptable practice. that is not the way we do business. >> so you stated publicly that something went wrong with our process. how is the process supposed to work? >> how is this -- how are you redesigning the process to ensure that in fact it should work the way that it needs to work? >> well, one of the things we're doing is the investigation by mr. velucas i have some earnly findings from in fluke cass as we look across the company it appears at this time thrfings information in one part of the company and another part of the company department have access to that. at times they didn't share information just by course of process or they didn't recognize that the information would be valuable to another area of the company. we have fixed that. we have announced a new position. jeff boyer the vice president of global vehicle safety, all of this will report to him. he will have additional staft and will have the ability to cut across the organization and will also have the right functional leadership who understands what's going on in the different areas. so that's a fix we've already made and he is operating that way today. >> so when gm received complaints about the ignition switches for a number of years, ended up resulting in the redesigned ignition switch in 2006, when was it that anyone linked up the ignition switch problems to look at the cobalt air bags and not deploying? was that at about the same time? was that later? what's the time line on that? >> that is something i very much want to understand and know. but i again this is -- we are doing an investigation that spabs over a decade. and it's very important because designing a vehicle is a very complex process. that we get a detailed understanding of exactly what happened. but that's the only way we can know that we can fix processes and make sure it never happens again. >> when was it that gim informed nhtsa that in fact the redesign -- did in fact gm inform nhtsa that the ignition switch had been redesigned? >> i don't know that. >> i yield back. >> the chairman yields back. i now recognize the ranking member of the full committee mr. waxman for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. ms. barra we have heard about how in 2002 gm approved the use of faulty ignition switches in cobalts ion knows and other cars. that's what caused many of the problems that led to the recall of the cars model year 2003 to 2007. so new ignition switches were designed and approved by general motors. these were switches that were used -- were used in the model years 2008-2010. that all sound right to you? am i correct in what i'm saying? >> there's a couple statements you made at the beginning that i don't know to be true. >> well, in 2002, gm approved the use of what turned out to be faulty ignition switches. in several cars. >> they actually were parts that went into a 2003 was the earliest model. >> well, the tests were done in 2002. but the cars were 2003 to 2007. so we had a recall of those cars. >> right. >> and then there was a new switch, a new ignition switch designed and approved by gm. and these new switches were in use in the model year 2008-2010 cobalts and ions. >> to the best of my knowledge that's correct. >> ok. but in a briefing last week, delfi told committee staff that these new switches also did not meet gm specificications. they told us the force required to turn these switches was about two thirds of what gm said it should be. and documents that were provided to the committee also confirmed that top gm officials were aware of the out of speck switches in 2008 and 2002 vehicles in december 2013. so there's a document if you want to look it up it's tab 39 page 6 of your binder. there was a december presentation for gm's high level executive field action decision committee. and that at that meeting they showed that the performance measurement for almost half of the 2008 -- you go 2008, 2010, model year vehicles. ignition switches were below the minimum gm required specificications. my question to you is are you concerned that many 2008 to 2010 model year cars have switches that do not meet the company specificications? >> as we assessed the situation, my understanding that there was work going on to look at the switches again, looking at just because a switch or a part an engineered part doesn't meet specificications doesn't necessarily mean it is a defective part. as that analysis was going on at the same time we were looking across to make sure and when we recognized that spare parts might have been sold through third parties that have no tracking to know which then we made a decision all of those vehicles. >> were informed that a lot of these cars those model years had switches that were just as defective as the 2003 to 2007 cars. that those cars were recalled. but you didn't recall the model year 2008 to 2011 vehicles until a month later. on march -- 28s. why did the company delay in recalling these newer vehicle's? >> the company was looking my understanding is the company was assessing those switches but again at the same time in parallel they were looking at the spare parts issue and the spare parts issue became very clear we needed to go and get all of those vehicles because we couldn't identify which vehicles may have had a spare part put in them. and we -- >> we recalled the entire population. >> but you've recalled those vehicles. you recalled them later. >> yes but not when you knew there was a problem. >> we recalled them. >> your recall did not mention the faulty switches that were originally installed in the cars. they mentioned only quote faulty switches may have been used to repair the vehicles. why did the company not announce that subpar switches may have been installed in those vehicles in the first place? >> again, there was an assessment going on to understand if the specificications, the parts performance was adequate. >> wasn't it misleading to say that the company didn't tell them subpar switches may have been installed in the first place? what if i owned a later model car with its original ignition switch? your recall implies that i don't have to do anything. but my car might still have a subpar switch. will your company conduct a detailed analysis of these late model vehicles to determine if they are safe and will you provide the committee with rarnty reports and other information so we can do our own analysis? >> i believe we are recalling all of those parts. all of those vehicles are being recalled. >> they're all being recalled. well, i must say in conclusion, mr. chairman, i am concerned. i know you've taken this job in an inauspicious time. you are trying to clean up a mess left behind for you by your predecessors. but i have one last question. how can gm assure its customers that new switches be installed beginning april 7 will finally meet gm's requirements? >> we are working very closely with our supplier, our executive director responsible for switches is personally look at the performance of the new switches. we will do 100% end of line testing to make sure that the performance, the safety, the functionality of these switches are safe. >> thank you. the gentleman's time has expired. ms. barra, i just want to be clear did you review the documents that gm submitted to the committee? >> no, i did not. there was over 200,000 pages my understanding. >> how about the document mr. waxman is talking about doid you review that? >> this page right here? >> yes. >> i actually saw this for the first time i think a day ago. >> thank you. i now recognize ms. blackman for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. ms. barra you've mentioned several times in your comments today's gm. so my assumption is that you are going to run gm in a different manner than it has been run in the past? and that >> that's correct. >> and you are making some changes. i want to ask you just a little bit about time line. helping us to get our hands around this because this is the first investigation we're going to do. we're going to have others. and continue to look at this to get answers and figure out what has happened here between you all and nhtsa, and also within what happened at gm. so you mentioned in your testimony that this came to light on your watch. so i am assuming that there was no widespread knowledge in gm about this issue until you became ceo. am i correct on that? >> at the senior level of the company, we learned of this after the recall decision was made on january 31st. i was aware in lace debtber december there was analysis going on cobalt issue. but as soon as we understood the senior leadership understood this issue and that a recall decision had been made we acted without hesitation. >> ok then how did you find out about it? was it through someone bringing the issue to you to say ms. barra we have a real problem here? or in doing your due diligence did you find out about it? >> the committee, the leadership committee responsible for making recall decisions made a desin on january 31,. they notified mark rice who immediately picked up the phone and called me. >> and can you submit to us the members of that leadership committee that make those recommendations? >> yes. >> thank you. and then was your predecessor, mr. acreson, your predecessor, was he aware of this issue? >> not to my knowledge. >> he was? >> not to my knowledge. >> he was not. are any of the members of the leadership committee also -- were they a part of his leadership committee? >> there are members of today's team that were also members of mr. eckerson's leadership time and to my knowledge they were not aware. >> do you think there was a coverup or it was sloppy work? >> that is the question i've asked mr. velucas to uncover and i'm anxiously awaiting the results of his study. >> do you think it had anything to do with the auto bailout? >> with i'm sorry? >> ok. do you think it had anything to do with the auto bailout? >> with the auto bailout? >> again, i need to get the results of the study to make all the determinations. >> and going back to what mr. upton said you're going to be sharing that information with us? >> we will be -- >> as you get those. ok. was there -- the engineers that were responsible for this, have you brought them into the process? i know this is something that the part was actually created by delfi. correct? >> right. >> and they have an engineering team that was working on that. so they have a shared responsibility and liability in this entire issue. have you met with them and with the engineering team that was responsible for this switch? >> i have not met with the specific engineering team that is responsible. >> ok. >> but i am speaking to leadership and those individuals are being interviewed as part of the investigation. conducted by mr. velucas. >> now, going back did you say this this was a defective part when you talked about it earlier? >> we have learned when we knew when the recall decision was made and we later went back and looked at the chronology there's points that suggest and that's why we're doing the investigation. >> all right. now, i think that you're going to hear from more than one of us about not having a new part number assigned. who made that decision? was that strictly a delfi decision or did that come into the gm supply chain for that decision to be made as to how that part number would be coded? >> at a general level, general motors is responsible for general motors parts numbers. >> ok. >> but again that's part of the investigation to understand how that happened. >> ok. does that seem inconceiveable to you? >> yes. it is an inconceiveable. it is not our process. and it is not acceptable. >> ok. i would think that it probably is not. have you asked delfi if you can have access to their documentation and their e-mail chain dealing with this issue? >> i have not. and again mr. velucas will go as the investigation takes him to get the information that he needs to make a complete and accurate accounting of what happened. >> my time has expired. thank you mr. chairman. i yield back. >> just clarification ms. blackburn. we have asked for that e-mail chain from delfi and we will let you know when we get that. we now recognize chairman emeritus of the committee mr. dingell for five minutes. >> mr. chairman, i thank you for your courtesy. i begin by telling the families of those who were injured or killed by the defective general motors vehicles they have our sympathy and we believe the events here are tragic indeed. i join everyone in expressing my condolences to the families who were killed or injured in those crashes. now it is incumbent upon the congress, federal regulatories and general motors to determine how these deaths could have happened and to take reasonable steps to ensure that the safety of american motorists and their families are moving forward. i expect that this investigation will be thorough. and i counsel all the stakeholders to be unabashedly forthright. now, ms. barra, i would like to build on chairman murphy's line of questioning. and all of my questions will require yes or no answers. if you cannot answer some of my questions i expect that you will submit responses for the record and all available relevant supporting materials. now, ms. barra, is it correct that gm has now recalled approximately 2.5 million small cars in the united states due to defective ignition switches? >> yes >> yes or no? now, ms. barra, is it correct that gm recently expanded its recall of small cars because it was possible that defective ignition switches may have been installed as replacement parts? yes or no? >> yes. >> ms barra, is it correct that the ignition switch in question was originally developed in the late 1990s and approved by general motors in february of 2002? yes or no? >> yes. >> ms. barra, is it correct that general motors' own design specificications for such ignition switch required 20 plus or minus 5 newton centimeters of torque to move the switch from the accessory position to the running position? yes or no? >> yes. >> ms. barra, is it correct that general motors approved production of such ignition switch despite test results by dell fy during the production part approval process or p prn ap? showing that the switch did not meet gm's torque requirement? yes or no? >> that's not clear to me. >> now, ms. barra, is it correct that general motors approved a redesigned of the ignition switch used in the presently recalled vehicles in april 2006? >> yes. >> ms. barra, is it correct that gm's torque requirement was the redesigned switch remained the same as for the original ignition switch? yes or no? >> it is not clear to me and that's why we focused the investigation on that area specifically. >> when that information becomes available would you submit it to the committee? >> yes, i will. >> now, ms. barra, to your knowledge, did the redesigned ignition switch meet gm's torque requirements? yes or no? >> i believe -- >> do you want me to say it again sf to your knowledge, did the redesigned ignition switch meet gm's torque requirements? yes or no? >> it's part of the investigation. >> ms. barra, will you please submit for the record an explanation of the factors that gm takes into conversation when approving a part for production? are there circumstances where gm may approve parts for production when such parts do not make such design specificications? yes or no? >> yes. >> if so, could you please submit materials for the record explaining when and why that might occur? >> yes. >> ms. barra, i appreciate the length to which gm under your leadership is going to recall the vehicles and ensure that they're safe to drive. gm's cooperation with the committee is necessary in order to understand the process by which and the reasons decisions were made leading up to the 2014 recall. you may have so far done so and i expect that you will continue to do so. thank you for your courtesy, mr. chairman. thank you ms. barra. i yield back the balance of my time. >> the gentleman yields back. i now recognize the chairman emeritus of the majority mr. barton of texas for five minutes. >> thank you, mr. chairman. before i ask my questions i want to make just a general observation. this is probably the last major investigation that this subcommittee and full committee is going to conduct where we have the services of mr. dingell and mr. waxman. we have had a history on this committee and this subcommittee going back at least 40 to 50 years when we have major issues we try to approach them on behalf of the american people in a nonpartisan very open way. and it certainly appears that we're going to continue that tradition today. so i hope that we can show the best to the american people that the congress at its best gets the facts, presents the facts, and does so in a way that in the future we protect the public health and safety for the american people. now, with that caveat, i do have a few questions. a number of congressmen so far have made the point that these ignition switches didn't appear to meet specificications. and my assumption is that you've agreed that they did not meet specifications. is that correct? >> we have learned that as we did the recall. >> now, i am an industrial engineer. i used to be a registered professional engineer. i'm not currently registered but i have been in the past. why in the world would a company with a stellar reputation as general motors purchase a part that did not meet its own specificications? >> i want to know that as much as you do. it is not the way we do business today. it's not the way we want to design and engineer vehicles for our customers. >> i mean, i just don't understand that. i'm -- i've never worked in an auto assembly environment. i've worked in a defense plant, an aircraft plant. i was plant manager of a printing plant. i have done limited very limited consulting in the oil and gas industry. but i've never been a part of an organization that said we set the specs when a part or doesn't meet the specs we go ahead and buy it anyway. i just -- you know, you're currently the ceo. but at one time i think before you became ceo you were the vice president for global product development purchasing and supply chain. i mean, is it your position now that general motors will not accept parts that don't meet specificications? >> we will not accept parts that don't meet our performance safety functionality durable requirements. as i mentioned before in the steel example, there will be times where there will be a material or a part that doesn't meet the exact specificications but after analysis and looking at the performance, the safety, the durability, the reliability, the functionality, it will be ok. that happens very often as we buy steel. to make the body of the vehicles. >> well then you don't need specificications. with all respect -- no. >> but what you just answered is gobbledygoop. it's your own specificication. it's your company's specificications. if a part doesn't meet the specificication why in the world would you not refuse it and only accept the part that meets the specificications? >> there needs to be a well-documented process if you accept a part that doesn't meet the original specificications. >> would the gentleman yield? >> briefly. >> do you have that information? >> on steel? >> no. on starters. >> on the ignition switch? >> if it didn't meet specificications do you have the information on these starters that it met all those other criteria? >> that is part of the investigation. but clearly the fact that we made a recall it did not meet the performance. >> we have the advantage as a subcommittee that we know now what happened in the past. we know now that there is a real problem. we know now that a number of young people have lost their lives and apparently because of this defect. so we have the advantage of hindsight. and so i -- i understand that. but as ms. degette just said and a number of others, there's no reason to have specifics if you don't enforce them. this next question is not a trick question but it is an important question. right now how many parts are being used in general motors product that don't meet your own companies' specificications? >> i don't have that exact number but i can tell you the parts that we're using today meet the performance and the reliability the safety that they need to if we find we have a part that is defective that doesn't meet the requirements, we then do a recall. >> well, again, with due -- that's not an acceptable answer i think to the american people. we're not telling you the specificications to set. now, there are some safety specificications that by law and nhtsa by regulation sets. but there shouldn't be a part in any gm product or for that matter any automobile products in the united states that doesn't meet the specificications. my last -- well, at what level was the decision made to override and to use this part even though it didn't meet specificication? was that made at the manufacturing level, at the executive level or even at some subcomponent purchasing level? do you know that? >> that's part of our investigation to find the answer >> you can watch this entire hearing on our website, www.c-span.org. ournvite your feedback on spotlight program. >> family members of victims who died or were injured because of gm faulty switches spoke on capitol hill in april. their comments are about 10 minutes. >> i was your typical 20-year-old. one of my prized possessions was my brand-new car. i had a beautiful red cobalt. it was good on gas. it was mine, all mine. i had friends living in different states. hopefully i had a reliable car to get there. all of a sudden, my car went from 45 miles per hour to zero within seconds. as cars swerved to avoid crashing into me, i cried hysterically. two men jumped out of their cars to push me to a gas station off the side of the road. i called my mother crying. she told me to shut the car off and when i turned it back on, it was fine. it happened again when i was on a long haul to visit a friend in tennessee. the same exact thing happened. thankfully, the car behind me was very alert. i turned the key in the ignition once again and the car was good to go. when i returned home, my mother and i took a car to the service center for second time. she insisted they keep the car until they figured out the problem. after 10 days, they said they found the problem. they informed me that you maybe my keyring was slightly enlarged. then it happened a third time. i somehow escaped a four-car pileup. at that point in my life, i was diagnosed with heart disease and i had a pacemaker implanted. dr.'s and foreign-made that any sort of stress or anxiety would because to set off this device. this led my mother and i to decide this car was a death trap. driving this car was like laying a game of russian roulette with my safety and that of my friends. i cannot begin to explain the fear and confusion that runs through you when you no longer have control of your car. my hope is that the horror stops right now. i don't want anymore truck -- more drivers to be mourned by family and friends. i would like to close by quoting my mother's letter. she said "this is a safety recall issue if there ever was one. i should not have to list to the safety problems. this car needs to be recalled, re-examined, revised and corrected." thank you. >> next, we will have terri di batista. >> good afternoon. my name is terry di batista. we helped amber take out her 2005 chevy cobalt because of its highly rated safety features. now we know gm was aware of the fact that there were problems with the ignition switch before the car was even available to the public and the problem would result in the airbags not deploying. i feel that gm needs to be held countable to the public for allowing these deadly switches to be used. the department of justice to hold a criminal investigation. it is my sincere hope that there will be changes made to the law and ordered to avoid families experiencing my tragedy. >> my name is laura christian. i am the birth mother of amber murray rose, the first known fatality of the chevy cobalt effects. at first, it was one and then we were a few. as you see, we are many and there is still more. this is just the tip of the iceberg. we a t