[inaudible conversations] conve] [inaudible conversations] good afternoon and welcome to the wilson center. We were founded as a living memorial to the former president. So we are congressionally chartered, scholarship driven, and fiercely nonpartisan. I am Robin Quinville and a director of the Global Europe Program here at the center, and where focus on the challenges europe is facing today and how we Work Together on those. Among these challenges is russias invasion of ukraine two years ago and the threat it poses to our security as transatlantic partners. As a result of that invasion, natos membership has grown adding finland and sweden to its strength, and the question of ukraine relationship to nato is going to be front and center at this summer washington summit. The European Union has sped forward europeans opening negotiations just last month and while that would be a very dependent process, the decision also recognizes and supports ukraines european future. What we are seeing is a strategic shift. The invasion of ukraine has shifted europes threat perception arguably europes center of gravity. And this is give an immediate impetus to the weimar triangle, france, germany and poland working coop really together on issues of concern. And so in fact, while cooperation between france and germany has often been seen as the motor powering European Union decisionmaking, the weimar triangle made will be the new, can they call it hybrid, engine of the future . We are exceptionally fortunate to have with us today three prominent members of parliament from these three countries. Im going to introduce them in alphabetical order so that no diplomatic incidents. First pawel kowal is a share of Foreign Affairs committee, professor, cofounder of the museum of the warsaw uprising, and third in polls from 200552000 and before returning into 2019. He also served in polish village of Foreign Affairs and its ashes could to counsel council. From 200914 he was a of the European Parliament at its Foreign Affairs committee. Natalia pouzyreff is a member France National assembly answers on the committee of the defense of the armed forces. She has been a member of the National Assembly since 2017 and is also been a member of the french delegation to the francogerman Parliamentary Assembly since 2022. Norbert rottgen has been a member of the Parliament Since 1994 and chaired its Foreign Affairs committee from 20142021. From 200912 he was. From 200912 he was germanys minister for environmental Nature Conservation and nuclear safety. And i will just say that while i was dcm at her embassy in berlin, i very much appreciated his engagement and support for the transatlantic. Professor Katarzyna Pisarska is chairwoman of the Casimir PulanskiFoundation Council and chair of the Warsaw Security Forum and i was able to produce with the shipper are impressive list of accomplishments includes professorships at the Warsaw School of economics, as well as secure in the u. S. Affiliation with University Southern california Johns Hopkins university and harvard university. So its no wonder she was talent spotters reported by the World Economic economics you to come as a in the foreign and security policy. So with all that you know who is up here, and im going to tell you this is going to go. So that you any ideas can be thinking of your question because im going to try and leave some time for those at the end. So im going to ask the doctor come up and give the a coupe remarks and then will have a discussion among ourselves and the ask a few questions, then im going to turn to you so this discussion will be as good as you make it as well. Weve got until about 3 00. Adam want to thank our colleagues at cspan for agreeing to broadcast this so for those in the audience come we are live on cspan. All right. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you very much, robin. Thank you goes to the Woodrow Wilson center for hosting us today. Its been a truly exemplary cooperation we have been having, thank you for your support of this visit. You probably wondered why are we here . And let me start with what i think critical information. Never in history have there been a polish, french, german parliamentary delegation to congress. Never have our security interests aligned to the extent that we would be speaking in one voice and going to convince the u. S. Congress to the very critical security interest of the entire transatlantic alliance. We have come a as a weimar triangle delegation come first and foremost of course meet congress, meet senators but also do everything for the committee on come subcommittee on your tomorrow to speak about the necessity of the United States remaining in your come remaining at key transatlantic partner. We will also speak mainly about ukraine who today is not being wheeled but is being out shop does everyday because of the lack of antimissile defense shields because of a lack of ammunition come because of the lack of proper arms delivery the country suffers, sipping casually and military casualties. But we also want to bring a message to the congress that europe is stepping up. It is stepping up as an alliance. It is stepping up as individual countries. It is stepping up as a European Union in the area of military support for ukraine but mainly and also in the area of building strong European Defense capabilities as part of nato. Today already 50 of all assistance to ukraine from european countries. It is not on the military assistance that we are providing. It is the refugees that we are hosting in european countries, millions and millions of ukrainians live and work and had all the benefits of being the danger. We provide humanitarian assistance and, of course, countries such as my own, poland, are critical to military and humanitarian hub for ukraine. And we want to do our share. We understand that European Security is at stake. We understand that we are in the shift in European Security architecture, and we know your will have two new longterm be able to defend its own continent. We cannot go alone. The fact that were setting up does not mean that we do not believe the United States any longer. If we would waver now, if we were to disconnect, if we will, if we will simply abandon ukraine, the consequence would be dire not only for ukraine itself but for the international European Security order, including the security of countries closest to russia such as the Baltic States and against my own country, poland. So today our discussion with the wonderful three parliamentarians that have come here is of course about what kind of impact the weimar triangle, the reduced hopefully engine of cooperation can have in the area of support for ukraine. But we also want to show a truly voice of unity. If the poles, the french and chairmans come together, i think it means that the situation is getting really serious. So robin, back to you. Thank you. Thank you so very much. I i think that that really lays out some of the challenges ahead of us. And just for this audience and for our viewers, the weimar triangle was established originally in 1991, but it seems to me that it has always been energized by issues related to ukraine. For example, in 2014 when we had the referendum on crimea, again, the weimar triangle ministers sprang into action, right . Just ahead of the invasion in 2022 i believe you are, in fact, a member of the delegation that went to kyiv to show support. So it strikes me that this has proven a catalyst for the weimar triangle work overtime. Can you talk levit about the measures you have taken to support ukraine . Katarzyna told us very quickly but what europe is doing but in your countries how you are perceiving this together am going to start with you. Thank you. Thank you so much. Practically only few. 2 discussion. I would like to propose to you to start from that sentence that, in fact, we can observe the end of central europe, especially of poland. 30 years without work in a great conditions to develop to change europe without war, without conflicts, without problems. And after 2014, after start of russian invasion against ukraine, we didnt, we didnt see that change our mentality. We also thought that we are, we live in a peaceful work, especially in central europe. And last attack him last russian attack against ukraine fundamentally changed our approach to situation in europe, and the second point is that wartime, because we, in fact, should, we, in fact, live in wartime. We should be ready for completely different style of lives. We should be ready for completely new problems. We should have much more money for defense, for security. And we are at the moment kind of front of stage after your period and the third point, its not about, the problem is not about the new role of weimar triangle. From my point of view, weimar triangle is also come has also one role in this historical moment, to reenergize processes in europe. The first one to start to think of our role intensified system of security. The second one, to think our role in enlargement of the European Union and internet. We should observe current processes, processes to opening of European Union and negotiations for full membership made by, provide by ukraine but in my opinion also moldova and transatlantic links. Thank you. Tell me how you see this from the french side, strategic autonomy has been mentioned. How does it fit into your perception of how the why mark try to can be of use . Yes. I would like to remind that february of 2022 was a strong wakeup call for europe. And that europe has been released united since constable united in support of ukraine. We had this european summit intersite in 2022 in march just one month after where European Union decided put more effort in military and resided for the sanctions as well. Then i would say some species and declaration that were made that we should have at a certain point the western part of of your. We should have listened more to the eastern flank of europe listen more to our polish friend and belgic friends that the threat was real and considerable. We come to now where the why mark format is really, the weimar triangle is really revived and this is a. 2 years after where what we have d say a strategy where were more aligned on our perspectives. So they become the strategy it, of course but i would say first is yes, we have to be more selfreliant, doesnt mean went to be fully independent but we have to boost our capacities for sure, and this is an objective shared by all the member state countries. Thats why everyone is investing more and more in this. France has been investing, we plan to double our defense expenditure during the ten, the use of president macron. We started in 2017. So we will reach i will say minimum but the other countries are now investing more. And so we can be, we say we have to do more for our up defense capabilities. And the second pillar is the transatlantic link from what we call the european pillar within nato. And so we dont see it as something that you could oppose between the strategic economic economy in one side and the european pillar within nato. Its really commentary and its needed, so we need the United States support within nato. Editing the u. S. Need also europe. Because europe is fighting for its values, for some ideas, democrat again an ideology that is coming from russia. But that would harm also the United States as a leader on the global scene. So i think we have this common interest. And, of course, now we have more common strategy. We are aligned. We have this what were doing in the weimar triangle is that we are expressing a political will. And thats a key point within europe. We can have expectations as was said but in order to achieve this strategic goals, theres a need for Strong Political will. And i think now its understood amongst the three countries. And that we are going to engage more the order of the state. We know we are at a critical moment. Now we have to find more ammunition, more air defense interceptors. We have to supply them to ukraine. We know its a critical moment but at least we know where we are going in supporting ukraine until they can win against russia. Thank you. Thats all for now. You will not find the arguing with the proposition that the United States also needs europe, so im going to give you the floor on the same question. Yes. Certainly for germany, the return of a land war, europe, and the end of the longest piece eight in european history has fundamentally changed our country. And to briefly describe what has changed i would like to start not with our policies but with our people. And before the war, the german mentality increasingly was quite pacifist. So the aspect of defense and military did not play a role. It has an always would be defended. If you spend with this after 1990, now we are surrounded by friends, so do we need the old time cold war military, is not in your page. The new age is the european peace process. This is finally change. And i would say i could not, i could not remember all or depicting any way our history a situation where a change as profoundly, as quickly, including the change of mentality of the people really has taken place as it has, as it is the case as a result of the war coming back to europe. Now, we appreciate a majority of german voters, appreciate more defense spending. We had a recent poll that said a majority says we have to be critical in our budget and we do not want to increase that spending but theres one exception, and it is for security and for defense spending. There is a majority arguing for more weapons to ukraine. So unbelievable three years ago from now if anybody had proposed there could be a situation seeing germany delivering weapons to any kind of conflict, because traditional doctrine of German Foreign policy was no weapons to an ongoing conflict. And certainly and particularly not if and when russia is involved in it. So this as a fundamental shift and the famous the seachange of policy, the german chancellor announced the bundestag only three days after the war broke out on 27th of february has really taken root in the german come in the majority of the german people and population, and this is really, really, really remarkable. And this is a real hope that this is not only help, this is evidence to the fact that this is not for the moment but this is a fundamental shift, a paradigm shift, including mentality and policy. In terms of policy, also a lot has happened. We agreed in a bipartisan, with support of opposition, the largest opposition party, not all opposition parties to establish a 100 billion special debt fund to fund our army. We abandoned, i thought for years with many friends in this country with nord stream ii but now was a matter of days which came to was abandoned. I remember. What . I remember. You remember, yes, yes. And the defense or the military support germany has given to ukraine in 22 and 23, amounts to around 12 billion euros. We have now 7 billion euros in our current budget. Of course additional help for refugees, 1 million ukrainian refugees, state aid budget help to mentoring aid. So really a lot has been done. However, and i will conclude with that, this is true for germany. Its true for europe. Its true for the west. We are not doing enough. If you compare what we are doing against the past, its impressive, totally impressive. Unimaginable. If you measure it from what is necessary to achieve our goals, and our goal is to defeat war, this is what is at stake. If war turns out to be successful, even only partially successful, war would remain in europe and this would create different europe from today. You would not recognize his europe if word gets established because then it would extend and would come closer to us. So its all about our own interests. Of course it solidarity for ukraine and all that, but but fundamentally were talking about our own interests, about our own and what are we doing about that. Regarding an related to this, we are insufficient. And we really have to do more. As i said, much has changed, but the real and critical point is are we doing enough for what is at stake . And the simple answer is no, we are not. And time is running out. Time is of the essence and we have to really step up very quickly, otherwise the costs and the consequences would be of a historic dimension negatively for all of them. I agree with you. And i think what we see here and we sometimes hear, we see all of these things that it happenen each of your countries in order to support, but youre right, the question loduca of ts really key in all of this. I think sometimes that is a question of how long will this last . We have seen now what 18 to 20 countries of the nato allies have managed to reach the 2 i will do so this year. But what im wondering is whether or not this configuration the weimar triangle, can it be a way of ensuring that this continues throughout europe, that you only get this, can you be persuasive the entrepot populations across europe . And how do you see that going in the future . And maybe ill ask is with you, madame, dissonance it just since political owes something you identified as critical. Yes. Yes, i said the political will buy the weimar triangle has kept to engage the other member states. For instance, sweden and finland joined nato and the great expectations, what they could say how we could cooperate, coordinate better within the transatlantic areas and within the eu. So we have to provi