Transcripts For CSPAN Discussion On Future Military Policy And Strategy 20150524

University of central arkansas. Finally to my far right last and harming this, is Lieutenant Colonel karen she is a strategic Intelligence Officer with experience ranging from the tactical to the strategic level. With that, let me turn the floor over to colonel hoy who will introduce the program. Thank you very much for hosting us today. Good morning to everybody. I will explain a little bit about where we come from and why we are sitting on this table. What led to this. First of all, we are five or six students from the u. S. Army war college. The six students were already moving to its new assignment in europe so that he could not be here. So we are actually five of six. We are in the u. S. Army war college but we are in a special program called the call are the carlyle scholars program. We do the curriculum in four months instead of 89 months. So we have got more time to do research, to do engagements with think tanks or the state department. We started in october 2014. I will not go through all the steps in this slide, but we started in october 2014 to study into russia. And the relationship between europe and russia. And it linked into several other programs we were doing already at the u. S. Army war college. Over time we had meetings with experts from think tanks and universities and from the state department as well. And those meetings were to confirm and improve and refine our ideas or our understanding of the russian system. So that is what we did over time. So the wargame was a month ago but prior to that we had many meetings in washington with tanks to discuss our view of what we thought the russian system was like. We use what we called operational design. It is a way to frame the environment to frame the problem and frame the approach to the system. We started with first understanding the problem. So we looked into puins grand strategy. And we used ways and means to define that and we looked for tensions within the current russian system and fractures in the system as well. For the environment, we used visualization of the russian bear and the russian bear with his own dna and moving through. He uses gears that controls the bear. So that is what we used to frame the environment. And then we framed some approaches. Some of those approaches are in on how to influence the russian system. In those approaches led to the wargame we did in april. Once wed completed the process of design in collaboration with a Different Organization you saw on the charge, we thought it would be good to take this designed and tested as close as we could to a random field experience. In that case that would be a wargame. What you see in the slide in front of us is how we laid that. When we looked at the strategic documents, we talked a great deal about strengthening our alliance with europe. The question was then, given that, how should the u. S. Then consider its policy towards russia . How should that impacted . We met with several folks along the way in building the net assessment. And we then took those engagements and invited people to come to carlyle to produce a pate in this wargame. We divided into a russia team and the u. S. Team and then we had the control group. And the way the wargame worked, we started out in a large Group Plenary session. We presented our assessment of the russian system, what we understood u. S. Policy toward russia to be. And that we let the russia and the u. S. Team go to the breakout rooms and refine or confirm what had just been presented to build what would be their baseline for Going Forward. In each case, we told if you are the russia team consider yourself advises to president putin. We walked back into the Plenary Session. Each side had an opportunity to brief the other. And then they had a chance for clarification, questions of clarification from one side to the other. Once they had baselined their policy going into the game, we then provided what we would call a strategic scenario that each side would have to deal with. What we found was that there was not a lot of movement from the way we had designed the russian system or the way we presented u. S. Policy. We felt we had a good baseline. After they came into the Plenary Session of pretty good refinement. So we started with the first scenario. The two teams went to the breakout room. They would confirm the policy they had was valid. And what changes they needed to make and what was going to be there strategic approach Going Forward given this scenario. They went they then came into the larger group than briefed each other. Once i would briefed the other side would brief and they would be allowed to provide a counter argument back and forth. And the white cell would ask clarifications. We then issue the next inject. And then the white cell would go through a debriefing process. What did they hear that was feasible and not feasible . How did they understand what they had heard. We presented that process through five different injects. This should say scenarios. These were the scenarios we wanted to see a secure and stable and prosperous europe. We had to suspend reality and say if we could if youre could be Energy Independent from russia, what would that look like and how would both sides react russian mark the second one more possible and more urgent as expansion of the ukrainian conflict, beyond the line of control if it was an expansion. In other regions of interest and in a strategic miscalculation. The third world was uncontrollable nationalism. We characterized to use of nationalism as a weaponization of nationalism. What happens when he loses control of that nationalism . How would both sides react . The fourth was not meant to be a coup but effectively the way we structure that was Vladimir Putin is no longer in power. How did the u. S. Interpret it . And what would they advise to now. And how to go forward with it . The final turn, getting beyond crisis was less a 70 a strategic scenario as much as it was what does each side want to see from the other . These are the four key considerations. The first 1 compete with russia sounds counterintuitive. We talk a lot about cooperate where we can. What we found is that on each side the u. S. Would look for corporation. And the russian side would come in competitively. We had one participant say with that we were in an environment where we are competitive. We should compete. Cooperate when you can cooperate. While you think that order would come through cooperation in this case, the competition has got to be resolved first. The second one was clearly articulating the position toward russia, Eastern Europe and the ukraine. When the u. S. Team would debrief, we found that there was a little bit of ambiguity toward each of those different players. And that was one of the other pieces that needed to come out. The policy had to be clear in regard to each. The third challenge was a consistent, from the white cell was the u. S. Teams lack of a good information policy or information strategy. And then the last bullet with two election cycles coming up in the u. S. And with russia in 2018, clearly that timeline needs to be leveraged. We need to look at what needs going to be crimea 2017. So while we dont by no means attempt to influence u. S. Election but whatever policy is built it has to survive our own natural election and be implemented by a new administration Going Forward and stepping into russian cycle on the russian side. With this ill pass off to dr. Jim mcnaughton, one of the observers of the u. S. Tomorrow. Of the u. S. Team. Dr. Mcnaughton thank you, joe. I had the opportunity to be a note taker setting in and listening to u. S. Teams discussions over the two days of the war game. I just want to start with two general observations and look forward to questions and discussion after our introductory remarks here. My observations really on point one and point two you see on the screen here. Having watched a mix of people try to come up with the u. S. Policy or what the policy would be with some of these hypothetical situations, it was very interesting to find out really they were confronting a sea change in u. S. Policy. It was clear to them that something had changed in the international environment. The tough part was figuring out what to do about that. They realized last two decades at least our relations with russia in general based on the concept we would encourage russia to become a normal country within European Security architecture, European Community and that russia would be encouraged to play by the rules and u. S. Could treat them as they treat any other Regional Power around the world. After the seizure of crimea and when conflict erupted in Eastern Ukraine it become clear that set of assumptions was no longer valid. Everyone could see that sea change. Hard part between players trying to formulate in this academic environment what should u. S. Policy be, figure out how to compete with russia. Its very difficult to jettison those set of assumptions and long range policies the u. S. Work with for many, many years. We considered alternative futures within the war game. It became clear for the next several years, the u. S. Would have to be would have to manage strategic competition with russia rather than treat russia as another normal country in the environment. Second general observations i would like to start with, its easy to say the United States needs to articulate a position towards russia and Eastern Europe and ukraine. Theres severe challenges we discovered. Joe is absolutely correct that the u. S. Team ended up being more reactive than proactive as it struggled to balance several major sets of consideration ss. The United States policy is not developed simply in washington d. C. We must take into account nato allies and other partners in the region. A great deal of consensus building and discussions before a policy can be, in fact clearly stated by our leaders. Where we have challenges develop policy consensus, the lack of knowledge how russia is going to respond. As we, we could send armaments lethal equipment to kraenz. To the ukrainians. At each step lacked understanding of the russian system felt comfortable if we do this, pretty sure russia will do that. That really muddied the water as well, made it difficult to achieve consensus. Clearly areas everyone agreed on we really electronically want to continue to cooperate with russia. In areas such as the discussions over the Iranian Nuclear program. This is something quite important for very valid reasons that we need russian cooperation to continue. How do we manage strategic competition while maintain areas of cooperation with russia. Took a lot of time. Oftentimes the result is quite messy when it was time to go into the Plenary Session and say, okay, u. S. Team, what have you come up with as far as the policy. That was one of our great challenges. Turn to our colleague talk a little bit what he saw observing russian team. Lay thanks, jim. As alluded to i was an analyst none of us were participants during the war game. We facilitated, observed, took notes. A unique Vantage Point i would dare say without predispositions, weve been doing this since october. I start with a couple general comments. We can speak a little bit more fidelity, granularity from the period. On hold during twoday war game russia was able to operate with strategic flexibility, a good bit more options available. Russian team had more options, less constrained international norms, laws, alliances. For instance, during one of the turns, armor and troops on the border, cast as defensive move posture rather than what it was was an overtly aggressive move which leads me to second point. Russia operates with far more informational operations campaign. Their io remarked as one participants as more less weaponized propaganda. Oftentimes russia was able to spend a particular narrative that the west could not easily counter. If they did attempt to counter lead time to gather facts and figures for a more truthful message. That gave again leading to the first point quite a bit more flexibility and how they reacted. Russia no desire respond to ukraine. Over the twoday war game escalate and deescalate at will. Provide a good bit of leveraging to the west rather than argue reducing economic sanctions or moving troops or forces around as they willed. Again, speak a little more fidelity during q a period with that ill pass over to karen and offer more insights. I was also on the red time with chris. I have their two key things. First competitive attitude Decision Making u. S. And nato policies within the region. The russia team sought strategic flexibility, if you will, not through the development of clear longterm policy but instead through the creation of what they call tools. Designed to seize opportunities as they arise. Russian team saw longterm strategy as ineffective complex strategic environment they are operating in. Why spend time developing this strategy that we may never use. Lets spend efforts on tools that allow us strategic flexibility and also surprise. Those tools were frozen conflicts, bilateral agreements, back door economic deals and the development of proxy forces which weve seen in use recently. One player summed up russias intentions succinctly. We used this quote quite often. He said the russia team played to win while the u. S. Played not to lose. So diplomatic posturing had , little impact on russian behavior throughout the game. As they tried to determine the best way to characterize president putin, is he a longterm strategist, tactician, what is he . They decided putin more a chess player. He studies the board and improvises as needed. Hence the need for tools longterm strategy. The second observation was russian team decisionmaking process was driven mostly by the desire to maintain power. Second, the return of russian preimminence. In every discussion, decision made desire to maintain perpetuate, and presented the system was evident. While the team is confident that putin would be in power or as president for years to come, they always considered that position when making decisions. They didnt want to jeopardize elections. That came up in their discussions. We had this election cycle coming up in sync with u. S. Elections. Lets not do anything that would put president putin at risk. Finally the team made sure win destiny that team use russian propaganda to make sure that the perception within the russian population was one that makes you are russian greatness was on the rise. Putin machine was returning russia to its rightful place on the global landscape. Also, of course, to undermine u. S. And nato actions in the region. With that ill turn it back over to you. Thank you, karen. During the war game i the facilitator for team white. We could see them come back from small rooms and presenting new policy or reactions. Already been said but some Key Takeaways i took from there and my team as well. My team consisted of western and Eastern European fellows. Western and Eastern European International Fellows. Sometimes european, how you say that, look on the situation. So partly repeating, u. S. Team came back. They were kind of struggling with how to deal with a situation, because they were always reactive and defensive. They wanted to play within the International Rules. They were always waiting for the other side, what would happen and struggling with their position all the time. Whereas the russians could play more savvy and cunning and more proactive and on the offensive. They would say well try something new and look what happens. So that was a big difference between the two sides. We all agree where it comes from. But its just an observation. Second takeaway, everybody talks about nato all the time. Not everybody. But we should have a united nato on this, have consensus. The question is when were ever going to get that. Thats 28 countries on one line. Thats what we saw in the game. Maybe it is more it is wiser to just address a couple of countries within nato and create a coalition of the willing. Those willing probably depending on the subject 22, 24 of the 28 countries. Thats maybe all you need. Thats one of the takeaway as well from the war game looking from team white. Really interesting exercise. We would love to know more about your net assessment something that needs to be widely done about russia. Personally over the last three weeks ive spent more than half of the time in various scenario exercises. Four of them actually. One of them conducted by joint force looking out to changes in human geography, engineering technology, and world order looking out to 2035, looking at implications for joint force. I see steve out there. He was there four days with me a few weeks ago. Ive also spent a couple of exercises for the National Intelligence Council Global trends publication looking out again to year 2035. And then last friday, over at the german marshall fund, in a more neutral exercise, thinking about russia. And part of the fun for me is i always get to play russia. [laughter] i think some of the notes that we concur on is theres greater flexibility in the means and mechanisms, the timing in which russian can act. There is constantly number one concern is regime preservation. It starts there. I think its important to think about ukrainian conflict. Today in those terms as well there is a big domestic political aspect to them. One area there has been a lot of disagreement about looking in the near term is whether russia is looking to expand the conflict in ukraine. Im interested to hear in your game, russia is not. That is my personal conclusion but i think it is a pretty contentious issue. And we might talk about it more. I did have an opportunity to read through your report thats come out. We will have a link and copy of this on our website. The report about what the presentation is based upon. A couple of things id like to hear a little bit more from you before we turn the floor over to the audience. In the executive summary, notice that u. S. And russia systems are inherently competitive especially regarding russias near and abroad nato and arctic. Probably contest the term inherently competitive. We were inherently competitive during the cold war. Im more skeptical were inherently competitive today. Im not sure what that means. To me, what the ukrainian conflict is mainly have mainly about, it is about the failure over the last 25 years to come to an agreed European Security framework. Certainly the contestation and , competition in russia and abroad no question. I look at different theaters i think it gets a lot more complicated. In some places, overlapping interests. Two of them to some extent would be the arctic and asia, or at least northeast asia. You can point to others as well. Joe, youve pointed out, of course, that in this exercise there was the desire to maintain a certain degree of cooperation with the russians on issues that we size extremely important. The iranian new year program or is one, program was one. For the most part weve been able to walk and to come for the most part of 14 months or so since the conflict began. Point to others, for example decommissioning of the declared, decommissioning, removal of declared syrian chemical weaponsms in the first half of 2014. The second question i had came to the point, and i struggle with this question all the time. You raise the question, does putin have a grand strategy. Well, i would argue certainly has strategic goals. Whether that adds up to grand strategy or what is the relationship between a grand strategy and strategic goals im not sure. Does the United States have strategic goals . Absolutely. Do we have a grand strategy . I wouldnt call what we publish to be a grand strategy. So if you can kind of elaborate a little on what you see as the differences. It is often said that putin is a great tactician, which i absolutely agree with, but hes not a great strategist. On that im not sure i do agree with that. On the third, and kind of related to this, on an earlier point, it is pointed out that the United States should seek areas of cooperation with russia on a range of regional and local issues. Nonetheless, return to business as usual perhaps through another reset with russia is not possible in the shortterm. I guess you know, the term reset, of course, is attached to the specific historical moment of the Obama Administration when they came to power in january of 2009. But i would argue that, but i would argue bill clinton, george w. Bush administration as well maybe not from day one, had a strategy for a we dont need to call it a reset, but a major effort to set the u. S. Russian relationship on a constructive path and to Work Together on many, many issues toll toll. Together. I dont necessarily exclude the possibility that when the next administration comes to power in january 2017, they are going to look at the panoply of issues and challenges to u. S. National security and foreign policy, and they are going to make a judgment about to the degree they want you, for lack of a better term, have a reset with russia. Of course, it depends and awful lot on what happens between now and i would postulate what would have to happen i think, is the to ceasefire accords would be judged to be not in complete violation, still be in effect, per se. From that i think we would already be already have seen significant efforts between europe and moscow. If we take the point that moscow is not seeking a wider conflict in ukraine, then the tactic to me would seem to be stable stay below the radar, a violation of ceasefire accords, there is no big offensive or any place for that matter. With that pressure relieving sanctions in europe will grow significantly. Youll see some of that probably this summer if that condition holds. More of it at the end of the year, the timing for the sooir the midst to ceasefire accords and even more in 2016. In which case, Holding Together Alliance Unity may be considerably harder as we go along. Let me say to other things quickly, and taking up too much time. But its a quite good document in the report you produced. You state that ukraine, this is a quote, would likely be the best place to confront russia and send a clear message of intent, capability, and will. And here i just have, why. [laughter] ukraine is not a nato member. So it is a much harder place to send a clear message of intent and capability and will. I think this is at the crux of the dilemma for the Obama Administration, as well as our european allies because we are in kind of a gray zone with ukraine. I guess i would ask you what do you mean to confront russia . What does that mean exactly . Why is it the best place . It sounds like, i dont want to put words in your mouth, your operating under a domino theory process behind this, that with success in ukraine, then the russians moved out of the layer move elsewhere. They look at the chessboard and say, what is the latest vulnerability. I would argue there is a awfully large difference between undertaking some kind of hybrid or other military action against ukraine versus a baltic state or nato member. I think and i hope that is a bridge too far. I was very interested by your point of the coalition of the willing. But that would require a very, well, i guess to what extent would it require a different rule making framework within nato. What would that mean for nato. If we are more explicitly drawing coalitions of the willing from nato. I think ill stop there and give the panel time to respond and then we will open up for discussion with everybody. Thank you. I think were struggling, taking a lot of notes there, andy. That was very good. So your first question [laughter] you are counting on that. In terms of inherently competitive, and i think you asked the question, is it really competitive in the fact that there are other areas where we can cooperate or where we should cooperate, i think the challenge is that currently, the distraction of the ukraine prevents cooperation. And so once that crisis is solved, then we can go back into a cooperate mode. Cooperative mode. That conflict or that competition overshadows a lot of those areas where we can cooperate. Look at the meeting two weeks ago between secretary kerry and putin. We walked away saying it was good we talked. But there were no agreements substantive agreements that came out of that meeting. Because of this competitive environment we are in, we have to solve this one major competitive issue before we see the fruits and other areas of cooperation. If i may address the u. S. Side of that, the systems sort of an emerging view within context of the wargame, was on the u. S. Side that the russian system was fundamentally different from the u. S. System. Russians as weve already mentioned, proceeded to have we perceived it have much greater freedom of action. But theres a degree of cronyism and corruption that was a great worry to u. S. Players. There was a sense that, you know, we didnt want to go back to the cold war. We kind of had historical memory of the cold war. We were glad that we got that, beyond that, so then we thought ok if it is not cold war, we are moving to normal relations. But that didnt work either conceptually. So we are kind of stuck between the two. And we keep coming back, the u. S. Team kept coming back to the fact russian regime operating by a different set of behaviors. Thats what we meant by competitive. Inherently competitive. It wasnt that we had a dispute over a particular issue, but there was something fundamental in the russian system that just had a consistently at odds with the u. S. And the west. So from the russian Team Perspective you mentioned expansion conflict in the ukraine. There was much debate on the russian team whether or not they wanted to continue to film foment opposition to western actions. Of course, the narrative they spun was ukrainian crisis and regional maladies subsequent to that are all, of course, u. S. Machinations in the area. But desire to expand the conflict, there was no appetite. Specifically russian team said they will not let separatists fail. However, the desire to create a long strategic flank on the russian army in the ukraine wasnt a desired outcome. You mentioned whether or not putin is a strategic thinker versus a tactical chess player. Often we saw the russian team was able to craft this particular narrative that they had. As i mentioned in general comments, during one of my turns, i think it was a protest in latvia we had and a small eruption of conflict there in terms of protests. Russia was able to amass their armor, move ships to bhorder and move troops to the border and spin a defensive posture. So this was an opportunity we were able to observe that russia operated tactically. Was there a strategic desire . To unmask troops there . To amass troops there . We didnt observe that. Reacting to appear opportunity that arose. That being said at no point did russia ever want to i guess enter into any conflict with the west. Economic sanctions at this point , according to the russian team were livable. While the ruble has been plummeting, they found ways to operate within the context of the sanctions that were there. So it was a concerted fear of increasing any opportunity of the rest to impose more for the west to impose more sanctions that oftentimes kind of constraints to some extent the russian teams actions. But oftentimes, again, it was this tactical improvisation rather than sort of a mass strategy of the team operated under the two days. I just add that the team chose to go that route because they felt like it helped divide nato Decision Making. It created this tension within nato. So it was the tool of choice, if you will. Id like to briefly go to one of your last points about why ukraine, it was a sense at least on the u. S. Side, we were hearing some very distressed messages from our east european nato allies in the context of the wargame, from the estonia, latvia, lithuania, poland and some other nato allies. But the u. S. Team did not feel that russia was ready to cross that clear, bright shining line of triggering natos article five. Though we wanted to reassure our allies, particularly in the baltic and particularly to encourage them to head off any possible protests or Mass Mobilization of authorities, that might give an entree to russia to meddle in politics, we felt the real challenge was happening on the doorstep of nato. That means ukraine. Obviously some other countries like moldova and georgia we were concerned about, but we felt that if the u. S. Simply encouraged nato to build a wall around the current nato members and say, we are not going to take any cognizance of what happens jan beyond the borders of todays members, that would be a big mistake. That is why we came back to the very thorny problem of how to stabilize the situation in ukraine, and reinforce the new government there to where it can settle its difference with no outside interference. At least from the perspective of the u. S. Team, thats why they were interested in essentially making a stand in ukraine even though its not a nato member. I think that ties a little bit into the last question about nato, and we drew it out there so i think i have to answer that a little bit. You mentioned that putin uses attention in nato as well. We all can see that. So it ties into korean part as the ukraine part as well. As long as we stay strong, theres a lot of agreements that have been broken in the past already. So the Baltic States, if youre going to leave there, were going to be next. Whether its going to happen or not, its probably yellow or red line it will never cross. Its a message you sent to the countries. That was the most important part of it. We all like the united consensus within nato. But we did not see it happen in the game. Every time that the u. S. Came up with a policy and thought, we got this approach, and then some countries say we dont agree, so we move somewhere else. Giving back to putin, he can use that. Even after putin he away as nato and say its not a problem, but were going to solve it with mostly nato countries. So with that you dont give him the opportunity to use the leverage. So thats kind of where we came from. Well, it is a bear of a policy problem. Theres no question of that. I didnt mean to make a bad pun. It just happened. For me i think over the last 15 months and then turn out over to , questions, theres sort of three baskets of policy. One area, and its the hardest area, is the one that deserves the most attention is how you help ukraine. How you help ukraine survive. And its not just military. Its financial. Its governance. Its everything. And were fighting difficult odds. Ukrainian management has been suboptimal, to put it mildly. But the focus of the intent in of intention in washington is often to punish russia. In ways its the easier part to do, at least with the economic sanctions. And the middle part where ive been surprised that the United States has been so ready to kind of outsource is the diplomacy. And i think that at some point and ive written about this several times over the last six months, that we need to play a larger role. But let me open it up to questions, comments, and right here. Yes, hank . For the panelists and the audience. Im hank gafney, long time follower of russia, deep experience in nato, and still following all this in retirement after 20 years in osd and 20 years at the center for naval analyses. And the 16 seminars iran with them. What the discussion reveals to me right now is the real big obsession is ukraine. And i want to come back to what putin in his paranoia saw and remember, as we decided in some discussions here, its all putin. I cant wait to see the discussion of how hes going to be overthrown, but he thinks that we want ukraine and nato so we can move u. S. Forces and their Nuclear Weapons up on his border. And therefore do what from that, i have no idea. But of course, we have no intention of doing that. But he thinks so. He thinks we wanted a naval base and were going to move our ships there. He thinks were going to put Nuclear Weapons in crimea, et cetera. And how do we really overcome that in our process of trying to stabilize ukraine . Who wants to take that first easy question . [laughter] for our group and net assessment i studied putin, and before this project, i was not a europe analyst nor a russian follower. Putin is a hard man to understand, first of all. And i agree with you hes a paranoid man. He is an intel analyst, he thinks everyone is watching him in some corner, somewhere. Im not sure that we have the answer to that exactly. I mean, we have ive struggled with this a bit, but i think putin has hit his own reset button. And that reset button, im not sure has any corporation with cooperation with the west at this so im not sure we can get point. Past that. And we may not be able to do that diplomatically ourselves. We might have to work with that coalition of the willing. And that was the recurrent theme in our war game. Is that we have these two perceptions. We have the russian perception of the u. S. , that actually sees the u. S. As this declining power. We have the u. S. Perception of russia, and we see it as a power and decline, and we tend to not in decline and we tend to not give russia the due it believes it deserves, and now we see putin snubbing the west more and more often because of that, i think. Listening to the discussions of the u. S. Team during the war game, everyone was hesitant to do anything to feed the russian narrative. So to what extent do we provide support to the government of ukraine . To what extent can we provide support to the nato members and the baltic . We were secondguessing ourselves to the point of paralysis. The consensus was over two days we had to break out of that paralysis and not sit on our hands out of a fear of feeding someones paranoia. We had to take concrete measures that everyone would understand. Some would perhaps misunderstand or twist them for their own purposes. But the u. S. Team felt a greater risk was to do nothing. They it now is there was some risk of making it look like that the u. S. Wanted to put troops into ukraine, if we could jsut get just get the message across clearly that we are providing trainers to the Ukrainian Government, that the people who really want to understand what is going on while not misinterpret that as putting a permanent nato base on russias borders. A quick comment about that question because it is one we all struggle with. But there was one moment where if i were in the white house advising our president it wouldve been on temporary 21, 2014. February 21, 2014. This was the day there was the political agreement signed between the european foreign ministers, mr. Janokovic and the ukraine opposition that would call for early elections 10 months later. And a number of other provisions. I recall reading that here in my office in washington and realizing that there is no way this agreement was going to be was going to hold. Because the people would not agree to it. In october, when i was at the Discussion Club and we heard p i had one question which i would i wanted to ask him. And i will tell you in a second. But he said that when the agreement was signed, president obama called and they talked about it and everything was ok. My question to them was, did you receive another phone call when the agreement fell apart . Because it was at the time when the agreement fell apart is when it was absolutely necessary to try to reassure mr. Putin that in fact we did not want this agreement to fall apart. That it was not measures that we were taking or supporting that led to this agreement falling apart. Because when the agreement fell apart and mr. Janacovich fled kia, to me it reflected the complete destruction of plfment putins complete policy and he had to react to that and he did the way he did. Whether we could have prevent that i dont know. But what i fear is that inside our government at the time there was probably a little bit of a feeling of we won. When janacovich fled. And rather than thinking of you know what . Weve got a big problem. And we need to Work Together. Try to Work Together. With mr. Putin our european allies to try to resolve the problem in ukraine because its very dangerous. But i have a fear that the sense of a little bit yeah we got them. Ok, steve. Steven blank American Foreign policy council. Having just emerged from the same bunker as andy a couple weeks ago, i have a suggestion that might help alleviate some of the problems that andy pointed out. First of all, with regard to the objectives we in the United States tend to separate the objective of regime separation from the restoration of russia as a great power. As one that is seen as a great power globally. I would suggest to you that those are the same objectives, that the latter, the restoration of a russia that is seen at home and abroad as a global great power is a precondition for the survival for the regime. As andy suggested, ukraine went west. Putin would come under enormous domestic pressure if not may even be unhinged in power. So there is no difference here. The conditions of regime survival and preservation into the future is the strategic goal and the condition of that goal being met. One of the conditions. Is this restoration of the great russia. The second point here is that we can therefore overcome the distinction between strategy and tactics. Whether putin is a tactician or a strategist. Because i think he is a strategist in that he has creatively taken and used all the elements of the russia power. I think were all familiar with. In order to bring about that restoration and preservation of his power. And the point of this whole operation therefore is not to achieve some final state but to develop these tools, as you have called them, instruments of power others would say, in order to keep the game going. Because that is how russia sees the world as being in any case. And second this is the only way that it can maximize what is the condition of its great power and the regime at home that is a fully independent sovereign great power which is what it says it is and wants to be recognized as that doesnt have to answer to anybody either at home or abroad. And thats the strategic objective. I think that things become much more clear to the analysts and i think they will become clearer to you and you therefore can overcome this dilemma of whether he is a tactician or a strategist. Because they do serve the strategic objective and there is no gap here. The final objective is not whether or not ukraine or some specific territory in ukraine belongs to russia but whether russia is accepted as a great power. The specific territorial parameters of ukraine are beside the point. Now everybody understands you have to deal with russia on its terms. Im a consultant here in washington, d. C. Thanks for your comments this morning. This war game looks like it was very interesting, a very enjoyable time and i applaud you taking a structured look into the future and helping us to understand these issues. Three quick questions of clarification, if i might. You mentioned one area of cooperation that you saw iran and you mentioned syria of course as well. In your discussion in your work did the topic of cooperative Threat Reduction nuclear security, in russia come up . Obviously thats an area on hold right now and we have some concerns about that. So just curious your thoughts on that. And then a couple of reaction if you might. In recent days there have been two high level state department visits to sochi and moscow now. Are these positive signs indicators of a thawing of relations . If not, what should we be looking forward to in the future as a positive sign . And finally russia will hold the chair of the Security Council in september. Is this a concern possible areas of mischief that could be introduced into the agenda at that time . The areas of cooperation. The u. S. Team was very concerned about the safety and stability of the Russia Nuclear enterprise. So yeah there was great concern. And this is tied also to your next point about how do we read these most recent contacts. During the cold war as the years went on as you know we had developed a pretty probust series of ways to communicate and coordinate with the soviet union their leadership and also their armed forces. It was never perfect but at least there were channels everything from incidents at sea to aircraft and air space to yeah. Different kinds. Signaling, the hot line. And there was sort of a sickening realization on the part of the u. S. Team that perhaps some of that has eroded or no longer exists. Weve talked quite a bit as we have gone out to various think tanks weve found that the generation of soviet experts are now in retirement or and theres the next generation is not nearly as extensive. Theyre just as eager and just as smart im sure but there arent as many on the ground as there were 25 years ago. So theres there was a concern on the u. S. Side that perhaps theres value simply in strengthening the mechanisms. And thats how i would read just me as a citizen reading what was happening with secretary of state kerrys visit recently for example as a good thing in general, not because of any grand agreements that may or may not have been signed at that time. But its certainly reassuring that we can talk and i would hope that if theyre talking publicly that theres some back Channel Communication going on as well. Which i think is where the real work can get done. Certainly i would agree. I will say from the russian Team Perspective looking out in the future most notably the election cycles that drove a good bit of the russian teams now in some of our later scenarios. It was interesting to note that it came up in conversation. Well have a new Administration New u. S. Administration in 2016. The russian team is looking for a political win or a win of some sort in 2017 in order for putin to be reelected in 2018. So the russian team discussed numerous times of what that political win or what that International Win might be. And it was notable that they surmised that it will be a new u. S. Administration facing those challenges. And again, the russian team would hold those strategic cards, i guess if you will. So while there might be conversation now and certainly there theyre worthwhile, i think the most telling point from the russian teams perspective is whats going to happen next year when its a new administration. And russia is looking for that win, whatever that win might be. Jack. I teach parttime at Catholic University in our religion and international politics. My previous hierarchy i was in the state department and was enabled one time to participate in a program at the Armed Forces Staff college. There, we did a mini version of what you all have participated in. Having to do with the middle east. Thinking back, it strikes me very much that in all our discussions we paid very little if any attention to the role of religion. Which certainly i think in recent years has proven to be much more important. Certainly in our involvement in iraq. And syria. But im kind of surprised that in looking at the russian bear, with Everything Else in there, theres nothing about religion. And it strikes me that it is a certainly Important Role of the Russian Orthodox church, which is kind of come back more into popularity also with mr. Putin. Should be considered a bit here not just simply because of its relationship with western orthodoxy, if you will. The Christian Church and the west. But also, the islam. And i wonder to extent does religion play any role in the conversations either on the u. S. Or the russian side . Ok. The gentleman right in front. Thank you very much. I am with the National Defense university. My question is that you mentioned that ukraine is the Perfect Place to confront russia. But in this war game what they really factored out in this war game as well for example if the confrontation that inclusion at the conflict you dont have to both parties dont have to agree to expand it. If one expands it unilaterally then how do you deal with that . Number two u. S. A. Has allies. Was it also considered what allies the shia has . And number two, three when you say putin do you mean the which putin do you mean . That is an important factor. And the last but not least what is the china factor . Do you think china and the shia do have any commonly perceived ideology . And if they have from where . Thank you. Reporter from voice america. A followup question about the china factor. Im looking at this russia figure too. Talking about the chinese ooshshurens. Could you elaborate on that . The second question is also about china. The growing relationship between china and russia theyre talking about. So who poses a greater threat to the u. S. , china or russia . Thank you. Back to the panelists. So with regards to the question on religion it did come up in the initial net assessment mainly in relation to the orthodox church. Why you dont see it on the actual diagram we characaterized it pretty much under the, as a tool of russian nationalism, frankly. We didnt see it as a driving factor as much as a resource that could be use to continue to push forward a russian nationalism. On the question about russian allies i dont we didnt consider that as a major factor within the artificial construct of the war game. We know that russia has reached out to particularly to central asia and some of the countries there. But we didnt see that as those partnerships as really contributing much either to russian policy or to the russian impact in the situations we were trying to look at specifically. Russia will never be able to recreate the war saw pact and even this war sau pact was an alliance of unequals much more so than nato i would argue. But no, we didnt take those alice into account. And i think thats allies into account. And i think thats an opportunity for the west actually to make a very, very telling point through the International Media frankly, that anyone who understands the world situation today with any degree of clarity can see that you have a group of 28 democracies at different stages of development who are cooperating and trying to create a Security Architecture for europe, and then you have one power that is throwing its weight around and violating some of the norms of the international environment. And reaching out to frankly some of the countries that they have reached out to are more in line with the russians idea of how a government and economy should run than western europe. So i think that is something that the west could use to its advantage to make sure that that message is loud and clear. You have 28 democracies confronting country that are controlled by a very different system. Actually, i was going to kind of pile on to jims comment. What we didnt see was and i will let the russia team speak to this clearly. But as they came in to each of the sessions what we saw a continually reach out bilateral relationships that facilitated a purpose as any nation would do. Thats what we saw with the chinese relationship as well, frankly. As far as where the assessment was is that as russia would turn toward china that they really had the lower end of the bargaining relationship. China had the upper hand in that china or russia needed china but not china needed russia. So thats why they had like i said the chinese relationship was one of risk for the russians. They could play to it, but they were coming into it having to negotiate less than their optimal deal, if you will. A quick comment. The u. S. Needs to be aware of its own seems and weaknesses. And i think one of those is that we now at least within the Defense Department tend to view the world regionly. There are some broad threats transnational threats. We get that. We have some functional combatant commands. But in general terms, we have this goes back of course to the cold war. One combatant command focused on europe and russia and one focused on the Asia Pacific Region and china. And so we tend to want to put our problems into those bins and assign a military commander to deal with it. That said, theres a huge amount of cooperation that goes on with other u. S. Government agencies as well. And we are finding more and more that perhaps that regional structure for the defense commands is not as helpful in places like the arctic where you have several u. S. Fourstar commands that have some involvement in the arctic from northcom and youcome and paycome and others. So that is something that we need to be aware of on the u. S. Side. And think about perhaps we can overcome that in the future. You would have enjoyed it last week. I proposed at a different session that there be created on the national Security Council. The large continent eurasia. So you overcome some of the stovepiping. Ok. Paul. I had a question about the disparity in the way the two contestants in the ukraine crisis view how vital the interest of ukraine are respectively and how that actually played itself out in the exercise. In addition, i tend to agree with the findings on that currently the likelihood is that russia will pursue a frozen conflict in ukraine given that there is little to gain from seizing other places and much to lose. But that will hold up only unless and until russia starts to see that perhaps as ukraine policy is headed for a second col laps as dr. Cutchen so aptly described the first one. Im curious what your thoughts on that or at least how that played out as well and the scope of the exercise. Thank you. Thank you. Kyle scot. I want to turn to your policy conversation two clearly articulating a policy position. Im sure my colleagues in the state department would argue that we in fact do have a clearly articulated position but im going to posit that youre correct and then challenge you. You all did the studying. What would you articulate as to what that policy would be . And after i hear that ask the colonel if he could state whether he thinks the europeans would agree with that policy. Thank you. Im actually based in berlin nowadays. Im actually here as a fellow at the American Institute of contemporary german studies to actually interview american experts and officials on their take on Energy Vulnerabilities in europe. So you can imagine ive been interviewing a lot of people about this. And it is sort of coming down to a few scenarios. I just want to im not saying this is the most likely scenario but it goes along the lines of what you pointed out. I dont get so much out of this as theres Something Else that can happen. Its not just a matter of what the u. S. Wants to do and how it reacts to what russia does. Its the flow of objective circumstances that gets out of hand if people dont take ahold of the situation. A lot of so a lot of people, certain people i think a lot of people have been telling me the clear feeling of the european attitude is please take this problem away. You know, they dont want to really face up to what is there. And frankly that theres a similar situation on our side. And somewhere that goes along with what youre describing. So the objective things that are developing is if the ukrainian economy col lapses in a couple of years or major demonstrations, another mide on huge all the of refugees. What about that sort of situation . As things basically collapse if theres not a Major Program of the west to get involved and sort of help them take control of their economy and rebuild it. Fine. If people dont want to send military aid fine. For whatever reasons but take control and do something proactive. Otherwise it degenerates and really both sides lose control. And then you get a situation as i think its true as mr. Cuchen said about what happened after the agreements falling apart. Things get out of control on both sides. Its a question to a reaction. I apologize. If i may address the first question from the russian perspective of what the policies are or the objectives are. So as i previously said the russian team had no desire to escalate the conflict. One of our final turns was the demise of putin a new alternative form of government arises. What are the first actions. The russian Team Immediately said we will not give back crimea. It was a political win that they do not intend to turn back on. But in terms of escalating the conflict again they have no appetite for increasing the conflict whatever. Of course come 2017 if they find a political win the target of opportunity certainly is one that the russian team had addressed. Likewise to return to a previous question with regard to china. As we saw play out, although we didnt really explore a whole lot of the chinarussia dynamics the russian team during one of the turns said chose to try to undermine that as much as possible through backroom deals, sweetheart deals, if you might, and primarily the reason they were so interested is to maintain an economic dependence of europe on russian energy. And that was weighed against some of the economic deals that they had most recently made with china which were not so favorable for the kremlin. So from i guess a minor perspective thats how i would probably address the russiachina question as we saw play out in the game. Really that was really the only time that china came up in the discussion was with regards to economics and energy. The Eurasian Economic Union was mentioned briefly, but thats not where they focused their discussions. While the russian team said they would turn to china, they would much rather maintain the European Market that they now enjoy. Reference the policy Going Forward. That was probably the greatest challenge of the war game, frankly, and thats part of the reason you see that as an outcome. In each turn there was just a lack of clarity. At one point, the discussion was we continued to say we want a europe thats whole, free and at peace, but maybe this is the good, fast and cheap discussion. Do we want a europe thats whole . Do we want a europe thats whole and free . Do we want a europe at peace . A and we look at historical examples of when that may have been the case. So i think we do want a europe thats whole, free and at peace. And i think our policy is we do want a democratic ukraine and we do want the respects for international borders. The challenge is, how do you then clearly articulate it, and then what is the strategy linkage to the the policy. So if thats the policy, what are the methods and mechanisms that were going to use to then continue to advance that, and i think that gets to your point, sir, reference, how do you prevent the spillover and how do we encourage a democratic ukraine that then becomes stable in a prospering member . Thats probably where your answer is, and once that linkage is correct, then we can probably have a clearly articulated policy towards those three areas. Europe. Yeah, its our and that was our second consideration. It came actually from the western europe and the Eastern European countries as well. Because they need to know what u. S. Stands on a lot of things and especially the Baltic States. It doesnt matter what path is chosen, as long as its clear, and they were kind of frightened and everybody on the stands said, ok, if russia takes this next step, what will be the reaction of the u. S. . So they wanted clarity instead. And its not so much the content, but the clarity thats the most part of it. Yeah, we had a couple of International Fellows saying russia is part of europe whether we like it or noft. It is. So, yeah. Good morning, rob kim from the national war college. Army college grad. As a war strategist, a couple of things that strike me which lead me to ask you a couple of 01 25 12 questions. If we take at face value, we have a longterm relationship with the russians that is unavoidable. Thats a competition for them to play out is a problem for the the United States. Because of this asymmetric escalation they seem to have because of the nature in ukraine. And then the third observation is how the u. S. Was continually reactive. They were trying to play a defense and always caught and moved behind the russians. So the question is how do you stee the initiative . If you have a strategically competitive relationship, what are the places where the advantages accrue to you where you can force the russians to react to what youre doing rather than you react to them. Where are the places where advantages accrue to the United States that you can play out in a competitive environment, which cause the russians to rethink being aggressive in places where they have escalation dominance . First question. Second question, which is that if you have a longterm competitive relationship with the russians, then what are the critical capability gaps that you have . What are the capabilities you really need to develop that you dont have . One of the reasons youre not acting is you reach in the tool box and theyre not in there. What are the tools you need to develop that you dont have . Thanks. Good questions. In the back of the room. Good afternoon. Im from crimea international student. I have 01 26 41 two questions, relates to russia. Relates to crimea peninsula. The first one, what do you think about crimea annexation . Was it a longterm plan or just tangible opportunity . And the second question, the first item in this slide, you said, you say about compete with russia to maintain the national order. What do you think, is it possible to cooperate, even to compete with country which so brutally break International Rules . Thank you. Yes, sir. Yes, jonathan, also a consultant here in washington. I was curious how in preparing this war game you looked at the evolution of policy over the year, proceeding the war game with respect to Eastern Ukraine. The way i looked at it, i saw a lot of russian propaganda, kind of at the outset of the period that was intended in efforts intended to destabilize Eastern Ukraine. You had separatists, quote separatists, unquote, who are active in places, and at the end of the day, Nothing Happened in the largest russian speaking city in the country. Nothing happened. Police were able to deal with the loophole. And they ended up with control of a piece, and they would have been, you know, either in jail now if it hadnt been for the direct intervention of russia. So in that context, it looks like a Large Russian failure. They were not able to instigate a mass uprising in Eastern Ukraine, and theyre left with this nonviable sliver of land next to the border with russia. Whats your perspective . And how is that failure to ignite a mass uprising in the russian speaking population in the country . How does that figure into russians callculus . Thank you. I guess the first question, ill start in the reverse order here. He example you gave of russian policy towards Eastern Ukraine. Im going to combine it with a question on crimea, whether it was an opportunity or a plan. And i think that going into it we saw that the crimea was was an opportunity on the back end of the sochi olympics. You have forces available. And i think Eastern Ukraine, frankly, was another opportunity. The difference was the geography of crimea was fairly well set, and that was thats where that opportunity probably had a little more solidity, it was a little more solid than in Eastern Ukraine. We saw the Eastern Ukraine movement, going back to what we said before, its all about maintaining the regime. And those were opportunities to create instable. Thats why you didnt see the tractions in many areas, frankly. There wasnt a clearly identified geographically limited goal that was the aim of what we saw in Eastern Ukraine, as opposed to what we saw with crimea. And on the second part of your question, on the can you compete with somebody who is so that . Sorry for that. Its not a question whether you can. I think you must. If you dont react, its a signal of weakness. Its not a question of whether you can compete in that environment. We believe you have to compete in that environment. Because thats the game hes playing. From the national war college, appreciate your question about capabilityies gap. Let me take a stab at that. One thing that the u. S. Team wished they 01 31 33 hey hey hey no four deployed in europe itself. There was a sense that we needed to put a floor under whats there now and perhaps move some forces back into europe. Simply because its a long way kansas, to get to somewhere in the nato area. And so thats a capability. We base those drawdown decisions on certain assumptions about the International Security environment that were made several yours ago. We have to be able and willing to go back and reexamine the assumptions as far as fore structure in europe. Theres another capability. Theres of course a great deal of destruction about what to do and how to provide support to the the government in kiev. It doesnt always have to do with weapons. And communications systems. This is just on the military side. Economic and political support. And of course, we have partners, osce and eu and the imf. And you have a joint effort from a lot of different governments and Different International organizations and regional organizations trying to help kiev. Its not just about how many tank weapons we can provide them. And one that the team worried about a lot was the lack of ability to communication with the russian people and the russian ethnic kmirnts in other parts of europe. It is true that there has been no mass uprising in other parts of Eastern Europe. Even a year ago the terrible tragedy in odessa. Somehow theyve been able to keep the russian speaking population in odessa from rising up and staging, you know, overthrowing the Ukrainian Government or the Regional Government there. Thats a good thing. I chalk that up as a success story. In the longterm, they need to reassess and communicate the open free press, probably the best way to do it. Through social media and websites, through television in particular, for the russian speaking minorities throughout europe. So that at least they have an alternative source of information to the h highly politicized information pouring out of moscow, thats very very well funded. And its not just u. S. Instruments. Its not just the radio for europe. It could be the bbc. Theres any number of avenues that the west can reach. And communicate the truth to russian speaking populations. And very quickly on this initiative. That was one of the larger challenges throughout the exercises. Ironically if you look at the shocks that she designed, they were all targeting the 01 34 49 russian systems. There were no shocks to the u. S. System. Yet at each turn when we came back in the preliminary session, the russian team was very proactive in each of their moves. We concur with your assessment that we dont think there will be any type of hybrid type attack if you will on any nato member. Yeah, exactly. Yeah, granted. Thats a fair knock on wood. But that was really the assessment, that line was so well known and pronounced there would not be a provocation. And in the Baltic States, the thing they have going for them is they have the eu membership. Life is frankly much better in the Baltic States than across the border, even if youre a russian speaking nationalist. We see that on the diplomatic fronts, frankly, on other contested spaces or what could be contested spaces. And part of that is how we deal with our own allies and how we have areas of disagreements. We have to show this despite the fact we may not agree on different issues, whether theyre house we use forces or we we build forces. Let me make a comment on the successor failure question. Its a very interesting one. It was a brilliant success. And it was a great head fake too. You put 40,000 or 50,000 troops on the border, and you come in through the back door into crimea. And what we should be expected at this. I dont plan to be nostrodomus or anything, but over the weekend of february 21, 22, 23 jeff manchov and i were writing a piece for csis, and of course it was about the implications of the february 21st accord, which then of course the accord fell apart so we had to rewrite it over the weekend. And one of the things inserted will is you have to think about a possible asymmetrical reaction. And the most likely place for such a reaction would be crimea. Its the least ukrainian part of ukraine. But yet, we do still seem to i mean, seem quite surprised. Quite surprised by it. And also the fact that the Ukrainian Military forces in crimea completely backed down. My concern at that point was that created an impression for putin that the environment was way too permissive. Theres no reaction from the west. Probably will not be much reaction from the military forces if there were further incursions into ukraine, which is what i was immediately afraid about on february 28th. That was when my hair was on fair and saying we need to mobilize the strongest reaction possible, including sending military assistance to ukraine. Trying to alter it at that moment. The next step dont do it. Dont do it. Its almost impossible for our political system to command a strong response and more difficult for our european allies at that time. Now, was it a success . Well, i think you miscalculated the degree to which the russian supported insurgents would be welcomed in Eastern Ukraine. Putin came out on april 17th with the line and with that policy, got a very tough defeat in odessa a few weeks later. And the aspirations modulated. To what extent, how broad were the aspirations in the beginning . Its impossible for me to say. Theres a phrase the appetite grows with eating. But so well leave it. Will this be judged as success or failure . I think its too early to tell frankly. If we get back to steves point, which i agree with, in the that foreign and domestic policy are so intertwined, how long is mr. Putin going to continue enjoying a 25 increase in his Popular Support . Mainly because of activities in ukraine. There are differing views about that. We had a very good presentation here at csis on april 28th thats up on our website. One of the things he argued is if you look in the past at when economic downturns have occurred, theres usually a time lag between the the impact of economic downturn on the support for the president. So it will be interesting to see how, to what extent the political opinion polls up hold at the level where they are and for how long. Ok. We have time for one more round. I saw the gentleman in the gray shirt shirt. Yes. Thank you. U. S. European command. Question to you about the information, the russian propaganda. Its clearly an effort were not winning, and a lot of this is due to one, the unified nature of the russian information warfare, state run media. But also the fact that their propaganda isnt so much convincing, but making them doubt everything. Even doubting the truth. Besides pure capables. Capabilities, do you think our approach of countering their propaganda is working when frankly the pop lus isulous is trying to influence the truth, or do you think we need a new approach . Ok, i want to exercise two options. First, the russian invasion, for example. And second, russian massive cyber attack. For example, against estonia, where a government is strongly relying on internet and israeli government. In fact, all for example, very important financial in Eastern Europe. Is this the case for article five . Back to the panel. And you can conclude as well. Yeah, ill take the last question about the cyber attack. Yeah, i wasnt we dont have one we dont have consensus about everything. When we said that he will never go into the the Baltic States, im not quite sure about that. He wont do that with tanks, im pretty sure about that. Actually in our war game, we one of the the injects was 2 conflict, and there was a combination with smaller attacks, Cyber Attacks in the other places. So yeah, we considered that. And that brought us to the idea that putin is not sor much, thats our belief, looking for a gain of terrain, and hes looking for a great russia, but 01 42 56 needs some sort of conflict going onto keep the momentum that we can have if 2018. So as long as the conflict stays, that will be the main interest, and as soon as that dies out, he might try and cyber will be one of the ways he could try that in other places as well. Yeahious i think taurking about article five, and theres a big red line everybody says in article five. I agree to that. But i think its a very thick line as well. So whether he crosses it, i think hes too smart for that. But he will stay just into the line. And with cyber, thats really hard to tell. And its really hard to make one clear stand on this is article five and this is not. Yeah, that was the debate that happened inside the u. S. Team was what is going to institute an article five attack . Was the cyber attack in estonia an article five situation . Was about other smaller violations of sovereignty . What are we going to consider article five . There was some talk of does it need to be rewritten. And frankly i think the consensus going out was no. Because its written its written the way its currently written is fine. What might need to happen is a discussion about what does it mean in a new environment . It was clearly written in the washington treaty in a different environment, where some of these other challenges simply didnt have a way to materialize. But now thats the next step. Weve got to determine what does that mean, and as he said its probably a thick line, and then thats up for the council to decide. When is the line going to be thick, and when is it going to be very thin . The broad interpretation of article five for the red team allowed them to hedge their bets, to use their tool kit, to push up to the line and then stop, and create that tension with nato. Thats what we saw as a goal of the red team quite often. If i might also add to karens remarks. And the question is really what can we see as the initiative. The russian team was very concerned over the economic dependence and inner dependence of europe. I think if if u. S. Were to go forward that might be some avenues of an initiative that certainly the west can concede upon, precluding that ability of russia in the near abroad to control the economic dependency, if you might. Often times the russian team as karen made mention of, would go right up to that red line that very thick red line. They acknowledged the fact that they can spin a narrative far faster than the west could. And so i think you mentioned the question about is there a way to change our info ops . I think certainly being faster would probably would probably certainly help the United States in the future. While, obviously im an air force guy, and we prefer our safety reports and our after accident reports to be clear and concise, certainly getting a message out quickly after airliner is shot down may have actually improved u. S. Flexibility, rather than waiting until all of the truth is done. Thats my small insight. And just as a concluding comment, i agree with chris. Sometimes getting, you know, your best information out quickly better then waiting for weeks and having a thorough, complete report. Thats an aspect of the competition. We have to understand its competition. Though it doesnt have to be u. S. Government sources of information. And i think it we, in the west, should not be hung up on just responding to distortions and lies and pointing them out. I think we have to provide a the russianspeaking population about what is happening in the west. How do the people live, how do their governments treat them . And thats a longterm strategy. But thats i think the one that we have to approach. And then finally, i want to draw your attention again to the point four up there. There is a concern that we have two election cycles rolling up in the next two or three years that have the potential to have some negative interference with each other. Were we hope that the u. S. russia policy towards russia does not become highly politicized during the 2016 campaign which has already begun and you hear, you know foreshadowing of that in some politicians making statements or asking rude questions. But the new administration and the new president whoever he or she may be coming in to office in january of 2017 will be coming smack into a period of priority need on the part of russia to do something to make an impact for their own election cycle a year or so later. We have to be aware of the potential for a dangerous situation in 2017. Well, i think its time to wrap up and id like to make a concluding comment. First of all, thank you. Coming here to csis today and sharing the fruits of their labors so to speak from the work of the net assessment of russia and then the subsequent war game that was carried out last month. And one thought occurred to me that it was in response to the question about the importance of secretary kerrys trip to sochi and other state department and other u. S. Government engagement with russia. And the issue with mutual communication is so important right now. Never in the i started traveling to the soviet union in 1979 and never have i seen in 36 years a wider disparity between the narratives that are being told in our two capitals. And, you know, certainly not everything about our narrative is right and not everything about the russian narrative is wrong. There are different perceptions of the same events. And the fact that were not talking to each other about them as much as we should be doing, in some ways were talking less than during soviet times i think is a real detriment and increases the bad policy, frankly. So maybe one small effort that i would suggest is that i think it would be interesting to exercise exercise, to do a scenario like this that included russians, europeans and americans, but on mixed teams. And i think we would learn a lot from each other about how we see different phenomena through a different lens, but how that different lens may not necessarily be right or wrong, but we need to understand really to i think make better policy towards each other. So thank you very much for sharing your thoughts and wisdom with us today and thank you all for coming. [captioning performed by national captioning institute] [captions Copyright National cable satellite corp. 2015] captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption contents and accuracy. Visit ncicap. Org this summer book tv will cover book festival from around the country. Next weekend were live at book expo america in new york city where the Publishing Industry show cases their upcoming books. June were live for the programs. Near the end of june watch for the annual roosevelt reading festival from the Franklin D Roosevelt library. Then live at the harlem book favor. With author interviews and panel discussions. Then live from the nations capitol for the National Book festival celebrating its 15th year. On monday former c. I. A. Deputy director michael more el spoke at the National Press club in washington, d. C. He offered an assessment of the agencys current and past terrorism efforts and discussed use sis al qaeda, and other groups. In opening remarks he refutures the recent news article stating that pakistan was informed beforehand about the Osama Bin Laden raid. This is an hour. Keith hill good morning and welcome to the National Press club. My name is keith hill. I am former president and a member of the clubs newsmaker committee. A few has keeping items. Please turn off cell phones or items that will make a noise. I will be asking questions to michael morel for about 30 minutes, and then i give priority to reporters for questions. Then i will open it up to others. I request that you