Even the harder question, which we will also deal with, is what do we do about it . A couple notes at the beginning, please turn off your electronic devices, not just vibrate because that can interfere with the sound system, and, if you have a reason to use your phone outside, you are welcome to do so. Our meeting today is on the record and we will talk for about 30 minutes and open it up to questions. Our distinguished panel begins to my right with my friend stephen. She is cofounder and Research Director where she keeps an eye on the macroeconomy on a range of industrial sectors and has as much experience on the ground as anybody i know. Is the chinat study manager eli. He had a special focus on china policy in the midst of a vast portfolio. And our visitor from cambridge to manyend and advisor people in this room. He is director of the Belfort Center of science and the kennedy school. He is most relevant for today, author of the new book destined for war, can america and china escape the trap . The only people who are not on about the book is in is a tribe in amazon [laughter] we will start there. The concept of the trap has provoked intense interest on both sides of the pacific ever since grade started talking about this. Even before the book was out. Whats we will do today is we will ask our panelists to give us a few words at the beginning on how they can conceptualize u. S. China relations from their relative advantage points, what are the opportunities and tensions, and where is this headed. Grandma we will start with you. Thank you so much for this opportunity graham i think if there is a lens that helps us to understand the relations of china and u. S. Today, i think that concept is great. Throughe trying to look the news and noise of the day, whether it is about going from the climate backdoor, a missile test in north korea, or a potential confrontation in the th china sea, Germany China becoming germanys number one trading partner. That, that through principal dynamic is a rising power that is threatening to disrupt the ruling power. Picture helps us but the rest of the things in place. This concept is called luciditys trap. This is not my idea. It, i dont know about hope in this audience i dont have to tell you about it, but you should at least google it. [laughter] you can download his book for free. [laughter] and you can read the first hundred pages. In the whole book, you will learn anything more than anything youll ever read. A spectacular book. It was the rise of athens and the fear that this is still in sparta thats made war inevitable. As i explained in the book, he is using inevitable as a hyperbole for exaggeration. I look at the last 500 years in the book, find the 16 cases where a rising power threatened to displace a rising ruling power. In 12 cases, the outcome is war. In four cases, the outcome was war being averted. Book, businesshe as usual in this case, i believe our case now will produce history as usual. It would be catastrophic. Cases help war can occur. In cases war could be catastrophic, that does not mean war cannot occur. The case i urge people to think about most is the case of 1914. I dont think you can study world war i too much. It is still a dazzling to imagine. Actorsthe present what were asked after the war, and he. Id, if we only knew how could the assassination of an archduke by a serbian a mash thatcome produces a fire that burns down the whole of europe. And of the war, world war i, every leader of the principal actors had lost what they cared about most. Hold re was trying to emperor was tried to hold together the empire. The regime was overthrown. Germany, he was trying to back up his buddy in rihanna. Vienna. France never recovered as a society, and britain, turns into dy would have chosen people tion that its this is like today there is stress thatructural is reflected in what the book is called the rising power syndrome. Sayidea of i deserve more or sway. Confining because they were put in place before i became bigger and stronger. The ruling power becomes anxious am a fearful, maybe even a little paranoid. This, therefore, enhances and magnifies misunderstandings so everything anybody else does looks rather menacing. It also exaggerates the impact of external events that would otherwise be in quantum went to inconsequential. Events from a by third parties, that could be easily manageable, that is the case of smart as well. Partiesct between two that had a great war in which both were destroyed. A thirdparty action produces an action to which there is a reaction for which there is a youn at which, there are at somewhere know he wanted to go. You have been an agent of the ruling power, what you make of the patterns of history and how does it informed the way think today . It is great to see some in frontier looking forward to the conversation. Having spent years debating the andt of china and academia in the white house situation, i have come to the firm belief that almost every arguments over u. S. Policy as it relates to china is what i would call a proxy war over the underlying assumptions of china. Where you land on the assumptions determines where you come out and policy issues. I think thats important enough to be lifted up to the front of the conversation, otherwise, it would be lurked behind. The first is the inevitability of chinas rise. I was reading grahams comment in New York Times describing chinas unstoppable rise. Saying is my left the World Largest pyramid scheme and it wont be important to the Global Economy and a relatively short amount of time. When your prediction on the chinese power projection is fundamental. There are people that believe the subject is relatively benign, the effect want to be different, they want what we want, they want what they want, but its want of it does all that much. Theres a Different School that i subscribed to that suggests that chinas rise is not a bad thing, but elements of it to toe quite severe challenges the vital interests of the United States. Where you come down on the question, the nature, character of chinas rise is fundamental. It is worth bring those out in discussion at the top. As it relates to the trap itself, being a witness and averted this participant in u. S. Strategy, i couldnt agree more that war between the United States and china would be devastating. The capabilities are extraordinary. It would be like nothing the war world has ever seen. We talk about cyberspace, the effects could be absolutely incredible. Shouldnt be complacent about that. I dont think we are, though. We have a deeply engaged relationship with china. With a great military relationship, confidence Building Measures and the fact that we havent had a Major Military crisis between the United States and china over the last couple years is a testament to that this type of engagement is helping us understand intentions and interest, and keeping us away from the precipice of conflict. Were my critique is, is not in grahams arguments but how it is being applied. I think the concern about avoiding confrontation with china, lowering tensions, has been taken too far. Relationship,eeping it happy, healthy, good lowering tensions, avoiding conflicts, confrontation, has become an end in and of itself. Been that is has resulted in what i would consider a risk aversion in the u. S. China relationship that has created a permissive environment for chinese assertiveness, liberalism, and, thats the biggest but today in asia is not on the brink being on the brink of war, but on the brink cure of influence, whatever you want to call it. A china order in asia in which china will win by not fighting to steal a chinese phrase. Wes risk aversion, when center our strategy run avoiding war, it is leading us down another dangers path and we ought not to ignore that potential outcome. The last thing i say as it relates to the tethering our strategic lens around this issue , war avoidance, there are other nt aspects of the u. S. China relationship. Ande is an ideological ideational competition that is getting more fierce. There is an institutional competition that is getting peers. It is my sense that that is the future of u. S. China competition and where lies. We think of the essential feature,s the military we will miss the other part of the competition. I was reading an article by a leading chinese academic yesterday who said, talking about the relationship between us, the rivalry will become less hot but more profound and widespread. I think that is right. As we think about how to manage this critical issue of the challenge of avoiding war, we ought not to let that resulted risk aversion or distraction from the other elements of the competition. Even it if it is endemic point thatimportant were not sleepwalking toward this innocence. Ann, over to you. Ann i think the big question is why am i here. I think there is a good reason why im here and that it is that chinas ambitions are not just strategic. Im a big fan of looking at the evidence in front of your eyes and not what you imagine. The evidence is that they have no plan on designing to become a great world power strategically, but, what it does have designs on his economic extending its economic strength growth of the world, collecting tribute, building states along its borders that have relationships with economic dependence on it, and building its own private channels of economic communication. Allison, this is above my pay grade, but although that is an interesting aspect, there are others that could be just as useful. Im a big fan of carl vogels work. What is his book called . [inaudible] anne exactly. I think perhaps an interesting paradigm to use is the great multiethnic empires that have all perished except for china. Persian, and even the romans. To some extent, the romans were expansionist it but mostly in economic terms because of their extend to to find new sources of income. I think that is what we need to be focused on with china. The effort to build dedicated. Nd less transparent channels transfer system that china has tried to build, the road system to bypass the world bank and multilateral institutions, all of the trade arrangements with Southeast Asia. Yes, they extend military power to their, but i would say that is more about having military power that being interested in invasion or anything like that. The issue ofat taiwan and hong kong and their selationship to the mainland are being underestimated for the risk. The strategy for the rest i think china is quite determined to recapture taiwan in one way or another. Not militarily. That would not benefit china and any possible way. They are very dependent on the technological strength of taiwan industry. T i think, one should think more shenzhen andand the concept used in the past to extend one nation one country, two systems toward taiwan. Get perhaps trying to representation in the mainland on to taiwan as happened under the kmt. A coop strategy rather than a military strategy. I think that is where we should be focused. Another example of war without bullets in that context. If i can, graham, i expect you want to respond to some of these things. I wonder if you would take us to the next question as well, what do we do about it . What are the policy implications . You have staked out, effectively, the stakes. You showed us what the risks of then, theggests, but hard question is what do we do . How much should it accommodate is its rise and how much a check against eventual war, or does it hasten war . Graham let me make three points. I think the difference among us, clarifying and going to the point, thats let me start with a point and i will come back to in the conclusion of the book, i say this book will be very unsatisfactory. In washington, you have to describe the solution in the same sentence as the problem. The doctor says dont just stand there, do something. I allow the last chapter to unfold a new strategy having a snappy title. Take an aspirin and everything will be fine. [laughter] i say this is not the case. This is not a problem subject to washington fix. This also gives you the opportunity for volume two very anne [laughter] volume two. Graham my hope is all you into is somebody that is by somebody in your generation. Those whose minds are not as encumbered or even by the constraints, because i think our discussion about strategy toward sh. Na has been basically mu in the clinton administration, the obama hedge is aion, and great moniker that excludes nothing and permits everything. It essentially goes with the flow. I can explain why i am either hedging or engaging and the Defense Department can pursue containment, treasury can pursue concessions. I would think that this has been the absence of a strategy. This allows us to go with the flow of what ever happens. Point, back to the first the trap is not about only a military competition. Reading about athens versus sparta, the reason why a athens drove sparta crazy was there economy, culture, their invention of everything. What the corinthian ambassador tried to convince to the spartans are not living with the athenians, they said, these people are out of their minds. If whatever they invent doesnt work, they have something new the next day. Withine never happy their own country, and they are not happy to let anybody else be happy in their own country. Inventedhe athens everything. ,rama, philosophy, history professional navy, architecture. These guys were zooming in all dimensions. In the chinese case, and we are seeing china in our face everywhere in every domain. Harvardg i give to my classes 26 indicators on when will china become number one. Maybeudents say in 2040, 2050. The second chart says, already. Already biggest automobile producer, cell phone producer, biggest economy. They say, well. Wow. The proposition is that the impact on the ruling power is not just military, it is economic, cultural, everywhere that we see. Elis point which is absolutely correct, some trap andterpret the proposition that the only to get the only way to avoid war is to concede. Wait was trying to avoid the trap to avoid war basically going with the flow and letting things happen the way that they did. I think this proposition is not in terms of what to do, concede in every setting. Story, iok at the wrote a piece for memorial day about what should be the big what wey anything about owe to people that gave our lives so that we can have our debate and decide what we want to decide. It, it wouldking be avoiding unnecessary wars. Most people think this is about i rock, no. Unnecessary wars we shouldve avoided, our world war i, easy. O avoid, and world war ii the authority for the claim of is winstoni churchill. He tells a story, at one point, fdr asked what should we call this war . He said i should call this the unnecessary war. He was shocked. I told him, how is it unnecessary . Militarily, we done what many people said including churchill, the u. S. , thee, and britain generals that thought this was a you wouldnt have had world war ii. You cant get where we are to concede or confront and in the conclusion, i think what we need now is a discussion and debate among the whole Strategic Community that says, here is this problem, this issue, this diagnosis that i try to. Liminate through the lens we have had to think of something way outside the box of the current conversation are we on a trajectory toward an unnecessary war. A twoday we are on decorate toward china and is a if we are on the path we continue on now. To answer the question on how to resuscitate what u. S. Policy , to answerk like question to graham about where we go from here, what should we policy, looking forward as well, the elements of what u. S. Polishes should look like, what u. S. Government should look like going forward, the first is get your team in place. This. , graham is right, will require a much higher level of expertise than we have had today. We cannot have senior officials coming in to the National Security adviser who are going to learn about the South China Sea for the first time or be traveling to japan for the first time at the level we need to take seriously. This is a central challenge. Our personality will have to reflect that as was the institutions. They absolutely dont. There will have to be a reformation and the state department, Defense Department, but much more to be much more focused. The second, it will be obvious to everyone in the room, u. S. Strategy in asia has to be comprehensive. Right now, the Trump Administration is talking about peace through strength, dual carrier operations in the East China Sea, one person will be giving a big speech at shangrila. It will not cut it. No amount of u. S. Power will resuscitate American Leadership and revive American Interest in the face of this challenge. That has to be an economic components, institutional component. As long as countries in the region believe that china is the future economically, our military will not stand that perception. Whether there it is tpp or something else, there has to be a Major Economic trade initiated for it. My personal critique of the Trump Administration as it relates to asia has been the transactional nature of the way the president has talked about his approach to asia. Very focused on north korea saying things like, what will i do, start a trade war . The president does one again president of taiwan again, i will have to check with others. Because of desires of lowering tensions with china with north korea, as someone who is worked on this issue for many years now, i think many who have would agree, this is the wrong approach. What United States should be doing, is the present when from across the board rather than signaling the United States being for sale or owing to trade up its vital interests. The chinese will have done that interrupted the United States around that. Tohink the United States has be willing to take more risk in asia. There is a perception, not to the point of tripping into war, but theres a perception of china being a very firm they have core interests that would must not get near, save face, and that is the theory and practice. In almost every single incident, some are public, some are not, stop what you are doing, you are violating our interests, we will take a principled stand here, and if you dont, there will be consequences. China has backed down on every single situation. Theres not a lot of evidence for this escalates or he acceptance of china. Some of their logical vulnerabilities inside actually make them the risk your player. We ought to think about that on how robustly if its our own interests. , that is exactly what i wanted to talk to you about. Before i do turn to questions, frame the scene politically and economically. How is it important to their behavior in the dynamic that graham and eli have described . To what degree is china feeling as if it wants to pursue a more risk tolerant approach in the world. What degree are we misreading china from abroad stance . About thenow a lot cast and the strife in the Trump Administration, but we dont see that in the she administration xi administration. Opacityealing with such , and sharp tactics will win. They are in the year where they are going into the congress been named a leader for life. He is trying to consolidate his position and remain in place to keep a positions and his life and liberty and east asia. The stakes could hardly be higher. Part of what everyone knows including every single human being that china is in a very risky economic position. The Financial System is being pushed to the brink. There are backup plans within the government in case the goes or blows. M there is not a lot of understanding of the risk and there is very high risk. The consequence of that is the Central Government wants to oject to the people that you cant be as rich as they said you can be, nobody can have everybody can have a ferrari, we want you to drink tea leaves and have small apartments. We will be projecting our power and you will be able to fly to milan and buy things with 6. 8 rem and the to the dollar. You will be proud to be chinese. I think the messaging of the belton road program is important internally to showing up xi and giving him a sense or surrounding him with the clout of glory that he really does carry the mantle of the old communist party. And that he can carry it into the future. Before he got to questions, the story we tell each other as chinas economy slows it is more inclined to take more adventurous postures overseas. You think that is right or wrong . More adventurous posture . Rally people around the flag. In the absence of delivering the trip to malign, will we deliver the emotional satisfaction of being able to punch somebody in the nose. Anne i think that will calm. The issue right now is that the system has relied very high income streams to certain supporters. As income streams have to be maintained, and is growth clients and profit declines, it becomes more and more difficult to do so. You have to look out around the world for other income streams and reward people in different ways. I agree completely with you lies analysis elis analysis with pakistan. You never find a china talking about isis, terrorists, and that is mainly because they close their own borders and keep their own muslims from leaving and creating overseas movements. They are really not interested in international terrorism. China doeso things like going to muslim schools and forcing children during ramadan to eat. It forces muslims to shave their beards. This cant be pretty popular and pakistan. Pakistan,t hurt from one does hear about the friction andeen the United States pakistan. We need to be focusing on the economic imperialism rather than the ships going to be its not. We bring folks into the conversation here. There are microphones going around. If you raise your hand, we get you one. We remind you to stand and state your name, and affiliation, and because we have a lot of people wanting to speak, lets avoid comments and make sure asking one question. Graham can i make one quick note, you like . Eli . Group atna working harvard. Verizon china for every year for the past 10 years. I have been bullish. Every year we make a bet. Every year i once a bar. That is not forever but you never know how things are going to go. If im netting for next year, i would be happy for anybodys thats because i keep a better book, i think china will grow three times the u. S. Three times the rate of the u. S. If you want three times, you go like this. [all talking at once] graham historically, when economies fail, if they falter, rarely do governments blame themselves. Problems ision of quite prominent. Therefore, if the only other leg leadership stands on his nationalism, which it is, it is specter more assertive china under those circumstances. Anne i just want to give a quick answer to that into your first point that you gave your first response, because this is my domain. Lets do the thought experiment. Imagine that the Trump Administration were successful in collecting a 10,000 tax from every person in the United States. Thus, gathered 3 trillion . Or 30 trillion . You use that three chilean dollars to build a wall around all the borders, canada, mexico, and kent everybody else. 25 ,. S. Gdp would rise roughly, next year. From the spending of the 3 trillion and building materials, etc. When that be a good thing, valuable, would it be something that would sustain our growth into the future . This is a way to look at china. Or 20 points with the auto and steel industry, and studies show we would exceed their production in the u. S. , but the chinese exceeded ours. It doesnt convey value to the chinese people. We go there in the back, please. With taiwan. Washington,rs in there were people who were saying that if the United States and china were ever going to war, it would probably be over taiwan. Is that assertion still valid today . Is the current stalemate in cross relations making u. S. China relations more difficult . Thank you. Eli, do you want to take that . I guess there are are a couple different ways to answer that question. I dont think we are on the precipice of war with china over taiwan, but, of course, it is an area of potential conflict himself seems quite intolerant on any moves of independence. I think the domestic politics in taiwan into the way the United States has, in my view, a very good team, a very strong Team Managing this issue to the point where it was not a central component of the u. S. China relationship. It is relatively well managed, and that could change in the event there was an unexpected turn and taiwanese politics. I dont think we are at a point where this is a defining issue in the u. S. China relationship. Graham in the book i have a chapter about taiwan being a viable country. I think the things about taiwan that washington doesnt like, china will fight over taiwan independence. I think that is a fact. The u. S. Has its accepted that fact and theyre not likely to fight over taiwans independence. Charles, right here in the front. Thank you. Im part of the u. S. China working group and Capital Counsel of asian research. I agreed as will play out in an economic sphere and as i watch the f and ed, i wont comment on what trump is doing with the new negotiation strategy. It seems they are more process oriented as time went on. It became more and more and tolt to have results get chinese to commit. Given that a lot of this is going to play out in the institutional arena, and we have our institutions, do we need to rely on those and fight it there or propose new institutions to china . We missed an opportunity with the aaib. Is there more we should do . What kind of institutions should we create to deal with this . It is a very good question. Let me answer that in a couple ways. Number one, i do think we should be looking to create institutions with china. At the same time, in this environment, it is a perception that we have on the economic front of inevitability toward a china let order. I think it is important the United States provides alternatives to a liberal futures in the region. Wasnt excluded from the partnership, but it wasnt ready to be up member because it wasnt ready to meet the high standards of governments, transparency, and other associated rights in that agreement. Ton as we look to find a way reach on into the system in a peaceful way, prosperous way, i think it is important to continue to maintain what we consider high liberal standards. First, i think we ought to not compromise our own view of where we want the region to go as we go about doing this. Aib and nelsonon road. You watch the Chinese Media over the last couple of weeks, the rhetoric has gotten, this is the savior of humanity, a century long project, the defining issue around mankind will organize. [laughter] no, literally. Arctic. Y are adding the it is encompassing the world. It is hard to know what to make of this, because, in a sense, it withand and visionary, but we need to put it in perspective in terms of size and reality. Doing some back of that contact lesions in my office today, because i had a chinese newspaper i brought back from a recent trip and it had a huge bicture on the front saying aai filling the infrastructure gap in asia. They estimated the infrastructure gap is 26 trillion over the next decade. B has loaned about 2 million. 00007 contribution to what is needed to fill that gap. Toll need 130,000 aaibs fill it. I think it will be the same thing with the bolton Road Initiative you have a lot of promises, big dollars, but, what is actually new, we have to put in perspective. The last thing i will say, it is important, even if the numbers themselves or not thats a large, even if the economic facts are not themselves determinative. They give china authority. You see a number of leaders going to beijing and they will do it again. Message anduce its that has been the convening authority being as important as the Business Done by the institution. China gets convening authority and they are shaping perception of the future of the order in asia. Things like the bolton Road Initiative, or a aib. If everybody walks away thinking we better make nice with china, thats will spill over into every other element of the International Politics in asia. As an example, i was speaking to a Southeast Asia expert and he said to me, i think we are at the point where there is no country in Southeast Asia that will be willing to entertain a because ofy issue the perception of the economic side. Theyre worried about economic retaliation. Reliablee assess the reality of the dollars and institutions, the profound effect they are having on politics is important. Graham i agree mostly with what he said, but i would say, look in the book and you will say, heres a question, in Development Aid today, compare the world bank to chinas set of figurement banks and out in terms of loans this year and next couple years, which is bigger. You would be surprised. The chinese banks are larger. Graham four times. Anne it makes you wonder, what is this bolton road thing since the China Development bank already has the three times the Balance Sheet of the world bank. What has china become, a glorious leader . Not really. Right here. Thank you. Simon henderson, the Washington Institute for your policy. I would like to ask the panel, which country does china look at as being its natural allies, and why . If there arent natural allies, doesnt need them and, if not, why not . Graham i would get one shot. View isral washington russia and china cannot have a Good Relationship is russia is weak and they have a long border, and siberia doesnt have people. Over the long run, this will be a very troubled relationship. Over the short run, xi xi pin gs best buddy is himself. And pink get together, what do they all about . Against the u. S. What are they talking about . The u. S. Undermining both of us. Are they correct . The answer is yes. [laughter] anne my thoughts will be briefer as it is not my area. I would say china takes an instrumental and transactional approach to its alliances rather than having ran alliances. Theexample, you will find u. K. Very thrilled about its relationship with china rights now, because china has promised to bundle the power plants that will disappear again if china does not or when the next round comes up. The same is true, i think china likes having north korea, very dependent on it because it gives them a bargaining chip. I think that is the relationship. China is conceptualizing itself as a great ancient, ancient power with tributary states around it. It doesnt need alliances, but it needs the occasional relationship. Eli if youre thinking about military alliances, were not that the point of chinas signing up for mutual defense treaties. It is expanding its military footprint, its worst military base in djibouti. It is shopping places in the world to add to that and, over time, we will see more peoples army in terms of access agreements and moving around. On the question, it is interesting, one thing that i think china will find out and starting to find out now is, it is easy to sit back and engage in a winwin economic relationship with the world. Intoit starts to get out the nasty competitive world of International Politics, it will be able to play the game anymore. Obviously, china has tried to develop Close Relationships with ironic, saudi arabia, palestinians, israelis. That will only work up to a point. At some point, they want to be a major player in that area, then they will have to make really hard decisions on what side they want to be on. That is not the nature of chinese politics now. What ive seen over the past couple of years, he gets too close to that, they pull back. We see that in the bell Road Initiative. The economic corridor has touched on indias sovereignty concerns. All of a sudden, Chinas Initiative is stepping on core sovereignties co sovereignty concerns. Shaping as the chinese president steps in, it will be much harder to conduct a winwin Foreign Policy and they will have to come down on some the things that they havent been able to do today. In terms of the president being think itll be really telling on the chinese policy debate on what point they take. Graham i want to thank anne for a book i read a while ago. We are talking about the prospect of a clash, would any of you care to comment on some issues on which we cooperate with them . There was an event in paris, if i can remember. [laughter] the two greatest emitters of Greenhouse Gases had come to a consensus. I think it was a great success, maybe. Im not sure. It is a legitimate question. In the absence of Climate Change as a basis to talk about positive elements of the relationship, is that all there is . Do we have anything at this point . Can it be counter proliferation, isis, what are the areas or opportunities . It is the question at the moment that we need to be thinking about. Graham the economic arena in principle could be won. Analysis on elis how the could be evolved. The reason why we opened relationship with china was not or china, not for the international order, not for all the reasons that are typically given today, but because we had one objective in mind. I was part of the process. I think that was the right idea. We built up china to that end. Economically, militarily, and other ones. Into the cold war, 1991, we took a holiday, victory lap where we declared that we dont need strategy anymore, everyone will be globalized and whats good for one is good for all. We werent recognizing that china was getting bigger and stronger. China was most likely to be like china when it became big and strong. It had been that way for a few thousand years and it was not likely that is was going to be washed out easily. I think we are seeing a reemergence of china that looks a lot like china. The chinese have a long time that hard time thinking about how to relate to some in the party. They say, there is nobody equal to me. The way i understand the relationship with me is that, the extent at which they give me respect. Hierarchal system, you have to know your place. Your place is not my place. My places at the top of the pyramid in your place is somewhere adjusting to that. Relationships, the ones the chinese whenever wanting to take over anybodys territory. They want other people to become chinese. We want everybody to become like americans. Have democracy, human rights, this into that. The chinese say youre not worthy of becoming chinese. You cant become chinese. And it wontte us be too close. The closer you come, the more i will give you a little bit. Respect, i me enough will give you a present. If we go to the question about the bases of potential meaningful cooperation, some sort of way out of the , the trumpperil administration is putting a lot of weight on the joint of the peninsula saying that korea may be the way in which we find a something. Believedegree do you there is a opportunity there for a meaningful breakthrough . Lets confine it to the u. S. China relationship on the north korea question. Let me back up for a secondary i think this is a good question. During the Obama Administration there was the climate deal, ironic, economic relationship and its not been great. It seemed like it was heading in the wrong direction, so i think the question of the vacuum on the positive legislature and the small ball being put in that. There is obvious constraints on some of the scientific and declaration exploration issues. I think the fact that the economic relationship has on industrial strategy is very dangerous a very dangerous trajectory. I think that is not only going away, but it is potentially coming the center point of the competition. Knows much more about that than i do. Cynical,korea, call me but i still think there is a gap between how far china is willing to go and the degree to which the demand of the United States in terms of applying enough pressure on north korea, either to changeim jongun his tabulation or create dynamic north korea that lead to a different decision makings within the leadership there. I dont think it is going to be a natural place or a meeting1 of interest, i think it will be, jinping thinksxi he needs to do, trouble make a depending on what is getting on trade or signals otherwise on whether he has to push for more or whether thatll be enough. Becausethink it will be of a strategic overlap. It will be determined by other factors. Anne your more diplomatic than i. I cant imagine a dumber strategy than the trump extent. Tell us what you really think. [laughter] not myi didnt wear my president tshirt. I thought that the taiwan malt was a good idea. Thats if it had been supported by strategy. I think the relationship is all about investment in trade and that is not where that is where we need to use our lever. They dont use leverage over is a, data security, that very disadvantageous one to the United States, and we have nothing to say about it over currency to some extent. I think the apparent deal between the feds, all the different feds and the china at the woods meeting last year was dumb and a bad idea and negative for the United States. There are a lot of levers that we dont use and that we should be using. It is all about investment in trade. About it is not about on the margins, climate and military cooperation. We have excellent institutions, we just need leadership and we dont have it. I would argue we havent had good leadership on china for a while. Graham on north korea, to make a north korea the defining issue in the relationship between the is strange. Very strange. This is a problem that no one else has been able to solve. We have put this hot potato i spent a couple of days with some of the folks doing postmortem and the notion was, the chinese survived. Now we lifted this problem, if we are unable to solve it, who is going to be right . I wrote a piece this week in the times about this being a possible cuban missile crisis in slow motion. In the foreseeable future, next , but notbe even sooner for years from now, on his current path, be able to attack San Francisco with a nuclear weapon. On the other hand, President Trump said this will never happen. President obama trump went out and we did, never going to heaven. Trains going right toward a crash unless one of them different. I think the ways to tell the chinese, make sure this guy divers. Todid divert when they were you didnt get them to divert when they were attacking japan with nuclear weapons, and now youre telling us, i have to solve this problem . I would say, this is the train to watch for. Right there. Barry would hong kong. Hong kong. D, how does japan fit into this equation in terms of japan china relations and how it fits in with United States . Graham, you will get the last one. Graham one of the fascinating differences, everyone one of the 16 cases is interestingly different. One of chinas problems if you compared with the u. S. , when we emerged when hundred years ago as the dominant power, is that we had many we didnt have any neighbors that were strong. Japan is a strong neighbor. It is the Third Largest economy in the world. Japan is a serious military power. If there were conflict in the East China Sea between just the chinese and japanese maybe, it would be bad for the chinese navy. I think the question that eli made the point that eli made earlier, people see that it is has changed drastically. See theyou will security relationships that we have built up in the philippines , you can see already, south korea will be extremely stressful. And ultimately, perhaps it will fail. Evan i think were going to follow the rules and finish on time. I want to thank all of you for coming and i hope youll join me in thanking this terrific panel. [applause] [captions Copyright National cable satellite corp. 2016] [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. Visit ncicap. Org] [captions Copyright National cable satellite corp. 2017] momentarily, we take you live to the white house to hear from epa administrator administrator scott pruitt joined by sean spicer. Will have live coverage of the briefing when it gets underway here on cspan. Until then, part of todays press conference with Houston Chronicle leader nancy pelosi. Speaker pelosi some of us are wearing orange today. A girlemorate
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