Was the jv team. Clearly wrong. I think that is wrong as well there it i think it is a major varsity team. If you want to use those kinds of monitors. I have seen nothing that compares with its viciousness. Intelligencen the committee now since before 9 11 and i have watched this evolution of nonstate actors into world terror. Very carefully and closely. Groups really the first that has the wherewithal in terms of financing, the fighting structure,terms of a heavy equipment, heavy explosives, the ability to move quickly. They crossed the border into iraq before we even knew it happened. People whoa group of are extraordinarily dangerous. Withnator Dianne Feinstein her view on meet the press this morning. The Washington Post writes a different take about it, with the headline dan pfeiffer said the president will continue to move at his own speed to respond to these crises regardless of criticism. There is no timetable for solving these problems that will meet the cable news cycle speed. We would much rather do this right than do it quickly. The story goes on to say, this week, president obama will have an opportunity to show leadership at a crisis at summit with european allies. Immediately afterward, secretary of state john kerry will travel, where potential partners are hoping for direction. Director of the national count counterterrorism center, related to Surveillance Program to the current isis threat. A panel of National Security experts at an annual meeting. This is just under two hours. Deeply indicate the use and potential abuse of technology by government and nongovernmental actors. Used technology to its movements. Said, movements reflect aspects of the society. Often reflect or nearer the resources, tools and aspects of the societies they attack. They use Digital Technology to attack us, to build movements, and we use it to track them. In a sense, we see the very forces we are fighting, so Digital Technology is provided great benefits. It also enhance threats. Many say it also applies to the nsa. It uses technology, Digital Technology to protect us from terrorism, but also the potential for abuse. I am reminded of James Madison statement where he said we need governments to protect us, but at the same time, we need what we call precautionary cautions to protect us from the government. If there are angels, they do not dwell on this particular earth. We are fortunate enough today to have a very distinguished panel to discuss the nsa and set the stage for what i hope will be an interesting queue in day. I am donald downs, university of wisconsin and the moderator of the discussion. It is also special given the situation in the world today and iraq and syria and elsewhere, the discussion is all the more relevant. What the nsa does is difficult. For one thing, the government has modified the program ep diddley in recent years due to what i call pressure and adding to the fog is a classified nature of the nsa work and the complexity of the interaction with the fisa courts, congress and executive branch. In addressing the question we have to know what is going on, but also see the forest. I hope to pay all today will get the right balance. If the nsa is watching this plenary session, welcome. If jeremy is watching, welcome to you, to. We will give you a sample of the questions we will be dealing with. How legal art nsa programs . How effective are they . What are they . How serious a are the dangers and threats the nsa programs address and how do we define the dangers for legal policy or process . We are going to obtain data. If so, what are the same arent . How much should the rules and norms regarding intelligence gathering differ from domestic law enforcements . Just how different is foreign intelligence gathering from domestic lawenforcement . How much overview is provided by checks and balances in the system . Congressional review, congressional checking, Public Opinion, the press, inspector generals, executive Branch Oversight and have such checks insufficient . Beensufficient question sufficient . The nsa has often done its job with secrecy, especially in the past. So what is the balance between secrecy and openness . And who should decide where that line is drawn . What is the role and legitimacy of whistleblowers and leakers in our system . What is the legal status of Edward Snowden . The leak has provided so much information, especially about the Metadata Programs. What about the other leakers and whistleblowers . Or is spending a few years with putin punishment enough . How has the Simple Growth of new technology been responsible for the nature of nsa programs . How does the press deal with the publication of stories involving National Security . How to Public Opinion of the press shape policy and government response. One of the classic tradeoff between liberty and security . That security and liberty should reinforce one another if properly done. Before i introduce the panel, i want to Say Something briefly about the program to set the stage, and the panelists will say a lot more about them. The nsa was established in 1952 on that though it was based on previous intelligence operations. Those point is to gather foreign intelligence through surveillance. This is sustained from a normal operation of domestic law enforcement. Indeed, when the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act was passed in 1978, it was based on the reaction to previous abuses of surveillance by the government. The Main Objective is to give the government a power the power to do what is necessary when it comes to Foreign Surveillance and preventing the power from reaching over to the domestic sphere. American citizens are sustained from foreign intelligence dangers. What happens when there is a third category . When american citizens are involved . That is the third area where a lot of the controversy arises. Much of the controversy of the program pivot around the concern of nonforeign intelligence select into intelligence gathered regarding foreign intelligence. Since 9 11, for the most part, this is the reduction to a simple formula, there are four basic programs used. What two of them are contentbased surveillance, telephone and internet communications. Section 702 addresses when the nsa may look into the content. If it is purely foreign intelligence, it lies the on the purview of the Fourth Amendment. But the intelligence pertains to american citizens, then there are legal standards if such investigation needs to be covered by the law. The second set of programs involve metadata collection. Both internet and telephone. The Internet Program has been dropped as my understanding or seriously modified but the Telephone Program remains. This is largely covered by section 215 of the patriot act for the Business Records provision. Made of data metadata is by government providers. Includes those such thing as numbers dialed, time and length of the call, cell phone information, websites visited and the like. This data does not itself pertain to the actual content of those communications. At one time the Supreme Court held such information is not upheld by the fourth information because it does not deal with content. Those decisions occurred many decades ago when technology was not nearly as developed as it is now. So there is a greater concern with the new technology. In order to get into the content of this, a fisa court authorization is required. There is a big debate that her first speaker will address is to whether or not prior authorization is required to look at the made of metadata itself. The Communications Content provisions are also approved by the fisa court. At the New York Times published information in mid2000. Meanwhile, the extent is not really know until edwards noted until 2013. Edward snowden in early 2013. After the fisa Amendment Act of 2008, all four programs were given legal cover. We now know the pfizer court and nsa have been involved in a lot of back and forth in recent years over compliance. Some say this shows they are doing their job. Others say it shows they have not been sufficiently guarding Civil Liberties. In the wake of the disclosure, the government in recent months has discussed three different reform proposals. I will not get it to those now for the reasons of time but i assume the panel will be talking about them. It will be interesting to see whether or not they can go forward given the events in the middle east. Back in 2009 we have been christmas underwear bomber in detroit. The reforms were in the making back then but as soon as the act took place, reforms were stopped. There seems to be a pendulum effect into the immediacy of terror threats and the strength of proposals for reforms. It is a very distinguished group. The order that they will present additional accountants. Georgetown University LawSchool Professor has green written extensively on the nsa and related matters including too expensive pieces that i have had the pleasure to read before the conference. She has advised leading privacy groups. Professor donohoo donohue will talk about legal implications of the bulk Metadata Program and section 702. The second speaker will be matthew olson. Mr. Olson is now the director of the National Counterterrorism center in washington. Before that, he served as general counsel for the National Security agency where he was position as chief legal counsel. He served as an associate Deputy Attorney general and responsible for supervising and coordinating National Security and criminal matters. Mr. Olson also have the honor of serving the Obama Administration and bush two administration. He will talk about the nature of terrorism, the threat it presents and what the agency is doing to support counterintelligence efforts. He will also focus on the surveillance in the role of the programs in the ability to identify and disrupt terrorist threats. Third speaker will be martin baron, executive director of the Washington Post. He was the editor of the boston globe executive editor of miami herald and associate editor of. New york times. I know for sure he will contribute to our panel. He will talk about the press and how the press deals recording National Security stories and how it interacts and negotiate with the government. Peter fever is our last speaker. Peter fever is our last speaker. A Political Science at duke where he is widely known for work in international relations, National Security, peace and conflict study. Wellknown for institutional studies. Director of the duke program in american grand strategy. From june 2005 and july 2007 he was on the leave on the 2d the director for Strategic Planning and International Reform at the National SecurityCouncil Staff of the white house where his responsibilities include National Security strategy, regional strategy reviews and other political issues. He has written widely on issues as National Security, simple military relations and the cost of war. He will focus on the larger political and public dynamics in play in the area and how they and hinge on policymakers calculations. So the formats are the following. Each panelist will present five minutes and they may lead over. Then we will have an exchange where they will reply to one another. After that we will open up to queuing and a from the audience. Thank you very much. I the microphones working . We decided to discuss from the table. I would like to thank john for the introduction. A wonderful opportunity to come together and discuss the issues and i would like to thank my fellow panelist in advance for the discussion. There are two Central Programs that have really captured attention. The first is double collection section 215 and section 102. In light of the limited time i will really focus on section 215. What i will say up front is my primary concern constitutionally with how is being exercised related to the post targeting analysis and the use of foreign intelligence information and ordinary criminal prosecution without any of the protections one would otherwise see in a Fourth Amendment context. I would be happy to return to that during the discussion. There is a twopart series and harvard journal of law and Public Policy. The first one was just published. These deal with section 215 and 702. They are pretty much in the forest. Feel free if you want to take a look or if you have questions, i welcome all of that as well. Focusing on section 215. What i would like to say is free things. Particularly bowl collection. First is that violates the whole purpose of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act and is illegal under the statutory language passed by congress. As you can see, i do not have a view. Other than that, nsa. First, it violates the purpose. There were a plethora of programs that all of us in this room know well that had to do with the collection of both information on u. S. Citizens. At the nsa for instance, a project called an array, collected information on a total of 1650 p all. No more than 800 50 people at a time. Operation tram rock shamrock they collected messages looking for ties for foreign intelligence. One characteristic is they started limited. This started by only monitoring americans traveling to cuba but quickly expanded to anyone involved in criminal activities, suspected drug activity, individuals with suspected international terrorism. This Committee Really led the church to say they did not want to create opportunities for executive Branch Agencies to collect bulk information on u. S. Citizens. That was the purpose behind fisa. They were concerned that developments in technology would allow agencies to exploit ambiguities in the law to intrude upon american citizens privacy. These are stated aims of the legislation. To protect u. S. Persons, not just from nsa surveillance but fbi programs, fisa established for import and protections. First, any information from an electronic intercept in particular had to be specifically tied to an individual. Second, that individual had to be identified as a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power prior to collection of information on that person, minimization procedures had to be put into place, and the foreign Intelligence Surveillance court would oversee this process. Initially they dealt with electronic intercept. 10 register and cap and trades and that is really what the issue in the Metadata Program, the number one title one dials and the one can be received. Finally, Business Records is a provision. In regards to what has happened, and many of these basic principles and the approach of congress and the purpose of introducing fisa have really been countered by nsa actions. The orders issued by verizon or two arise in our book collection. No prior targeting. No probable cause the individual was involved in criminal or foreign intelligence related activity. Before they had to know the target to get information. The argument is now theyd get the information to ascertain who they are. Completely backwards from the approach they have traditionally had. The role is shifting. So that is the first argument. This is really contrary to the principles. This also violates the statutory language itself. There are in this regards three ways in which it does so. The first one i want to focus on is the language that says the government must have reasonable grounds to believe the tangible things sought are relevant to an authorized investigation other than a threat assessment. So again, there has to be reasonable ground to believe the information the tangible things sought are relative to an authorized investigation other than a threat assessment. So what is happening in this regard is the government argues that all metadata is relevant to authorized investigation. But that makes the phrase relevant to completely meaningless. If it is all many relevant, what is irrelevant . It also makes the reasonable ground statement. You must have reasonable grounds to believe that all records are relevant to an authorized investigation. It makes the prior clause out of existence as a statutory matter and establishes a very concerning precedent. If all metadata is relevant, then so is all email, all internet metadata, all financial records are relevant. All medications and social media. All of this would be relevant to assessing potential threats to the United States. So what is irrelevant . This clearly contradicts intent. This is part of that phrase. The way it is being read by the nsa treats