[captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2014] [captioning performed by national captioning institute] up, -- >> coming up -- >> there is a lot more disconnection, a lot more families that are broken that should not be broken. the familiesbout that just cannot hold because of the stress of life, not holding a job, going from one job to ,nother, living in that world that working-class up-and-down onld, puts a lot of strain people. even though they are so -- addictions are so rapid now because it is easy to get drugs and alcohol. i think all of this is contributing to my story being more of the american story than a lot of people are willing to admit. >> a former gang member, committee activist, and politically -- political driguez, willis ro take your calls today. >> house speaker john boehner has announced a special committee to investigate the attack on the u.s. consulate in libya. a subpoena to john kerry to testify on the matter before the house oversight committee. next, we will hear from an air during theal on duty attack. he testified thursday in the committee. this is three hours. >> the committee will come to order, this hearing on benghazi, instability, and a new government, successes and failures of u.s. intervention in libya. the oversight committee's mission statement is that we exist to secure two fundamental principles. first, americans have a right to know that the money washington takes from them is well spent, and, second, americans deserve an efficient, effective government that works for them. our solemn responsibility is to hold government accountable to taxpayers. it is our job to work in partnership with citizen watchdogs to deliver the facts to the american people and bring reform to the federal bureaucracy. this is our mission. today the oversight committee convenes a fourth hearing related to the security situation in libya before, during, and after the september 11 terrorist attack which claimed the lives of four americans. the committee has previously brought forward important witnesses who offered new and enlightening testimony on security failures that forced the administration to walk back false claims about the nature of the terrorist attack. testimony of previous witnesses identified key questions in the interagency process that only this committee has the jurisdiction and the charge to investigate. while much of the effort in the investigation has focused on the department of state, we have recently conducted several joint interviews of her relevant military personnel with the house armed services committee. while we had requested that these interviews be conducted as unclassified, the pentagon leadership insisted that they occur at the inexplicable and unreasonable level of top secret. some of my colleagues on the other side of the aisle have called for an end to this investigation. these calls are clearly premature and only raise public concerns about the political agenda to stop an important investigation before it has completed gathering facts about this debacle. in particular, the committee seeks insight into communications and directions that flowed between the state department, the department of defense, and, yes, the white house. it is essential that we fully understand areas of responsibility before, during, and after the attacks. it is my hope that today's hearing will help us add to our investigation's expanding body of knowledge, and i am pleased that we will be proceeding on an entirely unclassified basis. we do so because the american people, more than anyone else in this body, have the absolute right to know why four men are dead in an attack that could have been prevented. today we have a distinguished panel of witnesses before us today that will bring expertise to us about the current situation in libya. one of our witnesses, retired united states air force brigadier robert lovell brings first-hand knowledge of u.s. military in libya. u.s. african command is sometimes called africom. in the military command lingo, this is the organization that had responsibility, not just for libya, but for the entire continent of africa. this unit's mission included both the libyan revolution and the september 11, 2012, terrorist attack on a diplomatic compound in benghazi. general lovell was the deputy commanding general of joint task force odyssey guard. in this assignment he was tasked with helping the state department reopened the u.s. embassy in tripoli after the fall of gaddafi. we appreciate all of our witnesses taking time to testify and enlighten the public about the situation in libya and the effects of u.s. decisions. in addition to pursuing the relevant information about the military's involvement in libya, we continue to receive documents from the state department. since late march alone, we have received over 3200 new documents, many of which have never been seen before by anyone outside of the administration, and all of which -- and i repeat -- all of which should have been turned over more than a year and a half ago when the committee launched its investigation. some of these documents, which were brought to light only days ago three request through a request by the organization called judicial watch, show a direct white house role outside -- i will repeat this -- the documents from judicial watch which were pursuant to our request more than a year and a half ago show a direct white house role outside of talking points prepared by the intelligence community. the white house produced the talking points that ambassador rice used, not the intelligence community. in pushing the false narrative that a youtube video was responsible for the deaths of four brave americans, it is disturbing and perhaps criminal that these documents and documents like these were hidden by the obama administration from congress and the public alike, particularly after secretary kerry pledged cooperation and the president told the american people in 2012 that every bit of information we have on benghazi has been provided. this committee's job is to get to the facts and to the truth. i for one will continue to chip away at this until we get the whole truth. the american people -- the americans who lost their lives in benghazi, those who were wounded, and the american people deserve nothing less. so today's hearing is critical for what our witnesses will give us, and i welcome you and i thank you for being here. but it comes in a week in which the american people have learned that you cannot believe what the white house says, you cannot believe with the spokespeople say, and you cannot believe what the president says, and the facts are coming out that in fact this administration has knowingly withheld arguments pursuant to congressional subpoenas in violation of any reasonable transparency or historic precedent, at least since richard milhous nixon. i now recognize the ranking member. >> i think the chairman for yielding, and i thank him for holding this hearing. in 2011 the people of libya rose up against their dictator and his oppressive rule which lasted more than four decades. at the time republicans and immigrants alike strongly supported helping armed rebels in their efforts to overthrow gaddafi. in april 2011, senator john mccain traveled to libya and met with rebels after which he proclaimed they are my heroes. during a national television appearance on july 3, 2011, senator mccain warned that allowing gaddafi to remain in power would be far more dangerous to the united states than the alternative. he stated this notion that we should fear who comes after or what comes after gaddafi ignores that if gaddafi stays in power it is a direct threat to our national security. airing a television appearance on april 24, 2011, senator lindsey graham agreed that taking the fight directly -- senator lindsey graham agreed that taking the fight directly to gaddafi with protect our national security. he stated, and i quote, "you cannot protect our vital, national security interests if gaddafi stays." he also stated, "the focus should now be to cut the head off." as the revolution grew stronger, gaddafi embarked on a crackdown. march 17, 2011, he threatened his own people. president obama explained to the worldwide united states was trying to remove gaddafi. he said "the world watches events unfold in libya with hope and alarm. protests demanded universal rights. in a government that responds to them. they were met with an eye and. gaddafi chose to pass a brutal suppressant. innocent civilians were beaten, imprisoned, and in some cases killed." senator mccain supported obama's visit. he said "if he had not acted, history would have remembered qadhafi in the same breath as former yugoslavia. a source of international shame." in an op-ed in april 2011, senator mccain wrote this, "the president was right -- gaddafi finally met his ugly demise. he was an extremely dangerous tyrant. he supported international terrorism during the 1980's, including a bombing which claimed the lives of 270 innocent civilians. he also reportedly pursued chemical, nuclear, and biological weapons. after gaddafi was killed, the new libyan government reportedly uncovered two tons of chemical weapons gaddafi had kept hidden from the world, yet armed and ready to use. we all know it dedicated and patriotic special envoy named christopher stevens arrived in many ghazi to work with the libyan people on their transition to democracy. he had forged deep connections with the libyan people during his career. he understood the challenges caused by 40 years of oppression. ambassador stephens believed in the promise of a new future for the country. today, libya is at a crossroads. open a newspaper and you will read about violence, weapons in a central government that has not yet consolidated its control over the country. on the other hand, the libyan people continue to look with the west with respect and hope. they aspire to work with united states to build a state-controlled democratic country. if we want them to succeed, we must find a way to reengage the world and ourselves. this was the bipartisan goal shared by republicans by lindsey graham and john mccain who called on the united states "to build a partnership with a democratic and pro-american libya that contribute to the mansion and security, prosperity, and freedom of the region at a time of revolutionary change. i look forward to hearing from our witnesses about how we assist people of libya. >> i thank the gentlemen. all members may have seven days in which to submit opening statements for the record and any quotes of senator lindsey graham or john mccain. for what purpose does the gentleman receipt -- request recommendation -- >> one is from the harvard kennedy school belford center for science and international affairs, entitled, "lessons from libya, how not to intervene." another is an associated press article entitled "libya's guns." "libya, transforming a company into -- a country into a failed state." the other is a state department document partially referenced by congressman -- the subject line is "libya update." the date is september 12 at 12:46 p.m. there is a paragraph pertinent to our discussion today. it is referencing the libya ambassador. when he said his government expects the former qaddafi regime elements carried out attacks, i told him the groups carried out the attacks is affiliated with islamic extremists. this coming from the state department, cheryl mills, secretary clinton posses chief of staff. i live -- i would like to enter this into the record. >> what was the date and time? >> september 12, 2012, hours after the attack. it is what the state department told the libyan government what was happening. "i told the libyan ambassador that the group attacks are affiliated with islamic extremists. those were the facts as the state department knew them. >> without objection, so ordered. copies will be distributed. we now welcome our guest and witnesses. general robert is the former deputy director for intelligence and knowledge development director at the united states after command. and the former deputy command general of the joint task force. and a research fellow at the hoover institution. mr. david ross, phd, is a senior fellow at the foundation for defense of democracies. mr. frederick is a senior associate for middle east program at the carnegie endowment for international peace. your title is impressive but they're all doctorates. pursuant to the rules, if all witnesses could please rise and raise your right hand. do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony you are about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth? thank you and please be seated. all witnesses answered in the affirmative. in order to allow sufficient time for questions, i would ask each witness summarize their opening statements, which will be placed in the record in their entirety, as well as other extraneous material. please died -- try to stay close to the five minutes. as my predecessor often said, green means go everywhere and yellow means hurry up through the intercession and read means stop. please observe that on the countdown clocks. with that, general, you are recognized. general -- >> thank you -- >> for all the witnesses, pull your mike's close to you because -- they are fairly insensitive. >> thank you. i retired this past year after 33 plus years of service. my service began in 1979 upon enlistment of the united states air force. it has been my honor and privilege to serve as an officer concerning my -- 1985. i served with many brave and distinguished women. i thank them for their service and example. my time in service was filled with great and humbling opportunities. i am thankful for these as well. i have been shaped by professional education, training, and it's.'s. these personal influences have informed my thoughts on the subject. to present a sense of context, here's an outline. the chairman has already covered some, but i -- i would like to add i twice served in africa command, first as a colonel and representative to command and next as a general officer as the deputy director of intelligence and knowledge development commission. i served as an officer for the operation center. during the dawn. and operation unified protector. in addition, i also served as the senior military liaison to the national science foundation. that is relevant since the science foundation was also an interagency partner. that greatly influenced my views on how interagency partnership works. three topics are submitted in my opening statement. the first is the nature of the command. second is the military operations with regard to libya. it discusses strategy, supporting policy, and policy in a highly dynamic and limiting -- it can be highly dynamic and limit strategy when it is challenged to achieve a desired result. benghazi in 2012, this is the most serious. there are many sayings in the military. one that rings most true is you fight the way you train. in benghazi, we did. many with firsthand knowledge recounted the heroism displayed that night. they fought the way they trained. that is in the record. outside of libya, there were discussions that churned on about what we should do. the elements also fought the way they were trained, specifically, the predisposition to enter agency influence had the military structure and spirit of government support waiting for a request for assistance. there were counts of time, and capability, and discussions of the question, could we have gotten there and made a difference. while the discussion is not, could or could not of time space and capability, the point is we should have tried. as another saying goes, always move to the sound of the guns. we did not know how long this would last when we became aware of this, nor do we completely understand what we had in front of us, be it a kidnapping, rescue, recovery, hostile engagement, or any and all above. what we did know early on was that this was a hostile action. it was no demonstration gone terribly awry. to the point of what happened, the facts lead to the conclusion of a terrorist attack. they were focused on on the attacks became attributable very soon after the event. thank you for the invitation to appear before the committee. i take this matter very seriously. i am prepared to take your questions. >> thank you, general. >> the starting point for a conversation about libya is that this is the sailing stake. security is eroding and governance is ebbing. as a result of those things, libya is not able to capitalize on its one big advantage, the oil revenue on which its economy is predominantly based. unless we are not interested in the outcome, both for libyan themselves and from the threats that are emanating to us from them, american policy should actually work to strengthen security in libya and strengthen governance in libya, so that the economy can help buffer the transition time of a fragile, democratizing government. our policies are not doing that. our policies are principally interested in limiting our involvement and, as a result, the problems inherent in all transition societies, the societies that have lived 40 years under a repressive government, and had his functional economies, they need structure assistance and help to the united states knows how to do that in terms of security sector reform, in terms of governance, and yet, we helped overthrow a government without helping establish security or governance. we largely ignored the growing restlessness of the militia in libya, and of the migration of jihadist to libya, where jihadist saar now in possession of a libyan government military base less than 20 miles from the capital. in overtaking the base, they also got ready valuable american military equipment, which we will be seeing in syria, libya, and even in our own country, unless we really help manage the problem of jihadist him in libya and elsewhere. building government capacity is the key to doing that. we cannot expect the libyan government is going to be able to disarm militia or to control the spread of jihadist him in their territory. that will be the result of political to go see a shin it cannot lead clinical negotiation. militia will not disarm until they have a high level of confidence that the reason for the political vacuum that exists in libya -- the libyans are having a messy and slow, one step forward and one step back conversation about governance in their country. but they deserve an awful lot more help from us and nongovernmental solutions the the unitedions states supports. instead, we have largely been silent on an election that was marred by violence and enrich yesterday's parliamentary vote in tripoli was prevented from coming to conclusion by storming out of the parliament by armed men. as was said, we need to do all that is necessary to help the libyan government transition and we are not. the last thing i would say is that if american policies will not help the fragile government transition to establish security and governance, that we actually ought to encourage other states to do so, states in the region that constituent it, politically amongst its neighbors, or states from outside the country. predominantly, the administration's policies have criticized the motives and actions of others instead of encouraging them to avoid our own policies. >> thank you. >> distinguished members, it is an honor to appear before you to discuss successes and failures of the nato intervention in libya. it seems two days ago that we were seeing rare good news out of libya. oil experts were about to resume after rebels holding it had come to an agreement with the government. on another optimistic note, the parliament had reconvened despite the new prime minister. the previous prime minister had resigned after only six days after his family was attacked. the prime minister before him was kidnapped by rebels. the prime minister vote did not go well. gunmen stormed the parliamentary building and forced lawmakers to abandon plans. this is libya today. each step forward for this is another step or two back, usually driven by security problems. each step forward for this is another step or two back, usually driven by security problems. the central government cannot execute basic sovereign functions in its own capital building. gunmen shut down justice and foreign affairs for two weeks due to a political dispute. outside countries are questioning whether it is safe to even keep diplomats in libya. jordan's ambassador was kidnapped last month. two tunisian diplomats are being held by jihadist. there have been many other attacks on embassies and staff. i do not have to remind anyone of what happened to ambassador stevens. i have submitted testimony explaining at length why i conclude the cost of nato's intervention outweighed the benefits. nato responded with extraordinary speed to the situation and save the lives gaddafi would have taken. this was accomplished with no allied casualties and only a 1.9 billion dollar cost. the question remains -- was going to war in libya the right choice? i would suggest the strategy of intervention should be called into question. several argue the arab spring had stalled at the time and intervening could help breathe new momentum into the revolutionary events. the desire to see dictators fall is noble but noble intentions do not automatically make for wise actions. the intervention came when there were already wrenching changes and unpredictable situation. tunisian and egyptian leaders have fallen and there were other revolutionary rumblings. it was not just the decision to stop gaddafi's advance but to speed up change. the problems associated with speeding up events could be seen in the second order of consequences. the most well-known occurred in north mali, where a collection of al qaeda linked jihadist, including al qaeda's north african affiliates gain control over a lot of territory, prompting a french led intervention in january 2013. the rebellion has a long history, but gaddafi's overthrow transformed dynamics. libya's dictator had been a long supporter and with him gone, they lost a major contributor. there are other ways libya's intervention contributed. after the dictator defeat, they raided his weapons caches. the heavily armed return to mali reinvigorated. there were signs that now, a year later, the jihadist may be back and indeed, southern libya has played a role in their combat. fighters from al qaeda fled from the advancing french and allied forces into southwest libya and blended with local militants. a variety of groups operate training camps in libya. millions have benefited from the flow of arms to neighboring countries. the factors make libya a concern. 30 miles from the libya border, which had multiple links to libya, including training. despite the superb execution of the intervention, this created a much more complicated regional dynamic for the u.s. senate and helped jihadist groups and has had negative consequences for libya's neighbors. it is not clear the intervention saved lives. some scholars argue that the fact the nato intervention prolonged the war meant that it cost more lives than it safe. -- saves. even if it saves more lives than libya, further lives were lost as a result. this is why i cannot join with those who proclaim nato's intervention to be a strategic success. i appreciate the opportunity to testify and i look forward to answering your questions. >> thank you. chairman, ranking member cummings, committee members, i am grateful for the opportunity to speak with you about libya's security crisis and what the international community can do to assist. i bring the perspective of both a scholar who travels frequently to the country and a military officer who served in tripoli prior to the revolution. i spoke with libya government officials, military officers, and militia leaders across the country, including benghazi. at the core of libya's crisis is the power of its militias, who draw support from a wide array of local tribal, ethnic, and religious constituencies. their persistence is rooted in the absence of an effective governance, representative institutions, and a strong and central army and police. since 2012, the militias have become politicized. they have used armed force to compel the passage of a sweeping law barring gaddafi era laws from the government. they kidnapped a prime minister and stopped oil production in the east. weapons are the de facto currency through which demands are pressed. militias have also captured illicit trafficking networks. libya's instability has been aggravated by the weak transitional government to put the militias on the payroll. under the loose authority of the defense and interior, the idea was to harness the manpower of the revolutionaries to fill the security void left by the nonexistent army, which was deliberately kept weak by gaddafi, who feared its potential. by all accounts, this has been a disastrous bargain. it has attracted new recruits and has given the militia bosses even more political power. that power is especially evident in the east, where militias demand the removal of personnel through state institutions and the implementation of a sharia-based competition before they surrender arms. these actors remain on the outer fringes of libya's politics and security institutions. overwhelmingly, the the countries reject violence for political means. based with the weakness for the central government and an array of informal societal actors come to ngo's and religious authorities have mobilized against the militias, especially radical groups. they have demonstrated a societal resilience and moderation that is kept the country from sliding down the path of civil war. i want to emphasize that every libyan i spoke with a true to the crisis to the enduring legacy of gaddafi's rule, rather than policies or decisions during the nato-led intervention. he deprived libya of even a basic rule of governance. pitted tribe against tribe. kept the security institutions deliberately weak, and marginalized the eastern part of the country. libyans overwhelmingly remains supportive of the operation and welcome outside assistance. where are the areas where this assistance can be best supplied? most important task is reforming the sector. the u.s. and its allies are currently engaged in such a project under the offices of -- auspices of what is known as the general-purpose force. in doing so, they must ensure the ranks of the new force are inclusive of libya's diverse tribes and region and that effective oversight is in place so political factions do not capture the new security entities as the personal militias. it is important to recognize lasting security cannot be achieved without addressing the economic and clinical motives that drive support for militias. the government has tried to disarm the mobilized and integrate the young men of the militias. none of the efforts has succeeded because the country is paralyzed between opposing political factions. each side sees any movement on the security sector as a win for his rivals. in essence, libya suffers from a balance of weakness amongst its factions and militias. no single entity can compel the others to coercion, but every entity is strong enough to veto the others. with this in mind, the ultimate solution for libya's woes lie in the political realm. in the drafting of a constitution, the reform of its election, and a broad-based reconciliation under the broad-based national dialogue. these are areas where outsiders can lend advice and measured assistance, but where the ultimate burden must be borne by libyans themselves. thank you for the opportunity to speak with you here today. >> thank you. i now recognize myself for five minutes of questioning. you were not on this or the armed services committee's primary list of people interviewed in the process, and yet you came forward here today, came forward to the committee, and could you explain to us why you believe it was necessary to come forward to offer us your testimony? >> yes. i came forward because, as a retired officer, most importantly having served a number of years, i felt it was my duty to come forward. the young men and women who serve in uniform, those that serve along with us, in civilian clothes, the circumstances of what occurred in benghazi that day need to be known. with all of the discussion that ensues over a full forthcoming to the american people, it is important. it is a duty to be here. >> thank you. our committee has interviewed a number of people, including those downrange, people both in libya and benghazi. but as i said earlier, we, for the most part, have not interviewed people, the exception being general ham, although carter ham was at the pentagon on september 11. do you believe it is appropriate for us to interview other officers and enlisted personnel that serve with you that day as part of our discovery of what they believe could have been done, not just in what we military people call the to shop, but also in the three shop and so on? >> sure, i think if it's any information that gives the most well-rounded picture, they are important to obtain. one of the questions, as we fan out here, one of the questions i have for you is, your primary job is knowing the risk, knowing who the bad guys are and where they are and knowing what might face them. is that correct? so your expertise is not in the -- >> yes. >> so your expertise is not in the operational response of what reef you lose will wear and react with in time. however, you are intimately familiar with the risk of extremist groups in egypt, libya, and throughout north africa and all of africa. now, >> yes. >> african command, basically, does not have any jets. it does not have any conventional divisions. so you leverage all of the other commands when you need physical boots on the ground. >> that's correct. boots on the grounds, planes in the air, ships in the sea, etc. >> however, the role of african command, and i'm not trying to put words in your mouth so please correct me if i'm even a little off, it is in fact to look at a continent in which we have almost no troops and almost no basing. we have a small joint ace but -- base but for the most part, we have no military assets in africa. is it fair to say that counterterrorism, looking for and being aware and working with the government in africa, with or without if necessary, to combat terrorism and to make sure governments are stable and able to support our missions and the eight missions and the embassies? is that really to a great extent why there is a unique command with a four-star general in charge of it that focuses on this continent of a billion people larger than north america? >> that is precisely the understanding. to help africans help africans, and work with africans and our other partners to do so. >> so in that role, on september 11, earlier, there was an attack in egypt. did you know of, anticipate, or believe that the attack in egypt was based on seeing a youtube video? >> personally, no. >> that never came to you even though intelligence and what may have caused something would have been right up your alley. and in the hours that ensued after the attack on our compound in benghazi, did you hear youtube video? >> briefly discussed, but not from any serious standpoint. >> what time did you first hear there was a video? >> it was early in the evening. >> before 3:15 in the morning. >> absolutely. i would have to say probably i dismissed the notion by then by working with other sources. >> i want to follow quick one last thing. you have heard about this early on and, as the deputy and the highest-ranking person that moment working these issues, you dismissed the idea that this attack was in fact a demonstration that went awry and was based on a youtube video out of los angeles. >> yes, sir. >> thank you. more than three years ago, a wave of clinical change swept through the middle east and north africa. the arab spring promised hope for people oppressed by dictators for decades. but it also led to abrupt change and i look forward to learning how this movement has evolved and how the united states can support a peaceful democratic transition in the region. i would also like to focus on the choice our country faced when the uprising against dictator gaddafi began in 2011. at that time come the united states could have done nothing and allowed gaddafi to remain in power or we could have supported the liberation of libya. at the time, both republicans and democrats called on the president to support the rebels and gaddafi. for example, lindsey graham -- "you cannot protect our vital national interests if gaddafi stays." in a general level, do you agree with senator graham? >> yes, i do. >> dr. flake, how about you? >> yes, i do. >> earlier, i think you would agree with me that there are things you would do to be supportive of the government. what with those things be? >> there are several things. as several parent mentioned, helping establish a national army that is helping to police libya'territory, rain in the militia as you begin to get political solutions to problems that will permit their disarmament. second, support and structure that helps organized civil society and elections in libya. we are doing much too little in helping libya move forward. we do that largely with examples, our own but also what all of us know about society. we know how to do this and we are just not doing it nearly enough. >> three months later, on july 3, 2011, senator john mccain stated, and i quote, "if gaddafi stays, it is a direct threat to our national security." what is your view and did you agree? >> i did not. he was a brutal dictator. but he was also about as rehabilitated as a dictator could be. the statement he threatened our national security would have been very true in the 1980's, but by 2011 he was at most a third of fourth tier security concern. -- or fourth tier security concern. >> therefore, you disagreed with the senator. >> yes, i do. >> do you agree with the senators? >> i believe gadhafi was keeping a lid on a lot of things brewing. he was probably not a direct security threat the way he was in the 1980's. it depends on how we define security. many of the ills that spilled over from libya in the current from of libya it were because of his rule, how we kept things clamped down and didn't permit civil society, marginalize the east. the seeds of extremism were sown during his regime. in that sense, it was a security threat, i think we know libyans were fighting in iraq and afghanistan. >> what do you think we should be doing? what steps should be taken to improve the situation in libya? >> under the circumstances, the u.s. is doing quite a lot with other partners in europe and elsewhere. the u.s. is committed to train over 19,000 new libya soldiers as part of the general purpose force. this proposal is underway. we are engaged with the civil society. much of the problem is the other side. much of the delay we cannot really invert -- interface with them. the libyan government has not agreed to provide payment or the general purchase force, which is why we are unable to move forward with the training of the new army. during my travels to libya since the revolution, i found the international community has been engaged in terms of reforming the sector and helping oversight, reaching out to libya's vibrant civil society. a lot of this is the problem of access. the security situation does not permit us to go out and reach libyans. >> what would you have us do there? >> no longer serving having access to a lot of the pertinent information and data, i would not be able to give you a strong military answer to that. my personal answer would be one where it is a set of circumstances where we would have to work together. that development would have to be very engaged on the ground. >> thank you. i ask unanimous consent to put something on the record at this time. >> the commander general ham, we have also interviewed the advice commander. would you agree to provide the committee additional suggestions of the people from your recollection outside the hearing so it not be public, the people you believe would be most helpful to gain knowledge directly on the fact of the ground that day. -- facts on the ground on that day. >> yes sir. of course. of the list of people we have already interviewed, would they be people that would be able to render an opinion? i am not saying you would come up with the same conclusion, but would have the same type of information? >> each of those gentlemen, i know them. they are fine officers. >> would they be in a position to render an opinion? >> yes, sir. >> we have established we will get additional names and the names we already interviewed to -- would be ones on your list. >> thank you. a couple of questions. >> you testified we view the -- we knew the night of september 11 that this night was not the results of a video that has been shown. we knew this was a concerted attack. >> yes. >> that being said, in your position, you would know who would know what. the state department would also have known pretty instantaneously that there was an incident going on, i've seen videos of some of those transmitted. we had a pretty good idea of what was going on. would you say the state department should have or could have? >> they could or should, yes sir. >> the attacks started at 9:40, 3:40 in the afternoon here. approximately a six-hour difference, i think. >> yes. >> so it was not an unusual time here in the united states, that the appropriate people in the highest level people should be alerted that something serious is going on at one of our posts. is that correct? >> during the day here in the united states, yes sir. >> i do not know if i could have saved the ambassador or the aide with him. they may have been killed in the smoke, or the first part of that -- would you say that is a pretty good assumption? that it was not possible to save them because they were probably killed within an hour or two? the u.s. does not have the capability of responding, not that we should not have had on the ground the capability to respond to some kind of attack. would that be a correct assumption? >> typically, the greatest desire for whatever situation you will be into, to have adequate security. >> i know we have over 100 posts. there were about 14 listed as high risk, and benghazi was one of them. >> you would have to look to the state department. >> someone failed. they failed to have the proper protections. every post does not have the same risk and every point does not have the same risk. that was one of the major ones. the time frame did not allow us to save the ambassador as they came in and attacked. it was an attack. it wasn't a demonstration in the street. the two navy seals, i believe they were killed at approximately 5:15 a.m. it started at 9:40, a good six hours. i have been to italy, spain, turkey. as a member of congress, if we had an incident, this is for -- before benghazi that we could respond and had the capability of responding. particularly, an ambassador or american citizens from north africa, it is not exactly the toughest spot. i believe we could have saved those had someone taken action. do you think we have the ability to do that? >> presently or at the time? >> at the time, it did not happen that way. others have discussed -- >> did the united states have the ability to protect -- people at that post, within six hours -- >> the state department would be responsible for the time on the ground. the military could have made a response of some sort. >> the military could have made a response. i believe those two individuals were not saved. mr. issa and i, we went and interviewed people. our military personnel, they were not given the go-ahead. they were not given the assets. no one responded to go in and save the two individuals who were lost. i believe we had that capability. can you tell the committee if you think we had the capability of saving them at that time once again? >> you mentioned personal assets and time and distance. all those things put together at that moment? i was not in operations -- >> again, we had that capability, i believe. i was told even before this if we had an incident, we could go in and rescue or resolve a situation. do you believe we have that capability? >> if capabilities were in hand, then they could be employed. >> thank you. >> welcome to our panel. let me pick up on that. you were not in the operational chain of command at the time of the tragedy? >> not in the chain of command. i was serving in a staff role at that point in time. >> you are not making decisions. >> that is correct. >> i do not know if you're familiar with the fact the service committee on february 10 issued a report -- i want to quote from it and see what part of this you disagree with. my friend from florida suggests we could have done something from italy. "secretary panetta, in consultation with general ham, general dempsey, and others, verbally authorized three specific actions. first, two marine and fast platoons were ordered to prepare and deploy. second, a special operations unit known as commanders -- cif, training in croatia was ordered to move to a nato air station in italy and await instructions. these orders were issued approximately 2-4 hours after the initial attack. is it your contention we should have done this sooner or more of it? or do you deny it happened? >> my belief as i put in my statement, it has to do with, we should have continued to move forward with whatever forces we were going to move forward with. the timeline was in the operation of the channels. what i am looking at is how we choose to respond in the future really needs to be along the lines of the military feeling empowered to take action under the authorities it has. so that it can move forward and do that -- >> i want to read to you the conclusion of the chairman of the committee, the republican chairman. he conducted formal briefings and oversaw that report. he said "i am pretty well satisfied but given where the troops were, how quickly the thing all happened, and how quickly it dissipated, we probably could not have done much more than we did." do you take issue with that conclusion? >> the conclusion that he could not have done much more than he did, that is a fact. >> i am sure you can appreciate there might be some who, for reasons, distort your testimony and say we could have done more than we did. that is not your testimony. thank you. if i understood your testimony, libya is a mess. it is a very unstable environment. that is the environment in which we are trying to work and which we were working at the time of the tragedy in benghazi. >> correct. >> no amount of u.s. troops and security forces were going to change that environment. >> they will not change the fact the central government cannot exercise a writ. >> my friend in utah, i went to tripoli, not benghazi. the airport at the time, security was controlled by the militia and not the government. >> i am not aware of whether that is changed. -- that makes one very uneasy about security. let's hope they're friendly. but, it is obviously painful, transparent symbolism of the lack of any authority. i see you shaking your head as well. do you want to comment? >> i agree with you. >> that is also very important. the testimony the three of you have provided, which i appreciate. again, people can play politics with a tragedy all they want. the fact of the matter is, at the time of the tragedy and even to this day, libya is a very unstable situation post-revolution. the object is to do the best we can to try to change that dynamic to create a more stable government that provide security not only for us but also for its own people. a fair statement? >> absolutely. as i mentioned, since 2013, the u.s. has been planning in -- for helping the libyan government with forces. our diplomats are involved with reaching out to civil society. but it is a tough challenge. i really want to emphasize a lot of this is on the libyan shoulders. this is a country that needs to reach a broad political reconciliation among its faction before they can be in a position to receive outside help. when i talk to people in the state department, there is a sense where there is a lack of partnership on the other side and you need that. i think much of this is taking time. libya is writing a constitution. they held elections in 2012 that, by all accounts, were relatively transparent and fair. they remain very pro-american, which has been contrasted to many other countries in the region. >> i want to thank all four of you for your testimony. it is very enlightening. it is a contribution to what has been a conversation about a tragedy in libya. thank you very much. >> thank you. for what purpose does the gentleman from florida seek recognition? >> along with 60 members, this letter was sent to the president saying it was a year now since the benghazi attacks. nothing had been done to bring these people to justice and asking for the administration to act. >> without objection, so ordered. the gentleman from utah is recognized for five minutes. >> thank you and thank you all for being here. thank you for the service of your country in general. god bless you. thank you for your service over 33 years. on september 11, 2012, what was your ranking title? >> brigadier general, u.s. air force. i served as the deputy director for intelligence knowledge development j-2. >> where were you the night of september 11 and 12th? >> at home until i was recalled. >> to the operations center in germany. you were in the room. >> yes. >> you were able to see, hear, feel, understand what was going on in that room? >> we worked toward understanding, yes, sir. >> were you ever interviewed by the accountability review board? >> no, sir. >> your primary responsibility was to try -- "africom j-2 was focused on attribution, that attacks became attributable very soon after the event." what do you believe they were attributable to? >> an islamist extremist group. >> al qaeda? >> we felt it was [indiscernible] >> affiliated with al qaeda. >> yes. >> aq, were they involved? >> [indiscernible] >> how quickly did you come to the conclusion that you believed there were al qaeda affiliates or al qaeda themselves involved engaged in the attack? >> very soon, in the early hours of the activity. >> was it a video? >> no, sir. >> did it spark a protest? >> no, sir. >> i want to get the facts at the time. the cia station chief is quoted as saying, "not not an escalation protest." would you agree or disagree with the cia station chief's analysis? >> absolutely, it was an attack. >> jones at the state department, in an e-mail that went to among others, hillary clinton's chief of staff says she told the libyan ambassador september 12, 12:46 p.m., i told him the group that conducted the attack is affiliated with islamic extremists. would you agree or disagree with that statement? >> yes i would agree. the timing of it, i do not know. the content, yes. >> the scandal that is here, that some choose to ignore, a phony scandal, is the fact that the cia station chief, the military themselves. you have the person sitting front of us, who is the head of intelligence and he is looking at the intelligence. they come to the conclusion that it is sharia and then you have the department of state telling libyans. none of them think it is a video. none of them. the military, the cia, the cia station chief, the state department, all of them, the fact that the time, mr. chairman, the facts do not point to a video. that only comes from the white house. what was going on in the room, general? our people were under attack and people were dying. what is the military doing? >> desperately trying to gain situational awareness in an area where we had a dearth of it. >> were they moving to the sound of the guns and doing what they were trained to do, or were they sitting around and waiting for the state department and hillary clinton to call them up and do something -- and say, "do something." what do they actually do? >> we sent a predator drone overhead to -- >> did we do enough? your professional opinion. i know you care deeply. what was the mood in the room and what was the feeling? was it to save our people? >> it was desperation -- >> what? >> desperation to gain awareness and be able to do something to save people. >> did they actually do it? the three actions we talked about. a fast team. they are not even trained to go into that fight. the other force we are talking about is coming from the united states of america. we had assets there. did they actually go to the sound of the gun? do they actually go into benghazi? >> no. >> why not? >> basically, there was a lot of looking to the state department for what it was they wanted and in the deference to the libyan people and the sense of deference to the desires from the state department in terms of what they would like to have -- >> did they ever tell you to go save the people of benghazi? >> not to my knowledge. >> we did not run to the sound of the guns. we had americans dying. we had dead people. wounded people. and our military did not try to engage in the fight. would you disagree with that? >> the gentleman's time is expired and a gentleman may answer on any of the questions if he did not feel you got enough time to answer fully. >> four individuals died. obviously we did not respond in time to get there. >> the gentleman's time has expired. >> i thank the gentleman. >> we may have been able to, but we'll never know. >> thank you, mr. chairman. this hearing is interesting. it seems to be based on the notion that there were unintended consequences after the intervention into libya. let me begin by saying it is the nature of the beast if one is talking about the mideast. it is interesting to note in contrast when we intervened in iraq, where the consequences -- where we could have prevented by simply letting the monitors on the ground, continue to look for weapons of mass distraction, we went willy-nilly. we did not have anything like that in libya. yet we went in headfirst. perhaps the most catastrophic war of the 20th century engaged in by the u.s.a. many of us were very doubtful about libya, to be sure, and many democrats followed our republican colleagues who argued very forcefully for intervention in libya and democrats were quite split on it. senator mccain, who was the last standard bearer in 2008, the leader on foreign policy, he said in 2011, some still argue we should be cautious about helping the libyan opposition, warning that we do not know enough about them or that their victory could pave a way for al qaeda takeover. how do your sponsor that argument? -- respond to senator mccain's argument? >> i think he was incorrect. we did not know enough about the rebels at the time which was testified to by the members of the intelligence committee. >> do we know enough about them now? even if we did, one wonders whether that could have moved us one way or the other as we saw this dictator in power. dr. wehrey, it seems that senator mccain was saying if we do not intervene, the war might have dragged on longer and al qaeda might have been strengthened. do you agree that was a risk? >> i do agree. if the war had dragged on, you might have seen the de facto partition of libya, gaddafi holding on to loyalist areas. the country might have become a haven for jihadists. >> were these rebels seen as pro-western? >> they were. in my interactions with them after the revolution, even islamists in the east were supportive of nato's help in their interface with nato. by and large, they remained pro western. what happens in any opposition there are splinters, so you had groups peeled off that were more radical and have links with radical groups, but i think he was accurate. >> thank you very much. i yield back. >> i thank the gentlelady. i would let members know that there will be a vote on the floor at approximately 10:55. we will remain here taking questions, probably for the first 10 or so minutes after they called the vote. we will then recess until approximately 10 minutes after the last vote is called, meaning if you vote quickly and head back, you will be here when i regavel us open again. we now go to the gentleman from ohio, mr. jordan. >> thank you. i want to pick up where my colleague was at. you had two statements in her testimony that i think are most telling. the first is always moved to the sound of the guns. that means something for you, doesn't it, general? >> yes. >> you take seriously the airmen, the soldiers, the sailors, you had a chance, you take that seriously? >> yes. >> and you could not do that on september 11 because you said we were waiting for a request of assistance for the state department. you could not react normally the way the military always reacts. in this situation you could not do what the military always does? is that accurate? >> yes. >> and you have been deployed all over the world. has there ever been a situation prior to this where you could not react in the normal customary way the military reacts? >> no situation -- >> first time in your 33 years rising to the rank of general, you could not do with the military always does, run to the sound of the guns? >> yes, sir, for me. >> why was that the case? what had the state department done in your time at african command, what was the culture, what was the climate, what happened where you could not do what you normally do? >> this was a command created to be a bit different. it was created to work with an interagency environment to ensure -- >> i get that. what specifically? we have soldiers down, people under attack. you know as everyone now knows it was a terrorist attack. when you have soldiers under attack, you run to the sound the guns. you could not do that. what specifically had the state department done or said that prevented you from -- we know this is unique and that it was different the way it was set up, but when that happens you still react the way you are supposed to react, and yet you could not. what did the state department do that prevented you from doing it? >> well, it is not what they did in that particular situation. they did not come with a stronger request for action. >> in your time dealing with libya, when there was a situation, the state department said do this. now they are not giving you guidance at all? >> prior to that, our condition was with odyssey guard, we were there to support the state department in setting up and establishing the embassy in tripoli. therefore, the work that was done relative to libya was one where the state department was in the lead and we worked to support them to achieve the goals of the united states. >> who at the state department did you and the officers directly above you -- did you directly interface with? >> in varying circumstances, but for me, i had interactions when i was in italy working with odyssey guard. would have talked on occasion with ambassador -- >> anyone else? >> briefings back at africom over the summer, andrew shapiro came there as well. he was briefed. and then of course ambassador johnny carson, who was very engaged obviously in what went on. >> and this is andrew shapiro who was assistant secretary of state for political affairs? >> that is correct. >> part of global strategies, correct currently? >> yes. >> definitely where he works. did the general urge the state department to take a specific action? did you and or the general get specific direction of what to do? >> i cannot speak for anyone other than myself. that was not my place to encourage them to do that. >> and you do not know if the general urged -- >> i do not know if they urged to take action. there was dialogue over what action wanted to be taken. >> the general like you was trained in a culture that says when you have soldiers under attack you respond, right? >> there was a senior admiral in charge, but they were engaged back in d.c. >> i yield back. >> i thank the gentleman. you mentioned mr. shapiro and the engagement, was libya different in state department interface, and if so, how? >> either -- the answer is, yes, it was different, and it was different because our other engagements, where we were engaged militarily, where we were supporting the policy of the united states, we worked with a c.t. type focus, counterterrorism type focus. this was the first activity that did not start out as a counterterrorism effort that employed the combat power for africa command. >> thank you. mr. lynch, are you next? the gentlelady is recognized. >> thank you, chairman. given the atrocities that gaddafi committed, it is no question that libya is much better off without him. after 42 years of rule, we have a delicate transition to a democracy. dr. wehrey, you testified previously that overwhelmingly the country's political leaders are rejecting violence for political means and that they are committed to some sort of a democratic path forward and that they will have greater cooperation with the u.s. can you explain in more detail what their willingness is or how that willingness to cooperate with u.s. is manifesting itself, and what can we do? >> again, it is really significant that some islamists who at one time were foes of the united states, these leaders are now in the parliament, in ministries, they are meeting with united states diplomats, meeting with our ambassador there. it goes back to the tremendous goodwill that stems from the intervention there. they look at the areas where we can help as applying our own expertise in democracy, how do you run a parliament. you have to remember -- and i was in libya under gaddafi -- it was an orwellian state where people had no role in their self governments. they had no experience in things that you and i take for granted. they are sending delegations to other countries to learn how do you run a town council, what are structures for federalism, how do you oversee budget, basic things. the u.s. has an important role to play. there is a tremendous need for security, and the former prime minister came to the united states and asked for u.s. help in training the new libyan army. the united states has stepped up with that request, along with britain, italy, and morocco. we are helping and prepared to help in that respect. i would also say engaging with the people of libya. when i talk to the u.s. diplomats, they say libyan society is vibrant. there is an educated class, young people, a thirst for openness, we are training their media, reaching out to youth groups, women, and these are all incredibly valuable areas. yes, the country has a terrorism problem. but i urge policymakers to not be consumed by the terrorist problem and not let that be the only lens through which we view this country. >> can you speak about their police forces needing help to train their police forces from the u.s. or any other allies? >> other allies. much of this training is already going on in places like italy. the italians, jordanians, turks are involved. many people are training their police. this training is happening in other countries for security reasons. >> are there are additional risks to consider as we support the effort in this transition? are there risks for a program for demobilization and reintegration of the militia members? you talked about combating terrorism. as united states helps libya moving forward, i want to make sure we minimize risks to our nation and to our citizens as well. are there any risks we should be keeping an eye on as we try to help them move forward? >> absolutely. when we trained the new libyan security forces we want to make sure we are doing a thorough vetting of these individuals to make sure we are not imparting training and equipment to bad actors. we do this in our engagement elsewhere in a number of states. there are always a number of risks involved. africom, they are asking the tough questions, we are going to step in and help train this force, but what are the unintended consequences down the road? we do not want to create a military that steps in and subverts the democratic process in the country, becomes more authoritarian or goes back to the old ways. i think that is a risk. border control is a huge area we need to focus on. the european union is heavily involved in this. i think the united states needs to push the europeans to take on more of the burden. much of their security is directly impacted by what happens in libya. >> thank you very much. i yield back. >> i thank the gentlelady. the gentleman from michigan. >> thank you, mr. chairman, and, general lovell, i thank you for your service and your desire to be here. i recognize the fact that you led as commander, but were under command as well, and the frustrations of being under command at times in this situation appear to be very evident. i appreciate you being here. you mentioned in your written he comes the ability to mobilize this with limited on the ground. what do you mean by the implied timeframe? >> the united states was acting under odyssey dawn, and then was supporting under the u.n. resolution. so in working through the compressed time frame prior to oup taking place, the united states was acting with allied partners and more focused nato-plus effort, if you will, with oup. there was a desire to get done what we could get done prior to that and then moving forward. also, there is so much you can do without boots on the ground. i was not in an operational role at the time, but just military knowledge tells you need is on the ground to hold and make changes, much as the panelists discussed here today. >> effectiveness, could you elaborate, of this policy? >> of a new boots on ground policy? >> yes, sir. >> you can effect from the sea, you can effect from the air, but you can hold and have lasting change by being present on the ground in a situation where you need more than, say, diplomacy or economic influence and the military is called in. that is serious business and the change takes place on the ground. >> am i to understand then that the effectiveness was compromised, that it was not complete, was not as full as possible, was not satisfactory without having this boots on the ground available to you? >> i would characterize it as you would obviously have had a different outcome and effect had you had boots on the ground than without it. >> when did africom become aware of political turmoil in libya? >> libya was a country that we watched as we watch all of them -- i'm speaking from a j2 perspective. we kept tabs on all the countries. in the arab spring, we do especially that there could be other effects going across that area. there were things that we watched that were c.t. oriented and things that we watched that were more broadly politically effecting. that began to happen -- >> when you begin monitoring it. when was that? >> in the early 2011 timeframe. >> did africom have any role in the decision-making process to intervene in libya? >> would you repeat? >> did africom have any role in the decision-making process to intervene in libya, and if so, what was that role? >> i would not have that information. >> what was africom's role during odyssey dawn? >> to work with allied partners prior to the u.n.'s resolution taking effect to assist the rebels in libya. >> what about unified protector? >> that was a more broad effort sanctioned by the united nations to assist the rebels in libya. >> dr. gartenstein-ross, some have praised the nato intervention as a model intervention, but your testimony points the consequences of the intervention. what are some of the most pronounced consequences of this libyan intervention? >> the largest is what happened in north mali -- >> the gentleman's time has expired. >> what happened in north mali. a direct line can be drawn between the intervention by nato and the situation in mali. the two are separatists groups and jihadists were able to exploit that. those who fought for gaddafi came back heavily armed. there are other consequences that could be felt with the flow of arms threat the region, going to egypt, tunisia. lives have been directly lost there, and one thing we saw in january this year is they shoot down of an egyptian military helicopter. we did not know for sure where those arms came from, but the united nations panel of experts which looks at the diffusion of libyan arms and beatty accounts believe that gaddafi's armories are the most likely place where militants were able to get this weaponry to shoot down that helicopter. when you look at the unintended consequences it has made the region must less stable. >> thank you, mr. chairman. >> thank you, mr. chairman. thank you to our witnesses who are here today to testify before this committee, and it is important to recognize that before us today is a panel of experts for whom we as a committee can gather critically important information and advice as well as insight into the on the ground and geopolitical realities in libya and the greater middle east region. the tragedy that occurred in benghazi is that, a tragedy, and out of those who died serving our country and for the safety of those who continue to do so around the world, it is imperative that this committee gain actionable policy reforms so that we can prevent similar disasters from occurring again. so i want to ask the panel, and i will start with mr. wehrey, in your testimony cannot you discussed at length the challenges that outside assistance, including from countries like the united states, turkey, britain, morocco, and italy, face in terms of providing training assistance in the development of an effective libyan army. can you elaborate and what your recommendations to this committee would be? >> again, i think i would recognize that before this training can take effect or before you can build a real security sector, you have to have political reconciliation in this country. libyan's have to get together and hammer at out a broad pact. they have to go forward with this national dialogue. much of the paralysis and outside assistance has not had an effect is because there has not been this reconciliation among these factions. i would urge outsiders to focus on sequencing, that we need to support the libyans in these political issues in reforming their parliament from in the national dialogue, in the constitution so that this training can take full effect. it is the horse before the wagon. there has to be security in the country for these institutions to function. we have to help them to a certain degree create the space for these institutions. i think the united states since at least last year has recognized that this country needs greater help. when i speak to people in the defense department, there is a willingness and appreciation for the situation. nato is engaged. other arab countries, europe, so the willingness is there. >> other panelists, would you propose specific reforms that this committee could recommend? >> in addition to what dr. wehrey said, there are several other specific things we could do. one of the united states' great strengths in helping transitioning countries is to emphasize how federalism works in the united states, not just politically, but also militarily. the balance of the national guard and reservists and their function in the states is for libya in my judgment a very useful model, because their political reconciliation is not going to progress without a more activist federalism that makes the region's of the country and the tribes of the country feel more politically secure than they now feel. you will not get disarmament and hold them. i will focus on that. second, we need to be a much more vibrant voice talking about how the violence damaged the elections, how much it matters that only 15% of the libyan people were represented in the 48 people selected for the constitutional council. we need to create political attention to this, and that will help them to the political reconciliation they need to make. some people to say nothing can be done because the libyans themselves need to make progress. they will not make progress without us helping them have the security to make brave domestic political choices, and we are under investing in that. >> anyone else, last 17 seconds? >> one performer i would recommend, the council did issue revisions, breaking from al qaeda, it is important for the u.s. to be aware whether some figures with the government are helping jihadist groups. one thing we learn from our experience in egypt is back in the damaging. one figure i would draw attention to is a former libyan fighting member whose media advisor had been a member of a global jihadist forum. according to regional media, he has providing shelter to a jihadist group in that country. even while we help libya is good to be aware of and to bring political pressure down on those who are supporting america's enemies. >> thank you. let the walk through couple things. i will be a final question. then we will take a recess. let me walk through five minutes of questions. general, thank you for your service. i want to be able to ask a couple quick questions. based on what you were watching that night, do you feel like the united states was doing everything it could do to protect the people, its facilities abroad, that the united states was doing every thing it could do to protect its people and facilities abroad, based on what you saw the night? >> no, sir. >> do you believe that night and even during that night, did you believe that this was a protest rooted in an internet video? >> no, sir. >> did you have any sense that night based on what you were hearing about the communication between state and dod and what was happening on the ground, trying to gather information that there was a steadiness and a strength through that evening in trying to make the decisions? >> there was a bit of -- there was definitely a strong desire to come to decisions. there was a period of time where gaining an understanding of what was needed from folks on the ground, because we did not have a lot of insight -- >> was there communication coordination? >> there was a lot of back and forth, yes, sir. >> did you feel like there were clear lines of adjudication and steadiness of leadership so there was a consistent plan that was unfolding? >> it was continually strived for in that room. we were looking back to the united states for more -- >> were you getting it from the united states? were you getting clear communication leadership from washington, from the united states, on what to do next? >> my observations were that they were still looking for more decisions. >> does anyone know if we have brought the people to justice that did this in error fantasy in our facilities? is anyone aware that justice has been carried out? >> we have not. >> so the four things i just walked through, were the four talking points saying these were the areas that we were going to be talking about when we went into the sunday shows. all things we knew in the initial days are not true and we are still waiting for this statement that came out from the beginning -- >> we will take these individuals to justice. two years later, so the four things the white house put out, three of them are factually not true, and one was a promise that is still unkept. what were you tracking that evening? how were you gathering that information during the course of the evening? >> there were national means to gain intelligence. there were the communiques we received directly or indirectly from individuals on the ground -- >> you're talking about the e-mail traffic? >> the chat. the analysts worked through chat, and the operational channels did the same thing. we also -- at a certain point in time, we were able to swing a bird over there and relieve that and gain more. >> then the phone conversations have a different point -- the individuals on the ground are in phone communication with other individuals. were you getting information about that as well? >> we knew we would have knew we would have information filtered back to us that people were back in communication. >> were you were aware there was close circuit tv that was available on the compound itself? >> no, sir. >> there is video feed that was extensive that you can look down the street and see that there is no protests going on in the street, and you can actually see the actions on the compound, and be able to get through that. that video you did not have a feed to. that close circuit tv does exist as well as the predator, the feed you are dealing with as >> those calls would go back to the operational chain of command, so those people that were engaged were back in washington, d.c. the general was dealing with that as well. >> there was a clear line of communication, you knew that where that would come from? >> we would be in contact with people. we would hear back at that command center from at my level from a military authority to do something. >> ok. did we have americans back that night -- >> sir? >> the united states military always watches americans' backs. did we have americans' backs that night? did you consider this attrition normal for our facilities? is this a normal security situation? prior to that attack, was this a normal environment for our personnel? >> no, sir. >> does anyone else have a comment on that? was this a normal security environment? >> it was not a normal security environment. >> i have heard there was a push to normalize security and actually withdrawal individuals that were our own, americans, to provide security and to put in country security folks, which is typical for us, that we have a larger force in embassies and facilities that are provided for in country. we had a militia watching our front door from libya. the front door of the facility, a local militia was providing this attorney for it. a quick question -- if you went to libya right now would you be ok if one of the local militias guarded your front door? would anyone be open to that? >> with all due respect, that is the way security is functioning in this country -- >> i understand -- >> [indiscernible] >> a normal security environment that we would run with one of