millennials are engaging their communities. >> what is the one issue that will be important for young people in 2016? >> many. well, i think this gets back to the millennial. it is not a one word and -- one word answer. we all issues that are important to us. every issue is connected. figuring out how to have a bigger lens, solving each issue. my last thing to copy your question, i never really understand why older people are saying they don't understand millennials. you can ask people what they are interested in. how they want to communicate and how they would want to partner with you. instead of categorizing one group as this elusive group we all have the power to make relationships with people. >> that discussion concerning the issues that motivate their generation is tonight at 8:00 p.m. eastern on c-span. >> a house homeland security subcommittee on the tsa pre-check program allowing for expediting screening at airports for preapproved passengers. those who testify include inspector general john roth and tsa risk officer kenneth fletcher. it is about an hour and a half. >> i hope that is not a bad omen . >> the committee on homeland security subcommittee on transportation security will come to order. the subcommittee is meeting to examine the pre-check program of the tsa. i recognize myself for an opening statement. i would like to thank the witnesses for their precipitation -- for their participation. i know your time is viable. on the offset i would like to express my concern for the victims attack last friday at the louis armstrong new orleans national airport. transportation security officers have the responsibility of securing our nation's aviation systems. we have seen tsa and lawn for smit personnel act swiftly and bravely to protect passengers from a security threat at a checkpoint and i commend them for that. i commend the tsa and law enforcement personnel in new orleans and at airports across the country for their dedication. over the last three years the tsa has adopted a common sense risk -based approach. since the pre-check program tsa pre-check has garnered a positive response from passengers and transportation security stakeholders from moving away from a one-size-fits-all approach to aviation security. pre-check has change the way americans think about passenger screening in a post-9/11 world and i think it should expand. in order to do so this program must grow and mature in a manner that saves taxpayer dollars while sparing the traveling public and reducing risk to aviation. growth of pre-check should not be at the expense of these core objectives. i'm concerned that several initiatives related to expansion do not meet these criteria. one initiative is the management in collusion program involving conducting a real-time threat assessment to identify passengers who are eligible for tsa pre-check on a flight by flight basis through the use of tools like passenger screening canine teams, explosives trace detection technology and behavior detection officers. while this may reduce utiliz -- may reduce wait times it does not reduce risk to aviation. on the contrary. passengers who go through the pre-check enrollment process and pay $85 for expedited screenings, are not in benefits promised to them. largely due to the fact that passengers who did not enroll and are unfamiliar are being ushered into expedited screening lanes with little to no information about the screening process. the experience for these travelers is at best confusing and at worst infuriating. when tsa instructs passengers who have been conditioned to take their shoes and belts off are now suddenly told to leave them on. questions are mean about the effectiveness of the program to detect threats. the government accountability office released in december 24 teen that tsa did not comprehensively test effectiveness. tsa tested security layers but not the security effectiveness of the overall management inclusion process as it functions as a whole. tsa leaves us without an accurate assessment of the program's performance. tsa has cited the random nature as a positive, i believe that the benefits of this unpredictable program has not been shown to outweigh the potential risks. tsa should not operate management inclusion if it does not address the issues i've outlined. we learned a convicted felon utilize pretax screenin as part of the tsa risk of -- risk assessment program. they determine risk assessment using risk all grow them spoken to tsa. in this instance we understand that even though the traveler recognize the individual from media reports, a tsa supervisor allowed the passenger to proceed to a pre-checked screening. we must worry not become complacent. because of pre-checks, and that officers should be allowed to use their better judgment during the screening process. we share the same goal to protect passengers who use our critical transportation systems every day. the subcommittee looks forward to today's important dialogue on how to enhance risk-based security going forward. i would like to thank you for being here today. i would like to introduce the members of the subcommittee. the gentlewoman miss rice for any statements she may have. representative rice: i would like to note the incident that occurred last friday in new orleans when an individual assaulted multiple tsa officers with wasp spray and a machete. it is a reminder of the risks that transportation security officers face on the front line of efforts to protect passengers and maintain the security of our aviation sector. it is a difficult, dangerous and often thankless job. i want you to know, and i feel safe saying i speak for everyone up here, that our thoughts prayers, and gratitude are with you. we are committed to developing solutions to enhance security. for your safety and for the passengers you protect. ester chairman, thank you for convening this hearing so we can examine the psa paycheck program. the pre-check program is one of the risk-based initiatives aiming to maintain an effective security while maximizing efficiency. when the aviation and transportation security act became law it authorize the tsa to use available technology to expedite the security screening of passengers who participate in programs. this allows the tsa to vet passengers through expedited screening and tsa can allocate resources on the ground to focus on travelers we know less about or suspected criminal intent. one million people have voluntarily submitted i graphic information in order to participate. that makes sense to me and seems like an appropriate balance between effectiveness and efficiency. certain populations who have not undergone this vetting on the front end are sometimes permitted to use the pre-check screening lanes. that doesn't make sense to me. it suggests that the balance tips too far toward efficiency at the expense of security. that was the case when a convicted felon and a convicted member of a terrorist organization used a pre-check lane as we learned from the report last week from the office of the inspector general. that breach is on excusable. we can concentrate resources on passengers who are unknown to us and post the highest potential risk, but when a passenger such as this individual, who was known and posed enormous risk is given access to the pre-check lane it demands we take a hard look at the methods used to calculate that risk. that is why we are here. to examine the risk of expanding pre-check beyond preapproved passengers. to reassess the methodology, and to assure we never allow the pursuit of efficiency to compromise security. a look forward to hearing from the witnesses here today. i want you to know we are working with ranking member thompson on legislation that will be introduced. our hope is the information gathered today to better inform that measure. with that i think all the witnesses today and healed back -- and healed back the balance of my time. >> i want to recognize the ranking minority member of the committee mr. thompson with any statement he may have. i want to note preliminarily that mr. thompson is a busy man and his is -- and it is an honor to have him here. and i appreciate his guidance on this subject matter. representative thompson: thank you for holding today's hearing. i appreciate this committee's willingness to take a hard look at the vulnerabilities of how the transportation security administration is administering the pre-check program. as a frequent flyer at long believed that tsa should have a trusted traveler program or individuals identified as low risk are provided expedited airport security screenings. when the tsa was established in 2001 congress granted the tsa the authority to establish a trusted traveler program. it took years for the tsa to get over its initial reluctance about modifying its screening operations to admit trusted travelers. john textile -- john pistole observes credit -- deserves credit. it makes sense to provide expedited screenings to passengers who have voluntarily submitted by graphical information and fingerprints and have been fully vetted. today there are one million known low risk travelers in the pre-check program. that is a good start, but given that 2 million people fly every day, tsa needs to continue working to bring more americans into the pre-check program. that is the focus of today's hearing. it is not on the vetted population that are legitimately low risk and receive expedited screening, it is with the tsa has called the real-time intelligence-based methods for identifying passengers on a trip by trip basis for expedited physical screenings. the so-called management and inclusion programs and other real-time screening methods that tsa currently employs that our nation's airports have not been scientifically validated as effective security approaches. both the department's own inspector general and comptroller general have independently found these approaches create security phone or abilities. last week the inspector general released a report about a troubling incident involving a traveler who was granted enhanced security screening. suffice it to say the terrorist and criminal history of the traveler involved should have resulted in tsa to terminate that enhanced security screening was in order, not expedited screening. this is just one incident, and i'm sure it would never have come to light if not for the courageous tsa employee who came forward to report it. commonly report to -- commonly referred to as a whistleblower. are these procedures appropriately designed to ensure a person who actually presents a security risk is not given a lighter screening? i have no confidence based on the public and classified information i have seen that this is the case. i believe the situation demand legislative action. together with the chairman cap -- with chairman katko and ranking member rice, -- i look forward to working with the leadership of this subcommittee to bring our concerns to the concerns of care way to get timely action to address the security vulnerabilities. with that, >> on march 10 2014, previously mr. roth serves as a director of criminal investigations at the fda. then he had a long and distinguished career with the department of justice beginning in 1987 as an assistant u.s. attorney for the district of michigan. he had excellent on-the-job training doing very complex organized cases. as did i. local mr. roth. -- welcome mr. roth. mr. roth: thank you for inviting me here today to testify about tsa's pre-check initiative. i public testimony will focus on the unclassified portions of our inspection report. the majority of what we found is classified or contain security information. i look forward to discussing recommendations in greater detail when we move into a closed session. in october 2011, a pre-check at four airports. after that program ended in 2012 congress directed tsa to certified i 2013 that 25% of air passengers are eligible for expedited screening without lowering security standards. congress directed tsa to outline his tragedy -- outline a strategy to 50% by 2014. to accomplish these goals tsa did the following. granted some known populations pre-check eligibility. second managed inclusion to allow the general public opportunities for pre-check benefits. third implement it risk assessment rules for pre-check eligibility. finally, pre-check application programs for membership. these actions have resulted in a massive increase in the population eligible to receive pre-checks. first, what processes and procedures tsa uses to fit her grant applicants properly. how the tsa assesses membership eligibility. how the tsa test the process for effectiveness and timel -- and timeliness. the tsa needs to modify the check vetting and security processes. we determined that pre-check communications and coordination need improvement. our specific findings were classified or contain sensitive information. in addition we responded to a whistleblower disclosure concerning the risk of the secure flight program that may create a cap in aviation security. the results of that are ssi and have been delivered to the subcommittee. to illustrate the need for modification in the pre-check process we issued a report this month that found a notorious felon can -- notorious felon convicted of domestic terrorism was granted pre-check. we received the information after learning the convicted felon was improperly cleared for pre-check screening. we learned from this incident that such rules are in adequate to determine that only low risk applicants receive pre-check screening. we recommend limited pre-check passengers. we are concerned about the tsa response to the findings. they have not accepted the majority of the recommendations. this concludes my statement and i welcome any questions you or other members may have. chairman katko: thank you. what you can talk about in an open hearing, i appreciate your input. we appreciate you being here today. the second witness, mr. fletcher is a chief risk officer at the department of security at ministrations. users possible for developing and drying the long range vision and objectives for tsa -- he is responsible for developing and driving the long-range vision and objectives for tsa. mr. fletcher: i appreciate the opportunity to appear before you . as you have noted this hearing closely follows the second brazen attack on a checkpoint in less than 18 months. a tsa workforce and the police in new orleans prevented this from ending in tragedy. acting administrator caraway went to new orleans on saturday to show support. he was inspired by the resilience of all involved. i'm confident i speak for all of tsa when i say thank you to the enforcement in new orleans for their swift response to the attack. since its creation tsa has focused on building and enhancing a multilayered screening system including a well trained work technologies intelligence and information sharing, explosive canine detection teams in the federal air marshal service. from nearly a decade tsa applied this and a one-size-fits-all approach. the philosophy changed in late 2011 when tsa implemented and intelligence driven approach to aviation security. commercial aviation remains the target of terrorist groups who have proven to be intelligent and adaptive. as demonstrated by the development of nonmetallic explosives. one of the most serious threats to aviation. one request is to implement more security measures for every passenger and another is risk based policy. the idea of a risk-based aviation security is not novel. a trusted traveler program was mentioned. in the 9/11 support tsa should provide risk-based security 2% -- risk-based security to protect assets. tsa is able to deploy limited security resources to effectively manage risk by concentrating on high-risk travelers. effective risk management involves identifying, analyzing, and communicating risk and deciding whether to assess or control the risk to an acceptable level considering the cost and benefits of any actions. for tsa, effective risk management includes how to provide the most effective risk security to enhance the value the tsa provides to the american people. as noted by the 9/11 commission perfection is unattainable. and in my view, the pursuit is unattainable. trying to eliminate all risks results in poor security, unnecessarily burdens the aviation industry, and puts pressure on civil rights and liberty. a key component to the approach is the pre-check application program launched in 2013. over the past 12 months tsa has sustained an enrollment volume of 3500 travelers. more than double the original projections. last week we exceeded one million applications. the enrollment potential is greater. reckitt research indicates that more than -- market research indicates that more than 15,000 travelers will enroll with an additional 21 million undecided. 36 million travelers, these 36 million travelers are our target. the continuing collaboration with private sectors are vital to tsa's ability to implement risk-based security. cooperation and engagement with these partners is essential in helping tsa and establish and expand the pre-check program which now includes 11 airlines representing 85% of domestic travelers with 530 pre-check lanes now operating at 133 airports. the tsa plays an important role in partnerships with our aviation system and is committed to fielding responsive risk-based solution that can enhance our security posture. thank you for the opportunity to testify and for your support and interest in our --. >> i don't know if you time to that but you are within a few seconds of five minutes. that is pretty good. the pre-check of homeland security the best example of what the government thinking up side the box can accomplish. i commend the tsa for that program. we are here to make sure that it is being properly implemented and is still safe. that is what we are here to do. thank you for being here today. our final witness is the director of homeland security. prior to this position ms. grover was the assistant director for the health care team where she read reviews on a wide range of health care issues. she has been with gao since 1991 . the chair recognizes ms. grover to testify. >> good afternoon. i am pleased to be here today to discuss tsa's implementation and oversight of the check conclusions. three weeks ago during the week ending in march 3, half of all aviation passengers received expedited screenings for one of three main reasons. they were enrolled, they were selected for one time pre-check based on the automated risk assessment, or were randomly assigned expedited screening at the airport through tsa's managed inclusion process. my remarks today reflect findings from the recently issued report on expedited screening. we support the move toward risk-based screening to improve passenger experience. assuming that passenger risks are properly medicated to ensure risks are minimized. we found the tsa uses several methods. for pre-checked and rowley's, in some cases they perform a background check to determine low risk status. or they accept passengers because they have already had a similar access meant, such as eligible members of customs and border protection's trusted traveler programs. in other cases passengers are enrolled based on their affiliation with a specific group and who may not have had a background check. examples are members of the congressional medal of honor society. who have received the highest honor for action against enemy forces. another group of passengers receives pre-check on a per flight one time basis resulting from tsa's automated risk assessment. they use information from the secure flight system to score each passenger on each flight based on a set of risk rules. the score determines the likelihood a passenger will receive pre-check for the trip. another group of passengers are randomly suggeted at the airport through the managed includes in process. tsa recognizes these are unknown risk not low risk. to use expedited screening tsa developed a real-time threat assessment raised on behavior detection activities and explosive detection capabilities to identify and screen out high-risk passengers. the man is conclusion process resulted in a higher level of security compared to standard screenings according to tsa. gao has concerned about managed inclusion. in a report in december we concluded that tsa had not demonstrated that the behavior detection officers can reliably identify high-risk passengers by observing passenger behaviors for those indicative of fear stress, or deception. in response, this past february, officials told us they had revised behavioral indicators and rules for using them. they started pilot testing the approach in a few airports. tsa has not demonstrated the overall managed includes process is effective at providing the level of security. they said testing is underway and will be completed in mid-2016. we are previously reported on challenges the tsa has faced designing along with the established standards. poorly designed studies do not produce reliable results and are not a good use of resources. to ensure the tsa yields reliable results we want the inclusion testing adhere to established standards. the dhs concurred and said they will implement a systematic evaluation of the process. if implemented appropriately it would address the intent of our recommendation and increase the likelihood that the tsa testing would produce reliable results about the testing process. this concludes my statement and i look forward to your questions. >> thank you for your testimony. we thank you for your precipitation -- for your participanttion. i will concentrate my questions on one area, maybe two. the first unmanaged inclusion. as you've heard so far, and is to inclusion is one of the exceptions to the pre-check program. i don't know if exception is the proper term, that it is added to the pre-check program. as a preliminary matter the pre-check program is something that people pay for. it is a service as well as a risk-based security method. the fundamental premise of pre-check is that it allows tsa to better focus on the higher risk travelers by getting the ones who are lower risk in the pre-check program. the fact remains that people pay for the service. it is quicker access into the secure area of an airport. with that overview i want to talk about managed inclusion. to start, if you could briefly mr. fletcher, give us a brief reason that tsa went to managed inclusion? >> i think the genesis was really the super bowl in new orleans, we were anticipating significant crowds. they more than doubled their peak volume of passenger traffic. the airport was resource constrained. the challenge becomes how do you eliminate the risk of this large crowd of people being an attractive target for a suicide terrorist attack? there was a lot of internal discussion. the idea of doing a real-time threat assessment on the passengers, explosive detection screening with passenger screening canine teams and what it would provide as far as sufficient value to provide those travelers with an expedited screening process. that proved to be a very successful endeavor. as we look at the success of that, the question became is there a way that we can systematically expand that kind of concept to improve the efficiency and at that time we had very low volume of the pre-check passengers and i think today, we are about 48-50%. we have a lot of inefficiencies in the process where we had dedicated this at many of the larger airports but it was significantly underutilized and the wait times were becoming excessive. so, we began expanding managed inclusion as a way of conducting a one-time real-time threat assessment of the passengers. explosive screening and behavioral observation to afford them an expedited screening experience as a way of managing wait times and improving the efficiency of the process. >> thank you. a couple of things here. you mentioned one of the things being resources and reducing the risk by having a large crowd in a non-secured area of the airport. >> yes, sir. >> if we expand the pre-check program through better marketing and it's growing at its own merit, does that change the calculus for wanting to use this? >> it actually does. >> it does or does not? >> it does change the calculus and that is our goal. we want to dramatically expand the application program. >> so do we. >> as i indicated in my statement, we believe that it is upwards of 36 million travelers that could benefit. we are targeting those that are taking three or more trips per year, and we think that is a good value proposition, even at an $85 cost. it is worth than spending the money. it is a challenge, marketing and communications is quite frankly not something that the government does well in many instances. so it is a marketing challenge and we have engaged a professional marketing firm to help us with our brand positioning, creative content. we have done the broadly expanding of the partnerships and our goal is to dramatically improve the number of travelers and so my calculation is that to sustain a 50% screening put through rate, we need 25 million americans enrolled in the tsa preach check. -- pre-check. our own application program and customs and border protection we have about six point 5 million. we need to quadruple the number of individuals. that will take us a bit of time to do. that ultimately is our goal. we would like to be able to significantly dialback on both management inclusion and risk assessment rules and replace that current valium -- volume with an enrolled population. >> thank you. i know i'm over time, but i want to follow up briefly on that. from a resource standpoint, that is one of the -- is it fair to say that there is a significant number of employees at work on a part-time basis? >> i think it's about 23% of the population. >> if you could just address the fact that you know the high peak traffic hours, isn't it possible for the tsa to better utilize the part-time employees to deal with these high traffic areas and not resort to management inclusion? >> i think we are doing a very credible job of managing those part-time resources. again, like everything that tsa has been trying to do, it is taking a balance and measured approach. i cannot afford -- my experience when i was at the chicago o'hare it's difficult for me to work a 20 hour per week part-time employee -- the needs of the operation versus the needs of the individual. i believe we do a credible job today. i'm not sure there's much more we can get in that regard. >> thank you very much. >> thank you. i'm going to direct my questions to you. i think it's important for us especially in light of your comment that you would like to take the universe of people that go through the tsa pre-check lines pursuant to either management inclusion or risk assessment, you would like to decrease that number and increase the actual number of people that go through the pre-check process. can you tell us what that process is? >> today they apply online or at one of 300 enrollment centers. they provide a set of biographic information, provided a photographic id, proof of identity and proof of citizenship. they provide their fingerprint. we do a security threat assessment against them for criminal disqualifiers immigration, are they a u.s. citizen, a lawful permanent resident, we do a threat assessment, are they listed on a terrorism database, and they get there no traveler number. we say that will typically happen in two weeks. it typically happens within days, three or four days. we mailed them there no traveler number and they go on a secure website and retrieve that electronically. it is a relatively painless process, if you will. >> what would disqualify someone from obtaining pre-check status? >> there's a list of criminal disqualifiers that are permanent. then there is a list of interim disqualifiers as well, a criminal conviction within seven years. the are criminal convictions that are permanently disqualifying. an example of that, i think you have alluded to in your opening statement, conviction of terrorism related offense espionage against the government treason, those would be permanent disqualifiers. >> are there any obstacles you encounter as an agency during this process with getting relevant information from other agencies, whether it be the fbi or the watchlist are there any impediments or obstacles you have encountered in getting -- >> i don't think there are impediments with the way the process is currently designed. there are opportunities to improve the process. today, we do not do we current betting for criminal to squire fire -- current tvetting for criminal disqualifiers. we don't have the legal authority to do that today on our own accord because we are in this instance, we are not a law enforcement agency from this perspective, so we cannot run our own checks as customs can do an investigative law enforcement agencies. we believe that is an important enhancement to the program as we move forward. >> i was going ask you if you have a plan in place as you have answered this for recurrent vetting. so all you have to do is qualify you as a law enforcement agency or you would do what appears that you are doing now with partnering with another agency that could carry out the recurrent vetting and then sharing the information with you? >> that is correct. that is not without the cost. the fbi is a fee reimbursement program for that particular service. >> it all comes out of the same pot. >> the application program's fee funded. those costs would have to be absorbed by the individual applicants. >> i'm talking in terms of bdo's and tsa officers. there is a built in cost structure their. -- cost structure there. recently, there was a report that since 2007 when the training for bdo's was put into place to the present day, there were approximately 30,000 people pulled out of the line based on observations of the behavioral detection officer. it is further understood that of those 30,000 people come of that universe, less than 1% of them actually had an instance where it resulted in an arrest. do you think the training for the bdo's is sufficient given that kind of empirical data that may be they are not looking at the right things? may be missing people who truly do represent a danger. >> we have just completed a research foundation analysis for each of the revised indicators. we are in the process of doing a comprehensive evaluation of those new indicators. we have completely revamped the training program for the videos over the last several years. if i go back to theaters has seven -- back to 2007, i would agree with your position but i believe we have taken significant strides. with the exception of two recommendations, one from -- that we defund the bdo program and the one about taking a holistic view of management inclusion, all the recommendations from dhs ig and -- have been closed. >> that was not an attack question at all. if you implement a plan, you have to review it to see if it is achieving the data goals. i appreciate your willingness to take recommendations -- i appreciate the fact that you are willing to take these recommendations of how it can be better. >> have established a coalition with private sector privacy groups that signed a nondisclosure agreement that allows them to gain access to information that will help us informed the program and make sure we are achieving the right balance between what we believe is an essential layer of our security regime and concerns about civil rights and civil liberties. >> thank you, mr. fletcher. >> thank you, ms. rice. the charity has a session chair recognizes mr. thompson for questions. >> i ask unanimous consent -- thank you. mr. fletcher come in the inclusion program, how many bdo's do we have? >> i don't have that exact number. i know we have about 11% fewer bdo's today than we did two years ago. the number has reduced. i believe it's around 3100 total across the system, but i don't have that exact number. >> you talked about a process. are you aware of any scientific data that say that the bdo program is successful? >> i know we have established a scientific foundation behind each of the indicators. i'm not personally aware of scientific data that answers your specific question. >> you looked at it. are you aware of any? >> i'm aware that tsa has taken another look at the literature that is underlying each of the indicators that they are using. they are in the process of testing the use of the new indicators and the new rules for using the at airports right now. we are awaiting the results of those tests to see what the tsa learns about how they are being applied in practice. >> as of this hearing, you are not aware of any data that would say that that program works? >> as of this hearing, i have not reviewed evidence from tsa demonstrating that the behavioral indicators are working in practice as they intend. >> let me go on the record -- i support the pre-check program, too. i want to have sound science behind it. and not just the ability to look at somebody who has been vetted look at someone who has not gone through a database from a background standpoint and say you get into the pre-check line. part of why we are trying to have this hearing is to make sure that those individuals who are in the pre-check line, that there is some science behind getting them that, as well as some vetting of who they are. more specifically, we talked about the whistleblower who said they saw and knew someone in line that was a domestic terrorist, had a conviction, went to jail. can you provide me with whether or not that is -- if the tso sees an individual of that description, that they have the authority to say you need to go back for further vetting for enhanced screening? >> tso's have had that authority. the discretion to deny an individual access to the pre-check lane and send them to the standards grinning process on that day. back in 2008, we started training our tso's in critical thinking skills in response to the ig's investigation. we have reiterated that guidance. >> you want to comment? >> when we engaged in this inquiry after receiving the whistleblower complaint, the tso did not feel empowered to make that decision on his or her own self that. i recommendations were to tsa to clarify what authority the tso has so they had that empowerment when they see a situation they believe is unsafe. >> when they checked with the supervisor, what did the supervisor say? >> the supervisor order that person to go through the pre-check lane. >> we let a domestic terrorist get on a plane that if that person had applied to pre-check that person -- if that person who traveled had applied through the regular pre-check program what would that person's status have been? >> they have several as qualifying criminal and fences -- offenses which would have prohibited that person from being a member of pre-check. >> mr. fletcher, can you share with the committee what orientation tso's are going through now so that they do feel empowered that windows situations exist, they can stop it at that point? >> congressman immediately, the head of our office of security operations issued written guidance the field that clarified that and reinforced the critical thinking skills that have been built in the program over the previous several years. that was followed up by information in a briefing that went to the entire front line uniformed workforce over the next several weeks to ensure that every individual tso was hearing that consistent message. i think we are currently in the process of reviewing our standard operating procedures to make sure that any language about discretion and critical thinking is clear what our intent is so that the tso does not feel inhibited or lack of empowerment to be able to exercise that discretion. that is absolutely one of the keys to mediation security. the individual tso to use their experience and judgment and exercise some level of individualized discretion. >> the traveling public feels that some system of vetting has occurred for every person who was on that plane. to whatever extent we can provide that, we should. i would encourage you to look at what you are doing so that the end result is that there are no anomalies in the system that would allow someone with an obvious criminal record that would have been disqualified is on that plane without the knowledge of people who are traveling. >> as you know, we rely very heavily on information from the national law enforcement and national intelligence communities. every passenger is vetted against terrorism databases and watch lists and identified, either initially as either an inhibited and not allowed to fly , designated for enhanced screening or prevented from being eligible for expedited screening. in this specific instance, this individual is not, was not and is not in the national terror screening database. that is a discussion that is ongoing between tsa and the terror screening center. this is an intelligence and information-based aviation security regime and we have to have confidence that if there is a domestic terrorism suspect that they have been appropriately identified and watch listed. that is the glitch in the system. if that individual had been watch listed, they would not have been allowed to be designated as eligible for expedited screening. >> i yield back, mr. chairman. >> the chair will now recognize other members of the subcommittee for five minutes each. after we have exhausted questions, we will allow ms. jackson five minutes time for questions as well. i plan to recognize members who are present at the start of the hearing by seniority on the subcommittee. those coming in later will be recognized in the order of their arrival. the chair recognizes mr. rogers for five minutes of questions. >> i want to talk some more about this managed inclusion program. what was the objective when you all set that up? what are you trying to accomplish with this? >> there was multiple objectives . in the first instance, it was improving -- to improve the efficiency of the tsa pre-check lane. in the second instance, it was about how do we do a much more effective job of managing the wait times, reducing that risk that it that becomes the object of target for a terrorist attack. >> with the tsa conduct a conference of analysis on the entire process, reducing the pre-check vetting to a flip of a coin? >> i do not believe it is by the flip of a coin. >> send them through that line every once in a while? >> we believe -- as we look at the individual parts and are at the process of looking at managed inclusion in total as a system, we believe that provides a better security proposition. it is more effective security than standard screening based on the analysis that we have done to date. >> maybe i'm confused. my understanding of the way managed inclusion works is you got somebody with an ipad that taps it and it randomly sends it somebody up through the pre-check line that has not gone through the application in screening process that the people who paid to be in the pre-check line went through. is that not correct? >> there is a random -- >> isn't that taking a higher risk? there are no longer going through the machine that we told everybody in the world is necessary. they did not go through the vetting process. >> they are exposed at a significant higher rate to explosive screening. a significant percentage of passengers that are etd screened prior to that random selection process. they are also subject to additional screening three td -- through etd. five lanes with random selection as part of the screening process. >> how do you think folks feel who paid for the pre-check status about individuals who did not pay for it and did not go through the vetting being allowed to get in line with them? >> i have heard negative complaints from the traveling public about the managed inclusion process. part of our desire to dial these tools back so they become a significantly less contributor to the overall expedited screening process and replacing them with an enrolled population is because of the pushback we have gotten. also because it moves those passengers -- provides a lower risk opposition -- proposition than someone who does go through this assessment rules. >> you mentioned the explosive detection canines. if in fact we had enough of those assets so that they were in all these lines, i would not have a problem with this. as you know, we have a very limited number of those canine teams. not because i haven't been trying to change it and i intend to get a lot more for a leave this place. that's before i leave this place. we don't have enough of them. this program is a reckless practice. to take people who have not been through the proper vetting and put them into a lane that requires a lower level of screening because the people in that lane have paid to be vetted through a system that makes them less of a risk. i hope you all will rethink this program because it is reckless and the. >> thank you, mr. rogers. mr. x in the, i believe you are next up -- ms. jackson lee, i believe you are next up. >> this is a committee i hold very dear come a very important response ability and i thank both of you for your astute leadership. let me also think the witnesses for their service. certainly the representative from the gao for providing us a flashlight to be able to ensure and correct and keep the american people secure. let me thank all of those part of the homeland security team, tsa that's my great -- many of you know my great admiration for the officers who put their lives on the line in the nation's airports to save our lives. i want to acknowledge the shooting and the loss of life of tso officer in los angeles -- i went out to los angeles in the last session. let me offer my concern and best wishes for a speedy recovery. let me proceed with a series of points and let me make this point and my colleagues should hear my point. this is a team effort when we talk about securing the airport. i'm causally frustrated and i understand local government but i do believe this will require a federal sort of engagement and setting protocols. there is not enough coverage of the tso officers of armed personnel within this instance as hired or dictated to the local airports the first news reports came out it was a tso officer that shot the perpetrator in new orleans who had a machete and something else from endangering the lives of passengers, not on knowing to classify him as a terrorist or deranged individual. it was the brave acts of a local law enforcement -- i will be raising this question of the protocols to be established in airports across america. there is not enough coverage. the airport management, they save money, cities save money by not having the appropriate armed law enforcement present. let me ask the question to mr. fletcher. are your tso's armed? >> no, they are not. >> approximately how many do we have across america? >> somewhere in the total of 48,000. >> let me thank you for that. i'm much happier and feel much safer in spite of these downfalls then i was pre-9/11. they are not armed but they are monitoring some of the world's largest airports . >> that is correct. >> knowledge is not the largest targets are transportation modes. >> that is an accurate assessment. >> in america, we have tso's and don't have any consistent understanding of what the armed presence is. let me jump to this point of the situation going with the tso that knew that there was a person convicted of domestic terrorism. what was the basis of the supervisor who the tso came to sing it is all right, let him through? >> i don't have an answer to that. i know our security operations did an inquiry. i believe they have that answer. >> i would make this point. training has to be crucial. if the tso had the authority you have a training problem. in terms of the tso's knowledge of what their opportunities and obligations and authority is in the supervisor approached by the tso gave the approval of him going through. is it in the inspector general's report as to why the supervisor allowed the person to go forward? >> the tsa has a rule that the tso's men increased level of screening a passenger receipts at a checkpoint based on a belief that can be put into words and explain to others that is based on observations that suggest an individual -- >> this person decreased it by telling the tso let him walk on through. i want to emphasize that we have a double issue here, in protecting the perimeter of the security checkpoint were a person may need to be stopped and may be agitated. i'm not suggesting a counseling of law enforcement on our travelers. i'm suggesting we need to protect our tso officers. we have one too many incidences. if the reports are accurate, the number of guns that were stopped are more than we might imagine. that is something else we need to complement, the issues of training. i have introduced the no-fly foreign fighters legislation which will be in this committee. i would like to have that they'll presented to both the chairman and recommender of this committee to give you extra help on a list that is extremely screened or scrubbed to make sure that you have the most current individuals on that no-fly list, particularly those who are foreign fighters. i hope the agency will review my legislation because i'm looking for tools that will help tso officers do their job and i think there are two helmets of weaknesses. when a tso attempted to do the right thing, a supervisor pushed him on. the issue of security around the perimeter. i thank you very much. i thought i has a bill to put into the record but i see that i don't. i understand that we moved to expand tso pre-check and we use a paid process. you allow people to pay for that. i would like to get a report on whether or not our vetting is extensive on the paid process more extensive than not. i yield back. >> thank you, miss jackson lee for being here. the chair now recognizes mr. radcliffe for five minutes of questioning. >> thank you, mr. chairman. i appreciate you holding this hearing on the issue of security in our airports. i'm a foreign terrorism prosecutor. i very much believe in the mission of the tsa and believe -- i'm grateful for the testimony of the witnesses today to a form -- inform the opinions of this subcommittee. i am also someone who goes through our airports through the tsa pre-check program. i am very familiar with that. based on the testimony i was able to review, the one thing i am concerned about is some of the tsa's more flexible programs that allow for real-time assessments of potential risks as opposed to the tsa pre-check which allows travelers like me who qualify and submit to a background check to get through more expeditiously. you've commented on that in your march 16 report and talked about the incident involving a convicted felon who was improperly cleared under one of these more flexible programs. let me start there. why is the tsa using methods like managed inclusion and risk assessment to expedite the tsa pre-check line when individuals who opted in the pre-check program go through a more rigorous procedure to gain the benefits of the program? >> we have talked a bit about managed inclusion. we believe it has security value. we have not spent a lot of time talking about risk assessment and partial response to your question, risk assessment -- one of the underlying principles behind tsa's approach is the vast majority of americans simply want to get from their destination to their destination as quickly as efficiently as possible and represent essentially no threat to aviation. our bias has been identifying ways to expedite the flow of legitimate travelers and reducing that burden. there is a balance we have tried to take in a measured approach. we look at an initiative like managed inclusion or risk assessment rules. we consider the security effectiveness of the proposition. we consider the operational efficiency impacts. we look at what the impact on the passenger is. we look at what the impact on industry may be and then consider the fiscal implications and the policy implications. is this the right public policy for the agency to adopt? is it going to be politically acceptable by you? will it be politically palatable or socially palatable to the american people? we take a thoughtful approach to that. the underlying basis of our rules is the age, gender and itinerary information today that we have been collecting since we implemented secure flights in 2010. we started that at the beginning of the program with the small slice of frequent flyers that we extend eligibility for. that is not the only review that we've done. we had an independent analysis of that approach that was completed by one of the federal funded programs in 2013. we worked closely with the civil aviation threat assessment group . we have had a review in 2014 by the homeland security studies and analysis institute. all of those independent reviews have validated the fundamental principles behind that. they have identified some opportunities for improvement as has the inspector general and gao. we believe strongly that the independent reviews we have conducted provide a good security and good value proposition for the american people. we have taken a thoughtful and measured approach to both of those programs. much more so on risk assessment rules than we have unmanaged inclusion because we have not been as much of the independent validation on that initiative. >> thank you, mr. fletcher. i would love to ask a question but i will yield back. >> thank you, mr. radcliffe. we will have a brief second round of questions here. i now recognize myself for some follow-up questions. i apologize for the somewhat rapid fire manner. the convicted felon issue, the convicted felon that was cleared, is there any doubt -- were they an error when they feared that convicted felon for pre-check? >> if they presented a risk to aviation, if they were a convicted terrorism operative they should have been watch listed in the terror screening database. >> this person would not have passed the pre-check status. >> when i have been accepted. this would not have been accepted. >> the risk assessment approach and managed inclusion approach are not as thorough and good as doing the pre-check background check. >> i would agree with that. yes, sir. >> shifting gears for a moment from a pure marketing standpoint , part of pre-check is marketing , is it fair to say that pre-check, when someone has paid for pre-check, they pay for a product, they see people going into the line, sometimes ahead of them, that impacts marketing? >> i look at it as a free sample you would get. we know from interviewing travelers that many of them have had the opportunity to experience expedited screening through managed inclusion and risk assessment rules, have subsequently implied and rolled in the program. there is some benefit. -- enrolled in the program. >> for the people who have paid for the program, it is a negative. >> the are negative sentiments. -- there are negative sentiments. >> i'm trying to get home and there is a long line and no pre-check line open. how come pre-check is not always open? when it's a product that people have paid for. >> it's a matter of resource efficiency. there are times of day at large airports where we simply don't have the passenger volume or are not running managed inclusion operations where we can sustain the dedicated tsa pre-check lane. in 2013, we gave the federal security directors the flexibility to be able to ship standard screening lanes when the expedited screening volume is there and convert those lanes back to standard screening lanes. we are trying to be good stewards of the resources we have available to us. in many of those instances, we simply don't have the volume to sustain the expedited screening lane as a dedicated proposition. >> ok. i have not forgotten about you two. i do want to ask you this -- ms. rice asked some good questions about recurring b setting. there is a cost associated with that. do you know how costly it would be to do recurring vetting? >> that is a potential vulnerability we have identified in our previous report. the importance of recurrent vetting. >> for 20 years -- recurring vetting is a serious issue. i would ask you to direct us to the entity that can give us an idea of how costly that would be. as this program matures and more time gets -- takes place between the time they are initially bedded up to the present time -- vetted up to the present time, there is more opportunity for a person to go back. -- go bad. is it fair to say that there is a science developing with algorithms that might be able to do this recurring vetting on a regular basis without a lot of cost? >> we have been working with several private sector companies on evaluating risk algorithms that are not directly related to criminality. we do believe from my personal discussions with the national association of professional background screeners and discussions with some private sector data brokers that they can do in effective job -- an effective job with publicly available electronic information without having to go through the traditional check. >> on december 22 of 2014, there was a request issued for tsa pre-check application expansions. it sought private sector application capabilities to expand the enrollment access to pre-check. solicitation was taken off a very seventh of 2014 -- on february 7 of 2015. why? >> there was one provision that should not have gone on in the original solicitation that we were concerned about. we are currently working with the department to go through that entire rfp to make sure that we get it right. that is our best opportunity to dial back on managed inclusion and risk assessment rules. we have to get it right in the first instance. >> do you have any idea what the timeframe is? >> last week, indicated perhaps as early as the end of this week or next. i'm hoping it will be soon. >> excellent. the last question about marketing and enrollment. i have talked to airport operators and they have expressed a strong interest in providing kiosks so people can come and sign up for pre-check. they have also offered to do -- provide space and their airports to do the follow-up vetting at their facilities. to me, that sounds like a no-brainer. we have every single in the airport should have the option of being able to do one of those, have one of those kiosks to sign up. i envision with a kiosk someone is manning the kiosk, they pay the fee and fill up the form, it goes to tsa and they do their work. what do you think about that? >> we are hoping to get innovative solutions in response to the rfp. our exclusive contract it's the relationship between the airport and our contractor that manages the existing enrollment application. many airports have been generous with space. many airlines have leased space to facilitate the enrollment process. other airports have been resistant and are waiting for opportunities to be more directly involved. >> you have a contract with a vendor that is preventing you from developing this program further? >> right now comes the application program that exists today is through a single vendor that runs all of our vetting application programs. the intent of third party, the rfp is to broadly expand that to be able to take advantage of those other opportunities you just discussed. >> is there anything in that contract that would prevent these airports from opening these kiosks? >> we have that discussion this morning about what changes to the contract we can make to loosen some of the contractual restrictions and provide more latitude to move forward. today, there is nothing to prevent an airport from entering into an agreement with more faux tphotrust. >> from a convenience standpoint for passengers, the pre-check is not exactly where it should be. my understanding from the pre-check process in syracuse is if you want to get screened, you have to drive to us we go, new york -- oswego, new york. that is wildly inconvenient. i would like to see a process whereby passengers can get the follow-up interviews at the airports. if you have frequent travelers those you want to sign up for pre-check, why not make it as convenient as possible? they can do the follow-up interview at the airport. that makes much more sense. we will be looking into that as well. >> yes, sir. >> the rest of my questions are going to be at our closed-door session, if that's ok. >> i ask unanimous consent that the remainder of the hearing be closed to the public. disclosure of such testimony evidence or other matters would endanger national security or compromise sensitive law enforcement information. is there any objection? during none, the motion is agree to and the subcommittee will recess briefly to move to a secure location to continue its business. [captioning performed by the national captioning institute, which is responsible for its caption content and accuracy. visit ncicap.org] [captions copyright national cable satellite corp. 2015] >> congress is currently on a two week break. john boehner leading a congressional delegation, headed to the u.k. yesterday, meeting with the chancellor -- that trip to focus on economic and security ties between the u.s. and u.k. nancy pelosi is in asia with another group of lawmakers. they arrived in cambodia today to begin a five nation visit that will focus on u.s. relations in the asia region and issues related to security cooperation, human rights and trade. >> this sunday, eric larson on his new book "dead weight." -- "dead wake." >> the question arises as to what ultimately happened to the lusitania. why was the lusitania allowed to enter the sea without escort, without the kind of detailed warning that could have been provided to the captain, but was not?

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