military deployment there. ukraine's efforts to resist the russian invasion have suddenly turned into the forgotten war. is it actually going anywhere? both russia and ukraine are trying to mount counter—offensives of their own, before winter sets in, before it becomes cold and dark and wet. and argentina. whatever�*s happening in the convoluted presidential election in this most complex of countries? the situation could not be more dire, and i think that's why many, especially the younger voters, think that something very radical has to be done to change this. israel's wars with its arab neighbours have always divided its friends in the west. the united states may sometimes criticise israel, especially under binyamin netanyahu, but its basic support is never in any doubt. britain, which once governed palestine, and tried with almost total lack of success, many feel, to be even—handed betweenjews and arabs, has now come firmly into the american camp. it supports israel's right to do whatever it feels it's got to do in gaza. germany is wholeheartedly on israel's side, but support from france and the rest of the eu is more nuanced. they want israel to hold back, if possible, from the full—scale onslaught, which could well take the lives of many civilians. senior american military officers who took part in operations in densely packed towns and cities in iraq after 2003 are often highly dubious that civilian casualties can be avoided, though israel insists it can and will avoid them. others have questioned whether netanyahu will be able to get rid of hamas in gaza, root and branch, as he promises to do. the danger for israel, they say, is that hamas, which has planned all this out with a great deal of care, will simply find ways of going deep underground and emerge again, if international pressure obliges the israeli forces to pull out, however long that takes. we've seen this pattern time and again over the past 56 years, ever since the west bank and gaza were captured by israel in the 1967 six—day war. tom bateman is the bbc correspondent injerusalem. there are 360,000 reservists that have been called up. it's a huge number. plus, you have a conscript and professional army ofaround150,000, 160,000. there are half a million troops now. and remember, the border between lebanon and israel is extremely important as well. so there is a very, very big military deployment there. as for what's happening around gaza, i mean, we've seen this huge movement of troops, hardware, tanks, artillery, and a very large number of troops now massed around the gaza perimeter. there is a sense in the country of potential hesitancy. that's how you might read it. i think the israeli government would put it very differently, that they're ready to go. they're getting their plans finalised and prepared, but they are going to go in. but i think, john, the big issue here is around the hostages. there are more than 220 being held by hamas. i think that is the biggest, both political and military, part of the calculation at the moment. you've had president biden saying the issue of releasing hostages — and there are american citizens involved as well — he said there is no bigger priority for him. and i think once we began to see captives being released, with the mediation of qatar, which has ties to hamas, it's clear there is a line of communication. and hamas, they've deliberately calculated this to put themselves in a strong position. they're trying to ward off an israeli ground invasion. on that basis, there's no reason why the idf shouldn't be held up permanently from going in, is there? this is going to be an extremely challenging military operation for the israelis. benjamin netanyahu historically is not a big risk—taker. and so i think things may become a lot more complicated. and i was really struck, i was in the room when president biden came. he said, "don't be consumed by rage. "don't make the same mistakes we made after 911." now, look at what the west did in iraq. look at the way the iraqi state was simply dismantled. so i think there is a sense of a warning here about, has this been thought through, you know, what's it going to involve? what are the military objectives? and that's something the americans really want to know. that's probably another reason for the delay. and it does look to me, reading some of the israeli press, as though netanyahu is in a bit of a problem, isn't he? there's going to be a huge inquiry into everything that went wrong. why were 3,000 hamas gunmen able to get across that fence, overwhelm the israeli military at the gaza perimeter there, and cause the mayhem and destruction and commit the atrocities that they did? so that element of things is already starting to emerge. and remember, john, you know, israel was in a — it's an unprecedented political crisis on the eve of all of this happening. it may be one reason that hamas chose the timing as they did. but benjamin netanyahu has been in real trouble. this country was more divided than it has been in a generation, perhaps since the foundation of the state, very much focused around benjamin netanyahu's leadership, and the hardline far—right, ultra—nationalist nature of the government that he had effectively relied on in order to get back into power. people were concerned that israel was basically shifting its identity from a jewish democratic state, in their view, to a potentially theocratic dictatorship. do you think benjamin netanyahu is finished? what mr netanyahu has tried to do is galvanise a government around him. he's brought in an emergency war cabinet, includes benny gantz and others, of former leaders of the idf, chiefs of staff, opposition figures. so we have this emergency government. so at the moment, things are stuck together. he's trying to sideline the ultra—right—wingers that were so unpopular among many. but the question is, how long can that last? and i think, by the end of this, it is very, very hard to see a situation in which he emerges intact. the arab world erupted in support of hamas after its brutal incursions into southern israel, but these are very different times from the days when the countries bordering on israel posed a major threat to its very existence. what do the surrounding countries feel and plan to do now? egypt, for instance. why has it been so unwilling to open the crossing from gaza into its own territory? to get the wider view on all this, i turned to sebastian usher, bbc world service middle east editor. i think the egypt government's position is, obviously it's in a terrible bind. its aim in that is to ensure that as much as possible humanitarian aid goes into gaza, but that it is enough to prevent people in gaza from coming out, but very, very strongly, and for a variety of reasons, making clear that they are not going to accept a large number of palestinians to come across. that's not because they don't want to protect them. it's because they don't want to facilitate to one extent what they see as a kind of return of what happened in 19118. as far as the palestinians are concerned, there's a mass exodus of people and they're never able to return. so they would be responsible, essentially, they would feel, for doing israel's work. they also, economically, are in a terrible state. so having a big influx of people to look after. a huge, huge issue. there's an election that's coming up. it's been moved forward to december. politically, egypt has been much more stable in one way under abdel fattah al—sisi. i mean, rememberthe turmoil after 2011, the muslim brotherhood came to power and so on. but the price of that has been far more repression, essentially, of free speech of the people. and part of that was a sense that this issue of the palestinians has been at the forefront of how arab states and arab people defined themselves, had faded to an extent. let's turn to israel's northern border, to lebanon. what's your feeling about what hezbollah is going to do? are they — is there going to be a war there? i mean, my feeling is that hezbollah doesn't want it. 0bviously, israel doesn't want it, and i don't think iran quite wants it. but that's a feeling that circumstances might... ..override. the way that things have been playing out so far, over the past two weeks, is every day, we've seen a very slight intensification of these skirmishes between hezbollah and otherfactions, palestinian factions that are based in the south of lebanon, too, with israel. but they've stayed within what are called the rules of engagement, which means you fire, we fire back. i think at the moment, hezbollah, iran are probably relatively satisfied with that, that they're making their point. essentially, the lebanese government, the lebanese state has no real say in this. they're spectators, just like we are, which is an extraordinary situation to be in. and we know that lebanon is in a very bad economic state, terrible economic collapse, for the past three or four years. and politically, too, there's no government there. there's a caretaker government. there's no president there. they haven't been able to elect one. and hezbollah tells them what to do. hezbollah, to a degree, tells them what to do. this is the other point of it. i mean, hezbollah is far more a weapon of iran than hamas is. so i think unless things spiral in an absolutely desperate way down in gaza, possibly in the occupied west bank as well, i think hezbollah and lebanon would be the next thing after that. i don't think they happen before that. what do you think about the almost, you might say, conspiracy theory that this is all because iran wanted to stop saudi arabia getting too close to israel? i mean, the generalfeeling is that this was something that was in the planning foryears, probably, at least months by hamas, predating the real momentum that was beginning to take place in the move towards normalisation between saudi arabia and israel. so it's definitely in iran's interests that this has happened, because i think there's no way that saudi arabia, in the short term, can now do any deal with israel, but it gives saudi arabia potentially, just as iran may be thinking it has this too, a chance to play a more active diplomatic role in what might come after, in terms of what the palestinians might get. this having been leftjust to rot, this situation, no momentum in the peace process for years. the two—state solution, under president trump, virtually disappeared in israel and in parts of the palestinian territories. it's no longer something people talk about. there's generations growing up in both countries who've never really had that as a genuine option that it might happen. you know, it's almost like a myth that this could happen. so the optimistic side is that, having seen the abyss, having seen what doing nothing creates, that there'll be a move like we haven't seen for a very long time to try and get somewhere on that, and that saudi arabia will be able to play a very big role in that. is there going to be a much wider war, or is it going to be restricted to what happens between the border — southern border of israel and gaza? there isn't any appetite in the arab world amongst its governments to get actively involved in this, in any kind of military terms, obviously. but there is an appetite on the streets. we're not going to see a 1967. we're not going to see a yom kippur war, i don't think. you're not going to see arab countries sending their armies. that isn't going to happen. president volodymyr zelensky of ukraine has always been worried that right—wing pressures in the united states would make it harder to get the american money and weapons, which alone can help him win his war against the russian invaders. now, though, an entirely new crisis in the middle east has put the ukrainian war out of the minds of every american politician for the foreseeable future. president biden, with a mixture of high statesmanship and political street fighter�*s cunning, has managed to bind up aid for ukraine and for israel into a single parcel, so that should sort the problem out for a bit. still, ukraine knows perfectly well that the only real solution is for it to start visibly winning the war. is that happening, though? it doesn't seem to be. i've been speaking to vitaly shevchenko, of bbc monitoring. ukrainians know perfectly well, if western allies stop or tone down assistance to ukraine, that's probably the end of the road for ukraine. it will not be able to keep on fighting for much longer. the time pressure is on ukraine to deliver something, in terms of victories, advances, achievements by the time a presidential election happens in the united states next year. and that's why there's a lot of concern within ukraine about the counter—offensive, which has entered its fifth month. to keep on receiving that aid, ukraine needs to show something for it. but there have been small victories, small successes, haven't there? 0n the farther bank of the river dnieper, at the moment, for instance. we've seen reports of the ukrainians crossing the river and establishing a presence on the russian—controlled bank of the dnieper. but we don't know how many ukrainians we're talking about. the other three hot spots are further north, in the zaporizhzhia region, because if they're successful there, it would mean that ukrainian forces would potentially be able to cut through russian defences all the way to the coast of the sea of azov, and therefore disrupting russian logistics and cutting the so—called land bridge, going through from occupied crimea, all the way to the russian city of rostov. so far, i don't think ukraine has achieved much, in terms of advances, but the hope is there. further north, this is where the russians are trying, as far as we can tell, to mount a counter—offensive of their own. they've had a lot of losses, haven't they? i've been reading about this. i mean, lots of tanks destroyed and so on in the attack. that's right. and it probably tells us how little russian forces have learned from their experiences. but the thing is, john, russia is much bigger than ukraine. it has more people, more tanks than ukraine. and it seems that both russia and ukraine are trying to mount counter—offensives of their own, before winter sets in, before it becomes cold and dark and wet. the one area that you haven't mentioned is, of course, the naval situation both in crimea and in the sea around it. i mean, that's been a remarkable success for ukraine. for a country that doesn't really have a fleet to speak of, it's been able to achieve impressive successes there by striking the headquarters of the russian black sea fleet. russia's pride and joy, if you like. another sign of ukraine being very successful in the black sea is the fact, that despite russia pulling out of the grain deal, ukraine has apparently been able to establish a safe corridor of its own, which grain exporters can use to take grain out of ports such as 0desa. so even though we're not seeing much movement on the ground, we are seeing some movement on the sea. ok, now, this is where i put you horribly on the spot. is ukraine going to win? ukraine is facing an extraordinarily difficult uphill struggle. it's facing a huge neighbour which had spent decades preparing for something like this. some people ask, you know, define ukraine's victory. what's it going to look like? does that mean restoring its borders to the way there were, back in 1991, which is what volodymyr zelensky says, including crimea? that's going to be difficult. but i think for ukraine, long—term survival is victory in itself. but for russia, survival in its present form is also not going to be easy, given how fragile such regimes are, longer term. argentina is the most complex country in latin america, and i personally would say one of the most delightful. it's not for nothing that it's said to have the highest proportion of psychiatrists to general population on earth. its politics have always been a shambles, and its economy is an example of how not to do it. in 1900, argentina was richer than australia or sweden. by 2000, it had sunk far, far below them. with inflation at 140%, you might expect the economy minister, sergio massa, to get a drubbing from the electorate. instead, in last sunday's first round of the presidential election, he came top. and the bookies�* favourite javier milei, the anarcho—capitalist who out trumps donald trump by campaigning with a chainsaw, promising to chop down the central bank and abolish the national currency, could only come second. so what on earth will happen in the deciding round of this argentinean roller—coaster, when milei and massa face—off next month? got the clapper? no worries. there we are. i asked veronica smink, of bbc mundo in buenos aires. milei divided the centre—right and right vote. and these would, it would seem logical for them to group together and make him the winner in the second round. but, as we have proved with the primaries, and now with the first round of elections, logic doesn't apply necessarily in argentine elections. but milei is such a divisive character, isn't he? i mean, it's such an extreme thing to vote for him. surely a lot of centre—right people will think, "whoa, that's just too far for us." more than half of the electorate will vote for a change, who voted for a change both in the primaries and in the first round. and if milei plays his cards right, and maybe tones down some of the rhetoric, he might — it would be likely for him to attract them. because you have to remember that since peronism was created almost eight decades ago, mostly politics has been about peronism and anti—peronism, and anti—peronism today is milei. can you just explain to me why a country as rich, as full of educated, intelligent people should have gone just so badly wrong in the last 60 years? governments spend more than what they have, and this is the main problem that argentina has had, which has tried to solve either by borrowing too much money, and now it's in a debt crisis, or by financing it by printing out more money, and now this is why argentina has 1a0% inflation, and has had many hyperinflation problems in the past. having said that, another big issue that argentina has had is that it's basically being like going to and fro between democracy and military governments, and this has wrecked institutions. it's really hard to pinpoint it on one political party or on one presidency. they have all overspent, mainly because the institutions aren't strong enough to have checks and balances. so it's been a problem shared by all. and the economy? i mean, does anybody know really what to do to get that 1a0% inflation figure down? well, this is the main reason that explains milei's surprising success. he's proposing something completely different. he's proposing dollarizing the economy, just looking at it in a different way. what he's saying is, "look, basically, "the people who have governed argentina so far "have not found a solution to this. "what i am proposing is something completely different, "completely radical, but that will solve the problem." so the issue is how many people will believe him,, and if what he's proposing can actually be done, which is the other issue. some people say it sounds great on paper, but it's impossible to do. what is it, i mean, to dollarize the economy, and what, to base it all on the us dollar? that's right. so he wants to do the equivalent to what ecuador did back in 2000, and basically saying, look, argentines don't use the peso to buy houses, to buy cars, to estimate the price of things. let's be honest, argentines use a dollar, which is a fact. but many other people say, well, using the us dollar will leave, and especially milei's proposal to completely abolish the central bank