Optimal policy for acquisitions of potential competitors und

The acquisition of potential competitors is a widespread phenomenon. This may be anti-competitive, as the incumbent kills off potential future competition, or welfare-improving, such as by easing financial constraints for the target. This column provides a framework to trade-off these effects. The authors find that antitrust agencies should prohibit takeovers whose transaction

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