A significant correction in the market. Youve got chinese assets which have been overprized, even against a basic analysis with their standard price ratios. But to draw too much implication from this in terms of, number one, the overall performance of the market in recent times to what it means to the economy in general and, three the direction of reform, i think we need to take a calmer perspective. Bremmer finally, a look back at charlies 2004 interview with former saudi former minister who died thursday, the worlds longest serving Prime Minister before his retirement in april. I believe saudi arabia sounds going a program of reform that is not only seriously pursued but adamantly pursued by the government in spite of the opposition of the conservatives inside saudi arabia. Bremmer iran nuclear negotiations, the chinese stock market and the late prince syed alfeisal next. Rose funding for charlie rose has been provided by additional funding provided by and by bloomberg, a provider of multimedia news and Information Services worldwide. Captioning sponsored by Rose Communications from our studios in new york city, this is charlie rose. Bremmer good evening. Im ian bremmer. President of the Eurasia Group filling in for charlie rose whos on assignment. We begin the program with iran nuclear negotiation. Secretary of state john kerry remains in vienna for talks with iran. In their 15th day longest trip abroad by any u. S. Secretary of state since George Schultz in 1983. A third deadline has come and gone with talks extended till monday. Both sides claim slow, hard progress. Meanwhile, opposition to a deal is strong among American Allies in the middle east and here in congress. Will we achieve a deal and what are the implications of success or fairly . Joining me now from washington is Suzanne Maloney senior fellow at the center for middle east policy at the brookings institution. And from cambridge massachusetts, gary samore. Hes the executive director for research at the Belfer Center for signs and International Affairs add Harvard Kennedy school. Pleased to have them both on this program. Let me start with the question of the latest latest hiccup. It seems to me that one issue thats suddenly become very, very prominent is the question of the removal of this u. N. Arms embargo. I certainly havent seen as much focus on it till recently. Why has that suzanne why has that gotten attention lately and could this scuddle the deal as a whole . This is definitely the most interesting wrinkle in the phase of the negotiations. There have been any number of issues that have been seen as obstacles which both sides have focused on in their public statements. First, many of the technical issues surrounding irans enrichment capabilities and, more recently, a lot of discussion about the timing and scope of sanction res leaf. But this week almost out of nowhere iranis began talking about the insistence that the arms embargo which is part and parcel of several u. N. Resolutions but most particularly the comp responsive embargo included in a resolution in 2010, they want that to go and theyre quite insistent about it. This is something that the administration has talked with its interlocutors in suggesting it remain in place irrespective of the negotiations. So to see this arise at this late date suggest if there have been large issues, the two sides havent had the time and opportunity to focus on or from a con spir conspiratorial point of view that the iranians are trying to tank the process to divide the p5 1 that has been negotiating with them and in particular align russia and china more directly with iran in the failure or delay of the negotiating process. Bremmer that last point is important, because i saw a statement from the Russian Foreign ministry that the foreign minister lavrov actually said the u. N. Arms embargo has to go, has to be one to have the first things to go. That implies a pretty significant gap between the position of russia and that of the United States and the europeans. Iranian negotiators also saying that the russians and chinese have a different perfective and there are very different moves from the Different Countries in the p5 1, and thats confusing all of this. So, gary whats your view on this . Do you think the russians are basically taking a flyer here . Are they moving away and are they looking to stick it to the americans at the last possible moment with the iranians getting cold feet or is this much to do about one or two statements that dont really matter . Well, i think it does matter a great deal. Ii can understand on reasons of substance why both the russians and iranians would like the arms embargo to be lifted. The russians because they want to sell weapons to iran and the iranians because they need modern they need weapons and they will have extra money because of the deal to purchase additional weapons. For the u. S. And western powers, i think its impossible to imagine that we could accept a lifting of the arms embargo. I think that wouldnt be it politically sustainable. So from irans standpoint, this was a good issue to pick, to wait until the last until the end game when most of the other issues have been resolved, as far as i can tell and we just dont know whether the iranians will use this as a bargaining chip and concede to keep the arms embargo in place for the time being in exchange for getting concessions on other issues relating to inspection or research and development limits on their enrichment program, or whether theyre serious about taking a stab at trying to get the arms embargo lifted, if not right away, then over a relatively brief period of time, and knowing they have the russians and chinese backing that, which could very easily, it seems to me, lead to a delay in the deal coming together. But i dont think it will result in a breakdown of the process and i think, ultimately, the negotiators will probably figure out a compromise so that the deal comes together. I justnt go know whether i just dont know whether it will happen over this weekend. Thats fair. If theres no deal by monday, do you think we have another extension and we just continue with all the sides in place occasionally moving back and forth to their capitals or are we going to take a break and really not come back for a while . Well, its very hard to make that call if youre not in the room. Obviously, kerry will have to make a decision based on whether or not he thinks some additional period of time is going to produce a compromise on the remaining issues, in particularly the arms embargo or whether he thinks theyve really reached the end in this round of negotiations and there is no room for further progress, in which case i think both sides would be willing to end this round, to extend the interim agreement because neither side wants the process to collapse and make plans for having another round of discussion sometime over the summer. Bremmer so you really dont see and when we see the russians and chinese, at least, breaking, and the russians doing so quite publicly, when we see kerry coming out and saying look, were not going to have endless negotiations, seems like, you know, the level of patience is wearing thin. You dont think there is any real danger this process is going to be derailed at this point. You think its either continuation of interim agreements or we get a deal . Yes, thats correct. Neither side wants the status quo to break down. From our standpoint, that would mean iran resuming the Nuclear Activities that are currently frozen and which weve benefited from because they havent been able to advance their program significantly since the interim agreement went into force in january 2014. From irans standpoint, a breakdown in the talks means resumption of additional sanctions which would hurt their economy. So i think both sides are more comfortable with the status quo with the interim agreement being in place, and well try to avoid a breakdown, especially a messy breakdown where fingers are being pointed as to exactly whos at fault but certainly the country that is seen as triggering a breakdown is going to be more vulnerable to diplomatic pressure and neither side wants to be blamed for causing the process to collapse. Bremmer if we lose monday suzanne we, dont get to a deal who, s more likely to be blamed for that at this point in the court of International Public opinion . Do you have a view . I think its hard to say. The iranians have done a pretty good job of avoiding the blame for the delays and process to date, despite the fact it has really been washington that has invested the most in terms of devising creative proposals to try to bridge gaps where theyve appeared. I think the real danger in not getting a deal in the course of the next 48 to 72 hours is what we saw after the last round the sides came together in late march, negotiated aroundothe clock for some days and actually came to this political framework in lausanne switzerland, that was hailed as a big step forward, went away and when they came back to the negotiating table, there was a lot of work to be done to solidify the positions they both achieved, so they had to renegotiate sm some of what they already agreed on. I think one of the dangers and incentives of keeping everyone at the table right now is, you know, we know were this close we know it will take work to get back to this point if we all disappear for a week or two or three. Weve got to try to get i across the get it across the finish line but at the same time there is a danger compromises will be made that will be unsustainable by the other side once they go back to political capitals and discuss this. Bremmer is there a danger the sanctions will erode especially if the americans are to blame for why we havent gotten a deal . The p5 1 doesnt seem to be quite in line like they have been. I think the sanctions have been durable and demonstrate the u. S. System to persuade the world there is a choice to be made of doing business with iran or the United States. Thats not a choice for any country in the outside world except for programs belarus. I think the ability to deter cooperation with iran in the end the chinese are interested in retaining a Good Relationship with washington, in alaska seases to the u. S. Financial system than in the potential upsides for business with iran. Theyve already had a lot of opportunity that they slowrolled in order to sort of ensure that they are diplomatically aligned with washington, so i think at least in the short term we dont have a lot of fears of sanctions erosion or collapse, if for the if the process were really to break down and we were to see some sort of end to the negotiations, then i think all bets are off. Bremmer gary, what do you think of the principle risks at this point if we dont get the deal on monday . Well, i agree with suzanne that the iranians have a tendency to walk back on commitments if the deal isnt sealed, so its quite possible they reopen issues that have been resolved during the latest very intense round. Theres a little bit of protection against that only in the sense that, as i understand it, the documents are virtually completed, so there may be a few brackets here and there but in the 100 or so pages of documents that have been agreed upon, it gives you a little more confidence that you can take a break and not reopen text. Its not absolute proof but at least gives you some protection whereas in april in lausanne, there was little agreed text or a lot of brackets in the text. The other big danger besides backtracking is some external event could take place which could jeopardize the negotiations. The middle east, as we all know, is in the middle of an incredibly turbulent and unstable and conflict chiewl phase with wars going on in seemen, syria and many other places. So with that kind of boiling stew, theres always a possibility something could happen to complicate the poll tex of reaching an agreement for either tehran, washington or both. Bremmer there has been a lot of talk in the news, of course, this week that one of the reasons why this last deadline was important was because congress only had 30 days as opposed to off0 to look at and approve the deal, needs twothirds of a vote so you cant just have the republicans scuttling it. Do you think that this also both in terms of its dragging on, and theres a longer period now, how much danger do we have that you get to yes and Congress Gets to no . Suzanne . Its still very much a sort of minority danger. You know, i think the administration has done a good job of effectively talking to congress. The debate Service Interests in congress if they want to be out in public with the views on this, but in the end, i think it will be difficult for republicans and other opponents to the deal to pull together a coalition of 66 or 67 senators who are prepared to override a president ial veto, a vote of disapproval of any kind of agreement with iran. There is a danger, of course that the 60day period provides for more public antics on the part of congress as well as some sense of dissatisfaction on the iranian side that the agreement that they may have committed to will then thereby take much longer so see in its first days of implementation. Its interesting. The majority of americans actually say they want a deal at this point. I think the outcome of the congressional review really depends on the substance of the agreement. If the agreement includes strong provisions for inspection and monitoring, strong limits verifiable limits on irans ability to produce phisle material and relief then i think theyre in a good place to extend the agreement, 30 off0 days, doesnt matter. If the transasia makes additional concessions and creates loopholes on any key issues that really havent been resolved yet then i think it becomes more difficult and is conceivable that they would lose enough support that they would not be able to sustain the agreement. So i think its premature at this point to predict what the congressional review will look like. In general, i agree with suzanne that the most likely outcome will be there will be strong congressional opposition, maybe majority support for a resolution of disapproval, but Unlikely Congress would attend of the day be able to muster enough votes to override a president ial veto but i dont think you can make that judgment till you see the details of the agreement. Bremmer how do you respond to those who say irrespective if we have a deal with teeth that this regime will get more powerful and wealthier and they will use the wealth clearly antithetical to america and the regions beyond. How do you respond, suzanne. Irans bad behavior has never been a direct response to the are Resources Available to it. The worst abuses at home and in the edge occurred in the 1980s at times of tremendous constraint as a result of the war with iraq and other issues, so im not particularly concerned that tin flux of resources as a result of sanction res lease is going to alter what we know to be a very problematic Foreign Policy. We have to confront it, we have to deal with that Foreign Policy irrespective of sanctions or the Resources Available. I do think that, you know, there is an argument to be made that iran will have other interests as a result of reengagement with the world, that there will be some constraint on its willingness to go rogue and to cause trouble, particularly in the gulf because of its investment in ensuring that it sustains its economy. But fundamentally, this is a country which we have deep and longstanding divisions. Those will not be resolved by a nuclear deal and were going to have to ensure that we have a policy that is well devised for confronting it. In addition to that we see a lot of folks not just republican but in the region that strongly oppose the deal. The saudis stronglyo supposed to the deal. Do you think thats an accurate read by them of their National Interests that they should oppose a deal from their perspective or is it mostly posturing to get nerns to do more for them . Whenever were talking to allies in the region, we have to recognize their fundamental concern about iran is not the Nuclear Issue derricks spite the fact that it is part of the threat perception and part of the underlying worry about what iran is up to. Fundamentally what theyre concerned about is the support to terrorists, subversive groups abroad and role in destabilizing some of its neighbors. But, you know, at the same time we have to recognize that some of our own allies, in particular the saudis and others in the gulf have been either asleep at the wheel or engaged in a way thats not been productive in terms of addressing some of the longstanding concerns about stability in iraq and elsewhere, and, so, i think we have to be careful to avoid accepting the narrative of the gulf states in particular, about how to handle iran. I think the administration has been right to try to craft a diplomatic resolution to the Nuclear Crisis and right to try to address the issues of the Islamic State in the levant in a way that is, in some respects correspondent to what the iranians are doing on the ground. Bremmer so gary, do we have our priorities right in were focusing resentlessly on the technical side of the nuclear deal. Were not focusing on these other issues many of the gulf states and the israelis think are more important, were not focusing on cyber, were not focusing on ballistic miss also, not focusing on support for hesbollah or proxy fights with allies in the region, is that an appropriate use of american sources and the view on riern. I think it is. If iran acquired Nuclear Weapons it would pose such a direct threat not only to u. S. National interests but the National Security interests of our allies and partners in the region that its right to address that issue as a separate isolated matter. But we should also recognize this is a transactional agreement thats being negotiated. Were getting restrains on Irans Nuclea