Transcripts For CSPAN3 Legacy 20240703 : comparemela.com

Transcripts For CSPAN3 Legacy 20240703

Time. I really appreciate the way that weve sort of expanded and the lens here. So were focused in in the ways that the individual experience is so nuanced and complicated and affected by by so many decisions that other folks make. So thank you. Again, lets take our panelists. Weve called this years symposium korea the first forever war as a way to focus our attention, the wars lasting legacies. And so in our third and final panel of the day well think about the ways that the war continues to shape world geopolitics military thinking and families. And one of the things that people probably know about the korean war is that it never officially ended hostilities terminated and an armistice signed in 1953 by north korea. The states and china significantly, not by south korea. That armistice made permanent what had been a temporary divide between, north and south korea, and it left an unstable truce in its place. And in the 70 years since, millions of people who through and fought that war have attempted come to terms with it. And while nations have also attempted to deal with the legacies of war left and our panelists here have left or bring wealth of scholarly and practice experience to our discussion of the wars wide ranging legacies. And i am delighted that they are here with. So to my left is frank m, who is Senior Expert on northeast asia at the United States institute of peace where he works to reduce tensions and enhance peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Hes advised the department of defense Us Army General counsel for secretaries of defense and served as head of delegation for level negotiations with the republic of korea. Megan is a strategic analyst with Defense Research and Development Canada and is an adjunct professor of war studies at the Royal Military college of canada. Shes a specialist military, Mental Health and resilience and is the author of scars. This trauma in the korean war nan kim is associate professor of history at the of wisconsin. Milwaukee, a scholar of korea. Korean war families memory and the environment. Shes written extensively about the wide ranging repercussions of the korean war. Shes author of memory reconciliation reunions in south korea. And last not least, is brian brian linn, who is the ralph arts home best professor in liberal arts at texas a m university, a military historian of the us army, the cold war and the pacific. Hes the author of elviss army guys and the atomic battlefield and most recently, real soldiering, the us army and the aftermath of war. So on last panel get well talk about legacies but before we get there we might begin a little bit in the war at the time of the war. A lot of people feared that it might be the beginnings of world war three. And so how did go from a war that at that was elicited great fear to something was forgotten or maybe not known in the first place. Was it truly forgotten. Was it forgotten by some . Was it remembered in other ways . Yes. Ill start. Thank you so much, sara and you and the schmitt family for finding opportunity here. Im not history in, but ive very much enjoyed the first two panels. Just feel like im learning a lot. Coming. Come here. Some, everyone. Im so last year we celebrated the 70th anniversary of the end of the korean and what ive noticed is the that the u. S. Government and the south korean government have commemorated commemorate in this occasion is primarily through the military aspects. So a celebration of the u. S. South korea alliance, a celebration of the mutual treaty and the sacrifices of the Service Members, the veterans, and also to be forward looking a celebration of the the future of the alliance, the enhancement of military defense and deterrence capabilities, and those are all things that need to be commemorate and celebrated. But what i think is also over is overlook is the importance diplomacy. Right . Because recall that the two militant, the military commanders of the two sides used diploma si during the war to end hostilities are hostilities that had millions of casualties. The two military sides use diplomacy to end the war right. That should be noted. It should also be noted that in the armistice agreement that the two military sides recommended a political conference to settle the korean question the issue of unification of the two sides. So that is something needs to be remembered. The before the armistice was signed president eisenhower went on tv and he the nation and im just going to paraphrase but he basically said that now the carnage of the war is ending and then the of the conferences is about to begin. Lets use hopefully have the wisdom to recognize that diplomacy is important so that we can use that to avoid conflict the hostility before rather than after the futility of battle. So this is something that i want to highlight. Again, its that i think is not recognized as much today. And its something that we should be focusing on in the contemporary times. Yeah, just picking up on what frank mentioned about diplomacy, ironically i think some of the language of diplomacy has an impact on how the war is perceived by people in the west, in western countries. So not just the United States, but the u. K. , canada, australia, all of these countries that are sending troops. The language is previous panelists have mentioned includes described as a police action, as a limited war. So back home, obviously, that has an impact on how the public perceive what the conflict is. It really doesnt highlight brutality of what weve heard described. It doesnt give the impression that i think we all know that the war is extensive with millions of casualties involved. So thats an important part of it. Another important part that has already been highlighted, as well as the of this this is only coming years after the Second World War and. The footprint is different. So the number of western troops that are sent to fight in korea. Is starkly disparate from the number that participate in World War Two. So a good example of that is with the number of american troops, 16 million americans serve in uniform. The Second World War, and its about 6 million during korea. And while thats still a big number, it is starkly disparate. And you start to see that as well in some of the other countries involved. So for the u. K. , theres about 6 million troops in uniform, the Second World War, and that shrinks down to about 60,000 in korea. So the domestic footprint simply isnt there. And its really interesting doing interviews with veterans of that conflict that when they initially were called up to go to korea or they volunteered in some capacity, many of them didnt where it was in the first place. And why they would be going there. And you can see that in families and friends, especially at home. If you didnt have a link to the war, it didnt have that tangible impact on your life that perhaps the Second World War had. And i think also the of the fighting is an important consideration. So when you think from 1951 to 1953, the fighting along the 38th parallel and its about fighting over a negotiating table essentially. So you are fighting to establish a line, to be able to take back maybe a hill or a few square miles of territory. Youre not in the same sort of dramatically mobile fighting thats happening during the latter phases, especially of the Second World War. So it doesnt get reported in the same way that the Second World War would be. In fact, korea is probably more similarities with later conflicts that all of us are familiar with, like and afghanistan than it does with the Second World War. So at least for western countries part, what plays into this idea of the forgotten war is that timing, the type of language thats being and just the footprint of what kind of impact it has on peoples lives. Thank you so much, kevin. And history and family and so much for opening the space for discussing and remembering the korean so the premise of the question harks back to the debate weve had over calling this the forgotten war, the unknown, the never known war. I will mention, though that this wasnt war that perhaps again comparable to some contemporary wars weve encountered. This was a that was being forgotten in real time. The first reference to the war as the forgotten war dates to 1951 in the u. S. News and world report. So i think my colleagues can also refer more to what was factoring into the the disinterest a relatively speaking, the again earlier in the first panel when i did the i had mentioned not having the congressional there wasnt the large popular discussion about the stakes, the war. And so therefore it could be downplayed and and again and sidelined. This was traumatizing also for the who returned and to encounter that relative disinterest when they had lost, you know, their buddies or themselves had their lives on the line and gone through extreme suffering and in the frontline, in the battlefield. So this forgetting also and some of the implications for this has to also do with the the count of war deaths, which is one that is strike in the range that. The number of war deaths with regard to the korean war is egregious. And compared to other modern wars. Theres a book by john timmerman, the deaths of others talking the fate of civilians in these forever wars and refers to the korean war as the closest to guessing in of the actual number deaths and in this in the reason for that has to do in part with the nature of warfare. First of all the time at which although there had been earlier dissent against one more engagement in the war in the us when the fighting stabilizes is when americans start to become disinterested. Of course, its also rise of television. This is the war following World War Two. But that was the time also that the war becomes very deadly because this the period of the strategic aerial bombing and so this notion of korean war being forgotten in the mid perhaps in the u. S. Is something that you cant with the fact that korea this was a total war and formative for both north and south. And so the weve already discussed the fact so when i was referring to this range i will say that ive also encountered this in teaching like course on the korean war this discrepancy between used for the military histories and then social history. Id say that its fairly common. The range will go from about 2. 5 million to 4 or even 4. 5 million. So if we can just stop for a moment, right. Were talking about a margin of error of 2 million people. And thats just chilling in its own right. And why is this the case in in a sense, this is also a factor of the cold itself. Right. And the given that the vast majority you have the aerial that are indiscriminately, you know, targeting both civilians and combatants. But what this as well is that what were having as a result of this discrepancy is some erasure of the vast impact. What teach my course on the korean war . I ask when you know, we start with a diagnostic and maybe could just ask in your head before coming to symposium and just before they even start the semester what they estimate number of deaths would be in you know, to 40300 to 400000. 3 to 4 million people. And my students, of course, the the global the number because the is that if it were such a large war they would have heard more about it. And this is unlike World War Two and the vietnam war. The korean war is overshadowed by these other conflicts, both in terms of historical and in Popular Culture. And so one thing to mention is, the like, again, the number of this not because the the war swept up and down the peninsula, it also in that in in these this retributive violence that occurred, you have these massacres that occurred on all sides. So in the social history of the war, this notion of it rather than you have the ongoing debate between what extent it was an international war, a civil war, it was also a war against civilians, against this indiscriminate violence on all sides or war against society. But that discussion which has come up number of times already in the earlier panels, was taboo up until the nineties. Really, again another casualty of the cold war is that history. And it was silence. So that this is both in the respect of the massacres that had as the result of the korean war and even the of no country that came out. That was the Pulitzer Prize was in 2000. So this is relative reason that this is coming out, entering into the historical record in historical to debate. Well, ive always not like the forgotten war since i actually study the forgotten war, which the campaign in the philippines. So the second thing id also say is having studied the postwar experience of the us army, every war is veterans come back convinced that theyre not being paid attention to. Okay, this is not world war one. The good war korea, this is the experience. Okay, you come back convinced that your service isnt being recognized whereas the parades, you know, wheres wheres the glory . And so the fact that the korean wars are war veterans are ticked off. Welcome to the veteran experience. You know, thats thats what had happened the in terms of the impact of i would just say im terrible with numbers so i actually wrote these down but in terms of like the war these are fiscal us budget in 1950 so that would end in june 1950, 140,000,000,002 years, 1952 400 billion total personnel. The Us Armed Forces in 1950 1,500,000 1952, 3,600,000. Total member the United States army in 1950 600,000 and of truman. It had it way it would have been cut down to almost 500,000. 1952 over 1,600,000 in some sense. It is a forever war because it sets the the cold war parameters of a of a us military thats no longer sort of saying, well, we can stay in the United States and bomb people from from a distance, but have a permanent presence. And so ill end with one last statistic, u. S. Armed forces in europe in 1950 are about 80,000. In 1952, its 240,000. So that permanent overseas presence of the united really starts existing. You want to say thats a forever war because. Its still continuing now. And i say that, yes, that we respect korea. The forever war. So if we think about what states and nations sort of learned from the korean war, whether thats again, the United States, north korea, south korea, china, soviet union and in canada of anyone, what lessons since states take away, what did they learn . Did they remember . What did they forget. You know, i can been on this. Okay. So trying to think about this one, especially because i am not an american historian. So i was looking at this more from a British Commonwealth perspective. So uk canada, australia and new zealand and what what the war would have meant to them. And looking at it from that perspective, i suppose you could look at it as for them. An exercise in Coalition Warfare and the dynamics of Coalition Warfare and of collective security. So a test of collective security early already been mentioned is a very early test for the United Nations now for the commonwealth and for actually many of the countries that form un coalition behind the United States. I think this is also a pivotal turning point. So this is when theres a shifting balance in power in the world by this point. So by 1950 the United States has clearly the superpower and many of these countries, the postwar defense and security is really still taking shape. I think its already been mentioned. Nato has been formed in 1949, but really its only on paper at that point. It really hasnt taken the shape that we would understand today. The australia and new zealand United States security treaty. So the ans this treaty isnt signed until a year into. The korean war. So 1951. So in other words the cement has not dried this. So its still still taking shape. And for many of these the reason why they contribute forces to the korean war. Yes, it is about communism, curbing communism globally, but its also about realizing how are we going to secure our own defense and security moving forward and recognizing that their relationship to the United States would be very important in doing so, moving forward. So thats of the dynamic of that. And i think its especially important when we think that were again at a moment where there a lot of forces shifting when it comes to in power, who is a superpower, how the balance of power exists globally, and korea provides, an example of how often times middle powers will behave in that kind of situation and the dynamics of coalition. I think another point from a more military perspect is looking at how changing political objectives can really extend a war for a prolonged period of time, which arguably is a lesson we may not have learned very occasionally. It could, yes. So i think the previous panels address this quite. But i from the the south korean the north korean perspective, obviously theres Lessons Learned about the importance of, you know, support for major powers alliances. You north korea was relying on china and russia south was relying on the United States. Theres also lessons selfreliance. I think north korea in particular recognized the the the the the need to take security into its own matters. The lessons of Nuclear Weapons. And were seeing it today. There there are vigorous commitment to maintaining possession of their own nuclear capabilities, because thats the ultimate guarantor of their own security right. I think from the us perspective, theres a variety of lessons. The two major ones, you know, the importance of deterrence, right . And Gregg Brazinsky talked about the atkinson speech in january 1950, the defense perimeter. Korea was left out and how a lot of people though

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