Thank you for joining me today to discuss a new book published by my long time colleague and friend dan randy, whos a Senior Vice President and director of the project on prosperity and development and holds the schreier chair here at csis. His work is oriented around u. S. Leadership in building a more democratic and prosperous world. Among his many other contributions, he was an architect of the build act, helped contribute to the reauthorization of the us Exportimport Bank in 2018 and was an architect of prosper africa, a u. S. Government initiative to deepen the uss commercial and Development Engagement in africa. Hes been a leading voice on the role in future of the World Bank Group and u. S. Leadership in the multilateral system. Prior to csis, he held leadership roles at the u. S. Agency for International Development and the World Bank Group. Earlier in his career, he also worked in commercial banking at citibank in argentina and Investment Banking at what is now Deutsche Bank dans book, the american imperative reclaiming Global Leadership through soft power is the first decade, its first book in decades to look at americas nonmilitary power through the lens of Great Power Competition. It calls for supporting broad based economic growth, supporting Good Governance and anticorruption, long term training. Differentiating our approaches in middle Income Countries and fragile states. And stronger u. S. Leadership in the multilateral system. Dan i want to congratulate you on a great book. Its been a its been a long process. And im very proud to host you today. So welcome. And why dont we dive right in . Thanks. Thanks, connor. Thanks for having me. Im really pleased to be doing this. This has been a long time coming. Ive been in washington for 20 years. Ive been at caesars for 12. Ive watched the rise of china over the last 12 years, but ive also watched the rise and the progress in many developing countries. And so its not our grandparents developing world. And at the same time, were in a period of Great Power Competition with china and their sidekick, russia. And so i think that we have to offer an alternative, enable an alternative, because china, in partnership with russia, can fill voids that we leave behind. They can fill voids in vaccines. We saw this with covid. They can close the Digital Divide through weiwei and zte. They can build bridges, build ports and airports. So to the extent we dont want to do that, china will do that. To the extent that we dont want to provide and support the development of Reliable Energy such as gas. China will do that for them to the extent that we fill trade voids, china will fill that as well. So at the same time, russia, which is doesnt have the same kind of heft as china is a is a major global disrupter. To put it mildly, their illegal invasion of ukraine has has global implications. And its in our interest to make sure that ukraine wins the war, but also ukraine also is financially successful as a stable democracy and a full member of the European Union and nato. I want to come back to ukraine in a little bit, but maybe lets start out with, i think one of the things that strikes me about the book is there is this sort of cold war parallel. You talk a lot about how the Kennedy Administration saw a real challenge to our ability to engage and developing countries. In the early 1960s that led to the peace corps, that led to usaid using the cold war. You know, how do you kind of see this as a as a competition right now . Is it analogous . Is it a little bit different . How do you kind of where do you see the similarities, indifference and sort of dodged this b, and so i think in the book, i sort of edge up to the idea of saying this is potentially a second cold war. I did a radio interview last week where somebody said they disagreed with me in the book because i sort of hem and haw on this issue of whether its a second cold war or not. And i finished i submitted the manuscript for the book in march of 2010, february, march of 2020, to the world has also since evolved, i think. And fortunately in a not great way in the last 12 plus months. So i think we need to see this certainly as revisiting our soft power in an age of Great Power Competition and perhaps thats a safer place. I think what i worry about is if i say its a second cold war, some folks kind of bristle at that and sort of dont want us to kind of and i think the framing of that as perhaps creates a problem. But i do think that if you look at in history, if you look at the emergence of the marshall plan, that was the result of the coup in czechoslovakia in 1948, which was sort of the dawn of the cold war, and was a direct response to sort of National Security concerns and Foreign Policy concerns at the time. If you look at the reorganization of aid in that early 1961, the foreign assistance act of 1961, it was a reaction to our perceived shortcomings during sort of the the First Quarter or so of the of the cold war, where this book called the ugly american, which was published in 1958, which i cant think of, a book thats been more influential in Foreign Policy. And john kennedy bought a copy for every member of the senate. Kennedy bought 100 copies of the book and gave one to every member of the u. S. Senate. And that book caused a revolution in thinking in the United States about how we ought to engage with the developing world. It caused it. It brought about the reorganization of the for our foreign aid. It a rejiggering of u. S. The initiative called the alliance for progress for the americas. It created the peace corps and it created the green berets. So these were all things that were a direct result of the book the ugly american. I would say weve had several moments since since the 1960s. At the end of the cold war, there were some rejiggering of our instrumentation to respond to the fall of the berlin wall. And then i would say after 911, there have been some some adjustments as well. I would argue that were at a moment in this period of Great Power Competition or whatever we want to call it, if we want to call it a second cold war. And theres some baggage with that that the National Security imperatives of engaging a resurgent china and a a a disrupter in russia require us to go back to the drawing board on our soft power instruments to respond to this new challenge that were finding. So i think, you know, as were as im listening to you, dan, i mean, one of the things that really comes out is the imperative of us using our soft power tools and using them better. I mean, what do you see as the importance now for soft power . And why do you think development and by extension, diplomacy are overlooked when the u. S. Is looking at how it engages in the world . So if you believe that were in an age of Great Power Competition, then most of our Great Power Competition is not going to play out in beijing or moscow. Its going to play out in tanzania. Its going to play out in guatemala. Its going to play out in the Pacific Island states. Its going to play out in central asia. Its going to play out in ukraine. These are developing countries with a series of hopes in aspirations and interests and to the extent we dont meet the hopes and aspiration missions of these countries, theyll take their business to china or theyll take their business to russia in some instances. And to the extent we dont engage in a number of different fields that are not in the nonmilitary sphere, they have the ability today because of their economic because of chinas economic heft, to be able to fill voids that we leave behind. So im all for peace through strength. Im all for a strong u. S. Military and a strong intelligence capacity. But i believe most of this competition is not a military competition. Its a nonmilitary competition. One of the things that i know has come up since you put out the book, since it was published last week, youve and youve done a lot of these discussions is this idea of, you know, implicit in the this discussion of uschina in the developing world and other regions is the idea that youre that you could be suggesting that they need to pick a side. How do you address that . How do you think about this interplay between the us and china and what how do we have to think about that . How do we have to frame it when were engaging in developing countries . So, i mean, in my heart, id like them to pick a side, but i think in reality, in most instances, thats going to be very, very difficult today. And that in that late nineties, Something Like 120 out of 200 countries, the number one trading partner was the United States. And about 60, the largest trading partner was china. Today, out of 200 or so developing countries, about 120 countries, their largest trading partner is china. And were the number one trading partner for about 60. So its going to be very difficult to say to some country where their number one trading partner is Mainland China, you have to pick a side and stop working with Mainland China. So i think its just not its not serious. And so i think we need to be realistic about that. At the same time, there are things we cant just say if countries dont take sinovac vaccines, if were not going to offer an alternative vaccine, dont take chinese made ventilators. If were not going to offer a ventilator, dont take chinese infrastructure or energy infrastructure. If were not going to enable long term, we dont have to meet china dollar for dollar, but its just not serious for us to say to countries that have developed beyond a certain level of development, have their own agency, have their own choices today, and can have a lot more freedom of action for us to say, dont take the vaccines, dont take the infrastructure, and dont close your Digital Divide with huawei. We have to enable an alternative. So let me go on that. So infrastructure is one of the ways that weve seen china really ramp up its presence in developing countries through the belt and road initiative. What do we need to do to offer a credible alternative to chinese infrastructure . My view is that to the extent that theyre building farm to market roads in the middle of nowhere, if they want to go knock themselves out and do that, thats fine. Then theres some areas where we ought to be competing with china on infrastructure, whether its us or through the Asian Development bank or japan or the australian, us or turkey or brazil. Thats fine. Then theres a subset of what might be described as commanding heights infrastructure, where we just dont want them to build it, where they has a dual use, say an airport or a port or lets certain kinds of Tech Technology like 5g and controlling 5g, we do. We should not want Mainland China to control the digital rails of the future in developing countries and the unholy trinity of huawei, zte and alipay. So thinking about digital in particular, you know, weve talked a lot over the years about how aid and Development Institutions did a lot to enable cell phone telephony in developing countries. And most countries had leapfrogged they people never had a landline. They only have a cell phone. So when youre thinking about closing the Digital Divide, what what do we need to do . What do you see as the opportunity on that . So the u. S. And the west helped create kind of version 1. 0 of the internet in many developing countries. And it was also an enabler through the series of obscure but important institutions called Development Finance institutions like the International Finance corporation, what was then called the overseas private investment corporation, the series of european Development Finance institute grants to enable the cell phone revolution thats happened over the last 20 years. And theres most people in the developing world, whether its afghanistan or african countries in africa or southeast asia, they all have access to to cell phone, telephony. And thats changed the world for the better. What youre seeing now is this next generation of high Speed Internet net, which has been accelerated because of covid. Everybody was in their basement for a year, whether they were in rural maryland, they were in moldova, malaysia or mali, and there was a realization that we all needed high Speed Internet. That high Speed Internet is the new electricity. And so this is this is going to happen. And so were either going there, either people are going to close this new Digital Divide of high Speed Internet, either through Mainland China or through weiwei, zte and alipay or some coalition or somebody else. I would strongly prefer that some coalition of somebody else that requires is getting our act a little bit more together. It means us working with allies like south korea, finland and sweden. It means having some sort of a strategy, how were going to use development, financing the oceans. It probably means having being a little bit more thoughtful and tangible how we use our aid agencies to kind of prime the pump for some of this stuff. Some of this is about making sure that various stakeholders show up and on bids for certain kinds of infrastructure. And then my hope is, is to the extent that countries pick weiwei, zte and zte for socalled 5g technology, which is sort of the latest technology thats being used that we can have to the extent we lose in some instances, we need to get ready for six g or the next generation so that we can supplant Mainland China because its just not in our interest because of either values, commerce and most importantly, sort of the valuing vacuuming up of data, information thats going directly to beijing. Thats being used for all sorts of bad purposes. So let me let me take this. You mentioned allies in your last answer. You know, your book is entitled the the american imperative. And, you know, i think some some not me may look at this and say, oh, this is a little bit of an America First argument that youre trying to make here. And i think its a its you know, how how do you kind of what do you say to that . Where do allies where how do you kind of think about the american role from that perspective in the world . Nothing significant the United States has ever done. Have we been able to do by ourselves. So we have needed friends and partners to accomplish anything of any significance. The cold war can fronting big challenges like hiv, aids, responding to covid aid thats required sort of leading a coalition to the extent that, you know, weve been able to do that. Sometimes were not a great friend. Sometimes were a little bit of a flaky ally and friend. We need to do a better job of that. I would say that one of our greatest strengths is the fact that weve got a big network of friends and allies. And so i think we need to make sure that were being a good friend and a reliable friend. Stuff you learned in kindergarten. But we also so we we anything we want to accomplish in sort of this responding to closing the Digital Divide, making sure that the next pandemic were not all sitting in our basins for a year, making sure that Mainland China doesnt control the email for the secretary general ship of the u. N. , or so the commanding heights of the multilateral system. We need to work with our friends. And so this is not an America First book. This is a book that says we need to this is an internationalist book that says we need to work with our friends, that we have a big challenge. I think i think theres a consensus in washington that we have a big problem with russia and we have a big problem with china. I dont believe theres a consensus yet in washington about what the heck to do about it. And so i wrote the book as a contribution to say, heres some thoughts about some things we could do if we could respond to china and russia. And if you believe that most of our competition is not about night vision goggles and battleships and missiles, those are all really important things. As i said, i believe in peace through strength. Then we need to come up with look at a variety of spheres. Think about what were going to do and how were going to burden, share. And in some ways, development is about helping countries become wealthy enough and hopefully free enough that they join the community of free market. You know, free, free nations that are market democracies that are willing to burden share on big challenges and also to join, you know, this is a big set of words, but the liberal international order, the and i dont mean liberal as thats a progressive sort of that the or the set of rules and arrangements that were set up after World War Two. We want countries to develop and then become burden sharers in th