It will give us a sense of how many questions are out there. We would like to accommodate as many of you as possible. First up, dr. Simon miles, the author of the book. He is assistant professor in the Sanford School of Public Policy at duke university. He has published research into diplomatic history, diplomacy, and statecraft. He is the author of the book we will be talking about today, engaging the evil empire. He holds a phd. He will talk about his book. We will introduce our distinguished commentators afterwards. Simon, to you. Simon thank you so much. Its a real pleasure to be here. Especially here as so much of the historical scholarship that really got me excited about history, that is probably the reason i am a historian, and i will leave it up to the audience to decide if thats for better or worse. All the work that was being done by those who went before me, its a real treat to be here with you, especially with mary and elizabeth giving some comments, to which i look forward. This book started for me as a puzzle. This book started for me as a real puzzle. On the one hand, i was very familiar with the kind of cold war story of, i guess we could say, the death of detentes. If you will. The soviet invasion of afghanistan, the iran hostage crisis, events in latin america spelledca that kind of the end for many people of conflict, if you will. On the other hand, i knew very well the story of reagan and gorbachev. Reagan had taken to calling him gorby. Strolling across red square. Cooperation the seeming , transformation of the cold war from conflict to cooperation. So much so that i would say that the late1980s period has become one of the textbook cases of old rivals putting their differences aside. The end of the cold war itself is something which strikes me by its rapidity and its unexpectedness. It is there and then it is gone. I especially wondered then how did we get there. How did we get the end of the cold war story . How do we get there in a way which seems like such a swing, from the end of detente, from the end of u. S. Soviet cooperation to collaboration, cooperation between the two superpowers . And in particular, how do we get there during a period during which the story, the conventional story goes the superpowers are not even talking to one another . You have on the one hand reagan, who was maybe too ideologically focused to even talk to the soviets. On the other hand, you have soviet leaders who epitomize the gerontocracy. I went looking for that. I went looking for an explanation that could tell us something more than just the sort of second cold war image of implacable hostility, but that could maybe show us what accounts for this transformation and also maybe prefigure some of the momentous shift that we associate with the process of ending the cold war. I went looking in the archives, the soviet archives, in moscow, the American Archives in simi valley and washington, d. C. , and the archives of a lot of their allies. One of the elements im really proud of about this book is its incorporation of a variety of perspectives on the cold war and a variety of materials. Let me run down the three big things that i found and that i think, in the q a, we will probably flesh some of these out in greater detail. I found first that the key to understanding both the speed and the scope of the changes of the late 1980s lies at the beginning of that decade. The reasons for that are two parallel shifts. First, a shift that the balance of power perceived to favor the soviet union, to one more accurately perceived to favor the United States. Also from a war of words supplemented by back channel dialogue, to one of over dialogue in the famous summits between reagan and gorbachev. In writing this book, i found these two shifts that explain trends, which are lockedin in the first half of the 1980s and which have such an influence on the latter half of the decade. Second, i found that whereas many argued Ronald Reagan was either kind of a flipflopper on strategy toward the soviet union , some people famously argued that reagan had none. Some have gone so far to say reagan was too much of a simpleton to have one in the first place. The United States actually implemented a pretty consistent approach to the soviet union, a dual track grand strategy, if you will, which shaped both of those aforementioned processes. The two elements thereof are basically carrot and stick. Theres a lot of back channel negotiating going on between east and west. A lot of deals are being done very quietly, about, for example, human rights issues. The second element, the stick, is the famous peace through strikes. The ideological and political offensive of trying to bring American Allies on board with the United States. On the third point, and this is really important to me because of the nature of the book, moscow actually had strategies of its own. The soviet union isnt just being acted upon, but rather its a pretty active participant in the cold war at this time. Indeed, even under mikhail gorbachev. I try to present these not so much as an interregnum, but as a fairly consistent application of a pretty key tenet in the soviet approach to policy, which is to reduce tensions, reduce cold war tensions in order to create breathing space for moscow, in order to actually compete more effectively against the United States. Let me say again, thank you to everyone in the audience for coming. Thank you to everyone for organizing this. Im really looking forward to talking about this book. Great. Thanks, simon. As mentioned, we have two distinguished, wonderful commentators with us today to start the conversation, elizabeth c. Charles and mary sarotte. Dr. Charles is a historian in the office of the historian at the u. S. State department, researching and compiling the formulations of the United States series. She completed the Reagan Administration formulations volumes on the soviet union, 1983 to 85 and 1985 to 86, and the intermediate Nuclear Range forces treaty. She is now working on the george w. Bush records on the collapse of the soviet union. She has an m. A. In russian history from boston college. She currently serves as president of the society for the history in the federal government. She also serves as curriculum and Training Committee with the National Council on public history. Mary sarotte is the inaugural holder of the kravis distinguished professorship of historical studies at Johns Hopkins university. Most recently, she was the deans professor of history at university of southern california, usc. Shes also a Research Associate at harvard university. She earned her phd in history at yale university. She is the author and editor of the five books, including the collapse. 1989 the struggled to create postcold war europe. Both were selected as Financial Times books of the year, among other distinctions and awards. Following graduate school, mary served as a white house fellow and joined the faculty of the university of cambridge, where she received tenure. She is a former humboldt scholar. We will start with mary, who has to part a little early today to go and teach. We will have questions for simon, who will have a chance to immediately respond to the questions. Mary, the zoom room is yours. Great to have you with us today. Mary excellent. Its an honor and pleasure to acknowledge the work of a brilliant young scholar doing amazing work on the reagan era, which we all really want to understand better, because it is hugely important. I was just casting my eye over the names of people in the audience, and its a real testimony to your work and its importance. The names of the people who are here, i see just a few who popped up, nate jones, david holloway, james mann, william hill, samuel wells a very impressive collection of colleagues, editors, participants in events. But its a real testimony to your work. Its great to be here today. I recommend you buy the book. You can do it while im talking. Go to indy books or amazon. Whatever you want. You dont even have to pretend to listen to me because i cant see anybody. I was told to give you a few thoughts, to make sure we get time for the audience. I wont go into any great detail. I blurbed the book. Im particularly interested to learn about the beginning of the 1980s, because the 1980s are a janusfaced decade. We start the war with the potential for Nuclear Conflict and we end with the peaceful collapse of the berlin wall. The first half of the 1980s is very different from the second half. Because of the extreme difficulty of working as a scholar at the reagan library, in my view, the first half of the decade is underresearched compared to the second half. Ive worked with excellent archivists at the george h. W. Bush library, who have bent over backwards to help me with the requests ive been filing since the end of the last century. Everyone who works in that area knows that there is a large amount of documents out in the public domain. Im pleased to hear Elizabeth Charles is working on bringing even more out. Whereas the reagan library, not for lack of trying by the staff, but somehow the weight is much more on its function as a museum and as a platform for events than for research. It is fiendishly difficult to work there. Its a credit to simon that hes been able to start getting things out. We have good scholarship now on bush. I recently got a bunch of documents declassified from the clinton president ial library, most notably transcripts of conversations between clinton and yeltsin. Im finishing a book manuscript on nato expansion. Its great to have simons book. It was wonderful to see documentation of this dual track approach, this idea that there was no reagan reversal, because obviously thats a persistent theme, that there was some this complete aboutface by president reagan between the first and second term. I will be interested to hear more about that. I was particularly interested to read where you wrote there was no reagan reversal because i know ambassador matlock, and he has consistently said that, and its good to see it. I have only the highest regard for ambassador matlock, and its good to see it confirmed independently by scholars. Its important that the history of these events be written, not just by participants, but also by historians. John gaddis has written, a participant in events doesnt necessarily have the best you, because your perceptions extend no farther than your own senses. You are down on the ground level, surrounded by people. You obviously know exactly whats going on, but you dont have perspective. Its useful to have a historians perspective as well. John gaddis has written it is from a distant hide. You lose detail, but the perspective is much greater. So, i just have one area i want to zero in on, because its of interest to me in my current writing on nato expansion in the 1990s. At one point in the book, simon, you talk about page 49, ways the kremlin hoped to use the debate over enter intermediate range Nuclear Forces to play on this tension. Of course, the conventional line in germany was a relatively thin line for the soviets to punch through. You wanted those weapons to protect against the soviet union. The tension between the u. S. And nato position that those forces were necessary versus the popular revulsion at them. This comes up later once the wall comes down, as a why to try to put the brakes on german reunification. After the wall comes down, it is suggested to gorbachev, how about we propose some kind of referendum where we say the to the germans, you could have your unification if you give up Nuclear Weapons on their soil, particularly the shortrange ones. By then, the inf treaty had come into effect. He thought this would be a winwin. He thought either the west and helmut kohl would simply not have this referendum at all, which would be a Public Relations coup for moscow, because moscow could say we are on the side of paying attention to Public Opinion in the west. Or there was a chance that moscows favored side would win. The shorter the range, the deader the germans, why do we want them anyway . I would be interested in your thoughts about how that lays out in the early 1980s. I really cant stress this. The landscape of the 1980s switches in the middle of the decade. Working on the early 80s is different from the late1980s and early1990s. I think in the future for historians historians will say, i work on october 1, 2020, but only on twitter. We may have to get that specific. 1980s are not quite that bad, but it is such a rich decade, its a meaningful difference to work on the early versus the late 1980s. As someone focused on the late 1980s, its great to have company on the early1980s. Thank you, simon, for writing this book. Thank you. Do you want to respond . Simon maybe i will pick up on your point about the quantity of information, right . Its so true that, as time progresses, the quantity of material that requires declassification grows logarithmically. Once we get into the world of things like that, i really feel for those whose job it is to do the publics work and to get that information out, including, of course, elizabeth and her colleagues. You mentioned some of the challenges. Part of the solution to that was sort of dogged use of mdr requests, to the extent that i could and to the extent that those came in time. I spent five years getting my phd, and that wasnt enough time for a great many of those requests to be completed. And im still waiting on some of those, and its been a couple years since i finished. Part of my approach with this book was to try to find backdoors. And, of course, that was applicable to the russian case, where some of the eastern bloc nations, especially east germany and czechoslovakia and ukraine, provide a real wealth of scholars, material for scholars, who want that eastern bloc perspective, but who may be cant get it in russia. I have to stress that the russian archives right now are extraordinarily open. The amount of material you can get now in moscow is pretty spectacular in terms of things which had been open for only a brief amount of time in the 1990s, were closed down in the sort of midyeltsin years, and have now been opened back up. I certainly made use of some of that in this book. Im working in those materials now for another project. So, where that led me was, indeed i want to talk about the reversal and then i want to talk about imf, which i think is the other thing mary has charged me with. The reagan reversal story makes a lot of sense, right . Because if we focus, as a lot of the key works which put forward this argument did, if we focus on the public elements of this, thats absolutely what you see. You get evil empire speech, mid1983. Late1982, you have the westminster speech. Communism, history. Theres a lot of harsh rhetoric. And then it really does change quickly. Where i sort of deal with the reagan reversal thesis is by saying, ok, what else is going on here, what else is actually happening under the hood, if you will, of american policy. Thats where, to me, the picture becomes a lot more complicated. On the one hand, some of the catalysts that have been put forward as having catalyzed this reversal looked different to me using international archival sources. The alleged near miss of nuclear war, for example. Also a lot of internal political bureaucratic policy elements. Also, what is actually happening. Reagan didnt just decide, for example, in january, 1984, that he wanted to talk to the soviets. He decided that back in the mid1970s. The same time he was for political reasons lambasting gerald ford for doing it and then lambasting jimmy carter for doing it, he was also saying publicly that we need to find a way to talk with them and make progress on matters of mutual interest. Reagan starts singing this tune in the 1970s. In the 1980s, he starts implementing it quite quickly. In the book, i highlight an episode in berlin where the Reagan Administration maintains a very sustained back channel dialogue between the u. S. Ambassador to the federal republic of germany, west germany, and the soviet ambassador to east germany, to the german democratic republic. The former, reagans appointee, shows up. He says Ronald Reagan sent me here to use this as a forum for discussion, for conversation, to try to keep the cold war under control, to keep it cold. He is not really a reversal, but a shift in emphasis. Its a shift in emphasis from more of the buildup, and its important to stress here, whatever reagans lionization, in 1982, he is not american optimism personified. He is the opposite. He is so pessimistic. The soviets had us beat in strategic arms come people on his team were saying. Theyve had us beat forever in conventional forces in europe. We are in big trouble here, folks. Then you have stagflation, the demoralization of the american public, etc. As the u. S. Situation improves, reagan is far more confident and his advisors are more confident. Ambassador matlock, who we are privileged to count as a colleague here at duke, but also george schulz, who pushed this agenda forward of doing more overt, as opposed to covert engagement. Thats how i think about it. To me, this is also, if i can say as someone who not only teaches history, but teaches strategy, this is good strategy. Good strategy is responsive to changing realities, whether thats at home or abroad. Good strategy is interactive, in a sense. What reagan calls quiet diplomacy it bears fruit and he keeps doing it. Your question about imf and nato, i think, such an interesting one, because it shows how much more is going on in this period than just the superpowers. That is a Civil Society question, too. Imf, especially in the early1980s, is an extremely fraught subject. Some of the greatest protests are over the imf issue, especially in germany, which is going to be the home of two ballistic missiles. Theres questions about whether italy, belgium, the netherlands, will even accept the deployment of nato Nuclear Weapons on their territory, at that military installation there. This is the era of the womens peace camp, of cmd, of a whole universe of peace organizations, not only in western europe. Its important to stress, theres also a robust east german peace movement. Indeed, in western europe, funded in part by the soviet union or by the east germans. Often, the east germans were the conduit for the cash and for the various forms of support, but not made up of communist sympathizers. Made up of people who were really worried about inviting Nuclear Attack on their homes with the presence of these weapons. Thats not a uniquely european phenomenon. Look at the midwest. The minutemen. Those who lived around the minutemen ranchers and things , like that, have great concerns about living next to a giant bullseye, so to speak. The soviets see this as a really useful opportunity. Thats why they are putting a lot of money and effort into trying to drive a wedge. They can call into question whether or not the military element of the nato alliance, a military alliance, is actually viable. This strikes a lot of people in the kremlin as a really valuable opportunity to try and call into question some of the ancient, the old cold war issues. Will the United States really trade new york for paris . Berlin . Go for west imf to break nato is appealing to the soviets. It is cheap in the grand scheme of the ways you can test natos viability. Certainly when the west german bundestag finally votes to accept the pershing iis, this is a big setback for the soviets. In november of 1983, there is a if you do that without giving us a heads up. Is a key part of that story. Thank you for those questions. Thank you. Incredibly pleased to be here and discuss this amazing new book. Been working on this project for a long time. I cannot talk enough about the depth of archival research, all the archives you went through, makes this book shine and shows us what you can do, looking at archives and digging around in places that you may not think you are going to find something allows you to get the nuances of these stories on the superpowers during this period. I do need to start with my disclaimer, these views are mine, not of the u. S. Government, and my comments are going to be based solely on declassified and publicly available materials. Now that that is out of the way, like simon, i have worked with these characters and documents and in these archives for far too long and lived with these people and their decisionmaking and how they work is fascinating, but simon has done us a Great Service by filling an enormous gap in this literature. This book starts with gorbachev in 1985, goes to 1991, how gorbachevs reforms impacted what happened in 1991. As simon shows us with this book, in this period, the current of these events where there. I know well from my work in the office with my colleague who completed the other reagan volumes, we see the documentation of reagan reaching out, talking to the soviets, trying to open this dialogue, but it is behind the scenes, it is not public. In public, you get rhetoric about the evil empire, how the soviet system did not work and would not function. This is all in public. The behindthescenes that shine through in simons book. To me, it is in the title, engaging. That was throughout this entire narrative. Behindthescenes, we see the secretary of state talking to the soviet ambassador. We see ambassador hartman in moscow engaging with his soviet counterpart when possible. We see schultz meeting on the fringes of u. N. Meetings, any other international meetings. They are trying to find a way to communicate, trying to open this dialogue. In one of simons footnotes i found it entertaining to put this in a footnote a reminder that neither superpower should allow strong rhetoric for domestic consumption to influence international relations. That encapsulates what this book is about. In public, we may say things, but behindthescenes, we are trying to figure out a way to make this relationship more fruitful at engaging with each other. Why this is happening is what is important and where simon shines through with his analysis. He explains to us that the soviet union needed the breathing space. I enjoyed your analysis of how they were behindthescenes running things. I would love for you to talk more about that. It is how these leaders were making decisions to engage, to give the breathing space they needed, because they recognized that reagan and the u. S. Were economically on better footing, so to get where the soviet union needed to be to improve its economic situation, they were going to have to cooperate with the u. S. Once we get gorbachev on, this changes dramatically and gorbachev is more wellpositioned to make this happen. The other think i think simons book does is put this in a global context. It tells the story of the u. S. And soviets and how they were trying to engage but also talks about the allies on each side, how leaders were meeting with u. S. Officials, how u. S. Officials were meeting with people and east germany, people were meeting in london, people were trying to talk. I thought it was interesting and i wish we had more of that but i believe that was an issue of space and try not to write too long a book. I think you do an excellent job of leaving in the dramatic events and issues, especially 1983 was tumultuous, the imf missiles being deployed. What is in it for either side to keep talking . You dove into that and that is where this book provides an excellent analysis. This has not been studied enough until now. My two questions i will start with, if you mentioned that within each government, the soviet and u. S. Governments, there are factions who do not want to engage of the soviets and do not want the soviet leadership to engage with the u. S. This comes out in the book. I am wondering if you could flesh that out and talk about these sections and how reagan is able to push down people like michalski and weinberger and make them realize that he is serious about talking to the soviets, and the same thing from the soviet side. I think we need to know more about the soviet strategy, what they are trying to do. I think more discussion of that would be interesting. Also, i think, what policies laid the foundation for gorbachev that maybe we under appreciated, that we are not thinking enough about, and did you have one or two ideas that they started that gorbachev was able to deal with . I have more questions but i will stop there for now and just say that i enjoyed reading this book. The footnotes and archival use is incredible and thank you for writing it, and i will look forward to a discussion with all of these amazing participants. Christian simon . Simon thanks so much. With an eye on the clock, im going to not get as full an answer as i could to those excellent questions. Let me make the following brief remarks. I too wish that there had been more on the allies in here and in order to scratch that itch, im writing an International History of the warsaw pact, but that will be a little bit of time coming, but im looking forward to using some of the material that was on the cutting room floor for this project to drive that project, or at least part of it. On the faction issue, this is such an important element, because not only at the time in a lot of government, except for those parts which were intensely focused on kremlinology, but also in the popular perceptions of the soviet union then and now, it is a monolith. Even the phrase evil empire denotes there being an emperor who runs the show. What i found for this period and for so many other people who have done work on the soviet union before me and after me find that it is more complicated than that. In fact, i can probably answer both your questions by talking about people within the kgb but also within the central committees International Department who had a strong sense that all was not well. There is a wonderful memoir by the head of the analytical section of the kgb who talks about defections, and not highprofile defections, but young kgb officers probably on their first postings who have gone through the ideological vetting, get to the west, then say, you know, this is for me. That is the information that a lot of other people in the leadership are not seeing. This tells me something about where we are. The answer i will give to the policy is the fostering of his coterie they called themselves the freethinkers. The creation of an environment in which they could come closer to speaking truth to power than anyone could elsewhere in the soviet union. Who is the most famous . Gorbachev. Who comes into office with a keen understanding of the full picture of the soviet unions problems, that is why i argue he is willing to go further than anyone else was. Others understand this. I am glad you mentioned the inclusion. One of my mentors as a graduate student always described me as americas preeminent poroshenko revisionist and i dont know he meant it as a compliment. I see a lot of interesting i would not say policy innovations, because a lot of what he is doing is going back to the playbook, but he is aware of the problems and in some ways, he turned to older solutions. There is a power struggle going on around him and some of these efforts are confounded. The fact that his kidneys dont work also confounds some of these efforts. In the United States, George Schultz is such a key figure because he is a skilled political operator, but he can also deliver results. When makowski and weinberger are trying to stymie these efforts, not only can schultz go around in the bureaucratic labeling, but he comes back with a win, he consistently, and that is very meaningful in terms of shaping american policy. So i see those as the key elements here. And shoko does introduce certain economic policies which figure in some ways. Given his kgb background, he is more reticent about touching it. Gorbachev is an innovator in that regard. He opens an establishment, a precedent. Andropo could say, we need to change this, this is not working, without undermining the system. Gorbachev takes that and ones with it and does damage to the system. That is an observation. That is a key element also of that. But thank you for your generous comments and for those questions. Christian thanks so much. We are quickly getting to the q a session and i do want to give the audience a chance to chime in. I know, mary, you have to run. Is there anything on your mind that you would like to ask simon . Otherwise, i will see if elizabeth has another question. I know you have to run. Anything urgent . Mary i only wanted to say by the way, the photo behind me is the reagan ranch, which i pulled up in honor of professor miles visit. I would like to encourage everyone to vote. Am i allowed to do that . [laughter] christian is there an election coming up . Mary simon, you have an amazing crowd. I know you have not been able to scroll through the attendees like i have. I think we should go to the audience as soon as possible because there is depth of expertise out there. Christian thanks, mary. Elizabeth, i will try to weave you in later in the conversation. Simon, if you could be a little more concise, that would allow us to accommodate more questions. We have focused on making acceptable the soviet side. I would love for you to talk about you mentioned the u. S. Side, the difficulties there. I think it is important for you to talk about the russian and other documentation and to what extent it goes beyond what has already been uncovered and published in recent years, especially for the gorbachev period, where we are seeing a lot new work coming out. Secondly, if you could talk more about both sides, especially the gorbachev factor. The competition, which strikes some people as reductionist interpretation of what gorbachev was about and a qualitative difference that the world. With this soviet leader. If you could respond to that, because i think that is one of the major arguments in the book, at least indirectly, that you make. Simon happily, christian. I will try to do so briefly, though you make that hard by asking me to talk about all the wonderful archival materials under those hospices. Auspices. Let me do my best to answer both in a brief manner. There was an enormous amount of material in russia that i have. Mary mentioned some of the slowness of declassification at the reagan library. There is a lot of material you can get from the russian side from the russian state archive of contemporary history in moscow where the american side is still classified. I humbly submit no one should be happy about that status quo. In my interactions with folks in the u. S. Government, it is a point i like to make and i cite the specific episodes. My approach was to basically build on a Network Understanding of how alliances work. Even if you accepted the most topdown interpretations of what the warsaw pact was, and i dont and i try to argue against a lot of that in this book in order to tell someone what to do, you still need to tell them what to do. You need to explain what they are supposed to say, supposed to do, supposed to think. That leaves a paper trail. That gives us access to the thinking in moscow, even if only as distilled and packaged for the consumption of their allies. Sometimes, it gives us access to stories that have not been told before. I mentioned the berlin back channel. I have never seen explicit american documents about this. I have seen some materials from papers which, if you know about it, makes more sense in that context, but i have never seen the american side of this, nor have i seen the russian original side. I came across a purely by accident, all of this in the east german archives translated from russian into german. That is the promise, to me, of this approach to research. As you said, an approach which is so deeply connected to the work that the Wilson Center and International History project have been doing. On gorbachev, i could talk for a long time about this, so let me just make the point this might sound cryptic but i dont mean it to be. The gorbachev of 1989 is a different gorbachev than the gorbachev of 1985. For better or worse, i think for better, this book ends with gorbachev of 1985. There are evolutions in his thinking. I would argue that some of those have been skillfully packaged in the past as being pure, liberalminded policy shifts, but at the time were very much driven by needs. In particular, the needs for anything approaching a diplomatic win, even if it was just the successful conclusion of the summit, because things were going poorly at home. The gorbachev of 1985 almost immediately after coming into power excoriates the United States for caring about human rights. I talk about that in the fifth chapter. It jumps off the pages, i would not say that about my own. His real frustration with hypocrisy about human rights is different from the gorbachev of 1989. That is where im going to leave it. Thank you. I am not a specialist in the 1980s, so take this question as an outsiders engagement with your engagement with the subject. If i hear you correctly, the impression that one gets quite clearly, or at least i got clearly, is that the first half of the decade successfully laid the foundations for american success in the second half of the decade and there is something a way in which you portray quite positively the Reagan Administrations approach of dealing with the soviets. Then there is a paragraph that you have in the introduction about what you dont cover in the book and you say that, thinking holistically about reagans Foreign Policy, moving past the partisan rhetoric, the failings cannot be ignored no matter the success. And there are failings on american policy in central america. With the contras, the sandinistas, the Human Rights Violations in el salvador. Could you bring those back into the picture . Reagan is pursuing his grand strategy in the first half of the 1980s, he is beginning to lay waste to central america. If he could bring that into the picture and how does that temper if you had twice the number of pages, how would that factor in . Simon it is a critical question and of course, you did not mention this, but there is a conversation to be had on domestic policy as well. I think a lot of this story, holistically, as you rightly say, have to do with Ronald Reagans leadership style, or as we can term it, lack thereof. Reagan was a bad manager. You can regularly read in internal memos, everyone walking out of a meeting believing they had been given the green light to do whatever they want to do by the president. Which, if you know what they are talking about, is impossible because it is predicated on the other when not being allowed to go forward, so people are taking a live license, then we see, for example, the irancontra scandal, taking a lot of liberties, to put it extremely, extremely mildly. So reagan was very focused on the u. S. Soviet question. Part of the reason i feel i can get away with this focus is that it mirrors the present and this is the policy issue, the Foreign Policy issue in particular, which has his fingerprints the most on. Latin america is beyond a tragic story of american policy and it was allowed to become that by the vicious cycle of a degree of indifference on the part of reagan, but an overall ideological tenor which he sets which says that fighting communism is a good thing. A lot of aides in regional or functional roles say, i want to fight communism and im going to do that in latin america because that is my purview. Then there is the element of the proximity and the thinking in a lot of American Government circles at the time, and this is not unique to the Reagan Administration, that there is more room for maneuver because latin america, the United States backyard, the feeling that what is acceptable there things are acceptable they are which might not be acceptable elsewhere. In a bigger book, this might feel like a less positive book about the Reagan Administration because those failings are serious and they absolutely matter, which is why i try to acknowledge them in the introduction. I am a believer in responsibility in the fact that the person whose name is on the shop bears responsibility, but when it comes to where reagan is involved, on a lot of issues that are not u. S. Soviet relations, he takes a backseat. One of the challenges of writing this book, you look through National Security Council Minutes and the president is almost absent sometimes. It is in other, smaller meetings, the meeting after the meeting, etc. , where he makes his views known, and latin america is not just this does not excuse anything, but it is one of the cases where you see some of this playing out with disastrous consequences. Thank you for that question. That is an important element. Christian lets go to audience questions. First, i would like to call on an ambassador. Please unmute yourself. That was a thoughtprovoking discussion. I want to make some brief points, firstly about [inaudible] the second point, the whole policy of carrots and sticks goes back well before reagan. Thirdly, i think it goes to the question which was mentioned at the beginning, i think that perception the americans had in the 1980s was matched among the russians. I think not enough [inaudible] the question of how the players perceive the situation as well as what the situation actually is. [indiscernible] one soviet after another saying, this is not working. A lot of people gave sophisticated input trying to deal with the problem of that. So when gorbachev arrived, he was arriving well prepared. [indiscernible] a very stimulating discussion. Christian thanks very much. Simon, would you like to respond to that . If not simon the point is well taken about this. Reagan is not the first person to implement such an approach. Your reference is spot on. If you do read the book, you will find the reagan spin on that approach and on the russian perception, which you rightly raised, is so critical to all of cold war history. Christian let me call next on william hill. Please unmute yourself. Can you hear me . Christian yes. Thanks very much for a fascinating presentation. I have not read the book, i look forward to going through it. I witnessed a number of the things that you described and analyzed in it from a junior position to be sure. I have one short comment and one question. I am not sure that the nonchanging aspects of the background are fully appreciated in more popular histories of the soviet union, in particular before he moved over to the kgb as head of the International Department of the central committee, where he has assembled a cast of analysts, many of whom appear later as architects. I just wonder to what extent you dealt with that aspect. I am wondering to what extent you find changes in personnel had influence on the direction and development of u. S. Policy towards the soviet union. We dont get George Schultz until a couple years into the administration. Reagan starts out with a chief National Security advisor on russia and later moved to matlock, quite different approaches and different experiences in dealing with the soviets. I wonder to what extent that does that. Simon thank you. Let me answer as briefly as i can. The former kgb background, absolutely critical. I ranked that as one of the most important things he does, bringing this coterie around him, which is the kernel of the team in 1985 and onwards. I think that is critical and i do also agree with you that he is the specter of the kgb. I think it can be overplayed in terms of what is policy views are. He is the loudest voice against intervention in poland in the 1980s, vice his policies towards prague and hungary. Personnel is key and i can talk for a long time about this so i will simply say, the arrival of people like George Schultz and matlock who are in step with how reagan thought about the cold war, how he thought about the soviet union is vital in enabling the president and others around him to execute on this strategy successfully. I give a lot of credit to matlock, to George Schultz, also to george h w bush, who is a strong voice in this camp during the tough battles, including richard price, who is not totally opposed to this but does not want to go as far as reagan himself. So thank you for those two points. Christian thank you. If numbers of the audience could introduce themselves briefly by name and affiliation, if you like, that would be helpful. My audio is working. Thank you for letting me ask a question and thank you for the presentation. I have not read the book yet but i will. I took part in some of the demonstrations you talked about. Why did the reagan People Choose the back channel diplomacy while using this extreme rhetoric . The arms buildup was another part of that policy, which we saw as dangerous. We, so many in europe and the u. S. , would not want to support the Reagan Administration and were skeptical of what it wanted to do. Through some other things you said, did reagan have this big strategy, that a blueprint to end the cold war . It sounded like you were talking about this, Something Like a grand strategy. Thank you. Christian thank you. Question about the grand strategy. Simon as someone who teaches a course on grand strategy, i should add a question mark to the title. Why choose the quiet diplomacy and overt on diplomatic statements . I think the basic answer is the Reagan Administration did not feel in the early 1980s that they were in a position that they could turn that diplomacy into success. There is a strong feeling that they dont want to talk for talkings sake, that they are going to do something big, like a summit, that there needs to be actual results. They felt that at this point, they would not be able to get the result that they wanted out of them. That is why they focus on the hairraising rhetoric and military approach, but that also gives leverage. The investments in things like accurate nuclear missiles, we can see how that benefits the u. S. Bargaining position later on in the imf treaty. Reagan did not have a blueprint to end the cold war because he did not think it was going to end in his lifetime. At the beginning of his administration, there is a consensus that the soviet union would probably be around for another 60 years. There was no sense that reagan was going to be alive to witness the end of the soviet union. Of course, he was wrong on that. Rather than seeing this as a blueprint to end the cold war, i would say it was a blueprint to reduce cold war tensions on american terms. American comparative advantage visavis the soviet strategy reducing the levels of nuclear armaments. I described reagans strong personal views, nuclear abolitionism if you will, which is something he very much wanted to realize. It is not so much a blueprint to end the cold war or when the cold war, win the cold war, but it is a mindset of how to deal with the challenge posed by the soviet union in ways that favor american interests. Thank you for those questions. Christian next, we go to john. I think i am unmuted now. I am trying to figure this out. Your pronunciation of my name was very good. I am a University Professor emeritus at the university at chicago and i wanted to ask, what role did the Solidarity Trade Union in the 1980s, what influence did that have on soviet thinking . Christian thank you. Simon solidarity is a critical element of this history, of course. On one hand, it certainly is instructive to the soviets about the real problems that they have, not only in their own country, but in the warsaw pact about increasing dissatisfaction with the status quo. We know that gorbachev really does not view the warsaw pact leaders fondly at all. At one of their funerals, he brings them together and says, you are basically on your own. We are not going to be intervening. But i would say that the key issue is that it shows the possibility, the many soviet leaders, especially in the military, look back on the soviet nonintervention at the behest of people, the nonintervention in polish affairs is the deathknell. It opens up the range of possibilities for action by a lot of leaders. No one really is willing to go as far as 1989 so quickly, but it is pivotal. I think we can see a degree of the emboldenment based on soviet nonaction. Christian we will go next to james. Please unmute yourself. There we go. Yes, thank you for the presentation. I wanted to focus on the last year of the administration. You spoke about the evolution of policy and you see it much as i did in my one book on the subject. I want to focus on personnel. In that last year of the administration by the accounts of several people, the senior officials for the administration are getting together to make decisions without reagan. I think a quote was, he was past the point of being in the system to prevent something from happening. In some ways, he might be vastly more detached, and on the other hand, you have a vigorous debate that leads to the paws of the next administration, a vigorous debate on is gorbachev just another soviet leader or does he represent Something Different . Schultz is the plan advocate. The question is, how much do you find that reagan is himself participating in that debate or stealing that debate, or is he leaving it to others . Christian thank you. Simon i find a very active reagan on this issue. Part of this goes back to the comments i made in response to erics point about the Bigger Picture and there are a lot of cases where reagan allows bureaucrats not bureaucrats, they are political appointees to exercise initiative with disastrous consequences. So i dont see it as that simple and i would say that the soviet union issue was to reagan, at this point in particular, when there is a summit on the horizon, the key issue. On the nature of the soviet union, this is one, he is doing what matlock called soviet union 101. He is doing lengthy seminars with discussion papers talking about not just the nature of the new leader but the nature of the soviet union. On the nature of the new leader, reagan writes a memo with his own thoughts on this in october of 1985, he dictates a memo with his thoughts on the matter, in which, again, we see the evolution from 1985 to 1989. They can is saying, the soviets would not have let this guy be in charge if they thought he was going to give away the farm, so obviously, he is a skilled political operator within the soviet context and he is committed to the soviet cause, perhaps reagan says the communist cause. So reagan is on the record on this debate and at this point, he is saying, gorbachev, there are some things that make him look more appealing, also things that make them more dangerous. This is a guy who can do pr, this is a guy who is sort of glamorous but also engaging and personable, which you cannot necessarily say so this is dangerous. What makes him new makes him a better advocate for his ideology. Reagan is very involved in this. He is actively engaged in this question, he is producing policy documents on this issue. His views change, though. Over the course of the 1980s, his views change on gorbachev. At this early time, he is in the thick of it. Christian i want to give elizabeth a chance. Let me bring in two questions that came to us through the email. One is from philip brown, interesting that the archives are open these days, given the example of paul whelan, american president in russia. Secondly, a question by brad morris, how do you evaluate the significance of reagans attempt to impose sanctions on the western allies regarding the pipeline with the soviets . Also, was reagan abandoning this plan . Simon let me answer the first question with a no. No i am not unaware of any of those issues, i have nothing but nice things to say about the archivists and other folks at the moscow archives. That being said, i do take care to comply with all the visa rules, etc. The pipeline, fascinating issue, kind of apropos of marys earlier question about imf because this is a key source of tension where on one hand, you have this perhaps as a canadian this typical american extra territoriality on the dealings of other countries, which turns around and bites the Reagan Administration. In particular, margaret thatcher, who is generally perceived as reagan closest ally, she is probably his harshest critic on the siberian pipeline issue. That is another key obstacle to challenge to nato cohesion. It does not portend well for the imf issue. On one hand, it is seen as american overreach and to many people, american arrogance, and on the other hand, because the United States cant get its allies on board, and this is frustrating to the Reagan Administration, but reagan in particular backed down to a certain extent on this issue in order to preserve the stability and solidity of the alliance and not subject it to a less necessary stress test than deploying cruise missiles. Christian elizabeth, any followup questions, short questions, since we have a number of questions collating . Elizabeth i dont, im going to let you keep going with the audience, but im apologizing to simon. The documentation in these two volumes will marry well with everything simon has written about and provide more context. Look for them soon on the internet. Christian thank you. Question by email. How accurate was the early 1980s cia estimate on the fragility of russias economy in pushing reagans Economic Warfare . Did it empower those who believed a resolution of the cold war was possible as opposed to those who thought the ussr would continue for much longer . Simon the issue of the soviet economics performance is a book in and of itself. One thing i was struck by, especially in the early 1980s, was the sense that capitalism was in crisis, right . That does not mean that people were looking to the soviet union, the soviet model, but there is a great oped in the New York Times in 1979 which is called, japan, return the favor and occupy us. There is a lot a publications at this time, including, if you can get your hands on one of the original versions of paul kennedys book, the cover art tells the story of the United States on the decline and japan coming up behind it. Not communism, socialism, but a more significant role for the government in managing the economy was seen by many people as a strength, not as a weakness or liability. I think that colors a lot of the interpretations of people like reagan and how they interpret, how they orient themselves through cia estimates, which are on one hand telling a bad story about the soviet economy, but on the other hand, Ronald Reagan is saying, we are in the worst Economic Disaster this country has seen since the great depression. It is easy to look back on the late 1980s and think that that is the economic climate, but early 1980s, you are talking about a recession, barely gotten out of stagflation, the memory of panic at the pump is a fresh one, and that is when policymakers read these memos saying things are bad in the soviet union, many are saying camacho, but we think they can recover from that in a way out of recovery our economy might not be able to, and things are not so great here. Christian thank you. I want to see if we can get three more questions real quick in one after another and then give simon a final chance to respond before eric will wrap up todays event. Please unmute yourself. Brief question. Hi, everybody. Thank you for the presentation. It is very much in quincy and with the views that i have about this issue. I have not seen the book yet but i will. I am happy there is a book based on more documents. The other thing is a comment on [indiscernible] i perceive the comment as you believe in 1985, gorbachev spoke about nonintervention. I dont agree with that if that is your point because my position is different. It was the summer of 1988 when the soviets gave up the idea of intervention. Then the question is about the fbi. What was the role of fbi . It has been documented for a long time now, how gorbachev was begging reagan to give up on the idea of fbi and reagan said no. Christian appreciate it. Please unmute yourself. A brief question. I have read the book so i want to ask you to talk more about the relationship between reagans strategy and reagans doctrine. Thank you. Christian thanks. Please unmute yourself. George schultz in his memoir said that the day pershing to arrived in germany was the equivalent of dday for the Reagan Administration. One of reagans iconic moments was what he said in berlin, mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall. This was arguably not a message to mr. Gorbachev so much as an effort to influence many other audiences, so i would like any comments you would have on the Public Diplomacy effort during the 1980s to make the imf issue compatible for resolution, given the fact that european governments had assigned on, more or less, to this decision in 1979, but they had domestic opposition. Any comments on the role of Public Diplomacy on the imf issue. Christian thank you very much. We are past our time, so simon, a quick response, you probably dont have time to respond to each question individually, and hopefully the conversation continues afterwards. Simon let me briefly say, on gorbachev about the eastern block being on their own, i dont think that they necessarily take seriously, the leadership of the warsaw pact countries, but i think gorbachev means it seriously. Even get your hands on a copy of the book, you can see the reference to the russian archives where i get this information from. On the economy, it is critical. It is critical because early in the reagan term, he needs to focus on the economy. That is the big issue. It is not Foreign Policy. This is something that makes a lot of eastern block policymakers welcome his election, which is a counterintuitive aspect of what we know happens later, but many people in the check Slovakian Ministry say, he is going to focus on the economy, he is not going to nail us on human rights like jimmy carter. That is critical and that economic strength and the recovery emboldens the ship from covert to overt diplomacy, which i talked about earlier. Especially Public Diplomacy, when it comes to imf, it is undeniable that there were not good at it. They sent out William Buckley, whose job it is to bring everybody on board, and he comes back and he is not persuaded that he has succeeded. That is not William Buckley the conservative pundit, this is a state official. Not very successful. Overcome by quiet especially with u. S. And nato allies, a critical aspect. Thank you. My thanks to you, simon, elizabeth, and mary. Over to you for final words. My thanks to you as well as those posing questions on the audience. Announcer you are watching American History tv all weekend every weekend on cspan3. Next on the presidency, National Portrait gallery Senior Historian Gwendolyn Dubois shaw provides an overview of the every eyew exhibit, is upon me first ladies of the United States. 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