Want to thank the commentators and everyone for assembling this deeply honor especially to be giving the William Roger lewis in the flesh. We were on the state Department Committee suffering through a lot of bows and arrows back in the decade prior, and i got to know him well and i feel really honored to give a lecture that is in his name. This book came about and so many of you, my friends, have heard this origin story. This came about because lewis liked the review i had done and mentioned the series that helen was doing that would use my biography to teach history that would pick biographical topics or would use a representative biography to get a broader subject of history. They had just published their first volume. It was on pocahontas. And issues regarding native American History, they were looking for somebody to do something on foreign relations, he offered me the opportunity to put together the perspectives. These were supposed to be short and concise books, that was the idea that, and the topic i debateds and consulted with some people about which biographical figure might serve that purpose of the american context, and i kept coming back to Henry Kissinger. Such a long career in foreign relations. Even though im not born in the u. S. , his career really represent something about 20th century american power. When i did get the chance to tell kissinger that this was the goal of the series, a short and concise book, using him as a prism to look through foreign relations, he looked at me and said, but you will leave things out. I do leave things out. I dont cover everything in the book but it is not a short and concise as i had hoped. It got longer. It was even longer when i submitted the manuscript and had to cut 25 . There are lot of things that be left out. I think another question that i have heard, there are two other kissinger books that have been published this year, why another book on him . That is a legitimate question. To the extent i make a scholarly contribution, i am trying to write the book to reach a broader audience and reach scholars, the central argument is to look at kissinger in any way. Most accounts, most look at him as a Foreign Policy intellectual whose advocacy helped the u. S. A realistic Foreign Policy and that was geared towards the promotion of American Security and interests, and interests are defined narrowly. That is the usual approach to kissinger. I do not think that is incorrect but it is incomplete. What my book seeks to do is to look at kissinger as a political act, a politician. This was an insight that i got from a comment from the French Foreign minister who commented that he thought kissinger was far more of a politician then he acted the. I think the basis of this is to understand, this is the way in which history of american Foreign Policy we have to understand that it is fundamentally determined by the struggles and battles of domestic politics. Germans would call it this is the goal that i want to. Convey in looking at kendrick kissinger always portrayed himself some of you may have seen the interview he gave to mike wallace when he was talking about his book, even then he portrayed himself as someone above politics, independent and not be partisan. There was a original source of studying kissinger at it recorded the 1972 Republican National convention. At one point during the national convention, dan rather comes up to kissinger, asked him about the vietnam peace settlement in august of 1972, whether it will help president nixons chances in an election. Kissinger said, the president never talks to me about politics. We know this is nonsense. They understood political importance of Foreign Policy. The tapes combined the television material and other material, it gives insight into how nixon and kissinger approach Foreign Policy. The book is essentially although there is one chapter that tries to give the essentials of kissingers career and to talk about his connection to political ideas and thoughts before he becomes National Security advisor the book is essentially about his governmental career lasting from january of 1969 to january of 1977. In the second chapter, after a sloppy start, i entitle you cant lose them all. Things did not go well the early period of the nixon presidency. They organize what they call the trifecta or trifecta. They talked with the soviet union, the paris Peace Agreement and vietnam. Ultimately it would help contribute to the landslide electoral victory of Richard Nixon in 1972. There is a wonderful tape of a conversation when nixon calls kissinger up after kissinger has given his piece of hand press conference in october of 1972. Nixon calls kissinger up and says, henry has notice on all three networks. They were watching the Television News as well. He remarked, on all three networks there is an interesting story. Kissinger says, we have wiped mcgovern out. There is this political sensibility about their understanding of Foreign Policy that i think is something that i think is a large part of the first nixon term. Not to say that there arent other considerations, but it comes up in the discussion. It certainly is there. The next part of the book gets into, you might say, the happy period of nixon, but rather unhappy time for nixon but a successful time for Henry Kissinger. Nixon wanted to keep kissinger doing the same thing for the second term, the watergate would destroy his political credibility and power, and effectively reverse the roles, kissinger became the indispensable man. In 19731974, he was the most admired american, particularly for his role in the middle east, where he would play a role for settling the yom kippur war, but also in developing and negotiating the first agreements between israel and egypt and israel and syria. He was pursuing his own goals. Richard nixon had his own views, but kissinger could manipulate and avoid what nixon was talking about as he negotiated this engagement. Kissinger would become, after the syrian agreement went into newsweek, and they put him in a superman outfit. Of course what goes up must come down. Kissinger had a much more difficult final few years and the administration dealing with a much more Hostile Congress and investigation. Certain events and not go very well. Frustrations in the middle east, the soviet involvement. Questions about the frustrations with the peace treaty. Much of this also led kissinger into thinking and arguing that Foreign Policy needed the domestic Foreign Policy needed to be different. A quote from him in 1975. When he argued, in history we can either escape from the world we are dominated. We must conduct with flexibility, imagination in pursuit of our interest. We must be thoughtful and be prepared for the contingency. We must pursue limited objectives simultaneously. Kissinger, in some ways, in 1970 was attacked from the right and the left. From the right it was for insufficient anticommunism. From the left, insufficient attention to human rights issues. Kissinger by the end of the time in office is talking about the limit of what the United States can do and the necessity to recognize that. At the same time it was in kissingers on makeup. In his role as secretary of state he is pursuing initiatives for certain powers of the United States and the world. Henry, for all of the sensible limits, having to assert that power. I have a last chapter, which talks about kissingers retirement. At all think anyone thought that 53yearold Henry Kissinger would not be back in power in some form. There was the fear of president s, that he would outshine them or preempt their own authority, as he seemed to have done with gerald ford. The interesting thing about that chapter is i cannot really use the types of sources a historian would like to. I had a moment when my copy editor said, a there is another book you know there is another book in the slapped in this last chapter. Kissinger i dont think anyone thought in 1977 that kissinger would not be back and forth power in some form. And some form. And somehow they would preempt their own authority, he had done seemed to done that with general gerald ford, but i think also the interesting thing about that chapter is, i cant really have this to the sources as a historian would like to. I have a funny moment when my editor said you know theres another book in this last chapter. I felt like saying that maybe, but there will be a book that somebody from 50 years from now will write that when those materials are available. Kissinger did become, in the seventies and eighties and even into the 90s, the commentator on american Foreign Policy. He became almost a symbol, and an exercise or of american power. In the sense that side where i think i want to close here. Thanks very much tom, and we know have were fortunate to have a distinguished panel of experts and scholars, and colleagues and friends to provide some initial comments and some questions for tom and we want to set this up into actively, so i have asked our commentators to be short on praise and to really focus on a couple of key questions that will draw tom out some more, on the main arguments of the book. And we will start with, professor barbara keys the chair of the u. S. International history, in the university at the uk, she received her ph. D. From harvard, and author or editor of three books, including reclaiming american virtues. It was published by harvard in 2014. Dozens of articles and book chapters, including one entitled, Henry Kissinger the emotional statesman. Another one, the diplomats two minds. Constructing a Foreign Policy. Also diplomatic history, after finishing a book manuscript on torture and pains, since 1945, she is writing a book currently currently, on Henry Kissinger and. She has recent president , of the society of historians on american revelations. We are excited to have her with us. Barbara you have the floor. Thank you for having me, and we congratulate tom, on his major chief meant. And it occurred to me last night that for the field of u. S. Foreign relations history, writing a book about Henry Kissinger is a bit like climbing mount everest. There is a small but sizable number of people who, undertake the challenge and part because it is such a challenge. And one of the things that makes is a challenge is that there is such a large body of scholarship, and basically on kissinger. So among the various things that tom contributes to that literature, i want to briefly touched on two things than posed to questions. So the two things that stand up for me, about toms book are, first it really is quite brief. It may not look very brief, but he manages to cover the next years in about 200 pages. And that brevity is a hard thing to do well, to condense such a complicated and event filled period when there is so much going on. In so many different parts of the world, and to do it without over simplifying and losing nuance, its a terrific achievement. The second thing i think is useful about toms work, is that the last chapter he mentioned on kissinger, after 1977, and tom covers that extensively more so than other works and i can only think of one of the recent work that does that at all. And i think its really an important part of kissingers career. And i just want to say as an aside, one of the things that puzzles me is why it is that no enterprising journalist has as yet undertaken to write a book about kissinger, after 1977. There is so much say and even the sources are hard to find, i think they are there. Its not just that he was a media talking head, or an unofficial policy advisor but he was a businessman. The fact that we know so little about him as a businessman in the last 40 plus years, as the head of Kissinger Associates is s amiss in the understanding of our u. S. Negotiations. Particularly when it comes to china. But not explicitly. I have two questions for tom, they are both big pitcher questions, and i will say them both and then let tom respond. So the first is, obvious question its about the relationship between nixon and kissinger. Of course the big question for anybody who writes about kissinger, is the fact that when we assess his role we have to acknowledge that it was nixon, who was the president. Who made the ultimate decisions. In your conclusion tom, you write that kissinger was a dutiful agent, of nixon. And you suggest that kissingers role is really important both in providing intellectual framework, and the realist framework and in selling nixons policies, and i think you did a terrific job at outlining how well and how definitely kissinger cultivated the press to sell those policies. That suggests to me that your position is close to what john articulated 1994 when nixon reconsidered that she wrote that kissinger was a geopolitical follower than a leader. And its a contrast to jeremys assessment and jeremys book, that kissinger was im quoting a genius as a strategist. So tom, you portray him more as a tactician so i want to press you on this point in relation to the specific episodes that you cover and how you present them. I think there are a number of interesting points you make. Where you suggest that kissinger triggered nixons reactions in ways that kissinger, would then later regret. And kissinger played on nixons anxieties. Often to enhance his own power. So will take for example, the invasion of laos, but the south yet dummies forces, where kissinger played a key role and rogers, the secretary of state who i dont think anyone has ever written a single book, on rodgers. But rogers opposed in very present ways and is one example of the many times that kissinger pushed nixon in certain directions and typically, in many cases towards these force. So let me ask this question, is it not the case of policy makers that are never just dutiful agents, but rather advisers whose perspectives an analysis and support for opposition, to various policy sometimes also gives them causal responsibility for those policies. And particularly at certain moments, are there not times when kissinger does have a high degree of personal responsibility, and was in fact the decisive person. Or may have been the decisive factor. And i think you walked up to this conclusion a couple of times, and then always had a cabinet. Like there was also a National Security reason, for what kissinger was pushing. So my second question, is also a very big picture and im sure you fielded many questions along these lines over the years tom, and its about morality. And i think a lot about this quote, that jeremy pulled out during one of he pulled out for his book, Henry Kissinger and the american century. So what are your core moral principles . Kissinger answer to this i am not prepared to share that yet. Which is pretty remarkable considering that he is very happy to share opinions about pretty much anything so in your conclusion, you do fault kissinger for working against democracy in chile which you say undermined National Interest in 1970 to 1973 and you describe it as ignorant about argentinas dirty war. You also defend the bombing of cambodia and even were default kissinger in the case of argentina, your language is tepid. You say its hard to justify. The defense that you offer seems to be in part that everyone did what nixon and kissinger did, kennedy, eisenhower, wishing that america stayed in the cold war. But you also said that the claim that everything is justified because it was a cold war necessity, which is the argument ferguson makes it he said the argument is not very persuasive. Im not suggesting that what you needed to do to satisfy me here is not to offer a more vigorous condemnation of kissinger or a more robust defense, i can understand that you are trying to do either. To the extent that you wade into the debate, i was left uncertain about your position. Let me frame this in terms of this question. Do you think that kissinger had a moral compass . And if he did not, or if it was not well articulated, shouldnt we expect statesmen to health to have well articulated moral principles. Thank you for your excellent questions, that also draw that geographical setting up toms books. Excuse me. Im sorry. Still have a landline. These are hard questions, needless to say, and i guess i expect that. The Nixon Kissinger relationship, i do use the term dutiful follower. In that sense i do think the Foreign Policy in the first nixon years was nixons Foreign Policy. I think kissinger, to borrow the argument, i think he tuned himself into nixon and it advocates more forceful measures as he did on the korean shoot down of an american spy plane in 1969. I do think that is something about, particularly in the first years, in which kissinger did and often times to read nixon as a part of enhancing his own prestige and importance. Unlike the secretary of state it was a constituent of one president and i think kissinger was very aware of that. To a certain extent he did advocate policies that played into some of nixons own inclinations towards the use of force. Specifically on laos, i do think that was one where kissinger was persuaded that some type of use of force could strengthen the negotiating situation that was still and his memoirs was for that. How much responsibility . I think its there. I think that kissingers role on a number of these issues does give him a certain level of responsibility. Kissinger learned not to doubt himself. Kissinger loved to use the analogy of his life. Kissinger learned to follow that and also came to enjoy greater prestige and a better relationship with nixon because of that, i think kissinger had a moral compass. The older i get, the more reluctant i get. I am probably more reluctant to make that case. I think he did in some measure